
Urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods

unravelling the collaborative process between public and private parties <<



*“Cities have the capability of providing something for everybody,
only because, and only when, they are created by everybody”*

- Jane Jacobs

PREFACE

This document encompasses my master thesis for the degree course in Management in the Built Environment at the Delft University of Technology.

Studying at the faculty of Architecture and engaging in all different facets of the building sector, a great interest in cities has unfolded itself, and especially in the way they are developed. I currently live right next to the Delft central railway station; in an area that was completely transformed over the past years. When I first moved to Delft, the railway ran on a double track viaduct, an infinitely high staircase connected one train platform to the other and the above-ground bicycle parking space was constantly cluttered. Now, almost 7 years later, a modern, new train station has been put into use, the rail viaduct was replaced by two tunnels, the old station was redeveloped into a restaurant and cyclists can store their bike in one of two underground bicycle parking spaces. The freed up space above ground is still under development. Looking out of the window, I am amazed by the ongoing redevelopments and by the amount of cranes I see.

Simultaneously, I learned that Buitenhof, a post-war neighbourhood at the edge of Delft, suffers from the consequences of a declining liveability. As following from a study by Platform31, this neighbourhood is at risk of falling into decay due to increasing concentrations of vulnerable, low-income households. At the same time, the unilateral housing stock has not yet deteriorated to such an extent that urban renewal is seen as a priority. Therefore, in the short term, people-based policies are predominantly pursued, which aim to enhance the independence and self-reliance of people. Cautiously looking into the future, the municipality does aim for the neighbourhood to eventually be redeveloped. By the year 2040, the housing stock should be more diverse and residents should enjoy a pleasant, safe, attractive living environment they feel attached to.

It is precisely this contrast that has brought me to the subject of urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods. In my opinion, intending for residents to enjoy a physically pleasant living environment by the year 2040 is too vaguely defined and too far down the road. By then, the liveability in Buitenhof will have declined even further, resulting in an even stronger contrast to the newly redeveloped railway district. This study therefore aims to motivate public and private parties to get started today instead of in 20 years.

I could not have completed this graduation research without the extensive support of a number of people. First of all, I would like to thank my mentors, Erwin Heurkens and Gerard van Bortel, for sharing their invaluable expertise and enthusiasm, and for motivating and challenging me throughout the entire process. I would also like to thank my mentor from Rebel, Ewoud Dekker, for his positive encouragement and counselling. Many thanks as well to my other colleagues for their helpful and supportive input and for the work experience I was able to gain.

Moreover, I would like to thank all interviewees for their willingness to provide me with invaluable data and knowledge. I have very much enjoyed the pleasant conversations.

Finally, I would like to thank my dear friends and family for accompanying me during these challenging and enjoyable years. I am particularly grateful for the unconditional support of my parents, who have always encouraged me to follow my instincts.

Liesbeth van Walsum
Delft, June 2019

SUMMARY

Cities are seen as important drivers of economic growth and more than ever, today's cities are the incubators of economic renewal (PBL, 2016). The negative side of this celebrated triumph, however, is becoming more and more visible as well; reflected in an increased division between "good" and "bad" neighbourhoods (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Municipal policymakers, housing associations and social professionals have expressed their concerns about increasing concentrations of vulnerable target groups and the negative impact on liveability (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Problem definition

Housing stock diversification is considered to be the most appropriate long-term strategy for coping with liveability problems that arise in vulnerable neighbourhoods, since diversification can dilute the problems and strengthens the mutual self-reliance and neighbourhood cohesion (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018).

In practice, however, certain barriers to diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods are identified. These barriers largely relate to the recognition that the force field has fundamentally changed over the past years. The national government took a step back, wherefore the initiative for interventions at neighbourhood level must now come from the municipalities. Since the introduction of the new Housing Act in 2015, housing associations have mainly been focusing on managing their properties, and are less concerned with liveability issues at the neighbourhood scale (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Consequently, municipalities tend to expectantly look at new players who might financially support or reinforce the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, but market parties seem to rarely show an interest in such projects. In addition, a shared vision on the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods is often lacking, and the collaboration between performing parties is not always optimal (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Research goal and question

It is assumed that barriers to urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can largely be tackled by means of effective collaboration between public and private parties. Thereby, the determined research goal is *"to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods"*. This goal consists of three parts: (1) to understand the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment projects, (2) to analyse the currently administered course of action in vulnerable neighbourhoods, and (3) to identify effective forms of cooperation and management instruments specifically for that context.

Following from this goal, the main research question is as follows: *What forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods?*

In order to provide an answer to this main research question, a couple of sub-questions are formulated:

1. *How is urban area redevelopment organised?*
2. *How is urban area redevelopment managed?*
3. *How is urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods organised and managed?*

Research methodology and approach

Since this research largely focusses on concepts that cannot be quantified into numeral data, it can be characterised as qualitative. The first stage of the research focuses on developing theoretical concepts, which follow from a literature review on how urban area redevelopment is organised and managed. Those discoveries are joined together in a conceptual steering model in the context of urban area redevelopment, of which the main components – management tools, management resources, inter-organisational arrangements and management activities – provide a basis for the analytical case study model.

In the second stage of the research, the theoretical concepts are used to conduct and compare multiple case studies. Based on a range of criteria, the following urban area redevelopment projects were selected for this: Fruitbuurt North in Ondiep, Utrecht; Kleinpolder Southwest in Overschie, Rotterdam; Vermeerkwartier in the Schilderswijk, The Hague. Aiming to unravel the collaborative process between public and private parties, the empirical data is collected by means of semi-structured interviews with the main actors of each case. These findings are complemented with an external validation.

The final stage of the research focuses on translating the findings into a set guiding lessons for forms of cooperation and management instruments that are effective in urban area redevelopment specifically aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Results and conclusions

The results and conclusions are shared by means of concise answers to the sub-questions. Subsequently, an answer to the main research question is given.

1) How is urban area redevelopment organised?

Urban area redevelopment is organised and shaped through a network of multiple interdependent actors, who each bring in their own objectives and apply their own logics in a particular instance of time and space (van Bortel, 2016, p.64). On the neighbourhood scale, one can speak of Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations.

Public and private actors formally organise their cooperation in inter-organisational arrangements (Heurkens, 2012), which are informally established through interaction shaped by management activities. Different forms of cooperation can be discerned, as following from the three main network typologies: cooperative, coordinative, and collaborative, ranging from loose to strong relational connections (Keast et al., 2007). The different network types represent different purposes and different structural characteristics, and require different levels of trust and time to develop (van Bortel, 2016, p.61).

2) How is urban area redevelopment managed?

The concept of *steering* concerns the strategies and instruments actors use to influence the actions of other parties – and thus the cooperation structure – which have to be adapted to the characteristics of the network (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33). A distinction is made between management tools, resources and activities. Management tools refer to the public management role, whereby four municipal management goals were distinguished: shaping, regulating, stimulating and facilitating (de Hoog et al., 2014). Management resources are, in short, the three major means that represent material and knowledge power relations between actors: land, capital and knowledge (Daamen, 2010). Finally, by management activities, the process management activities negotiating, decision-making and communicating are meant, as central to the process of cooperation; the actual interaction between actors. These activities both precede as well as follow from the inter-organisational arrangements.

3) How is urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods organised and managed?

This question was answered by means of empirical research, by analysing what course of action is currently administered in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods. A comparison of three unravelled urban area redevelopment projects has clearly shown that *more than one road leads to Rome*.

The redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North in Utrecht was a *cooperative*, separated, individual development process, with independent goals and infrequent communication flows. By means of urban policies, visions, regional agreements, area prioritisation and spatial principles, the municipality of Utrecht has shaped the decision-making scope of the market players. The land-use plan had to be altered, as a result of which the municipality of Utrecht could exercise direct influence. The land was owned by the housing association. On the basis of one coherent plan, the portions of land that were intended for private sector developments were sold to an investor and a commercial developer. The commercial parties were thus not involved in the plan development. Each actor focussed on their personal plot of land, goals remained independent and relations were unstable.

The redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam was a *coordinative*, separated, individual development process with semi-independent goals and structured communication flows. The land – which was split into three sub-areas – was owned by the municipality, but since the municipal urban planning department struggled to come up with a feasible plan, it was decided to turn the public and private role division around by jointly making the developing parties responsible for the composition of one coherent urban plan. Thereby, the municipal role was mostly stimulating and facilitating. The process was structured by means of monthly steering group meetings, which focussed on rapid decision-making, the achievement of a shared sense of urgency and the fostering of personal relationships. Once a joint urban plan was established, the separate plots were redeveloped individually.

The redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague was a *collaborative* process, with joint decision-making, interdependent goals and thick communication flows. The municipal role consisted of regulating and facilitating management tools. The municipal project coordinator constantly monitored the process, consulted and contacted the required experts, and facilitated the spatial judicial course of action. The land was owned by the housing association. Aiming to diversify the housing stock, a tender was issued, on the basis of which the land was ultimately sold to a commercial developer. The land sale agreement was based on a minimum yield, a thorough risk assessment and adaptable programmatic volumes, which was thereafter optimised as much as possible. Consequently, goals were interdependent and the sense of collectiveness was strong.

What forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods?

Effectiveness is viewed in two ways. First, it is considered in relation to *realising objectives*, referring to the overall housing stock diversification aim. Secondly, effectiveness relates to *efficacy* (Dutch: voortvarendheid), with regard to the collaborative process, decision-making, adaptability and overcoming obstacles (De Leeuw, 2002). From the viewpoint of the former, the areas were all successfully, and thus effectively, redeveloped. From the viewpoint of efficacy, however, quite some areas for improvement were detected. In brief, it was concluded that the efficacy of the process becomes stronger when the relational connections and sense of collectiveness are strong as well.

Resulting from the generally weak economic, social and physical fabric, it was determined that effective forms of cooperation and management instruments for urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods must fundamentally be aimed at ways to actively contribute to the social value, enhance political awareness and attention, and decrease financial risks and uncertainty.

Following from the effectiveness aim within the vulnerable neighbourhood context, the importance of *mutual trust* and *a sense of collectiveness* became apparent. Efforts to achieve *strong connections* and a *shared sense of urgency* were therefore put central in the formulation of a set of guiding lessons. In order to establish a direct answer to the main research question – which asks for forms of cooperation and management instruments – these lessons are categorised into effective formal cooperation, effective informal cooperation, effective use of municipal management tools and effective use of management resources. This results in the following overview:

Effective formal cooperation [shaped by inter-organisational arrangements]

LEGAL & FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS	The formal cooperation structure should consist of a well thought-out foundation of financial agreements and risk management, supplemented by a joint urban vision with adaptable programmatic objectives
	<i>WHY: To establish strong connections and interdependent relations and goals on the one hand, whilst leaving room for possible alterations and optimisations on the other</i>
	<i>HOW: By stipulating agreements on profit and loss sharing, assessing the effect of market dependence and applying fixed volumes that offer room for slight programmatic changes</i>
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	A learning effect should be implemented in the organisational structure
	<i>WHY: To enable adjustments when necessary; contributing to both the project output as well as the efficacy</i>
	<i>HOW: By means of close process monitoring through regular steering group meetings and structural feedback sessions</i>

Effective informal cooperation [shaped by management activities]

COMMUNICATING & DECISION-MAKING	Attention must be paid to the management of expectations
	<i>WHY: To find common ground, to ensure that parties truly understand each other, and each other's interests, and to avoid friction and distrust</i>
	<i>HOW: By being open and transparent about what one is doing and aiming for, so as to enable the analysis of underlying motives</i>
NEGOTIATING	Actors should aspire wide-ranging, critical, substantiated negotiations
	<i>WHY: To develop negotiated knowledge, ultimately resulting in a well-conceived project focus</i>
	<i>HOW: By being critical, pragmatic and realistic about what is truly possible and by keeping each other alert with regard to the objectives</i>

Effective use of municipal management tools

FACILITATING	The municipal area manager must constantly be aware of and pay attention to the neighbourhood predicament
	<i>WHY: To enable central supervision in the redevelopment process and the playing of a linking role with respect to the establishment of a collective feeling of urgency</i>
	<i>HOW: By learning from the district council system: making sure that the municipal area manager acts as a connecting organ on the basis of constant insights into the neighbourhood predicament in terms of safety, social fabric, physical environment and liveability</i>
STIMULATING	Stimulating municipal contributions to the public space and flexible consideration regarding the social and economic complexity are vital
	<i>WHY: To incentivise and encourage developing parties</i>
	<i>HOW: By lowering land prices and planning costs for the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods so as to contribute to the required feasibility</i>
SHAPING/ REGULATING	The municipal urban planning department should leave sufficient room for market initiatives
	<i>WHY: For market assessments to be realistically based on the local circumstances, as related to the social and economic complexity and uncertainty affecting the development scope</i>
	<i>HOW: By only specifying guiding programmatic principles and a minimal yield, as opposed to a detailed ambition level (possibly with the aid of an independent consultant)</i>

Effective use of management resources

LAND/ CAPITAL	An organic approach/phasing should be pursued
	<i>WHY: To limit financial risks and to allow for anticipation on unpredictable, external influences</i>
	<i>HOW: By splitting up the land into different, comprehensibly sized sub-areas and by implementing one joint, coherent urban vision</i>
KNOWLEDGE	Standardised resident relocation procedures must be enhanced with locally relevant operations, and attention must be paid to an actively stimulated sense of belonging
	<i>WHY: To increase social value and economic quality</i>
	<i>HOW: By taking local conditions and interests into account and by building onto the overview that housing associations already generally have of the local circumstances</i>

Recommendations

Below, recommendations with respect to the implementation of these lessons in practice and recommendations for further research were distinguished.

Recommendations for practice:

- The guiding lessons should be perceived as a nudge in the right direction, as a helping hand; not as a complete strategy that in any case guarantees success.
- The guiding lessons are based on empirical findings from three urban area redevelopment projects in the Randstad area; projects taking place in other areas of the country might demand a different approach.
- The foundation of how to achieve the lessons should be seen as examples that followed from the case study findings and external validation. These could only to a certain extent be made specific, wherefore parties might prefer other (or additional) steering tactics in practice.
- The guiding lessons do not cover the entire urban area redevelopment spectrum. The successive development phases – initiation, design & feasibility, realisation, and operation – were not made explicit for instance. In practice, parties will thus encounter aspects that were not empathetically included in this research.

Recommendations for further research:

- In order to provide a more thorough substantiation for the social value of a diversified housing stock, further research should include the opinions of new and existing residents, and surrounding neighbours.
 - To increase the validity and generalisability of the lessons, more interviews should be conducted, a focus group should be organised, and additional case studies (preferably outside of the Randstad area) should be conducted.
 - It would be interesting to test the guiding lessons in practice, so as to enable adjustments that can improve the presented approach.
 - In a complementary study, it would be valuable to draw distinctive lessons for each development phase.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION

1. INTRODUCTION

This chapter firstly addresses the problem definition of the research. This will thereafter result in a research focus, a research question and deliverables. Lastly, the societal and scientific relevance are discussed.

1.1. Problem definition

The problem definition derives from the recognition that the force field around vulnerable neighbourhoods¹ has fundamentally changed over the past years. The national government took a step back, wherefore the initiative for interventions at neighbourhood level must now come from the municipalities. Since the introduction of the new Housing Act in 2015, housing associations have mainly been focusing on managing their properties, and are less concerned with liveability issues at the neighbourhood scale (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Consequently, municipalities tend to expectantly look at new players who might financially support or reinforce the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, but market parties seem to rarely show an interest in such projects. In addition, a shared vision on the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods is often lacking, and the collaboration between performing parties is not always optimal (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

1.1.1. *Rising urban inequality; spatial segregation*

Cities are seen as important drivers of economic growth (PBL, 2016). Currently, one even speaks of ‘the triumph of the city’ (Glaeser, 2011). More than ever, today’s cities are the incubators of economic renewal (PBL, 2016). However, the negative side of the celebrated triumph is becoming more and more visible as well, since not everybody profits from the economic growth. This partly relates to the changed relationship between the city and the countryside, but mostly to the economic inequality within cities (PBL, 2016). Inequality that is reflected in polarisation – the increasing differences between the privileged and the underprivileged – and in segregation – large concentrations of high-income/high-educated groups living separately from large concentrations of low-income/low-educated groups (van der Velden et al., 2018).

Municipal policymakers, employees of housing associations and social professionals have expressed their concerns about increasing concentrations of low-income groups and the influx of refugees and asylum seekers in such neighbourhoods (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). It is an ancient axiom that like attracts like. Within cities, high and low-income groups, and high and low-educated people each live in different areas (van der Velden et al., 2018). Highly educated people frequently live in the same neighbourhoods, have their children go to the same school and make little contact with the lower educated. People with a migration background often cluster together in larger cities and within those cities, they assemble in specific neighbourhoods and areas. The low-paid and unemployed also live closer and closer together and do not really mix with others (van der Velden et al., 2018). In this context, the division within cities – between “good” and “bad” neighbourhoods – and between city boroughs – city centre and suburbs – is expected to further increase over time. Professionals in the social field moreover recognise an increase in complex social problems (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Value judgement within a welfare state

Opinions and ideas regarding inequality and segregation are divided. The extent to which these developments are perceived as a problem concerns a value judgement, which depends on the normative perspective that is applied (PBL, 2016). After all, each human being is unique. As argued by de Vos (2015), each person is born with unique biological and genetic characteristics, and then grows up in an equally unique familial, cultural and social context. People are by definition different and therefore unequal (de Vos, 2015). In general, however, one can state that a one-sided focus on relative differences can obstruct the view of the development and position of low-paid groups. As part of the welfare state, the Dutch government is actively involved in the prosperity and well-being of the inhabitants. Prosperity relates to the extent to which people have sufficient resources to fulfil their needs. Well-being relates to the degree to which people are satisfied with their physical and mental health. In addition, a pleasant living environment and sufficient, adequate housing are part of the fundamental social rights.

¹ Vulnerable neighbourhoods are neighbourhoods faced with disproportionately large problems, considerably larger than in the rest of the country: a weak economic fabric with high unemployment rates, a relatively high number of people with low incomes, relatively many immigrants, a weak social and physical environment and a unilateral housing stock (Boelhouwer et al., 2006)

Although it is difficult to truly judge the inequality issue, it is justifiable to argue that a certain quality of life and liveable residential environment should be pursued for all. The main focus therefore lies on liveability rather than equality, which will receive more attention later on.

1.1.2. A policy categorization

When dealing with issues related to urban inequality, a distinction is often made between people-based and place-based policies (e.g. Kline & Moretti 2013; Spencer 2002; Glaeser, 2011; Manville, 2012). People-based policies directly target groups of people, such as particular income-groups or groups with a certain level of education. Alternatively, place-based policies indirectly target people and are directly aimed at territories such as neighbourhoods (Buitelaar et al., 2016). In addition, a distinction between pull and push policies can be made. The former aims to stimulate groups of people and areas that thrive, provided that this pulls up the bottom as well: *the rising tide lifts all boats* (Moretti, 2012). The latter is directly aimed at the bottom, by trying to give it a push (PBL, 2016). Combined, these two dimensions result in four policy categories, as given in the table below:

	People-based	Place-based
Pull (the lowest along with the top)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improving higher education institutions Stimulating the knowledge economy 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Creating/ stimulating production and innovation milieus
Push (the lowest upwards)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Education policies Income policies Labour market policies Integration policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Preventing segregation Improving neighbourhood conditions (liveability)

Table 1.1: Policy categories and examples (Buitelaar et al., 2016)

Truly combatting issues related to urban inequality and liveability requires a combination of people-based and place-based policies: one needs the other, and one influences the other (Buitelaar et al., 2016). This study, however, focusses on an area-directed approach; on the bottom right category of table 1.1. Place-based policies that seek to improve the position of deprived places can be found at different spatial scales (Buitelaar et al., 2016). At regional level, investments in shrinking regions are made. At area level, physical implementations aim at combatting social and economic disadvantages. Examples of this are national policies such as ‘het grotestedenbeleid’ (GSB) and ‘Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing’, as further clarified under section 1.1.3., and the urban regeneration of 40 so-called power neighbourhoods (‘Krachtwijken’ in Dutch) (PBL, 2016).

Academics are often critical about the effectiveness of alleviating poverty and concentration thereof through place-based policies (e.g. Bolt, Philips & Van Kempen, 2010). The general critique is that place-based policies do too little for the people themselves. Understandably, people do not get any more skills or money through “investments in bricks” (Buitelaar et al., 2016). Although place-based policies only indirectly target people, reasons for such policies can nonetheless be supported in several ways. A purely pragmatic one is given by Manville (2012): “Stacked against economic arguments is a cold political fact: power tends to be place-based. Thus person-based policy, however desirable in the abstract, might be unrealistic in practice. Delivering aid to troubled places might simply be more feasible than delivering it to distressed people”. The simple fact is that countries are organised in a territorial way (e.g. neighbourhoods, boroughs, cities, provinces, regions, etc.) (Buitelaar et al., 2016, p.28).

Another argument for place-based policies derives from an analysis by Uytterlinde & van der Velden (2017), whereby the liveability progression between 2002 and 2014 was reviewed in 140 neighbourhoods. That analysis shows that positive liveability developments can most notably be linked to the housing stock and to reduced levels of insecurity and nuisances (Uytterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). The study also describes that the physical implementations, such as newly constructed dwellings, the sale of social housing and investments in the public domain, have had a positive effect on the liveability. Both with regard to the attraction of middle and higher income households, as well as in improving safety and quality of place (Uytterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). That physical approach has diluted the problems in vulnerable neighbourhoods, which, among other things, resulted in a statistical improvement of the socio-economic position of these neighbourhoods. To conclude, although place-based policies have a rather limited effect on people’s social-economic status, they are vital to urban liveability (Uytterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

1.1.3. *Urban area redevelopment: housing stock diversification as a long-term strategy*

The aforementioned conclusion is also reflected in research on the resilience of social housing properties, by Leidelmeijer et al. (2018), whereby housing stock diversification is considered to be the most appropriate long-term strategy for coping with liveability problems that arise in vulnerable neighbourhoods. It is stated that diversification can dilute the problems and strengthens the mutual self-reliance and neighbourhood cohesion (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018).

This strategy has been part of Dutch urban planning policies since the late twentieth century. In response to growing criticism on urban renewal and redevelopment of cities and discussions about threatening social divisions, urban policies increasingly focused on improving the situation of disadvantaged communities (Fainstein, 2011). National policies such as 'het grotestedenbeleid' (GSB) and 'Nota Stedelijke Vernieuwing' aimed to strengthen the position of cities, to prevent segregation along socio-economic and ethnic lines, and to realise an undivided city (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). To enable a coherent policy, an investment budget ('Investeringsbudget Stedelijke Vernieuwing', ISV) was established through the bundling of subsidy programmes of various ministries. This allowed the central government to provide thirty municipalities with a budget every five years to stimulate and support urban renewal projects (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). This tendency was further pursued in 2007, when the Balkenende IV Government set up a district-oriented perspective. Forty districts in eighteen cities were selected with the intention to transform those areas into superb neighbourhoods ('prachtwijken') within 8 to 10 years. This policy was an addition to the GSB and ISV policy and included both physical as well as social components (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

In 2012, however, the Rutte I Government decided that – for both political as well as economic reasons – no further funding would be made available. Simultaneously, housing associations had to drastically adjust their investment scope due to the economic crisis. As a result, the innovation engine stagnated: numerous restructuring projects were put on hold or were called off entirely (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Consequently, the initiative for addressing urban issues in neighbourhoods has shifted towards the local authorities. The commitment and involvement of the national government mainly focuses on supporting the municipalities, by means of knowledge-sharing and – if necessary – legislative adaptations. This role was limited even further after 2014, when the ISV-budget was cancelled (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Partly due to the continuing economic crisis, the welfare state activities had to be given a more modest footing, which led to the decentralisation of the public domain. The underlying idea was that customisation by local and regional authorities would lead to fewer financial partitions and a more integral urban area redevelopment approach, which should then ensure an effective and efficient implementation process (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

In 2015, a new Housing Act was introduced, which has restricted the action and investment scope of housing associations. In accordance with these legislations, housing associations must strictly separate their commercial and social activities so as to mainly concentrate on services of general economic interest (Rijksoverheid, 2019). Housing associations may only serve lower income groups and can no longer actively commit to attracting middleclass households (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Although housing associations may sell social rented houses to middle-income groups, in practice, those target-groups are only reached to a limited extent. Instead, such dwellings tend to be bought by former tenants who are unaware of the fact that ownership also involves preservation costs, thereby resulting in impoverished premises and overdue maintenance (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). Moreover, in many places, individual sales have led to mixed complexes and mixed associations of property owners (VvE's), which regularly creates a barrier when maintenance and renovation decisions have to be made (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Now that urban area redevelopment initiatives have shifted towards local level, much is expected of market parties. Developers and commercial investors, however, tend to rarely show an interest in such vulnerable areas. Meanwhile, it is argued that municipalities make little effort to actively approach or incentivise these parties and have instead adopted a wait-and-see approach (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017).

Another barrier for more diversified neighbourhoods relates to performance agreements between housing associations and local governments. Most housing associations focus on organising their available and affordable housing stock as efficiently as possible. Whereas energetic sustainability has been a part of this for a number of years now, social sustainability is not specifically included yet (Leidelmeijer et al, 2018). Local agreements with municipalities and tenants are mostly dominated by agreements on the affordable housing stock and the extent to which it becomes available. Preventing concentrations of vulnerable groups is defined much less clearly. As a result, performance agreements can unintentionally form a barrier for more diversified neighbourhoods (Leidelmeijer et al, 2018).

Lastly, making room for new houses in a higher segment by demolishing social housing properties, must not result in a significant decrease in the amount of social dwellings. In areas where the social housing market is under pressure, social rented dwellings need to be added to other neighbourhoods to compensate for the reduction (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018). In practice, however, it is not easy to add social housing to the existing stock. In popular neighbourhoods, municipalities tend to ask rather high land prices and on top of that, commercial market parties are very keen to participate. It is the other way around in less popular areas, which means that housing associations often depend on the financial position and political vision of the municipality (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018).

1.1.4. *Collaboration in urban area redevelopment projects*

Tackling the barriers to diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods thus requires effective collaboration between local governments, housing associations and commercial parties (Leidelmeijer et al., 2018). When looking at the collaboration between parties involved in urban area redevelopment, a general need for improvements can be recognised (e.g. Daamen, 2010; Heurkens, 2012; Kort & Klijn, 2013; ten Have et al., 2017). In his dissertation on private sector-led urban development projects, and based on the findings of other practicing professionals, Heurkens argues that urban area redevelopment in the Netherlands is characterised by a growing sense of ineffectiveness and inefficiency. Within such a process, one is cooperating at most, but does not make use of a collaboration method that can lead to the desired quality and enduring value (ten Have et al., 2017). Several juridical, managerial/organisational and financial barriers can be identified, as summarised in the table below:

<i>Juridical barriers</i> (create impossibilities, complications and/or high development costs)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Complicated and lengthy procedures: expropriation of existing users, adaptation of the land-use plan, building permits, etc. - Restrictive national legislation (noise and environmental standards) and regional policies (such as parking norms)
<i>Managerial/organisational barriers</i> (create uncertainties)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unclear or non-existent structural visions and planning strategies of the local government (unstable policies), wherefore developing parties do not know where they stand - Political uncertainty, due to the 4-year terms, and lack of official, administrative expertise and continuity
<i>Financial barriers</i> (create unprofitable conditions/financial gaps in the land exploitation and demand large pre-investments)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - High expropriation costs, on-site soil decontamination costs, legal costs, consultancy costs and infrastructure costs - High costs resulting from land speculation - Investors doubt the possible return of certain products and cannot invest in desired developments due to tax-related reasons

Table 1.2: Barriers that prevent or restrain inner-city redevelopment projects (Verheul et al., 2017)

As argued by Klijn et al. (2008, p.252), urban area redevelopment processes are characterised by multi-level governance, as it involves several levels of public actors and decisions, at the local, regional and central levels. Many public, private and societal actors are involved, who all want to influence the decision-making process and who all have different understandings of the main problems and of how problems and solutions change over time (Klijn et al., 2008, p.252). A variety of values must moreover be addressed, which are each represented by a different actor that must be reconciled. In addition, different projects can be connected in several ways, thus further complicating the decision-making process (Klijn et al., 2008, p.252).

Policymakers and researchers assume that the involvement of private actors in the provision of services, or in the realisation of policy goals, increases quality and results in better value for money (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 90). In that

case, private parties are involved earlier in the decision-making process and contribute more vigorously than in more traditional client-supplier or principal-agent relationships. This indicates that more intense collaboration between public and private actors will generate better results (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 90).

As stated in the “Reiswijzer Gebiedsontwikkeling 2011”, a set of guidelines for urban area (re)development projects, pleasant collaboration only occurs if the right choices are made. This means that the right parties should be involved, at the right time, with the right role-distribution and according to the right procedure (Rijksoverheid, 2011). Subsequently, an analysis of the market situation should indicate if the chosen procedure will lead to the desired arrangements or if the development strategy should be revised. All these choices are of importance to reach a successful result (Rijksoverheid, 2011). At the same time, this clearly shows that an urban area (re)development project is rarely established easily. The amount of choices to be made is extensive and the timing aspect is crucial as well (Rijksoverheid, 2011).

Another observation is that urban area (re)development projects are lengthy and require trust among the collaborating parties. This relates to the informal factors of collaboration, whereby certain mutual (mis)perceptions can be recognised (ten Have et al., 2017). Local governments often get the impression that developing parties are only in it for the money. In their perception, market parties only invest in land positions as a way to buy public cooperation and they lose their say in it as soon as the investing parties are included in the process (ten Have et al., 2017). From the perspective of developing parties, municipalities rarely make any concrete choices and constantly expand their list of ambitions. They get the impression that municipalities expect a lot, without being aware of the associated costs. In addition, property developers feel as if they are never valued for their knowledge and expertise, but only for their money (ten Have et al., 2017). In a selection procedure, it is difficult to gain insight into the nature and extent of these perceptions, and to estimate the level of trust. Trust must gradually come into being and can be influenced by numerous factors, such as the choices local governments make in the preparatory phase, the extent to which market parties are involved in the process, the organisation of the negotiation process and the refinement of the partnership (Rijksoverheid, 2011).

The study by Kort & Klijn (2013) also focused on the trust aspect, whereby their findings show that trust in partners has a fairly strong effect on project outcomes. There is more trust when city councils have tighter control on the market parties. Trust in the city council, on the other hand, has a less strong effect on the outcomes (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 104). In addition, it is concluded that soft forms of democratic legitimacy seem to be slightly more effective for achieving outcomes than hard accountability instruments (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 104).

When looking at the incentivising aspect of partnerships between the public and the private sector, local authorities must find ways to influence and modify the behaviour of development actors. According to Adams & Tiesdell (2012, p. 198), public managers must learn how to create incentives for the outcomes they desire from actors over whom they only have limited control. Their study furthermore shows that the tool-box currently used by local governments is in some way deficient or, even if complete, not put to the most effective use. Hereby, the following management instruments are distinguished, classified by their impact on the decision environment of development actors (Adams and Tiesdell, 2012, pp. 206-207):

- *Shaping instruments*: policy instruments intended to shape market behaviour. These instruments intend to shape the decision environment of individual development actors by setting a broad context for market actors and transactions.
- *Regulating instruments*: policy instruments intended to regulate market behaviour. These instruments focus on constraining the decision environment of individual development actors by regulating or controlling market actions and transactions.
- *Stimulating instruments*: policy instruments intended to stimulate market behaviour. These instruments intend to expand the decision environment of individual development actors by facilitating market actions and transactions.
- *Activating instruments*: policy instruments intended to build capacity. These instruments focus on enabling development actors to operate more effectively within their decision environments and so facilitate the operation of other policy instruments.

1.2. Research goal and question

Following from the problem definition, it is assumed that barriers to urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can largely be tackled by means of effective collaboration between public and private parties. Thereby, the determined research goal is *“to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods”*.

Following from this goal, the main research question is as follows:

What forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods?

In this question, “forms of cooperation” refers to both formal as well as informal aspects. The word “cooperation” is preferred over “collaboration”, as the latter already says something about the level of collectivity. More attention will be paid to these distinctions later on.

The phrase “management instruments” first of all encompasses the tools that local governments have, or should have, at their disposal, to interfere with the decision environment of development actors (Adams & Tiesdell, 2012). In addition, private actors also make use of management resources to influence project outcomes (Heurkens, 2012).

The word “effective” represents the assessment of the forms of cooperation and management instruments and is viewed in relation to realising objectives and efficacy (De Leeuw, 2012).

“Urban area redevelopment” refers to deliberate, strategic, physical interventions in a geographically defined urban sub-area that aim to improve an existing urban situation (Daamen, 2010; Heurkens, 2012).

