

**Building Beauty:  
Kantian aesthetics in a time of dark ecology**

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## Propositions

1. Cultivating nimbleness is to willfully gather together one's self in the wake of a formative force far richer than the derivative web of living power relationships of human embeddness within a horizon of social, economical, political and historical subjectivating power relations.
2. For an ethical society it is necessary to provide elective spaces. The term, *elective space*, conveys the type of area, space, structure, building, or venue, that an individual has no requirement to consume, conduct labor within or reside, i.e., it is not a place where one must go, it is a non-market-led place one may choose to go.
3. Kant seeks a means by which he could personally contribute to the progress of humankind via the *Critiques*, which together strategically compose a didactical theory for the cultivation of the self.
4. The materiality of the building needs to be considered as its dynamic system of material parts. Steel, brick, concrete, people, insects, plant life, bacteria are all part of it. The attempted sterilization of the non-human life forms is highly dysfunctional. Architects need to study biology as they are composers of living systems.
5. Bad architecture manifests uni-directional (descending) systems of vibrant matter, condemning them to false hierarchies which exhaust gracelessly. Devoured parts expire, others that once intertwined with them are left without reference or bridge and languish in a confused manner. Stockpiled parts corrode without movement. Such structures afford very thin and limited engagement; they are spaces that present an immediate and unalterable hierarchy of perception and that can be labeled, identified and classified without playful compositions.
6. Human beings are parts of nature and when a human being is able to act in both the relation to their free intentionality and the larger context of nature, then Kantian art is created.
7. The habits of cultivating aesthetic judgment distill as: (a) a willingness to postpone an immediate identification of the object by the understanding, (b) a habit of identifying false complexities which trick the imagination into unbalanced or uni-directional causalities, (c) a familiarity with the feeling of pleasure arising from an event of Beauty which encourages one's recognition of and appetite for it.
8. The closest we can come to lifting the veil of Iris is in the event of Beauty, which is the experience of mirroring the hermeneutical loops of teleology whereby *means*  $\odot$  *ends* via reflecting upon aesthetic objects and horizons.

9. The re-prioritizing of the material presence is a means of resistance to current normalizing practices particularly manifest in the standardizing effects of bad architecture. The dominant problem with the current form of *normalizing* practices is that it de-values material presence, while it prioritizes categorization and an abstract and determinate world.

10. The clearest quality assessment of pure beauty that may be teased out of Kant's critical period is that of the causal nexus. The object, if it is to be judged beautiful, cannot be merely the inert, silent matter of artifacts. The quality of the object therefore is assessed on the manner of its matter.

## Stellingen

1. Het cultiveren van lichtvoetige sensibiteit betekent het intentioneel samenbrengen van het zelf in de nasleep van een kracht die veel rijker is dan het afgeleide web van dagelijkse machtsverhoudingen in ons menselijk bestaan; een bestaan dat verbonden is met een horizon van sociale, economische, politieke en historische machtsrelaties die ons tot subject maken.
2. Voor een ethische maatschappij is het van het grootste belang om te voorzien in electieve ruimtes. De term electieve ruimte betekent het soort gebied, de soort ruimte, structuur, het gebouw of de voorziening die niet in bezit genomen kan worden door een individu, er kan geen arbeid in verricht worden en je kunt er niet wonen; het is ook geen plaats waar men per se heen moet, het is geen plek voor de markt economie.
3. Kant zoekt een middel waarbij hij persoonlijk kan bijdragen aan de vooruitgang van de mensheid via zijn drie Kritieken, tezamen vormen ze op strategische wijze een didactische theorie voor het cultiveren van het zelf.
4. De materialiteit van een gebouw moet gezien worden als een dynamisch systeem van materiele delen. Staal, stenen, beton, mensen, insecten, flora, bacterin zijn er allemaal een onderdeel van. De sterilisatie van niet-menselijk leven is uiterst disfunctioneel. Architecten zouden de biologie moeten bestuderen omdat zij ook samenstellers van levende systemen zijn.
5. Mislukte architectuur manifesteert zich in systemen van dynamische materialiteit die maar op een manier functioneren, en ze op die manier uitleveren aan valse hirarchien die de lichtvoetigheid als het ware uitputten. Losgeraakte delen hebben geen betekenis meer, andere delen die er mee verbonden waren blijven zonder referentie of verbinding op een verwarrende manier achter. Opgeslagen delen roesten weg. Dergelijke structuren leveren een erg beperkte mogelijkheid tot interactie; het zijn ruimtes die een onbemiddelde en onveranderlijke hirarchie in onze perceptie achterlaten. Je kunt ze identificeren en classificeren zonder het lichtvoetige spel van de compositie.
6. De menselijke soort is deel van de natuur en wanneer een mens in staat is te handelen in relatie tot vrije intentionaliteit en de relatie tot de wijdere context van de natuur, dan wordt op dat moment een ethische kunstvorm geschapen.
7. De cultivering van een ethisch oordeel betekent het volgende: (a) een bereidheid om een directe identificatie van het object door middel van begrip uit te stellen, (b) het vermogen om valse complexiteit te zien die de

verbeelding misleidt tot ongebalanceerde en eenzijdige causaliteiten, (c) een bekendheid met het gevoel van plezier dat voortkomt uit de ervaring van schoonheid en die aanzet tot verdere exploratie.

8. In de ervaring van schoonheid ligt het optillen van de sluier van Iris besloten, het is de ervaring van het weerspiegelen van de hermeneutische cirkel waarbij middel en doel weerkaatst worden op het esthetisch object en zijn horizon.

9. Het opnieuw prioriteren van de materile werkelijkheid is een mogelijkheid om weerstand te bieden aan de normaliserende praktijken die in het bijzonder aanwezig zijn in de gestandaardiseerde effecten in mislukte architectuur.

10. De duidelijkste kwalitatieve beoordeling van pure schoonheid die we kunnen ontlenen aan Kants werk is die van de causale nexus. Het object is geen inerte stilgelegde materie van artefacten, als we het tenminste als mooi willen beoordelen. De kwaliteit van het object wordt daarom beoordeeld volgens haar materialiteit.

## Abstract

In the aftermath of a normalized Foucaultian world with an all encompassing web of biopower, one remaining hope is to cultivate nimbleness. Nimbleness is an embodied aesthetic sensitivity to the material presence. Cultivating nimbleness is a particular style of cultivation; it is to willfully gather together one's self in the wake of a formative force far richer than the derivative web of living power relationships of human embeddedness within a horizon of social, economical, political and historical subjectivating power relations; which are chronicled and labeled by Michel Foucault as the normalizing practices of biopower. In other words to have freedom, one must start by rejecting the categories and labels normally internalized in order to relearn to learn from the material presence. Such a style of cultivation is a means of resisting normalizing power relations which co-opt cultivating practices to engross their own dominance which has had the by-product of an impotence to negate the gross material injustices present. This normalizing style of cultivation is a prevalent, corrupted, semblance which denies the importance of beauty for that of efficiency, rejects non-human purposiveness, and limits its measure of ethics to short term economical pragmatism.

The thesis acknowledges that something is awry with the world and that giving care to beauty might help. The aim is to examine the event of Beauty as depicted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and to apply this characterization to elective architectural spaces such that it may motivate individuals to cultivate their own nimbleness in relation to a formative force of nature. However given the revealed need for sensitivity to the particular material presence, the thesis can not be a rule book or catalog for beautiful design. Rather it is a rehabilitation for architects who are already heterospatially curious, with the desired outcome of architects cultivating their own nimbleness to reflectively judge as a ground up, multi-node, rhizomatic means of resistance to normalizing power practices as manifest in bad architecture.

## Abstract

In de nasleep van een genormaliseerde Foucauldiaanse wereld, met een allesomvattend netwerk van bio-macht, bestaat er een overgebleven hoop om lichtvoetigheid te cultiveren. Lichtvoetige sensitiviteit is een materiële aesthetisch sensitiviteit. Het cultiveren van lichtvoetige sensitiviteit is een bepaalde stijl van cultiveren: het is de intentionaliteit van het zelf in het kielzog van een vormende kracht die veel meer omvat dan het afgeleide netwerk van levende machtsverhoudingen van menselijke inbedding binnen de horizon van sociale, economische, politieke en historisch subjectieve machtsbetrekkingen die zijn opgetekend en gelabeld door Michel Foucault als normaliserende praktijken van bio-macht. Met andere woorden: om vrijheid te hebben moet men beginnen met het verwerpen van de categorieën en labels die geïnternaliseerd zijn als normaal om opnieuw te leren van materialiteit. Een dergelijke stijl te cultiveren betekent een manier om weerstand te bieden aan genormaliseerde machtsverhoudingen die samenwerken met cultiverende praktijken die op hun eigen dominantie uit zijn, en die in een bijproduct resulteren van onmacht om schromelijk onrechtvaardige materiële omstandigheden het hoofd te bieden. Deze genormaliseerde stijl van cultivering is een wijdverspreide en de gecorrumpeerde schijnvertoning die het belang van schoonheid inruilt voor dat van efficiency, het verwerpt niet-menselijke doelgerichtheid en het beperkt de mate van ethiek tot de korte termijn van het economisch pragmatisme.

Het proefschrift erkent dat er iets mis is met de wereld en dat het aandacht besteden aan schoonheid zou kunnen helpen. Het doel is om het ervaren van schoonheid te onderzoeken, zoals het door de filosoof Immanuel Kant is beschreven, en deze definitie toe te passen op electieve architectonische ruimten, zodat individuen gemotiveerd kunnen worden om hun eigen lichtvoetigheid te cultiveren in relatie tot de vormende kracht van de natuur. Echter gezien de gebleken behoefte aan lichtvoetige sensitiviteit voor een specifieke materialiteit kan dit proefschrift niet gebruikt worden als een handboek of catalogus voor mooie vormgeving. Het is eerder het in ere herstellen van architecten die reeds een meervoudige interesse hebben in het concept ruimte, met als gewenst resultaat het cultiveren van hun eigen lichtvoetige sensitiviteit ten einde reflectief te kunnen oordelen vanuit meervoudige en rhizomatische mogelijkheden van verzet vis a vis de normaliserende praktijken die tot uitdrukking komen in de mislukte vormen van architectuur.



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# Preface

The motivation for this inquiry was sown long ago, before I knew of others that had made such observations and arguments. The perspective is in the style of what is now called *dark ecology*; a theory for aesthetically coping with an ecological catastrophe that has already occurred.<sup>1</sup> However to be clear this is not a study of Mortonian thinking. It incorporates a parallel observation of the phenomenon which he aptly coined as dark ecology. The title of the thesis could easily also read: Building Beauty; Kantian Aesthetics in a time of artifactual ecology. Or more succinctly: Building Beauty; Kantian Aesthetics in a time of artifacts.

One of my earlier memories is of talking a friend's father out of subjecting us to a popular fast-food chain, via a then sound argument regarding the company's practice of clear cutting rainforest to graze massive stocks of bovine. Countless other critiques of the misuse of matter or life followed that first victory. However, that pragmatic hope of one's individual actions resolving the societal impact of such horrid habits, was confined to my youth. Though I have never failed to honor my earlier convictions of a conservative and reciprocal engagement with matter, this minimal optimism in pragmatic choices was lost while attending an international climate change conference and being confronted

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<sup>1</sup>Morton, [2007](#) and Morton, [2010](#).

with the carbon tipping point.<sup>2</sup> The carbon tipping point is a predicted set of events in which, as the carbon levels reach certain given amounts, this will cause temperatures to reach minimal extremes, which will trigger the three major ‘carbon sinks’ to *flip* from storing carbon, to emitting all that has been stored in addition to not storing any new carbon emissions — these sinks being the ice caps, last vast forests (the Canadian, Tropical, and Siberian) and the coral reefs. Hence learning, via the seemingly overly detailed and researched collection of scientific data, that this set of consequences which await, lie in combination with the abundant amount of remaining coal reserves; my final lingering hope evaporated.<sup>3</sup> It seems willfully naive to predict a peaceful transition into the planet’s next phase.<sup>4</sup> As the population drops from its climax of clearly more than the seven billion it is now, to the predicted non-fossil-fueled carrying capacity of anywhere between 2.5 million to 250,000 people; I would imagine the observers and their descendants will suffer a vast agony for humanity’s habits.<sup>5</sup>

Dark ecology takes account of the observation that it might already be too late to prevent a massive collapse. I believe this is the time we live in. Yet in terms of one’s individual engagement with the world, this void where pragmatic benefits might be reasoned, is

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<sup>2</sup>Climate Change and Governance Conference: Critical Issues for New Zealand & the Pacific, 28-29 March 2005, Wellington, New Zealand. This conference can be viewed as a follow up to the vital 2001 Amsterdam conference and the Amsterdam Declaration: “A conference in July 2001 produced the Amsterdam Declaration on Global Change. It stresses that the Earth System operates as a single, self-regulating system, that human impacts may be equal to the great forces of nature in their extent and impact, that global change cannot be understood in terms of a simple cause-effect paradigm, that Earth System dynamics are characterized by critical thresholds and abrupt changes, and that changes currently taking place are unprecedented.” Text found in conclusion of Goudie, 2013, p. 339 Furthermore the collection of text titled *Global Change and the Earth System* is one of the more comprehensive and accessible outcomes of these conferences’ material, see: Steffen, 2005.

<sup>3</sup>For further details see “The Copenhagen Diagnosis: Updating the World on the Latest Climate Science” Allison, 2011. Or “Scientific Case for Avoiding Dangerous Climate Change to Protect Young People and Nature” Hansen, 2011.

<sup>4</sup>For insightful research into a time when this happen before, see Bryan Ward-Perkins’ *On the Fall of the Roman Empire*. Ward-Perkins’ research is of particular interest as it gives attention to the art of pottery in the lead up and post population bottle neck. Ward-Perkins, 2006.

<sup>5</sup>For numbers on a post-collapse carrying capacity, see Joseph George Caldwell, *The End of the World, and the New World Order*, who predicts of a pre-industrial carrying capacity of a “few hundred million or less” Caldwell, 2003, p. 3. For alternate estimations see: Butler, 1997a; Willey, 2000; Shaofeng, 2004.

a moot point. That is to say, the manner in which one conducts themselves can not be reduced to pragmatic justifications. My agenda is to argue that one must try to care regardless of hope, strategy or perceived benefit; this is what is meant by ‘building beauty in a time of dark ecology.’ The focus of this thesis is not on the immediate issues of Morton’s *Dark Ecology*, but rather acknowledges the problems anthropocence poses, as the background context of this investigation. Springing forth from these circumstances, inquiring into Kantian aesthetics uncovers the unpragmatic reflective observations, that there is something inherent in the living world that affords us to harmonize with a primitive and formative force; which is something of a melody that has persevered through time and space. At base I take this melody to be the manner in which parts treat other parts of a system. The successful manner seems to be a positive feedback loop, whereby means cause ends and ends ground means (*means*  $\odot$  *ends*). Or in other words; to replenish what is devoured and make use of what is gathered. This entails a subjective purposiveness to all parts; be these parts atoms of matter, human scale objects, celestial bodies, et cetera.

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Progressing through the system of academia, spread amongst three radically differing genres, I have come to recognize a discernible divide between motivations of scholarship. In one camp are the people that at a youthful point are confronted with drives or desires uncommon or unacknowledged by their milieu and in their otherness, a quest of knowledge is forged that relentlessly drives them on past the point of the original query. The other camp is home to theorist who enjoy the riddle, the problem solving nature of the set questions and the bureaucratic forging through text, poking holes in the masters, and synthesizing past ideas with their own wit. This is not the Platonic divide between philosopher and rhetorician or between love of wisdom and the joy of debate. “*For all a*

*rhetorician's rules/ Teach nothing but to name his tools.*"<sup>6</sup> Both camps' skills lie in the hunt for truth, as for neither, is merely winning an argument that which gratifies the childlike joy of figuring something out, something small that makes it all just a bit more clear. However the difference exist via that first awkwardness of recognizing one's own concerns are not met by society, and stays with the first camp, pushing them on.

As I grew up in the San Francisco Bay Area there was not much regarded as abnormal. Yet, something about the world has always deeply perplexed me. How is it that we can choose not to observe the potential of cleverness inherit to all life forms? A choice that seems to have afforded us the opportunity to squander the beauty of our homelands. Aesthetics can commonly be brushed aside as merely superficial concerns of overly privileged or pretentious unpragmatic people. However its seems to me that there is something about beauty in nature which teaches us to succeed with life; and beauty in art that teaches us to anticipate each other. With this thesis I hope to convey the importance of publicly accessible beauty in architecture.

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<sup>6</sup>Carritt, [1914](#), p. 20.



# Introduction

Fundamentally this thesis seeks to explicate Kant's third *Critique*, ground its contemporary relevance through Foucault's observation of a web of normalizing power relations, and establish the philosophical means of resistance via cultivating one's embodied aesthetic sensitivity, i.e., nimbleness.

The methods by which an architect can cultivate their own nimbleness, which in turn lends momentum to a positive feedback loop of an architectural causal nexus (i.e. spaces where architects can cultivate their nimbleness  $\odot$  nimble architects creating spaces to cultivate); are as diverse as the architects who seek to cultivate themselves. As is discussed in fine detail throughout the thesis, cultivating embodied aesthetic sensitivity can be conceptually structured as a three movement act. Very briefly it is the trifold effort of: first rejecting false knowledge, then stretching and humbling the soul via an experience of infinite and finitude of existence such as a primary paradox, and lastly enacting a disposition of unconcealment. The architect can undergo the first movement by study of any of the philosophies of cultivation. Rejecting false knowledge is a logical exercise well explored by philosophers beginning with Socrates, who is a prime figure for an architect to turn to for the first movement. Likewise, the exercises in the text of the Stoics and Epicureans may serve as excellent guides to rejecting false knowledge. The reasoning for why one ought to reject false knowledge is the subject of the first chapter.

The second movement requires a firsthand experience of a primary paradox, such as witnessing sublime horizons and beautiful objects. Such experiences plant the seed for a will to be ethical. This movement is delicately examined via Kant's aesthetic theory in the third chapter, titled *Beauty & Sublime*. Finally, the third movement of cultivating nimbleness is a disposition of unconcealment. In other words, it is a style of being in the world in which one acts with freedom and nature's techniques. Most simply put, this is a positive feed-back loop in which the means cause the ends and the ends ground the means; *means*  $\odot$  *ends*. In other words: to replenish as one devours and to use as one accumulates. This matter is elaborated in the final chapter, *Art & Nature*. As an aside, in between each primary chapter, is a brief interval of a critical description of an architectural object. In one case the object exemplifies nimbly created architecture and in the other an attempt that could have, but fell short of opening a space for cultivation. Investigating the reasonings, details, and needs for these movements, reveals that a nimble architect has a manner of uncovering and freely creating consensual circular causal relationship in which the thing is both the cause and effect of itself and is not one of dematerialized austerity or typology.

Central to Immanuel Kant's *Critique of the Power of Judgment* is the claim: a judgment of taste is based on the form of purposiveness of an object.<sup>7</sup> This analysis appreciates Kant's final discovery regarding the 'gap' in his thinking, his theory of matter, and the fascinating reversal of his stance on the possibility of beauty being found in color. From his work on the theory of matter, Kant's third edition of the third *Critique* reverses the conclusion regarding the formal qualities of color as existent via the vibrations of ether from "but which I doubt very much" to "which, after all, I do not doubt at all".<sup>8</sup> I believe, this line of reference provides an intriguing perspective on Kant's formal theory

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<sup>7</sup>Kant, 2000, 106 §11 5:221.

<sup>8</sup>*ibid.*, 109 §14 5:224 and Förster, 2000, p. 47.

of aesthetics and opens room in his overall theory for beauty in architecture. For Kant, form derives from a formative power of nature, inherent in an object and capable of luring an individual's mental faculties into adopting its relational patterns; its manner of matter.<sup>9</sup>

This thesis regards beauty as specified by Kant and imagined through public architectural space. It provides an architecturally biased reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* and evokes a need to generate momentum for an *architectural causal nexus*. Structured as a bifold investigation of reflective judgments, comprising the pairings of *Beauty & Sublime* and *Art & Nature*, it offers new research by mingling Kant's aesthetic and teleological theory with architecture via a defense of judgments of taste, formal beauty and the material presence. Hence the thesis reads Kant's metaphysical structure of reflective judgments; both in terms of the human experience of the event and what it must be about the world itself which affords such an experience.

Kant expresses his concern for cultivation most clearly in his 1784 essay, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* Kant claims enlightenment is the lack of immaturity; more precisely, the ability to use one's own understanding to cultivate their own minds. Unfortunately it is easy to be immature and people can remain in the slave-like state of not needing to think for themselves because society is set up in a manner where previous and dominant thinkers inform the majority of people about the simplest knowledge needed to survive. Kant asserts, "If I have a book to serve as my understanding, a pastor to serve as my conscience, a physician to determine my diet for me, and so on, I need not exert myself at all."<sup>10</sup> Beyond these simple aspects of

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<sup>9</sup>I shall exercise throughout the thesis my own strong preference for the term *individual* in indicating the category of human type beings. I employ the term in the same style Heidegger would use *Dasein*, or so and so would use *subject*, or others might use *person*, *man*, *rational being* and so forth. I find *individual* the most neutral, non-misleading, understandable, and aesthetically pleasing term currently available.

<sup>10</sup>Kant, 1983, 41 35.

life explained and scheduled, people have no need to ask past the lines drawn by the “guardians.”<sup>11</sup> When an individual’s actions are based on the request of others, the actions are not free, in addition there is no knowledge of aspects which the guardians wish not to tell or suppress. Resulting in individuals lacking other possibilities than those placed before them, which is what Kant calls immaturity.<sup>12</sup>

Being politically influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712—1778), who argued that all people needed to advance, not just the genius; Kant directs his energies to a didactical theory applicable to all humanity.<sup>13</sup> I would like to read Kant as seeking a means by which he could personally contribute to the progress of humankind via the *Critiques*, as the three *Critiques* together strategically compose a didactical theory for the cultivation of the self.<sup>14</sup> When seen with this motivational angle, Kant’s critiques take on a radically alternative manner to the predominate scholarly trend of emphasizing the pursuit of rationality for freedom.

In the third *Critique*’s introduction Kant positions the faculty of judgment as bridging

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<sup>11</sup>Kant, 1983, 41 35.

<sup>12</sup>As an aside, I will clearly note that I intentionally employ the non-gendered plural for the non-existent, non-gendered singular throughout the thesis; as in the pronouns: they, them, themselves, for the gendered he or she, him or her, and himself or herself. The non-gendered plural pronoun is not perfect, but aesthetically and practically preferable to the inanimate singular, awkward doubling of the gendered pronouns or bizarre reduction to a singular he or she. Additionally, I enjoy that it recalls the multiplicity of all individuals; for every individual practices both a bit of the masculine *he* and the feminine *she* throughout their life. Hence I shall consistently employ the plural rather than the singular pronoun.

<sup>13</sup>John T. Goldthwait asserts Kant “states that Rousseau made him respect the masses; not the genius alone but all men are necessary to the progress of humankind” Kant, 1960, p. 11. For further contextualization of self development through education and nature as examined through the theories of French thinkers such as Etienne Bonnot de Condillac, Helvétius, Jean le Rond d’Alembert, Diderot, Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, the Physiocrats, the Idéologues, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and their English counterparts John Locke, David Hume, James Mill, and Jeremy Bentham, see: Oliver W. Holmes’ *Theories of Nature and Education in the Development of the Human Self in the Eighteenth Century*. Holmes, 2008.

<sup>14</sup>For further discussion of Kant’s motivations and the purifying effects of metaphysical knowledge, see Ian Hunter’s *The Morals of Metaphysics: Kant’s Groundwork as Intellectual Paideia*, with the excellent observation: “The greater obstacle to approaching Kant’s moral philosophy as a way of life, however, comes from the fact that both its friends and its enemies insist on its formal (or formalistic) character.” Hunter, 2002, p. 909.

“the great gulf” between the concept of nature and that of freedom.<sup>15</sup> The presence of aesthetic objects and horizons afford the opportunity to exercise the skill to judge reflectively. In the second part of the third *Critique* Kant argues that we must act *as if* a circular causal relationship between means & ends (whereby the means *cause* the ends and the ends *ground* the means, *means*  $\odot$  *ends*), is a transcendental principle while at the same time acknowledge that we can never know this to be true. This teleological relationship is the grounding for a reflective power of judgment capable of engaging, but never fully understanding, the vibrant and reverberant world. In the end, the closest we come to lifting the veil of Iris is in the event of Beauty.

Discussing topics such as judgment, formal, beauty, and art within the field of architectural theory may appear trite. However the impression diminishes upon attending to the use of these terms. Metaphorically, for instance *form* is not a *still cube* but rather a *moving wave*; like a sound wave which effects the manner of vibrations of the matter it encounters. Likewise, Kant argues for a formal purity, but that purity is based on teleological judgments of mean & ends, such that aesthetic objects transparently express causal relations known as a *nexus finalis*. Most simply put, this is a positive feed-back loop in which the means cause the ends and the ends ground the means (*means*  $\odot$  *ends*). Hence, Kant’s formal purity is one that affords the perceiver to uncover a consensual circular causal relationship in which the thing is both the cause and effect of itself and is not one of dematerialized austerity or typology; but one closer to the ideas of Arne Naess’ *deep ecology* in which everything is causally connected as parts within a dynamic system.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>Kant, 1987, 35 §IX, 195.

<sup>16</sup>In particular note the opening assertion: “In 1972, [Naess] coined the phrase *deep ecology*, to distinguish a moral relation to the natural world from simply an instrumental one.” Naess, 1986, p. 402. The term ecology itself was first coined by Ernst Haeckel in 1869 as the following definition of ecosystem: “It was quite obviously an expression of the bioscientific currents of his time when, in January 1869, the young Ernst Haeckel used the term *Öcologie* during a lecture on the developments and tasks of zoology. At the beginning of the century A. von Humboldt (1808) had already given these currents new

Perhaps then, raw spacescapes of wilderness could most copiously demonstrate the phenomena of beauty or sublime.<sup>17</sup> But given the rarity of such spaces, it seems criminal to suggest them as a primary means of cultivating aesthetic judgment, as so few may access it and pragmatically if the entirety of the current human population was to visit such wilderness, it would cease to exist. Additionally given the current global situation of anthropocene, in which human habits impact all living system, postulating raw spacescapes of wilderness takes on a richer tone than the intended image of elective spaces. However, to the same extent, one may claim that some spacescapes are more wild than others. For example, from firsthand experience, I understand the alpine forest of New Zealand's south island to be more wild or akin to accepted descriptions of raw wilderness than the central canal district of Amsterdam. But such areas are not readily accessible. However, the scale of wilderness is opened to non-human object spacescapes, than wilderness is existent around and within us; such as the micro organisms in our shoes or life-force of the sky and the weather. Indubitably we effect such systems, but we have not yet set their style of behavior to our standards of abstracted hierarchy.