Lastly, the guiding principle is to make a contribution to the enabling of housing stock diversification as a place-based strategy for combatting issues related to urban inequality and liveability. Hence, the explored practice should be “aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods”.

The main research question is answered by means of both theoretical as well as empirical research, whereby the former will result in an analytical framework for the latter. Chapter 2 will elaborate further on these methods.

1.3. Deliverables

In order to ultimately contribute to the combatting of issues related to urban inequality and liveability, this research intends to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. This means that guiding lessons for practice are to be formulated.

To achieve that desired degree of applicability, lessons will be drawn from practice by unravelling and comparing the collaborative process behind multiple equivalent urban area redevelopment projects. In order to draw comparisons, an analytical framework will firstly be composed. That framework is based on a literature study and will help to grasp the management and organisation of urban area redevelopment projects. By understanding how actors cooperate on and manage projects aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods, lessons can be drawn and recommendations can be made for public and private parties who can benefit from such guidance in their daily practice. The final product will thus be a comprehensible set of guiding lessons for effective cooperation and management in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods.

1.4. Societal and scientific relevance

In this supplementary substantiation of the research goal, a distinction is made between the societal and scientific relevance.

Societal relevance

It would be too short-sighted to assume that mixed neighbourhoods are the holy grail of issues related to urban inequality, as opinions strongly diverge as to the wider societal benefits of housing stock diversity. Truly combatting problems resulting from spatial segregation requires a combination of people-based and place-based policies: one needs the other, and one influences the other (Buitelaar et al., 2016).

It is, however, safe to assume that a certain degree of physical maintenance and attractiveness is of great importance to one's quality of life. According to Zuidgeest (2017), physical interventions contribute to the strengthening of a neighbourhood, as such place-based policies literally blow "a breeze of fresh air" into the area. Building dwellings for more wealthy target groups does not make existing residents richer. It does, however, indirectly help them. Home owners usually invest more in their surroundings and often fall back on different norms and values (Zuidgeest, 2017). With new, higher income households, a baker might suddenly sell more bread, enabling him to expand his business. A formerly deprived neighbourhood gradually changes into an attractive, popular area where people truly want to live. The neighbourhood visibly improves. As argued by Zuidgeest, a positive impulse to a physical area does not make people richer, but a pleasant, safe environment can make them happier.

With this in mind, the societal purpose of this research is for the outcome to contribute to the strengthening of neighbourhood resilience. As a range of barriers can be recognised in practice, it is very relevant to expand knowledge in the field of urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Scientific relevance

As identified in the problem definition, there is both a practical as well as a scientific need for knowledge on effective urban area redevelopment processes. Whereas policymakers and researchers assume that a more intensive cooperation between public and developing parties adds value by producing better and more efficient policy outcomes (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 90), the requisite knowledge of how to achieve that is often lacking. Urban area redevelopment processes are by definition characterised by a high level of complexity, as it involves many public, private and societal actors who all want to influence the decision-making process and who all have different understandings of the main problems and of how the problems and solutions change over time (Klijn et al., 2008, p.252).

Especially in the context of vulnerable neighbourhoods, local governments, housing associations and commercial parties seem to be in search of an appropriate interpretation of their roles and tasks in order to obtain a new balance of forces (Uyterlinde & van der Velden, 2017). In that specific department, theoretical knowledge has not been acquired yet. Therefore, existing theories on urban area redevelopment processes will be applied to the analysis of the administered course of action in a range of vulnerable neighbourhoods. By doing so, this research aims to generate explicit theoretical knowledge on what forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in that context.

PART II: METHODS

2. RESEARCH DESIGN & METHODOLOGY

In the previous chapter, the problem definition, research goal and question, deliverables, and societal and scientific relevance were described and discussed. This chapter now presents the strategies and methods that are used to reach the proposed research goals.

First, the research objectives are given, in the form of sub-goals and a conceptual model. Thereafter, the research sub-questions that follow from those objectives are formulated. This provides the basis for the overall research design, which is visualised in the form of a block diagram. That research design will then be used to elaborate further on the methods and techniques that are applied for the data collection.

2.1. Research objectives

Following from the research goal *“to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods”*, three sub-goals are formulated: (1) to understand the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment projects, (2) to analyse the currently administered course of action in vulnerable neighbourhoods, and (3) to identify effective forms of cooperation and management instruments specifically for that context. In the figure below, these sub-goals are merged into one conceptual model. Underneath, the different research elements are given, as based on the four P’s of area development by Verheul & Daamen (2014).




Figure 2.1: Conceptual research model




Figure 2.2: Research elements (own illustration, based on Verheul & Daamen, 2014)

2.2. Research sub-questions

Following from the main research question: *“What forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods?”* and from the sub-goals that were defined in the previous section, a couple of sub-questions are formulated.

1. How is urban area redevelopment organised?
 - What actors can be identified and how do they relate to each other?
 - What types of cooperation can be distinguished?
2. How is urban area redevelopment managed?
 - What management instruments can be defined?

These first two questions are answered by means of a literature study into the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment. By determining what actors can be identified and how they relate to each other, what types of cooperation can be distinguished, and what municipal management tools, management resources and management activities can be defined, a better understanding of the urban area redevelopment field can be established. This information will result in a theoretical framework that is to be applied to the empirical analysis of this research.

3. How is urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods organised and managed?
 - What lessons can be drawn?

This third question will be answered by means of empirical research, with the objective to analyse what course of action is currently administered in vulnerable neighbourhoods. This empirical research consists of a comparative case study analysis, whereby the collaborative processes of three equivalent urban area redevelopment projects are unravelled and compared to one another.

For the answering of the main research question, the comparative case study findings are linked to effectiveness. Those findings are moreover complemented with an external validation, enabling a broader reflection on the data that was collected from the case studies.

2.3. Research design

Since this research largely focusses on concepts that cannot be quantified into numeral data, it can be characterised as qualitative. In a qualitative study, an inductive approach to the relationship between theory and research is emphasised, meaning that emphasis is put on the generation of theories (Bryman, 2012, p.36). The various steps that are to be taken are visualised in a research design that can be found on the following page. As described by Bryman (2012, p.46), a research design provides a framework for the collection and analysis of data. Furthermore, the research design reflects what dimensions are prioritised.

As illustrated, the research can be split into three main parts. The first stage focuses on developing theoretical concepts, as based on relevant professional and academic literature. These theories are drawn out of a study on how urban area redevelopment is organised and managed, investigated from the network perspective.

In the second stage of the research, the theoretical concepts are used to conduct multiple case studies. Thereby, the goal is not only to understand the selected cases in depth, but to draw comparisons in terms of similarities and differences as well. Case study research enables the researcher to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly perceptible (Yin et al., 1985). Due to these characteristics, it is often being used as a method to collect qualitative data in applied academic fields such as urban planning and management (Heurkens, 2012). These findings are moreover complemented with an external validation.

The last stage of the research focuses on translating the empirical findings into a set of guiding lessons for forms of cooperation and management instruments that are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods.




Figure 2.3: Conceptualised research design

2.4. Case selection

The criteria for choosing relevant cases mainly relates to the diversification goals and results. It should concern vulnerable neighbourhoods (Vogelaarwijken²) where an urban area redevelopment project has taken place that was aimed at diversifying the housing stock. The scale of the redevelopment, in terms of the amount of dwellings that were realised, and the time-period during which it took place, should correspond as well. In addition, both a housing association as well as at least one market party must have been involved in the process. In order to draw a comparison while attaining a rather general overview at the same time, another criterion is for the study areas to each be part of a different large Dutch city (G4). That way, the market conditions are comparable, whilst there is room for individual conclusions on municipal policies as well. These criteria have led to the following cases:

- Fruitbuurt North in Ondiep, Utrecht
- Kleinpolder Southwest in Overschie, Rotterdam
- Vermeerkwartier in the Schilderswijk, The Hague

² On March 22nd, 2007, Ella Vogelaar, Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration, presented a list of 40 Dutch disadvantaged urban areas that were to receive additional funding in order to combat accumulating social, physical and economic problems

The case-studies depart from the notion that, in all areas, the housing association has taken a central, leading role in the urban area redevelopment process due to their significant ownership of social housing in the neighbourhoods at hand. In collaboration with the municipality, the housing associations developed plans to replace affordable housing of low-quality with mid- to high-segment homes. The market parties were then involved for legal, financial and/or organisational reasons. Each case analysis focusses on unravelling the collaborative process between the housing association, the developer and the municipal area manager or project coordinator. On the basis of similarities and differences, lessons with regard to effectiveness are drawn.

2.5. Research methods

Research methods are techniques for collecting data (Bryman, 2012, p.46). The main methods used in this research are a literature review and semi-structured interviews, which are shortly discussed below.

Literature review

The existing literature represents an important element in all research. Reviewing and exploring the relevant literature helps to identify what is already known about the topic; what concepts and theories have been applied to the topic; what research methods have been applied to the topic; what controversies about the topic exists and how it is studied; what possible clashes of evidence exist; and who the key contributors to research on the topic are (Bryman, 2012, p.8). For this research, the literature review focusses on the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment. The results are conceptualised, by translating the data into variables. A variable is an attribute on which cases vary (Bryman, 2012, p.48). Those variables will thereafter be used as part of an analytical case study model for the empirical research.

Semi-structured interviews

An important aspect of the empirical case study research consists of conducting interviews. Since rich, detailed answers are preferred, a semi-structured interview technique will be applied. In this type of interview, the researcher does make use of a list of questions or fairly specific topics to be covered, but the interviewee still has a great deal of leeway in how to reply. Questions thus may not follow on exactly in the way outlined on the schedule, resulting in a flexible interview process (Bryman, 2012, p.471).

The case-study interviews are conducted among different types of actors involved in the process: the local government, the housing association and the commercial developer. In addition, three impartial “experts” in this field were interviewed on the following topics: public-private collaboration in urban area redevelopment, the social obligation of market players to invest in vulnerable neighbourhoods and the role of the public sector in effective urban area redevelopment processes.

PART III: THEORIES

3. LITERATURE REVIEW

In this chapter, a theoretical, analytical framework is developed. The theories are drawn from three components. Firstly, research on the organisation of the urban area redevelopment domain with regard to parties and relations is explored. Subsequently, urban area redevelopment is viewed from the network and management perspective, focussing on management instruments and activities. Lastly, the effectiveness aim is clarified.

3.1. Urban area redevelopment: organisation

In this study, the phrase “urban area redevelopment” refers to deliberate, strategic physical interventions in a geographically defined urban sub-area, as based on Daamen (2010, p.18). Hereby, the word “area” emphasises the neighbourhood scale, as opposed to the larger city scale. In addition, the *re-* prefix (choosing the word “redevelopment” instead of “development”) indicates a response to improving an existing urban situation, with a specific approach in a specific period of time (Heurkens, 2012, p.47). Due to the fact that areas are complex in the sense that they are influenced by dynamic events from their surroundings, urban situations in specified areas cannot, however, be canvassed as isolated phenomena (Heurkens, 2012, p.48). When analysing such processes, the larger context thus needs to be taken into account.

3.1.1. Changing State-Market relations

Over the past two decades, the relationship between public and private actors in Dutch urban area redevelopment practice has shifted fundamentally. The former *hierarchical relationship* between the two has shifted to a more *network-oriented* relationship. Consequently, Dutch urban area redevelopment is faced with an increased influence of the private sector and a decreased influence of public bodies in decision-making processes (Heurkens, 2012, p.23). This results in a decreasing manageability of urban area redevelopment processes which leads to a change in the role and strategic behaviour of the parties involved. According to Heurkens (2012, p.24), public and private parties are looking for new roles, responsibilities, and competencies in order to reposition the management of urban area projects. In that context, Boelens (2010) argues that governments need to reposition themselves within *public-business-civil community networks*. Thereupon, *public sector-led* civil coalition-building needs to radically change into the acceptance of a public sector position as part of an actor-network, rather than being positioned hierarchically outside of such networks (Heurkens, 2012, p.24).




Figure 3.1: Changing State-Market-Civil relations

Heurkens (2012, p.89) states that the growing importance of the private sector in urban area redevelopment and the intensified cooperation between the public and private sector resulted in inter-organisational changes for the realisation of urban area redevelopment projects. The creation of organisational and contractual cooperation can be seen in the light of more private sector influences on the one hand, and the deregulation of tasks and responsibilities from central towards local governments on the other (Heurkens, 2012, p.89). Development-led spatial planning policies have created local decision-making networks; urban areas have become the dominant level on which public and private actors act to realise spatial objectives (Heurkens, 2012, p.89).

3.1.2. *Actors, roles and characteristics*

As stated by van Bortel (2016, p.64), urban area redevelopment is organised and shaped through a network of multiple interdependent actors, who each bring in their own objectives and apply their own logics in a particular instance of time and space. In this section, the roles of those public, private and civil actors are clarified, whereby the categorisation is as follows:

- The public sector: role of local authorities;
- The private sector: project developers, investors and housing associations;
- The role of civil society.

The public sector: role of local authorities

In urban planning, the role of the public sector can be regarded as highly institutionalised. The Dutch planning system allows for different roles of national, regional and local public institutions (Heurkens, 2012, p.141). Since this research derives from the notion that the implementation involvement has decentralised, the focus lies on the role of local authorities.

Certain legally binding planning instruments can be used by local authorities to (in)directly influence – and thus manage – the outcome of urban projects (Heurkens, 2012, p.142). Statutory land-use plans are for example considered to be strong management instruments for local authorities in terms of development control. In these plans, the use of land is regulated, by specifying what the land is intended for and what plan limits apply. Land-use plans are frequently altered and updated when market situations change (Heurkens, 2012, p.142).

Dutch municipalities can choose to apply an *active* land policy. In this case, the local authority buys land, divides it into building plots and releases it to builders or occupiers, as based on its strategic spatial vision (Louw et al., 2003). When applying a *passive* or *facilitating* land policy, on the other hand, the land acquisition instruments are not used pro-actively. Instead, the private sector initiates urban area redevelopment and the local authority restricts its own land acquisitions for public services and functions (Heurkens, 2012, p.142). Logically, active policies allow the municipality to exert more influence on urban area redevelopment processes than passive land policies, as this gives local authorities the freedom to take on an entrepreneurial planning role – which does entail higher financial risks as well (Heurkens, 2012, p.143). The sale of land obtained by executing an active land policy generates revenues for the local authority's general budget and can be invested in public functions such as public spaces, infrastructure and public real estate (Heurkens, 2012, p.143).

As a result of larger amounts of private land ownership, land purchase and land development revenues have drastically declined over the past years (ten Have et al., 2017). The changed relationship between public and private actors in Dutch urban area redevelopment practice, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, is evidently reflected in this. The transition from an active to a more passive role is clearly noticeable. In essence, this role focusses on supporting spatial initiatives by private parties and private individuals with little to no financial backing (de Hoog et al., 2014). From this passive position, however, local authorities can still pursue different goals, as illustrated in the table below.

Management role	Management goal
Providing a framework (policies)	<u>Shaping:</u> Creating area potential and shaping the decision-making scope of market players
Providing a framework (spatial-judicial regulations)	<u>Regulating:</u> Demarcating area potential and limiting the decision-making scope of market players
Initiating	<u>Stimulating:</u> Increasing area potential and broadening the decision-making scope of market players
Facilitating	<u>Facilitating:</u> Exploring area potential and supporting the decision-making scope of market players

Table 3.1: Public management roles and goals (source: de Hoog et al., 2014, following from Adams & Tiesdell, 2012)

An extended version of this table, wherein management tools are included as well, can be found under Appendix 3.

The private sector: project developers, investors, housing associations

As the municipal role has become more passive, the role of private parties has become more active. The private sector is increasingly taking initiative to invest in urban areas (de Hoog et al., 2014). In Dutch urban area redevelopment, this sector can be divided into different actors. Van 't Verlaat (2008) describes them as “risk taking parties who create and realise projects for the market”. Within the spectrum of private actors, a division can furthermore be made between the period of involvement, which relates to the time of commitment, as defined by the different redevelopment stages (Heurkens, 2012, p.144). Thereby, the following three main Dutch private actors are distinguished: project developers, investors and housings associations, which are briefly described below.

Project developers

According to Deloitte (2010), “developers are the link between the demand and supply of real estate and form the connection between the end-user and contractor”. Van der Flier & Gruis (2004) argue that the main objective of developers is to “realise a maximum yield against a manageable risk level”. Since the yield of real estate development is obtained after the realisation and sale of real estate, and it is not common for them to own and maintain real estate objects after realisation, this indicates a rather short-term involvement (Heurkens, 2012, p.145). Roles can, however, differ within urban area redevelopment processes, depending on the type of developer.

As listed by Heurkens (2012) and based on Helleman (2005), Nozeman (2008) and Kazemi et al. (2009), the main characteristics and competencies of Dutch developers are:

- Risk bearing investors in land positions;
- Risk-bearing investors in plan development and preparation;
- Real estate development;
- Concept development;
- Product development
- Project management;
- End user market knowledge;
- General market knowledge;
- Contracting & organising expertise;
- Communicating & marketing expertise;
- Network relations.

Putman (2010) states that the main similarities and core competencies of Dutch project developers relate to the risk-bearing investment in land, plan and real estate development. Furthermore, Putman (2010) argues that developers can also be recognised by weaker features, such as lack of transparency, having a strong internal focus, and lack of end-user market knowledge.

Housing associations

As described by van Bortel (2016, p.52), housing associations provide housing for target groups that cannot afford full market rents, while balancing social and economic objectives. Housing associations are self-governing organisations, operating within a framework of government regulation, but without direct government control (van Bortel, 2016, p.52). In accordance with the (new) Housing Act (2015), housing associations must strictly separate their commercial and social activities so as to mainly concentrate on services of general economic interest (SGEIs, Daeb in Dutch). According to the central government (Rijksoverheid, 2019) SGEIs are:

- Building, renting and managing social housing. This is seen as the most important task of housing associations: accommodating people with a smaller budget.
- Managing social real estate. For instance, a community centre, neighbourhood library or a shelter. This social real estate must be situated in areas where the housing association owns housing complexes. Housing associations may develop 10 percent of their social real estate into a commercial function, such as a barber shop or a general medical practice.
- Investing in liveability. By means of caretakers or strategies to combat nuisances for example. These activities are determined in cooperation with the municipality and must take place in areas where the housing association owns housing complexes. Housing associations may not spend more than €125 per home on this and a different organisation must be responsible for the exploitation.

Only under strict conditions, housing associations may undertake commercial activities. Among such non-SGIE activities is the development of (liberalised) rental dwellings in the private sector, owner occupied homes, and commercial real estate (Rijksoverheid, 2019). This makes it possible to build free sector housing in neighbourhoods where dwellings are being demolished, so as to establish a more balanced mix of low- and higher income households.

Due to the long history of government control over and delivery task of social housing, which was transferred to housing associations in the 1980s, housing associations are often regarded as semi-public institutions (Heurkens, 2012, p.146). Therefore, Dutch housing associations are often typified as “hybrid organisations, which carry out public tasks, but are independent, private organisations, having market-driven objectives as well”. This hybridity is also evidenced by the housing associations’ broad and continuously evolving array of services. These activities often combine state, market, and civil society values (van Bortel, 2016, p.44). Housing associations own a lot of property in neighbourhoods that face urban regeneration tasks and therefore have major interests in these neighbourhoods (Kort, 2005).

Investors

Real estate investors adhere to long-term business models and constantly invest in their real estate portfolio in order to maximize returns. They are either involved in urban area redevelopment as a result of their ownership position, or by extending their portfolio by purchasing new objects in strategic locations (Heurkens, 2012, p.147). Investing in real estate is based on generating yields: direct yields through returns on rental income or indirect yields through the growth of real estate value. In contrast to project developers, investors do not have to cope with presale housing percentages, as they focus on the rent market instead of on the sale market (Heurkens, 2012, p.147). Putman (2010) states that investors can also be risk-bearing actors – dependent on their position as a partner in a partnership model for urban area redevelopment. Although investors are viewed as being crucial for the purchase of real estate objects and thus for the viability of urban area redevelopment projects, they mainly play a passive role (Heurkens, 2012, p.147).

The role of civil society

In making decisions on cities and urban planning and development, the role of civil society has become increasingly important. According to Hanson et al. (2006), “governance comprises of the complex mechanisms, processes and institutions, through which individuals and other interest groups articulate their interests either through formal or informal channels, mediate their differences and exercise their legal rights and obligations.” Thus, in principle, urban governance includes three groups of actors: the State, the Market and Civil Society, as illustrated in figure 3.1. In figure 3.2, the tilted urban governance triangle is expanded with brief descriptions for the relations.

Un-Habitat (2004) declares that “the spirit of good urban governance requires a constructive and purposeful interaction and engagement of these three sectors. Such engagements must be based on effective participation of all stakeholders, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equity, efficiency and effectiveness, accountability and a common strategic vision.”

Banachowicz & Danielewicz (2004) explain that, “While it is the role of the government to create a conducive political and legal urban environment, the private sector creates wealth through generation of employment and revenue. Civil society, consisting of various interests groups, facilitates political and social interaction and dialogue within the urban environment.” According to Hartley (2016), and following from the much used quote by Jane Jacobs (see page 2 of this document), “A city’s future is still largely planned by a few influential people, rather than influenced by hundreds of actions taken daily by thousands of people based on what they believe about that city’s future.” She therefore debates that citizens and experts should more often work together as equals, that places should indeed invite citizens to make key decisions about what happens in their neighbourhood, as such places allow local innovation to flourish and are locally relevant (Hartley, 2016).




Figure 3.2: Urban Governance: State-Market-Civil relations (adapted by author from Arts, 2014, p.19)

As illustrated in the figure above, and as noted by Heurkens (2012, p.76), genuinely including civil society (e.g. local communities, businesses) in urban planning and development decisions, can be seen as co-management; as a step towards collaborative planning.

Neighbourhood scale: Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations

Following from the roles that were described above, and altering it to the neighbourhood scale, one can speak of Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations. As explained, housing associations are often typified as hybrid social enterprises. According to van Bortel (2016, p.49), housing associations have inherited a hybrid mix of public sector, market and civil society values, structures, purposes, and governance mechanisms. This distinction – as opposed to a project developer – was visualised in the figure below, wherein the combined Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations are illustrated. It must be noted, however, that the other sectors are “hybrid and fuzzy” as well. As stated by van Bortel (2016, p.50), many other organisations cannot simply be pin-pointed that easily either, due to problems of fragmentation, unclear boundaries, dynamics, and mixed-coordination mechanisms. Very few organisations in the market, state and civil society sectors are close to their “ideal” types (van Bortel, 2016, p.49).




Figure 3.3: Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations in urban area redevelopment (altered and adapted by author from Brandsen et al. 2005, p.752)

Compared to the original triangle, the figures used for this study were tilted, as to place the municipality (state) next to the developer (market) instead of prominently at the top. This refers to the notion that, nowadays, the position of the public sector in public-business-civil networks has changed from a hierarchical role into becoming a more equated part of it. Instead of being dominant in many policy areas, the government is seen as one of the players with its own specific goals and resources (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33).




Figure 3.4: Labelling of the Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations in urban area redevelopment

The community is positioned at the bottom to illustrate that this role is included in a more informal, indirect manner, as this research does not aim to fill the academic gap on the organisation of co-management, co-creation, or collaborative planning as it may. Instead, the attention primarily goes to understanding the relations between the municipality, developer and housing association. The extent to which citizens were involved in and have a say about the project output will, however, still be addressed.

3.2. The network society

In line with the shifted state-market relations from a hierarchical one into a more network-oriented relationship, one often speaks of a *network society*. Boelens (2006) argues that our perceptions of time and space have changed, by becoming more multifarious, complex and structurally open-minded. He states that society has become ever more mobile, is in individual motion and is networked in a manner that has redefined the traditional meaning of society itself, as well as its spatiality and place-ness. The original idea of the “planned society” has rightly ended up on the rubbish dump (Boelens, 2006, p.27).

Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) have defined networks as “more or less stable patterns of social relations between mutually dependent actors, which form around policy problems and/or clusters of means and which are formed, maintained and changed through a series of games”. In this contemporary network society, public and private sector organisations are increasingly faced with controversies over the way the problems they encounter should be handled (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Thereby, the network approach can provide theoretical concepts and normative starting points for analysing and assessing complex processes in network settings and the role that perceptions, interactions and institutions play in this (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).

The starting point of the network approach is that actors are mutually dependent for their goal achievement (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Each player has its own values, interests and objectives, and will try to achieve its objectives by using the resources and instruments at its disposal. Actors cannot achieve their goals single-handedly without the means possessed by others (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.34). To achieve mutually satisfactory outcomes, form new relations, organisational arrangements, joint meanings, a common language and trust, actors must therefore

cooperate (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). Only by engaging in interaction, parties will gain information and positions and standpoints will become clear. Through mutual perceptions, binding decisions and agreements that enable common action and joint solutions, a “negotiated environment” where certainties are created can gradually emerge (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). These interactions take place between a small group of players in patterns that are collectively shaped via formal and informal rules. Together, these elements form the network structure (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).




Figure 3.5: The policy game as a mix of strategies that actors bring to the arena (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004)

The concept of “steering” concerns the strategies and instruments used to influence the actions of other parties, which have to be adapted to the characteristics of the network (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33). As illustrated in figure 3.5, networks are constantly in transition; opportunities to influence other players can change over time. The absence of a hierarchical structure means that every stakeholder can try to influence the decision-making agenda (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.36). Decision-making and steering can therefore be unpredictable. Interdependencies can necessitate collaborations with many network players in decision-making processes. These players may see the proposed course of action as irrelevant or even detrimental to their interests. Decision-making in complex networks can therefore involve serious conflicts (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.36).

Van Bortel (2016, p.58) states that, with the emergence of the network society, the delivery of housing policies and neighbourhood renewal was transformed. Bureaucratic procedures were replaced by multi-actor decision-making “games” in collaborative governance networks where the government no longer was the dominant actor (van Bortel, 2016, p.58). According to Brandsen et al. (2005), borders between market, state and civil society are blurred.

3.3. Urban area redevelopment: management

Urban area redevelopment management is viewed from the network perspective. As raised in the previous section, this perspective acknowledges that actors are increasingly interdependent in solving problems, and that problem solving and decision making occur in the tension between dependency and a variety of objectives and interests (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). That complex problem solving and decision making process in a network setting is captured in a conceptual steering model in the context of urban area redevelopment. This illustration, as shown in figure 3.6, must not be interpreted as a static representation of reality. It rather provides the ability to explain mechanisms in projects – in terms of the relation between organisation, process and management – and can thus be used to analyse and compare cases.

Herein, the organisation represents the *formal structure* of the cooperation, as shaped by the legal, financial and organisational arrangements (Heurkens, 2012). According to Koppenjan & Klijn (2004), these arrangements ask for mutual acknowledgement of meaning and joint image building and should be the result of the development of negotiated knowledge. Thereby, views with regard to the extent to which certain components should be formally enshrined vary. On the one hand, the concrete nature of urban area redevelopment requires actors to structure projects with inter-organisational arrangements such as a clear role division and contractual agreements (Heurkens, 2012, p.51). On the other hand, the complexity resulting from rapidly changing environments, requires a flexible approach (Bruil, 2011, p.24). Daamen (2010, p.8) illustrates this difference by stating that planned strategies imply full control and surprise-free implementation, whereas process strategies leave room for learning due to an essentially boundless and unpredictable environment. This difference will thus be taken into account when drawing lessons from empirical research.

The second “box” of the conceptual steering model represents the *process* of cooperation; the actual interaction between actors. Related to this are the process management activities negotiating, decision-making and communicating (Heurkens, 2012). Koppenjan & Klijn (2004) argue that certain factors can contribute to these interactions, such as: lack of non-functional blockades and stagnation, the realisation of breakthroughs, and for the length of the process to match the degree of cognitive learning. Another condition relates to the degree to which parties become acquainted, develop interaction rules and trust, and choose cooperative and negotiation focused strategies. Lastly, “openness, transparency and democratic legitimation of the process” are mentioned (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2014). Due to its informal character, however, it is difficult to truly grasp all contents of the “process box” in beforehand, wherefore it also offers room for other, additional informal factors that might surface as part of the case analyses.




Figure 3.6: Conceptual steering model in a network setting, in the context of urban area redevelopment (roughly based on De Leeuw, 2002 & Heurkens, 2012; clarification is given below)

Moreover, each urban area redevelopment project takes place within a certain context, which is often subject to change (Heurkens, 2012). Thereby, a distinction is made between the direct *project context*, referring to the (constantly changing) social, economic and political circumstances, and the *institutional context*, shaped by the spatial planning system and policies that apply. These influences are canvassed as “external factors”, whereby most of the attention goes to the project context, as analysed to indicate its influences on both the formal as well as the informal structure of the urban area redevelopment project. The spatial planning system and policies are included as being part of the municipal management role. Following from the (institutional) context, namely, actors can apply certain management tools and resources to influence the formal and informal structure.

As described in the previous section, the concept of “steering” concerns the strategies and instruments used to influence the actions of other parties, which have to be adapted to the characteristics of the network (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33). This indicates that management measures can both be used to influence the structure of the project itself, as well as the structure of its surroundings. De Leeuw (2002) categorizes these as *internal* and *external* management measures. This study will, however, primarily focus on the internal management measures, whereby a distinction is made between management tools, resources and activities. The management tools refer to the public

management roles and goals, as listed in table 3.1. Management resources are, in short, the three major means that represent material and knowledge power relations between actors: land, capital and knowledge (Daamen, 2010). Finally, by management activities, the process management activities negotiating, decision-making and communicating are meant, as already discussed as being central to the process of cooperation; the actual interaction between actors.

It must lastly be noted that – apart from the personalised design – a substantial alteration was also made in comparison to the conceptual steering model by Heurkens (2012), based on De Leeuw (2002). As the main aim of this model was to explain the project mechanisms in terms of the relation between organisation, process and management, the internal management measures – categorised in management tools, resources and activities – were granted different positions. The municipal management tools and resources are namely viewed as most directly following from the project context. In turn, the formal cooperation structure – shaped by the inter-organisational arrangements – is directly influenced by those management tools and resources, simultaneously indicating a more indirect influence of the project context. The management activities were positioned in between organisation and process (with arrows going both ways), to illustrate that the process management activities – communicating, negotiating and decision-making – form the “link” between the formal and informal cooperation, as they both precede as well as follow from the inter-organisational arrangements. These positions and relations form the basis for and are mirrored in the analytical case study model, as presented below.

3.4. Analytical case study model

In figure 3.7, the analytical case study model is presented. This structure follows from the conceptual steering model in the context of urban area redevelopment (figure 3.6). In this model, however, the main components of the conceptual steering model are broken down into a range of variables. These variables were already roughly introduced in the explanation of figure 3.6, but require further clarification, as these are the attributes on which the empirical cases are to be analysed and compared.




Figure 3.7: Analytical case study model

Municipal management tools

As following from Adams & Tiedell (2012), in table 3.1, four municipal management goals were distinguished: shaping, regulating, stimulating and facilitating. In practice, policy instruments that result from these goals are intended to

secure or realise spatial objectives and interests, for which reason they can be considered as management tools (Heurkens, 2012). These tools influence the way projects can be developed by indicating spatial visions and directions, by stating financial, programmatic or lay-out rules, or by securing funding and investment for development (Heurkens, 2012). Appendix 3 provides a complete overview of the public management roles, goals and tools.

Management resources

In urban area redevelopment, three major management resources are distinguished: land, capital and knowledge. These resources represent material and knowledge power relations between actors (Daamen, 2010). Heurkens (2012) states that actors who own most of the land, bring in the capital, and have the required knowledge to be brought into the urban redevelopment project, obtain a powerful position. With this power, they can influence decisions about the project, and thus realise their objectives.

Inter-organisational arrangements

Public and private actors organise their cooperation in legal rules and requirements, financial risks and revenues, and organisational tasks and responsibilities (Heurkens, 2012). The nature and attribution of these arrangements can change over time, as urban area redevelopment projects are characterised by several successive development phases: initiation, design & feasibility, realisation, and operation (de Jonge, 2010). In each phase, different agreements are made. These formal commitments then influence the way public and private actors can manage urban redevelopment projects (Heurkens, 2012).

Here, it is furthermore important to add that different levels of cooperation can be discerned. Keast, Mandell, and Brown (2007) identified three main network typologies, i.e. cooperative, coordinative, and collaborative networks, ranging from loose to strong relational connections, as illustrated in figure 3.8. The different network types represent different purposes and different structural characteristics, and require different levels of trust and time to develop (van Bortel, 2016, p.61).