Given that we cannot shrink our bodies to fit into our shoes, disperse our matter to intertwine with clouds, then perhaps the relatively handy and assessable artistic sculpture or painting could best serve to enliven Kant's critique of reflective (both aesthetic and teleological) judgments; for paintings and sculptures may embody aesthetic ideas and have served as the traditional item of debate. But such objects lack the material

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impulses. Haeckel meant a new understanding of a field of work developing in biology, which considered the organism not only on its own, but also as embedded in a relationship between the nonliving (abiotic) and living (biotic) components of the environment (Haeckel, 1870). Some years earlier, in the treatise *General Morphology of Organisms* he had already defined the term *Öcologie*, which he linked exclusively with research into life-space interactions governed by natural laws, as the *Naturhaushaltslehre* (science of the nature household) (Haeckel, 1866).”Schreiber, 1990, p. 21.

<sup>17</sup>As an aside, it should be noted that *spacescape* is my own coinage produced while tutoring and pursuing an architectural masters. Spacescape recalls the full volume of a designated subarea and emphasize a metaphysical perspective of the area. It is less ambiguous than the term *space* and inherently acknowledges the horizon.

magnitude to enfold the body. Such objects may offer beauty but less easily afford the formlessness of Kantian mathematical sublime. Thus the turn is to architecture, as it is intimately interwoven with the intentional creative drive and amply enveloping to its temporary denizens.

In turning to a discussion of art and nature, the role of the artist or the genius surfaces. Alongside this role arises the critique of Kant's position on the autonomy of subjecthood.<sup>18</sup> Philosophically the historical context of the autonomy of the subject comes from (as discussed in the first chapter) the tradition of searching for the good life via cultivation of the self. The driving question focuses on the individual human being engaging with the world as a starting point. Regardless of its desirability, we are embodied human beings that can not logically prove the existence of anything outside our own care to wonder and engage.<sup>19</sup> Granting that starting point and releasing it from its haphazard collection of conceptually normalized knowledge, we can account for the perceivable moments of success by various stories of that which seems to us as the opposite of ephemeral. That is, we can make mythos about logos. We can attempt to convey an account of something forceful in the world.

### **logos is of nature and mythos is of humanity**

The use of logos and mythos here draws from William Wains collected essays in *Logos and Mythos*; which sets out to challenge the assumption that “literary texts are somehow lacking when measured against standards of philosophical reasoning and argument”.<sup>20</sup>

A good mythos is clear, entertaining, gives light to things the reader is curious about

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<sup>18</sup>For consideration which incorporates aesthetic judgments at the fundamental level of the human capacity to judge, via a detailed analysis of Kant's epistemology, metaphysics, ethics and aesthetic theory see: Longuenesse, 2009.

<sup>19</sup>I see nothing perceptive in granting an impossibility of care or wonder to engage for any classification of human beings.

<sup>20</sup>Wains, 2009, p. 2.

and stretches that insight and curiosity to elements and events the reader had not yet considered to query. It relieves the reader of conflating contrasting accounts and false knowledge perpetuated by historical, social, political situations and makes room for further ingrowth like a William Morris wallpaper print. But it is clear and avoids vagueness which leads to misinterpretation; concealment Lucretius warns of as:

“For fools admire and love those things they see  
Hidden in verses turned all upside down,  
And take for truth what sweetly strokes the ears  
And comes with sound of phrases fine imbued.”<sup>21</sup>

Depending on one’s audience, various mythos fit best. It seems to me some basic styles of mythos are: abstraction, minimalism, examples, metaphor, characterization of event as entity, deification, theology. Kant’s use of mental faculties are metaphorical, today contemporary analytical philosophy uses examples.<sup>22</sup> Twenty to thirty years ago the popular choice was thought experiments or extended metaphors, as seen with John Searle’s Chinese Room and Thomas Nagel’s bat sonar thought experiments.<sup>23</sup> Experiments “Of bitter medicine” to render the reader “tricked but not betrayed”.<sup>24</sup> Before that the trend was extreme abstraction as developed with Gottlob Frege (1848-1925), and seen with Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). These are all merely stories to point the reader in the direction of logos so that they may uncover it themselves. Aesthetist E.F. Carrington (1876-1964) draws upon the works of George Saintsbury’s *A History of English Prosody* and A.C. Bradley’s *Poetry for Poetry’s Sake* to

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<sup>21</sup>Lucretius, 1997, 21 641-5.

<sup>22</sup>Ginsborg, 2006a, p. 5.

<sup>23</sup>John Searle’s Chinese Room thought experiment, Searle, 1992; Searle, 1980 and Thomas Nagel’s *What is it like to be a bat?* Nagel, 1974.

<sup>24</sup>Lucretius, 1997, 30 940.



exemplify that words of poetry are only useful as tools to conjure up a feeling.<sup>25</sup> Carritt provides Saintsbury's example of Wordsworth's line:

"Our noisy years seem moments in the being, of the eternal silence,"

Carritt shows the meaning of the words as meaningless with the line:

"Our {noisy / loud-sounding / clamorous } twelvemonths appear minutes (seconds) in the existence of the unending soundlessness."<sup>26</sup>

It is not the meaning of the particular words that gives rise to the poetic feeling sought, but the grace of the verse that awakes the unity of feeling far richer than concepts alone. The mythos is there to evoke the individual to apprehend logos.<sup>27</sup>

Moreover, logos itself is something that develops and grows. Logos is the successful techniques of engaging with the material presence in gesture, actions and moments of truth. Logos enters with the mood of a room when honesty is spoken, the eagerness of newborn's eyes, the life of a summer meadow bustling in the heat, and such. It is a style of care that can be experienced firsthand in beauty and expressed only in the material presence. Architecture like philosophy is a mythos about logos. As such it attempts to express logos, to do such one needs to actively and intentionally cultivate nimbleness, a sensitivity to material presence, to the life force of matter itself. To produce, express, manifest material forms with sensitivity to the situation is the closest we can come to logos. We must act with that nimble intentionality which is actively both corporeal and analytical intentionality. We must see both the vase and the wine glasses of the

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<sup>25</sup>Edgar Frederick Carritt published under the name E.F. Carritt, which I believe should be respected, similarly to Le Corbusier's choice to reform his name. Carritt, 1914, pp. 181-2.

<sup>26</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>27</sup>For an examination of Stoically understanding of poetry as mythos of logos via a 'hermeneutic circle' that opened Homeric epics to philosophical readings by those already in the sect, see Emily Batinski's informative *Seneca's Response to Stoic Hermeneutics*. Batinski, 1993 For further analysis of Seneca's style of writing see Robert Coleman's specialist account literary style in *The Artful Moralist: A study of Seneca's epistolary style*. Coleman, 1974.

common optical illusion in unison to work with the formative force in a style of logos which renders the material presence beautiful. What we know about such beauty is that means ought to cause ends and ends ought to ground means. All examples I will give are thereby derivative, they are mythos, not rules but indications.

Logos is the logic, form, force, structure, pattern of everything. However it is something that is not necessary, for clearly it is possible to act without successful techniques of nature, i.e., to devour without replenishing or stock pile without using. The manner of logos is more like a pattern present in those systems which are successful in their persistence of existence. Logos is like a piece of music, played again and again with inevitable variations given the myriad of temporal plateaus. Its score is written only after the vibrations are heard or felt firsthand, the score can be thought of as the story of the practice, or the mythos. This thesis seeks to be a mythos; a score of this melody, a story which points to something that can only exist firsthand in the present material moment. I believe all philosophical theories aim to be mythos, attempting to direct the reader's attention to something fundamental about existence (logos). Theory itself is not the truth or pursued experience, but it can serve as directions to it. Yet, philosophy is limited in that it must work through the referential and hopelessly ambiguous medium of language. Hence words are drawn together to lure the interlocutors' imagination to harness their own experience of events and situations to confirm or rebut the claims. Here lies the motivation for the turn to architecture. The objects of architecture present a unique situation in which a mythos can be composed without language. An architect can form matter to compose a story in the material presence which can be immediately grasped by the later visitor. It is this expressive quality of architecture that I seek to discuss within this thesis. For although there is no logical pragmatic justification to harmonize with logos, there is something beyond our understanding that beckons us to

try.

This reading of Kant's *Critique of Judgment* argues that one must act *as if* all matter is subjectively purposive because that frees the individual to have a disposition of unconcealment, i.e., to freely or authentically engage with life.<sup>28</sup> One way of manifesting this is by providing architecture that is both an ends and a means of itself. Acting in a style sensitive towards the material presence and the techniques of nature as logos. The manner in which the parts relate to each other as a system, demand further recognition by which they may lead to an architectural object that is closer to a product of nature than a malformed artifact.

Architectural objects emerging from such sensitivity might provide a moment of pleasure for those who exist post a major population bottleneck and global systems collapse.<sup>29</sup> The agenda then might seem to be to provoke someone to create spaces that may offer those descendants, moments of beauty by intentionally formed matter which expresses that we were not callous all of the time, that something beautiful once occurred; an exuberance of beauty that may warrant further attempts of similar habits. An expression akin to the magnificent blossoms of a flowering tree's final known season, when all efforts are diverted to hope of new beginnings.<sup>30</sup> However, this is not the agenda. Rather, to create beautiful architecture which is in harmony with nature's technique or logos is worthy of pursuit in itself. In short, one does it because it is what ought to be done, not because it serves a practical purpose.

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<sup>28</sup>Unconcealment in the sense of "We shall set before ourselves the concept of duty, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from concealing it and making it unrecognizable, rather bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth all the more brightly". Kant, 1996 (1797), 52 4:397.

<sup>29</sup>See *Power Down* by Richard Heinberg, for excellent historically contextualized description of the term *collapse*. Heinberg, 2004, p. 10.

<sup>30</sup>In the final known season of a flowering tree, all effort is devoted to the blossoms. This is what the ancient Greeks would call *epistêmê* knowledge (something individuals can easily observe about the world), but the recognition was first drawn to my attention through Anne Whiston Spirn, *The Language of Landscape*. Spirn, 1998.

This thesis is not a rule book for design, but rather a means of rehabilitation for architects already heterospatially curious. At base the next couple of hundred pages are here to justify a very simple argument; something is awry with the world and giving care to beauty may help.

# Chapter 1

## Rejecting False Knowledge

*From that which we leap*

### 1.1 Base Introduction

The overarching argument of the present chapter is that the diverse philosophical methods of the *epimeleia heautou*<sup>1</sup>, share a basic structure and offer a method of resistance to normalization by cultivating nimbleness which affords freedom. The basic structure is a trifold effort: first rejecting false knowledge, then first-hand experiences of a primordial paradox and finally enacting a disposition of unconcealment. The current chapter contextualizes the need for such efforts and examines the context of rejecting false knowledge — without regurgitating the details of the philosophical methods themselves, for there is no reason to compete with the richness of the primary sources such as, the Epicureans, Stoics, Plato, Merleau-Ponty, or the likes. The later chapters engage the paradox and disposition of unconcealment via a close reading of Kant’s third *Critique*.

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<sup>1</sup>I.e. cultivation of the self with the aim of self-sufficiency, peacefulness, and awareness of the vastness nature.

Here is an austere outline of the chapter, provided merely for orientation. This introduction will begin by establishing a context to the perceived problems within architecture by employing Foucault's research into normalization and evidence of devalued material presence. To do such I will examine Foucault's method of the *problématique*, account of pastoral power, and its current position within corporate or market powers. I will further examine the particularities of power; as relational and in terms of subjectivity and cultivation of self (i.e. *epimeleia heautou*), how these power relations are non-consensual and the common critique of Foucault's lack of grounding with a brief rebuttal by method. Then I will turn to how Foucault points to Pierre Hadot and Immanuel Kant for richer details, respectively in the history and solution. Following this, I shall draw out how the issues manifest in architecture as bad architectural ecosystems and connect bad architecture, bad habits and threats of the eternal return. I will then briefly position the thesis within determinist theory and argue that designs are manifestations of what Kant comes to call "aesthetic ideas".<sup>2</sup> I then proceed by narrowing the category of the architectural object of study and introduce the concept of *elective spaces*; along with justifying carving out the architectural object from its context of the city. Next, I will continue with a detailed account of the historical origin of the concept and practice of *cultivation*, which justifies the thesis' employment of the term, by explaining what cultivation is, different types of unfreedoms, movements of cultivation and practices. I will then introduce the key details of the architectural causal nexus which is a circularly causal relationship between architects and architectural spaces. Then I present a case study of Le Corbusier along with an analysis of failed attempts of motivating architectural causal nexus. Then I examine the notion of artifactual theology and a plead for heterogeneity in the built environment. Finally, I shall conclude by providing new bearing with preliminary notions for following chapters.

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<sup>2</sup>Kant, 2000, 191 §49 5:313ff.

### 1.1.1 Framing the built environment

Bad architecture is everywhere. We have all seen it, walked through it, frowned upon it, worked within it, shopped and attended events while in its clutches. A single thesis could not cover the vast diversity and extent of bad architecture existing amongst us. Though dwelling with such narrative could be as disadvantageous to one's habits as the architecture itself. However, it must be addressed to a minimal extent to situate what relations may be drawn between the profuse flourishing of bad architecture, human habits, and possible means of resistance.

Bad architecture is one aspect of an overarching political, social, economical pattern of increasingly limiting thinking and dulling of the possibilities of action. Such a proposition raises the need to distinguish the notion of bad architecture from bad building. Some *non-architectural* buildings have been presented as incapable of being bad. For example, buildings of the vernacular, traditional, or über-pragmatic construction (such as is denoted with Brazilian favelas), are hailed as infallible manifestations of the particular site, cultural and historical context.<sup>3</sup> While an exhaustive debate along these lines is outside of the perimeters of this thesis, it is interesting to consider the distinction to establish the context of the thesis.

At a minimum architecture demands something more than the pragmatic manipulations of materials for shelter. It can be claimed that architecture enters with the spirit, soul, culture, or humanity. That is, material designs become architecture when the intentionality of the potential users effects the plan. Correspondingly, the concept of 'building' demands no proclamation of reflection regarding the temperament or demeanor of the intended space. In considering the generating intention of the structure a line can be drawn between the singularity of the aesthetic idea, versus the multiplicity of

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<sup>3</sup>Glassie, 2000; Perlman, 2010; Jaguaribe, 2004.

pragmatic adaptations for users' needs. Aesthetic ideas are noteworthy, in that they arise with imaginative playfulness and with much thinking but no determinate thoughts, concepts, or language. According to Kant, aesthetic ideas are the counterpart to ideas of reason, and are possible through the faculty of spirit and intimately connected to genius.<sup>4</sup> A structure that manifest an aesthetic idea is architectural, as it is some sort of material construction arising from a playful indulgent with conceptless ideas of pure forms.

The divide between architecture and building drawn by generating intentions, calls into question the temporality of the object. An original architectural object can develop over time into a mere building as it has pragmatic facets, additions or augmentation restructuring its form.<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, a mere building can transform into architecture, if its structure is reformed via a singular aesthetic idea.<sup>6</sup> The difference can be as subtle as Frank Gehry's sweeping of the floors which makes the leap between building to architecture or the coat of grey-green paint of Gardner Dailey's late modern design of *Evans Hall* (1971) on the UC Berkeley campus, which transformed the architecture to a mere building (with the hope if its mass fading into the surrounding hills).<sup>7</sup> Hence the central dividing point between an architectural object and a building is the unity of intentional reflective judgment which guides the present material form.

Here, the question could predictively turn to what type of structures are architectural or just buildings. Yet rather than indulging this diversion and while acknowledging that many constructions are mistaken as architecture or buildings, the question of whether or not there is a possibility of bad building beckons. That is, are contractors and property

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<sup>4</sup>see: Kant, 2000, 191 §49 5:313ff.

<sup>5</sup>Though the building may retain 'good bones' as people like to say.

<sup>6</sup>Such as the *Gehry House* (1978).

<sup>7</sup>Powell, 1999, p. 129 Gehry and Bletter, 1986, p. 185 and *No Stirrings of Pride: The chronicle of higher education. July 6 2007*, p. i.



developers out of range from aesthetically critique of their contribution to the built environment? Are developers who “house people making money, or to make money housing people”,<sup>8</sup> such as Carl Koch or William Levitt who constructed collections of low budget buildings as monocultural communities, outside this thesis’ critique? Or are contemporary modular home construction, such as kit houses, manufactured housings, prefabricated homes, container homes, and possibly 3-D printer houses, not positioned to be critiqued within aesthetic criteria?<sup>9</sup>

There are two modes of responding to this muddle of queries. One question can be formed as: can there be bad building, and another is: are buildings subject to aesthetic critic. Firstly, given that building sets out different demands for itself; i.e., not that of creating a mood or intentional experience of the end user, but rather a pragmatic manipulation of materials for shelter, it seems fair at minimum to claim that there can be bad building, as many buildings are indeed not confirming these alternative expectations. For example consider the national scandal in New Zealand of ‘leaky building syndrome’, in which the government had to financially compensate thousands of home owners due to the ramifications of a neo-liberal lowering of building standards on a national level, passed as “The Building Act 1991”, which resulted in many thousands of newly constructed buildings (1994 to 2005) to suffer from avoidable and severe weather tightness problems.<sup>10</sup> Although, perhaps this presents a further argument regarding the distinction between building practices and building policy, which brings the discussion into terms of the social-political realm and away from the claimed psycho-philosophical field of this thesis. The assertion of contemporary artist Banksy, that “there’s nothing more dangerous than someone who wants to make the world a better place” reverberates the current study’s direction of that of individuals’ pursuit of cultivation, as a ground

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<sup>8</sup>DiFranco, 1991, *Not So Soft*.

<sup>9</sup>Such as the Sears Roebuck Kit House (1908-1940) and Lindal Cedar Homes (1945-) [Lindal 2013](#).

<sup>10</sup>It is reported that “Leaky homes will cost \$11.3b to fix”. NZPA, [2009](#).

up, multi-node, rhizomatic means of resistance.<sup>11</sup>

Hence, critique of the built environment may not be limited to structures whose creation was effected by architects. However, perhaps what is being overlooked in this distinction between building and architecture is the diversity inherent in the practice. Architects are not merely men with diplomas, titles and jargon. This phenomenon manifests Kant's claim that:

“Self-educated minds commonly possess a certain originality which one can use to sharpen one's way of conceiving things (which are usually due more to one's teachers than to one's own thinking) and often such people can give us a wholly new perspective for assessing things.”<sup>12</sup>

Three of the most gifted architects within the last century, Frank Lloyd Wright, Carlo Scarpa, and Tadao Ando, never studied architecture to receive a technical degree. Early Le Corbusier's haunting proclamation that architecture enters when the building touches my soul, conveys that this skill of architecture is not a science achieved merely by diligence. In Le Corbusier's own words:

“You employ stone, wood and concrete, and with these materials you build houses and palaces. That is construction. Ingenuity is at work. But suddenly you touch my heart, you do me good, I am happy and I say: ‘This is beautiful.’ That is Architecture. Art enters in.”<sup>13</sup>

Thus returning to the proposal of non-architectural buildings like the houses of Carl Koch or William Levitt, it is perhaps more fitting to claim a similar process to that of architecture is at work. An idea is employed to generate and guide the project, as the late

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<sup>11</sup>Banksy, 2001; McCormick et al., 2010; Banksy, 2006.

<sup>12</sup>In the letter from Kant to Johann Kiesewetter on February 9, 1790. Kant, 1999, 336, letter 102.

<sup>13</sup>Corbusier, 1931, p. 153.

Le Corbusier will say, “Architecture creates shelters.”<sup>14</sup> However, the embodied skill of intentional judgment is guided by market-led practices. Some degree of the skill attempts the task of taste; but is underdeveloped and in need of further cultivation. This is because the frame of the designer’s reflections are not those of aesthetic beauty and sublime, but one that is derivative and piecemeal from the individual’s social, political, and economic background. Attempts at aesthetic ideas which are framed in the semblance of rules result in underdeveloped buildings which become obsolete, fail to warrant care and confine their end users to insipid experiences of life. Although these buildings only set out to achieve pragmatic solution for basic human living conditions via the process of creating something anew through forming matter, the richness of the contextual situation is engaged. It is thereby the context that is greater than the builder’s intentions that *überhaupt* warrants aesthetic critique of buildings.

*“Men’s subtlety imprisons careless songsters in its narrow net” Sophocles, Ant. 343*<sup>15</sup>

In regards to the temporality of the architectural object which in aging may be tempered with short-term pragmatic adaptations; the question remains if such buildings are still within the field of aesthetic critique? Following the same reasoning as above, the conclusion to draw is positive. The material intervention is generated by some degree of judgment. The results of this judgment may be justifiably labeled as bad building. Hence there can be bad buildings; both in terms of their fulfillment of basic pragmatic expectations and in terms of their aesthetic relationships.

The difference between architecture and building is then one analogous to that of continental and analytical philosophy: there are discernible patterns between the practices. Both (continental & analytical philosophy and architecture & building) have an ex-

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<sup>14</sup>Corbusier, 1960a, p. 49.

<sup>15</sup>Carritt, 1914, p. iii.

tensively shared history, within which either side purports their own superiority. Yet, although the divide is useful to know for context and strategic means of communicating with people, it is ontologically meaningless.<sup>16</sup> As both fields are means of creating structures for engaging with the world or pursuing the love of wisdom.

The re-prioritizing of the material presence is a means of resistance to current normalizing practices particularly manifest in the standardizing effects of bad architecture. The dominant problem with the current form of *normalizing* practices is that it de-values material presence, while it prioritizes categorization and an abstract and determinate world.<sup>17</sup> Material presence is the vibrant matter as it exists on the edge between memory and possibility, in which the memory and possibility is not limited to an anthropocentric bias.<sup>18</sup>

### **material presence**

The words *material presence* convey the leap between the relational manners of matter as they unfold. It exists at all scales, that of a hand and a pen, a window and a void, a skyscraper and a tree, or in the other direction, the matter of micro organisms, primary atoms, ether or particles. The material presence is the moment pregnant with change as matter leaps from one state to another.

Imagine that you are the sounding of a particular melody, your existence being a precession of tones. Your earliest experience is a distant *pianissimo* and there are fears that beyond *fortissimo* you may cease to exist. Without the sounding of your melody, you do not exist. Moreover, the sound is necessarily stretched through time, as it is audible

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<sup>16</sup>As was taught in Berkeley philosophy camp. Sluga, 2002.

<sup>17</sup>Normalizing practices as observed and contextualized by Foucault shall be elaborated below.

<sup>18</sup>Additionally for an insightful examination of the vibrancy of matter see Jane Bennett's *Vibrant Matter* Bennett, 2009, which refreshingly accounts for both the potential and lack of harmony observable within a monistic metaphysics.

insofar as it is changing. It exists through its performance. When a note is divided into slices, each instance sustains no sound. But between each vibration is the possibility of the next, the moment of change and choice. That moment is the present. Within the momentum from the crescendo pushing forward and the anticipated next note, sound from another may mingle with one's own. In the leap from what has been to what will be, is the material presence.

Yet in what sense is the term matter employed? Is it the matter of Lucretius' atoms falling in the void with moments of swerves?<sup>19</sup> With a finite number of different shapes; rough ones like fire, smooth ones like poppy seeds, coming together, coming apart, radiating off bodies in replicant form of thin slices reaching eyes, becoming seen. Or is it Spinoza's matter of atoms composing together a god? Or Leibniz's matter of infinite monads, pre-harmonized by a god, such that each monad acting within itself, mirrors others acting only within their self, a system designed before time?<sup>20</sup> Or late Kantian matter, where the basic unit is capable of both internal and transient affects and effects. Or Newton's mechanism of motion where matter is inert and action is only from without. Or Hegel's addition of self determination of the substance to Kant's proposal.<sup>21</sup> Or like the particles of quantum physics, where the location of a particle is only a probability until it is observed.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>19</sup>Lucretius, 1997, 42 ff. 219 ff.

<sup>20</sup>Kant found Leibniz's pre-established harmony to be "whimsical figment", Riley, 1986, p. 562. See also Kant's 1793/1804 book, *What real progress has metaphysics made in Germany since the time of Leibniz and Wolff?* Kant, 2002c, pp. 3349-424.

<sup>21</sup>Hegel liked Kant's points about substance and force, as it provided an alternative to Newton's merely mechanism approach, an argument for matter as essentially active with an account of this activity that avoided pre-established harmony. But Hegel thought Kant fell short by not attributing a power of self determination to substance. As Hegel argued in *Remarks on the Kantian Construction of Matter from the Forces of Attraction and Repulsion*, in the *Being-of-itself* section of the *Science of Logic*. Hegel, 1961, 178-184 (33fn30) Hegel's view appears rather open to the position of hylozoism.

<sup>22</sup>See Sean Carroll article on the cosmological constant for one of the more accessible accounts written by a practicing physicist. Carroll, Press, Turner, et al., 1992, in particular page 8 ff. Or see Hughes' classic text *The Structure and Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics* Hughes, 1989, in particular see pages 59-71, where Hughes' explains the details of how observable variables of position and momentum can be read by looking at the appropriate coordinates.

The working analysis here of the material presence is sympathetic to Lucretius (died c. 50bce) and attempts to draw out ramifications of Kant’s third *Critique* and Final Synthesis. Ether comes together in certain relational patterns and successfully composes objects. Ether is Kant’s later term for a primary unit of matter. In the *Opus Postumum* he comes to regard ether as something deducible from the conditions of possible experience.<sup>23</sup> These relational patterns of how individual ether engages with each other is driven by the subjective purposiveness of the object. Kant’s theory of matter is not based on a gravitational attraction, but “a contact force” and “effect of repulsion—the results of the impact of the unceasing ether-oscillations.”<sup>24</sup> This initial attempt of working out the details of the ether develops into something the leading scholar on Kant’s final synthesis, Eckart Förster explains as:

“Kant has by now firmly established that all mechanical forces of matter depend for their possibility on the dynamical forces of the ether, and thus all parts of matter distributed in space are interrelated as members of a universal mechanical system of the forces which originally and constantly (according to modality) agitate matter.”<sup>25</sup>

Förster’s assertion refers to Kant’s significant comment in the *Opus Postumum*:

“The transition from the metaphysics of nature to physics is the tendency of the laws of motion in general toward the principle of moving forces of nature. Space and time realized.

The *primum movens* is not locomotive but rather internal, by reciprocal attraction and repulsion of all parts of matter.

The collective idea of all the moving forces of matter precedes *a priori* the

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<sup>23</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 83.

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*, p. 83 as the original Kantian source.

distributive idea of all the particular forces, which are only empirical.

The matter whose internal motion makes weighing (therewith, the rigidity of the lever) originally possible, must itself be imponderable. It is expansive, however, because it occupies, by means of internal concussive motion, a greater space than if it were at rest.”<sup>26</sup>

As shall be argued in the subsequent chapters, Kant’s metaphysical structure resides on a presumed formative substratum beyond our limited ability to sense. This supersensible stratum is not inherently insensible, as perhaps other beings might have a better sensory experience of it, but due to our limited embodied cognition we currently cannot sense it. In the final synthesis, he attempts to grapple with “a gap” in his thinking regarding the connection between metaphysics and physics.<sup>27</sup> Through extended scholarship Eckart Förster uncovers that by 1798 a “gap in the critical philosophy” truly worried Kant.<sup>28</sup> The final synthesis examines the “‘living force’ of impact” of “ether-oscillations” and attempts to form a transition between his metaphysical theory and physics without the employment of a god, as was customary in his pre-critical writing.<sup>29</sup> Kant tries to establish how things shift from being possible, to being determinable objects. In Kant’s words:

“ ‘Every thing, as regards its possibility, is...subject to the principle of thoroughgoing determination, according to which if all the possible predicates of things be taken together with their contradictory opposites, then one of

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<sup>26</sup>Kant, 1993, 55 22:200-1.

<sup>27</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 53.

<sup>28</sup>*ibid.* Eckart Förster notes quotation from Kant’s letter to Christian Garve of September 21 1798 (12:257). See: *ibid.*, p. 48. For an alternative interpretation of the ‘gap’ which associates the importance of the ether with the human body see: Thandeka, 1992, however Thandeka’s reading is less familiar with the text of the *Opus Posthumum*.

<sup>29</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 67 original: Kant, 1993, 5 21:454 & 14 21:389 and *ibid.*, 24 21:308 & 34 21:521 Further details of this topic are discussed below in chapter five.

each pair of contradictory opposites must belong to it' (A571f.)”<sup>30</sup>

Along these lines Kant comes to see the supersensible substrate (*omnitude realitatis*) as the source of all matter in addition to it being a formative force. Förster describes this key assertion as follows:

“The principle rests on what Kant calls a necessary ‘transcendental presupposition,’ namely, the idea of an *omnitude realitatis*,...that contains, as it were ‘the whole store of material’ for all possible predicates of things... We cannot think of a finite thing except in terms of some limitation or privation. But a limitation, as a determination of an object, is always derivative and presupposes the thought of the realities that it limits and that contain the data or material for the possibility and thoroughgoing determination of the thing: ‘All manifoldness of things is only a correspondingly varied mode of limiting the concept of the highest reality which forms their common substratum, just as all figures are only possible as so many different modes of limiting infinite space’ (A578).”<sup>31</sup>

The reasoning within and surrounding this claim is essential to my reading of Kant’s third *Critique*. It is clear that by finding the “gap” in his thinking, a dialectical illusion of contradiction surfaces between his position of the first *Critique* and that of the final synthesis and the third *Critique*.<sup>32</sup> The third *Critique* was republished during the time Kant is working on the final synthesis as its third edition with only a few but significant changes as discussed above. The most notably change was the reversal of the conclusion regarding the formal qualities of color as existent via the vibrations of ether from “but

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<sup>30</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 80.

<sup>31</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.*, p. 84.



which I doubt very much” to “which, after all, I do not doubt at all”.<sup>33</sup> The third *Critique* predominately affords the theories developed in the final synthesis, a theory in which Kant suggest; “All the primitive moving forces of matter are dynamic; the mechanical are only derivative.”<sup>34</sup> This is the difference between the mental faculty of reason as being responsible for “projecting a certain point—a *focus imaginarius*—toward which it directs all the efforts of the understanding, a point where these efforts might converge as upon their point of intersection.”<sup>35</sup> And the reverse position of the *focus imaginarius* as being “the principle from which the systematic unity of all the moving forces of matter is thought to emerge.”<sup>36</sup> In the first *Critique* it is our mental faculties projecting this focus imaginarius. Contrarily, in the third *Critique* and the final synthesis this systematic unity is existent regardless of our projection of it and furthermore is what affords all matter (including us) existence. Thus there is a formal and subjective purposiveness of nature that is inherently material, regardless of human’s cognition of it. This matter is the ether which is supersensible but can become determinate (and sensible). In other words, objects are composed of matter existent in a supersensible substratum, but it is possible through engagement, for this matter to become determinate. Both as “*concreto*” and “*in individuo*,”<sup>37</sup> as Förster clarifies as, “determined or determinable by the idea alone” although, purposive alone, regardless of the idea.<sup>38</sup>

By thinking of the ether as vibrating in the style of sound, a mythos takes shape. An object is a collection of vibrating ether which come together and generate a unique melody. Its tone may generate a pattern of relations which like a sound wave, affords matter distinct from itself to echo its relational patterns. When an object’s generating

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<sup>33</sup>Kant, 2000, 109 §14 5:224 and Förster, 2000, p. 47.

<sup>34</sup>Kant, 1993, 55 22:239.

<sup>35</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 84.

<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>37</sup>*ibid.*, p. 81.

<sup>38</sup>*ibid.*

sound wave confronts another object which has its own unique tone (its unity), the sound waves can combine in a number of ways. They may for example violently clash, be consumed by the other, transfiguring the other object's sound, harmoniously merge with the other sound, or amplify the vigor of the relations patterns. Philosopher Patrick Healy eloquently discusses this phenomenon in an essay on the relevance of ornament in contemporary architecture. In the context of Louis Sullivan's search for a system of ornament that could render the inorganic fluent, Healy draws upon an analogy to sound:

“As in musical theory, a tempered tuning lies in the division of tonal spaces into identical subspaces, there is through intensities the sonorous reality of cosmos, itself an historical process, beginning perhaps as monophonic melody lines, a sense of ‘natural’ euphony, with the discovery of the octave, a connecting of tone and line, again allowing a sense of the harmonious, the discovery of the different intervals and effects.”<sup>39</sup>

A practical example may be drawn out from this metaphor to the scale of the human body and the windowsill. The windowsill (as a object) is composed of a system of vibrating ether relating to each other in a particular manner which generates a particular style of waves. As an individual human engages with the windowsill, the various ether of which the individual is composed, echo the manner of the windowsill's matter. The embodied human faculties of sensory perception are guided by a primitive normativity which echoes the manner of the object and horizon encountered.<sup>40</sup> The primitive normativity guides via constituting pleasure when echoing the manner of the object's vibrations and displeasure when clashing with the manner. In other words, pleasure is

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<sup>39</sup>Healy, 2004, p. 48.

<sup>40</sup>Further discussion of *primitive normative* as a concept developed by Kantian scholar Hannah Ginsborg is found in section 5.0.3. *that which affords aesthetic judgments*.

the normative feeling guiding the mind to match representations to objects, to echo the manner of matter.

In short the material presence slices through scales of vibrating matter in the leap between the notes. As objects maintain themselves, or humans engage with others, and as judgments are being made. In other words, material presence is the void which affords metamorphosis. It is presumed in our theories of physics, biology, design, psychology, sociology and astronomy. It is the moment between the notes, the cocoon of the moth, the leap across the synapse, that which is free from where it was and where it is going, but *überhaupt* inspired by its context.

### **foreshadowing aesthetic judgment within the immediate context of material presence**

To briefly position aesthetic judgments at this level of vibrating matter, although comprehensive discussion of aesthetic judgment is reserved for the chapter below on *Beauty & Sublime*, consider the following. In addition to the basic architectonics of nature as a system of parts relating to each other with an overall unity and purposiveness, there is also a distinction between successful and unsuccessful manners of matter. Nature's techniques are the core principles of successful patterns of matter relating to one another. The basic principle of nature as implicit in late Kantian text are:

To replenish as one devours.

To use as one accumulates.

Objects with parts relating to each other in a pattern where devoured matter is replenished and those collected are spent, are objects behaving in nature's techniques. If parts of a system relate to each other in this manner, then the system of parts is self-nourishing,

self-perpetuating, and successful. As humans, we ought to then judge the object to be beautiful. In this sense the object itself is self-nourishing and self-perpetuating. It must be both an internal (or intrinsic) relationship of the object to itself, and an external (or relational) relationship of the object to its horizontal context. That is, the object must relate to itself with these principles and relate to other objects with these principles in its wider context, if it is a practice of nature's techniques.

It is helpful to consider the quality of the manner of matter as variant by scale rather than as plateaus of yesses and noes. For example, it is not that the Japanese maple tree (*Acer palmatum*) along the river bank has dynamic matter in the manner of replenishing what is devoured and using what is accumulated. The particular wood composite floor boards in affordable apartments have completely inert matter. Rather the matter of the tree is able to work with each other in a positive feedback loop  $\odot$  style, while the matter of the floor has been mis-formed or malformed and is unevenly perishing, as some parts may still try to act with the principles of nature, i.e., in the final causes style (nexus finalis). Yet, because the object has been designed with a false hierarchy which condemns the parts to stagnate, their capacity to self maintain is blocked and the object becomes a mere artifact in Kantian terms. When the manner of the matter is blocked and stagnant, condemned to rot and grow brittle, then the object does not awaken the pleasure of aesthetic judgment; warranting political theorist Jane Bennett's question: "Is trash stuff whose power to move, speak, or make a difference has become dormant or dead?"<sup>41</sup> The words *feedback loop* might call to mind issues around cybernetics, as engaged in the work of Donna Haraway, Alfred North Whitehead, Gregory Bateson, Francisco Varela, and so forth. However this rather promising direction is outside the modest confines of this thesis, which fundamentally seeks to explicate Kant's third *Critique*, and ground

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<sup>41</sup>Bennett, 2004, p. 350.

the contemporary relevance of this study through Foucault's observation of a web of normalizing power relations and the philosophical means of resistance of cultivating one's embodied aesthetic sensitivity, i.e. nimbleness.

Returning to the above example, in the situation where the matter of the windowsill relates to each other by replenishing what is devoured and using what is accumulated, and the embodied faculties of the human perceiver echo this manner of matter, then there is the further pleasure of an aesthetic judgment. In this case the windowsill would be an aesthetic object, i.e., an object which affords an event of Beauty and an object of art. Likewise a similar sequence of relationships occurs with a natural object (a product of nature in Kantian terms). Consider for example the orchid residing on the windowsill. This orchid can be a healthy orchid and able to maintain itself via the interaction between its parts (with some of those parts for finite spans being the beings which bring it water). Hence, both aesthetic objects and natural objects share a basic  $\odot$  pattern of how their parts relate to each other, which when echoed by a human perceiver affords an aesthetic judgment. Furthermore, the collection of these aspects when occurring together can be understood as an event of Beauty.

Manner of Matter of the Object	Perceived as	Judgment Style	Event Type	Individual, Social or Political Ramifications
Aesthetic Object (both art & natural objects)	i. $\odot$	Aesthetic	event of Beauty	affords cultivating nimbleness
	ii. $\curvearrowright \rightarrow$	Determining	hyper-uni-direction cognition	Reinforces relations of biopower
Artifact	$\curvearrowright \rightarrow$	Determining	concept-led cognition	Reinforces uni-directional habits

Table 1.1: Three ways of perceiving two styles of objects

On the other hand, if the windowsill is not a system where the parts replenish and utilize each other, as say with a rusted and mildewed aluminum windowsill, then the object is not art nor a product of nature, but merely an artifact. Artifacts have uni-directional relations which do not warrant aesthetic judgments, but merely a determining judgment of say, 'that's a windowsill.' In such a case, when a human encounters a uni-

direction artifact, because of the way we are set up to comprehend the world, we still echo this manner of matter guided by the primitive normativity of the power of judgment which bestows pleasure when echoing the manner of the matter. Thus we experience a small amount of pleasure when echoing a uni-directional relationship, even just for the brief moment in which the determining judgment is made. That is, when we position something about us in a relationship which is solely depleting because we are witness to such an object, we still feel a bit of pleasure. This embodied way we have developed to cope with the world, has an unfortunate by-product of bestowing (albeit a tiny degree of) pleasure when enacting depleting relational habits. I hope to study this phenomenon in further research, but I believe this inherent capacity we have to comprehend the world when utilized within system where some parts devour without replenishing or stock pile without utilizing creates a feedback loop, in which the harmony of a healthy ecosystems evaporates. That is, by being amongst artifacts with uni-direction manner of matter, we echo that manner and have pleasure in doing so and if repeated often enough we come attuned to the uni-direction manner. Which would seem to account for the predominate deviation from harmonious system of parts working with nature's techniques in the observable world we live within.

The overall argument of the material presence strategically leads to a form of hylozoism or radical materialism.<sup>42</sup> Radical materialism grants that all matter has subjective purposiveness and therefore should be tended to with care. Understanding the world as composed of living matter vs. inert or dead matter is relevant within a contemporary society experimenting with generating radically new amalgamations of matter; as well as engaging the physical confinements of collective human practices.<sup>43</sup> However radical materialism may be pragmatically terrifying to a culture charmed by disposable, steril-

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<sup>42</sup>Hylozoism is the doctrine that all matter is alive.

<sup>43</sup>For an additional strategy of this argument see Jane Bennett's notion of "thing-power" Bennett, 2004, 350 ff.

ized, and dull objects. Granting matter the conceptual ontology of life within the field of human knowledge, would demand and generate radically different styles of engaging with the world and maintaining human society. At minimum the ‘things’ that we produce and use ought to be made to best possible quality, warranting a long and graceful life, be economically repairable and able to end with dignity. In other words, one pragmatic byproduct of thinking about the world in radically materialistic terms is that when people design and produce objects, the aim ought to be for the parts of the object to relate to each other in a manner of replenishing and utilizing. Historically, objects made by artisans and craftspeople with freshly renewed and contextually aesthetic and durability standards, have been valued, cared for, and passed on from one individual to another. Things must be designed to be cared for, this is something good both for the object and the individual drawn into care. Whether it is a building, furniture, tableware, car, clothing, appliance, or the likes, radical materialism demands a renaissance of redesign that ends the throw away, disposable society of transported widgets which dominates the market-led world economy. Radical materialism grants inherent value to material things as if all things could be parts of nature, regardless of any pragmatic logic. Nature is everything, not merely officially categorized landscapes. However, everything is not necessarily practicing the successful techniques of nature. In this sense radical materialism may conceptually harmonize with the awareness of our current time as one of dark ecology; that is, that a system of living parts of a whole is engaged is an ends without hope of pragmatically conditioning the environment to sustain current populations of human life.

**in anticipation**

Over attention to categorical, determining concepts breeds space for false knowledge to thrive. This act of the power of judgment is the role of pure reason Kant assigned to judgment in the first *Critique*. In determining judgements, the faculty of judgment does not act freely as an independent faculty, but rather takes its lead from the arsenal of concepts in the faculty of understanding. With determining judgments, relationship between the individual's faculties of imagination and understanding acts uni-directionally;  $\curvearrowright \rightarrow$ . The understanding simply subsumes the offerings of the imagination under a label already established by the general population, i.e., a normative concept. The logical power of judgment composes a hermeneutical loop between an individual's faculty of understanding and their relevant societal norms of concepts (or web of biopower).

Determining judgments can act hyper-uni-directional when the anticipation of what is expected predominates the fresh engagement of the event, rendering the experience concept-led.<sup>44</sup> For example, while traveling to a writing retreat in Brittany, I boarded a rural and local train. Haggard and famished, I attempted to lift my heavy suitcase to the overhead storage above my seat. Condemning of my fellow passengers' lack of compassion or help, I shot my gaze about. To which another individual indicated that it was seemingly absurd that I did not use the mid-train car luggage storage space directly adjacent to me. And suddenly there was this perfect space, at chair height, to store my bag. I had not seen this space as I boarded the train and looked around on my own; though I had noticed several other details regarding my fellow passengers, the seats and windows. Never before had such a thoughtfully designed storage space been provided in the middle of a train car, and I simply did not engage with the space afresh. My own concepts of what a train car is like, dominated the present situation. I saw what I

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<sup>44</sup>For further discussion of the conditions regarding concept-led cognition see: Ginsborg, 2006c.



expected to see, the cognition was concept-led.<sup>45</sup>

### false knowledge

False knowledge may seem like a logical impossibility, for if what one thinks of as knowledge is false, then it simply is not knowledge. However, to retreat to a historically and politically naive epistemology, creates an impoverished system of thought for structuring the phenomena. Although categorical knowledge is truly awe-inspiring, when left unchecked by judgments that freshly reflect on present situations, it becomes vulnerable to misrepresentation. Clearly an immediate drawback to explanations that reject categorical knowledge is that the less an explanation unifies phenomena, the less explanatory it is.<sup>46</sup> If a law of nature is claimed to apply to merely one event, then the law would not figure in a theory that could reasonably be thought explanatory. That is exactly why there needs to be a balance between categorical knowledge which employs determining judgments and first-hand, embedded knowledge working with reflective judgments. At the moment categorical knowledge dominates individuals' engagement with the world.

False knowledge manifests in society as normalizing practices and the construction of bad architecture which is often led by dominating power relationships, i.e., the market and to a lesser extent the state. Michel Foucault's (1926-1984) studies of the political and social processes of western European societies show that a considerable amount of concepts taken as universal truths are the results of historical events.<sup>47</sup> His work mandates review of what assumptions, basic to a discipline, are unnecessary and dangerous.

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<sup>45</sup>For discussion on how concept-acquisition is inherently a circular account, see: Ginsborg, 2006a, in particular the analysis of why we must "accept that there cannot be a non-circular account of concept-acquisition on the basis of experience" *ibid.*, 7 ff.

<sup>46</sup>For further discussion see Lakatos and Kuhn argument in: Lakatos et al., 1970.

<sup>47</sup>See: Foucault, 1988, pp. 10, 11 and Foucault, 2001, p. 525.

Thereby, I would like to question the position given to the material present in architecture. Although there may already be a growing backlash to digital augmentation within the current academic architectural studios, at the societal and constructive level, we prioritize representations and things where the materiality is irrelevant.<sup>48</sup> For example note the mass proliferation of digital augmentation, where the goal of the matter is to distract or detach the individual from their embodiment to the embedded moment. Consider, the history of bank design and how for the last few decades resources have been devoted to electronic widgets rather than marble counters or impressive interior voids.<sup>49</sup> The effort and resources are still used to project their security and strength or their economic efficiency, but now what impresses is the impression of digital advancement (e.g. flash websites, login calculator devices, video cameras, double locking glass doors). There is no vault door or need to know that notes or gold are stored; the situation is derivative upon derivative. As we ignore and are ignorant of the material world, it becomes more and more standardized and manifest of neo-liberal, market-led design, and all the more desirable to ignore.

### historical background of the problem at hand

In his later work Foucault sought to call to attention a web of biopower relations as causing normalization, by first historically contextualizing normalization as the process of subjectification by the other (what he calls *trans-subjectification*), and finally by offering a signal method of resistance as subjectification by the self (*self-subjectification*).

It should be acknowledged that a majority of secondary literature on Foucault, critiques

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<sup>48</sup>The backlash as observed by architectural theorist Arie Graafland, 2013. For further consideration of the problem of “digital worlds” and “artificiality” see: “[Nature, Territoriality, and the Imaginary](#)”, p. 77 or Graafland, 2003a.

<sup>49</sup>For example consider Soane’s design for the Bank of England versus one’s contemporary local bank or bank machine.

him as being overly deterministic in claiming that all individuals are subject to an all encompassing web of power and that he offers no room for resistance.<sup>50</sup> However such critiques fail to engage with Foucault's final return to philosophy, as in his research into the care of the self; seen mainly in the second and third volumes of the *History of Sexuality* and in the later lectures at the College de France from 1979-1984.<sup>51</sup> The thesis engages with the later works in which resistance is possible, and as such the critiques of Foucault not leaving room for hope of resistance are circumvented.

It should also be noted that Foucault's work is perhaps more methodological than theoretical. Foucault tended to abandon words rather than redefine them, hence he casted off the terms *philosopher*, *historian*, and *theory*. His methodology was that of the *problématique*. The notion of the *problématique*, originates with Louis Althusser (1918-1990). In *Reading Capital* and essays such as *For Marx*, Althusser explicitly attempts to draw the reader's attention to the unarticulated philosophical background and ideological framework with Marx's philosophical text.<sup>52</sup> Foucault modified the method by including the *problématique* itself as being subject to the scrutiny. As Foucault scholar Robert Nola notes, Althusser's

“Problématique signify the logically prior, formative conceptual structures  
of any actual society without which its characteristic forms of theoretical

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<sup>50</sup>See Lecture X, *Some Questions Concerning the Theory of Power: Foucault again*, in Habermas' *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*; in particular Habermas, 1987, 286 ff. See also Nancy Love's sharp analysis of the problem as she states it: “Once Foucault defines subjectivity as subjugation, where can he turn for resistance?” Love, 1989, p. 277 Additional consider: Turner, 1994; Pickett, 1996 and Hoy, 1986, in particular see the chapters contributed by: Ian Hacking (235-240), Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow (109-121), Charles Taylor (67-101), and Arnold Davidson (115-139). Furthermore see Ehrhard Bahr's essay, “In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas” for a clear comparison and account of the two philosophers diversion from Kant in terms of viewing theory as action or as object. Bahr, 1988, 101ff.

<sup>51</sup>Foucault, 1990b; Foucault, 2003; Foucault, 2001; Foucault, 2008; Foucault, 2010 Lectures at the College de France, 1974-1975: Abnormal, 1978-79: The Birth of Biopolitics, 1981-82: The Hermeneutics of the Subject, 1982-83: The Government of Self and Others, 1983-84: The Courage of Truth [The Government of Self and Others II], and the lectures in the united states, Foucault, 1988; Foucault, 1993; Foucault, 1988.

<sup>52</sup>Lewis, 2009.

and practical understanding lack determinate meaning or direction; whereas, applied to Foucault, the notion acquires (genealogically) the paradoxically of ever presuming to fix anything like an Althusserian problématique.”<sup>53</sup>

In other words, Althusser’s problématique basically presumes that a privileged and detached thinking is involved in structuring the networks of thoughts or action the structure explains. Foucault on the other hand, argues that the thinking involved in the structuring is also subjected to the same power practices as the networks of thoughts or action that it attempts to explain. He saw the work of thought as a response to a set of current difficulties. Thought is to weave these difficulties into a coherent problem which affords a diverse response of possible solutions. For example, he finds that it was thought that arose with, “the anxiety generated by the relationship between men and boys in Greek culture.”<sup>54</sup> In *The Use of Pleasure* Foucault tracks the historical example of the Greek discourse around adult—youth relationships between males. The philosophers of the *Phaedrus* and the *Symposium* raised the question relevant to their time of how to erotically enjoy young boys but still pave the way for their eventual manhood.<sup>55</sup> However, the perceived sexual habits of Greek men is less relevant than the methodology which Foucault describes, demonstrates as historical and employs himself; which is this method of the problématique. Given that his thinking rejects any transcendental grounding to truth, he sets out to persuade his readers by broad brushstrokes of historical contextualization which he calls genealogy.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>Robert, 1998, p. 39.

<sup>54</sup>Smart, 1991, p. 209 and see: Foucault, 1990b, p. 225.

<sup>55</sup>For further discussion of the issue around masculinity, penetration and actors, see Shadi Bartsch’s excellent scholarship in the *Mirror of the Self*. In particular see pages 138 ff. for her discussion of Ancient Greek and Roman strategies of how to protect oneself, or more relevantly adolescent boys, from the “evil eye”. Bartsch, 2006, 138 ff.

<sup>56</sup>The use of genealogy is inspired by Nietzsche’s “On the Genealogy of Morals.” Friedrich Nietzsche, 1989 See also Foucault’s essay “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” in Foucault, 1977, pp. 139-164. Additionally for further analysis on genealogy see: Healy, 2003, p. 135 In terms of rejecting grounding, Foucault goes as far as to reject the role of the body and wholeness of the world. See: Hengehold, 2002 In particular the rather fine line of: “Despite his debts to Heidegger and his resonances with Merleau-Ponty,

Foucault strives to show the misleadingness of the contemporary idea that we form our own identity individually and of our own accord, independently of a political, social, economical, historical milieu of power relations. While he believes it is possible, and even desirable, to form an idiosyncratic and aesthetically identity, he argues that it is more common that individuals' default identification is manipulated by established, yet evolving, power relations successful at maintaining the influence of those in charge.<sup>57</sup> Foucault, like Kant, Henry Thoreau (1817-1862), Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and several others seek to awaken anyone caring to listen, to their own embeddedness in a swarm of power, slavery, or inauthenticity by providing a tool box of concepts.<sup>58</sup> In other words, Foucault "insisted that his critical discourse commanded neither him nor anybody else to engage in such a struggle, but it could help an individual who already had such a commitment to better undertake the struggle".<sup>59</sup>

At base, the claim is that subjectivity formally emerges in the discussions of Socrates and Plato and advances to the normalizing epoch of Foucault's time. In his 1982 article on "The Subject and Power", he illuminates a genealogy of subjectification.<sup>60</sup> He asserts that through Christian institutions the *epimeleia heautou* techniques (cultivation or care of the self) morphed into pastoral power. While defining *power* verbally as actions upon action, working through a social network of relations; *pastoral power*

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however, Foucault is suspicious of the world's apparent "whole-ness" and the body's role in lending it a unifying horizon of possibility. Increasingly, he comes to regard the being of "man" as an illusion created through overlapping discourses and social practices which take the body and its comportment as their common aesthetic reference, rather than the ontological ground through which bodies and historical meanings are disclosed and invested with significance." Hengehold, 2002, p. 137 Finally, it is interesting to compare Foucault notion of genealogy with Kant's discussion of history as a sequence of "historical situations", as discussed in Galston, 1975, 50ff.

<sup>57</sup>The first style of identity forming practices Foucault call's self-subjectivication, while the second set he calls trans-subjectivacation. It should be noted that Foucault trans-subjectification is nothing akin to Gadamer's 'trans-subjective event' in which a subject changes their disposition towards the larger community. For further discussion see: Davey, 2013, §5.

<sup>58</sup>For instance, see Jane Bennett's discussion Thoreau's version of a cultivation of the self in: Bennett, 1990.

<sup>59</sup>O'Leary, 2002, p. 156.

<sup>60</sup>Foucault, 1982.

is actions upon individuals' actions towards their own thoughts and desires.<sup>61</sup> Pastoral power is enabled by a system in which "certain individuals can... serve others... as pastors".<sup>62</sup> Thus specified individuals become guides for other individuals to accept their *true* self. The pastoral guidance employs codified techniques formulated to manage thoughts and feelings.<sup>63</sup> The method trains individuals to internalize the church's authoritative structuring of categories and in turn becomes an efficient and effective system of micro-power.<sup>64</sup> Foucault asserts that within Christianity pastoral power was restricted to the sphere of the church, albeit an expansive sphere. He argues that with modernity, the state takes over this pastoral power and applies it to everyone. The state promotes "simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures."<sup>65</sup> In employing pastoral power at the state level, the state co-ops identities, slotting individuals into an overarching ordering of existence, in which certain behaviors are normal and others are unhealthy. Of the unhealthy behaviors some individuals may be recovered by aid of proper training while others must be rejected from society.<sup>66</sup> The employment of pastoral power on a larger societal scale promotes normalization. Consider for example the concept of 'normal sleep'. Currently a full uninterrupted night is considered normal and healthy. While the middle ages there was a rather different pattern. They would set to sleep at sunset, and then awake in the middle of night - interact with neighbors and then have a 'second sleep' a few hours later. There was even a specialized architectural

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<sup>61</sup>Foucault, 1982, pp. 789, 791.