Figure 3.8: Horizontal Integration Continuum (source: Keast et al., 2007 & van Bortel, 2016)

Management activities

Process management activities are viewed as influencing others by interaction, wherefore it is important to address sociological aspects (Bult-Spiering, 2003). Actors do not only need to communicate with one another to establish a collaborative process; communicating is viewed as an important management activity in itself (Heurkens, 2012). As actors involved in urban area redevelopment projects need each other to achieve their individual goals, public and private objectives are traded-off in negotiation processes. These negotiations lead to decision-making; decision-making on what is built and on the legal, financial and organisational arrangements of a project (Heurkens, 2012). Communicating, negotiating and decision-making are thus viewed as important management activities that are to be analysed in terms of their relation to the formal arrangements.

3.5. Urban area redevelopment: effectiveness

The aim of this study is to be able to formulate an advice on what forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. In accordance with management literature, such as De Leeuw (2002), effectiveness is viewed in two ways. First, it is considered in relation to *realising objectives*, in this case specifically referring to the overall housing stock diversification aim. Secondly, effectiveness relates to *efficacy* (Dutch: voortvarendheid), with regard to the collaborative process, decision-making, adaptability and overcoming obstacles (De Leeuw, 2002). This indicates that effectiveness is, for a large part, based on an actor's perspective, and that one actor may therefore view the management of a certain project as effective, while the other does not. Analysing urban area redevelopment in relation to effectiveness thus means that the actor's viewpoints on the effectiveness of public-private collaboration and the management measures actors undertake have to be distinguished (Heurkens, 2012).

PART IV: PRACTICES

4. COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY RESEARCH

The analytical model as developed in the previous chapter, was used as a framework for comparative case study research. This design entails studying three comparable, yet contrasting, cases using identical methods. It embodies the logic of comparison, in that it implies that we can understand social phenomena better when they are compared in relation to two or more meaningfully contrasting cases (Bryman, 2012, p.72).

In this study, the three cases are comparable in the sense that each case concerns an urban area redevelopment project aimed at diversifying the housing stock in a vulnerable neighbourhood. The redevelopment projects have taken place around the same time period and the “relations triangle”, as presented in figure 3.3, applies. It does, however, differ per case what exact role each actor played and how active that role was. Another more contrasting aspect derives from the fact that each neighbourhood is part of a different (large) Dutch city.

4.1. Separate case study findings

In this section, the case studies are described separately. The given information is gathered by means of interviews with the concerned municipality, housing association and commercial developer of each urban area redevelopment project (see Appendix 1 and 2 for the interview protocol and list of interviewees). Each description starts with an introduction of the project motivations, the time period, the objectives and the involved stakeholders. Thereafter, the management instruments, formal cooperation structure and informal cooperation factors are clarified. Thirdly, attention is turned to the external factors, with regard to social, economic and political influences. Finally, the effectiveness of the collaborative process is assessed and overall lessons and conclusions are drawn.

4.1.1. Utrecht: Ondiep (Fruitbuurt North)

In Ondiep, a typical pre-war working-class neighbourhood in Utrecht, the district Fruitbuurt North has been redeveloped in three phases. Partly through renovations, partly by means of demolitions followed by new constructions.




Figure 4.1: Neighbourhood impression (source: LEVS architects) and redevelopment location in Utrecht (source: Google Maps)

Case introduction

Ondiep was founded in 1915, when the municipality developed subsidised row houses for labourers. The neighbourhood was composed out of a range of separate projects, resulting in various inward-oriented residential blocks with their own mores, such as the Fruitbuurt and the Bomenbuurt, Het Kleine Wijk and Het Witte Wijk. As part of a new living programme, and originating from serious social unrest, nuisance and the worsened image of the neighbourhood, the project *Vibrant Ondiep* (Dutch: *Levenslustig Ondiep*) was introduced by the Province of Utrecht in 2003. Ondiep had to be redeveloped into a vital, life-cycle-proof neighbourhood, suitable for all ages and lifestyles.

The first demolition works began in 2005, and in 2011, the urban plans for the Fruitbuurt North were designed. Based on feasibility studies, Mitros had decided what parts could be renovated and which properties had to be demolished

to make room for new developments. The guiding principle has been to diversify the housing stock in the Fruitbuurt. In order to increase the overall liveability and attractiveness, the parties moreover had to implement the municipal *Groendiep* programme: a resolution to add more greenery to the public space in Ondiep.

Due to the economic crisis, the redevelopment plans for the Fruitbuurt came to a standstill for a couple of years. The process was set in motion again around 2015, but then the new Housing Act was introduced, which had consequences for Mitros's development scope.

In sub-area 1, Mitros demolished the houses and sold the land to MN, a pension provider. By the end of 2017, the construction of 44 single-family homes and 36 apartments was completed. These dwellings are rented out for the long-term, in an affordable segment just above the social rental limit of 711 euros per month. In sub-area 3, Mitros sold the owner-occupied plots to Zondag Ontwikkeling, including the already developed urban plans. This developer took over all rights and obligations that had already been stipulated with the municipality of Utrecht, as well as the commitment to build the given amount of owner-occupied dwellings, in collaboration with BAM Wonen. Finally, the 91 houses in sub-area 2 were renovated.



Figure 4.2: Sub-areas Fruitbuurt North

Municipal management tools

In 2010-2011, the municipality of Utrecht had concluded agreements with all local housing associations on the entire housing stock and, in particular, on the strategy for four disadvantaged neighbourhoods for the period 2011 until 2015. Those outcomes were bundled in a booklet called 'Building the city, cooperation agreements between the municipality and housing associations of Utrecht, 2011-2015'. An essential component of this was that the municipality would spend 4 million euros on the neighbourhood approach on an annual basis. That way, housing associations were encouraged to look beyond their real estate by improving the quality of the surrounding public space as well. In addition, the city-wide objective was to properly bring the housing stock into balance, to achieve more mixed neighbourhoods and to improve the overall liveability and quality of life in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Around that time, the municipality of Utrecht also put together a participation standard, consisting of different participation levels. Each level indicates to what extent the community should be involved in the process, ranging from informing until co-creation. The purpose of this was for the responsibility for participation trajectories to shift towards the developing parties, whilst the municipality would take on an advising role.

Zooming in on the Fruitbuurt, the municipal steering influence began with the urban programme of requirements, in which both programmatic as well as quality targets were described. That document was used for decision-making within the municipality and had to be approved by the city council. In addition, the *Groendiep* programme had to be implemented. Aiming to add greenery to the predominantly stony neighbourhood, a booklet with spatial design principles was set up. Those principles focussed on the addition of greenery in the form of flower beds, green facades, additional trees and particular paving stones that would add quality to the appearance of the public space. Through ISV funds, the municipality was able to make money available for this. Since the municipality has experienced how difficult it can be to simply demand a certain level of quality from a developing party without making any financial contributions themselves, these funds are seen as “an essential instrument” in the achievement of the *Groendiep* ambitions.

In addition to these municipal requirements and programmes, the land-use plan had to be changed as well. Hence, the municipality could exercise direct influence on what would be realised in the Fruitbuurt. On the other hand, the municipal area manager believes that “it is always a matter of give and take”. The area manager thus had to find ways to motivate Mitros to develop plans with which the municipal objectives would be achieved. As the municipal objectives with regard to the quality of the public space did not entirely match with Mitros’s financial means, the negotiation process called for “persistence and persuasive power”.

According to Mitros, the municipality of Utrecht is known for its strong urban opinion and thus made use of some shaping tools. LEVS based their design on specific spatial preconditions and the municipal urban designer closely monitored every step of the design process. Mitros looks back on that collaboration with satisfaction. The urban planning department had clearly indicated what was possible and proposed solutions for barriers along the way. The plan, for example, needed to comply with strict parking regulations, wherefore several urban redevelopment options were shared and suggested.

The contact with the municipal housing department went smoothly as well. As soon as the demolition plans were ready and approved by the alderman, urgency declarations were released, through which the residents were prioritised over others in their search for a new home. For Mitros, that contribution has been of critical importance to the relocation process.

Management resources

All the land belonged to Mitros, whereby the land of sub-area 1 was sold to MN and a portion of sub-area 3 was sold to BAM/Zondag Ontwikkeling. In addition, Mitros bought a small piece of land – a small square – from the municipality so that a supplementary dwelling could be built. Regarding the finances, Mitros, MN and Zondag Ontwikkeling have invested money in the development and bore the associated risks. Thereby, MN and Zondag have also paid Mitros for the associated planning expenses.

In the time of the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt, Mitros had little experience with collaborating with commercial developers. Up until the new Housing Act (2015), Mitros had mostly initiated and executed such mixed housing projects independently. Therefore, Mitros envisioned and developed the entire plan for the Fruitbuurt North themselves and only involved MN and Zondag at a very late stage. This ultimately led to complicated contracts and discussions, and to “a lesser sense of responsibility” among the commercial parties – that is at least how Mitros experienced it.

Inter-organisational arrangements (formal cooperation)

In 2011, the agreements between Mitros and the municipality of Utrecht on the spatial limitations and conditions, the programme and the layout of the public space were laid down in an urban programme of requirements. The plan was drawn up quite literally and also included aspects such as the applicable sustainability criteria. Even after it had

become clear that Mitros would execute some parts of the plan in collaboration with other parties, Mitros remained the prime contractor of the municipality. Mitros was and would continue to be their discussion partner, on the basis of which further agreements with the other developing parties were made. Therefore, organisationally, numerous consultations and meetings between the municipal area manager and Mitros's project coordinator have taken place.

Commissioned by Mitros, LEVS architects made one coherent urban design for the new dwellings in sub-area 1 and sub-area 3. This design was then developed further in collaboration with the municipal urban planning department, to ensure that it eventually resulted in a plan that both Mitros as well as the municipality agreed with.

The prepared land and plans for sub-area 1 were sold to MN in 2016, whereafter the dwellings were constructed by Van Wijnen. In sub-area 3, the collaborative structure was more complex. In principle, BAM Wonen was Mitros's partner. BAM, however, had included Zondag Ontwikkeling as the party that would develop and sell the houses. Consequently, Mitros had to deal with an additional contractual partner, which meant that both BAM as well as Zondag had to be included in the negotiations about the further elaboration of the plots that Zondag had acquired. While drawing up the land purchase agreements, it became apparent that interests diverged and opinions differed. For Mitros, this development was part of a much larger picture, and, from their role as a housing association, they represented both the municipal objectives as well as the interests of their social target group. Zondag's contribution, on the other hand, was relatively small and thus only required very limited effort.

This contradiction is reflected for example in a debate about what the encounters between the owner-occupiers and social housing tenants would look like with regard to the design of backyard pathways and fences. Mitros recalls that such dialogues were very time consuming, which made it feel "as if the development was brought all the way back to the preliminary phase". For Mitros, it made little sense to talk about those minor details on such an abstracted, contract level, as it felt impossible to tie everything down formally.

Management activities (informal cooperation)

Looking at the softer side of the collaboration, the sense of collectiveness was clearly lacking. Mitros believes that the risks of new construction projects can be reduced by means of shared interests and mutual trust. In this case, however, expectations and interests varied widely, wherefore no clear, straightforward path could be followed. Not only with regard to Mitros and the commercial players; the municipal area manager and Mitros's project manager have had many wide-ranging debates as well, and often held opposing views – both for substantial as well as personal reasons. They simply did not get along, which negatively impacted their collaborative process.

Agreements between the municipality and Zondag Ontwikkeling were made indirectly, as Mitros remained the primal contracting party. According to Mitros, this made things extremely cumbersome and time-consuming. The municipality had to truly rely on Mitros for conveying each message correctly, as emphasised by the area manager. Especially when it concerned aspects that Mitros did not seem to support at first, informal factors such as "good conversations, argumentation and persuasiveness" were required.

In addition, Mitros encountered difficulties from the fact that, in general, the relationship between the municipality and the housing association differs from that of the relationship between the municipality and a commercial developer. Mitros states that, for a housing association, it is never just about that one plot. Performance agreements with the municipality apply about the entire portfolio, wherefore "bickering about one location can cause complications for the other". Moreover, Mitros pointed out that they serve social interests as well, whereas MN and Zondag mostly pursued financial objectives in the Fruitbuurt.

External factors

Social influences

Before the redevelopment could take place, Mitros had to realise a sufficient amount of support. This meant that at least 60% of the residents had to give their consent. The conversations with the residents' committee were lengthy, because the residents did not agree with the plans. Residents of the Fruitbuurt, and of other parts of Ondiep, are very much attached to the neighbourhood. They did not want for so many dwellings to be demolished, and demanded to

know exactly what those dwellings would be replaced by. Therefore, it took quite some time before Mitros had convinced the residents' committee of the added value of their plans. They have preserved and renovated as much as possible. With regard to the residents of the dwellings that had to be demolished, the municipality released urgency declarations, an extensive relocation process was organised and they received financial compensations.

After this process, it was very difficult for residents to comprehend and accept the fact that the developments were delayed for quite some time. Only part of the renovation works could start immediately in 2011/2012. Due to the economic circumstances and legislative changes, the demolition works and new constructions could not start until 2016. In the meantime, some houses had already become vacant and Mitros could hardly keep the area liveable. This resulted in a lot of nuisance and strong feelings of insecurity.

For financial as well as practical reasons, many elderly often continue to live in a house that is too big for them. To address this, a special senior arrangement was established for projects such as this one in the Fruitbuurt. This concerns an arrangement whereby senior citizens (55+) are encouraged to move to a new, yet smaller, apartment, by only increasing their rent level by a maximum of €50 per month. Experience has taught Mitros that one always has to mention such an arrangement very clearly and frequently, because people are often not aware of the fact that such a helpful solution exists. In the case of the new apartment building in the Fruitbuurt, the future perspective has thus been underlined very specifically, by focussing on the benefits of a new home with an elevator. In addition, Mitros has offered to help them with the move.

Political influences

No significant political factors have influenced this project. Ondiep had been suffering from social unrest for quite a while, so the redevelopments that were set in motion in 2008, were welcomed with open arms. Arising from the city-wide goal to bring the housing stock into balance and to improve the liveability in vulnerable neighbourhoods such as Ondiep, the municipal council did, however, push for a certain programme and a certain quality – but that is only normal.

Economic influences

The economic circumstances have changed substantially over the past years, which has had a strong influence on the redevelopment process in the Fruitbuurt. Due to the financial crisis, the plan had to be put on hold for a couple of years. Contractors were not interested in such projects and, for a long time, commercial developers and investors did not want to pay the given land price. Only after the market accelerated again, contractors and commercial developers dared to develop the private sector owner-occupied and rental houses in the Fruitbuurt North.

When Zondag Ontwikkeling put their dwellings up for sale in 2016, the Fruitbuurt still did not have a very good reputation, for what reason potential buyers had to get used to the asking price. Eventually, however, the houses were sold quickly and the prices have since then risen throughout the entire city of Utrecht, including vulnerable neighbourhoods such as Ondiep.

Effectiveness

Realising objectives

For the entire redevelopment of Ondiep, the general municipal ambition has been to improve the liveability. Both with regard to the target groups – the housing stock diversification – as well as with regard to the public space. The *Groendiep* programme was one of the ways through which the municipality provided some guidance. Due to the high ambition level, choices had to be made, but now, the positive results are clearly visible. The fact that a distinctive housing product was added contributes to this as well. Thereby, the municipal objectives have certainly been achieved. Although it has already been a couple of years since the redevelopment took place, the plan also meets the objectives of the current municipal council.

Mitros and the other developers are also very pleased with the results. In their opinion, the Fruitbuurt has become a nice, attractive neighbourhood, the residents are satisfied and the reputation of Ondiep as a whole has improved enormously.

Mitros strongly believes in the socio-economic benefits of a diversified housing stock. Initially, the housing association was rather cynical about it, but now that they have been able to see the positive effects of owner-occupiers in several districts that were previously dominated by social housing, Mitros is convinced that housing stock diversification is the only intervention that can truly improve the liveability in vulnerable neighbourhoods. People meet each other on the street, see each other, talk to each other. In Mitros' experience, it enhances social control and, since vulnerable neighbourhoods are often characterised by high unemployment rates, children are surely encouraged by the fact that their neighbours are now setting a different example.

Efficacy of the collaborative process

In retrospect, the municipality and Mitros both agree that the adaptability of the collaboration had certain shortcomings that led to project delays. The process suffered from several external influences that were difficult to predict or steer on. Although it is never possible to oversee every little detail or to avoid complications by including every aspect in the formal contracts, Mitros and the municipal area manager did not specify a clear time horizon at all. They did not formulate a joint, explicit planning with milestones. Consequently, this led to a lot of uncertainty and confusion, for which reason the parties will make sure to approach such a situation differently in the future.

Mitros would have preferred to have redeveloped the Fruitbuurt independently. Especially because market players did not believe in the project at all during the economic crisis. Nobody dared to establish such a collaborative relationship, whereas Mitros was ready to get started. But since the legislations prohibited Mitros from developing the private sector properties, they suddenly became dependent upon others. The plans were ready, but no one would buy the land, causing major delays, resulting in the neighbourhood to deteriorate even further.

The fact that Mitros was obliged to collaborate with other developing parties has made the redevelopment much more complicated for them. In preparing the contracts, Zondag and BAM wanted to adapt the plans according to their own standards. Therefore, time-consuming conversations were scheduled. This made Mitros feel as if they were starting all over again, whilst they desperately wanted to speed things up. Meanwhile, the houses had been vacant for quite some time, or had even been partly demolished already. Mitros is convinced that, if they could have taken matters into their own hands, those processes would have been easier and they would have been able to speed things up more easily.

Lessons learned/preconditions

Somehow, the stakeholders did not have much concern for each other's interests. The overarching project goals of diversifying the housing stock and improving the quality of the public space were clear and everyone agreed with that. Nevertheless, the interplay of give and take between the municipality and Mitros was complicated and vulnerable. They were unable to create a sense of collectiveness. A lesson for the municipal area manager has thus been that it is important to invest in that personal relationship, and that the soft side of a collaboration should not be underestimated. She has learned how vital it is to identify and disseminate exactly who you are dealing with at project level, as that makes it easier to communicate with one another about how the escalation of certain complications along the way can be prevented.

According to the municipal area manager, it is also important to get an idea of who the future residents and users will be. Local entrepreneurs, organisations, shop owners, and so on. By looking at the area from a broader perspective, a view of all stakeholders can be established, so that they can be involved at an early stage, which will ultimately lead to better project results, she reckons.

The municipality of Utrecht is very aware of the fact that they are becoming increasingly dependent on the initiatives of other parties. Whereas the municipality does like to take control, the area manager of the Fruitbuurt explained that it is not in their nature to implement an active land policy or to initiate urban area redevelopment projects themselves. That does, however, make it difficult to manage and steer developments in a certain direction and to aim high, because in the end of the day, they are not the ones who pay for it.

An important lesson for Mitros has been that they have done too many things separately and individually. In consultation with the municipality and an architect, they came up with the entire plan, before presenting it to the

market. In hindsight, it would have been better to have involved a commercial developer right from the start, to approach it more as a collaborative process. Somehow, for Mitros, such joint action did not feel as 'obvious' at the time, but somewhat scary and oppressive instead. Looking back on this project in Ondiep, Mitros assumes that complicated agreements and discussions about contracts could have been prevented if Zondag Ontwikkeling had been included right from the start. Through shared responsibilities, Mitros would, for example, not have been the only one to resolve issues during the construction phase. In a collaboration in which parties operate more as equal partners, a balance can most probably be found more easily.

Mitros also wonders whether it would be possible to create a collaboration that is less sensitive to the influence of external factors. A partnership one can still make modifications to when aspects such as legislations and economic shifts change the original starting points in such a way that both parties are understanding about the fact that some twists can never be predicted.

4.1.2. **Rotterdam: Overschie (Kleinpolder Southwest)**

From 2008 onwards, Woonstad, Van Omme & De Groot and the municipality of Rotterdam have made plans to redevelop a large area that had been empty for almost two decades into an attractive, mid-priced family district.




Figure 4.3: Neighbourhood impression (source: *Thuis in Overschie*) and redevelopment location in Rotterdam (source: Google Maps)

Case introduction

Between 1990 and 1992, thirteen post-war flats with over 500 small social rental apartments were demolished by the municipal social housing company (Dutch: Gemeentelijk Woningbedrijf Rotterdam, nowadays an independent organisation called Woonstad) in Kleinpolder Southwest. In the years that followed, various redevelopment plans have been considered. There was a different plan every four years, but none of those plans could ever be realised. For several, uncertain reasons, the municipality struggled to make a feasible plan for Woonstad. This was partly due to discussions about noise pollution and air quality, because the South of this location borders the A20 and the East borders the A13. Meanwhile, Overschie badly suffered from the fact that such a large patch of land was unused. The neighbourhood facilities were under pressure and the major entry route of Overschie was very unattractive. Moreover, the overall housing stock in Kleinpolder was very unilateral and outdated. After Ella Vogelaar, the Minister for Housing, Communities and Integration, had introduced the neighbourhood approach in 2007, the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest was put higher on the priority list, as the demand for interference was firmly stressed.

In that time, Rotterdam was still split into several sub-municipalities (districts). The district council of Overschie had some spatial planning powers, but did not deal with land allocation or land-use plan procedures. The district council did, however, have a good view of the deterioration of the area and thus actively pursued the redevelopment. In order to speed things up, the district council managed to place the responsibility for the coherent urban area redevelopment plan with the developing parties, as the municipality proved unable to develop a suitable plan for the area.

The aim of the development was to diversify the unilateral housing stock in Kleinpolder and to realise an attractive, representative entryway. In addition, the plan had to meet the prevailing environmental and aesthetic requirements. Woonstad Rotterdam has taken the lead in this. More than 50% of the housing stock in Overschie was from Woonstad; they had already been developing properties in the neighbourhood for over 100 years and thus had a huge interest in the redevelopment finally coming off the ground. They built 84 spacious single-family homes between 2012 and 2014. Due to the economic crisis, construction of the other plots started somewhat later. In sub-area 1, Van Omme & De Groot realised 31 owner-occupied single-family homes in 2018, and another 13 homes are currently under preparation. In sub-area 2, seven single-family homes were constructed by Groeneweg (nowadays called Batenburg) at the beginning of 2019.

These developments were part of a broader vision for Kleinpolder as a whole. Van Omme & De Groot had renewed and expanded a local shopping centre to the North of the location. Woonstad has renovated or replaced its outdated housing stock in Kleinpolder East. In order to facilitate the relocation of those residents, Van Omme & De Groot built an apartment building for Woonstad as a turnkey buyer. In addition, the municipality has invested heavily in the renewal of the public space. In that sense, all sub-projects are connected in some way or another; the one could not have been realised without the other, as the one increased the chances of success for the other.




Figure 4.4: Sub-areas Kleinpolder Southwest

Municipal management tools

The municipal urban planning department and the district council of Overschie have had a complex relationship during this redevelopment process. The district council had much concern for the negative consequences of the large patch of unused land in Kleinpolder Southwest and was very much aware of the need for an urban area redevelopment plan. However, no central municipal attention was being paid to Overschie. According to the district council, the urban planning department considered it to be too complicated, as the number of houses to be realised would be disproportionate to the complexity of the development.

In order to set the process in motion, the district council decided to approach the alderman by proposing to make the developing parties responsible for the plans. That suggestion did cause a lot of resistance at first, but eventually, the alderman decided to give it a chance. The district council drew up a set of guiding principles; a kind of framework with the programme, the phasing, the spatial requirements and the overall responsibilities. The starting point of this innovative approach was to put a stop to wishful thinking. Based on the goal that they would initiate a financially

feasible and programmatically desirable development, Woonstad and Van Omme & De Groot were to make a coherent plan. In a facilitating, advisory role, the urban planning department would then assess and validate that plan. The developing parties felt very comfortable with that role distribution. This way, they could determine their own planning and only depended on the municipality when they needed feedback.

In addition, the district council made an effort to financially link the eastern and western areas to each other. The necessary developments in Kleinpolder East were not feasible, and since the redevelopment process in West did not come off the ground either, the whole neighbourhood was stuck. Therefore, in collaboration with Woonstad, the district council stipulated that the revenues of Kleinpolder West could be used to finance the unprofitable top margin of the development in Kleinpolder East. That way, a significant part of the neighbourhood could actually be redeveloped. As an additional incentive and to increase the chances of success, the municipality made funds available for the public space: 1.5 million euros of ISV money was spent on the outdoor area.

At the time of the development, a land-use plan did not yet apply in Kleinpolder Southwest. The central municipality did not really agree with that and thought that a land-use plan should firstly be established. Since the district council, however, did not want the developments to be delayed any longer, they convinced the municipality that such a land-use plan procedure would take too much time. Therefore, the general building regulations (Dutch: *bouwverordening*) applied. Noise pollution and air quality studies were conducted as if it were a land-use plan, resulting in a proper judgement on the environmental parameters.

The fact that there was no land-use plan did cause a great deal of commotion at a later stage, because, as a consequence, but to the dissatisfaction and expense of the municipality, building fees could not be levied.

Management resources

The land was owned by the municipality, split up into three parts and sold separately to the developing parties. The revenues in Kleinpolder West were used to cover the unprofitable top margin in Kleinpolder East.

A large part of the public space was developed by the municipality; the costs that were made were included in the land price. Woonstad and Van Omme & De Groot were each responsible for their courtyards. In addition, natural drainage systems had to be assembled in the sub-area of Woonstad. As Woonstad could not manage that themselves, they had to reach a settlement with the municipal urban management department and Syntrus Achmea.

In terms of experience, it was of added value that Van Omme & De Groot is a developing contractor. The benefit here is that both aspects of the developing process can be combined to one another, wherefore the associated risks can be managed more accurately.

Inter-organisational arrangements (formal cooperation)

At the start of the process, an East-West discussion between Woonstad and the municipality of Rotterdam took place. The land of sub-area 3 no longer belonged to Woonstad, as it had remained with the municipality after the privatisation of the municipal housing company. In Kleinpolder East, however, Woonstad faced a major task: 280 severely outdated apartments that all had to be renovated or replaced. That was a loss-making development, as a result of which Woonstad insisted on buying a part of the unused land in Kleinpolder West. They fiercely negotiated at first, because the municipality was opposed to balancing out the two locations. But in the end, Woonstad was indeed able to do both developments. In Kleinpolder West, Woonstad bought the land from the municipality and constructed new single-family dwellings. Subsequently, those revenues could be used for the refurbishment of the dwellings in Kleinpolder East.

Van Omme & De Groot was approached by the municipality, because they still had a construction claim of about 50 dwellings that had to be completed somewhere. Several conversations led to a land reservation agreement for sub-area 1. Following that agreement, Van Omme & De Groot started to invest in the spatial planning process, something that is normally done by the municipal urban planning department.

As soon as the municipality had decided to place the responsibility for the urban plan with the developing parties, they had to show that they were truly committed. The plan had to meet the programmatic demands, energy labels,

environmental objectives, noise and environmental legislation, and aesthetic requirements. The municipality had divided the location into three sub-areas and entered into a separate contract with each of the developing parties. Woonstad and Van Omme & De Groot acted together in drawing up a coherent urban area redevelopment plan, for which the parties jointly hired the firm Arons & Gelauff.

The district council had set up an organisational system that focused on achieving a lean and mean process. To make sure that disagreements between the developing parties and the municipality would not fester for too long, and things would not come to a halt as soon as the heat of the moment was over, the district council introduced a specific consultation structure. As a general principle, things were not to be made more complicated than necessary, and a conflict or issue could never last longer than a month. A steering group, set up under the chairmanship of the district council secretary, would come together once a month. The players at the table were all mandated, so that decisions could be taken right there and then. When problems arose, a meeting would not be wrapped up until a solution was in sight. That way, the pressure was increased considerably.

In order to ensure an early construction start and to decrease risks, Woonstad closed a deal with Syntrus Achmea, whereby the asset manager has bought a large part of Woonstad's dwellings as an investment.

Management activities (informal cooperation)

Due to the complexity of the location, mutual trust, mutual commitment, was of great importance to the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southeast. Something that has contributed to that level of trust, is the fact that the district council secretary and a director of Woonstad knew each other from a previous project in the past. When the plan negotiations continuously ended up in a deadlock, they scheduled a meeting to talk things over. They discussed that it was time to try a completely different approach and decided to redesign the process. This is seen as an important tipping point, as from that moment onwards, the stakeholders began to look at the challenge from a different angle. From a large-scale, long-term perspective, a better overview of the playing field and of the cash flows could be achieved.

The level of trust was further on strengthened by the unusual approach of making the developing parties responsible for the urban plan instead of the municipal urban planning department. In order to get that done, however, the district council had to enter into intense discussions with several municipal services. According to Van Omme & De Groot, the district council secretary was known for his stubbornness/toughness. On the one hand, this came in very handy, as that perseverance has clearly been of crucial importance to the effectiveness of the redevelopment process. On the other hand, the district council emphasised that the internal relationships did still need to be fostered, because the municipal players were interdependent on many different levels. They thus had to find a way to keep things professional. According to the district council, much of what could be achieved depended on the personal relationships, wherefore it was vital to take care of those relationships while applying pressure at the same time.

That personal relationship played a central role in other respects as well. All parties considered it important to come together at regular times, regardless of whether or not there were any urgent issues that needed to be discussed. In their opinion, this was helpful for the relationship, and for the cultivation of mutual trust. By seeing each other on a regular basis, the stakeholders got to know each other better, which contributed to a deeper mutual understanding of one's values and interests. Van Omme & De Groot stressed that this made it easier to find one another when a disagreement or a conflict arose.

External factors

Social influences

Throughout the entire preparation process, the district council put a lot of effort into communication with the residents. The residents meetings were always well attended and the masterplan was openly discussed during general, public assemblies. At that time, residents did not oppose the masterplan, which could thus be established quite easily. Woonstad could immediately start their construction process in 2012, and, according to the housing association, the residents of the adjacent gallery-flats were very pleased with the fact that something was finally happening.

However, when Van Omme & De Groot and Batenburg wanted to start their constructions in 2015/2016, a lot of commotion was caused. Neighbours were worried about the accessibility, the amount of new residents, about trees that needed to be chopped, and about headlights that would shine into their living rooms. In addition, there was a small playground, where one of the neighbours would organise an outdoor cinema event each year. Much value was attached to that small space, for which reason the neighbours stipulated that Batenburg would remove two houses from their plan. That way, the playground could be preserved. In that sense, priority was given to maintaining quality, to valuable places that neighbours liked to make use of. According to Van Omme & De Groot, residents were not against the redevelopment in general, only against a couple of features. All in all, however, that commotion did cause some construction delays, as well as a great deal of tension between existing and new residents.

Political influences

Due to the highways, Overschie had always been under serious scrutiny: extensive discussions about noise pollution and air quality were constantly conducted in the neighbourhood. For a long time, the city council wondered if it would even be responsible to build houses there. At the same time, however, for liveability reasons, it was not desirable for such a large patch of land to be unused either. Consequently, Kleinpolder Southwest was the subject of constant political debate. In the end, the liveability arguments outweighed the environmental discussions and the district council managed to gain the necessary support.

According to Van Omme & De Groot, a widespread problem with the municipality of Rotterdam is that a lot of focus is put on the city centre and on Katendrecht. In their experience, it is not always easy to get the attention and decision-making they desperately need in vulnerable neighbourhoods such as Overschie – as that is not something the city council “scores” with. From a political point of view, one only seems to score with a “hip and lively city centre”, Van Omme reckons.

Economic influences

Woonstad sold and built its homes between 2012 and 2014, which they considered to be quite “risky” timing. Eventually, the dwellings were sold quickly and in retrospect, the entire development has benefited from the increasing attractiveness of Rotterdam. Woonstad had expected 50 percent of the buyers to come from Overschie and 50 percent from elsewhere. But in reality, that ratio is even stronger, as about 75 percent is not from Overschie originally. The value increase of both the new as well as the existing, surrounding properties has also been even larger than Woonstad had predicted.

Van Omme & De Groot did not start building right away, but decided to wait a couple of years instead. Once they noticed how successful Woonstad had been, and once the economic circumstances had improved, they dared to get started. In 2015/2016, the first houses were sold for circa 275.000 euros. Almost 3 years later, the prices of the last houses have risen up to circa 400.000 euros.

Effectiveness

Realising objectives

The parties have succeeded in “getting Overschie out of the environmental discussions”. From a desert, a circus area, the developing parties believe to have transformed Kleinpolder Southwest into a vital, popular family district. To the satisfaction of the municipality of Rotterdam, the unilateral housing stock was diversified and the demand for single-family homes has been met. Moreover, the quality of the public space was enhanced and the supply of facilities was expanded, which, according to Woonstad, has also been important for the overall improvement of Ondiep’s “reputation”. From the point of view of Van Omme & De Groot, that total accumulation of spatial interventions has turned Kleinpolder Southwest into a neighbourhood where people actually want to live, as opposed to a neighbourhood where people remain who do not have a choice.