<sup>62</sup>*ibid.*, p. 783.

<sup>63</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>64</sup>For a pragmatic analysis of these issues in corporate architecture see: Dale, 2005.

<sup>65</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 785 Also consider the claim: "One could say that power relations have been progressively governmentalized, that is to say, elaborated, rationalized, and centralized in the form of, or under the auspices of, state institutions." *ibid.*, p. 793 For a detailed consideration of the context of government in the Foucauldian vein see: Inda, 2005, pp. 1-20.

<sup>66</sup>For further discussion see: Foucault, 2003 In particular, see the lecture of 5 February [109-137] for a historical discussion of societal creation of ogres, as individuals whom can not be reclaimed. For the formation of the role of confessors and pastors see the lecture of 19 February [167-199]. For a detailed discussion of the creation of the disfunction of masturbation and the means by which parents ought to correct the child to recover them for society, see the lecture of 5 March [231-262].

detail of a ‘night stairwell’ in some monasteries for the period of being awake between first and second sleep.<sup>67</sup>

In the thirty years since Foucault’s research, it has become more apparent that the dominating position of traditional states of governance has become challenged by various international corporations.<sup>68</sup> However, in the context of the thesis, this shift serves merely as a development of the historical based theory of normalization, which is observable in the use of the media, spaces for consumption and political influence. Computer scientist Jaron Lanier has observed a particularly detailed and concrete application of normalizing power practices. Lanier is best known for pioneering virtual reality (early 1980s) and advocating open source and free information. However from a position well within the heart of the computer and internet industry, he has recently (2000) re-evaluated his perspective of how information ought to be shared, based on observations of the culture of network technology.<sup>69</sup> In an interview with political journalist Matt Miller, Lanier explains his argument as follows:

It seems like ethically information should be free, because when you think of a dictator, the first thing they do is to try to control information. But what’s happening is that when people share freely on a network, the best computers can out compute everyone else. And the best computers are far better, think of city size computers with their own power plant and that use rivers to cool them. These computers gather data from everyone else in order to calculate subtle moves so that whoever owns the computer can gradually not take risk, gradually gather benefits and impoverish everyone else.

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<sup>67</sup>See: Greene, 2005, p. 7. See also interview on Science Friday with Ira Flatow and guest sleep experts: Flatow et al., 2013.

<sup>68</sup>For further consideration of this proposition see Noreena Hertz’s *Silent Takeover*. Hertz, 2003.

<sup>69</sup>See Jaron Lanier: “One-Half of a Manifesto” (2000), and *You Are Not a Gadget* (2010). Lanier, 2000; Lanier, 2010.

A prime example is the American healthcare industry. What used to happen was that companies would hire statisticians, called *actuaries*, who would do their best to approximate rates. However now, with tons of data collected on individuals, the insurance company can insure only the people that need health care the least - and the problem with that is that eventually everyone, i.e. the whole society, has to pay for the company's perfect business or 'perfect insurance scam'.

And this is not just happening within one industry or one county. These superior computational position which are substitute to the people with the biggest computers, search and gather data from people to create behavioral models. These behavioral models are sold to third parties who then pay for the placement of the option in front of you which slowly manipulates you over time - these are the link ads and whatnot - and gradually what happens is people are steered into decisions that subtly overtime benefit the people close to the big computers, but the way you pay for it is that gradually your career prospects is reduced, gradually your access to credit is reduced and gradually your options start to fade away because all the power and clout is accumulating with these big computers.<sup>70</sup>

This monetization of the data provides small groups of people (those who have the biggest computers or access to the information collected) with cost effective and far reaching means of manipulating the larger population. Foucault's observation that power is most dangerous when it 'goes underground' or becomes invisible, seems even more relevant today, than in the time of his research. Hence in the context of the thesis, this shift from government to market serves merely as a development of a historical based theory

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<sup>70</sup>Lanier and Miller, 2013.



of normalization, and not as a rebuttal to the observability of the practice. International corporations have sufficient resources, opportunities and potential to benefit by executing pastoral power in a contemporary and more encompassing version of the earlier states' practices and that of the church before it.

To illuminate a connection between the practice of individual subjectification, societal normalization and bad architecture, it is useful to further understand Foucault's conception of power. As stated above, Foucault qualifies power as an action, in particular, an action on another's actions. Hence power is not a *thing* people have, but a relationship between actions. He claims that power is exercised through power relations between parts of an ever changing system of biopower. Or in his words, power "brings into play relations between individuals".<sup>71</sup> This is not to suggest that power causes and forms all relationships. Rather, that when discussing power it must be considered as it exists within a complexity of relations between individuals. In this way, it is non-sensible to question how power exists as an abstract concept that is decontextualized and disembodied from actors.

In clarifying how power works, Foucault teases out three 'types' of power; i.e. power relations, relationships of communication, and objective capacities.<sup>72</sup> These 'types' always overlap and work intimately through one another.<sup>73</sup> By theoretically segregating and structuring them as 'types' of relationships, Foucault builds a framework within which to explain events of power. He asserts that "in a given society there is no general type of equilibrium between finalized activities, systems of communication and power relations."<sup>74</sup> Rather, like an abstract painting (say Jackson Pollock's *Blue Poles: Number II* (1952)), the three power 'types' appear to haphazardly overlap and collide with each

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<sup>71</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 786.

<sup>72</sup>*ibid.*, p. 787 He also uses the terms 'systems' or 'ways' to describe this phenomenon. *ibid.*, p. 786.

<sup>73</sup>*ibid.*, p. 787.

<sup>74</sup>*ibid.*

other. As politics come in and the state is visible on the horizon, particular “‘blocks’ ” (*blocs*) emerge.<sup>75</sup> In these blocks, the “adjustments” amongst the power types become stagnated.<sup>76</sup> Consider the analogy: politics is to the collision of power types *as* art historians are to art types, i.e., they structure it, give the structures meaning and take prestige from understanding the meaning they assigned to it. “Blocks” is quite a clever coinage because it also can be taken as prevents, as something which blocks free play of the imagination and actions. In a block of the three types of power (relational-capacity-communication), experiential elements are formalized and thus fossilized, e.g., the use of space, regulations of ‘internal life’, structuring of activities and the regularity of the people present and their character.<sup>77</sup> Bad architecture manifests these fossilized blocks of power and averts the imagination from playfulness.

Foucault’s later research into normalization and *epimeleia heautou* as a means of resistance, bears argument for viewing current societal habits as both unnecessary and dangerous. I consider him a catalyst philosopher and see his greatest strength to be that of a head turner.<sup>78</sup> His reading of history seeks to lead individuals to practice resistance to a current regime of a dominating corporate state.<sup>79</sup> Foucault suggests a prescriptive premise to his own scholarly undertakings as; “to promote new forms of subjectivity through the refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries.”<sup>80</sup> In saying ‘this kind’ he refers to the (then) current regime of the state by which normalizing practices are ever expanding amongst a global population. He takes the regime as something temporally confined to the last several centuries and he incites

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<sup>75</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 787.

<sup>76</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>77</sup>*ibid.* For further discussion see: Markus, 1993 Markus cites educational institution as one of many examples of power blocks.

<sup>78</sup>John Rajchman’s depiction of Foucault as “an exceedingly *visual* historian” is additionally appealing. Rajchman, 1988, p. 90.

<sup>79</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 778.

<sup>80</sup>*ibid.*, p. 785.

an enthusiasm to resist it. A further relevant claim revealed in this statement concerns the method by which an individual may resist. In asserting the desirability of new forms of subjectivity, he suggests that subjectivity in itself is not the problem. The practice that must be resisted is the current style of normalizing subjectification, promoted by corporately amplified pastoral power which commodifies one's dissent. In other words, some forms of subjectivity correlate with resistance.

Foucault defines the term *subject* as twofold: “subject to someone else by control and dependence; and [that which is] tied to his own identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.”<sup>81</sup> Both forms indicate an individual that is defined or confined by a relationship; either to another or themselves. Additionally he stresses that both definitions suggest a form of power which subjugates and makes subjects subject to it.<sup>82</sup> The social development which transforms human beings into subjects is one Foucault claims Kant readdresses when he questioned “who are we?”, in terms of “what is this period, the enlightenment?”<sup>83</sup> Foucault situates the techniques of the *epimeleia heautou* as a form of power that produces this reaction in individuals to (re)create themselves as subjects.

Ancient Greek philosophers argued that via the transformation, one was united with divine reason, a primary force to the world and everything about it, which is called *logos*. Logos is the generative principle of the universe, i.e., a formative force.<sup>84</sup> Foucault puts forth that there is no divine reason or logos, and that truth comes from the truth-teller (*parrēsia*) and that via the transformation one is to unite with oneself, a unity grounded on nothing other than its occurrence.<sup>85</sup> However, Hadot suggests Foucault was being

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<sup>81</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 781.

<sup>82</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>83</sup>*ibid.*, p. 784 For further analysis of Foucault's turn to Kant see: Pryor, 2002, p. 320, Bahr, 1988; O'Leary, 2002 Healy, 2003, p. 138.

<sup>84</sup>Aristotle: logos, ethos, pathos: force, character, emotion.

<sup>85</sup>Foucault, 2010, p. 66 1982-82 lecture. In particular see the second hour of the lecture on 12 January

intentionally pragmatic by claiming that the ancients views agreed with his own, because he wanted people to undergo this transformation themselves.<sup>86</sup> For a detailed account of Foucault’s rendering of the cultivation of the self see appendix A.

Rather than a prior truth as something independent of human beings and inherent to the world itself, Foucault suggests such ideas are merely formalized power relations created within subsections of society where blocks of pastoral power codify means of individual’s attempts to unite oneself with oneself — a self that is not a transcendental self, but one willfully formed by the individual. The notion of the true transcendental self was co-opted by the Church and employed as a means of training the individual to internalize disciplines that benefited existing power relations.<sup>87</sup> This is able to happen because in a block of pastoral power individuals may not govern the relations, so while there is a certain degree of voluntary submission in a power block (e.g. the individual chooses to enter the church), according to Foucault, it is not possible for there to be full agreement by each of the individuals participating. In his words, “power can be the result of a prior or permanent consent, but it is not by nature the manifestation of a consensus.”<sup>88</sup> Perhaps consensus is impossible for institutions in which individuals are required to submit themselves to the governance of others, such as hospitals, auto shops, or prisons. However it may be questioned if that extends to all sets of relationships. For example, philosopher Hans Sluga calls into question Foucault’s claim by suggesting in his political

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1983 [61-74]

<sup>86</sup>Pierre Hadot, ‘Reflexions sur la notion de culture de soi’, in Michel Foucault, *Philosophe*, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1989. However Foucault scholar Timothy O’Leary suggests that Hadot was more critical of Foucault. “Hadot’s second, and more important, misgiving about Foucault’s reading, is that it tends to mobilize a notion of self which is very far from either the Hellenistic or Classical ideas of what it is that one ‘cares’ for... Hadot, therefore, suspects Foucault of imposing a modern, individualist idea of self on the ancient texts, in order to be able to read them as what we could call avant letter guides to dandyism. Hence, Hadot judges Foucault’s account to be unsatisfactory ‘from an historical point of view’ ”. O’Leary, 2002, pp. 71-72.

<sup>87</sup>Brown, 1964; Veyne, Ariés, and Duby, 1998; Cameron, 1986; Brown, 1971a; Brown, 1992; Nock, 1933.

<sup>88</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 788.

philosophy book, the *Politics and the Search for the Common Good*, that some groups (such as tramping or hiking clubs) can organize themselves without non-consensual or pastoral power practices.<sup>89</sup> Sluga questions, if these sub-communities, schools, or ‘sects’ really do require a universal codified system of conduct or behavior. This suggests it is possible that some blocks of power, (i.e. some organizations and social networks) can operate without teaching only abstracted universal rules and promote a fluid exchange of power amongst the members of their given sub-community.<sup>90</sup> Nevertheless, without granting the expansion from describing blocks of stagnated power types to qualifying all power relations as necessarily non-consensus, there is still a plausible description of the phenomena, which grounds Foucault’s later theory of a web of power relations which enact a normalization of its population.

It might appear as though there is no room for comedy in the structuring of existence as depicted here. Cannot identities be fun to play with? Identities can bring people together by helping individuals to access other people and other things. They put an easy ‘handle’ on people, so that others may appear more approachable or understandable. Additionally, some identity can perhaps warn us to guard ourselves from trouble, akin to the zigzag pattern of the European viper (genus *Vipera*). Thus one may question if all manifestations of social identities are mere expressions of one’s subjectification to normalizing powers. When an identity is taken as the dominant vantage point of an individual’s selfhood, then that individual is tempered by the identity’s predetermined manner and unfree to act freshly in the variety of situations encountered; their judgments become overly concept-led. In other words, when the identity is stagnate and determining of one’s manner, then the identity is merely the expression of one’s sub-

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<sup>89</sup>Sluga, [forthcoming](#), p9 ff.

<sup>90</sup>For further discussion see Menno Hurenkamp’s “Organize Liberal, Think Conservative: Citizenship in Light Communities”, in Duyvendak, Hendriks, and Van Niekerk, 2010 Or likewise, the case study documented in Liz Walker’s *Eco Village of Ithaca*, Walker, 2005.

jection. However the overall use of social identity, still leaves room for the fluid manifestations of manners, which may be identified by others as something familiar. In this alternate synopsis of behavior, the manners which are identified, do not determine the manners which are expressed. These are finite moments of identity, projected by the observer and merely afforded by the observed. The individual themselves is not structured by the observed manner and the identity is confined to the relational context of the situation.

Foucault's work on the care of the self has proved influential, but its capacity to ground is fleeting, as he grants no self, identity, consistency or causal connection, which in turn, negatively commits him to an a priori truth, i.e., that all a priori truth must be denied.<sup>91</sup> Jürgen Habermas, Arnold Davidson, and Charles Taylor, question that without an independent objective truth, how can Foucault claim that being in the world as a being whose task is to endlessly question their current situation is more desirable, just, or better, than being a being who submits to how things are and gets on with the concerns of daily life.<sup>92</sup>

Amongst other thoughtful responses to these critiques, mine is to retreat to the methodology. The first premise of Foucault's argument is that there is a set of difficulties. Yet, one may rebut that if no one notices the difficulties, then are there really difficulties? It seems that even if people are 'getting on' with their daily lives, they still are aware of the difficulties — even if they cannot put their finger on exactly what is wrong or linguistically articulate it. An observation expressed most clearly by philosopher A.T. Nuyen in

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<sup>91</sup>For further deliberation on Foucault's endeavor with this issue see: Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996. For example consider the claim; "Foucault made no effort to establish what is true and false, founded or unfounded, real or illusory, desirable or undesirable, legitimate or abusive. Foucault recognized no criteria by which a thought-system could be judged true or false, or better or worse. Any thought-system is logical according to its own logic. Different historical thrown-nesses just made them different." *ibid.*, p. 748.

<sup>92</sup>For further discussion see: Gutting, 2005, in particular James Bernauer and Michael Mahon's offer a concise contribution on the topic.

terms of Lyotard's argument within *Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime*;

“Just because something is not there, not presented, does not mean that it does not exist, or has no right to exist. Silence does not mean absence or irrelevance. The failure to reflect in this way amounts to taking one's own discourses, or at best all the existing discourses, as representing the totality of all there is.”<sup>93</sup>

Beyond that, there are the indisputable injustices of: environmental devastation, diminishing biodiversity, anti-bacterial resistance for medical operations, loss of top soil, death of the coral reefs, space junk, peak oil, increasing natural disasters, callous institutionalized responses to natural disasters, ‘mental’ health issues such as dementia, ‘physical’ health issues such as obesity, economical asymmetry, lack of training for usable skills, eroded privacy, profuse invasion of advertising or religious rhetoric, domestic abuse, corporate abuse of labor, international slavery, lack of funding for the humanities, and increasing inaccessibility to higher education. However these are not the immediate problems *of* normalization. The problem due to normalization, as I find it, is that we dare to do nothing. That such injustice is taken as normal. Without doubt, fringe groups have sought and seek to resist this view and therefore counter these problems. But as a population, a society, and as a species we have failed to act as if such injustice is not normal.

Therefore Foucault's method is to respond to things happening; the grounding is the situation at hand, not an independent truth. It is a way of coping with a situation, or a style of being in the world. However, there is a circularity to how I have read Foucault's work. He employs a method that justifies his method. His method justifies his findings which justify his method. His method (theory is a historically contextualized

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<sup>93</sup>Nuyen, 1998, p. 40.

act) presupposes his findings (there is no true theory that we can have access to). It is a bit awkward, but Foucault seemed well aware and unperturbed by the questions regarding the location of his grounding.<sup>94</sup>

The strength of Foucault's research is his expressed observation of the problem of normalizing power relations. Additionally, he points to a viable means of resistance. That he did not have time to thoroughly investigate the solution or that he ultimately denies the possibility of something independent of humans which nevertheless structures aspects of the world (i.e. a priori truths), are reasons that Foucault's work is employed here merely to identify the problems of bad architecture and introduce theorists who have extensively studied and structured means of resistance. Such as Pierre Hadot (1922-2010) who comprehensively studied the cultivation of self and Kant who developed a critical didactical theory of cultivation. According to philosopher Arnold Davidson, "Hadot's notion of spiritual exercises provides both the interpretive framework and conceptual basis for Foucault's study of ancient sexual ethics."<sup>95</sup> Hadot is seen as the historian who introduced Foucault to the cultivation of the self during his final return to philosophy. In a different direction, Foucault points to Immanuel Kant for hope of resistance.<sup>96</sup> He cites Kant as someone who evoked people to question their favorite assumptions; i.e., to dare to know. Kant provides one of the most comprehensive and thoughtfully structured ob-

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<sup>94</sup>In addition, Foucault did not perceive a unified history operating in the name of progress: "The forces that are at work in history do not obey a destination or a mechanism, but the hazards of a struggle. They do not manifest themselves as successive forms of primordial intention; they do not always take on the appearance of a result.' Foucault approached the past as if it were a kaleidoscope containing a number of discrete fragments, not a collective and cumulative learning process: it reveals a pattern, but one largely shaped by contingencies. To move from one *episteme* (Foucault's neologism for a particular period's epistemology) to another, was to 'twist the kaleidoscope', and create a new pattern. The sequence of patterns obeys no inner logic, conforms to no universal norm of reason and evinces no higher purpose. Macro history, therefore, cannot be regarded as a form of progress, for the latest pattern is 'neither more true or false than those that preceded it' (Paul Veyne related in Ref. 15, p. 152)." Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996, 748 ff. For alternative attempts of resolving the critique see: Rajchman, 1986 For details analysis of Foucault's structuring of knowledge see: Peters, 2003, 210 ff.

<sup>95</sup>Davidson, 1990, p. 482.

<sup>96</sup>Foucault, 1984b, pp. 32-50



servations of the workings of cultivation and hence resistance to contemporary pastoral power. This works with the idea that periods of enlightenment can occur throughout history, that enlightenment is not something that happens just once, and thereafter all individuals or all of society is enlightened.<sup>97</sup> Rather, enlightenment is a spirit of questioning the accepted normal habits and knowledge of one's own society, as echoing epiphanies. That ideas of the enlightenment were poached and taken out of context to justify horrid exploitative practices through colonization and within subsections of domestic populations; is a testament to the need for constant embodied contextualization within the material presence. It is not a coincidence that the practices of cultivation on the levels of the individual and that of society (as with political enlightenment thinkers) mirror each other, as well as their susceptibility to being co-opted for asymmetrically engrossing relationships of power.

An interesting similarity between Kant and Foucault is that the strength of their logical arguments did not alter their notorious faith based behavior. Kant's project of persuading people to cast off the false tutelage to the church and free them from necessarily believing in an all powerful christian god, exist side by side Kant's own ardent and relentless presumption of a god.<sup>98</sup> Likewise, Foucault's genealogy of subjectification and avid rhetoric to cast aside identities of sexuality are overshadowed by his own well documented and discussed sexual identity. It is strange that a man who presented well articulated arguments for resisting social-political-economic identities, himself is so strongly identified.

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<sup>97</sup>For further discussion see Ehrhard Bahr's *In Defense of Enlightenment: Foucault and Habermas*. In particular the passage: "Foucault is induced by Kant's text to envisage modernity as an 'attitude,' that is 'a mode of relating to contemporary reality'. Consequently, rather than distinguishing the 'modern era' from the 'premodern' or 'postmodern', Foucault considers it more useful to see the attitude of modernity in conflict with attitudes of 'countermorndernity'." Bahr, 1988, p. 104.

<sup>98</sup>Jordan, 2011, p. 77 For a particularly interesting interweaving of Kant's theory of sublime and reflections upon a god, see Paul Cobben's contribution to a recent collection of critique on the third *Critique*. Loose, 2011, pp. 133-58.

**as manifest in architecture**

The behavioral affects of normalizing practices can be witnessed in individuals' physical and imaginative skills being increasingly constricted and standardized.<sup>99</sup> At the same time, the qualities of the materials' present in the everyday urban setting are increasing limited. The normalizing practices erode everyday (*epistêmê*) knowledge of materials, materials themselves and engagement with materials. These dissolutions reinforce each other, leading to an ever greater de-valuation of the material presence. Given that architects are also individuals living in the social, political, economical environment, how then can architects seek to design structures which afford richer engagement? Architects design from their imagination and knowledge, and if they too are caught up in normalization, then how can they design spaces that value present matter?

Contemporary architectural theorists have exposed the domination of representations, detachment, segregation, depopulation, surveillance, and an overall emphasis on how a space is read (categorized, identified, analyzed) rather than how a space is felt (to: reflect, imagine, engage).<sup>100</sup> In particular consider architectural theorist Sylvia Lavin's excellent scholarship on the underdevelopment of material spaces in respect to females.

In a recent essay for Log, Lavin's analysis of Peter Eisenman's *Wexner Museum* (1989)

<sup>99</sup>It should be noted, I take this division between the physical and imaginative skills of the body as purely a practical short hand for the far richer commonality between the skills. However the embodiment of intentionality is outside the perimeters of the thesis. For further discussion on the topic see the works of Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception*, Hubert L. Dreyfus, "Phenomenological Description versus Rational Reconstruction", Dreyfus, 2001, "Overcoming the Myth of the Mental: How Philosophers Can Profit from the Phenomenology of Everyday Expertise" Dreyfus, 2005a, Sean Kelly's "Seeing Things in Merleau-Ponty" Kelly, 2004 or my own chapter in Jacquet and Giraud, 2012, pp. 293-312 titled, *Thinking Bodies*, in which I draw connection between the understanding of embodied intentionality and architecture.

<sup>100</sup>For extended arguments of architecture's retinal domination see the works of: Alberto Pérez-Gómez, Elizabeth Grosz, Martin Jay, Dalibor Vasey, Karrison Harries, Judith Butler, Jonathan Hill, Bernard Tschumi, Neil Leach, David Farrell Krell, Glen Hill and *etc.* Pérez-Gómez, 1992; Pérez-Gómez and Parcell, 2004; Pérez-Gómez and Parcell, 1996; Pérez-Gómez, 2006; Pérez-Gómez, 1999; Grosz, 1995; Grosz, 2001; Jay, 1993; Leach, 1997; Leach, 2006; Krell, 1997; Fernández, 2007; Imrie, 2003; Ballantyne, 2005.

and Pipilotti Rist's *The Tender Room* (2011) installation, culminates with the following critique of the space:

“I’m fairly certain [Rist] did not know that when Eisenman designed a ‘logo’ for the Institute for Architecture and Urban Studies - a Vitruvian man overlaid on a map of Manhattan suggesting that the IAUS was now the *umbilicus mundi* - he selected the only Renaissance treatise to represent this ideal figure with an erection. She did not need to know this fact to nevertheless be a canny reader of Eisenman and his entanglement in the analogy that a building is a body in order to confront the one spatial sentiment not ejected by Eisenman’s criticality, namely, that this body be male. Rist did not merely install *The Tender Room* in a generic museum; she harnessed the Wexner and its sharp resistances to interrogate how the relationship between buildings and bodies, and between male bodies and institutional power in particular, continues to predetermine our apperception of the world.”<sup>101</sup>

Lavin’s example serves both as a critique of an architectural practice and a manifested response to the shortcoming.<sup>102</sup>

Many architects manifest unharmonious causal nexus, in other words spacescapes which devour without replenishing or stockpile without use, i.e., spacescapes which do not practice nature’s techniques. Such structures afford very thin and limited engagement; they are spaces that present an immediate and unalterable hierarchy of perception and that can be labeled, identified and classified without playful compositions. I think of monoculture buildings, floor plans, and interiors, rooms with composite floors covered by photographs of wood, with tables made of polyamide which cannot be cared for or age

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<sup>101</sup>Lavin, 2012, p. 102.

<sup>102</sup>For further critique of along these lines see also: Lavin, 2004.

gracefully, an abundance of colonizing objects which pop up quickly to enliven (return life to) the void, but that can overpower the space if a new diversity is not established, with windows that cannot be opened and ventilating systems sifting chemically modified air, and spaces where predators alone have the advantages of concealment, visit, access, acoustics and so forth.<sup>103</sup> Spacescapes where non-human life is taken as subservient, where matter is formed to be abused and rejected from the loop, warranting patterns of unharmonious habits.

For an example of such habits, consider the brilliant and surprisingly unbiased documentary on the Nile Perch in Tanzania's Lake Victoria.<sup>104</sup> Writer and director Hubert Sauper's opening scene symbolically established the essential disfunction. In a dusted airport control tower, only a few stories tall, a local man squats viciously to kill the honey bee trapped inside. His zeal and frustration grows as he disrupts his office and schedule to kill the bee, which ever more irrationally attempts to flee. While all the time the room is constructed of walls of horizontally slotted opening windows (like glass Venetian blinds), if at any point the man had just opened the windows, then the honey bee could have evaded the space and ceased to disrupt the man's day. This scene artfully established the tone of the documentary in which every aspect of life is devoured. It is a pattern of practices of dominance, control, categorization, which devalue all non-human life and various categories of human life, that hinders the ability to engage with the present moment and respond freshly to the situation.<sup>105</sup>

Individuals may generally sense, but fail to articulate and attend to the effects material

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<sup>103</sup>For further musing about the decay of man-made objects see Caitlin DeSilvey's committed interaction with an abandoned country barn. DeSilvey, 2006.

<sup>104</sup>Sauper, 2004.