The developing parties managed to establish a joint, coherent urban vision. Subsequently, they noticed how that shared vision was strengthened even further by additional developments in the surrounding area, such as the expansion of a local shopping centre and refurbishment of the public space.

As Van Omme & De Groot put their houses up for sale at a later stage, this developer has benefited a lot from those joined forces. Their customers could see how that specific plot was part of a much larger project, and that the liveability had already improved a lot by then.

For the development by Van Omme & De Groot, it moreover helped that a land-use plan did not yet apply. In the context of feasibility, the fact that they did not have to pay any building fees turned out to be of essential importance. Moreover, a land-use plan would most likely have meant that the developer would have had to take significant design measures. According to Van Omme, with stricter regulations, it would not have been possible to realise outdoor spaces, which would have negatively affected the attractiveness of the single-family homes. Consequently, Van Omme would probably have had to develop apartment buildings instead, which, in their opinion, would have been a shame.

Partly by virtue of the economic windfalls, the developing parties have more than achieved their financial goals. At the beginning, that prosperity was not visible yet, so they did take some considerable risks. But in retrospect, according to Woonstad and Van Omme, it has indeed been worth their risks and effort.

Efficacy of the collaborative process

At some point, the district council knew that the municipal district system would cease to exist in 2014. Since they were afraid that the various changes would cause “the playing field to collapse”, they were very motivated to accelerate the redevelopment process. Therefore, the pressure was increased by means of the formally recorded organisational structure, through which the parties had agreed that an issue or conflict would never take longer than a month. The fact that the district council had made sure that they did not have to go through an extensive land-use plan procedure, was very beneficial to the efficacy of the process as well. Once the responsibility for the urban plan was in hands of the developing parties, they came to an agreement fairly quickly. Thereby, Woonstad and Van Omme had full control over the planning, which, in their opinion, contributed a lot to the efficacy of the redevelopment process. In that planning, intermediate inspections that had to be carried out by the municipality were properly included and well structured, so that everything could be coordinated accurately.

Due to the fact that Syntus Achmea bought a significant share of their dwellings, Woonstad could immediately kick-off their construction phase, which, they believed, went surprisingly quickly. According to the district council, Woonstad was even ahead of their planning at some point, as the demand was high and the building activities went smoothly. Because of the economic crisis, the commercial developers did not start construction until a few years later. As the residents’ trajectory caused additional delays, those plots could not be developed in one go and surrounding neighbours thus experienced some building inconveniences for a little longer.

Lessons learned/preconditions

Especially in the preliminary phase of this redevelopment process, there were quite some hurdles that had to be overcome – as the district council explained. In their opinion, the district council secretary had brought a “certain level of toughness” to the table, while having a good overview over the playing field and access to resources at the same time. Seeing how committed the district council was and noticing that municipal funds for the public space were made available, consequently provided Woonstad and Van Omme & De Groot with a lot of positive energy. This confirmed the feeling of trust, of collectivity, causing the parties to pursue one joint objective. This sense of collectiveness was also reflected in the urge to resolve hick-ups that resulted from aspects that were difficult to already oversee in the masterplan phase. Moreover, the district council, Woonstad and Van Omme & De Groot truly presented themselves as one collective group at every residents’ meeting, by “literally holding each other’s hands”.

For the district council, the most delicate moment was struggling to convince the alderman and urban planning department that it would be wise to firstly, hand the responsibility for the plan over to Woonstad and Van Omme, and to secondly, financially link the eastern to the western part of the development. That was an unusual course of action and caused a lot of resistance, wherefore the district council really had to stand their ground in difficult negotiations. It put quite some pressure on their relationships with the municipal services, but eventually, they succeeded, which, in their opinion, resulted in a drive that was sorely needed.

Nowadays, the municipal system has changed, which is not without reason. But Woonstad and Van Omme do believe that, in this case, the district council did provide a central platform. The district council acted as “the connecting organ” where things came together; the organ with a good insight into the problems and clear view of the need to take action.

The redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest shows that such a collaboration often strongly depends on the people who are part of it, and on their strength and persuasion. The district council noticed that “it takes two to tango”; that it is important for all parties to be committed to the agreements and objectives that have been determined, while also giving each other space. In their experience, that “game” was quite fragile, but did work out well in the end.

According to Woonstad, the housing association role is crucial in the redevelopment of a neighbourhood such as Overschie. Woonstad had already been part of the area for over 100 years and thus has a huge interest in making sure that the liveability is maintained. Therefore, and according to the district council, the conversation between the district council secretary and the director of Woonstad is seen as an important tipping point. As different plans continued to fail, the socio-economic problems kept increasing and matters were at risk of getting out of hand, it was determined that things simply had to change. From that moment onwards, the stakeholders looked at the challenge from a different, more decisive, angle, which opened up space for helpful resources and opportunities.

In Van Omme & De Groot’s opinion, another condition for such a collaboration is that parties need to truly understand each other, and each other’s stakes, well, and should thus schedule meetings on a regular basis. In support of the relationship, of building mutual trust, it is important for parties to be completely transparent about what they are doing and aiming for.

Both Woonstad and Van Omme have noticed that the chances of finding smart combinations could be increased by sharing responsibilities, by truly acting together. In their experience, the interaction between stakeholders becomes stronger when they operate from a shared framework. When parties have the same vision on the redevelopment of a certain location, that leads to things that can mutually reinforce one another – as illustrated by the redevelopment of Kleinpolder. By contrast, divergent views work against each other. Therefore, according to Woonstad, it is worthwhile to invest in the development of a shared, common vision. In Kleinpolder Southwest, the parties properly coordinated how they all looked at the neighbourhood and at the challenge ahead. By means of substantiated arguments, they were able to make an assessment of which housing typologies would be most suitable. Subsequently, a wide range of matching plans that mutually reinforce each other were initiated.

For the former district council, a general lesson that was drawn here, is that the government sometimes has the urge to keep control over certain developments where a facilitating, assessing role might be more suitable. The district council is aware of the fact that some plans are in need of an actively directing municipality, but, in their opinion, this redevelopment in Overschie illustrates that things can also be done differently. They believe that wanting to control too much might hinder innovative solutions. Sometimes, the municipality might have a different perception of the demand, and of the financial risks and opportunities, the revenues and the costs. That perception can then result in a programme that does not fit entirely well, in which case no developer will want to take the associated risks. In such cases, the municipality could provide some general guidelines that need to be met, in order to let the market do the rest of the work.

4.1.3. Den Haag: Schilderswijk (Vermeerkwartier)

With the development and realisation of over 180 spacious homes, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen have answered to the need for single-family homes in the Schilderswijk.




Figure 4.5: Neighbourhood impression (source: Van Wijnen) and redevelopment location in The Hague (source: Google Maps)

Case introduction

The Vermeerkwartier is located in the western part of the Schilderswijk. The urban structure was established in the 19th century and is typified by short, narrow residential streets. Previously, the Vermeerkwartier consisted of 500 social multi-family homes from housing association Haag Wonen. Based on a thorough assessment of future scenario's in 2011, Haag Wonen had concluded that renovating the residential complexes to an acceptable level would not outweigh the benefits of demolition followed by a new-build development. The resulting objective then was to use this outcome as an opportunity to diversify the housing stock in the Schilderswijk, by developing single-family homes for middle income households.

Initially, Haag Wonen wanted to undertake the entire redevelopment themselves, but it quickly became clear that their finances no longer allowed such large investments. In 2013, Haag Wonen issued a tender, through which commercial parties were asked what they thought might be possible at this location. Six parties showed an interest, of which two parties made a serious offer in 2014. In June 2014, both of them were asked to present a concrete proposal, whereby the plan of Van Wijnen was preferred. On the basis of exclusivity, Van Wijnen worked out the details of their plan, and in 2015, the contracts were drawn up.

The project was aimed at bringing the owner-occupied/rental homes ratio into balance, by adding properties in a different segment – as opposed to the large share of social housing in the Schilderswijk. Jointly, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen reflected upon ways to maximise the added value, intending to create a healthy neighbourhood where people would live pleasantly. As a result, the amount of dwellings has been reduced significantly: from 500 social multi-family homes to 187 free-sector single-family homes and 13 apartments. The municipality of The Hague was very pleased with the diluted programme and considers this to be a great enrichment for the neighbourhood.

The first phases (phases 1 and 2, see figure 4.6) were put up for sale in December 2015, of which the construction started in May 2016. The last phase will be completed in the summer of this year (2019), so then, the total construction time will have been 3 years.



Figure 4.6: Building phases Vermeerkwartier

Municipal management tools

The municipality of The Hague played a facilitating role. The project coordinator constantly monitored the process, consulted and contacted the required experts, and facilitated the spatial-judicial course of action.

Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were able to ensure that the new dwellings could be realised within the framework of the existing land-use plan, while stretching the limits as much as possible. The plan was assessed against standard welfare level. In each phase, the minor exemptions scheme (Dutch: *kruimelgevallenregeling*) was applied, which meant that a lot of consultation took place in preparation of the building permit. Through precise customisation – “colouring within the lines” – each block was fitted perfectly. Therefore, no new kinds of visual quality plans had to be drawn up and municipal cooperation was only needed to a limited extent.

As the land was issued to the housing association on a long-term lease and bought out by Van Wijnen in perpetuity, in each phase, the municipality examined whether or not a leasehold supplementation had to be paid. In each phase, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen had to demonstrate what the demolition and construction costs were, what would be built, and what would then be the difference in value. Those calculations all added up to zero.

Due to the economic circumstances, the municipality initially welcomed any kind of plan with open arms. Once the market slowly started to recover again, however, the municipal urban planning department expanded their demands and actively interfered with the urban design. According to the municipal project coordinator, Van Wijnen’s design was found to be too rural, wherefore qualitative improvements had to be made. There was a general demand for higher building volumes and in particular, for a height accent in phase 3, along the Hoefkade. By then, however, the process was already set in motion and the contract between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen was already drawn up. This revision thus led to discussions between the municipal project coordinator and the urban planning department. The former was in charge of an already moving train and knew that nothing to the detriment of the financial agreement between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen would be implemented, while the latter had certain spatial objectives to pursue. According to Haag Wonen, the urban planning department simply had not paid enough attention to the designs at first, wherefore they had to come back on their endorsement later on.

For some urban planning ideas, the land-use plan had to be altered. However, a consequence of the late, unpractical timing was that the municipal project coordinator would no longer rule in favour of altering the land-use plan at such a late stage in the process. Therefore, it was not entirely possible to incorporate the desired urban design modifications. But Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen did manage to fit the desired height accent of phase 3 into the already existing spatial framework.

Apart from the demands that were placed on the urban design, the municipal area manager was a strong proponent of the idea to accommodate a healthcare facility in the Vermeerwartier and actively promoted this by suggesting a range of suited organisations. Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen tried to meet that programmatic objective by going through a fairly lengthy exploration process with HWW Zorg. In the end, however, they decided against it, because the interests of this health care organisation insufficiently matched with the objectives of the ongoing urban area redevelopment process. Nevertheless, according to the municipal project coordinator, the fact that Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were prepared to deviate from the original programme was still conducive to the collaboration.

Management resources

The municipality had leased the land to Haag Wonen. In the redevelopment process, Van Wijnen received the land in perpetual ground lease per phase, and after completion, those land lease agreements were either transferred to the individual private owners or to Syntrus Achmea.

The municipality did not provide any financial contribution, but ahead of the development, they did refurbish and renew the public space. Renewing the sewerage system in the Vermeer neighbourhood was already planned for 2011 and 2012, long before the urban redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier was even announced. In consultation with Haag Wonen, those operations were carried out according to the original plan, while taking the future developments into account. In the redesign of the road network, the parking specifications were thoroughly taken into consideration.

The amount of homes was reduced from 500 to 200, which might suggest a non-feasible business case for Haag Wonen. The housing association, however, immediately recognised that apartment buildings would not generate an attractive land value in the Schilderswijk. Besides, the objective precisely was to diversify the housing stock by developing a different product. The land sale was based on a land yield of 20.000 euros per single-family dwelling.

From 2009-2010, Haag Wonen had sought different commercial partners that could realise the private sector accommodations of their initiated urban area redevelopment projects in other parts of the city. So knowledge-wise, the housing association already had some experience with such partnerships and with the sharing of responsibilities and risks.

Van Wijnen is a developing contractor and only develops for its own production. For Van Wijnen, the advantage of acting as a developing contractor is that the two parts of the entire redevelopment process can be combined very well. Thereby, in their opinion, the associated risks of both processes can be understood better, which is thus considered a valuable management resource for developments such as this one in the Schilderswijk.

Inter-organisational arrangements (formal cooperation)

This redevelopment project concerned a collaboration between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen, whereby they considered it important to formally arrange everything properly and thus took quite some time to do so. Both parties explained that a lot of energy was put into drawing up the contracts. In order to ensure that fuss and discussions later on in the process were prevented as much as possible, risk assessments were openly shared. Van Wijnen had estimated the magnitude of the financial risks, after which that amount was taken out of the offered land price. Thereby, a separate, explicit risk pot was composed. The amount that was still left at the end of the project would then be added to the land price. With regard to that land price, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen agreed upon a minimum yield as the basis of their contract. To optimise that amount as much as possible, the parties subsequently examined how the yield could be increased. If advantageous market developments were to take place, the profits would be shared.

Haag Wonen had intended to include a back-up, safety net, for Van Wijnen in case the sale would be disappointing. But in the end, the housing association was not able to provide such a guarantee. Therefore, an investing partner was sought. Despite the risks associated with investing in such a commercially sensitive neighbourhood, Syntrus Achmea dared to directly purchase homes in the first building phase and to rent them out in the mid-priced segment. As a result, an immediate sale of homes was guaranteed and a certain building volume could be realised at once. For Van Wijnen, this also increased the chances of success for the other building blocks.

Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen mostly worked together on the basis of the spatial urban area redevelopment plan. With a first sketch design in hand, they jointly presented the plans to the municipality, and collectively completed the entire preparation process.

The area was divided into five phases. In each phase, Haag Wonen was responsible for demolishing the existing stock and for preparing the land for construction, so that Van Wijnen could thereafter start building. The volume of each phase was fixed, but the land purchase agreement still offered the opportunity to slightly change the programme. The moment something would change, settlements would determine the consequences for the land price, following from the fixed minimum. That way, all sorts of risks were managed and Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were able to anticipate on economic developments, which also ensured trust. Risks were distributed and shared, and as soon as things would go well, both parties would benefit from it.

The progress was monitored by means of a two-monthly steering group consultation meeting. During those sessions, Van Wijnen would report to Haag Wonen how the contract was implemented and what progress was being made. Also with regard to the risk pot for example. In addition, particular coordination on the transfer of land was organised. Haag Wonen applied a certain schedule for the relocation of residents, possible legal procedures, demolition of the existing stock and for land remediation and preparation. That had to be aligned with Van Wijnen's planning. Through proper communication, the parties managed to optimise their planning as much as possible.

In retrospect, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen have both been able to properly adhere to the basic contractual agreements. Both with regard to the transfer of the land as well as in terms of the settlement of additional costs and revenues, which was separately calculated for each building phase.

Management activities (informal cooperation)

Determining the formal contractual agreements between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen has not been free of problems, but according to Van Wijnen, "there is no polish without friction". The problems were notably linked to financial objectives, as the land price for Haag Wonen directly depended on the expected return on Van Wijnen's investment. Therefore, the conversations were carried out in a transparent, open manner. Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were critical and made sure to keep each other alert with regard to the programmatic objectives and urban design principles. By using the available resources as efficiently as possible and through mutual alignment, coordination and tailoring, the negotiation process ultimately resulted in a contract they both agreed with. In order to avoid friction, jealousy and distrust, Van Wijnen mentioned that everything related to risks and revenues was formally stipulated.

Subsequently, the various phases of the redevelopment process created room for "a learning effect". According to Van Wijnen, communication aspects that did not work well in the first construction phase were fine-tuned by drawing lessons and making adjustments. A lot of information was exchanged with and between people doing the actual work. Through clear agreements between both contractors, unnecessary work was prevented as much as possible.

The expanded list of municipal urban planning demands led to vigorous debates with the developing parties and to changes in the sequence of the construction phases. The municipal project manager explained that several sketches and designs were discussed, which ultimately resulted in the urban allure that everyone could agree with. In order to not lose sight of their objectives, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen considered it important to "form a united front", by acting as partners and making efficient use of each other's characteristics and position with regard to the municipality. In their opinion, the "impatience of a developer", and the "long-term influence of a housing association" both came in handy. The former characteristic was used to apply pressure on the municipality in terms of decision-making, whereas the latter proved valuable in discussions about the number of square meters of commercial space. At one point, the municipality namely suggested to develop a large part of the plinth into commercial space. Being familiar with the neighbourhood, Haag Wonen pointed out that they were already having trouble with filling up their square meters of commercial space in other parts of the city. According to Haag Wonen, such a statement might have appeared more "suspicious" when made by a commercial developer only.

This partnership was also reflected in the residents' trajectory. Throughout the entire buying process, a great deal of attention was paid to the counselling of owner-occupiers. Van Wijnen took the lead in this, but did involve Haag

Wonen as a visible partner. They “appeared on every stage together”, to clearly express how “proud” they were of what they had accomplished.

Trust has also been mentioned explicitly as a key aspect of the collaboration between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen. In each project, Van Wijnen aspires to be “a good and reliable partner”. As for the Vermeerkwartier, Van Wijnen states that the parties were able to combine the “a deal is a deal” foundation with making an effort to keep the relationship comfortable. Haag Wonen could not verify exactly how much of the explicit risk pot Van Wijnen had needed to spend, and what would thus remain at the end. That asked for a certain level of trust: Haag Wonen simply trusted Van Wijnen to keep track of those costs in a decent, accurate way.

External factors

Social influences

At first, residents strongly protested against the announcement that their apartments would be demolished to make room for new single-family homes. According to Haag Wonen, it was a difficult message with a large impact that triggered quite a bit of struggle. By means of extensive conversations with the residents’ organisation, an acceptable social plan was composed. The 500 households could not all be relocated at the same time, so based on a certain philosophy, a block-by-block approach was chosen, whereby around 100 households were relocated simultaneously.

Once the new dwellings were put up for sale, this product clearly met a strong demand for single-family homes. According to Van Wijnen, inhabitants in the vicinity have been very pleased with the development as well. Over 80% of the buyers moved there from a place within the same zip code area and have been given the opportunity to climb the housing ladder. Even people who had left the area due to the lack of supply have now returned again. Thereby, for Van Wijnen, the involvement of people and their desire to live there was seen as a significant part of the process. By giving people enough comfort to invest in a home, families who can make a positive contribution to the neighbourhood were attracted. In order to stimulate their sense of belonging, Van Wijnen has paid a lot of attention to several milestones at which buyers could get to know their neighbours. A platform was offered and several gatherings were organised. This resulted in the desire to jointly furnish the courtyards, and for them to select the same fences and canopies, which added a lot of quality to the appearance of the dwellings.

Political influences

Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen “found each other in the midst of an economic crisis”; a time at which many building projects had stagnated and the city heartily welcomed any developments that parties were still able to get off the ground. The plan was governmentally warranted. Right from the start, the alderman was involved in the renovation versus demolition considerations and he strongly supported Haag Wonen’s final judgement on the matter. According to the municipal project coordinator, the alderman also ensured for things to speed up by means of quick decision-making and prompt actions.

Economic influences

During the plan development process in 2014-2015, market conditions were still vulnerable, wherefore the partnership with Syntrus Achmea was of high importance. As all properties of the first phase were sold quickly, the risks were greatly reduced, and prices were rising. The high demand for owner-occupied homes led to Van Wijnen only selling a smaller share to Syntrus Achmea than was initially foreseen. So in retrospect, the redevelopment profited from the economic circumstances. According to Van Wijnen, the property values have clearly increased over time, with major price differences between the homes that were sold in the first phase compared to those that were sold in the last phase.

The market conditions did influence the programme. For Haag Wonen, it was apparent that a dilution from 500 apartments to 187 single-family homes and 13 apartments would generate the most optimal yield. Densification in a higher segment, for example, would most likely have resulted in parking-related problems, causing the project not to be feasible. By contrast, Haag Wonen believes that, in the current economic climate, densification at an urban location like this might have been a more obvious choice.

Effectiveness

Objectives

The collaboration between Haag Wonen, Van Wijnen and the municipality of The Hague has resulted in a more differentiated housing stock in the Schilderswijk. With free sector single-family homes, this neighbourhood now distinguishes itself from other areas in the Schilderswijk, which are mostly characterised by social rental housing blocks. Haag Wonen regards The Vermeerkwartier to have become “a very popular place to live that radiates a lot of positivity”. The houses were sold very quickly, suggesting that the price-quality ratio is much appreciated. Moreover, a price rise can be recognised. This urban area redevelopment project did not lead to extra costs for Haag Wonen or Van Wijnen. Hence, all parties agree that both the joint as well as the individual goals have been achieved.

According to Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen, part of the success can be linked to the fact that they gave each other space to properly shape and define those objectives. As a result, both parties had a good feeling about the agreements that were made, which, they believe, is clearly reflected in the outcome.

Efficacy of the collaborative process

All parties are very positive about the efficacy of the process. Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen have found each other during a period of economic difficulty. They took their time to stipulate the formal agreements, but once the contracts were signed, everything went rather smoothly. According to Van Wijnen, there was no room for “nagging about small things” and Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen both shared the same “a deal is a deal” mentality. In addition, the collaboration with Syntrus Achmea allowed for Van Wijnen to accept a minimal presale percentage of 50 percent instead of the more usual 70 percent. Finally, Van Wijnen stressed that the economic climate, the willingness of people to invest in a home there, has very much contributed to the pace of the redevelopment process as well.

As Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen had to deal with converting the land loans, they strongly depended on the cooperation of the municipality. They did achieve to stay within the limits of the existing land-use plan, wherefore the planning procedures could be completed relatively quickly. In further negotiations with the municipality, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen strongly depended on one another, and made efficient use of their distinctive qualities and characteristics. The contractual negotiations between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were well underway when the urban planning department showed some resistance. This led to some adjustments in the partnership agreement, as the construction sequence of the last phases was altered. That way, a large part could already be built, while discussions about the precise programme and design of the last phase continued.

Parallel to the additional urban design exploration, a lot of time and effort was put into the municipal desire to accommodate a health care facility in the area. As suggested by the municipality, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen conducted an extensive study with health care organisation HWW Zorg. According to Van Wijnen, that was quite an intensive course of action, the outcome of which was uncertain and which deviated from the basic agreements that were laid down in the contract. Although they did believe that the health care facility would have added value to the development, the study showed that it was not possible to properly match the interests of the health care organisation to the ongoing redevelopment process. Therefore, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen decided not to pursue the partnership with HWW Zorg. An apartment building with a small commercial space in the plinth was realised instead.

Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were successful in their efforts to optimise the planning. In each phase, Van Wijnen was able to start construction soon after Haag Wonen had demolished the existing buildings and prepared the land. The contact between the demolition contractor of Haag Wonen and the contracting branch of Van Wijnen went smoothly; activities were properly coordinated and additional work was communicated in a timely manner. After the first phase, necessary measures were taken to make sure that lessons were learned and each subsequent phase would run even more smoothly. According to Van Wijnen, this led to an exceptionally quick “time to market”.

Lessons learned/preconditions

The collaborative process behind the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague has been very effective. Several factors have led to the achievement of all the objectives, and Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen look back on a successful partnership that they would very much like to repeat sometime. In their opinion, it was not an overly

complex collaboration. Van Wijnen explained that the parties have managed to “find the simplicity of the redevelopment”, which allowed them to increase the chances of success.

According to Haag Wonen, an effective collaboration process always starts with people. They appreciated Van Wijnen’s proposal, as it included profit-sharing and a fairly low pre-sale percentage. Thereafter, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen had an open conversation, made estimates and shared uncertainties. The parties were aware of each other’s interests and kept each other on their toes with regard to the common objectives. An adequate financial calculation model led to proper agreements. Based on a minimum yield, Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen ensured financial security, whilst allowing room for further explorations regarding the programme and urban design of the different phases.

According to the municipal project coordinator, the good start and basis were of great importance to the success. Everyone felt positively and comfortable about the course of action, they were confident, and the common objectives were clear.

4.2. Comparison

In this section, the case outcomes are compared to one another. Firstly, the external factors are analysed, by comparing the social, political and economic influences. Thereafter, the different sub-categories are evaluated separately; both by means of a complete overview, as well as by making a distinction between similarities and differences. At the end of each paragraph, the comparison findings are translated into lessons, by linking them to the external factors and effectiveness.

4.2.1. External factors

As pointed out under section 3.1, an urban area redevelopment project is initiated as a response to improving an existing urban situation (Heurkens, 2012, p.47). Apart from that context being the reason for such an initiative, it is also often subject to change. Urban areas are constantly influenced by dynamic events from their surroundings (Heurkens, 2012). In that sense, the external factors – social, political and economic circumstances – can be viewed in regard to their influence on both the internal project objectives as well as the collaborative process. In this study, the former relates to the vulnerable neighbourhood context and the aim to diversify the housing stock as a response to an existing situation within that context. The latter relates to the extent to which social, political and economic circumstances have influenced and shaped the forms of cooperation and management instruments that were applied to reach that aim. Combined, the purpose of the analysis below is to be able to draw lessons that are specifically applicable to urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

In table 4.1, an overview of the social, political and economic influences and the responses to those influences are given. Per section, a generalised link to the vulnerable neighbourhood context is drawn:

- In the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, social housing complexes typically have to be demolished, resulting in forced relocation processes and common dissatisfaction among residents;
- Diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can cause social unrest (tension between new and existing residents for instance);
- Political attention/warranting is not always naturally available when redeveloping vulnerable neighbourhoods (this depends on a range of factors, such as the political colour, and can therefore fluctuate);
- Due to financial risks and uncertainty, periods of economic difficulty can cause reluctance to invest in vulnerable neighbourhoods (strongly related to the attractiveness/image of the specific area and thus differs per situation).

It is not claimed that these relations exceptionally apply to vulnerable neighbourhoods, or even to all neighbourhoods one would typify as being vulnerable. Instead, these conclusions simply follow from the summarised overview of the three analysed cases and will therefore be used as the contextual basis. In tables 4.2 - 4.4, the similarities and differences regarding the different influences are given into more detail. This firstly provides further footing to the statements above and secondly enables an evaluation of the degree to which social, political and economic circumstances have influenced and shaped the applied forms of cooperation and management instruments.

External factors	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
Social influences: <i>relocation process</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Consultation sessions with the residents' organisation were lengthy; residents did not agree with the demolition plans · Reimbursement of removal expenses was paid · Municipal urgency declarations helped with the relocation process 	N.A.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The demolition message triggered quite a bit of struggle · Based on a certain philosophy, the relocation process was organised block-by-block · Reimbursement of removal expenses was paid · Municipal urgency declarations helped with the relocation process · Liveability was maintained by means of temporary housing permits
<i>social housing complexes typically have to be demolished, resulting in forced relocation processes and common dissatisfaction among residents</i>			
Social influences: <i>(participation of) new residents & neighbours</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Neighbours experienced a lot of nuisance and strong feelings of insecurity during the prolonged construction phase 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Neighbours worried about certain features of the redevelopment and stipulated that a small playground should be preserved · Trajectory caused some delays and tension between existing and new residents 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The sense of belonging was stimulated by means of a well-organised buying process: a lot of attention was paid to the different milestones at which buyers could get to know their neighbours and jointly decided on architectural finishing touches
<i>social unrest/ tension between new and existing residents can arise</i>			
Political influences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The redevelopment had to foresee in the city-wide goal to bring the housing stock into balance and to improve the liveability in vulnerable neighbourhoods 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Kleinpolder Southwest was the subject of constant political debate: extensive discussions about noise pollution and air quality vs. the desire to redevelop such a large patch of unused land 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The plan was politically desired and governmentally warranted: the alderman was involved right from the start
<i>political attention/warranting is not always naturally available (tends to depend on the "political colour" and can thus fluctuate)</i>			
Economic influences	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Due to the economic crisis, the plans had to put on hold for a couple of years · During sale, the Fruitbuurt did not have a good image and buyers had to get used to the asking price · The houses were sold quickly and prices have risen 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Woonstad considered their timing (2012-2014) to be rather risky · Van Omme & De Groot waited until the economic circumstances had improved · The development has benefitted from the increasing attractiveness of Rotterdam; property values have risen substantially 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Economic circumstances were uncertain at first (partnership with Syntrus Achmea was of great importance) · Economic market conditions have influenced the programme; densification was not feasible · The development has profited a lot from the economic windfall: property values have clearly risen over time
<i>due to financial risks and uncertainty, periods of economic difficulty can cause reluctance to invest (related to the image of the area)</i>			

Table 4.1: Overview of the social, political and economic influences

In the comparison of the similarities and differences regarding the social factors, attention was paid to the extent to which the residents have directly influenced the redevelopment processes. As concluded in the previous section, urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods almost always indicates that certain social housing complexes have to be demolished to make room for new dwellings in a higher segment. That means that the occupants of those social housing complexes have to move to a different neighbourhood – or, in any case, to a different complex. Such a message can trigger quite some struggle and resistance

– as illustrated by the redevelopment projects in Utrecht and The Hague. Although this was not the case in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest, the fact that the residents did not agree with the demolition plans, is still viewed as a similarity. This is because no relocation process has taken place at all in the Rotterdam case, since the area had already been vacant for many years and can thus not be compared to the social influences resulting from that relocation. However, it is safe to say that that situation in Rotterdam was quite exceptional and that, normally, relocation processes are an inevitable element of urban area redevelopment projects aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Due to that communality, both the housing association in Utrecht as well as in The Hague explained that they have adopted standardised relocation approaches that for instance include reimbursements of removal expenses. In addition, in both cases, the municipality released urgency declarations, through which the residents were prioritised over others in their search for a new home.

Looking at the differences, the relocation process in Utrecht was not entirely organised as the housing association would have liked. Since the project was impacted by economic uncertainty, the relocation process was experienced as chaotic and unstructured. During that period, the housing association furthermore struggled to keep the area liveable. This had implications for the effectiveness of the redevelopment in terms of efficacy. Vice versa one could also argue that the chaotic relocation process was a consequence of ineffective collaboration and management. In The Hague, on the other hand, the relocation process was organised by means of a philosophised block-by-block approach, whereby around 100 households were relocated simultaneously. By means of temporary housing permits, the housing association moreover managed to maintain the liveability during transition periods. Compared to the Fruitbuurt North, this seems to indicate the collaboration and management to have been more effective. Conversely, one could also say that the lesser extent of “negative” influences resulted in fewer factors that threatened the collaboration, and thus in a more effective process. These different sides and angles in relation to effectiveness will receive more attention in the final section of this chapter.

The direct influence of the local community can be increased through citizen participation. In all three cases, however, the actors have not organised a specific participation trajectory with regard to the local neighbours. The area coordinator of the Fruitbuurt North did mention that the municipality of Utrecht actively encourages market parties to involve the community in their redevelopment processes by means of a participation standard, but, according to the housing association and to the dissatisfaction of the municipal area manager, that participation standard was not applied here. In Rotterdam, this seemed less relevant, due to the “clean slate” situation and due to the impression that neighbours were all very pleased with the fact that the vacant plot would finally be redeveloped after all those years. In the end, however, some neighbours did express their concern about certain features of the redevelopment plans and stipulated that a small playground would be preserved. This caused some delays and tension, which could perhaps have been avoided with the aid of a participation trajectory. In The Hague, the local neighbours were not actively involved, because the housing association is not a strong proponent of citizen participation as due to their limited amount of resources. On the other hand, the developer did pay a lot of attention to the different milestones at which buyers could get to know their neighbours. As part of that platform, the buyers jointly decided on architectural finishing touches, which, according to the developer, did not only add quality to the development, but also stimulated their sense of belonging.

External factors: social influences	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
Participation trajectory <i>local neighbours</i>	No participation trajectory with regard to the local neighbours was organised		
Relocation process: <i>message triggered struggle</i>	Residents did not agree with the demolition plans; consultation sessions were lengthy	N.A.	Residents did not agree with the demolition plans; consultation sessions were lengthy
Relocation process: <i>removal expenses</i>	Residents received reimbursement of removal expenses	N.A.	Residents received reimbursement of removal expenses
Relocation process: <i>municipal support</i>	Municipal urgency declarations helped with the relocation process	N.A.	Municipal urgency declarations helped with the relocation process
<u>Differences</u>			
Relocation process: <i>organisation</i>	The relocation process was experienced as chaotic and unstructured	N.A.	The relocation process was organised by means of a block-by-block philosophy
Relocation process: <i>liveability</i>	The housing association struggled to keep the area liveable	N.A.	Liveability was maintained by means of temporary housing permits
Local neighbours:	Neighbours experienced a lot of nuisance and feelings of insecurity during the prolonged construction phase	Neighbours worried about certain features of the redevelopment (stipulated preservation of playground)	N.A.
	Social unrest	Delays and tension	
Participation trajectory <i>new residents</i>	No notable participation trajectory with regard to new residents was organised	No notable participation trajectory with regard to new residents was organised	Sense of belonging was stimulated by means of a well-organised buying process and joint decision on finishing touches

Table 4.2: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding social influences

The projects were all initiated during a period of economic difficulty; in vulnerable neighbourhoods where the liveability was under pressure and intervention was very much needed. For that reason, in general, the redevelopments were politically desired, supported and warranted. In Utrecht and Rotterdam, however, some political discussions did influence the project outcomes or its course of action. The redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North was part of a city-wide programme that focussed on bringing the housing stock into balance and improving the liveability in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Therefore, the project outcome had to adhere to a strict programme of requirements. That did cause some debate, as the housing association was not able to fulfil all municipal ambitions.

In Rotterdam, the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest was affected by a constant political debate, resulting of alternating discussions about noise pollution and air quality on the one side and a strong desire to redevelop that large patch of unused land on the other. For that reason, central political attention was not naturally available from the start. It was even argued that the redevelopment would not have been politically warranted at all if it weren't for the persuasive power of the district council. In any case, the liveability arguments did in the end outweigh the environmental discussions, which deemed absolutely necessary for the redevelopment process to be kicked off.

<i>External factors: political influences</i>	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
<i>Political support:</i>	In general, the redevelopments were all politically desired, supported and warranted		
<u>Differences</u>			
<i>Political discussions:</i>	Some rather strict demands were set	Central political attention was not naturally available as the area was the subject of constant political debate	No influential political discussions were mentioned

Table 4.3: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding political influences

As already mentioned, the three cases are comparable in the sense that they were all initiated during a period of economic difficulty. The commercial actors were quite hesitant at first, as they could not really assess how hard it would be to sell the dwellings for the estimated price. In Utrecht, the development plans for the Fruitbuurt North had to be put on hold for a couple of years, as it took a while before the commercial parties dared to take the investment risks. This did not only have consequences for the redevelopment process in itself, but for the residents as well, because the delay negatively affected the liveability. In Rotterdam, the commercial developers also waited until the economic circumstances had improved. They themselves did not mind waiting, but the housing association would have preferred for them to have started earlier, wherefore it did not necessarily strengthen the relationship. In the end, however, all redevelopments have profited a lot from the economic windfall: the houses were sold quickly and property values have risen substantially.

<i>External factors: economic influences</i>	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
<i>Burdened by economic risks:</i>	At the start of the process, the involved actors were quite hesitant due to economic risks		
<i>Benefitted from economic windfall:</i>	The developments have benefitted from economic windfall throughout the years		
<u>Differences</u>			
<i>Delays due to economic uncertainty:</i>	The plans had to be put on hold for a couple of years	The commercial developers waited until the economic circumstances had improved	N.A.

Table 4.4: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding economic influences

External factors conclusions: vulnerable neighbourhood context

The purpose of this analysis was to get a grip on the vulnerable neighbourhood context, so as to be able to specifically link the sub-categorised lessons that are to be formulated in the following paragraphs to this predicament. Hereby, social, political and economic circumstances were distinguished. Socially, it was concluded that forced relocation processes are usually inevitable when aiming to diversify the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. It is important to note here that such demolition decisions must of course follow from extensive, mandatory investigations into the physical and economic state of the concerning housing complexes to reveal that major renovations would by no means be feasible. Despite the thereby substantiated negative state, the aforementioned relocation processes and the thereafter following realisation of mixed neighbourhoods can nonetheless cause social unrest, dissatisfaction and tension among residents. By means of standardised approaches and regulations, existing residents can, however, still be relocated. Although such processes can be lengthy and unpleasant, these social influences thus rarely prohibit the redevelopment from taking place. In other words, and linked to effectiveness: the objectives are generally realised, but the efficacy of the collaborative process is commonly harmed by this.

It might therefore be sensible to avoid social tension as much as possible by means of sincere resident involvement and an actively stimulated sense of belonging for both new and existing residents. Such reasoning moreover applies

to a perhaps even more important argument, being that the social context should not be perceived as a *tabula rasa*. Especially when claiming to combat issues related to urban inequality instead of worsening them, it might be fitting to actively take the local conditions and interests into account. As stated by Hartley (2016), such involvement allows for local innovation to flourish and for places to become locally relevant.

Politically, it was concluded that political attention is not always naturally available when redeveloping vulnerable neighbourhoods. Among other things, this depends on the municipal capacity and political colour and moreover relates to the economic circumstances. As based on information shared by the interviewed developing parties and housing associations, political support tends to be provided more easily during periods of economic difficulty. In general, however, the level of political attention widely fluctuates, which can thus hinder the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods. Whereas periods of economic difficulty can trigger the necessary political support, it does often cause reluctance among developing parties to invest in vulnerable neighbourhoods. The financial risks and level of uncertainty logically differ per area, and are, among other things, related to the image of the specific neighbourhood.

One could argue that the social, political and economic factors that were described above can to some extent be linked to any urban area redevelopment project. In any type of neighbourhood, an urban area redevelopment project might trigger social tension and dissatisfaction, and may suffer from a lack of political support and economic uncertainty. Truly being able to judge the specificity of these circumstances would ask for a more extensive contextual analysis of a range of vulnerable and non-vulnerable neighbourhoods. Also without that substantiation, however, it is still relevant to make use of these external factors when formulating appropriate lessons. Discussions on the generalisability of the results and on the applicability of the final recommendations in other contexts will receive more attention in chapter 8.

4.2.2. Municipal management tools

In the previous chapter, four municipal management goals were distinguished: shaping, regulating, stimulating and facilitating. In order to reach these goals, municipalities have a range of management instruments at their disposal. In the analyses of the three cases, the role of the municipality was described by means of the “tools” that were used to steer on the development in order to reach their objectives. This is essentially viewed from the managerial perspective of the municipal area manager or project coordinator, as opposed to the perspective of the entire municipality as a whole. In table 4.5, the implemented tools are categorised by means of the abovementioned municipal management goals. The overview that was used for this can be found in Appendix 3.

As part of the theoretical concepts, the changing state-market relations in urban area redevelopment was mentioned, whereby it was suggested that the influence of the private sector has increased whereas the influence of public bodies has decreased. This trend is indeed reflected in the analysed cases. Although the interviewed municipal area managers were clearly aware of the fact that they are increasingly dependent on developing actors, it did seem as if they are still in search of the most suitable way to play the facilitating role. The overview of the municipal management tools that were implemented in each case (table 4.1), illustrates that the passive, facilitating role can take on various forms and reveals that it is possible for a municipality to pursue multiple management goals.

According to the former district council of Overschie, the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest has revealed that wanting to control too much can, in some cases, hinder solutions. Therefore, ultimately, their goal has been to stimulate and facilitate the redevelopment as much as possible. Among other things, this has been done by means of financial contributions to the public space and an innovative collaboration form whereby, under the supervision of the municipal urban planning department, the developing parties were responsible for making a coherent plan.

By means of urban policies, visions, regional agreements, area prioritisation and spatial principles, the municipality of Utrecht has clearly wanted to shape the decision-making scope of the market players in the Fruitbuurt. Due to the fact that the land-use plan had to be changed, the municipality of Utrecht could exercise direct influence. On the other hand, it was still “a matter of give and take” – whereby it was noted that, in such negotiations, the “soft side” should not be underestimated.

In The Hague, the municipal role was focussed on regulating and facilitating. The municipal project coordinator constantly monitored the process, consulted and contacted the required experts, and facilitated the spatial judicial course of action. With the aid of the minor exemptions scheme, the plan could be realised within the limits of the existing land-use plan. In addition, the municipal project coordinator closely monitored whether or not a leasehold supplementation had to be paid – which was not the case. Although regulating tools were not actively, specifically, altered for the development in the Vermeerkwartier, the existing policies did still limit the decision-making scope.

Municipal management goals, roles and tools	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North <i>[mostly shaping]</i>	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest <i>[mostly stimulating & facilitating]</i>	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier <i>[mostly regulating & facilitating]</i>
Shaping <i>creating area potential and shaping the decision-making scope of market players</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Urban policies: cooperation agreements between the municipality of Utrecht and housing associations, 2011-2015 (Building the city) Visions/regional agreement: Vibrant Ondiep and Groendiep public space programme Area prioritisation (vulnerable neighbourhood) Spatial principles: urban programme of requirements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Area prioritisation (Vogelaar neighbourhood approach) Spatial principles: conservation of the post-war urban structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Spatial principles were given: a certain level of urban quality had to be realised
Regulating <i>demarcating area potential and limiting the decision-making scope of market players</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structural concepts Land-use plan had to be altered Development agreements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Structural concepts: set of guiding principles There was no land-use plan; the general building regulations applied (regulations with regard to noise pollution and air quality were less strict) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Land-use plan did not need to be altered: minor exemptions scheme was applied The plan was assessed against standard welfare level No leasehold supplementations had to be paid
Stimulating <i>increasing area potential and broadening the decision-making scope of market players</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial contribution: ISV funds for the public space 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial contribution: ISV funds for the public space Financial construction: link between east and west Financial windfall: no building fees Maintenance of the public space is done by the urban management department (<i>stadsbeheer</i>) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ahead of the re-development, the municipality refurbished and renewed the public space (sewerage system and streets)
Facilitating <i>exploring area potential and supporting the decision-making scope of market players</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Municipal area manager actively steered on the process Municipal housing office: urgency declarations were released Municipal urban planning department was very involved and supportive 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Innovative form of collaboration: developing parties were responsible for making a coherent plan District council as a connecting platform Municipal urban planning department: guidance and counselling 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Municipal project coordinator monitored the process Municipal housing office: urgency declarations were released Municipal urban planning department actively interfered

Table 4.5: Overview of the municipal management goals, roles and tools

The facilitating management goal has thus taken on different forms in the three cases that were analysed. In the table below, these differences become even more visible, as only two overlapping similarities between all three cases can be distinguished. The municipality of Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague have all specified spatial principles, and each made an active contribution to the public space. When looking further down at the differences, however, it is noticeable that the exact implementations of both tools vary. With regard to the spatial principles, a specific urban programme of requirements applied to the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt, whereas the “measuring” tools used in Kleinpolder Southwest and the Vermeerkwartier were more general. In both Utrecht and Rotterdam, ISV-funds were made available as a stimulating contribution to the public space. The stimulating effect of the contribution to the public space in The Hague, on the other hand, was realised by means of refurbishments and renewal of the sewerage system and streets ahead of the redevelopment.

Municipal management goal, role and tools	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
Shaping: <i>spatial principles</i>	Specified spatial principles applied		
Stimulating: <i>contribution public space</i>	An active contribution to the public space was made		
<u>Differences</u>			
Shaping: <i>area prioritisation</i>	Area prioritisation: vulnerable neighbourhood (Vogelaar)	Area prioritisation: vulnerable neighbourhood (Vogelaar)	N.A.
Shaping: <i>urban policies</i>	Building The City cooperation agreements 2011-2015	N.A.	N.A.
Shaping: <i>visions/regional agreements</i>	Vibrant Ondiep & Groendiep public space programme	N.A.	N.A.
Shaping: <i>spatial principles</i>	Urban programme of requirements	Conservation of the post-war urban structure	A certain level of urban quality had to be realised
Regulating: <i>land-use plan</i>	Land-use plan had to be altered	There was no land-use plan	Land-use plan did not need to be altered
Regulating: <i>structural concepts & development agreements</i>	Specific structural concepts and development agreements were set	Set of guiding spatial principles	Plan was assessed against standard welfare level
Stimulating: <i>contribution public space</i>	ISV-funds were made available	ISV-funds were made available	Refurbished and renewal of the sewerage system + streets ahead of the redevelopment
Stimulating: <i>financial construction/windfall</i>	N.A.	Financial link between east and west & no building fees	N.A.
Facilitating: <i>collaboration form</i>	Collaboration form by means of the urban programme of requirements	Innovative collaboration form: Developing parties were responsible for urban plan	No formal collaboration form applied
Facilitating: <i>process management</i>	Municipal area manager actively steered on the process	Decentral guidance by the district council of Overschie	Municipal project coordinator monitored the process
Facilitating: <i>municipal housing office</i>	Municipal housing office released urgency declarations	N.A.	Municipal housing office released urgency declarations
Facilitating: <i>urban planning department</i>	Municipal urban planning department was very involved and supportive	Municipal planning department had a supervising, guiding role	Municipal urban planning department actively interfered

Table 4.6: Comparison of the similarities and differences between the municipal management goals, roles and tools

When looking at the other differences regarding the municipal shaping role, it immediately becomes apparent that, in comparison to Rotterdam and The Hague, the municipality of Utrecht has made use of the most tools that create area potential and shape the decision-making scope of market players. Apart from the spatial principles, the

municipality of Utrecht has prioritised the redevelopment of Ondiep over other neighbourhoods. This area prioritisation was also applied to Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam, soon after Ella Vogelaar had introduced the neighbourhood approach. Other management tools that shaped the redevelopment scope of the involved developing parties in Utrecht are the cooperation agreements for 2011-2015 between the municipality of Utrecht and local housing associations, the regional *Vibrant Ondiep* protocol and the *Groendiep* public space programme.

As described in section 3.1.2, land-use plans are considered to be strong management instruments for local authorities in terms of development control. Such plans thereby demarcate area potential and limit the decision-making scope of market players. When comparing the three cases, it is striking that the land-use plan situation was different for each case. In order for the new development to fit, the land-use plan in Utrecht had to be altered and updated. The municipality could thus exercise direct influence on what would be realised. In Rotterdam, the use of land had not yet been laid down in a statutory land-use plan, wherefore the general building regulations applied instead. On the one hand, this has limited the municipal influence. On the other hand, the more flexible regulatory approach created room for developments that might otherwise not have been possible. In general, however, not having a land-use plan was a deliberate tool the municipality of Rotterdam applied in order to encourage market players to redevelop the area. It has more been a coincidental circumstance that some municipal players agreed with and others did not. Despite the fact that the urban planning department would have liked for it to be different, in The Hague, the land-use plan did not need to be altered, as the minor exemptions scheme was implemented and the developing parties consciously “coloured within the lines”. Nevertheless, this conscious aim did limit their decision-making scope.

Apart from land-use plans, municipalities can make use of other tools that contribute to the spatio-judicial framework. These tools also differ per analysed case. For the Fruitbuurt, the municipality of Utrecht applied formal, structural concepts and development agreements to regulate the development scope. In Rotterdam, the coherent urban plan for Kleinpolder Southwest had to comply with a specific set of guiding spatial principles. Lastly, in The Hague, the plan was assessed against standard welfare level.

Due to the complexity of the location, and resulting from the broader scope that was administered by looking beyond Kleinpolder Southwest to the rest of Ondiep – or at least to the rest of Kleinpolder – the district council of Overschie had stipulated a construction whereby Kleinpolder east was financially linked to Kleinpolder west. Another financially stimulating windfall was created by the rule that the levying of building fees must always be connected to the land-use plan. As a land-use plan did not apply here, building fees could thus not be levied. However, although this broadened the decision-making scope of the market players and benefitted the redevelopment, the municipality of Rotterdam did miss out on additional income – which they were not pleased with. Therefore, this financially stimulating windfall is another example of a municipal management tool that was actually not used deliberately.

As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the involved actors referred to the municipality as taking on a “facilitating” role. Indeed, quite a few facilitating tools can be distinguished. On the one hand, these tools can be placed under several common denominators, namely: forms of collaboration, process management and municipal offices (housing and urban planning). On the other hand, the exact tools vary and the same tool never applies to all three cases. Zooming in on the process management tool, for example, illustrates that, in Utrecht, the municipal area manager actively steered on the process, whereas the project coordinator in The Hague mainly monitored the process. In Rotterdam, the district council of Overschie provided decentral guidance. As for the role of the municipal urban planning department, in both Utrecht as well as The Hague, the urban planning department was very involved in and actively interfered with the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and the Vermeerkwartier respectively. By contrast, in Rotterdam, the developing parties were responsible for the urban plan and the municipal urban planning department only played a supervising, guiding role.

Municipal management tools: findings

The very essence of the municipal management tools analysis can be summarised as *the search for finding a balance between keeping control and letting go; a balance between strictness and flexibility*. The conversations with the municipal area coordinator of the Fruitbuurt in Utrecht, the former district council of Overschie in Rotterdam, and the municipal project manager of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague, clearly reflected the general awareness of the increased dependency on private parties. The amount of public land ownership is declining, as a result of which the

governmental negotiation position has altered into a more passive involvement. The case study comparison has illustrated that the execution of passive involvement can still take on various forms. To enable the formulation of specific lessons, the involvement is linked to the vulnerable neighbourhood context – as based on the in section 4.2.1 generalised social, political and economic circumstances – and to the effectiveness aim.

Management of social, political and economic circumstances

In order for the relocation procedures to run smoothly, support of and close collaboration with the municipality is advisable. Firstly, the demolition plans need to be approved by the local authority, as based on the extensive, mandatory investigations into the physical and economic state of the concerning housing complexes. Secondly, support by the municipal housing office (releasing urgency declarations) is invaluable for the relocation processes of existing residents – as portrayed in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and the Vermeerkwartier.

The same can be said about resident participation. When a participation standard is to be applied by the developing parties, as was the case in Utrecht, the municipality still appears to be held responsible for ensuring the orderly management of such a procedure. In practice, namely, residents tend to turn to the municipal area manager to express their dissatisfaction about a redevelopment process. To avoid this, and to avoid social unrest in general, locally determined resident involvement and an actively stimulated sense of belonging for both new and existing residents is desirable. Herein lies an important managerial role for the municipal area manager.

Since political attention is not always naturally available when redeveloping vulnerable neighbourhoods, central, public guidance appears to be imperative. As views sometimes diverge between municipal departments and in order to assess the need and urgency to intervene, municipal area managers should ideally, at any time, be aware of the neighbourhood situation. This was illustrated by the essential role of the former district council of Overschie in Rotterdam.

In periods of economic difficulty, and related to the general financial risks and uncertainty of investing in vulnerable neighbourhoods, stimulating, incentivising management tools may need to be adopted to trigger the desired redevelopment process. Tools to increase area potential and broaden the decision-making scope of market players. For the development of public areas, stimulating subsidies seem to be essential. Both with regard to the desired quality as well as for the establishment of goodwill among the private parties. In addition, flexibility regarding land prices and financial constructions can help in the encouragement of urban area redevelopment projects. This for instance proved invaluable for the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam.

Effective municipal management tools

As stipulated under section 3.5, effectiveness is viewed in two ways. Firstly, it is considered in relation to realising the housing diversification objective. It is, of course, logical for the local authority to want to provide a framework by means of shaping and regulating tools. The case study comparison has, however, shown that the chances for such frameworks to produce the desired outcomes are higher if a collective understanding – a collective feeling of urgency – is established. The municipal area manager can actually play an essential linking role in this, whereby especially the soft side, in terms of good relationships, should not be underestimated. This includes the need for a realistically formulated ambition level with respect to the urban programme of requirements. According to the developing parties, housing associations and former district council of Overschie, the central municipality sometimes tends to have a deviant perception of the demand, or of the financial risks and opportunities. Such misperceptions can be avoided by (experimenting with) not specifying a detailed ambition level at all. Instead, only general guidelines are set, so as to leave room for market initiatives.

Effectiveness moreover relates to the efficacy of the collaborative process. The efficacy of urban area redevelopment processes – as viewed from the municipal management role – can benefit from trust in the competency of developing parties. In Rotterdam and The Hague, the developing parties had full control over the planning, whereby the municipal departments to a large part only played an assessing, facilitating role. This role division caused for things to speed up and for both parties to be pleased with the acceleration. This does not mean that a more actively involved urban planning department, for instance, is necessarily a bad thing. On the contrary, in Utrecht, the housing association spoke very positively about the supportive role of the urban planning department. As a general lesson, however, the reasons for wanting to actively be on top of things should be logical and of added value to the collaborative process.

4.2.3. Management resources

As stated by Daamen (2010), the three management resources land, capital and knowledge represent the material and knowledge power relations between actors. Heurkens (2012) thus suggests that actors who own the most of the land, bring in the capital, and have the required knowledge to be brought into the urban area redevelopment project, obtain a powerful position. Thereby, these resources can be used to influence decisions and to realise objectives.

Management resources	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
Land	The land was <u>owned by</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mitros (sub-area 1-3) • The municipality (small square of sub-area 1) 	The land was <u>owned by</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The municipality (sub-area 1-3) 	The land was <u>owned by</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haag Wonen
	The land was <u>sold to</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN (sub-area 1) • Zondag Ontwikkeling (portion of sub-area 3) • Mitros (small square of sub-area 1) 	The land was <u>sold to</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Van Omme & De Groot (sub-area 1) • Batenburg (sub-area 2) • Woonstad (sub-area 3) 	The land was <u>sold to</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Van Wijnen (perpetual leasehold)
Capital	The redevelopment <u>investments and risks</u> were for the account of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • MN (sub-area 1 + portion of sub-area 3) • Mitros, (sub-area 2) • Zondag Ontwikkeling (portion of sub-area 3) 	The redevelopment <u>investments and risks</u> were for the account of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Van Omme & De Groot (sub-area 1) • Batenburg (sub-area 2) • Woonstad (sub-area 3) <i>[joint financing of the coherent urban plan]</i>	The redevelopment <u>investments and risks</u> were for the account of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Haag Wonen (demolitions and site preparations) • Van Wijnen (construction and sale)
	<u>Municipal contribution</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • subsidies for the public space (ISV funds) 	<u>Municipal contribution</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • subsidies for the public space (ISV funds) 	<u>Municipal contribution</u> : <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • refurbishment and renewal of the public space (sewerage system and streets)
Knowledge/ experience (relevant and note-worthy)	<u>Municipality</u> of Utrecht + Experienced with the neighbourhood approach, as it was part of a citywide policy/ focus	<u>Municipality</u> of Rotterdam + The district council had a clear overview of the neighbourhood, and was very much aware of the urgent need for a suitable urban area redevelopment plan	<u>Municipality</u> of The Hague N.A.
	<u>Housing association</u> : Mitros + Good overview of the neighbourhood predicament, as this development was part of a much larger project – Little experience with collaborating with private parties in area redevelopment and relationship with the municipality was fragile	<u>Housing association</u> : Woonstad + Significant and long-standing neighbourhood involvement; good understanding of the neighbourhood predicament + Already quite experienced with such collaborative processes	<u>Housing association</u> : Haag Wonen + Good overview of the neighbourhood predicament (and of the chances of success of commercial space for example) + Already had some experience with such partnerships and with the sharing of responsibilities
	<u>Developer</u> : Zondag Ontwikkeling N.A.	<u>Developer</u> : Van Omme & De Groot + Developing contractor; thus able to synchronise the two phases and to accurately manage the associated (construction) risks	<u>Developer</u> : Van Wijnen + Developing contractor; thus able to synchronise the two phases and to accurately manage the associated (construction) risks

Table 4.7: Overview of the management resources

In that sense, it is relevant to compare the management resources of each case, by looking at the way they are distributed over the involved actors and the consequences for their power and steering influence. In table 4.7, the complete overview is given, whereby the bullets of the knowledge/experience resource superficially indicate whether an aspect has mostly encouraged (+) or hindered (-) the collaborative urban area redevelopment process. In tables 4.8 to 4.10, these outcomes are compared in terms of similarities and differences. In the concluding paragraph of this section, lessons in terms of effectiveness are drawn.

In the table below, the similarities and differences regarding *land* as a management resource are listed. A distinction is made between the land owners/sellers and land buyers, whereby no similarities – in terms of aspects that apply to all three cases – can be recognised. In the Fruitbuurt North, the housing association owned all the land, except for one small adjacent square they acquired from the municipality. Apart from that transaction, some portions of the land, and the associated plans, were sold to several developers. The remainder retained part of the housing association’s portfolio. This allowed them to personally develop one coherent urban plan, which was very effective with regard to their personal objectives. The housing association did what was – according to them and the municipality – best for the neighbourhood; a strategy that resulted in a diversified housing stock and improved liveability. Reflecting on the efficacy of the collaborative process, however, this use of land as a management resource left much to be desired, mostly resulting from the late involvement of (multiple) commercial developers.

In Rotterdam, the municipality owned the land, which usually means that they are the ones to develop the coherent urban plan, and can thus exercise direct influence on the project outcomes. In this case, however, the municipality did not make use of that influence, but instead made the developing parties responsible for it, as they themselves could not succeed in making a feasible development plan. Thereby, the influence regarding their personal objectives decreased. But it did benefit the efficacy of the collaborative process and ultimately resulted in a diversified housing stock and improved liveability.

In The Hague, the land was owned by the housing association as well, but there, it concerned leasehold land. The housing association was still considered to be the land seller, but, due to the leasehold situation, a certain legislative framework had to be taken into account (addressed under section 4.1.3). As their finances did not allow such large investments, the land was sold to a developer in order to enable redevelopment of the area. In the land sale agreement, general objectives regarding the desired programme were included, in order to make sure that the redevelopment would result in the realisation of a *new* housing type. This agreement furthermore led to an efficient collaborative process, including a quick time to market rate.

Management resource: land	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Differences</u>			
Land owners/sellers:	The housing association and the municipality	The municipality	The housing association (leasehold)
Land buyers:	Two developers and the housing association	Two developers and a housing association	One single developer (perpetual leasehold)

Table 4.8: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding “land” as a management resource

The land transactions led to redevelopment projects and thus to investments. A similarity between all three cases lies in the fact that the investments and risks were for the account of the concerned housing association and involved developer(s). The exact size of the investment and of the associated risks, however, differ per case and per actor. In Utrecht, the housing association was only allowed to invest in social housing; in services of general economic interest (SGEIs). That share consisted of 28 apartments and 57 single-family homes. In addition, they also performed demolition works and site preparations for the portions of land they sold to an investor and a developer. That investor then developed 44 single-family homes and 36 apartments, which are rented out for the long-term, in an affordable, yet private, segment. The developer realised 35 single-family owner-occupied, private sector homes in a different sub-area. In Rotterdam, the housing association has bought and redeveloped the plot in Kleinpolder Southwest prior to the new Housing Act, wherefore they were still able to realise dwellings for the private sector. They developed 84

single-family homes; partly rental (bought by Syntrus Achmea), partly owner-occupied. On the other side of the road, one developer constructed 44 single-family owner-occupied, private sector homes. Adjacent to that plot, a second developer constructed another 7 single-family owner-occupied, private sector homes. In The Hague, the housing association did not invest in any new developments themselves. Instead, they were responsible for the demolition works and site preparations. Thereafter, a commercial developer invested in 187 single-family homes and 13 apartments.

A second similarity regarding *capital* as a management resource is that the municipality made an active, financial contribution to the public space. Such a contribution is considered to be a stimulating management resource, as it increases the chances of success for the real estate developments (see section 4.2.2). The exact form of this municipal contribution does differ, as the municipalities of Utrecht and Rotterdam were able to make subsidies (ISV-funds) available for this, whereas, in The Hague, it was part of renewal operations that had already taken place ahead of the Vermeerkwartier redevelopment project. Due to the fact that both the municipality of Utrecht, as well as Rotterdam, considered the ISV-funds to be an important management instrument, it is important to note here that those funds were cancelled after 2014. As clarified under section 1.1.3, this is precisely part of the underlying problem definition of this research, as this budget cut has limited the incentivising municipal role. These examples thus suggest that there is a need for a suitable alternative – at least during economically uncertain times.

Management resource: capital	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
Investments and risks were for the account of:	The concerned housing association and involved developer(s)		
Municipal contribution:	Active, financial contribution to the public space		
<u>Differences</u>			
The size of the investments and risks:	Housing association: 28 apartments & 57 single-family homes (social housing, services of general economic interest, SGEIs) Demolition & site preparations	Housing association: 84 single-family homes (private sector, rent + owner-occupied)	Housing association: Demolition of 500 apartments & site preparations
	Investor: 44 single-family homes & 36 apartments (private rental sector)	Developer 1: 44 single-family homes (private sector, owner-occupied)	Developer: 187 single-family homes & 13 apartments (private sector, rent + owner-occupied)
	Developer: 35 single-family homes (private sector, owner-occupied)	Developer 2: 7 single-family homes (private sector, owner occupied)	
Form of the municipal contribution:	Through subsidies (ISV-funds)	Through subsidies (ISV-funds)	Refurbishment and renewal of the sewerage system + streets ahead of the redevelopment

Table 4.9: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding “capital” as a management resource

The third and last management resource that was analysed is a less tangible one, namely *knowledge/experience*. This relates to the relevant, noteworthy knowledge actors bring into an urban area redevelopment project. A valuable similarity can be found in the role of the housing associations in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North, Kleinpolder Southwest and the Vermeerkwartier. Due to their significant and long-standing involvement in the areas, the housing associations had a clear overview and understanding of the predicament at hand. This knowledge especially helped with regard to the implementation measures, as it enabled them to depart from the local circumstances.

The added value of having such an overview was also mentioned from the point of view of the municipal area manager in Utrecht, and by the former district council of Overschie in Rotterdam. In Utrecht, the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt was part of a long-term, city-wide policy that focussed on improving the liveability in multiple vulnerable neighbourhoods. Among other things, collaboration with local housing associations was sought and financial means were made available. Thereby, the municipal area manager was already quite experienced with the neighbourhood approach, which proved to be useful during the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt. The redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest benefitted from the clear overview that was provided by the district council, as this central platform was very much aware of the challenges and needs.

Unlike the similar, valuable knowledge that resulted from their significant and long-standing involvement in each of the neighbourhoods, the experience that the housing associations had with the collaborative aspect of the projects differed. As Haag Wonen had sought several commercial partners for the realisation of mixed neighbourhoods in the years before the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier, this housing association had already gotten used to such partnerships and thus to the sharing of responsibilities and risks. Woonstad also had quite some experience with collaborative processes that concerned separated developments comparable to the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest. This for instance includes a growing number of projects whereby Woonstad is asked by a commercial party to develop the required share of social housing, as part of a much larger development. By contrast, Mitros's experience with collaborating with private parties in urban area redevelopment projects was limited. Up until the new Housing Act (2015), Mitros had mostly initiated and executed such mixed housing projects independently – a habit that thus carried forward in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North. In comparison to the other cases, the level of collectiveness was limited here.

Another knowledge-related resource derives from varying statements on the influence of the relationship between the municipality and the other actors and was thereby typified as the “relationship with the municipality”. The influence of the relationship between the municipality and the other actors was named in a variety of ways. In Utrecht, the relationship between the housing association and the municipality was quite *fragile*. The project developer of the housing association felt burdened by the fact that, for them, it is never just about that one plot. Due to the city-wide performance agreements about their entire portfolio, an argument about one location can cause complications for the other, which resulted in a rather cautious attitude.

In The Hague, the relationship between the housing association and the municipality was distinguished from the position of the developer. Thereby, the broader connection and interest of the housing association was mostly seen as an advantage. Since they were familiar with the local conditions, they knew how difficult it was to fill up square meters of commercial space in that area, which proved useful in the decision-making process. At the same time, the housing association did indeed feel that the broader relationship required a somewhat cautious attitude. In that sense, it was considered useful that the developer could be more direct at certain times.

In Rotterdam, quite some pressure was put on the relationship between the district council and central municipal organisations. The district council of Overschie acted as a connecting organ, whereby, in terms of the progress, the *stubbornness* of the district council secretary proved invaluable. While adding pressure, however, he also had to keep things professional and foster the personal relationships at the same time, which was considered to be a “thin and vulnerable line”.

A final worthy note regarding knowledge/experience as a management resource relates to the type of developer. In both Rotterdam and The Hague, the fact that the (main) commercial actors are developing contractors, was considered to be a very valuable resource. Being both the developer as well as the contractor of their redevelopment project, allowed them to synchronise the two phases and to thereby accurately manage the associated risks. This does not imply that the fact that the developer in Utrecht was not a developing contractor but a risk-bearing project developer, was considered a disadvantage in any way. But it does mean that the process involved an additional party.