<sup>105</sup>As an aside, should one ever need to evacuate a bee or moth like creature from a room without easy access to opening windows, I find that a fresh flower will attract and relax the insect such that it may be transported outside.

spaces have on moods, postures and behavior and thus character.<sup>106</sup> Though to be sure there are disciplines outside of philosophy that study this, such as marketing and advertising.<sup>107</sup> This general underdevelopment to attribute affects to particular elements of material space is manifest through lowered expectations of material quality; accepting veneer, ready-made and one-size fits all products — which we ‘personalize’ by choice at the level of serif or sans-serif. This cannot be reduced to a debate about economics, as money is spent. Expensive things are bought, but these things tend to be conceptually rich, or at least heavily marketed. Alternatively, multiple disposable objects are bought with a greater accumulated cost over the lifetime of a well crafted object. For example consider the equipment one finds in an average westernized, contemporary kitchen, there is still a vast amount of money spent on kitchen equipment, but it is of lesser quality and greater quantity, e.g., a dozen Ikea mugs rather than a pair of well thrown mugs.<sup>108</sup> However, is this shortcoming due to an inadequate system of mass-production or an inherent impossibility of quality mass-production?

In the current system the industry operates with the model of a single rational idea of generating multitudes of profitable objects. In the words of Le Corbusier inspired by his early and brief engagement with industrial production, we are living in a system of “Taylorism, [the] horrible and inevitable life of the future”.<sup>109</sup> Kantian beauty

<sup>106</sup>For an insightful critique of this phenomenon see Hebert Dreyfus’ contribution in Jacquet and Giraud, 2012, pp. 23-40, “Why the mood in a room and the mood of a room should be important to Architects”.

<sup>107</sup>See *Drunk Tank Pink*, for an empirical collection of studies on this subject, albeit a naively reductive and analytical grasp on a far richer phenomenon. Alter, 2013 For a more interestingly account see the philosophical text on the subject, such as most admirably studied by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1964c; Merleau-Ponty, 1968 See also Jaron Lanier’s text for the claim: “Funding a civilization through advertising is like trying to get nutrition by connecting a tube from one’s anus to one’s mouth.” Lanier, 2010.

<sup>108</sup>For further discussion of the role of money see Jane Jacobs’ *The Nature of Economies*, Jacobs, 2002.

<sup>109</sup>Text quoted in Von Moos, 2009, p. 47 von Moos’ reference is to Taylor, *Le Corbusier et Pessac* (original complete French version of *Le Corbusier at Pessac*), Taylor and Sekler, 1972, p. 23; see also Le Corbusier’s own recollections in Petit, *Le Corbusier parle*, Petit and Corbusier, 1996, 51 ff. On Le Corbusier’s adventures as an industrialist, see Tim Benton, ‘From Jeanneret to Le Corbusier’, in which Benton dissects the months between July 1920 and December 1921 [29] in order to elucidate contributions of that period’s engagement with business, industry and the bombings in Paris (e.g. ‘Big Bertha’), which

cannot be reliably produced by the dictates of market-forces. Regardless of the details of the economic structuring, be them vertically or horizontally incorporated, when the driving momentum is that of market-forces rather than the formative forces of nature (logos), the object is subjected to false hierarchies. Producing beauty, like cultivating the self, is only achievable through disentanglement with societal norms. Sociologists Scott Lash and John Urry, introduce a notion of aesthetic reflexivity in their 1994 text which engages with raw economic data and a wide range of theoretical influences. Overall the argument was an alternative to the then dominating contemporary theory of the “Varieties of Capitalism” school, and argues for an understanding of the then current situation as a disorganized capitalism.<sup>110</sup> Since its publication, theory has moved on to dispel the inherently negative imaging of disorganized capitalism but Lash and Urry’s pivotal observational structuring remain influential today.<sup>111</sup>

Lash and Urry tease out from late and post modernism, a notion of aesthetic reflexivity which rather insightfully characterizes the period’s dominate referential art.<sup>112</sup> This is an art rampantly infatuated with the visual image and the mapping of space.<sup>113</sup> Lash and Urry present the claim that people in this period are actually more skilled in recognizing and comprehending the plethora of visual images. However this argument clashes with recent empirical studies which dismiss the possibility of ‘multi-tasking’.<sup>114</sup> Nevertheless, their own critique of the situation only adds to the weight of classification of a late and

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Benton describes as: “a simple passage between an unsuccessful episode of business into a return to art and architecture, but as a cathartic rite of passage into the ‘happy schizophrenia’ of Le Corbusier’s most creative period.” Benton, 2003, p. 29 However, I will endeavor to differ with the claim of the 1920s as Le Corbusier’s most creative period.

<sup>110</sup>Subsequent discussion have been contributed by: Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1998; Crouch and Streeck, 1997. Common to each theory is that they were a direct response to economic problems of their time. The approach has been comprehensively documented in the 2001 work, Hall and Soskice, 2004.

<sup>111</sup>See also Lash, 1987 and Ian Greer short review of Lash and Urry’s impact in: Greer, 2012.

<sup>112</sup>Lash and Urry, 1994 in particular pages 54-59.

<sup>113</sup>*ibid.*, p. 55.

<sup>114</sup>Gorlick, 2009.

post modern style of referential art. As in the Foucaultian sense of the “problématique”, Lash and Urry’s structuring of the situation is embedding with the situation itself.<sup>115</sup>

In their own words:

“Although art and literature became reflexive in the sense of self-referential with the advent of modernism towards the end of the nineteenth century, aesthetic reflexivity in the sense of allegory and symbol as a source of the self in everyday life is much more of a late twentieth-century phenomenon.”<sup>116</sup>

This notion is that people in late and post modernity come to define their individuality through referential art within their embedded system of discursive and determinate knowledge; which they label as “discursive reflexivity”.<sup>117</sup> Lash and Urry continue to employ these types of intentional individualization within the systems of mass production via a laboriously detailed analysis of three dominate models of industry; i.e. that of the Japanese, German-speaking, and Anglo-American production systems.<sup>118</sup> However, although various systems prove more capable of affording aesthetic reflexivity within the process of production (which corresponds to Kant’s notion of adherent beauty), there is no room for the production of objects affording Kantian pure beauty.<sup>119</sup> Both discursive and aesthetic reflexivity, like Kant’s referential art or adherent beauty, are necessarily embedded in its historical, social, political, economic situation.

Perhaps though, in turning to a wider historical context, the possibility of large scale production of beauty can materialize. The industrial revolution between the mid-eighteenth to mid-nineteenth century was the intensification of forms of production that were already there; i.e., artisans, craft, domestic industry. The rapid rise of industrial pro-

<sup>115</sup>Problématique as discussed in the above section 1.1.1 *historical background of the problem at hand*.

<sup>116</sup>Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 54.

<sup>117</sup>*ibid.*, p. 64.

<sup>118</sup>*ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>119</sup>Adherent beauty and referential art are discussed in detail in the final chapter, *Art and Nature*.

duction was tied to the intensification of these processes and the concentration of these workers within factory buildings where they were subject to industrial discipline. In attempts of overturning the dominant documentation and assessment of the industrial revolution through the gaze of the winners, historian Maxine Berg seeks “rescue all those forms of enterprise other than the factory from the dustbin of history.”<sup>120</sup> According to Berg, artisan-organized mass-production was possible and existent.

“Artisan-organized production was an equally dynamic industrial structure of the urban villages, suburbs and unincorporated towns of eighteenth-century Britain, in areas such as Birmingham and the London suburbs. It was a system of production which was not constrained by guild regulations but, nevertheless, just as in sixteenth-century Leiden and Lille, it did not operate purely according to the dictates of market forces; rather it was mediated through artisan customs and values.”<sup>121</sup>

In such cases a collection of skilled people worked together based on their individual freedom and embodied skills, and attention to the source of the material presence. Perhaps the example of Italian hilltop towns exemplified by Anticoli Corrado in the Sabine Mountains near Rome could offer a more recent version of Berg’s productive community. Architectural theorist Bernard Rudofsky describes the post modern retreat as:

“The very thought that modern man could live in anachronistic communities like these would seem absurd were it not that they are increasingly becoming refuges for city dwellers. People who have not yet been reduced to appendages to automobiles find in them a fountain of youth.”<sup>122</sup>

However, in contrast to the artisan-organized mass-production Berg details, the mar-

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<sup>120</sup>Berg, 1994, p. 87.

<sup>121</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>122</sup>Rudofsky, 1964, p. 37.



ket forces and the hierarchal discipline adamantly and profoundly advocated by Josiah Wedgwood, climaxing with the claim paraphrasable as: the goal is to have control over workers like fingers on a hand, introduced a micro management of labour in factories and condemned manufacturing to the production of handcraft at best.<sup>123</sup> The pottery baron set out to make all his workers respond to his signal command by launching the spacescape of industrial factories. The spacescapes were not there because of the machines. For example James Watts' steam engine was not used for fifteen years until after it was created because there was no reason for its use.<sup>124</sup> Rather the factories were spaces to group artisans together to maintain industrial discipline. Historian John Merriman points out that a popular trend during this time was to have postcards of photographs taken of these new collections of laborers in the factories. The photographs are taken of the workers by the front door, because this is when they stood together as they each had to clock in. The factory was first and foremost a way of putting discipline on workers; what they could and could not do. Even locking them in the building to keep them from chatter outside.<sup>125</sup>

Architectural theorist Vittorio Gregotti argues that the memory of philosophers' contributions lingers in architects' minds while the philosophical details are forgotten. Which he attributes to architecture's "preoccupation with the market image" and to economic forces as contributing to problems of the current state of "single-dimensional flatten[ed]" built spaces.<sup>126</sup> He feels that commercial pressures drive architects to design spaces which reach their height of appeal in the still image.<sup>127</sup> Gregotti states:

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<sup>123</sup>McKendrick, 1970 and John Merriman - European Civilization, 1648-1945, Lecture number 8, Industrial Revolutions. "He wanted a set of workers that responded as fingers on two hands in response to his command." Merriman, 2008 See also: Merriman, 1996.

<sup>124</sup>Merriman, 2008.

<sup>125</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>126</sup>Gregotti, 1996, pp. 99, 98.

<sup>127</sup>*ibid.*, p. 98.

The relationship between image and perception that was central to those [philosophical] texts now forms a distant, almost always forgotten background, while everyday language, and especially the everyday language of architects, encompasses increasingly insistent talk that makes image, along with its constriction and communication, into a primary objective in design, or even a measure of the quality of a project.<sup>128</sup>

He positively proclaims that architects ought to “construct new pieces of reality, thus modifying and enriching the world of our experiences”.<sup>129</sup> Gregotti’s argument is four-fold. Primarily the importance of an experiential perception of space lies in the background of architecture. However, due to commercial forces, architecture is dominated by the image. Furthermore the power of the architectural image leads to vapid and mundane spaces. Thus architecture must reconsider how to create spaces that enrich human experience of the world.

Perhaps there was space in the proto-industrial “plebeian community” for objects to be created in harmony with formative forces rather than dictated by market forces.<sup>130</sup> Likewise, in more contemporary setting, a comparison of the architectural object with that of the finely tailored garment is revealing because the unity between the artistic and technological sides has prevailed.<sup>131</sup> High-end fashion goods take on something radically unpragmatic, non-market-led and materially concrete. Admittedly, these initial pure aesthetic designs are unabashedly ‘knocked off’ and then provide dramatic economic gains and incentives. However, the initial designers are practicing something akin to Kantian artistic genius. They are often born into a tradition of craftsmanship, with

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<sup>128</sup>Gregotti, 1996, p. 95.

<sup>129</sup>*ibid.*, p. 100.

<sup>130</sup>See also the issue of primitive accumulation, Berg, 1994, p. 167.

<sup>131</sup>For discussion of the change in the architectural profession since the nineteenth century, whereby the “intuitive ‘artistic’ side, and the objective, ‘technological’ side, have grown further and further apart,” see Davis, 2008 Quotation found on page 279.

family members still practicing embodied skills. While at the same time, they have a complete disregard of expectations of what a garment ought to be. They have an intimate familiarity with the richness of the materials they form. They also have an undeniable connection to the moving body. The objects they create are merely part of the art that they create, thus in creating for example a jacket, it is created with the body and with the material, as parts working together as a system. The aesthetic object is the system of the jacket, body, and afforded movement; not the jacket alone. The artist designs the aesthetic object as such.

However, these are not the garments made by the factories of Wedgwood's control, or the disconnected designs of 'creatives' working in offices with production elsewhere. It is also not a collaboration of designers and managers working together that creates a beautiful object. Although group work is clearly forthcoming in the empirical sciences, I am reminded of a comment physicist David Auerbach made, 'that in physics research, working in groups is exponentially more successful than working alone.'<sup>132</sup> While *modus logicus*, might work well with groups of different people because they are playing with concepts rules and ideas; *modus aestheticus*, is confined to the material moment of an individual unity.<sup>133</sup>

At best mass produced objects can be referential art; as industrialize mass production needs rules driven by market forces. Perhaps the objects produced may be clever and play with the rules, drawing attention to the absurdity, prevalence or strength of conventions, but it may never be aesthetic and guide us to care for beauty. The current system of devaluation affords underdeveloped nimbleness to attend to the present situation. Given the current dominating practices, architecture is not expected to challenge or communicate with reflective embodied beings. Thereby in the spaces inhabited, there

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<sup>132</sup>Conversation with physicist David Auerbach in 2005, reconfirmed 2013.

<sup>133</sup>Discussion of this topic occurs in the final chapter, Art & Nature.

is a lack of opportunities to learn and develop nimbleness. In turn, the perpetuating impotence of embodied coarseness affords legalizing new ‘safeties’ by regulating spaces to ‘protect’ this dumbed down individual from ‘accident’ and increasing simplified singular and uni-dimensional spacescapes. Creating a feedback loop in which the ever increasingly feeble individual is design-regulated by ever more invasive ‘childproofing’ codes and minimized perspectives. In short, observations of various social and academic spheres indicate a current situation in which designed spaces do not afford the possibilities for intentional development to unfold between human engagement with material presence. The current situation can be interpreted as unnecessary and avoidable by resisting the dominating power regime via cultivating nimbleness through rejecting false knowledge and engaging afresh with sublime horizons and beautiful objects.

### **a need for marginal practices**

Perhaps it is possible to see the city as a chaotic and organic coalition of juxtaposed forms, containing remunerates of past generations’ dreams and disappointments. But as we enter the midst of the twenty first century, cities are marching in tune with a rhythm of collective ordering. No back-room committees are needed to explain the processes stacking the odds. No “they” or “other” must be conjured to represent something lurking in a subconscious to explain the drive to normalization. Philosopher Hubert Dreyfus provides a useful insight into the overly echoed threat of Nietzsche’s eternal return, when he notes, according to Heidegger, in the current epoch, “technicity[,] eliminates the marginal practices on the basis of which new worlds could be disclosed and dooms us to what Nietzsche already saw as the eternal return of the same.”<sup>134</sup> Theorist often

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<sup>134</sup>Dreyfus, 2003 In particular the claim: “Thus, according to Heidegger, technicity eliminates the marginal practices on the basis of which new worlds could be disclosed and dooms us to what Nietzsche already saw as the eternal return of the same.” [17]

employ the fear of forever reliving the same existence as the most poetic of warnings with the vagueness of recalling a dream. There is something immediate for us today in Nietzsche's warning over a century ago. Through a comparison of Heidegger and Foucault, Dreyfus asserts their joint judgment that the current pattern of the way we live together is dominated by the efficiency of organization and categorization. As the processes of organization spin upon their axis, habits and possible ways for individuals to live with themselves and each other are pulled within the form, categorized, labeled, stamped and stowed. A process gaining strength with each repetition of its act. If the synthesis of Heidegger's and Foucault's studies of human history and habits is valid, then Nietzsche's eternal return is the structuring of human existence that has categorized all practices to stability avoiding any shifts to other styles of existence.<sup>135</sup> Architecture provides surroundings, it gathers the possible in the materials and selected forms, which provides boundaries between what is and what could be. We inhabit the spaces created for our predecessors, by our predecessors, by ourselves and we learn the order of things; our behaviors, our movements, how far we can push and how much there is to work with. We live with each other in the buildings and cities we construct and we structure our movements within the possibilities these spaces provide.<sup>136</sup>

Architects are a meeting point between intentional actions to improve urban environments, a drive for innovative art and economic determinism. Ideas slip into architectural theory like diet fads; suddenly everyone is eating egg white omelets and no one can ex-

<sup>135</sup>For an alternative view of the eternal return as "also an eternal departure" see Veyne, 1993, 2ff.

<sup>136</sup>Sometimes it seems as though the statement, by our fathers and for our fathers, more readily captures the feeling of urban spacescapes. However, to promote that fallacy only gives justification to further exclusion via the logic of precedent. The extent of architecture designed by women throughout history is far more significant than citing a single childhood hero such as Julia Morgan as an exception. Hence for fun and to recall a few more than a dozen female architects who have to some degree engaged with design and matter radically differently than their male counterparts, consider the works of: Sophia Hayden Benett, Norma Merrick Sklarek, Marion Mahony Griffin, Eileen Gray, Lilly Reich, Charlotte Perriand, Jane Drew, Lina Bo Bardi, Anne Tyng, Norma Merrick Sklarek, Denise Scott Browne, Susana Torre, Wenche Selmer, Mary Colter, Irena Bauman, Kate Beath, and more recently: Kazuyo Sejima, Zaha Hadid

plain why.<sup>137</sup> Cities are left with monolithic sculptures devoted to the egos of star architects.<sup>138</sup> Limited resources are exploited and we are left to adapt to failed experiments.<sup>139</sup> Hence, the thesis leaps from the ship of bad architecture. Asking not to portray nor evoke its affects, but to provoke resistance to it. Bad architecture limits the possibilities of individuals and societies. It hinders the embodied faculties of mind, i.e., the imagination, reason, understanding, judgment, sensations and spirit.<sup>140</sup> It wears down the skills of engagement and teaches individuals to underperform. It weakens us completely, such that the possibility to overcome these environments is heroic rather than normal.

### is it then deterministic?

This is not the argument for social engineering as seen with the reach of control attempted through the works of Jeremy Bentham, early Le Corbusier, Frank Lloyd Wright, CIAM in the 1930s and 40s, then later with Super Studio, Archigram, Metabolism and the likes.<sup>141</sup> The term “social engineering” was coined by Maurice Broady in the essay, *Social Theory in Architectural Design*.<sup>142</sup> I grant that individual agency works within unpredictable limits, yet through examination of what does exist in space and what does happen in events, some sort of knowledge about the general situation can be gained, some theories can be employed and connections established. Australian architec-

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<sup>137</sup>As an aside, the whole egg is one of the most complete, healthy, and well packaged foods available. See McGee, 2007 In particular see pages 68-117 for a comprehensive study of the egg, from the perspective of its chemical makeup, evolutionary history, development, human use of the egg, and delightful sensory qualities.

<sup>138</sup>One thinks of the Montage of Starchitect skyscrapers aggregated in the UAE Desert, Rem Koolhaas, 2007

<sup>139</sup>For an excellent discussion regarding alternative possibilities to the shortcomings of merely novel design and the need to build for ‘lived spatiality’, see Alberto Pérez-Gómez’s *Architecture as a Performing Art: Two analogical reflections*. Pérez-Gómez, 2012.

<sup>140</sup>These are the faculties of mind with which Kant works.

<sup>141</sup>For further discussion of past hopes see Schrijver, 2010.

<sup>142</sup>Broady, 1966.

tural theorist, Jon Lang provides a tight four point structure of degrees of architectural determinism.<sup>143</sup>

“1.Free-will approach; Suggests that the environment has no impact on behaviour.

2. Possibilistic approach; Perceives the environment to be the affordance of human behaviour but nothing more. A set of opportunities upon which action may or may not be taken. E.g. a cup is on the table. I choose to fill it up with water or not. It does not make me thirsty.

3. Probabilistic approach; Assumes that human behaviour is not entirely capricious. The environment does affect behaviour but there are many variables.

4. Deterministic approach; Implies a simple cause-effect relationship between the environment and behaviour. For some this meant better architecture could make better people.”<sup>144</sup>

This thesis is sympathetic to the probabilistic approach and for example grants the awareness that the cup on the table makes my hand’s reach for it more probable. That is, the cup itself may lure the hand, regardless of my lack of need for yet more tea. However, the accessibility achieved by this thumbnail sketch of the relations between object—individual—world, neglects the subtlety of phenomena possible to observe and the contextualization of temporality. For example, the role of the *I* is confined to a behaving agent, while the environment is assumed as a collection of impartial, inanimate objects. The richness of this relation is examined in detail within a Kantian framework in the following chapters. Nevertheless, Lang’s fourfold division provides immediate orientation

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<sup>143</sup>Lang, 1987, pp. 100-108.

<sup>144</sup>*ibid.*

within the common spectrum of architectural deterministic positions.

At base, architectural design is about imagining future possibilities and making things that enable us to live out some of these possibilities. As Swedish design theorist, Erik Stolterman succinctly observes, “Maybe the most fascinating thing about design is that it is a process that starts with a thought and ends with the world looking different.”<sup>145</sup> Architecture starts with ideas of problems and solutions, and then the ideas take shape as they are formulated, communicated and tried out in detail.<sup>146</sup> An essential aspect of architectural design is giving form to material so that it embodies an aesthetic idea. The malleability of human designed space offers a structure for interpreting how the experience of aesthetic objects and horizons impact the opportunity to willfully cultivate a richer engagement and resistance to dominating practices.

Architecture is intimately interwoven with the creative drive of intentionality and amply enveloping to its temporary denizens.<sup>147</sup> Granting a minimal connection between spacescapes and human habits, architecture offers a handsome venue to access Kant’s depiction of the phenomenon of aesthetically judging objects and horizons. As discussed in detail below, a central movement of cultivating nimbleness is embracing a captivating paradox. Aesthetic judgments play a critical role in cultivating nimbleness, which in turn acts as a means to resisting dominating normalizing power relations. There are two styles of aesthetic judgments. Firstly, aesthetic judgments of the sublime, stretch and humble the individual, revealing their own gumption or willingness to try to comprehend something so vast or terrifying that the individual can merely apprehend a limited

<sup>145</sup>Citation found in: Bratteteig, 2010, p. 147 For original see Stolterman, 2007, p. 13.

<sup>146</sup>Drawing upon the works of: Schön, 1983; Lanzara, 1983; Bjerknes and Bratteteig, 1987; Henderson, 1999; found in: Bratteteig, 2010, p. 147.

<sup>147</sup>*Intentionality* both the sense of Franz Brentano’s resurrecting of the term *intentionality* into modern philosophy with statement; “every mental phenomenon is characterized by... the *intentional* inexistence of an object, and what we might call... *direction* toward an object”. Brentano, 1995, p. 88 and in the later phenomenological, Merleau-Pontian sense of a mode of embodied directiveness towards the world—*i.e.*, bodily intentionality. Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 53.



fraction of the components. Secondly, aesthetic judgments of beauty directly and immediately link one's own subjectively with that of others. The firsthand experience of harmonious habits of nature's techniques, along with one's own connection and pleasure from echoing such harmony, provides a means of experiencing a supersensible formative power, which affords one a disposition of unconcealment. The word unconcealment is borrowed from Kant's assertion:

“We shall set before ourselves the concept of **duty**, which contains that of a good will though under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, however, far from *concealing* it and making it unrecognizable, rather *bring it out* by contrast and make it shine more brightly.”<sup>148</sup>

In this sense a disposition of unconcealment is that of an individual who fluidly engages with the world with good will and uncovers others, objects, and horizons afresh - as they are aware of their own embodied limitations and coarseness. Thus the false knowledge of normalizing practices is compared with a far more fundamental paradox of the sublime, which is a paradox individuals are able to experience firsthand and without having to rely on the derivative (and often corrupted) teachings of dematerialized dogma. Along these lines, in the third *Critique* Kant argues that aesthetic judgments are the skills by which individuals find pleasure in their own engagement with the world. Thus, what better matter to engage with than that which we dwell within and create anew? The following chapters shall examine Kant's aesthetic and teleological theory as a means of grounding the phenomena of beauty, sublime, cultivation, art, nature and arguing via their analyses for a capacity to cultivate, which frees individuals from normalizing power relations that limit the will to act.<sup>149</sup> However to more suitably study the variables, the

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<sup>148</sup>Gregor, 1996, 52 (4:397) emphasis my own.) This topic is further discussed in the thesis' final chapter; *Art & Nature*..

<sup>149</sup>To subdue any false hopes, please note the following chapters are still a ways away.

critique of architecture in the thesis is confined to public architecture that individuals electively populate.

## 1.2 Elective Spaces

Elective spaces may afford cultivating nimbleness by providing sublime horizons and beautiful objects with which the individual is free to engage or avoid. Le Corbusier and Pierre Jeanneret composed Chandigarh as a city with separate areas of working, living and care for the body and spirit. *Elective spaces* overlap with the qualities of care for body and spirit. However the concept excludes spaces for maintaining the status quo of the existing state of affairs. That is to say, they are not grocery stores and shopping avenues, regardless of their therapeutic properties. They are not spaces with an intentional directive of redistributing capital. Though it may seem inconceivable to claim any space in the globalized, market-led, human centric environment can operate without an economic focus. Or that one must retreat to the minimal claim that elective spaces are places where gains in profit margins are not the rationalized priority but where they still play a role. However, the aim of resistance via marginal practices is to cast aside the need to categorize one's individual experience through the dominating structure. Hence the ability to think of elective spaces as possible is a preliminary step in resistance.

Cities are the environment of elective spaces. When a city changes, the context of elective spaces change. In recent years the study of the city or urbanism has regained popularity. A trend fueled almost by promising that by redesigning the city, current and predicted human populations will be able to thrive, climate change will be mitigated to livable degrees, and political asymmetry will be evaded. Urbanists have historically

addressed these issues of social, political and economical injustice.<sup>150</sup> Although urbanist intervention into the city plainly has a far reaching history, most recently urbanists have addressed these problems in two discernible waves. The first wave taking place between the 1930s-60s, which shared the systematic study of western cities' inhabitation and patterns to provide city councilors and developers with data, equations, and logical arguments to improve the lives of urban denizens and reinvigorate the cities of their time. This is seen in the canonical works such as Jane Jacobs' *The Life and Death of Great American Cities* or Kevin Lynch's *Site Planning*, which gathered empirical evidence of living conditions in urban environments. The critiques tended to generate practical solutions and requirements for improving the lives of people in western cities via local planning policies.<sup>151</sup> The second wave, rising in the 1990s and persistent today, studies systems of cities with pluralist, emergent, or other various and more ambiguous methods. The vogue is seen in the works of the London School of Economics/ LSE's Cities program's mania for data in, *Living in the Endless City*, the Delft School of Design/ DSD's social-political emphasis in, *Crossover. Architecture Urbanism Technology*, and Mike Davis' über-realistic dystopian vision in *Planet of Slums*.<sup>152</sup> This second wave is also noticeable in New Urbanism and the bustle of interest in landscape architecture, with some of the stellar theories appearing through works such as Anne Whiston Spirn's

<sup>150</sup>For overview of urbanism see the analysis by Jane Jacobs in, *The Economy of Cities* Jacobs, 1969 and historian Lewis Mumford's multiple millennia spanning, *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*. Mumford, 1961 Other text which provide a general overview of the historical role of urbanism that are worth noting include: Economics Edward Glaeser's *Triumph of the City* Storper, 2011, Urbanism and Urbanization: Views, Aspects, and Dimensions edited by N. Iverson Iverson, 1984.