Management resource: knowledge/experience	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
Overview and interests of the housing associations:	Significant and long-standing neighbourhood involvement, good understanding of the neighbourhood predicament		
<u>Differences</u>			
Experience/knowledge of the municipality:	Experienced with the neighbourhood approach	The district council had a clear overview and was very much aware of the needs	N.A.
Collaborative experience of the housing association:	Little experience with collaborating with private parties in area redevelopment	Quite experienced with such collaborative processes (mostly separated developments)	Experienced with such partnerships and with the sharing of responsibilities
Relationship with the municipality:	The relationship between the housing association and the municipality was considered to be quite fragile	The district council acted as a connecting organ (some tension towards the central municipality was caused)	The developer and housing association regarded their characteristics to be complementary
Type of developer:	N.A. (risk-bearing project developer)	Developing contractor	

Table 4.10: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding “knowledge/experience” as a management resource

Management resources: findings

In the previous paragraphs, the management resources of each case were compared, by looking at the way they are distributed over the involved actors. This concluding section now focusses on assessing how the resources land, capital and knowledge can be put to the most effective use with respect to the enabling of urban area redevelopment aimed at housing stock diversification in vulnerable neighbourhoods. To enable the formulation of specific lessons, the findings are linked to the vulnerable neighbourhood context – as based on the in section 4.2.1 generalised social, political and economic circumstances – and to the effectiveness aim.

Management of social, political and economic circumstances

As already briefly introduced under section 4.2.1, the social unrest that may arise due to forced relocation processes and unwelcoming tension between new and existing residents, may be managed by means of sincere resident participation and an actively stimulated sense of belonging. Linked to the distinguished management resources, this is mostly knowledge/experience related. The interviewed housing associations have adopted standardised relocation approaches that, according to them, are not necessarily aimed at sincere participation. The programmes do regularly focus on allowing for as many residents as possible to return to the area after completion, but their substantial opinions on the project outcomes are rarely implemented. Herein, a lesson would be that the mentioned significant and long-standing involvement of housing associations – which already enables them to depart from the local circumstances – can be used more effectively, by enhancing the standardised relocation approach with locally relevant operations. This can be supported by municipal experience with the neighbourhood approach. In addition, developing parties can also play an important role in this. In The Hague, the developing party did put quite some effort into the welcoming and inclusion of new residents, which, in their opinion, paid off. Such activities may just as well be expanded with the inclusion of existing residents and neighbours.

The management of political circumstances is mostly linked to the common lack of political attention. For developing parties, it appears rather difficult to steer on this, as it largely depends on the municipal capacity and political colour. One lesson, however, might be for developing parties to steer on outcomes that are most beneficial to the political course of action. In the previous section, the stimulating tools of the municipality were mentioned, as an incentivising means by which the decision-making scope of market parties can be broadened. Simultaneously, this could be turned around, by advising developing parties to apply incentivising management tools towards public bodies. Reasons for a lack of political attention might for instance be related to a lack of municipal capital and capacity. Market parties can then endeavour means by which they themselves invest in a large share of the public space and take on more of the responsibility for example – as illustrated by the urban redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam.

Lastly, it was recognised that periods of economic difficulty can cause reluctance to invest in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Linked to the distinguished management resources, lessons to overcome this are mostly land and capital related. These lessons are concentrated on measures that can be taken to tackle financial challenges and to reduce risks. As illustrated by the different case studies, splitting up the land in different sub-areas or phases contributes to the feasibility. Since developing parties are not always able to bare the risks of redeveloping an entire area on their own, a division in different sub-areas can offer a solution. By including multiple developers, they can each develop a comprehensible number of dwellings. Thereby, the establishment of one joint, coherent vision generally leads to mutually reinforcing developments. A phased redevelopment process is moreover advisable in relation to unpredictable, external influences in general.

Effective management resources

The lessons for effective use of management resources are considered in relation to realising the common housing stock diversification objective and in respect to the efficacy of the collaborative process. Especially the lessons for effective use of land as a management resource illustrate how vital it is to approach such a process from the perspective of the desired project output instead of from the perspective of the power that land ownership can bring one single actor. The analysis has shown that, although the inclusion of a comprehensive and detailed plan in the land sale can have a positive impact on the realisation of one's personal objectives, this approach is not always most effective in regard to the realisation of the general project objectives and efficacy. The buying party will always insist for the plan to satisfy his objectives as well, wherefore the selling of a fully devised plan can lead to time-consuming negotiations and project delays. The selling party might even have a different perception of the demand, which can then result in a programme that does not fit entirely well, in which case no buying party will be interested, or, rather, will want to take the associated risks.

As for the effective use of capital as a management resource, urban area redevelopment only takes place if a positive business case can be established. In that sense, it is assumed that the measures that can be taken to tackle financial challenges and reduce risks (as formulated above, under *Management of social, political and economic circumstances*) are directly beneficial to the effectiveness.

Apart from the knowledge related lessons that were formulated above, additional lessons regarding the most effective use of knowledge as a management resource focus on the relevant, noteworthy, distinctive experience actors can bring into an urban area redevelopment project. For starters, and as already mentioned under section 4.2.2, it is beneficial if the municipal area manager concerned is experienced with the neighbourhood approach, or is at least mindful of the specific neighbourhood predicament. Secondly, housing associations generally do not only have a clear overview of the local circumstances, but tend to be very familiar with the municipal force field as well. Consequently, they often know who to turn to in specific situations. A drawback of this, however, is that this relationship can be rather delicate, which frequently results in a cautious attitude. In that context, the collaboration with a commercial developer was acknowledged as an advantage, in the sense that they tend to be less cautious in the use of their sometimes impatient nature. From the standpoint of efficacy, it was namely stated that effective collaboration commonly requires a certain level of decisiveness and perseverance. Lastly, the type of developer can make a difference as well. In both Rotterdam and The Hague, it was considered an advantage for the commercial actors to be developing contractors as this allowed them to synchronise the two phases and to thereby accurately manage the associated risks.

4.2.4. Inter-organisational arrangements (formal cooperation)

As described in section 3.3, public and private actors organise their cooperation in inter-organisational arrangements concerning the legal rules and requirements, financial risks and revenues, and organisational tasks and responsibilities (Heurkens, 2012). According to Koppenjan & Klijn (2004), these arrangements ask for mutual acknowledgement of meaning and joint image building and should be the result of the development of negotiated knowledge.

Based on the case analyses, the legal and financial arrangements are jointly categorised in land sale agreements, spatial agreements and real estate sale agreements. The organisational structure is split into information on the steering group sessions (when applicable) and a statement about the type of cooperation of each urban area

redevelopment process. In the table below, these five categories have resulted in a summarised overview. On the pages that follow, these results are compared in a more generalised manner, by focussing on the similarities and differences.

Formal, inter-organisational arrangements	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
Land sale agreements	<p><u>Sub-area 1</u> [including plan costs]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: Mitros · Sold to: MN <p>And a small square</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: The municipality · Sold to: Mitros <p><u>Sub-area 3</u> [including plan costs]</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: Mitros · Sold to: Zondag Ontwikkeling (owner-occupied portion) 	<p><u>Sub-area 1</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: The municipality · Sold to: Van Omme & De Groot <p><u>Sub-area 2</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: The municipality · Sold to: Batenburg <p><u>Sub-area 3</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: The municipality · Sold to: Woonstad 	<p><u>Vermeerkwartier phase 1-5</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: Haag Wonen · Sold to: Van Wijnen <p><i>The contract was based on/ included:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Risk assessments and management · A minimum yield · Profit-sharing · Room for programmatic alterations · Ability to anticipate on economic developments
Spatial agreements	<p>Urban programme of requirements</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Set by: The municipality · Set for: Mitros <p><u>Coherent urban design by:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · LEVS architecten <p>By order of Mitros</p>	<p>Set of spatial and programmatic preconditions</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Set by: The municipal district council · Set for: Van Omme & De Groot, Batenburg, Woonstad <p><u>Coherent urban design by:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Arons & Gelauff architecten <p>By order of Van Omme & De Groot and Woonstad</p>	<p>N.A.</p> <p><u>Coherent urban design by:</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Venster Architecten <p>By order of Van Wijnen</p>
Real estate sale agreements	N.A.	<p><u>Property sales</u> (investment)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: Woonstad · Sold to: Syntus Achmea 	<p><u>Property sales</u> (investment)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sold by: Van Wijnen · Sold to: Syntus Achmea
Organisational structure: steering group	N.A.	<p>Monthly meetings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Focussed on: adding pressure, speeding things up, decision-making 	<p>Two-monthly meetings</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Focussed on: progress monitoring
Organisational structure: type of cooperation	<p>Separated, individual development processes, by means of one overarching urban design (developed by one)</p> <p>[cooperation]</p>	<p>Separated, individual development processes, by means of one overarching urban design (developed by all)</p> <p>[coordination]</p>	<p>Collaborative process, with joint decision-making, shared responsibilities and strong cooperation</p> <p>[collaboration]</p>

Table 4.11: Overview of all formal, inter-organisational arrangements

In table 4.12, the similarities and differences with regard to the land sale agreements are given. Logically, these outcomes closely correspond to the information on land as a management resource that was provided in the previous chapter. Some repetition thus occurs, but briefly naming the associated agreements is still considered to be valuable for the completeness of the cross-case analysis.

As already indicated by the choice for this sub-category, the similarity of the land sale agreements lies in the fact that transaction of land has taken place in each of the cases. The further details of those transactions, vary considerably. In the Fruitbuurt North, only certain portions of land were sold – as opposed to all the land being sold in both Kleinpolder Southwest as well as the Vermeerkwartier. This relates to the fact that in the Fruitbuurt, the housing association only sold the parts of the plan they were required to sell for legislative reasons.

The second difference shows the number of parties the land was sold to, and thus also the number of land sale agreements that were concluded. In both Utrecht and Rotterdam, multiple parties were sought. In Utrecht, this mainly related to economic uncertainty, as well as to the fact that Mitros was able to exert more control this way. In Rotterdam, the environmental legislation played a role in this as well, supplemented by the fact that here, the sub-areas were physically separated from one another by a road.

The third difference relates to the selling party. In Utrecht and The Hague, the land was owned and thus sold by the housing association. In the latter case, however, this concerned leasehold land, wherefore not only the housing association, but also the municipality of The Hague could exercise direct influence on the development. In Rotterdam, the land was sold by the municipality.

The fourth, and last, difference illustrates the distinction with regard to the inclusion of the development plans. In Utrecht, the complete development plans were included in the land sale agreement, for which reason the buyers also paid a certain amount for those plan costs. In contrast, the land reservation agreements of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam served as the foundation for further plan development, which ultimately resulted in the land sales. As for The Hague, the general programmatic lines were included in the land sale agreement, on the basis of which there was still room for alterations.

<i>Land sale agreements</i>	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
	Transaction of land has taken place		
<u>Differences</u>			
<i>Quantity:</i>	Certain portions were sold	All land was sold	
<i>Number of parties:</i>	Sold to two different parties	Sold to three different parties	Sold to one single party
<i>Sold by:</i>	Land was sold by the housing association	Land was sold by the municipality	Land was sold by the housing association (perpetual leasehold)
<i>Development plans:</i>	Development plans were included	Served as the foundation for further plan development	General programmatic lines were included

Table 4.12: Comparison of the similarities and differences between the concluded land sale agreements

Looking at the spatial agreements (table 4.13), the three cases have in common that, in each neighbourhood, a single architect was responsible for the realisation of one coherent urban design. The difference therein, however, lies in the commissioner of those designs. In Utrecht, the urban design was made by order of the housing association – being the land owner/selling party as well. As they redeveloped a large part of the Fruitbuurt North themselves and thus strongly aimed for a certain architectural appearance, they firstly made sure that the entire urban plan was established before the other parties got involved.

In Rotterdam, the urban design for Kleinpolder Southwest was made by order of the two main buyers of the land. Thereby, they did not only make sure that both parties agreed with the result, but were also responsible for a large share of the task that would normally lie with the municipality – as it was municipal land.

In The Hague, the developer, and also buyer, of the land was in charge of the urban design, which, in concept, was part of their submitted plan. In Utrecht and Rotterdam, these urban designs had to be based on specific spatial and programmatic requirements set by the municipality.

<i>Spatial agreements</i>	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
	One coherent urban design was developed		
<u>Differences</u>			
<i>By order of:</i>	Urban design was made by order of the housing association (selling party)	Urban design was made by order of the developer and the housing association (buyers)	Urban design was made by order of the developer (buyer)
<i>Specific spatial requirements:</i>	Urban programme of requirements	Set of spatial and programmatic preconditions	N.A.

Table 4.13: Comparison of the similarities and differences between the applicable spatial agreements

Both in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest as well as in the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier, risks could be reduced by means of a real estate sale agreement with investor Syntrus Achmea. In Kleinpolder Southwest, it was the housing association who ensured that a large share of their properties were sold at once. As a result, they were able to start their construction phase in the midst of the economic crisis. As for the Vermeerkwartier, the commercial developer had immediately included Syntrus Achmea in the plan they submitted to the housing association. Due to these guaranteed sales, they were able to apply a minimal presale of 50% instead of 70%.

Real estate sale agreements	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Differences</u>			
Property sales to an investor:	N.A.	The housing association sold properties to investor Syntrus Achmea (large share)	The developer sold properties to investor Syntrus Achmea (small share)

Table 4.14: Comparison of the similarities and differences between the real estate sale agreements

Due to the varying levels of collectiveness, the types of cooperation (as based on Keast et al., 2007, see figure 3.8), differ from one another. This begins with the organisation in terms of the steering group. In contrast to the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt in Utrecht, in both Rotterdam as well as The Hague, a steering group met on a regular basis. The former met monthly, whereas the latter met once every two months. The purposes of these steering groups, however, are divergent. In Kleinpolder Southwest, the steering group was aimed at adding pressure, at speeding things up during the preparatory phase: the phase during which the different parties worked towards one coherent urban plan. Once that plan was established, the parties mostly went their separate ways. In the Vermeerkwartier, on the other hand, the steering group resulted from the agreement between the housing association and the developer, and was set up for the monitoring of the progress that followed.

Organisational structures	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Differences</u>			
Steering group:	N.A.	Monthly meetings	Two-monthly meetings
		Focussed on: adding pressure, speeding things up	Focussed on: progress monitoring
Degree of collectiveness:	Separated, individual development processes	Separated, individual development processes	Collaborative process, with joint decision-making, shared responsibilities and strong cooperation
	By means of one overarching urban design, developed by one	By means of one overarching urban design, developed by all	
Network typology:	Cooperative	Coordinative	Collaborative

Table 4.15: Comparison of the similarities and differences between the organisational structures

These steering group differences are also reflected in the general levels of collectiveness. In Utrecht, the developments were organised quite separately: the housing association had developed the urban plan – in regular communication with the municipal urban planning department, yet individually from the other developing parties. Once the other parties were involved, some adjustments had to be made, which did ask for regular communication and information exchange. However, the connection was limited, the communication flows were infrequent and independent goal achievement was central. In that sense, the parties mainly *cooperated*, instead of *collaborated*.

In Rotterdam, the constructions were also completed separately, but, in contrast to the Fruitbuurt, the overarching urban design was developed by all. Thereby, and corresponding to Keast et al. (2007), collective learning occurred through project related and directed information sharing, the goals were semi-independent, and communication flows were logically structured. Therefore, this type of cooperation can be typified as *coordination*.

Lastly, the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague was truly approached as joint action. This was a collaborative process, structured by thick communication flows, high connections and formal agreements, and based on joint decision-making, shared responsibilities and strong collaboration. Interdependent goals were pursued and tactical information was shared. Both in the planning, as well as in the construction phase, the housing association and developer acted as partners.

Inter-organisational arrangements: findings

In the previous paragraphs, the formal, inter-organisational arrangements were compared by means of five sub-categories. Lessons regarding the formal cooperation are predominantly aimed at the extent to which certain components should be formally enshrined. As argued in section 3.3, the concrete nature of urban area redevelopment namely requires actors to clearly and formally structure projects with inter-organisational arrangements, whilst the complexity resulting from rapidly changing environments simultaneously requires a flexible approach (Heurkens, 2012; Bruil, 2011). This aspired balance between rationality and adaptability was also widely addressed by the actors that were interviewed and is therefore seen as the central element of lessons with respect to the formal cooperation agreements. A second component – which can be linked to the former, yet also demands separate attention – concerns the organisational structure, as following from the level of collectiveness. To enable the formulation of specific lessons, the findings are linked to the vulnerable neighbourhood context – as based on the in section 4.2.1 generalised social, political and economic circumstances – and to the effectiveness aim.

Organisational anticipation on changing social, political and economic circumstances

Since the context of an urban area redevelopment project is often subject to change, as a first lesson, it is helpful not to want to formally pin every little design detail down. General programmatic volumes should be set, whilst leaving room for possible adjustments. This enables the ability to anticipate on changing demands. More specifically linked to the circumstances in vulnerable neighbourhoods, this leaves room for possible events and implementations regarding citizen participation, and allows for modifications resulting from fluctuating political attention and economic inconsistency. For that same purpose, it is advisable to formally include risk management and agreements on profit and loss sharing. Following from a formally determined minimum yield, parties can subsequently examine how to increase that yield – as illustrated by the case in The Hague. Such an arrangement can moreover contribute to mutual trust and stable relations, which the unpredictability of changing social, political and economic circumstances strongly calls for. This is related to the organisational structure, whereby strong connections, extensive information sharing and interdependent relations and goals ideally lead to high levels of trust and a shared sense of urgency.

Effective inter-organisational arrangements

The lessons above are strongly connected to effectiveness – both in relation to realising objectives as well as in relation to efficacy. Regarding the former, effective formal organisational anticipation on changing social, political and economic circumstances increases the chances of success for realisation of the common housing stock diversification objective. Regarding the latter, efficacy relates to decision-making, adaptability and overcoming obstacles, which can – for a large part – be influenced by the formal structure that follows from the balance between rationality and adaptability as determined by the local circumstances. An additional lesson related to efficacy is that a learning effect can be realised by means of close process monitoring through regular steering group meetings and structural feedback sessions. That way, adjustments can be made when necessary.

4.2.5. Management activities (informal cooperation)

Resulting from the literature review, the analysis of the informal factors was mainly based on the process management activities communicating, negotiating and decision-making. These activities both precede as well as follow from the inter-organisational arrangements, wherefore they are analysed in relation to the formal cooperation structure. A general overview of these outcomes is given in the table below, after which a more detailed comparison is made in the form of similarities and differences.

Informal cooperation	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North [cooperative]	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest [coordinative]	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier [collaborative]
Process management activities <i>[relation to formal agreements]</i>	<u>Communicating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · All communication with the municipal area manager was organised through Mitros (including the agreements on the free sector plots) · Well-structured conversations were necessary to come to an agreement 	<u>Communicating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The parties considered it important to come together at regular times, regardless of whether or not urgent issues had to be discussed · Formally focussed on decision-making, informally on establishing good relationships 	<u>Communicating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Conversations between Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen were carried out in a transparent, open manner, the parties were critical and they made sure to keep each other alert with regard to the overarching goals and objectives
	<u>Negotiating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Negotiations were lengthy, complex and time-consuming, and requested an extensive use of argumentation and persuasiveness 	<u>Negotiating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · One shared, coherent vision was established, but no real negotiations have taken place due to separated developments 	<u>Negotiating</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · By using the available resources as efficiently as possible and through mutual alignment, coordination and tailoring, the negotiation process ultimately resulted in a contract that everyone could agree with
	<u>Decision-making</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Mitros and the municipality mainly disagreed about the public space & participation trajectory · Mitros and Zondag needed time to make a decision on design details/ interaction between social housing and owner-occupied segments <i>[convoluted decision-making process]</i>	<u>Decision-making</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Monthly steering group meetings were aimed at quick decision-making, by adding pressure and speeding things up <i>[focussed decision-making process]</i>	<u>Decision-making</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> · The general lines were formally determined, whilst leaving room for alterations/ ability to anticipate on economic developments <i>[adaptable decision-making process]</i>
Sense of collectiveness & mutual trust	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sense of collectiveness was <u>lacking</u>: · Expectations and interests varied widely: social versus financial objectives · Many opposing views (for both substantial as well as personal reasons) · Overall lack of trust 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sense of collectiveness was <u>of great importance</u>: · Tipping point: meeting between the district council secretary and Woonstad director · Making the developing parties responsible for the urban plan has also increased the amount of trust 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> · Sense of collectiveness was <u>strong</u>: · Haag Wonen and Van Wijnen acted together, as reliable partners; both in discussions with the municipality, as well as in the residents' trajectory · The "a deal is a deal" foundation was combined with making an effort to keep the relationship comfortable

Table 4.16: Overview of the informal factors

Apart from the process management activities, another categorisation that was distinguished as being part of the informal structure is “sense of collectiveness & mutual trust”. This stems from the notion that all actors have emphasised the importance of mutual trust, as that can contribute to a joint, collective feeling of urgency. The extent to which that mutual trust and sense of collectiveness was achieved is studied and compared, with the aim to be able to make a statement on its influence on the effectiveness of the collaborative processes.

As illustrated in table 4.16, the process management patterns differ significantly from each other. The only similarity is that, in all three cases, it was considered essential to structure the conversations efficiently. The further organisation and aim of those communication structures varies per case. In Utrecht, all communication was organised by the housing association; including agreements between the municipality and the commercial developers on the free sector plots. No joint sessions between the municipality, housing association and the other developers have taken place. The municipality and housing association met frequently, but not on fixed times, and those meetings were strictly focussed on decision-making.

By contrast, in Rotterdam and The Hague, the involved parties met on regular, fixed times. In Rotterdam, these were joint sessions, with mandated actors from the district council, housing association and commercial developers. The parties considered it important to come together at regular times, regardless of whether or not urgent issues had to be discussed. Formally, those sessions focussed on decision-making. Informally, they were furthermore used to establish good relationships.

In The Hague, the joint sessions mainly consisted of the housing association and the developer, whereby they received guidance from the municipal project coordinator – and from municipal experts, when necessary. The conversations were carried out in a transparent, open, yet critical, manner, and the housing association and developer made sure to keep each other alert with regard to the overarching project goals.

It is quite difficult to compare the negotiation processes. Although one shared, coherent vision was established for Kleinpolder Southwest, the actual developments were separated, wherefore the actors did not really label this as a negotiation. In Utrecht, the negotiations were complex and time-consuming, and requested an extensive use of argumentation and persuasiveness. Lastly, in The Hague, the negotiations were quite lengthy as well, but, according to the housing association and developer, this process was mostly characterised by efficiency, mutual alignment, coordination and tailoring.

All in all, the decision-making process behind the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North in Utrecht can be typified as “convoluted”. Due to several disagreements, the actors look back on lengthy, complex conversations and negotiations. Disagreements between the housing association and municipal area manager mainly related to the quality of the public space and the participation trajectory. Disagreements between the housing association and the developer of sub-area 3 mainly related to the design details of the interaction between the social housing and owner-occupied segments. This convoluted decision-making process is also reflected in the formal arrangements, because, formally, one does not really speak of a consistent, systematic collaboration either. The district was split into multiple sub-areas, which resulted in multiple land sale agreements and a mix of housing types and segments. Coherence was sought by means of one overarching urban design, but without integral involvement on the commercial developers.

As for the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam, the decision-making process can be summarised as “focussed” – which has been the guiding principle for the formal arrangements and organisational structure as well. Monthly steering group meetings were aimed at quick decision-making, by adding pressure and speeding things up. On the basis of a set of spatial and programmatic preconditions, the developing parties were jointly responsible for making one coherent urban plan. Due to the fact that the municipality of Rotterdam had entered into separate land sale agreements with each of the developers, the actual development processes were autonomous. For that reason, no tricky negotiations have taken place and decisions were made purposefully.

The decision-making process behind the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague is described as “adaptable”. Through transparent, open, yet critical, conversations, the parties made sure to keep each other alert with regard to the overarching project objectives. Thereby, the goal has constantly been to formally determine the

general lines in terms of a minimum yield, profit sharing and building volumes, whilst leaving room for programmatic alterations; for the ability to anticipate on future economic developments. That adaptability was the central thread throughout the entire process. The construction progress was monitored by means of two-monthly meetings, whereby room for a learning effect and planning optimisations was created in a flexible manner.

Process management activities	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Similarities</u>			
Communicating: <i>structure</i>	It was considered essential to structure the conversations efficiently		
<u>Differences</u>			
Communicating: <i>organisation</i>	All communication was organised through the housing association (no joint sessions)	Joint sessions: district council, housing association and developers	Joint sessions: housing association and developer (guidance from/monitoring by municipal project coordinator)
	Frequently, but not on fixed times	Regularly and on fixed times	Regularly and on fixed times
Communicating: <i>aim/focus</i>	Coming to agreements (decision-making)	Decision-making & establishing good relationships	Transparency & alertness with regard to project goals
Negotiating <i>key words (characteristics)</i>	Complex, time-consuming, argumentation, persuasiveness	N.A. (no real negotiations have taken place)	Efficiency, mutual alignment, coordination, tailoring
Decision-making <i>process</i>	Convolved decision-making process	Focussed decision-making process	Adaptable decision-making process

Table 4.17: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding process management activities

Despite the fact that the importance of mutual trust, of a collective feeling of urgency, was stressed as an important condition for an effective collaboration process, the extent to which a sense of collectiveness was achieved varies per case. In Utrecht, this collective feeling was lacking. The expectations and interests varied widely and a range of opposing views – for both substantial as well as personal reasons – interfered with the pursuit of a common goal. Consequently, the collaborative process behind the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt suffered from an overall lack of trust.

In Rotterdam, the sense of collectiveness was considered to be of great importance, wherefore a lot of effort was put into it. In that respect, the meeting between the district council secretary and director of the housing association is seen as an important tipping point, as from that moment onwards, the stakeholders began to look at the challenge from a different angle, causing the sense of collectiveness to grow. Furthermore, the fact that the developing parties were made responsible for the coherent urban plan has also increased the amount of trust.

In The Hague, that sense of collectiveness was very strong as well. The housing association and developer both aspired to be a good and reliable partner and have acted as such throughout the entire process by combining the “a deal is a deal” foundation with efforts to keep the relationship comfortable. They appeared on every stage together and clearly expressed a certain feeling of pride.

Sense of collectiveness & mutual trust	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<u>Differences</u>			
	Sense of collectiveness was lacking	Sense of collectiveness was of great importance	Sense of collectiveness was strong

Table 4.18: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding the sense of collectiveness & mutual trust

Management activities: findings

Following from the comparisons, it can be concluded that the management activities are interlinked with both the inter-organisational arrangements as well as with the achievement of mutual trust and a sense of collectiveness. The specific lessons are based on the influence of the vulnerable neighbourhood context and on the effectiveness aim.

Management of social, political and economic circumstances

As stated in section 4.2.1, an urban area redevelopment project is initiated as a response to improving an existing urban situation and is constantly influenced by dynamic social, political and economic events. Process management activities result from the interaction between actors and are therefore very much focussed on the internal project motivations, goals and objectives. At the same time, these activities are also applied when responding to unpredictable, dynamic, external circumstances. Whereas the lessons for effective inter-organisational arrangements were aimed at the ability to anticipate on changing events, the lessons for management activities are to be aimed at effective ways to firstly conclude the necessary arrangements and to secondly respond to unpredictable occurrences that might follow.

The informal management of social dissatisfaction and tension predominantly relates to communication. In Utrecht and The Hague, lengthy consultation sessions with the residents' organisations took place in order to receive the necessary support. As is the case for internal consultations, transparency and openness were considered to be of great importance in this. Since political attention is not always naturally available when aiming to redevelop vulnerable neighbourhoods, clear negotiations, led by persistence and persuasion, is sometimes necessary to obtain the required endorsement. Lastly, the decision-making process tends to be more complex during periods of economic difficulty. At the same time, wide-ranging, substantiated debates are seen as a strong basis for the formal cooperation structure. Being critical and keeping each other alert can namely result in a well-conceived project focus, as positively experienced by the developing parties of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague.

Effective management activities

Regarding the realisation of the common housing diversification objective, and closely linked to efficacy as well, the management of expectations is considered to be essential. Hereby, transparency and openness are of great importance as to ensure that parties truly understand each other, and each other's interests. This aims to avoid friction and distrust as much as possible. A thorough evaluation of the underlying motives can moreover contribute to the shared feeling of urgency. In addition, it is argued that negotiated knowledge is a strong basis for the formal cooperation structure, which asks for a critical alertness at one hand and mutual alignment, coordination and tailoring at the other. With respect to efficacy, it is deemed crucial to schedule meetings at regular times – regardless of whether or not urgent issues need to be discussed. Formally, these meetings are focussed on decision-making. Informally, they are focussed on establishing good relationships, by contributing to a deeper mutual understanding of one's values and interests.

4.2.6. Effectiveness

In the previous sections, the lessons for each sub-category were specifically linked to effectiveness. In this final paragraph, some general observations regarding the effectiveness of each urban area redevelopment project are shared. As stipulated in section 3.5, effectiveness is viewed in two ways. First, it is considered in relation to the realisation of objectives, whereby the realisation of the common housing stock diversification aim was put central. Secondly, effectiveness relates to efficacy, with regard to the collaborative process, decision-making, adaptability and overcoming obstacles. Precisely the difference between these two viewpoints has proven to be rather interesting to emphasise.

Despite the fact that some personal goals were not reached entirely, in general, all interviewed stakeholders are pleased with the results. In their opinion, the objectives regarding housing stock diversification and liveability have all been achieved. From the perspective of the developing parties, the dwellings were easily sold or rented, the financial goals were met, property values have already increased and the customers are satisfied. In that sense, all urban area redevelopment projects were effective.

When turning to the second benchmark for the effectiveness assessment, this image changes. Due to the fact that efficacy is somewhat more difficult to grasp, an overview is given in the table below. That overview illustrates that quite a lot of factors can be linked to efficacy. Within those factors, no general similarity can be named. This mainly relates to the fact that no clear time horizon or explicit planning was specified for the Fruitbuurt North redevelopment. Although the actors did mention that they would henceforth approach the planning aspect of such a process differently, it somehow did not seem that relevant at the time. In Rotterdam, on the other hand, the redevelopment process of Kleinpolder Southwest was actively accelerated by the district council. A lot of pressure was put on quick establishment of the basic, coherent urban plan, after which the developing parties went their separate ways. In The Hague, the parties were very much in favour of fast acting and rapid switching as well. Planning optimisation was thus considered to be imperative.

Effectiveness: Efficacy	CASE 1: UTRECHT Fruitbuurt North	CASE 2: ROTTERDAM Kleinpolder Southwest	CASE 3: THE HAGUE Vermeerkwartier
<i>Differences</i>			
Importance of speed:	No clear time horizon or explicit planning was specified	The process was actively accelerated, pressure was high (up until construction)	Speed, fast acting and rapid switching were of high importance
Importance/consideration of adaptability:	Initial course of action had to be altered due to legislative reasons (forced adaptability)	The shared framework allowed for (small) alterations and joint resolving of hick-ups	The contract included room for programmatic alterations/ability to anticipate on economic developments
Efficacy of the decision-making process:	The decision-making process was very time-consuming (commercial parties very involved at a very late stage)	The parties came to an agreement fairly quickly	Quite some time and effort was put into the formal agreements
Land-use plan procedures:	Land-use plan had to be altered	No extensive land-use plan procedure was needed	Plan could be achieved within the existing land-use plan limits
Presale percentage and investment deal:	N.A.	Presale percentage was exceptionally low (ca. 20%) and investment deal was made for the first phase	Presale percentage was fairly low (50%) and investment deal was made for the first phase
Project delays/adaptability:	The project was seriously delayed due to economic and legislative reasons	Construction was partly postponed due to economic uncertainty	The phasing sequence was altered, but there were no delays
Time to market and experienced construction inconvenience:	Lengthy construction process; high level of construction inconvenience	A large part was developed quickly; construction inconvenience was minimal	Quick time to market; construction inconvenience was minimal and the planning was constantly optimised
		The remaining part was developed later and phased; construction inconvenience due to prolonged process	

Table 4.19: Comparison of the similarities and differences regarding the effectiveness in terms of efficacy

Looking at the considerations regarding adaptability, one could say that, in Utrecht, the housing association was in some way forced to alter their initial course of action, as due to the introduction of the new Housing Act. Hence, this does show some ability to adapt – albeit not voluntarily. In Rotterdam, adaptability was implemented in the shared framework, which allowed for small alterations and joint problem solving along the way. In The Hague, room for programmatic alterations – for the ability to anticipate on economic developments – was empathetically included in the basic formal agreements.

The varying importance of efficacy is furthermore reflected in the speed of the decision-making process, planning procedures and the construction phases. In Utrecht, the commercial parties were involved at a very late stage, which resulted in a time-consuming decision-making process. In addition, the land-use plan had to be altered, the project

was seriously delayed and the construction process was lengthy. In Rotterdam, on the other hand, the developing parties came to an agreement fairly quickly once they were made responsible for the urban plan and after the district council had indeed increased the pressure. The efficacy of the process also benefitted from the fact that an extensive land-use plan procedure was not needed. Thereafter, an exceptionally low presale percentage and the investment deal with Syntrus Achmea led to a quickly developed first phase. The commercial parties, however, were quite hesitant due to the economic uncertainty, for which reason the remaining part of the redevelopment was postponed by a couple of years. From the perspective of the housing association and municipality, that was the downside of the implemented adaptability regarding construction speed.