<sup>151</sup>In addition to Jacobs and Lynch, the following is the almost orthodox collection of first wave urbanist works: Ian McHarg's *Design with Nature*, William Whyte's *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*, Richard Meier's *Planning for an Urban World: The design of resources conserving cities*, Peter Evans' *Livable Cities?*, Michael Hough's *City Form and Natural Process*, Dolores Hayden's *the Power of Place; Urban landscapes as public history*, Randolph T. Hester, Jr.'s *Neighborhood Space* and though not directly a text of urbanism, Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* which radically impacted the momentum of the movement. Ian, 1969; Whyte, 1980; Meier, 1974a.

<sup>152</sup>Burdett and Sudjic, 2011; Graafland and Kavanaugh, 2006; Kaminer and Robles, 2011; Davis, 2006a; Davis, 2006b.

*Language of Landscape*, in which she discusses the dynamic medium of landscape's subjective processes.<sup>153</sup> In general this latest wave comprises theorists whom examine the city in terms of its global role to improve health, distribution of wealth, ecological efficiencies, population and to mediate climate change. While no doubt is posed that better designed cities afford better opportunities for their inhabitants and the globe, cities as a whole are too congested with market-led normalizing practices to offer the material space needed for cultivating nimbleness.

While acknowledging that the greater urban sphere significantly impacts an individual's experience of a singular building and the somewhat absurdity of carving out a singular structure, the medium here is scaled to the individual; that is, a building generated from an individual aesthetic idea and an individual's experiences of it. In order to uncover the problem of the architectural causal nexus, the work here springs from a long standing philosophical practice of an individual working to cultivate their own patterns or habits and free themselves from internalizing normalizing power practices.

A simplistic distinction between empirical based disciplines and philosophy further justifies the individual nature of this study. Empirical sciences are largely led by popular interest due to the need of high monetary investment. When people as a majority are interested in something, say stem cells or ADHD, the mass amounts of funding required are allocated either by government, private companies or more likely a combination of the two. Likewise when people lose interest with a form of research, the funding is withdrawn, as occurred recently with the United States' NASA space program. The aims of studies may be to overturn established facts as observed by Karl Popper, but the areas of research are largely limited to popular interest. Philosophy on the other hand has a relatively low overhead. Philosophers, to a greater degree than empirical scientists, can

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<sup>153</sup>Spirn, 1998 See also the collection of essays edited by Ilse Helbrecht and Peter Dirksmeierby, *New Urbanism: Life, Work and Space in the New Downtown* Helbrecht and Dirksmeier, 2012.

practice regardless of the funding, perhaps even despite of the funding offered. Granted, projects under the umbrella of *citizen science* attempt to increase the accessibility for individuals to contribute to the empirical sciences,<sup>154</sup> it will be interesting to see if the hopes of such programs can develop within the establish framework. Philosophers are able to develop unpopular topics, understandings and structures of the world, many of which eventually seep into society through explicit reference (e.g. law, politics, sociology, geography) or implicit derivatives such as is observable in marketing, entertainment industry, or language. Indubitably, to properly develop arguments, theories and text, requires funding, but comparative to the empirical sciences this funding is minimal.<sup>155</sup> Hence philosophy is not as economically subject to popular trends, and is thus able to contribute radically alternative structures for understanding the world and life within it.

The research here is primarily philosophical, hence the material studied is limited to spacescapes generated by individual aesthetic ideas and theories of how individuals engage with such material forms. While the urban spacescape clearly warrants its popularity of study, there is something inherent to the singularity of the architectural object which may reveal both the unity of will within its creation and the possibility of cultivation within the individual who becomes a part within its system for an elective and finite stretch of time.

Once the topic is limited to the autonomous objects of architecture, the diversity of these object types is striking. I would like to formally dub the term, *elective space*, to convey the type of area, space, structure, building, or venue, that an individual has no requirement to consume, conduct labor within or reside, i.e., it is not a place where one

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<sup>154</sup>For further details see Citizen Science Alliance, chaired by Chris Lintott of University of Oxford. [Citizen Science Alliance](#).

<sup>155</sup>I would like to attribute any underdevelopment in this theory to underfunding.\*

must go, it is a place one may choose to go.

Elective space is a term I developed while teaching at Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand), which I have found richly useful in illustrating a very particular type of space. This thesis substantially amplifies what this term was meant to communicate. Some types of elective spaces are: art galleries, museums, libraries, theaters, retreats, historical monuments, cultural structures, religious structures, sporting structures, public collections (such as zoos, aquariums), cemeteries, national parks, scenic or natural reserves, and city parks.<sup>156</sup> As the tree chart seeks to illustrate, such spaces are often in the public domain, either publicly or privately owned and accessible to the public, though often by submitting to certain conditions.

Although there is a large overlap with communal public spaces, they differ in that one is never forced to visit elective spaces; as opposed to public streetscapes.<sup>157</sup> The concept of elective space overlaps, though is not identical to that of: cultural space, public space, natural reserves, common space, leisure space, open space and Richard Sennett's notion of "narrative space".<sup>158</sup> Some of the most charismatic examples of elective spaces include:

the *Guggenheim* New York (1959) by Frank Lloyd Wright,

the *British Museum* (1823-1847) by Sir Robert Smirke,

the *Seattle Library* (2004) by Rem Koolhaas,

the *Sydney Opera House* (1957-1973) by Jørn Utzon,

the elevated walkways of the *Barbican* (1982) by Chamberlin, Powell & Bon

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<sup>156</sup>For an excellent discussion of Monumental spacescapes and individuals' engagement with them see: Trigger, 1990.

<sup>157</sup>Other than the recluse, everyone must engage with the streetscape whether it is in the metallic bubble of the automobile, or with only a coat to buffer the flesh from the public assessment persistent within the communal streetscape. For further discussion of the division of the modern body amongst publicly or market-driven lines see: Schrijver, 2009, 88ff. For further historical contextualization of the phenomenon see: Nancy Forgione's analysis of walking in nineteenth-century Paris, Forgione, 2005.

<sup>158</sup>Sennett, 1992, 190 ff.

the *Baths at Vals* (1996) by Peter Zumthor,  
 the *Memorial to the Murdered Jews of Europe* (2006) by Peter Eisenman,  
 the *Church of Light* (1989) by Tadao Ando,  
 the *Fábrica da Pompéia* (1977) by Lina Bo Bardi,  
 the *California Green Academy of Sciences* (2008) by Renzo Piano,  
 the *Brion Cemetery* (1970-72) by Carlo Scarpa,  
 the *Norwegian Wild Reindeer Centre Pavilion* (2011) by Snøhetta,<sup>159</sup>  
 and *New York Central Park* (1857-73) by Frederick Law Olmsted.

The two primary examples of elective space considered in depth in this thesis are open to the public, but there are also elective spaces within some private residences. Bachelard's unused attic or basement, or even an odd cupboard, closet or garage can be unpragmatic and non-market-led spacescapes.<sup>160</sup> Within a grand manor, elective spaces could indeed be disused wings, rooms, towers, turrets or external buildings like mausoleums or the romantic legacy of a forgotten garden.<sup>161</sup> Though it may be objected given the regularity and formality of the traditions regarding tea drinking, it is possible to consider some of the enchanting spaces set aside for tea within the Japanese tradition as providing a style of cultural elective spaces. The tradition itself speaks to the need to set aside spaces for non pragmatic reflection. In particular Terunobu Fujimori's work comes to mind, not only for the surrealist tea houses like the *Takasugi-an*, 'Too-High Tea House' (2004), but also the incorporated nooks as founds in *Yakisugi House* (2007). However, as these domestic spaces are rarely accessible to the public at mass, their consideration is postponed to a future study.

It is my belief that elective spaces can be manifest anywhere. That they come together at

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<sup>159</sup>Within the Dovrefjell National Park

<sup>160</sup>Bachelard, 1994.

<sup>161</sup>Benes and Harris, 2001.

the widest diversity of scale. For example, certain configurations of bricks and wool may come together as an elective space for a small child, but cease to offer their non-market-led forms to middle aged individuals. Elective spaces are manifest when the collection of its parts interact with each other as a system without being guided or overshadowed by market-led forces. The parts of such a system which could compose an elective space include the building materials, the atmospheric matter (e.g. humidity, heat), the flora (e.g. grasses, flowers) and fauna (e.g. moths, people). When these component of parts engage with each other in a closed system with a formative force other than that of the dominating market-led, pragmatic forces of normalizing power relations, then the system exist as an elective space. Hence, given these defined requirements, the scale of elective spaces can be as impressive as international art galleries or national forest reserves, or as humble as one's desk.

The powerful aspect of structuring spacial environments in this style comes by further investigating the potential affordance of elective spaces in regards to their relationship to cultivating nimbleness. In other words, a prime requirement for cultivating nimbleness is having access to elective spaces. A further need is to have elective spaces that afford the event of sublime and beautiful. The chapter three below examines the qualities of spacescape affording such events.

On a simplistic level elective spaces are made from parts which do not promote hyper-concept-led thinking; thinking which merely plays out power relations of one's position within a web of bio-power. Hence, there must be a lack of branding—both linguistically and iconographically. However this opens again the hermeneutics of the issues. Consider for example a medieval church, such as the San Miniato al Monte on the southern hillside of Firenze, above Santo Spirito. The 11th to 13th century church in the Romanesque style and an interior with craved wooden beams, stones and centuries of monks bones, diffused



sunlight, musty air, unidentified creeks, paint, and then contemporary iconography. The forms would have been easily readable by the intended populous of the 12th century Tuscans, however, the ravens, owls and flat faces of men no longer fluently communicate to their guest the importance of their intended dogmas. With time, the architectural object of the San Miniato al Monte church has transformed from one that promotes normalizing power relations, to an elective space. The transformation of the object occurs with the change of some of its parts, in this case the human parts.

In short, elective spaces are spaces where one is never forced but only chooses to visit and cannot easily stay, as cultivation itself is something one must elect to undertake.<sup>162</sup>

In the argument on heterogeneity in spacescapes in Foucault's popular 1967 'Heterotopias; Other spaces' lecture, he states, "I believe that the anxiety of our era has to do fundamentally with space".<sup>163</sup> He recognizes a thickness and complexity within the physical form; both regarding internal spaces like "flowing" or "sparkling water" or "fixed" and "congealed like stone or crystal" and external spaces "in which we live, which draws us out of ourselves, in which the erosion of our lives, our time and our history occurs, the space that claws and gnaws at us". However his argument's focus is to distinguish a historical shift within the atmospheres, availability and liberty granted to visitors of unusual spaces. He contends that a social and political shift has changed the way we deal with transitory periods of life and abnormal behavior in people. The unusual spaces he highlights are the spaces of cemeteries, gardens, museums and libraries, prisons, Brazilian guest bedrooms on great farm estates, American motel rooms, brothels, Puritan and Jesuit colonies, and lastly boats. These are examples of something he labels as "het-

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<sup>162</sup>Though, to be meticulous, I will note that the practical act of staying is sometimes possible through illegally squatting in the space or through a career choice, for example being a park ranger and living in Yosemite National Park.

<sup>163</sup>Foucault, 1984a.

erotopias”.<sup>164</sup> There are two categories of heterotopias; firstly those which are otherly spaces set aside to deal with a temporary “crisis”, such as “adolescents, menstruating women, pregnant women, the elderly, etc.” along with boarding or military schools, and honeymoon deflowering. Individuals visit these various spaces for a fixed and finite stretch of time and then are free to return to society. However these ‘crisis’ heterotopias have been declining and are making way for a new more problematic heterotopias of spaces of “deviation”. ‘Deviation’ heterotopias are spaces set apart to deal with people who behave aberrantly; these are spaces of rest homes and psychiatric hospitals, prisons, and “possibly retirement homes”. The short lecture turned essay attempts mostly to draw the reader’s attention to historical practices of separate spaces for separate activities. Hence the conclusion that Foucault draws from his discussion of heterotopias is that in the past, these spaces were a bit more neutral, in that they existed to house otherly behavior, and once the individuals went through an unavoidable process of otherness—the ‘crisis’ period—those same individuals were allowed back into society as is. The crisis, was not a problem within the individual, rather it was an exhibition of something inherent with the world. On the other hand, the deviation heterotopias are employed to confine problematic individuals for a non-fixed period of time. However, neither styles of heterotopias afford the individual to discard their collected false knowledge, rather the spaces conform to the individual’s social, political and economical embeddedness and perpetuate the subjectification by the dominating power relations.<sup>165</sup>

Elective spaces are not merely for a transitional period of crisis or deviation. They are anti-pragmatic, post-human-centric spaces. It is interesting to consider the metaphorical richness these spaces provide their culture and language, as well as the ambiguous undertones associated with such spaces. For example consider the fable of Blue Beard, as first

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<sup>164</sup>Foucault, 1984a.

<sup>165</sup>For further discussion of the various perceptions of spacescapes see: Harald Kleinschmidt’s excellent and well detailed account in Kleinschmidt, 2000.

recorded by Charles Perrault in 1697.<sup>166</sup> In the classic continental story, the wealthy man of the area devours the young women who seek too much knowledge by exploring the disused wings of his manor.<sup>167</sup> The inherent ambiguous mood of such spaces is not a coincidence. Seeking resistance to dominating normalizing power relations through philosophical means of cultivating nimbleness is not without challenge. Akin to the cultural fables, the choice brings the seeker into ambiguous, threatening, and terrifying situations. In such situations the assuredness of one's assumptions is forced to be tested by the immediate material world. Yet it is by daring to know that one is free to will their own actions. People must have the choice to enter elective spaces, as cultivation itself is something one must elect to undertake through echoing epiphanies.

**within elective spaces, one may cultivate taste**

“Working in philosophy — like work in architecture in many respects — is really more a working on oneself.” Ludwig Wittgenstein.<sup>168</sup>

As one aims to resist power relations alive within bad architecture and attempts to uncover the proposed causal nexus of architecture, it might be asked: can it be justifiable to claim that merely by choosing to spend time in elective spaces, that somehow the individual develops new habits of engaging with the world? Elective spaces are not necessarily spacescapes of sublime horizons and beautiful objects. However, elective spaces provide the opportunity for people to be more open or sympathetic to the sublime and beauty, thereby if such spaces are inherently composed of sublime horizons and as beautiful objects, then such spaces afford a willing individual to cultivate their nimbleness.

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<sup>166</sup>Perrault, 2009.

<sup>167</sup>For a detailed and insightful critique of the Blue Beard fable, see Maria Tatar's excellent work: *Secrets Beyond The Door: The Story of Bluebeard and His Wives* Tatar, 2004.

<sup>168</sup>Wittgenstein, 1984, p. 24. It carries on to say, “One's own interpretation. On one's way of seeing things. And what one expects of them.”

Thus the further question surfaces; in such spacescapes does the architect cultivate a sensitivity towards forming matter in the patterns of its own unique causal nexus — which is the architect's development of their own embodied nimbleness? Cultivating embodied aesthetic sensitivity requires the individual architect to have first undergone an intentional process of rejecting false knowledge, which should release them from constant hyper-concept-led perception of their surroundings to a more raw and un-unified engagement with their material presence.<sup>169</sup> In such a state, if the individual chooses to engage a successful elective space which harbors events of Beauty in its material forms, then the individual may be open to an experience of the second movement of cultivation, a primary paradox, such as the aesthetic sublime. To clarify, cultivating taste, nimbleness, awareness of the present material situation, or an aesthetic sensitivity for the richness of object's subjective causal nexus, are all ways of naming a similar human skill. As argued in the subsequent chapters, aesthetic objects are able to warrant judgments of themselves as beautiful because they clearly express their own subjective causal nexus. Exactly what that is and why anyone should grant such an idea is examined later, but for now the context shall be laid out.

Very briefly, a causal nexus in the circular relationship between means & ends, whereby the means *cause* the ends and the ends *ground* the means, like a positive feed back loop; *means*  $\odot$  *ends*. On a large scale, Kant interprets this nexus as able to encompass all of nature — on this scale he aptly calls it: the techniques of nature or nature's supersensible formative power. On a smaller scale, an individual object may have its own causal nexus, which is tied to its inherent subjective purposiveness; as in a system of systems within systems. A causal nexus is a healthy ecosystem, where all the components cause and ground each other, thus affording the system as a whole to thrive. The question is, if

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<sup>169</sup>Un-unified as in, it was unified before, but now has been undone, un-unified.

the system of a causal nexus can be applied to causal relationships in general, and more relevantly, to creative professions such as architecture. Hence, we may think of a causal nexus of architecture which is akin in structure to the nexus of nature. This is where the means of an architect's ability to create nimbly *causes* spacescapes which afford individuals to develop nimbleness which in turn *grounds* architect's ability to create nimbly.

### **nimbleness**

However, all of this hinges on the idea that one may cultivate nimbleness. 'Nimbleness' is the embodied, nonconceptual skills of aesthetic judgment. Granted both the terms (nimbleness and aesthetic judgment) have different emphasis and come from different phases of Kant's philosophical writing which spans about six decades.<sup>170</sup> Nimbleness comes from an earlier work on *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*. Aesthetic taste comes from his later period and is most notably the subject of the first half of the third *Critique*. The term nimbleness helps to recall the embodied nature of cultivation. The pre-critical Kant argues individuals must cultivate nimbleness because, unfortunately we are made from coarse earth matter, which hinders the ability to freely engage with the world. As Kantian scholar Andrew Carpenter asserts, Kant argues that our "conceptual actives are dependent on sensory material that it receives of the effect of bodily action" and that the "sluggishness of the body, which is caused by the body's specific material constitution, impedes the ability of the soul to think".<sup>171</sup> In Kant's own words:

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<sup>170</sup>Kant's first publication *Thoughts on the True Estimation of Living Forces* appeared in 1747 and he was working on the notes for his Final Synthesis at the time of his death in 1804, which later appeared as the *Opus Posthumum*; and which famously has its own extended life. Though, it should be noted he retired from university teaching in 1796 at the age of seventy-two. Kant, 1929b; Kant, 1993.

<sup>171</sup>Carpenter, 1998, pp. 100 & 101.

“The human being is created to take in the impressions and emotions which the world is to arouse in him through that very body, which is the perceptible part of his being. The body’s material serves not only to impress on the imperceptible spirit which lives inside him the first ideas of the external world but also is indispensable in its inner working for repeating these impressions and linking them together, in short, for thinking. As a person’s body grows, his intellectual capabilities also proportionally attain the appropriate stage of full development and first acquire a staid and soberly mature capacity when the fibers of his corporeal machine have gained the strength and endurance which mark the completion of their development.”<sup>172</sup>

In short, cognition is not a disembodied, dematerialize, transcendental capacity, rather it is inherently positioned in the world of matter. As discussed above the concern is seen again in his final synthesis (published as: *Opus Posthumum*), where he returns his attention to the manner of matter. However, prior to being engulfed in further textual evidence of Kant’s materialism and embodiment of cognition, the point I would like to draw attention to is that, for Kant, cognition is something existent in a material world.<sup>173</sup> He does not suffer the Cartesian skepticism whereby mind may act without body or matter.<sup>174</sup> This is most clear stated in his correspondence with Johann Kiesewetter (1766-1819) sometime between 1788 and 1790. Förster translates and presents the assertion as:

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<sup>172</sup>Kant, 2008 The third section titled “Appendix, of the inhabitants of the stars” is not often engaged with by Kantian scholars. A few exceptions are Andrew Norris Carpenter and Jerome Schneewind Carpenter, 1998 and Schneewind, 1998, pp. 498-501.

<sup>173</sup>“Embodied Cognition” is a term developed by Carpenter in tandem with Hannah Ginsborg for his doctoral dissertation. It means: the metaphysical account of the causal conditions on thinking. For an illuminating study on Kant’s fluctuating interpretation on the qualities of spirit see: Carpenter, 1998, p. 98. An abstraction from the dissertation is later published as Carpenter, 2008.

<sup>174</sup>See also Kant’s discussion of discipline of the body as being properly prescribed by the philosopher. In particular see:[185 15:941-2] of Kant, 2007, 184-191 15:939-53.

“ ‘I posit my own existence’ in a world ‘for the sake of empirical consciousness and its possibility,’ because empirical knowledge of myself as a being determined in time can only be knowledge of ‘myself as a being that exists in a world’ (18:615)”<sup>175</sup>

Hence contrary to a preponderance of secondary literature positioning Kant in the paradigm of Enlightenment rationality with a contempt for philosophical issues of embodiment,<sup>176</sup> the richer investigation into Kant’s theory reveals means of contextualizing his assertions of the importance of the human faculties of reason to form ideas within the greater material world of expansive and movable matter.

### **nimbleness to judgment**

With cultivating nimbleness in terms of aesthetic judgment, the aim is to develop one’s sensitivity towards the presence of individual material objects and horizons and to be able to bracket-off the concepts of the categories from the moment of aesthetic judgment. The question arises then of how to account for the variety in skills of aesthetic judging. That is, can differences in aesthetic judgment be attributed to the variance of form and matter of the object, or form and matter of the individual judging (i.e. nimbleness of the body). We are not all judging the same thing. The thing changes with time and context, i.e., the intrinsic matter and form adapt as its temporal and spacial relational shift.

Simply put, the difference in aesthetic judgment must be a combination of both the object itself and the individual judging it. Beauty is not strictly subjective, but different individuals have varying capacities for perceiving events of Beauty. Because we are

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<sup>175</sup>Förster, 2000, p. 76.

<sup>176</sup>As is observed in Andrew Carpenter’s *Kant on the Embodied Cognition* Carpenter, 2008, p. 59.

material beings we must work to be skilled in experiencing events of Beauty. Likewise some beauties are more perceptible than others due to their material make up. It is helpful to think of the art of wine tasting. Some individuals have developed greater sensitivity or patients and care to discern a diversity of taste afforded by a particular wine. This is not the mere vocabulary to identify such favors but rather the skill of teasing the non-discursive flavors out from the whole. Likewise some wines afford a greater complexity of taste with a richer collection of taste to be teased out. Given the same bottle of wine, glass, tasting room, et cetera, if two different people have different aesthetic judgments about the same wine, it corresponds to their individual nimbleness. The wine itself affords an inherent degree of richness, complexity or harmony. No matter how sensitive an individual judger may be, certain wines will not offer a harmonious, playful exchange of form.<sup>177</sup> That is, the quality of the wine itself affords the judgment. On the other hand, if the individual cannot disinterest themselves from the desire for the wine, acquired concepts of what the wine should be, contextual societal background (such as price or prestige), then they are not capable of purely aesthetically judging the wine, and it is merely a sensational judgment of its charms or determining judgment in terms of its reputable classification.

Kant might seem contradictory in this area; as he states that some people are just born geniuses. In other words some bodies are simply more nimble from birth (as some are more coarse). But this seems to be a starting point, rather than a confirmed final capacity of individuals. The farther we cultivate our nimbleness, the greater our capacity to create beauty becomes. A finer gradient for engaging with beauty may develop the capability of editing our creations to manifest beauty. The more we are able to perceive the causal nexus of the collection of matter we work with, the more we may harmoniously appeal our

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<sup>177</sup>As is examined in the final chapter, form is the relational pattern of the parts of the object, the manner of matter.



own aesthetic idea with it. Returning to the melody metaphor of the manner of matter, the more skilled an individual becomes in hearing the object's individual dynamic and perpetually adapting melody, the more capable they become at combining the melody with their own aesthetic idea and composing a polyphony.<sup>178</sup> Hence the ability is to compose independently existent, harmoniously, and without hierarchical domination nor asymmetrical use and replenishment. Thus, although there can be no rule book or vocabulary of concepts for how to create beauty, one's familiarity and sensitivity towards it, enhances one's grace of intentionally forming matter harmoniously to the matter's own subjective purposiveness. Indubitably, cultivating aesthetic judgment improves access to beauty.

Likewise as seen in the contrasting direction, the potentially beautiful object can be neglected by the individual experiencing it. One way for this to happen is when the faculty of understanding steps in too quickly, subsuming the object as merely a token of a general type. In this case the understanding would be employing a concept upon the object that artificially structures a dominant perspective of the object. This is concept-led cognitive experience (which can be a helpful skill in other aspects of life). The dominant perspective of the object and the concept are borrowed from the on-going process of normative categorical creation from one's larger society. So for example, instead of seeing the brick in front of me for the harmonious composition of its forms which afford no primary perspective, I brush it aside and think, what is that brick doing on my desk? (This example assumes the brick is in itself harmoniously composed, which seems possible as long as it is not created in a market-led situation.) Thus to cultivate the power of aesthetic judgment, one could practice traditional Stoic exercises of focusing on

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<sup>178</sup>In particular consider the tradition of Renaissance polyphony of the early fifteenth century, to Tomás de Victoria at the end of the sixteenth century. A musical style and skill that regained momentum in 1980 with the Tallis Scholars and under the direction of Peter Phillips, with recordings of Palestrina's "Missa Papae Marcelli". Ross, 2011, p. 76.

the present and attempting to postpone the subsuming action of the understanding.<sup>179</sup> Though, some bricks are just bricks.

Cultivating nimbleness requires intentional practice of reflectively judging. It could be visualized as welcoming intentionality into the presence of the body and world about it. Somehow forgiving the body of its ‘imperfections’ societally promoted which sever the connection, or by rejecting the fear and disgust of the body and its systems to clean, heal and grow. Or additionally, by learning to linger in the pleasure of materiality or acting in styles which contribute to the pleasure of surrounding situation.<sup>180</sup> Being aware of the ecosystems one is already engaging with, which one composes, or which one is composed of, and learning to show care to such systems as to be in harmony with the habits. To know oneself as more than mere ‘mind’ floating about an informational world with standardizing façades in the statistically devised marketable style.

The prospect of cultivating taste assumes the ability to cultivate an aspect or habit of the self, which in turn necessitates the possibility of an action, i.e., cultivation. It is therefore fruitful to briefly attend to the history of this concept before applying it within the architectonics of Kant’s aesthetics.

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<sup>179</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 504 “Linked to the meditation upon death, the theme of the value of the present instant plays a fundamental role in all the philosophical schools. In short it is a consciousness of inner freedom. It can be summarized in a formula of this kind: You need only yourself in order immediately to find inner peace by ceasing to worry about the past and the future. You can be happy right now, or you will never be happy. Stoicism will insist on the effort needed to pay attention to oneself, the joyous acceptance of the present moment imposed on us by fate. The Epicurean will conceive of this liberation from cares about the past and the future as a relaxation, a pure joy of existing.”