Lastly, in The Hague, the considerations with regard to the desired ability to anticipate on economic developments caused the housing association and developer to thoughtfully take their time for the formal agreements. Once the formal agreements were concluded, however, everything went rather smoothly. They were able to develop the plan within the limits of the existing land-use plan, applied a fairly low presale percentage and collaborated with Syntrus Achmea as an investor for the first construction phase. The phasing was altered due to extensive additional urban design and programmatic explorations, but precisely because of that, there were no construction delays. As a result, both the housing association as well as the developer feel very positive about the time to market rate, as the construction inconvenience was minimal and the planning was constantly optimised.

On the basis of this comparison, and linked to the different forms of cooperation, it can be concluded that the efficacy of the process – in terms of speed, adaptability, decision-making, time to market – becomes stronger when the relational connections and sense of collectiveness are strong as well.

This conclusion can be underlined with the difference between the efficacy of the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier. Although the cooperative process behind the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North did eventually result in a diversified housing stock and improved liveability, the decision-making process was convoluted, the project was seriously delayed and the construction process was lengthy. This is, for a large part, related to the limited connections, infrequent communication flows and independent goals. The efficacy of the collaborative Vermeerkwartier redevelopment, on the other hand, was appraised more positively. Related to the high connections, thick communication flows and interdependent goals, fast acting was considered of high importance, a quick time to market was achieved, construction inconvenience was minimal and the planning was constantly optimised.

Effectiveness: concluding remarks

Viewed from the perspective of effective collaboration in terms of realising personal objectives and efficacy, and taking the overall satisfaction of the interviewed actors into account, some room for improvement was surely identified in the analysed cases. When looking at the project outcomes, however, the areas were all successfully redeveloped with regard to housing stock diversification. At least according to the interviewed public and private actors. This raises the question as to what the added value of effective management and organisation truly is for urban area redevelopment aimed at housing stock diversification in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Taking the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt in Utrecht for example: a cooperative network typified by low levels of trust and a lacking sense of collectiveness. In retrospect, the actors are not necessarily satisfied with the applied course of action. They are, however, pleased with the results, and in that sense, the objectives were realised. The involved actors would not choose this path again if they had the choice, but it nonetheless led to a diversified housing stock. Dwellings were sold quickly, the public space has become greener, the liveability has improved, residents are satisfied. In this respect, and merely based on these three cases, one could state that the surplus value of effective forms of cooperation and management instruments mostly relates to the efficacy of the process.

On the other hand, the three case studies do strongly emphasise the importance of management and organisation, as none of the redevelopment projects would have taken place without it. In Utrecht, the redevelopment depended on the contribution of commercial developers, which demanded a rather complex, yet successful, cooperation structure. In Rotterdam, the redevelopment was only kicked off due to active, flexible, organisational strategies. In The Hague, the required financial optimisation was achieved by means of joint action and shared responsibilities. This effectiveness discussion will receive more attention in chapter 7.

5. EXTERNAL VALIDATION

<< *HIDDEN FOR PRIVACY REASONS* >>

5.1. Recommendations per sub-category

Aiming to filter out relevant guidance, the gathered results are translated into concise recommendations per sub-category. In the last column of each table, these results are compared to the case study findings, by stating whether the recommendation at hand is supportive or additional to those empirical discoveries. This shows that the recommendations only partially deviate from the lessons that were drawn in the previous chapter. A lot of overlap can be recognised, complemented with a couple of additional insights. This thereby substantiates the concerning case study conclusions and enables more concreteness with respect to the definitive lessons for practice.

It must, however, be noted that some recommendations were only specifically mentioned by one of interviewees. This does not necessarily mean that the other parties do not agree with this statement, but it does demand a critical appreciation of its wider applicability. Even if a certain recommendation was mentioned by all three, its relation to the case study findings is put central, meaning that no recommendation is blindly accepted as the truth.

Recommendations regarding effective municipal management tools

These recommendations are very much focussed on possible ways for the local authority to incentivise and encourage developments by private parties, which largely relates to awareness with respect to the social and economic complexity – or the local circumstances as it may – in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Recommendation	Underlying reason/ substantiation	Supportive/ additional to case study findings
Municipalities should enhance their understanding of the effect of market forces	Allowing market assessments to be realistically based on local circumstances	SUPPORTIVE <i>the issue of this not always being the case was also addressed in the case studies</i>
Municipalities must be aware that low-to mid-segment rental dwellings do not in itself generate a feasible business case	Enabling the definition of a realistic ambition level and minimal yield, and for instance allowing a combination with owner-occupied houses	ADDITIONAL <i>no relevant programmatic disagreements were mentioned in the cases</i>
Municipalities should be able to actively apply instruments with which it is easier to deviate from fixed land prices	Related to the social and economic complexity in vulnerable neighbourhoods	SUPPORTIVE <i>only in Rotterdam, the land was owned by the municipality: land price was based on local circumstances</i>

Table 5.1: Recommendations regarding effective municipal management tools in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, as gathered by means of the additional interviews and compared to the case study findings

Recommendations regarding effective management resources

These recommendations follow from relevant knowledge/experience-related resources that can be used to both enable and add value to urban area redevelopment aimed at housing stock diversification.

Recommendation	Underlying reason/ substantiation	Supportive/ additional to case study findings
Long-term, local involvement of the housing association is considered to be a valuable resource	This can be applied to establish a good overview of the neighbourhood	SUPPORTIVE
		<i>this was specifically mentioned in the case studies</i>
Experience with stakeholder management in the form of citizen participation is considered to be a valuable resource for a developing party	Previous experience can help with finding smart solutions and by means of participation, contextual and financial challenges can be linked	ADDITIONAL
		<i>citizen participation did not play a central role in any of the cases</i>

Table 5.2: Recommendations regarding effective management resources in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, as gathered by means of the additional interviews and compared to the case study findings

Recommendations regarding effective inter-organisational arrangements

These recommendations relate to the formal cooperation structure and are mostly based on the consultant's experience with different forms of cooperation in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods.

Recommendation	Underlying reason/ substantiation	Supportive/ additional to case study findings
Deal-like thinking should be avoided by not prioritising speed over quality	In prosperous times, certain aspects tend to be optimistically overlooked	SUPPORTIVE
		<i>the importance of taking the time to think things through was stressed by all cases</i>
A contract should be tested on its durability, by assessing the effect of market dependence and clarifying the chances of failure	Linked to the identification and inclusion of a risk-related control system	SUPPORTIVE
		<i>this was emphasised most specifically in the joint action of the Vermeerkwartier case</i>
Agreements on profit and loss sharing should be stipulated into detail; programmatic principles should only roughly be enshrined	Relating to the ability to anticipate on changing social, political and economic demands	SUPPORTIVE
		<i>this was mentioned as the guiding principle for the Vermeerkwartier case</i>
The redevelopment trajectory should constantly be monitored and feedback sessions of project to higher levels must be scheduled regularly	Enabling organisational adjustments when necessary	SUPPORTIVE
		<i>regularity of mandated sessions was put central in the Kleinpolder SW and Vermeerkwartier case</i>

Table 5.3: Recommendations regarding effective inter-organisational arrangements in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, as gathered by means of the additional interviews and compared to the case study findings

Recommendations regarding effective management activities

This final sub-category relates to the informal cooperation structure, as shaped by the management activities communicating, negotiating and decision-making. The recommendations are closely linked to the establishment of common ground and formal, inter-organisational arrangements.

Recommendation	Underlying reason/ substantiation	Supportive/ additional to case study findings
Externally, collaborating parties should present themselves as one collective group	A strong cooperation regularly ensures a powerful position in resident debates/consultations	SUPPORTIVE <i>stressed in the Kleinpolder SW and Vermeerkwartier case</i>
Focus should be put on the management of expectations, by analysing underlying motives	Related to the assessment of whether all parties truly aim for the same goal (finding common ground)	SUPPORTIVE & ADDITIONAL <i>this was part of the case study findings, yet mentioned less explicitly</i>
Actors should be open and transparent in their communication and assumption sharing	To ensure that parties truly understand each other and each other's interests	SUPPORTIVE <i>the significance was stressed in all three cases</i>
The largest obstacles and possible solutions are best identified through joint discussions	Following from the belief that truly working together enables the surfacing of smart combinations	SUPPORTIVE <i>in the case comparison, the level of collectiveness was identified as a key component</i>
Actors should be pragmatic and realistic about what is truly possible	Both programmatically and time-wise and strongly related to the local circumstances	SUPPORTIVE & ADDITIONAL <i>this was part of the case study findings, yet mentioned less explicitly</i>

Table 5.4: Recommendations regarding effective management activities in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods, as gathered by means of the additional interviews and compared to the case study findings

PART V: SYNTHESIS

6. DATA INTEGRATION

In this chapter, the findings that were presented in chapter 4 and 5 are translated into concrete lessons for practice. First, the empirical lessons and recommendations are revisited and summarised into specific conclusions per sub-category. Thereafter, those results are converted into a combined set of guiding lessons.

6.1. Combined findings per sub-category

In this section, the lessons per sub-category are given. The structure is based on the categorisation and variables of the analytical model presented in chapter 3 and shown in the figure below. First, lessons regarding the vulnerable neighbourhood context, as shaped by social, political and economic influences, are revisited. Thereafter, that contextual framework is used as the basis for the formulation of lessons regarding effective municipal management tools, management resources, inter-organisational arrangements and management activities.




Figure 6.1: Analytical case study model

Findings and principles regarding external factors within the vulnerable neighbourhood context

In the problem definition, a vulnerable neighbourhood was defined as a neighbourhood faced with disproportionately large problems, considerably larger than in the rest of the country: a weak economic fabric with high unemployment rates, a relatively high number of people with low incomes, relatively many immigrants, a weak social and physical environment and a unilateral housing stock (Boelhouwer et al., 2006). Such problems are generally reflected in liveability issues, of which the recognition can, among other things, lead to an urban area redevelopment project being initiated.

Apart from that context being the reason for such an initiative, it is also unstable and often subject to change. From the perspective of effectiveness, varying social, political and economic circumstances can negatively impact the efficacy and chances of realising the objectives. When defining lessons regarding effective forms of cooperation and management instruments for urban area redevelopment aimed at housing stock diversification in vulnerable neighbourhoods, such varying influences thus need to be taken into account. Each neighbourhood is different, however, which means that the applicable social, political and economic circumstances are in any case different as well. To still be able to define lessons specifically applicable to vulnerable neighbourhoods, the social, political and economic events that influenced the three analysed cases were generalised into guiding principles.

Departing from the general problems vulnerable neighbourhoods are faced with and combined with the responses to the analysed urban redevelopments in the Utrecht, Rotterdam and The Hague, it was concluded that social unrest is viewed as an almost inevitable factor. By means of standardised relocation procedures, including extensive communal consultation sessions, financial reimbursements and municipal urgency declarations, negative impact of social dissatisfaction on project outcomes can usually be avoided. From the point of view of actually improving social value instead of simply aiming to avoid negative effects, however, actively taking local conditions and interests into account should be preferred over standardised procedures. Apart from this contributing to the social value, locally specified approaches can moreover enhance the economic quality of an urban area redevelopment project.

Politically, the empirical analysis indicated that the necessary public attention is not always naturally available when redeveloping vulnerable neighbourhoods. Depending on factors such as the composition of the municipal board and municipal capacity, the local authority is not always aware of the nature and extent of the problems in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Unawareness does not only make it difficult to receive the necessary attention in general, but also means that the social and economic complexity are not automatically taken into account when for instance establishing a public programme of requirements or determining the land price.

Economically, the contextual complexity can cause reluctance among developing parties to invest in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Problems resulting from the weak economic, social and physical environment usually negatively affects the image and attractiveness of a neighbourhood, which precisely reinforces the need to intervene, but simultaneously increases the financial risks and level of uncertainty.

In summary, lessons regarding effective forms of cooperation and management instruments for urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods must fundamentally be aimed at ways to actively contribute to the social value, enhance political awareness and attention, and decrease financial risks and uncertainty.

Findings regarding effective municipal management tools

This sub-category is aimed at the municipal management role, whereby the central purpose is to provide directory for the necessary facilitative involvement. This demands active awareness on the one hand and passive guidance on the other. Integration of the gathered lessons and recommendations results in the following findings:

- **FACILITATING:** The municipal area manager should be *aware of the neighbourhood predicament*, so as to be able to *provide central supervision* in the redevelopment process and play a *linking role* with respect to the establishment of a *collective feeling of urgency*
 - Public awareness, central supervision and the playing of a linking role are key when aiming to effectively redevelop a vulnerable neighbourhood
 - ♦ Illustrated by the significant area prioritisation of the Fruitbuurt North and by the essential role of the former district council of Overschie in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest
 - The importance of a collective feeling of urgency both relates to the internal cooperation (finding common ground and overcoming obstacles in support of the feasibility and efficacy) as well as to the external societal value and quality
 - ♦ Illustrated by the actively prioritised encouragement of a collective feeling of urgency in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest and the Vermeerkwartier, and by an undesired lack thereof in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant and developer)
- **STIMULATING:** To *incentivise and encourage* developing parties, *stimulating contributions* to the public space seem to be vital and *flexibility* regarding land prices and financial constructions is desired
 - An attractive public space is seen as an important contributor to the overall appearance of a neighbourhood, wherefore its refurbishment should be integrated in the urban area redevelopment project – ideally with the aid of public contributions
 - ♦ Illustrated by the applied ISV funds in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and Kleinpolder Southwest // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the developer and municipal area manager)
 - Related to the tendency that the associated financial risks and uncertainty can make it difficult for a redevelopment to become feasible, flexible approaches that take the social and economic complexity of vulnerable neighbourhoods into account are desired

- ♦ Illustrated by the proper land price and incentivising financial construction in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the developer and municipal area manager)
- **SHAPING/ REGULATING:** Instead of specifying a detailed ambition level, *guiding programmatic principles* and a minimal yield should be set, leaving sufficient room for market initiatives
 - This allows for market assessments to be realistically based on local circumstances, as related to the social and economic complexity in vulnerable neighbourhoods, and enables the combination of both commercially feasible as well as non-feasible housing segments
 - ♦ Illustrated by the encouraging, facilitating role of the urban planning department in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest and shaping role of the urban planning department in the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant, developer and municipal area manager; both supportive as well as additional recommendations)

Summarised, an *active role* with regard to public awareness, central supervision, the playing of a linking role and stimulating contributions is desired, as opposed to a *passive role* with regard to the setting of shaping programmatic principles. One could thereby conclude that the overall transition from an active into a more passive municipal role (as mentioned in section 3.1.2) is not as noticeable – nor desirable – in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods. Related to the described social and economic problems, such projects namely, to a certain extent, demand active public steering.

Findings regarding effective management resources

In section 3.4, the management resources land, capital and knowledge were distinguished as representing the material and knowledge power relations between actors (Daamen, 2010). It was stated that actors who own most of the land, bring in the capital, and have the required knowledge to be brought into the urban redevelopment project, obtain a powerful position (Heurkens, 2012). Thereby, this is mostly viewed as ways for actors to realise their own, personal objectives. The lessons for this study, however, are drawn on the basis of how the allocation and use of management resources can most effectively contribute to the joint project objective of diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. For that reason, the comparison in section 4.2.3 resulted in findings on how developing parties can effectively steer on social, political and economic influences so as to lower risks that may stand in the way of realising the main urban redevelopment objective. The associated findings are as follows:

- **LAND/ CAPITAL:** Organically splitting up the land into several *sub-areas/phases* contributes to the *feasibility* (decreases financial risks and uncertainty)
 - Developing parties are not always able to bare the risks of redeveloping an entire area on their own, for which a division in different sub-areas offers a solution: multiple parties can then each develop a comprehensible number of dwellings (ideally by means of one joint, coherent urban vision leading to mutually reinforcing developments)
 - ♦ Illustrated by the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and Kleinpolder Southwest
- **CAPITAL:** Collaboration with an *investor* can help cope with/lower presale percentages
 - Such a deal guarantees an immediate sale of homes and increases the overall chances of success
 - ♦ Illustrated by the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest and the Vermeerkwartier
- **KNOWLEDGE/ EXPERIENCE:** Social (and economic) value can be increased by enhancing the standardised relocation approaches with *locally relevant operations* (taking local conditions and interests into account) and by means of an *actively stimulated sense of belonging* for both existing as well as new residents
 - This relates to the principle that the social context should not be perceived as a tabula rasa and builds onto the valuable overview that housing associations already generally have of the local circumstances
 - ♦ Illustrated by the lack of locally relevant operations in all three cases, which generated social unrest and dissatisfaction among residents // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the developer)

Findings regarding effective inter-organisational arrangements

How public and private actors organise their cooperation is captured into inter-organisational arrangements, whereby the nature and attribution of these arrangements can change over time. The empirical research mainly resulted in findings on the extent to which certain components should be formally enshrined; related to the management of financial risks and uncertainty as well as to the ability to anticipate on changing events. The associated organisational

structure depends on the level of collectiveness. Integration of the gathered lessons and recommendations results in the following most noteworthy findings:

- **FINANCIAL RISKS & REVENUES:** Agreements on *profit and loss sharing* should be stipulated
 - Following from a formally determined minimum yield, parties can subsequently examine how that yield can be increased
 - ♦ Illustrated by the contracting of the Vermeerkwartier case // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant and developer)
- **FINANCIAL RISKS & REVENUES:** It is advisable to *take the time* to formally identify and include *risks* by testing the contract on its durability, assessing the effect of market dependence and clarifying the chances of failure
 - Primarily for the purpose of the ability to manage unpredictable social, political and economic circumstances that might (negatively) impact the urban area redevelopment discourse
 - ♦ Illustrated by the contracting of the Vermeerkwartier case // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant)
- **LEGAL RULES & REQUIREMENTS:** It is helpful not to want to formally pin every little design detail down: *general programmatic volumes* should be set whilst *leaving room for potential adjustments*
 - This leaves room for possible implementations regarding locally relevant resident involvement, allows for modifications resulting from fluctuating political attention and economic inconsistency, and contributes to mutual trust and stable relations
 - ♦ Illustrated by the contracting of the Kleinpolder Southwest and Vermeerkwartier case // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant and developer)
- **ORGANISATIONAL TASKS & RESPONSIBILITIES:** By means of close process monitoring through regular steering group meetings and structural feedback sessions, a learning effect can be implemented
 - That way, adjustments can be made when necessary, thus contributing to the efficacy
 - ♦ Illustrated by the organisation of the Kleinpolder Southwest and Vermeerkwartier case, and by an undesired lack thereof in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant and developer)

These findings are all aimed at the establishment of strong connections, extensive information sharing and interdependent relations and goals. Both theory (e.g. Koppenjan & Klijn 2004; Keast et al., 2007; van Bortel, 2016) and practice have emphasised the relevance of high connections, as this can lead to high levels of trust and a shared sense of urgency and togetherness. This is very beneficial to both the realisation of objectives as well as to the efficacy of the collaborative process. In the final paragraph of this section, the importance of mutual trust and a shared sense of collectiveness will be explored into more detail.

Findings regarding effective management activities

As stated in section 4.2.5, process management activities result from the interaction between actors and are very much focussed on the internal project motivations, goals and objectives. At the same time, these activities are also applied when responding to unpredictable, dynamic, external circumstances. Whereas the lessons for effective inter-organisational arrangements were aimed at the ability to anticipate on changing events, the lessons for management activities are to be aimed at effective ways to firstly conclude the necessary arrangements and to secondly respond to unpredictable occurrences that might follow. Thereby, they are interlinked with the achievement of mutual trust and a sense of collectiveness. The associated findings are as follows:

- **COMMUNICATING:** Externally (in resident consultations for instance), it is recommended for the collaborating parties to present themselves as *one collective, convincing group*
 - Clear communication, transparency, openness, persistence and persuasion is generally needed to receive the necessary social and political support
 - ♦ Illustrated by the strong connections of the Kleinpolder Southwest and Vermeerkwartier case, and by an undesired lack thereof in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant)
- **COMMUNICATING/ DECISION-MAKING:** Internally, the *management of expectations* is considered to be essential

- Thereby, transparency and openness about what actors are doing and what they are aiming for is of great importance: to ensure that parties truly understand each other, and each other's interests, and aiming to avoid friction and distrust
- Analysing underlying motives and finding common ground; in support of a shared feeling of urgency
 - ♦ Illustrated by the strong connections of the Kleinpolder Southwest and Vermeerkwartier case, and by an undesired lack thereof in the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant, developer and municipal area manager)
- **NEGOTIATING:** *Negotiated knowledge* – following from *wide-ranging, substantiated debates* – is seen as a strong basis for the formal cooperation structure
 - Being critical and keeping each other alert results a well-conceived project focus
 - ♦ Illustrated by Vermeerkwartier negotiations // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant and developer)
- **DECISION-MAKING:** Pragmatism and realism regarding what is truly possible is imperative
 - Both programmatically and time-wise and strongly related to the complex local circumstances in vulnerable neighbourhoods
 - ♦ Illustrated by all three cases // Supported by the external validation (viewpoint of the consultant, developer and municipal area manager)

The importance of mutual trust & a sense of collectiveness

The lessons of the sub-categories municipal management tools, management resources, inter-organisational arrangements and management activities can for a large part be joined together in the importance of mutual trust and a sense of collectiveness. As based on the network approach (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004) and complemented by De Graaf (interview, 2019), a collaboration exists, because actors are mutually dependent on their goal achievement and assume that everyone complies. That means that they rely on mutual trust in each other's commitment, ultimately resulting in a joint sense of collectiveness. That trust is harmed when things are contrary to what parties had agreed upon, or to what they expected.

Since an urban area redevelopment project is constantly impacted by unstable, varying social, political and economic events, the chances of unexpected alterations along the way are high in any case. The degree to which a cooperation structure is resistant to such alterations, in terms of its ability to adapt, strongly depends upon the shared sense of urgency and feeling of collectiveness. Especially reflecting on the vulnerable neighbourhood context, strong connections and high levels of trust are essential. The commonly weak economic, social and physical fabric namely present a particular risk for unstable influences – mostly in relation to social unrest and economic uncertainty. Efforts to achieve strong connections and the requisite degree of collectiveness are therefore put central in the formulation of a set of guiding lessons.

6.2. Set of guiding lessons

In this section, the separated findings are converted into a combined set of guiding, distinctive lessons. These lessons are all aimed at forms of cooperation and management instruments by means of which mutual trust and a sense of collectiveness can be achieved, so as to effectively redevelop vulnerable neighbourhoods.

1. The municipal area manager must constantly be aware of and pay attention to the neighbourhood predicament

- *Why? To enable central supervision in the redevelopment process and the playing of a linking role with respect to the establishment of a collective feeling of urgency*
- *How? By learning from the district council system: making sure that the municipal area manager acts as a connecting organ on the basis of constant insights into the neighbourhood predicament in terms of safety, social fabric, physical environment and liveability*

The importance of public awareness was firstly illustrated by the significant area prioritisation of Ondiep, the Fruitbuurt North. Originating from serious social unrest, nuisance and the worsened image of the neighbourhood, a regional programme was introduced, strongly encouraging and inviting housing associations and other developing parties to redevelop Ondiep in a vital, life-cycle-proof area.

Secondly, the role of the former district council of Overschie in the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest has shown how imperative it can be for a central organ to be aware of the need to take action.

2. Stimulating municipal contributions to the public space and flexible consideration regarding the social and economic complexity are vital

- *Why? To incentivise and encourage developing parties*
- *How? By lowering land prices and planning costs for the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods so as to contribute to the required feasibility*

In both the redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and Kleinpolder Southwest, the ISV-funds were considered to be an important, stimulating instrument. These examples thus suggest that, now that these funds were cancelled, there is a need for a suitable alternative. Ideally, these funds are replaced with a national or regional substitution. Since local authorities must, however, also find a way to cope with this themselves, it might be better to find local solutions. Taking the social and economic complexity into account, it would therefore be advisable to lower land prices and planning costs for the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods so as to contribute to the required feasibility. This strongly relates to the Kleinpolder Southwest case, where flexible consideration regarding the complexity of the redevelopment location offered a solution after years of failed attempts by the municipal urban planning department to make a feasible plan for the developing parties.

3. The municipal urban planning department should leave sufficient room for market initiatives

- *Why? For market assessments to be realistically based on the local circumstances, as related to the social and economic complexity and uncertainty affecting the development scope*
- *How? By only specifying guiding programmatic principles and a minimal yield, as opposed to a detailed ambition level (possibly with the aid of an independent consultant)*

The added value of allowing market parties to develop their own urban plan was firstly illustrated by the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest, where the urban planning department took a step back to only play an encouraging, facilitating role, ultimately resulting in a financially feasible and programmatically desirable proposal. In the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier, the municipal project coordinator and urban planning department also had relatively little to do with the programmatic principles. Some alterations were implemented to meet the urban requirements, but generally speaking, the redevelopment completely followed from market initiative and municipal cooperation was only needed to a limited extent.

4. An organic approach/phasing should be pursued

- *Why? To limit financial risks and to allow for anticipation on unpredictable, external influences*
- *How? By splitting up the land into different, comprehensibly sized sub-areas and by implementing one joint, coherent urban vision*

The redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North and Kleinpolder Southwest both followed from an organic approach, whereby the neighbourhood was split up into several sub-areas. This allowed for multiple parties to each develop a comprehensible number of dwellings, limiting the financial risks. In Rotterdam, a joint, coherent urban vision was established which resulted in matching, mutually reinforcing plans.

In The Hague, one single developer was able to bare the risks of redeveloping the entire Vermeerkwartier area, while still applying an organic approach. The area was split into five phases, allowing for anticipation on external social, political and economic influences.

5. Standardised resident relocation procedures must be enhanced with locally relevant operations, and attention must be paid to an actively stimulated sense of belonging

- *Why? To increase social value and economic quality*
- *How? By taking local conditions and interests into account and by building onto the overview that housing associations already generally have of the local circumstances*

This lesson actually follows from the notion that, in all three cases, little attention was paid to the local conditions and interests. The housing associations have each applied standardised procedures to successfully relocate existing residents. In the Fruitbuurt North case, both the demolition message as well as the prolonged construction phase triggered social unrest. In the Kleinpolder Southwest case, local neighbours were informed but not consulted, which caused a great deal of commotion. In the Vermeerkwartier case, extensive attention was paid to an actively stimulated sense of belonging for new residents, whereas existing residents were not included in this.

From the point of view of actually contributing to the social value instead of simply aiming to avoid negative effects, locally relevant operations should be preferred over standardised procedures. It is not implied that co-creation should be pursued. An advise would merely be to make more effective use of the overview that housing associations already generally have of the local circumstances, by actively taking those local interests into account, resulting in the aim to consult residents where possible.

6. The formal cooperation structure should consist of a well thought-out foundation of financial agreements and risk management, supplemented by a joint urban vision with adaptable programmatic objectives

- *Why? To establish strong connections and interdependent relations and goals on the one hand, whilst leaving room for possible alterations and optimisations on the other*
- *How? By stipulating agreements on profit and loss sharing, assessing the effect of market dependence and applying fixed volumes that offer room for slight programmatic changes*

Following from the notion that the vulnerable neighbourhood context is especially fragile due to a commonly weak economic, social and physical fabric, it was concluded that strong connections are essential. Contracting of the Vermeerkwartier case illustrated how proper risk management can contribute to the fostering of those strong connections and interdependent relations. Aiming to avoid friction, jealousy and distrust, everything related to financial risks and revenues was formally stipulated. Simultaneously, the general building volumes were fixed, but still offered the opportunity to make slight changes to the programme. This caused for the formal cooperation structure to be resistant to the influence of external factors as much as possible.

7. A learning effect should be implemented in the organisational structure

- *Why? To enable adjustments when necessary; contributing to both the project output as well as the efficacy*
- *How? By means of close process monitoring through regular steering group meetings and structural feedback sessions*

In the redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest, the parties considered it important to come together at regular times, regardless of whether or not urgent issues had to be discussed. Those meetings focussed on the achievement of a lean and process: decisions were made right there and then. When problems arose, a meeting would not be wrapped up until a solution was in sight. That way, the pressure was increased considerably.

In the redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier, the various phases of the redevelopment process created room for a learning effect. Aspects that did not work well in the first construction phase were fine-tuned by drawing lessons and making adjustments. Through clear agreements between both contractors, unnecessary work could be prevented as much as possible.

8. Attention must be paid to the management of expectations

- *Why? To find common ground, to ensure that parties truly understand each other, and each other's interests, and to avoid friction and distrust*
- *How? By being open and transparent about what one is doing and aiming for, so as to enable the analysis of underlying motives*

The importance of being open and transparent was emphasised in the Kleinpolder Southwest and Vermeerkwartier case. During the redevelopment process of Kleinpolder Southwest, the regular meetings were not just aimed at decision-making, but also at truly getting to know one another. That more informal side contributed to a deeper mutual understanding of one's values and interests and made it easier for the actors to find each other when a disagreement or conflict arose. In the Vermeerkwartier redevelopment, common ground was found by means of mutual alignment, coordination and tailoring.

9. Actors should aspire wide-ranging, critical, substantiated negotiations

- *Why? To develop negotiated knowledge, ultimately resulting in a well-conceived project focus*
- *How? By being critical, pragmatic and realistic about what is truly possible and by keeping each other alert with regard to the objectives*

The developing actors of the Vermeerkwartier stated that the problems that arose during the negotiation process have actually contributed to a well-conceived contract. The phrase “there is no polish without friction” was used to emphasise that the disagreements – which were notably linked to financial objectives – actually ensured the actors to remain critical and to keep each other alert with regard to the overall objectives. Consequently, risks were accurately identified and included. This was externally validated from the viewpoint of a consultant, who argued that times of hardship often result in the best contracts.

7. CONCLUSION

In this chapter, the research conclusions are provided, by ultimately answering the main research question. Following from the problem definition, the research goal was *“to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods”*. In the paragraphs below, the research sub-questions that were formulated to achieve this goal are answered, after which a comprehensible answer to the main research question will be given. In the final paragraph, recommendations for practice are listed.

7.1. Answers to the research sub-questions

In this section, answers to the research sub-questions are provided, as linked to the following sub-goals: (1) to understand the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment projects and (2) to analyse the currently administered course of action in vulnerable neighbourhoods.

1) How is urban area redevelopment organised?

Urban area redevelopment is organised and shaped through a network of multiple interdependent actors, who each bring in their own objectives and apply their own logics in a particular instance of time and space (van Bortel, 2016, p.64). On the neighbourhood scale, one can speak of Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations. Within that network, the position of the public sector has changed from a hierarchical role into becoming a more equated part of it. Instead of being dominant in many policy areas, the municipality is seen as one of the players with its own specific goals and resources (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33). Thereby, their role has become more passive. In essence, it focusses on supporting spatial initiatives by private parties and private individuals with little to no financial backing (de Hoog et al., 2014).

As the municipal role has become more passive, the role of private parties has become more active. The private sector is increasingly taking initiative to invest in urban areas (de Hoog et al., 2014). In this study, the private sector was further categorised into project developers and housing associations. Generally speaking, the main objective of developers is *“to realise a maximum yield against a manageable risk level”* (Van der Flier & Gruis, 2004). Since the yield of real estate development is obtained after the realisation and sale of real estate, and it is not common for them to own real estate objects after realisation, this indicates a rather short-term involvement (Heurkens, 2012, p.145).

As described by van Bortel (2016, p.52), housing associations provide housing for target groups that cannot afford full market rents, while balancing social and economic objectives. Housing associations are self-governing organisations, operating within a framework of government regulation, but without direct government control (van Bortel, 2016, p.52). In accordance with the Housing Act (2015), housing associations must strictly separate their commercial and social activities so as to mainly concentrate on services of general economic interest (SGEIs, Daeb in Dutch).

Public and private actors organise their cooperation in legal rules and requirements, financial risks and revenues, and organisational tasks and responsibilities (Heurkens, 2012). Thereby, different forms of cooperation can be discerned. Keast, Mandell, and Brown (2007) identified three main network typologies, i.e. cooperative, coordinative, and collaborative networks, ranging from loose to strong relational connections, as illustrated in the figure below. The different network types represent different purposes and different structural characteristics, and require different levels of trust and time to develop (van Bortel, 2016, p.61).




Figure 7.1: Horizontal Integration Continuum (source: Keast et al., 2007 & van Bortel, 2016)

2) How is urban area redevelopment managed?

Each urban area redevelopment project is initiated as a response to improving an existing urban situation, with a specific approach in a specific period of time (Heurkens, 2012, p.47). The approach is moulded by means of a formal and informal cooperation structure. Herein, the former refers to the organisation, as shaped by legal, financial and organisational arrangements. The latter refers to the process; the actual interaction between actors.