<sup>180</sup>In terms of pleasure, the thesis is directly referring to Kantian aesthetic pleasure as is analyzed in the following chapters. However, for a further insightful study into the matter see the works of Alberto Pérez-Gómez, such as: Pérez-Gómez, 2006 and Pérez-Gómez, 1992.

### 1.2.1 Philosophy of cultivating

To cultivate, in other words to: develop, mature, authenticate, emancipate, self-subjectivate. . . to become nimble, free, enlightened, mature, authentic, ethical, native, prepared for death.<sup>181</sup>

To express presentness, imitate wisdom, find logos, seek harmony, echo positive feedback loops, *means*  $\circ$  *ends*. As observed in a lecture by philosopher Diana C. Fleming, logos is something akin to the Star Wars Jedi's notion of *the force*.<sup>182</sup> It is something inherent and formative about the world. It has more than one side, and needs care to be balanced. The 'Jedi monks' seem to be warrior Stoics, who have cultivated themselves to be sensitive to the logos.

Cultivation immediately assumes three claims: there is a style in which one should live, there is a way of reaching this aim, and it is possible to live without reaching the aim. Philosopher Charles Taylor defines the ethical in a clear and useful fashion as: "the undivided category of considerations which we employ to answer questions about how we should live".<sup>183</sup> Taylor's description adapts the musings of moral philosopher Bernard Williams.<sup>184</sup> Though it should be noted that the views of Kant and Williams importantly differ when it comes to the pursuit of cultivating ethics. Kant's argument limits the means from barring harm to other individuals, whereas Williams' account affords the individual any means possible.<sup>185</sup> Regardless, in this light ethics are considered solutions for how best to live and cultivation is an ethical task. Taylor, along with other "neo-communitarian philosophers such as MacIntyre, Walzer and Sandel", as sociologist Lash and Urry note, Taylor draws upon both the " 'disengaged reason' of the Cartesian and Enlightenment tradition and the romantic-aesthetic modernist tradition" for moral or

<sup>181</sup>Such as is employed by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Michel Foucault (1926-1984), Henry Thoreau (1817-1862), the Stoics, etc.

<sup>182</sup>Lectures in Ancient Philosophy, Berkeley 2002.

<sup>183</sup>Taylor, 1989, p. 53.

<sup>184</sup>As expressed in the text by Bernard Williams, *Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* Williams, 2011.

<sup>185</sup>Williams, 1981.

ethical sources.<sup>186</sup> It is from this framework that Taylor draws out the overlap between aesthetic and moral or ethical practices.<sup>187</sup> It is relevant to consider that historically, as classicist Christopher Gill notes, the task of cultivation is never one merely of “exercising rational self-discipline”.<sup>188</sup> Though Kant devoted volumes to the idea of ethical behavior, the most relevant thread here are the three maximums on the aim of human intentional action.<sup>189</sup> Kant’s three maximums common to human understanding are: to think for oneself, to think in the position of everyone else, to always think in accord with oneself. These are the qualities of thinking as: “unprejudiced”, “broad-minded” and “consistent”.<sup>190</sup> An individual who’s thinking is unprejudiced, broad-minded and consistent is free and lives in the material presence; this is the aim of cultivating reflective judgment. With this aim the individual is becoming an authentic being who is free from false tutelage to superstitions or false knowledge, who dares to know and not know. In other words, reflective judgments stimulate the individual in finding their limits, accepting the limits, and exercising the will to living up to the limit. Poet Percy Bysshe Shelley plainly states the aim as:

“A man, to be greatly good, must imagine intensely and comprehensively; he must put himself in the place of another and of many others; the pains and pleasures of his species must become his own. The great instrument of moral good is the imagination; and poetry administers to the effect by acting upon the cause.”<sup>191</sup>

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<sup>186</sup>Both quotations are found in Lash and Urry, 1994, p. 51.

<sup>187</sup>See: Taylor, 1989.

<sup>188</sup>For example consider the claim: “both the ancient and modern practices presuppose that anxiety and distress cannot be cured simply by inducing the suffering person to exercise rational self-discipline.” Gill, 1985, p. 312.

<sup>189</sup>In addition to comprehensive explanations of these maximums, Kant points to them in the third *Critique* §40.

<sup>190</sup>Kant, 2000, p. 174 (§40 5:293)

<sup>191</sup>Shelley, 1821, §1.

As is described below, reason is certainly employed in the tradition of cultivation, however its worth is equal to that of how the individual engages their body and material surroundings. Rather suitably, the word *ethics* is derived from the Greek word *ethos* meaning custom or habit, which Deleuze further connects to dwelling or habitat.<sup>192</sup> Architecture's ethical task is to place individuals in the world, with the human community and nature. Architecture is far richer than the design of objects. The traditional process of cultivation is taught through an interplay of rational, conceptual and physical exercises carried out in shared spaces. In this way architecture is not an art for art's sake alone.

Yet before considering the matter of self-cultivating and thus becoming free, the details of unfreedom must be addressed. Somewhat darkly, Aristotle made the distinction between two types of unfreedoms or slaveries.<sup>193</sup> The first type of slavery is that which enslaves by direct interference of others; for example child prostitution in contemporary international cities, Jewish, Gypsy, Polish, homosexuals, recalcitrant clergy, the physically disabled, chronically ill, deaf, dumb, or blind and unwed mothers and their children from all nationalities under the Nazi regime, African Americans before the American civil war, or the majority of urban dwellers in the Roman Empire.<sup>194</sup> The second type of slavery is the unfreedom of those that are enslaved by their manner of behaviors or habits.<sup>195</sup>

This second type of unfreedom is in line with Foucault's account of normalization.

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<sup>192</sup>Deleuze and Patton, 2004, pp. 70-79.

<sup>193</sup>The dubious aspect surrounding Aristotle's assertion is that some people are natural slaves.

<sup>194</sup>For excellent discussions of Jewish and non-Jewish slaves, see: *Circles of Hell: Jewish and Non-Jewish Victims of the Nazis*. Johnson and Rittner, 1996 As well as, Konnilyn Feig's chapter 16, "Non-Jewish Victims in the Concentration Camps", in *A Mosaic of Victims* Berenbaum and Rittner, 1990, pp. 161-178, or *Hitler's Slaves: Life Stories of Forced Labourers in Nazi-Occupied Europe*, Von Plato, Leh, and Thonfeld, 2010. For further discussion of the grey area surrounding Nazi treatment of unwed mothers or single women see Elizabeth Heineman's, *What Difference Does a Husband Make?: Women and Marital Status in Nazi and Postwar Germany*, Heineman, 1999.

<sup>195</sup>See Félix Ravaisson's *Of Habit* Ravaisson, 1838, 2008 for a piercingly intelligent treatment of the topic of habits.

Contemporary political theorists regard Aristotle's first type of slavery in terms of the concept negative freedom or negative liberty; it is defined as the right to not be enslaved.<sup>196</sup> It is the primary right and without it one does not have the leisure to question the second. For this thesis, *negative freedoms* are assumed as a starting point. Likewise, basic needs of a functioning body are taken for granted; as one can not freely philosophize without clean water, nutritious foods, and warm shelter.<sup>197</sup>

Rather oppositely, the second type of unfreedom which is discussed in the prior sections and is akin to individual's being subjectified by normalizing power relationships, is assumed as the starting point. Normalization arrives on the wings of a derivative and corrupted practices of cultivation of the self, it is implicit and non-electively executed through political, social, and economical power relations and is manifest in the of bad architecture. The suggested means to resist this problematic situation is through a non-derivative, explicit, intentionally and electively sought cultivation of nimbleness. In order to determine what that might be, let us address the practice as it has been comprehensively investigated by philosophical historian Pierre Hadot (1922-2010).<sup>198</sup>

Hadot argues that philosophy from the period of Socrates was a practice of the *art of living* or *a way of life*. This argument was developed over the course of his life; it is his magnum opus of arguments.<sup>199</sup> Hadot's work examines the primacy of philosophy as a

<sup>196</sup>For example the term of negative freedom is used by Sven-Olov Wallenstein, in *Biopolitics and the Emergence of Modern Architecture*, Wallenstein, 2009, p. 13. As well as, negative liberty as used by Isaiah Berlin in Berlin, 1980 and comprehensively analyzed in the collection of essays in *Isaiah Berlin's Counter-Enlightenment*, Mali and Wokler, 2003 Additionally by Hans Sluga, *Politics and the Search for the Common Good*, Sluga, forthcoming, p. 18 With Neve Gordon, *Foucault's Subject: An Ontological Reading* Gordon, 1999, p. 403. Finally, Karsten Harries, *In Search of Home* Harries, 2000, §4.

<sup>197</sup>These elements are too often overlooked, and I must give credit to urbanist Karl Baker for their inclusion here. Additionally this positions the Late Antiquity proto-Christian cave dweller profit as a theologian and not a philosopher. See Peter Brown for further discussion on the role of the cave dwelling proto-Christian in late Antiquity in the edges of the retreating Roman empire, particularly in North Africa. Brown, 1971a; Brown, 1971b; Brown, 1992; Brown, 1989; Brown, 1983.

<sup>198</sup>Hadot held the Chair of *History in Greek and Roman Thought* at the Collège de France where his path crossed with Foucault.

<sup>199</sup>Present in works such as; Hadot, 2006; Hadot, 2004; Hadot, 1995; Hadot, 1998a, and Hadot, 2009. Additionally Hadot's influence on Foucault's later return to philosophy is significant, as expressed by

prescriptive practice and justifies this conviction with the works of Plotinus, Aristotle, Plato, the Epicureans, and the Roman Stoics. He finds a radical distinction of philosophy as a way of life and a later derivative practice of philosophy as a discourse. For the ancients, each philosopher or school practiced and taught distinct styles of the *epimeleia heautou* (cultivation of the self). Hadot explains these practices as:

“Generally, they consist, above all, of self-control and meditation. Self-control is fundamentally being attentive to oneself: an unrelaxing vigilance for the Stoics, the renunciation of unnecessary desires for the Epicureans. It always involves an effort of will, thus faith in moral freedom and the possibility of self-improvement; an acute moral consciousness honed by spiritual direction and the practice of examining one’s conscience; and lastly, the kind of practical exercises described with such remarkable precision particularly by Plutarch: controlling one’s anger, curiosity, speech, or love of riches, beginning by working on what is easiest in order gradually to acquire a firm and stable character.”<sup>200</sup>

Hence, *epimeleia heautou* are generally forms of self-control and meditation with the aim of self-improvement that is situated within the whole of a systematic understanding of the good life. Philosopher Arnold Davidson stylistically captures the practice as a “spiritual combat with oneself, aimed at a total transformation of one’s way of being”.<sup>201</sup> In other words, philosophical cultivations are various styles of spiritually directed practices of examining one’s cognition via sets of practical exercises. In this context the term *spiritual* conveys the idiosyncratic will of an individual.

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Arnold Davidson with the words: “Georges Canguilhem is indispensable to understanding the early Foucault, the work of Pierre Hadot is crucial to understanding his last writing.” Davidson, 1990, p. 482.

<sup>200</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 494.

<sup>201</sup>Davidson, 1990, p. 477.

In antiquity, philosophers often found themselves in a school or sect which refined and taught a particular style of comportment and self development. For example Platonism, Stoicism and Epicureanism, offered direct tutorship in what was considered the ideal way of behaving and living, through the use of the key philosophical texts to which each generation could add.<sup>202</sup> In modernity philosophers are more often studied as individuals, with their respective secondary literature considered as interpretive aids and critiques, rather than as composing an essential element of the philosopher's argument. Hadot extends his analyses of philosophy as teaching an art of living to a few modern philosophers. In particular Hadot reads Merleau-Ponty's return to the phenomena as evoking the reader to transform their perception of the world, and which is the shift sought by ancient philosophers when practicing spiritual exercises.<sup>203</sup> In a similar line and as is argued in greater detail in the following part below, Kant's later work can be read as proving a didactic theory of cultivating the individual.

An objection to Hadot's agenda is that it seems as though philosophy as a way of life, as the ancients practiced it, comes down to learning the best way to live according to a

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<sup>202</sup>Platonism, was founded with the teachings of Socrates (469-399bce) and Plato (429-347bce). Stoicism is generally considered to be founded by Zeno of Citium in Cyprus (344-262bce), Cleanthes (d. 232bce) or Chrysippus (d. ca. 206bce), however it was later in the Hellenistic period of the Roman Imperial times, that Seneca (1bce-65ce), Epictetus (around 50-135ce) and Marcus Aurelius (121-180ce) popularized the philosophy and emphasized the early doctrines central to the early Stoics' teachings. Epicurus (341-270bce) was born in Samos and died in Athens. He studied at Plato's Academy when it was run by Xenocrates. Later, when he joined his family on Colophon, Epicurus studied under Nausiphanes, who introduced him to the philosophy of Democritus. In 306/7 Epicurus bought a house in Athens, which had the famed garden where he taught his philosophy. Epicurus and his followers, who included slaves and women, secluded themselves from the life of the city. While Epicurus may have written as many as 300 books, we only have portions of Principal Doctrines, Vatican Sayings, three letters, and fragments. Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch and Lucretius provide some information, but most of what else we know about Epicurus comes from Diogenes Laertius. His account shows controversy surrounded the philosopher's lifestyle and ideas. It is also interesting to note that more recently, Thomas Jefferson practiced as an Epicurean. In his 1819 Letter to William Short, Jefferson points out the shortcomings of other philosophies and the virtues of Epicureanism. The letter also contains a short Syllabus of the doctrines of Epicurus.

<sup>203</sup>For further support see Arnold Davidson's discussion of Hadot in Davidson, 1990 For example: "Of course, Hadot also notes certain aspects of the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Bergson, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and the existentialists that recover, by different means, some of the existential dimensions of the spiritual exercises of ancient philosophy." *ibid.*, p. 479.



detailed, systematic structure of reality. While philosophy since modernity and its break from the church,<sup>204</sup> is a philosophical discourse that discusses the detailed systematic structures of reality.<sup>205</sup> Both emphasis seem highly desirable. Hadot's tone of wanting only the practice of philosophy as a way of life, seems too limited. However, this should not distract from the scholarship of the history of cultivation.

The diverse methods for the *epimeleia heautou*, taught by different philosophers, share a basic structure. It is a trifold effort: first rejecting false knowledge, then having experiences of a primordial paradox and then enacting a disposition of unconcealment. This trifold structure of the historically echoed art of cultivating one's self is my own abstraction, based primarily on my studies of Hadot, Foucault, Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger, Kant, Lucretius, Seneca the younger (c. 1 bce—ce65), and Charles Taylor. Hadot, Foucault and Taylor explicitly discuss the historical art of cultivating the self, while the others offer primary means of the practice. The trifold structure is a conceptual device aimed to uncover a reverberant pattern inherent to the didactic theory of cultivating, leading to a means of resistance to normalization. Which in turn, should help clarify means of motivating architectural causal nexus.

### **movements of cultivation**

The first movement of cultivating the self (i.e. the rejection of false knowledge) is conducted through various analytical techniques. Through practices of meditation, discussion, writing, and remembering, the individual begins to unclutter the mind from previously acquired, misleading assumptions about the world.<sup>206</sup> Without developing

<sup>204</sup>Where it had been 'theology's subservient handmaid'.

<sup>205</sup>For further analysis of Hadot's position see: Davidson, 1990 For example of the shift in what it is to philosophies, see: "Hadot, furthermore, traces the reduction of philosophy to philosophical discourse beginning in the Middle Ages." page 479.

<sup>206</sup>For example the logical maneuvers conducted in Kant's first *Critique* come to mind.

one's disposition for engaging with the world, one is disempowered and at the whims of other patterns and people. In Socratic dialogue the main point is to realize one's own ignorance by unlearning what one knows and realizing one can be virtuous by adopting the habit of cross-examination styled discussions.<sup>207</sup> The Socratic method involves taking away a sureness of the student by valuing examples from the everyday in a detailed debate. In this way the student learns both that they know less than they thought they did, but also to approach what they do observe through experience as potentially valuable contributions to understanding the world. In this way the Socratic philosopher bestows *a priori*, *a posteriori*, and *epistêmê* knowledge on an individual student. The Socratic method is both *aporetic* and *elentic*. *Aporetic* being a state of perplexity, because Socratic dialogue always end in perplexity. While, *elentic* is the Greek term for cross-examination or refutation. Hence, through dialogue guided by an older and wiser philosopher, the student is motivated to improve their ethical thinking and reject unreasoned assumptions.<sup>208</sup> The aporetic nature of the dialogue makes the student think things through themselves rather than being trained to accept clear facts or determining concepts.

It may be helpful to briefly delineate the qualities of certain types of knowledge. *A priori* ideas are *prima facie* intelligible and presented as true, such as logic and reason. A classic example is that it is impossible to have 'a *round square*' or 'the king of France riding a bicycle'. Of course with fuzzy logic—which affords a logically playing with time—there can be the king of France riding a bicycle, but not a round square.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>207</sup>Gill, 1985, p. 321 For further support and discussion see Charmides - early Platonic dialogue. Socrates is a special kind of doctor - "Who will not cure the body without the psyche, and who will not attempt to cure until he has made a diagnostic examination of the psyche of the patient, Charmides, to see if he processes *sophrosune* (self-control) or not. The diagnostic test and the proposed 'cur.' are conducted in Socrates' distinctive method of questioning dialogue, the *elenchus*." Plato - Sophist, p321

<sup>208</sup>In Socrates' trial, he compares training the youth to train horses, in that only one is a trainer, and everyone else corrupts. Admittedly, there is something odd about this comparison.

<sup>209</sup>Fuzzy logic as development of the theory of fuzzy sets by Lotfi Zadeh. Zadeh, 1965.

A priori logic is generally thought of as premises that cannot be contradicted and do not require experience to validate the claim, like, the principle of contradiction. A *posterior* knowledge is knowledge gained through experience of the world. Such as water is wet or staring at the sun burns one's eyes. In turn the Greeks divided this type of knowledge into *epistêmê* and *technê*. *Epistêmê* knowledge is available to anyone and everyone through everyday observations and discussions with other everyday people. For example, 'mature rose blossoms smell more intensely than young buds' and 'trees grow a green moss on their bark as the sap rises in the spring'; these are things that one does not necessary know already, but when pointed out to them, one can easily observe the phenomenon for themselves. At base, it is knowledge deducible from the observable world.<sup>210</sup> *Technê* is knowledge of specialist field, the *know-how*. It is generally unavailable to everyday people through regulations or specialized language, such as the contemporary practices of medicine or taxes, and sometimes architecture. In Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Socrates gives examples of *technai* as the skills of playing the harp, piloting a ship, cooking, medicine, managing a country estate, blacksmithing, and carpentry.<sup>211</sup> However, Socrates did have a clearly stated preference for human affairs as opposed to study of physical world of nature (*kosmos*). Which perhaps accounts for why the Socrates of the *Oeconomicus* claims the significant point is not the difference between common knowledge and craft, but rather between those who have care and diligence to use any knowledge they have gathered and those without such care.<sup>212</sup> In Plato's *Gorgias*, the emphasis of *technê* becomes the style of employing a final aim while practicing the skill.

Taking for example, the skills of the shipwright who in addition to a set of acquired and

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<sup>210</sup>The depth of discourse regarding the nature of knowledge is well beyond the confines of this paper. These comments here are mainly to push forward the argument within the thesis regarding the method of cultivating the self.

<sup>211</sup>Xenophon, 1925 (1997).

<sup>212</sup>*ibid.*, pp. XX.2-6.

embodies skills, also works towards a final form of the ship.<sup>213</sup> In this vein, *technê* is knowledge of how to make an aim materialize and the care to do so.<sup>214</sup>

The Socratic philosopher teaches a priori knowledge through the practice of *elenctic*, or formalized debates, which require certain operational principles to work. This is the first movement of the cultivation of self. Additionally the Socratic philosopher teaches a posterior and *epistêmê* knowledge by working through connections and giving attention to everyday experiences. This is in line with the second movement of cultivation.

Through these debates the aim is to expose truths about the world, but the strategy only works if the debaters accept principles of consistency, causal connection, and identity. Hence a relativist or sophist cannot adequately participate or hope to find truths through the Socratic method because they do not share the necessary principles. Metaphorically, in a poker game, relativists would be the players refusing to ante up. The point is well presented by John Brocklesby and Stephen Cummings in the following discussion of Habermas' "practical turn" to a "universal pragmatics":

“[Habermas] argues that when we attempt to reach agreement via discussion, we cannot but assume that the conditions under which a ‘true’ consensus could be reached are already in place (otherwise why would anyone bother to enter into discussion).”<sup>215</sup>

In this line entering into a dialogue, implies granting a desire for truth. Amongst the diverse exercises for cultivation, the canon of cultivation begins with a starting point of rejecting false knowledge by employing a priori truths to frame the path's threshold.

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<sup>213</sup>Plato, 1987, 503d-e.

<sup>214</sup>For further engagement with a rich discourse of types of knowledge in Greek philosophy see Rawlins' classic article *Epistêmê and Technê*. Rawlins, 1950. Additionally for a discussion of *technê* in terms of architecture see: Pérez-Gómez, 2006, 147ff.

<sup>215</sup>Brocklesby and Cummings, 1996, p. 746.

Upon granting room for a non-relativist metaphysics, the student pursued a training called *Askesis*, which means to train like an athlete on particular skills, pursuing depth and not breath. Stoics developed techniques of self-interrogation and self-reflection, that in classists A.A. Long's words, aided by "learning to take the norms of nature as one's own".<sup>216</sup> For example the Roman Stoic Epictetus, who was a slave freed by emperor Nero, opened a school for all ages and levels, which taught rigorous lessons for cultivating one's power of discrimination. He saw the school as a clinic or a "dispensary for the soul".<sup>217</sup> The idea was that via training true discourse became ready to hand. In other words, via *askesis*, *logoi* becomes *procheiro echein*. Through training the individual abandons previously acquired perspectives and reactions to the world, and instead acquires and makes use of primary truths regarding life, i.e., *logos*. The *askesis* of truth was reached by both *melete* and *gymnasia* in the Greek, which are the practices of meditation and to train oneself physically.<sup>218</sup> The *meditatio* comprises three elements: quiet listening (often requiring particular postures, as is documented with Plutarch and Philo of Alexandria),<sup>219</sup> *hupomnemata* (or the writing of notes to commit concepts to memory),<sup>220</sup> and memorizing what has been learnt and examining what ought been taken in. The *exeritation* also comprised three parts: abstinence, privation, and physical resistance.<sup>221</sup>

Hadot succinctly summarizes the practices as follows:

"Linked to the meditation upon death, the theme of the value of the present

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<sup>216</sup>Long, 1991, p. 118.

<sup>217</sup>Foucault, 1984c, p. 55.

<sup>218</sup>Foucault, 1988, pp. 10, 11.

<sup>219</sup>"To learn the art of listening, we have to read Plutarch's treatise on the art of listening to lectures. The art of listening is crucial so you can tell what is true and what is dissimulation, what is rhetorical truth and what is falsehood in the discourse of the rhetoricians. Listening is linked to the fact that you're not under the control of the masters but you must listen to *logos*." *ibid.*, p. 32.

<sup>220</sup>As, "It is necessary to try to have these dogmas and rules for living "ready to hand" if one is to be able to conduct oneself like a philosopher under all of life's circumstances." Hadot, 1990, p. 494.

<sup>221</sup>Long, 1991; Long, 1986; Long, 1977.

instant plays a fundamental role in all the philosophical schools. In short it is a consciousness of inner freedom. It can be summarized in a formula of this kind: You need only yourself in order immediately to find inner peace by ceasing to worry about the past and the future. You can be happy right now, or you will never be happy. Stoicism will insist on the effort needed to pay attention to oneself, the joyous acceptance of the present moment imposed on us by fate. The Epicurean will conceive of this liberation from cares about the past and the future as a relaxation, a pure joy of existing.”<sup>222</sup>

One example of a meditatio is the Stoics meditation on death. Here the individual engages with each day as a mini life; with childhood in the morning, old age in the evening and death with sleep.<sup>223</sup> One must reflect upon the day as one must reflect upon one’s life for as Seneca concludes, “what makes us so bad is this, that none of us looks back on his own life”.<sup>224</sup> On the other hand, Seneca notes that “a primary indication of a good man is his ability to spend time with himself.”<sup>225</sup> The Stoics meditation taught a profound detachment to life and a basic acceptance that in the context of the unfolding cosmic events, human beings are of rather little importance.<sup>226</sup> In contrast, the Epicureans were detached from the larger society, but kept emotionally bonded to selected individuals and their own ongoing and finite life.<sup>227</sup> In this sense it was more of a care of *a small friendship unity*, amongst which the individual’s need to care for themselves incorporated care for friends and space.<sup>228</sup> The Epicureans basically sought to contemplate “the genesis of worlds in the infinite void”, the sublime, the endless possibility of nature, or

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<sup>222</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 504.

<sup>223</sup>For further discussion of the Stoic mental exercises see: Joyce, 1995 and for an excellent argument on why they are not analogous to contemporary psychotherapy see: Gill, 1985.

<sup>224</sup>(83.2) Edwards, 1997, p. 28.

<sup>225</sup>Seneca and Campbell, 1969, p. 2.1.

<sup>226</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 494.

<sup>227</sup>For Kant’s consideration of the difference between the Stoic and Epicurean philosophical practices see: Engstrom and Whiting, 1998, 64ff.

<sup>228</sup>For further discussion of a collective care of the self see: Sluga, forthcoming.

the ephemerality of material forms.<sup>229</sup> Cultivation taught the individual to willingly limit their path to the universal flow of the logos.<sup>230</sup> However although the Stoic meditations taught a willful practice of self-control and judgment, they did not postulate a second order will.<sup>231</sup>

In short, for each school of thought the aim was to align one's self with logos or to work within the bonds of logical limitations established by observation, thought, debate and firsthand engagement with the materially present world. The alignment requires the individual to first purge false knowledge accumulated via one's particular political, historical, economical situation. The will is asserted in this way to gain control over what one can control and cultivate the skills of an unconcealing nature. As architectural theorist, David Leatherbarrow observed, "architecture reveals life to itself by giving it limits and resisting its forces."<sup>232</sup> As such, architecture can be an aid or hindrance to cultivation. Architecture that rejects object façadeism, immerses individuals in the sublime and beauty, and affords attunement of the body with spatial situations by expressing a sensitivity to the material presence and avoiding its obscurity by an over reliance on artifactual theology and iconography; aids the will and opportunity to cultivate, which in turn generates momentum for architectural causal nexus.

To be clear, this introduction has and will continue to focus on the first movement of cultivating nimbleness, while the following chapters analyze the second and third movements. The second and third movements are discussed via a close and slow reading of Kant's third *Critique*. The firsthand experience of a fundamental paradox (the

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<sup>229</sup>For further attention to the importance of the present moment see: Hadot, 1990, p. 494, Davidson, 1990, p. 477 and Hadot, 1990, p. 504.