The concept of *steering* concerns the strategies and instruments actors use to influence the actions of other parties – and thus the cooperation structure – which have to be adapted to the characteristics of the network (van Bortel & Elsinga, 2007, p.33). Thereby, a distinction is made between management tools, resources and activities.

Management tools refer to the public management role, whereby four municipal management goals were distinguished: shaping, regulating, stimulating and facilitating (de Hoog et al., 2014). Management resources are, in short, the three major means that represent material and knowledge power relations between actors: land, capital and knowledge (Daamen, 2010). Finally, by management activities, the process management activities negotiating, decision-making and communicating are meant, as central to the process of cooperation; the actual interaction between actors. These activities both precede as well as follow from the inter-organisational arrangements.

3) How is urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods organised and managed?

This third question was answered by means of empirical research, by analysing what course of action is currently administered in the urban redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods. Three cases were compared, which has clearly shown that *more than one road leads to Rome*. Each case concerned an urban area redevelopment project aimed at diversifying the housing stock in a vulnerable neighbourhood, they have each taken place around the same time period, and each organisation was broadly shaped by Municipality-Developer-Housing Association-Community relations. The exact role of each actor differed, however, and so did the level of collectiveness.

The redevelopment of the Fruitbuurt North in Utrecht – a separated, individual development process, with independent goals and infrequent communication flows – can be typified as *cooperative*. By means of urban policies, visions, regional agreements, area prioritisation and spatial principles, the municipality of Utrecht has clearly shaped the decision-making scope of the market players. In addition, the land-use plan had to be altered, as a result of which the municipality of Utrecht could exercise direct influence. On the basis of that framework, the land, which was owned by the housing association, was split into several sub-areas. The housing association developed one coherent plan for the area and thereafter sold the portions of land that were intended for private sector developments to an investor and a commercial developer. Thereby, the commercial parties were thus not involved in the plan development. Each actor focussed on their personal plot of land, goals remained independent and relations were unstable. The sense of collectiveness was therefore lacking.

The redevelopment of Kleinpolder Southwest in Rotterdam – a separated, individual development process with semi-independent goals and structured communication flows – can be described as *coordinative*. In the time of this redevelopment, Rotterdam was still split into several sub-municipalities (districts). The district council of Overschie have a good view of the deterioration of the area and thus actively pursued the redevelopment. The land – which was split into three sub-areas – was owned by the municipality, but since the central municipal urban planning department struggled to come up with a feasible plan, it was decided to turn the public and private role division around by jointly making the developing parties responsible for the composition of one coherent urban plan. Thereby, the municipal role mostly consisted of stimulating and facilitating management tools. The process was structured by means of monthly steering group meetings, which focussed on rapid decision-making, the achievement of a shared sense of urgency and the fostering of personal relationships. Once the joint urban plan was established, the separate plots were redeveloped individually.

The redevelopment of the Vermeerkwartier in The Hague – a collaborative process, with joint decision-making, interdependent goals and thick communication flows – can be characterised as *collaborative*. The municipal role consisted of regulating and facilitating management tools. The municipal project coordinator constantly monitored the process, consulted and contacted the required experts, and facilitated the spatial judicial course of action. The land was owned by the housing association. Aiming to diversify the housing stock, a tender was issued, on the basis

of which the land was ultimately sold to a commercial developer. The land sale agreement was based on a minimum yield, a thorough risk assessment and adaptable programmatic volumes, which was thereafter optimised as much as possible. Consequently, goals were interdependent and the sense of collectiveness was strong.

These varying course of actions offer a wide ranging overview of empirical data and show that urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can be organised and managed in many different ways.

7.2. Answer to the main research question

In this section, the empirical findings are linked more specifically to effectiveness, so as to provide an answer to the main research question: *What forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods?*

Effectiveness is viewed in two ways. First, it is considered in relation to *realising objectives*, referring to the overall housing stock diversification aim. Secondly, effectiveness relates to *efficacy* (Dutch: voortvarendheid), with regard to the collaborative process, decision-making, adaptability and overcoming obstacles (De Leeuw, 2002). From the viewpoint of the former, the areas were all successfully, and thus effectively, redeveloped. According to the involved actors, dwellings were rented and sold quickly, the liveability has improved and residents are satisfied. From the viewpoint of efficacy, however, quite some areas for improvement were detected. In brief, it was concluded that the efficacy of the process becomes stronger when the relational connections and sense of collectiveness are strong as well. Based on the case study comparison and linked to the network typologies (see answer to the first sub-question), a cooperative process – characterised by fragmented mechanisms – is generally reviewed as less efficient, whereas a collaborative process – characterised by connected mechanisms – is generally reviewed as highly efficient.

In addition, findings and principles regarding external factors were used to more specifically and critically reflect on the applied forms of cooperation and management instruments. Resulting from the generally weak economic, social and physical fabric, it was determined that effective forms of cooperation and management instruments for urban area redevelopment in vulnerable neighbourhoods must fundamentally be aimed at ways to actively contribute to the social value, enhance political awareness and attention, and decrease financial risks and uncertainty. Each neighbourhood is different, however, which indicates that every urban area redevelopment project should depart from a thorough overview of the contextual fabric.

Following from the effectiveness aim within the vulnerable neighbourhood context, the importance of mutual trust and a sense of collectiveness became apparent. Linked to the different forms of cooperation, a coordinative or collaborative process should ideally be pursued. Coordinative in the case of a slightly fragmented redevelopment, whereby multiple private parties are involved, who each individually develop a sub-area on the basis of one jointly created urban plan that stimulates mutually reinforcing implementations (Kleinpolder Southwest case study example). Collaborative in the case of a fully connected redevelopment, whereby goals and relations become completely interdependent (Vermeerkwartier case study example).

Efforts to achieve strong connections and a shared sense of urgency were therefore put central in the formulation of a set of guiding lessons. In order to establish a direct answer to the main research question, these lessons (as given on the following pages) are categorised into:

- Effective formal cooperation (shaped by inter-organisational arrangements);
- Effective informal cooperation (shaped by management activities);
- Effective use of municipal management tools; and
- Effective use of management resources.

Effective formal cooperation [shaped by inter-organisational arrangements]

LEGAL & FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS	The formal cooperation structure should consist of a well thought-out foundation of financial agreements and risk management, supplemented by a joint urban vision with adaptable programmatic objectives
	<i>WHY: To establish strong connections and interdependent relations and goals on the one hand, whilst leaving room for possible alterations and optimisations on the other</i>
	<i>HOW: By stipulating agreements on profit and loss sharing, assessing the effect of market dependence and applying fixed volumes that offer room for slight programmatic changes</i>
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS	A learning effect should be implemented in the organisational structure
	<i>WHY: To enable adjustments when necessary; contributing to both the project output as well as the efficacy</i>
	<i>HOW: By means of close process monitoring through regular steering group meetings and structural feedback sessions</i>

Effective informal cooperation [shaped by management activities]

COMMUNICATING & DECISION-MAKING	Attention must be paid to the management of expectations
	<i>WHY: To find common ground, to ensure that parties truly understand each other, and each other's interests, and to avoid friction and distrust</i>
	<i>HOW: By being open and transparent about what one is doing and aiming for, so as to enable the analysis of underlying motives</i>
NEGOTIATING	Actors should aspire wide-ranging, critical, substantiated negotiations
	<i>WHY: To develop negotiated knowledge, ultimately resulting in a well-conceived project focus</i>
	<i>HOW: By being critical, pragmatic and realistic about what is truly possible and by keeping each other alert with regard to the objectives</i>

Effective use of municipal management tools

FACILITATING	The municipal area manager must constantly be aware of and pay attention to the neighbourhood predicament
	<i>WHY: To enable central supervision in the redevelopment process and the playing of a linking role with respect to the establishment of a collective feeling of urgency</i>
	<i>HOW: By learning from the district council system: making sure that the municipal area manager acts as a connecting organ on the basis of constant insights into the neighbourhood predicament in terms of safety, social fabric, physical environment and liveability</i>
STIMULATING	Stimulating municipal contributions to the public space and flexible consideration regarding the social and economic complexity are vital
	<i>WHY: To incentivise and encourage developing parties</i>
	<i>HOW: By lowering land prices and planning costs for the redevelopment of vulnerable neighbourhoods so as to contribute to the required feasibility</i>
SHAPING/REGULATING	The municipal urban planning department should leave sufficient room for market initiatives
	<i>WHY: For market assessments to be realistically based on the local circumstances, as related to the social and economic complexity and uncertainty affecting the development scope</i>
	<i>HOW: By only specifying guiding programmatic principles and a minimal yield, as opposed to a detailed ambition level (possibly with the aid of an independent consultant)</i>

Effective use of management resources

LAND/ CAPITAL	An organic approach/phasing should be pursued
	<i>WHY: To limit financial risks and to allow for anticipation on unpredictable, external influences</i>
	<i>HOW: By splitting up the land into different, comprehensibly sized sub-areas and by implementing one joint, coherent urban vision</i>
KNOWLEDGE	Standardised resident relocation procedures must be enhanced with locally relevant operations, and attention must be paid to an actively stimulated sense of belonging
	<i>WHY: To increase social value and economic quality</i>
	<i>HOW: By taking local conditions and interests into account and by building onto the overview that housing associations already generally have of the local circumstances</i>

7.3. Recommendations for practice

The recommendations for practice can be combined into the notion that urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods must (1) depart from a thorough overview of the contextual fabric, so as to enable an active contribution to the social value, the enhancing of political awareness and attention, and the decreasing of financial risks and uncertainty; and should (2) aim to achieve strong relational connections and a shared sense of urgency.

The set of guiding lessons above offer a helping hand on how to do and achieve that. Thereby, they should be perceived as a nudge in the right direction, rather than a complete strategy that in any case guarantees success. A limitation for example relates to the fact that the guiding lessons are based on empirical findings from three urban area redevelopment projects in the Randstad area; projects taking place in other areas of the country might demand a different approach. Moreover, the foundation of how to achieve the lessons should be seen as examples that followed from the case study findings and external validation. These could only to a certain extent be made specific, wherefore parties might prefer other (or additional) steering tactics in practice. Lastly, the guiding lessons do not cover the entire urban area redevelopment spectrum. The successive development phases – initiation, design & feasibility, realisation, and operation – were not made explicit for instance. In practice, parties will thus encounter aspects that were not empathetically included in this research.

8. DISCUSSION

In this chapter, the limitations of the research, the validity and generalisability of the results and recommendations for further research are discussed.

8.1. Limitations of the research

As will most likely be the case in any other graduation research, a practical limitation of this research relates to time. Although the choice for a comparative case study analysis allowed for broader applicable recommendations than would have been the case with a single, in-depth case study, this did somewhat limit the extent to which the different aspects could be studied into wider detail. In that sense, some of the findings feel slightly superficial and ask for further explorations. Furthermore, this research does not include a focus group validation and the guiding lessons were not tested in practice.

8.2. Validity and generalisability of the results

The empirical data is not based on hard facts, but on personal opinions. Relating to that qualitative nature, data that was collected through semi-structured interviews can be viewed as somewhat biased. It will in any case be true that the interviewees answered the question on the basis of their personal ideas, feelings and perceptions. But that is also precisely what makes qualitative studies valuable. After all, collaboration concerns people, wherefore their opinions matter. Since several cases and opinions were compared to one another, it was, however, considered essential to mitigate room for interpretations that deviate from the central goal. For that reason, a clearly structured interview protocol was applied (see Appendix 1). Aiming to collect comparable data, the case study interviewees were all asked the same questions and the data was processed in a well-structured, critical manner. These findings were moreover complemented with an external validation, which offered additional and/or supportive discoveries.

The case study comparison has led to quite a wide ranging overview of empirical data. The varying course of actions have namely resulted in the notion that urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can be organised and managed in many different ways. A downside of their disparity, however, is that very little overlap regarding the recommendations could be established. A positively reviewed aspect of one case did seem to offer a solution for a struggle that was mentioned in the other, but a stronger substantiation of that finding would require for more comparable case studies to be conducted as well.

Lastly, it is hard to say to what degree the set of guiding lessons exceptionally apply to vulnerable neighbourhoods. One could namely argue that the social, political and economic factors that were used as the basis for the formulation of these lessons can to some extent be linked to any urban area redevelopment project. In that sense, they might just as well be applicable to other contexts. Truly being able to judge the specificity of these circumstances would ask for a more extensive contextual analysis of a range of both vulnerable as well as non-vulnerable neighbourhoods. In any case, however, the findings and principles regarding external factors have allowed for the lessons to be specified for the characteristics of the vulnerable neighbourhood context.

8.3. Recommendations for further research

Following from the limitations of this study, some recommendations for further research are to be shared. To firstly increase the validity and generalisability of the lessons, more interviews should be conducted, a focus group should be organised, and additional case studies (preferably outside of the Randstad area) should be conducted. Thereby, the focus should lie on the how-part: on making the lessons more tangible. Secondly, it would be interesting to test the guiding lessons in practice, so as to enable adjustments that can improve the presented approach. Thirdly, in a complementary study, it would be valuable to draw distinctive lessons for each development phase. Lastly, in order to provide a more thorough substantiation for the social value of a diversified housing stock, further research should include the opinions of new and existing residents, and surrounding neighbours.

9. REFLECTION

This final chapter provides a reflection on the relevance of the research, the applied research methods and the research process.

9.1. Research relevance

This section reflects on the societal and scientific relevance, as related to the preceding principles that were shared in the first chapter of this research.

Societal relevance

The problem definition empathetically departed from a societal issue. Following from concerns about increasing concentrations of vulnerable target groups and the negative impact on liveability, the goal was to contribute to a place-based approach by means of which the related issues might be combatted. Since housing stock diversification is considered to be the most appropriate long-term strategy for coping with liveability problems in vulnerable neighbourhoods, the research goal became to tackle the related barriers by means of lessons for effective collaboration between public and private parties.

Apart from the effectiveness aim, however, the lessons also had to be based on ways to truly add value on a societal level. In the unravelled collaborative process behind three relevant urban area redevelopment project, the existing social context was barely taken into account. From the viewpoint of effectiveness, the standardised relocation processes and resident consultations were efficient in the sense that social influences rarely prohibit a redevelopment from taking place. From the viewpoint of enhancing social value, however, it is sensible to avoid social tension as much as possible by means of resident involvement and an actively stimulated sense of belonging for both new and existing residents. This has resulted in a set of guiding lessons for urban area redevelopment that specifically aim to enable an active contribution to the social value.

More generally speaking, these lessons aspire to contribute to the realisation of liveable, attractive, resilient neighbourhoods by supporting local governments, housing associations and commercial parties in their search for a new balance of forces.

Scientific relevance

Over the past decades, Dutch urban planning policies have been analysed and evaluated continuously and the consequences of the changed force field around vulnerable neighbourhoods have been assessed quite extensively. Comprehensive research has moreover indicated that urban area redevelopment in the Netherlands is characterized by a growing sense of ineffectiveness and inefficiency (e.g. Daamen, 2010; Heurkens, 2012; Kort & Klijn, 2013; ten Have et al., 2017). As stated by ten Have (2017), one is cooperating at most, but does not make use of a collaboration method that can lead to the desired quality and enduring value. Whereas policymakers and researchers assume that a more intensive cooperation between public and developing parties adds value by producing better and more efficient policy outcomes (Kort & Klijn, 2013, p. 90), the requisite knowledge on how to actually achieve that is often lacking.

Especially with regard to the changed force field around vulnerable neighbourhoods, a knowledge gap can be recognised. This study therefore aimed to fill that gap by generating explicit theoretical knowledge on what forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in that context, allowing actors to make use of a collaboration method that can lead to the desired quality and enduring value.

9.2. Research methods

This section will briefly reflect on the applied theoretical and empirical research methods.

Literature study

The goal of the literature study was to understand the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment. That understanding was translated into a conceptual steering model, which functioned as the basis for an analytical case study model: a framework that provided the ability to explain mechanisms in projects and could thus be used for

the case-analysis and comparison. When collecting the data by means of interviews, however, it proved rather difficult to make optimal use of this framework, as it became apparent that actors do not look at a project in such a fixed and somewhat inflexible way. They surely recognised the categories and variables, but the information was still shared in a qualitative manner, whereas the analytical case study model almost suggests a quantitative approach.

After the interviews were conducted, the theoretical model did function well as a framework for the processing of the data. By means of the four categories and associated variables, the gathered data could be unravelled, packaged and compared in a structured manner. Eventually, the inter-organisational arrangements were categorised a little differently, as it was not possible to receive the actual contracts with the stipulated legal rules and requirements, financial risks and revenues and organisational tasks and responsibilities. Instead, the formal cooperation was assessed with regard to the degree to which legal and financial agreements were formally stipulated, as related to the applied form of cooperation. Thereby, the close link to the process management activities became apparent, since it proved impossible to completely separate those from the inter-organisational arrangements. In that sense, a lesson learned was to view the application of such an analytical framework mostly as a tool for the understanding and structuring of a case-analysis, optimally enabling the ability to compare results. Simultaneously, it is important not to cling on to it too strictly, since that could stand in the way of additional findings that do not at first sight “fit” within any of the categories.

Finally, the findings were assessed against the effectiveness aim. In accordance with relevant management literature, effectiveness was viewed in two ways: in relation to the realisation of objectives and in relation to efficacy. Precisely the difference between these two viewpoints has proven to be rather interesting to emphasise, since the surplus value of effective collaboration seemed to be mostly reflected in the efficacy of the process.

Empirical study

In the empirical part of the study, three cases were analysed and compared. These cases were selected on the basis of the principle that it should concern vulnerable neighbourhoods where the housing stock was successfully diversified as a result of an urban area redevelopment project. The scale of the redevelopment, in terms of the amount of dwellings that were realised, and the time-period during which it took place, should correspond as well. In addition, both a housing association as well as at least one market party must have been involved in the process. In order to draw a comparison while attaining a rather general overview at the same time, another criterion is for the study areas to each be part of a different large Dutch city (G4).

Thereby, the idea was for all three cases to actually be examples of “best practices”: of networks typified by dense interdependent relations and goals wherein effective forms of cooperation and management instruments optimally contributed to both the efficacy of the redevelopment process as well as to the project outcome. However, despite the fact that all three cases ticked the criteria boxes, they did turn out to be a little different than originally expected. A difficulty that was not well envisaged beforehand, is that the case information that was needed to truly comprehend its context in terms of objectives, time period, scale, involved actors, and so on, could only be made available after the contact was established and the interviews were scheduled. Therefore, the case assessments as provided by the (limited) information that was found online did not always entirely correspond with the actual project details, wherefore other case studies might have been more suitable in regard to the best practices goal. Not all relational connections were as strong as intended, for which reason the actors did not all speak of a collaborative process.

That being said, however, the cross-case method in itself provided very valuable data for the answering of the research question, hence foreseeing in the research goal. Moreover, the fact that the cases were not entirely flawless examples of effective urban area redevelopment projects did allow for discoveries that might not have been possible with “perfect” patterns. This namely allowed for the surfacing of lessons that possibly would not have been shared if it regarded projects the involved actors only had positive memories of.

To sum up, a lesson would be to henceforth spend more time on the case selection, by gathering more extensive background information on the basis of which a more sophisticated choice of case studies can be made. But the method in itself allowed for a broad, valuable overview of how urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods is organised and managed in practice.

9.3. Research process

This section reflects on the research process and is therefore written from a personal point of view.

Looking back on the research proposal that was presented around this time last year (June 2018), this process started off with high (societal) ambitions. Departing from the belief that there is a great need for a society in which everyone is given an equal chance – a city in which everyone is included – the research goal was to contribute to the achieving on an inclusive urban regeneration process. Inclusive both in the sense of combatting spatial inequality as well as in relation to more effective, efficient, integrated urban redevelopment partnerships and collaboration models. In short, it was stated that an inclusive area-based regeneration policy and practice includes effective partnership working, an integrated approach towards problem solving and a strong participative element with emphasises on the involvement of local communities in the strategy and implementation process (Schlappa, 2012). Since this interpretation was still quite vague, the first sub-goal was to define what exactly is meant by an inclusive urban regeneration process.

That was precisely the question that followed from the research proposal: what exactly would I be researching? And more importantly: what exactly would this research contribute to existing theories and practices? What followed was a lengthy quest for specification. Both related to my naivety regarding what could be achieved with a graduation research as well as to the wide ranging, social complexity of “the inclusive city”, in retrospect, this phase was the most challenging part of the research process.

Eventually, the presented policy categorisation for issues related to urban inequality provided the necessary step that was needed to climb out of the inclusive city debate. Thereby, namely, the distinction between people-based and place-based policies was highlighted. Following from these categories, it became possible to place this study within that existing policy framework, as a result of which it was seen as a small puzzle piece of a much larger whole. In addition, RIGO had published a research on the resilience of social housing properties around that same time (October 2018). In that report, the necessity of resilient place-based policies was stressed by stating that housing stock diversification is considered to be the most appropriate long-term strategy for coping with liveability problems that arise in vulnerable neighbourhoods. The listed barriers largely relate to the force field around such urban area redevelopment approaches. Consequently, it was assumed that barriers to urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can largely be tackled by means of effective collaboration between public and private parties. This then (finally) enabled the formulation of a clear research goal, being *“to provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods”*.

Once that research goal was formulated, it suddenly all seemed very logical and obvious. The research process was structured by means of a set of clear sub-goals, which naturally led to a range of sub-questions. The first two questions were to be answered by means of a literature study into the organisation and management of urban area redevelopment. By determining what actors can be identified and how they relate to each other, what types of cooperation can be distinguished, and what management instruments can be defined, a better understanding of the urban area redevelopment field was established. This information ultimately resulted in a theoretical framework that could be applied to the empirical stage of this research.

During that trajectory, the research relevance was constantly highlighted by means of media attention. As following from the RIGO research, several newspapers have devoted an article to the conclusion that the liveability in vulnerable neighbourhoods is drastically declining, simultaneously stressing the need for long-term solutions.

The third research question was answered by means of empirical research, by analysing what course of action is administered in vulnerable neighbourhoods. Thereby, I did struggle with the case selection quite a bit. The idea namely was to select urban area redevelopment projects by means of which the housing stock was not only successfully diversified, but which could also be seen as best practice examples of effective networks, typified by dense interdependent relations and goals. The latter, however, is not a criteria one can easily Google. Details regarding the collaborative process thus only became available during the interviews, which meant that parts of the cases turned out to be a little different than expected.

On the other hand, nearly all contacted interviewees responded positively to my request for an interview, as they all clearly recognised the substantiated research goal. Very interesting conversations have taken place, by means of which the required data was collected and the relevance was reinforced. Only the commercial developer of the Fruitbuurt North case was unwilling to schedule an interview, as he did not perceive that redevelopment as a collaborative process. He did answer some questions via email, and although the sense of collectiveness was limited, the inclusion of that case did allow for a broader reflection on the added value of strong relational connections.

Furthermore reflecting on the results, the interviews also resulted in the conclusion that not everything can be solved by means of effective forms of cooperation and management instruments. It was never claimed that it can, but the research does largely deviate from the assumption that barriers related to urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods can be tackled by means of effective collaboration between public and private parties. Effective collaboration surely contributes to the tackling of barriers and can moreover lead to enduring (social) value. It is difficult to judge, however, to what extent the guiding lessons offer a solution for obstacles related to housing associations firmly holding on to their existing plots, strict programmatic regulations and performance agreements between housing associations and local governments for example. The guiding lessons did aim to stress the added value of thinking outside of one's own, personal objectives, but the implementation thus depends on the degree to which actors truly take these lessons to heart.

In addition, the focus of the results strongly lies on *what* forms of cooperation and management instruments are effective in urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. The *how* of it was only concisely mentioned, since the data did not provide sufficient footing for a more extensive elaboration on the application possibilities. That detail level was not attained when conducting the interviews, which can therefore be seen as a limitation of this research.

Despite the fact that the results are less explicit than I would have liked, the set of guiding lessons provide an understanding of how public and private parties effectively cooperate on and manage urban area redevelopment aimed at diversifying the housing stock in vulnerable neighbourhoods. In that sense, the research goal has been achieved.

Lastly, I would like to add that the graduation track of the degree course in Management in the Built Environment has been a valuable trajectory from the viewpoint of personal development. It has been a very interesting process. A process whereby I was given the opportunity to become an expert on the topic of my choosing. That academic freedom has both made it enjoyable as well as challenging. I would not say that I am a born researcher, but I have certainly learned what it takes to become one. The research process and findings have moreover contributed to my fascination for urban area redevelopment projects: a fascination that I will hereafter put into practice. In my work, I now plan to contribute to the realisation of liveable, attractive, resilient neighbourhoods myself.

Liesbeth van Walsum
June 2019

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APPENDICES

Appendix 1: Interview protocol

Interview opzet t.a.v. afstudeeronderzoek naar de samenwerking tussen publieke en private partijen bij de herstructurering van kwetsbare wijken

1. Korte kennismaking en vragen om toestemming voor het opnemen van het interview

2. Introductie onderzoek: aanleiding, doel en aanpak

Ter afronding van de master *Management in the Built Environment* aan de TU Delft, doe ik onderzoek naar de samenwerking tussen publieke en private partijen bij de herstructurering van kwetsbare wijken.

De aanleiding hiervoor is het besef dat het krachtenveld rondom de herstructurering van kwetsbare wijken gedurende het afgelopen decennium ingrijpend veranderd is. De Rijksoverheid deed een stap terug, waardoor het initiatief voor wijkaanpak bij de steden is komen te liggen. Daar komt bij dat woningcorporaties zich sinds de invoering van de nieuwe Woningwet (2015) meer toe lijken te leggen op het beheer van hun eigen complexen, en terughoudender zijn geworden in ontwikkelingen op het schaalniveau van de wijk. Lokale overheden kijken dan ook verwachtingsvol uit naar nieuwe spelers die de aanpak van de wijken mogelijk (financieel) kunnen ondersteunen of versterken, maar commerciële partijen melden zich maar beperkt uit zichzelf.

Ondertussen staat de leefbaarheid in veel wijken onder druk en neemt de tweedeling tussen corporatiebuurten aan de ene kant en de rest van Nederland aan de andere kant toe.

Voor de lange termijn lijkt differentiatie van de woningvoorraad de meest aangewezen strategie om de problemen die in deze buurten ontstaan het hoofd te bieden. Door differentiatie ontstaat verdunning van de problematiek en kan de zelf- en samenredzaamheid in de wijken worden versterkt.

Vanuit deze aanleiding heb ik als doel om inzicht te krijgen in welke samenwerkingsvormen en sturingsinstrumenten effectief zijn bij stedelijke herstructurering gericht op het differentiëren van de woningvoorraad, om uiteindelijk een advies uit te kunnen brengen voor partijen die hier in de praktijk mee te maken hebben.

Dit onderzoek ik aan de hand van drie wijken/ gebieden waar zo'n herstructureringsproces heeft plaatsgevonden. Per casus ga ik in gesprek met de gemeente (projectleider/gebied coördinator), woningcorporatie en ontwikkelaar, om het samenwerkingsproces zo vanuit de verschillende perspectieven te ontrafelen.

- *Herkenningsvraag: herkent u zich in deze veranderende omstandigheden?
En noodzaakt dat voor u inderdaad tot 'anders samenwerken dan voorheen'?*

3. Analyse kader presenteren en toelichten

4. Casus context

Ik deel de voor mij bekende informatie over de betreffende casus, om zo kort in te gaan op/ een beeld te krijgen van:

- a. Ontwikkelperiode (bij alle casussen geldt dat de ontwikkeling is voortgekomen uit breder opgestelde visies voor de wijk uit ca. 2008, maar wanneer is dit specifieke project daadwerkelijk van start gegaan en afgerond?)
- b. Aantal gerealiseerde woningen (om een idee te krijgen van de schaal)
- c. Betrokken partijen (bruggetje naar vragen over de projectdoelen en samenwerking)

5. Gestelde doelen

- 5.1. *Welke gezamenlijke projectdoelen zijn er gesteld/ nagestreefd?*
- 5.2. *Welke individuele doelen heeft u/ hebben jullie gesteld/ nagestreefd?*
- 5.3. *Waren er ook doelen waar geen gezamenlijke afspraken over gemaakt konden worden?*

6. Samenwerkingsproces: interne factoren (ondersteund door het analysekader)

- 6.1. Formele samenwerkings- en realisatieovereenkomsten
 - a. In gesprek gericht op de vraag: *Hoe zijn deze contractuele afspraken precies tot stand gekomen?* (specifiek in relatie tot de hierboven genoemde projectdoelen en individuele doelen)
 - b. Contracten inzien om ook daadwerkelijk antwoord te krijgen op de vragen:
 - a. *Welke juridische afspraken & vereisten hebben de partijen gehanteerd?*
 - b. *Welke financiële risico's & opbrengsten hebben de partijen toegewezen gekregen?*
 - c. *Welke organisatorische taken & verantwoordelijkheden hebben de partijen toegewezen gekregen?*
- 6.2. Management instrumenten: *Welke publieke sturingsinstrumenten heeft de gemeente ingezet? En waarom/ met welk doel?*
In hoeverre heeft dit bijgedragen aan de effectiviteit van het proces?
- 6.3. Management middelen: *Welke management middelen (grond, vermogen, kennis) hebben jullie als gemeente/ woningcorporatie/ ontwikkelaar ingezet?*
- 6.4. Proces management activiteiten: *Hoe is het proces gestructureerd/ gemanaged/ gemonitord?*

7. Samenwerkingsproces: externe factoren

- 7.1. *Welke sociaalmaatschappelijke omstandigheden hebben het proces beïnvloed? En hoe?* (invloed van de bewoners)
- 7.2. *Welke politieke omstandigheden hebben het proces beïnvloed? En hoe?* (vierjaarlijkse gemeenteraadsverkiezingen)
- 7.3. *Welke economische omstandigheden hebben het proces beïnvloed? En hoe?* (economische crisis/ dip in de markt/ afnemend consumentenvertrouwen)

8. Samenwerkingsproces: effectiviteit

- 8.1. Het behalen van de gestelde doelen:
 - a. *Welke invloed heeft het samenwerkingsproces gehad op het, al dan niet, behalen van de projectdoelen?*
 - b. *Welke invloed heeft het samenwerkingsproces gehad op het, al dan niet, behalen van jullie persoonlijke/ individuele doelen?*
- 8.2. Voortvarendheid van het proces:
 - a. *Was er, in uw ogen, sprake van een voortvarend proces? En waarom wel/ niet?* (bijv.: adaptiviteit m.b.t. het overwinnen van conflicten)
- 8.3. Effectief samenwerkingsproces:
 - a. *Wat zijn volgens u voorwaarden voor een effectief samenwerkingsproces?* (meetlat benoemen)
 - *Wat heeft de effectiviteit van het proces bevorderd?*
 - *In welke opzichten had de effectiviteit van het proces beter gekund?* (welke lessen heeft u getrokken?)

9. Afronding

Appendix 2: List of interviewees

Case	Date	Organisation
Fruitbuurt North, Utrecht	14-03-2019	Municipality of Utrecht
	06-03-2019	Mitros
	15-03-2019 (via email)	Zondag Ontwikkeling
Kleinpolder Southwest, Rotterdam	03-04-2019	Municipality of Rotterdam
	04-03-2019	Woonstad
	06-03-2019	Van Omme & De Groot
Vermeerkwartier, The Hague	07-03-2019	Municipality of The Hague
	12-03-2019	Haag Wonen
	04-03-2019	Van Wijnen
[<i>additional interviews</i>]	18-02-2019	ECORYS
	09-05-2019	ERA Contour
	07-03-2019	Municipality of Rotterdam

Appendix 3: Overview of public management roles, goals and tools

Management role	Management goal	Management tools
Providing a framework (policies)	<u>Shaping</u> Creating area potential and shaping the decision-making scope of market players	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Urban policies (economic, social, environmental) - Visions (city, housing, area) - Covenants (regional agreements) - Area prioritization (VIP areas) - Spatial principles (programme of requirements) - Master plans (non-binding) - Image quality plans (non-binding)
Providing a framework (spatial-judicial regulations)	<u>Regulating</u> Demarcating area potential and limiting the decision-making scope of market players	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Structural concepts - Land-use plans - Regulations - Environmental permits - Building permits - Procurement (procedure) - Development agreements (contracts)
Initiating	<u>Stimulating</u> Increasing area potential and broadening the decision-making scope of market players	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Subsidies (environmental, social) - Premiums (demolition) - Tax arrangements - Financial constructions - Acquisition (land/buildings) - Expropriation (land ownership) - Investments (facilities, infrastructure) - Maintenance (public space) - Public real estate (leverage)
Facilitating	<u>Facilitating</u> Exploring area potential and supporting the decision-making scope of market players	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Forms of collaboration (formal, informal) - Networking (active, passive) - Process management - Area managers - Municipal offices