<sup>230</sup>Davidson, 1990, p. 478.

<sup>231</sup>For further discussion of Seneca's use of second-order wanting as laying the ground work for the second order will see Bard Inwood's *The Will in Seneca the Younger*. Inwood, 2000, 48 ff. For a pragmatic account of second order will see Harry Frankfurt's detailed and orderly essay, "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." Frankfurt, 1971.

<sup>232</sup>Leatherbarrow, Princeton Architectural Press, p. 84.

second movement) is examined with Kant's critique of aesthetic judgments, and the disposition of unconcealment (the third movement) is grounded in Kant's critique of teleological judgments. The disposition of unconcealment affords the creation of art and beauty.

### 1.3 Cultivation in Space & the Architectural Causal Nexus

The connection between the nexus of nature and the nexus of architecture is narrowed by the practices of cultivating the self. Some architecture itself is the large scale manifestation of an individual architect's experimentation with their own individuality. However, this does not inherently create a space for others to do likewise, though it neither necessarily discourages the practice. Consider for example the Gehry House in Santa Monica, an early work of Frank Gehry.<sup>233</sup> Gehry grew up in Toronto, Ontario in Canada, where a common childhood past time was playing in his father's hardware store.<sup>234</sup> The Gehry House's exuberant play of material found in hardware stores can be read as self forming experimentation. Whether the connection to his own childhood was explicit at the time or not, there is certainly an implicit use of materials common to his childhood years. Though his is not a canonical cultivation of the self, it is implicitly an experimentation with one's identity. Frank Gehry's post-modern deconstructivist architecture is suitably more of a Foucaultian, relativist care of the self; as opposed to a cultivation of nimbleness seeking harmony with logos.<sup>235</sup>

In contrast to Gehry, sometimes didactic philosophers are explicitly employed by ar-

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<sup>233</sup>The Gehry House addition serves as an effortless example of a building becoming architecture via the unity of an aesthetic idea.

<sup>234</sup>Chollet and Gehry, 2001, p. 112 and Frank Gehry's biography by Caroline Evensen Lazo Lazo, 2005, p. 13.

<sup>235</sup>See appendix A for a detailed account of Foucault's unique version of the cultivation of the self which rejects the need to cultivate in line with non-human patterns of nature.



chitects without necessary enriching or generating an architectural causal nexus. Take for example the early works of architect Steven Holl. In such works the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty acts as ornament.<sup>236</sup> The phenomenological theme in Holl's early work is particularly evident in his written collaboration with Juhani Pallasmaa and Alberto Pérez-Gómez, in *Question of Perception*.<sup>237</sup> In this publication, Holl references Merleau-Ponty and claims that the underlying question of architectural perception is intentionality.<sup>238</sup>

The architectural interest of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy is that the body synthesizes its immediate possibilities into ephemeral spatial situations. Engaging with spatial situations is not merely about multiple senses absorbing material surfaces and then relaying those brute images to the mind. It is the body's act of, moving through a gallery hall, pausing in front of a painting, adjusting one's stance to get the best distance to the painting, so that only then, does one 'find myself' admiring or reflecting on the painting's beauty, symbolism, *etc.* That is, Merleau-Ponty's theory of the thinking body, presumes three things; that there is something independent of human beings which influences but does not determine the objects and spatial situations an individual engages with, that it is fundamentally the body and not the mind that synthesizes these independent things into the determinate spatial situations engaged with, and that the readiness to respond and interact with situations is housed in the body itself, rather than in the analytical mind.

In contrast, Steven Holl's early work is concerned with what he defines as "perceptual phenomena"; i.e. "touch, smell, sight, etc.". <sup>239</sup> Which rejects the dominance of the eye

<sup>236</sup>Holl, 1989, p. 9 and Danto, 2008, p. 123.

<sup>237</sup>Pallasmaa, Pérez-Gómez, and Holl, 2006 and Danto, 2008, p. 124.

<sup>238</sup>Pallasmaa, Pérez-Gómez, and Holl, 2006, 41 ff. *ibid.*, p. 40 and correlating with the conclusion found in Danto, 2008, p. 124.

<sup>239</sup>Pallasmaa, Pérez-Gómez, and Holl, 2006, p. 43.

and allows the classical senses to interplay. In particular, his early architectural works are predominantly concerned with the use of light as a building material for making space.<sup>240</sup> In the written text, Holl reveals a misinterpretation of Merleau-Ponty's words by attributing the motivation of an "intellectual and spiritual" seeking of understanding spatial entities, to a "duality of intention and phenomena". A duality that Holl claims, is "like the interplay between objective and subjective or, more simply, thought and feeling".<sup>241</sup> Here, intentions are equated to the "objective" and then to "thought";<sup>242</sup> while Holl relates "phenomena" to the "subjective" and then to "feelings".<sup>243</sup> Hence Holl's writing resurrects a Cartesian subject-object dualism, out of Merleau-Ponty's enterprise to put the absurd segregated framing of being to rest.

Analysis of Merleau-Ponty philosophy leads to understanding the body as existing in a spatial situation through a directed, knowing, purposeful, non-rule-governed, and non-reflective flow of actions. That is, intentional bodily actions understand causal connections and respond to affordances. The primary objective in designing for the thinking body is to design spaces that are sympathetic to the intentional flow of bodily movement and help to develop it. Hence, the architect can design spaces for the thinking body by providing spatial affordances, veritable causal connection and rejecting object façadism.<sup>244</sup> However Holl's early works rely mainly on sensory stimulations, like the plastic rainbows light modification in the redesign of New York University's philosophy department's stairwell. However in conjunction with his theory at the time, Holl

<sup>240</sup>Gannon, 2004, pp. 17,18 and Kipnis, 2007, p. 37 and Holl, 1996a, p. 7, and *Glasgow School of Art, Seona Reid Building*.

<sup>241</sup>Pallasmaa, Pérez-Gómez, and Holl, 2006, p. 42.

<sup>242</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>243</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>244</sup>Avoid object façadism is designing with the aim of cohesive reliability of a material object that affords a correlated experience of the object from different engagements with the object. *I.e.*, if a individual approaches what *looks* like an oak door, the process of opening the door and moving through the door, and all other uses associated with the door and how the door relates to the rest of the room, should correspond to the materiality of the door.

thoughtfully muses that: “many of the ideas are positions that we can continue to work from today, but I also have my doubts. As soon as you make a statement, you want to transcend it”.<sup>245</sup>

Holl’s work of the last decade demonstrates a significant development of his own sensitivity to the material presence. Works such as the recently completed *Chengdu Landmark in Chengdu*, China, (2013) a multi-use public square and residential complex, incorporates a richness of materials, passages and voids that sculpt spacescapes particularly revealing of their individual position.<sup>246</sup> It is not that his working style has dramatically altered, but rather that there is now a confidence expressed through his finely tuned attention to matter and form. Additionally he has stepped away from employing philosophy as ornament and advocates firsthand observation; as demonstrated in the following insightful passage from a recent publication:

“The fact that explosive urban growth yields banalization without architectural quality is no surprise. What is surprising, however, is the attempt of the current generation of urban theorists to write apologetically for this flattening banality, as if we could be immunized to its effects via charts and data. Abrupt construction of back-to-back-to-front high-rise apartments continues regardless of intelligent critics in schools of architecture advocating more density with a specious mile. This different sort of banality—the banality of the detached critical argument—develops from a lack of firsthand observation.”<sup>247</sup>

Holl is only too apt in observing that the flattening banality of bad architecture cannot be evaded by charts and data. Furthermore the call to remind theorists of a need

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<sup>245</sup>Holl, 1996b, p. 33.

<sup>246</sup>*Frameweb website* 2013.

<sup>247</sup>Holl, 2009, p. 33.

for firsthand observation is bravely insightful of the discipline, as is his noble fury with market-led object façadism and artifactual theology leading to a density of indistinguishable corridors, offices, office parks and shops.

When taken as a whole, Holl's earlier writing seems to serve a pragmatic function as the canonical first movement of cultivation. The only unfortunate result is its generating of students who falsely discuss a familiarity with Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology through their readings of Holl. Yet perhaps this is a reminder that architects have more to offer via their spacial designs than linguistically compositions. After all, architects explore documenting thinking in sketchbooks; drawing spacescapes, details, moods, et cetera.<sup>248</sup> They can record history, progression, desire through observation and imagination of structural space and record it as image — why must they also be held accountable for developing a sensitivity to the art of linguistically composition?<sup>249</sup>

Frank Gehry exemplifies a relativistic, Foucaultian, logos-free care of the self; such that the spacescapes he creates serve to materialize his individuality and nothing more. With Steven Holl, although his earlier attempts of cultivation resulted in merely employing philosophy as ornament, this developed into a more grounded cultivation and as such warrants anticipation of his future works.

In a similar progression, Le Corbusier cultivated his sensitivity to material presence throughout his career. His earlier stated need for aesthetic purity and geometric austerity are rebuttals to the dominating style. With time and care he developed a profound artistic genius (in the Kantian sense, as is examined in the final chapter). Early Le Corbusier was adamant for the rejection of dominating habits within his own disciplinary

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<sup>248</sup> As Le Corbusier observed “When one travels and works with visual things — architecture, painting or sculpture— one uses one's eyes and draws, so as to fix deep down in one's experience what is seen.” Corbusier, 1960b, p. 37.

<sup>249</sup> Although, admittedly Le Corbusier did publish something like 40 books and over 800 articles, so there clearly is room for architects to write. Von Moos, 2009, p. 43.

field.<sup>250</sup> By early Le Corbusier, I intend to convey the period of work after his move to Paris in 1917 and not his pre-Le Corbusier professional activities in La Chaux-de-Fonds (1907-1917).<sup>251</sup> During his time as co-editor of the journal, *L'Esprit Nouveau*, (1920-1925) with Amedce Ozenfant, he promoted an aesthetic purism which searched for the invariant in nature, i.e., logos.<sup>252</sup> He advocated purging false knowledge and claimed: “we perish in untruth, it is a quest of morality.”<sup>253</sup> In Le Corbusier’s manifesto, *Towards an Architecture*, he argued against the normal tendency to design new structures according to prior styles.<sup>254</sup> In the Kantian style, he claimed art was necessary as a “‘disinterested passion that exalts us’”.<sup>255</sup> He expressed frustration with contemporaries who sported modern automobiles and Breton cupboards or requested a Louise the X, Y, Z façade.<sup>256</sup> Le Corbusier mused that in an age of the peasant, soldier, and priest “culture is the flowering of the effort to select.”<sup>138</sup> In other words to select with effort, or to judge with reflection. Le Corbusier further claimed that “selection means rejection, pruning, cleaning; and clear and naked emergence of the Essential.”<sup>257</sup> This sentiment echoes the demands of the first movement of the cultivation. He sought to reject the dominant practices of regurgitating predetermined styles of architecture - which is the relevant normalizing power in the field.<sup>258</sup> The rejection of false knowledge was at first confined to his particular field.

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<sup>250</sup>As he does most explicitly in *L'Art d'aujourd'hui* (*The Decorative Arts Today*) in which he rejected the aims of the architectural masters — Ruskin, Hoffmann, Guimard, Grasset. Corbusier, 1987, p. 218.

<sup>251</sup>For excellent scholarship on Le Corbusier’s family, childhood, and life in La Chaux-de-Fonds see H. Allen Brooks’ *Le Corbusier’s Formative Years*. Brooks, 1999. Additionally, for an excellent biography amongst the many, see Nicholas Weber’s *Le Corbusier*. Weber, 2008.

<sup>252</sup>*Purism* as an art movement developed from cubism and is dated between 1918-1925.

<sup>253</sup>For “purge” Corbusier, 1931, p. 20 and for “perish in untruth” *ibid.*, p. 13.

<sup>254</sup>For discussion of Le Corbusier’s early work with emphasis given the builds semblance of facial expressive qualities see: Vidler, 1993.

<sup>255</sup>Risselada et al., 2008, p. 28.

<sup>256</sup>Corbusier, 1931, p. 140.

<sup>138</sup>LC:TA

<sup>257</sup>p138 LC:TNA

<sup>258</sup>Admittedly a trend common to the time. For example consider the Futurist Manifesto which condemned copying historical styles. Apollonio, 1909a.

During Le Corbusier's first movement of cultivation of the self, his enthusiastic rejection of false knowledge can be most extremely witnessed with the Dom-Ino House (1914). The utter foundational bare principles of a structure for daily human life, is Le Corbusier's turned soil bed in which to sow new seeds.<sup>259</sup> It corresponds with a period of his work which is extremely austere.<sup>260</sup> Self asserted to be inspired by the perceived austerity of the new American engineers and the ancient Greek temples. He celebrated the colorless, unadorned Greek architecture, although he was aware that the Parthenon had been designed and maintained by the ancient Greeks as highly ornamentally both in color and painted patterns; and that the contemporary lack of ornament was due more to neglect and misguided efforts of British art historians who cleaned the artifacts with acid-wash to remove the remaining colors. Le Corbusier's first whitewashed houses, Haus Ozenfant, Paris (1922) and Villa, Vaucresson (1922), and along with Maison Cook (1926),<sup>261</sup> show the work as austere and pure through the form of the roof profile, horizontal strip windows, white lime wash, flat exterior surfaces, and overall whiteness.<sup>262</sup> In the vein of Adolf Loos' (1870-1933) Haus Steiner in Wien (1910), Le Corbusier mechanistically scrubs away all ornament and iconographical indications of what lies within. The use or class of the building remains unclear from without, it could be a boutique textile factory, a printing house, offices or a private residence. The iconographical clues are absent, or are waiting for a population to assign new meanings to the forms, like art

<sup>259</sup>For the best account of the logic, history and details of preparing a soil bed I have come across in written form, see: Solomon, 2006.

<sup>260</sup>For further discussion of Le Corbusier's convictions at this time see Tim Benton's survey and analysis in *The Rhetoric of Modernism: Le Corbusier as a Lecturer*. Benton, 2009.

<sup>261</sup>Which has more in common with Richard Neutra (1892-) Lovell House, Griffith Park, Los Angeles (1927-1929), than Loos's Haus Steiner. As both the Haus am Weißenhof (1927) and Lovell House (1927-1929) or Miles van der Rohe's, Haus am Weißenhof, Stuttgart, Ostfassade (1927) have a first floor balcony recessed under the second floor off horizontally strip windows, with roof veranda extended a vague impression of an augmented roof line. Features that are each present and exaggerated in the Villa in Garches (1927), and then further exaggerated and detailed in the Villa Savoye in Poissy, Nordecke (1929-1931).

<sup>262</sup>David Batchelor composes an interesting connection between Le Corbusier overt whiteness and cholera epidemics in Paris at the time. Batchelor, 2000, p. 44.

critiques created a language to discuss abstract art as observed by philosopher Patrick Healy:

“This concealing and structuring at the same time is educed by a key problem of relationally as in the arabesque for Islamic ornament, that finite relations exhibit the possibility of the infinite, which can be set against the architectural formal as in Le Corbusier which the simultaneous assembling of the surface, of a purely abstracted ornament, is in its clarity a place for no ornament, unless one wanted to add that such an autonomy of surface and appearance is the surface as ornament, such as argued for abstract painting.”<sup>263</sup>

In this moment, the object itself is meaningful without concepts. The question though is whether the forms resonants with the logos. An aesthetic theory arising from Foucault’s final return to philosophy would be grounded on the groundless care of the self. The Gehry House and the Haus Steiner would afford Foucaultian Beauty, as they cast off the preconceived dispositions for an ambiguous amalgamation of what attempts to tell no tales. In short, art that is self-referential and self-satisfied.<sup>264</sup>

Le Corbusier attempts something rather different than a Foucaultian Beauty in his early works. Architectural historian Stanislaus von Moos, in his now canonical text *Le Corbusier Elements of a Synthesis*, summarizes the aim of the Dom-Ino house as seeking a “rationalist cosmology in which nature functions as a machine whose adherence to physical laws is the very reason for its beauty.”<sup>265</sup> However, this is the negative beauty of the first movement of cultivation, (of Kant’s first *Critique*) on the limitation of rhetor-

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<sup>263</sup>Healy, 2004, p. 54.

<sup>264</sup>What Kant might correlate with his view of Mannerism. Described as: “Mannerism is another sort of ably, namely that of mere individuality (originality) in general, in order to distance oneself as far as possible from imitators, yet without having the talent thereby to be exemplary at the same time.” Kant, 2000, 196 §49 5:318.

<sup>265</sup>Von Moos, 2009, p. 51.

ical deductions of casting of historical figments of truth.<sup>266</sup> The Dom-Ino is a clean start. It is a form that grows richer with the second movement, (the third *Critique*) and the engagement with sublime horizons and beautiful objects as they radiate nature's techniques.

With time Le Corbusier's emphasis on the elements of abstraction and his fight against dominating practices in the market-led industries, developed into a richer care with his craft. As he developed a deeper insight with his own cultivation, he recognized that good spacescapes are about more than just rejecting the false knowledge of one discipline or profession; it is a more fundamental reevaluation of the concrete and individual situations and of the system of part within a whole.<sup>267</sup> *Museum with Unlimited Growth* (1931) can be seen as evidence of Le Corbusier engagement with the second movement of cultivation. Here is where he starts to play with form from nature. Although perhaps it is a little bit too rudimentary and representational of nature. Alternatively, the austerity of white washed surfaces blossom with color, texture and material richness with the *Beistegue Amarments* (1931). With this period he came to give no hierarchy to mass or space as he used a disinterest passion to create architecture as art.

A relieving moment is captured with an image of the moon in a published collections of his sketches. Next to a drawing of the moon from 1953, the caption reads: "la lune - c'est la première fois que je vois un visage á la lune."<sup>268</sup> Something more than mere mechanistic reason seeps into Le Corbusier's engagement with the world. The earlier domination by reason's beauty makes way for a playfulness with rhythm. The windows

<sup>266</sup>For an excellent discussion of modern architectural principles as seen in the works of Ledoux and Schinkel, and Kant's first *Critique* see: Damisch and Williams, 2002.

<sup>267</sup>Concrete and individual as discussed in the material presence section. Furthermore, see: Corbusier, 1960a, in particular pages 49 ff. Around the statement "I love walls, beautiful in their proportion, and I am apprehensive at turning them over to unprepared minds."

<sup>268</sup>"is the first time I see a face in the moon" on 'page' G28, image number 944 dated: 26 mai 53, Chandigarh. Underscript in the original. Benton et al., 1981.



at the monastery *Sainte Marie de La Tourette in Eveux*, (1956-1959) express a Kantian beauty.<sup>269</sup> Contrary to Moos' interpretation that the building "looks cheap" with a prevailing sense of austerity and ending up as a machine due to the lack of "all but the most primitive comfort", that only a few of the walls are whitewashed and the rest are left as exposed concrete, and that the pipes and ducts are painted in primary colors and are exposed throughout;<sup>270</sup> there is a subtlety of grace in the communication between the concrete, glass, iron and void.<sup>271</sup> The rhythmic separation of beam by glass, with the fine iron slanting together, breathing, stepping, leaning; welcoming the sun light, protecting the monks, allowing the country side to be something in itself rather than a picture framed by a man.

*La Tourette* offers a richness of complexity and a clarity of form sought by contemporary parametric designs. Yet, so far such computer generated structures have failed to notice the gap between the screen and material rendered. Parametric designs manifest false complexity without giving care to the production in space. No where does the shortcoming announce itself more boldly than by comparing *La Tourette* to a work like Zaha Hadid's Opera House in Guangzhou, *Guangzhou Opera House* (2010).

Le Corbusier's later spaces show sensitivity to the present and harmonious manifestation of form that then fits into an architectural causal nexus as it provides spaces for others to cultivate.<sup>272</sup> In tune with such thoughts, Le Corbusier wrote:

A man who searches for harmony has a sense of the sacred, the secret which is in every being, a great limitless void where you may place your own notion of the sacred - individual, completely individual. The issue is to reconcile

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<sup>269</sup>Besset, 1968, p. 132 and Potié, 2001, p. 47.

<sup>270</sup>Von Moos, 2009, p. 168.

<sup>271</sup>For a sympathetic critique of *La Tourette* see richly detailed account in *Architectural Representations and the Perspective Hinge*. Pérez-Gómez and Pelletier, 2000, pp. 361-368.

<sup>272</sup>Corbusier, 1970.

extreme individuality, the work of the creator’s imagination, with a given world, both natural and constructed, in the absence of a positive theology or cosmology. The result is much more than a simple reiteration of the old Romantic themes of transcendence through art, if by art we understand the production of ‘aesthetic objects’ placed in the homogeneous space of a universal museum.<sup>273</sup>

It is unfortunate that due to Le Corbusier’s early written commitment to abstract rational solutions and mass produced style, that the attempt to lead away from mere regurgitation of established styles and towards one of embedded material form, ultimately backfired as his own style became internationalized. An asymmetry which echoes again, the relative over attention to Kant’s first *Critique* to that of the Third. Or the first movement of the cultivation of self to the detriment to the second. As well as the historically stable cultural fear around the pursuit of cultivating nimbleness and resisting established parameters as we see in the Blue Beard fable.

### 1.3.1 Doppelgänger & the object as template

In spite of Le Corbusier’s and other architects later development of nimbleness, the emotive mandate present in their early works resonates in contemporary spacescapes. Modernist skyscrapers dotted with trees, green roofs and smart ventilation systems populate monolithic proposals of future cities. Star architects still attract attention through personal branding of novel forms, materials and techniques. Fashionable designs connote the significance of atemporal and aspatial solutions regardless of projects’ particularities. Take for example Zaha Hadid’s recently copied project *Wangjing SOHO* (2013) built in Beijing, China. The large triplex which is conceived as — “ ‘Chinese fans’ that

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<sup>273</sup>Le Corbusier’s *Le Poème de l’Angle Droit* (1955) Corbusier, Miyake, and Ji, [1989](#).

circle and embrace each other in an intricate dance,”<sup>274</sup> has been poached by property developers of Chongqing Meiquan Properties Ltd, who are currently constructing a duplicate as the *Meiquan 22nd Century* in Chongqing, China.<sup>275</sup> Hadid’s initial comments as reported in the Spiegel newspaper seemed to optimistically engage the occurrence by speculating that “if future generations of these cloned buildings display innovative mutations, ‘that could be quite exciting.’ ”<sup>276</sup> Yet, months after this interview she unambiguously asserted such copying should be stopped. The clone opens the question of whether the lack of contextualization to the site and lack of sensitivity to the materiality of the design, might have left the project vulnerable to such poaching; for instance could Wang Shu’s *Ningbo History Museum* (2008) be so aggressively copied? However, the Chinese replica of the entire Austria alpine town of Hallstätt — including chalets, spires and lakeside views — in Huizhou City, Guangdong, leaves room to doubt such a tidy conclusion.<sup>277</sup>

### where truth lies

Layers of statistical data project into urban spacescapes and increasingly supplements architects’ resources for knowledge. For example, the individual may attempt to learn to know themselves via statistical data, by ordering an annual review of ‘self-reported’ data tracking as is offered by Feltron.<sup>278</sup> As the store of information available diverts to digital knowledge and the drive to innovate is expressed via reiteration, the material world is de-prioritized by the people appointed to its care. Knowing by numbers is

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<sup>274</sup> [Soho Peaks](#).

<sup>275</sup> Disson, [Monday 07 Jan 2013](#).

<sup>276</sup> Platt, [December 28, 2012 – 12:48 PM](#).

<sup>277</sup> Additionally China is known to have versions of Manhattan in Tianjin, with copies of Rockefeller and Lincoln centers and the Hudson River. As well as a copy of Le Corbusier’s Ronchamp chapel in Zhengzhou, that was partly demolished after an intervention by the *Foundation Le Corbusier*, and in which a barbecue restaurant operates out of its ruins.

<sup>278</sup> [Feltron website](#).

fraught with misguided attempts to manufacture divisions in which the conditions for making valid claims are set by dominating power practices. As Horkheimer and Adorno aptly observe; “the blindness and dumbness of the data to which positivism reduces the world pass over into language itself, which restricts itself to the recording of data. Terms themselves become impenetrable.”<sup>279</sup>

The opportunity of knowing oneself by numbers raises an interesting distinction between the position of truth as expressed through act or document. That is, does one search for knowledge through contextual experience or in artifacts? Architectural institutions teach exegesis of the architectural object. Prior projects are studied like sacred texts resulting in arbitrary systematizations, where elements are taken out of context and reduced to justifications for current practices. Fashionable designs connote the significance of transcendental solutions regardless of a project’s particularities. However, the environmental, social and political climates of cities demand heterogeneous solutions by the spatial thinkers entrusted to compose the built world. Architectural schools rely too heavily on precedent for innovation, a practice label-able as *artifactual theology* and an expression of the wider pattern of normalization.<sup>280</sup> Through institutional emphasis on established vogues, students adapt to designing within a narrow field of anticipated potential. In other words, over time in an architectural and design institution, students learn to please their evaluators by reproducing the popular style. To be clear, they are verbally encouraged to create new designs but only within a given style. Students aiming to create design proposals outside the leading style generate greater resistance from expert evaluators or guest critics and are unequipped with the skill of constructing well grounded arguments to defend their awkward or unpopular proposals.

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<sup>279</sup> Adorno and Horkheimer, 1993, p. 164 For an excellent examination of the complications of ‘raw data’ see: Gitelman, 2013.

<sup>280</sup> This is my own coinage, which arose while deeply enveloped within the works of Paul Veyne and Peter Brown.

Another problem with the spacescapes created from artifactual theology, is its echoing pattern of iconography: people must read these buildings. As Pierre Hadot maintains, “In matters of philosophical teaching, writing is only an aid to memory, a last resort that will never replace the living world.”<sup>281</sup> Writing, reading and discourse sharpen the power of *determining judgments*. As is discussed in the following chapter, determining judgment is a Kantian term for judgments where the representation of the thing is subsumed under a concept of the object’s type. In other words, determining judgments are those which subsume a particular under a universal which is already available, e.g., the judgment that ‘this text is a thesis’ is a determining judgment. Such judgments can widen frames of reference and enrich one’s mental library of concepts. They also help in relinquishing false connections or assumed causal relations, by revealing contradictions lurking within the combinations of premises. Such development is central to communication and collective creation, as well as abstract denotation of the observable world such as narratives or text. However it leads to shortcomings when over emphasized within the material arts. The material arts offer the potential to play with form without pre-structuring the field with concept-led linguistic judgments.

There is a need for heterogeneity in the built world; some spaces must be devoted to cultivation or else normalizing practices will commodify resistance and Nietzsche’s eternal return will prevail.<sup>282</sup> Through contextualizing cultivation, the role is revealed of how truth and knowledge impact the practice of innovation. Questions must address the dominating style and evaluate individual’s potential to generate solutions that may be of value to the enormity of current challenges. Generally students collect connoisseur knowledge and learn to design based on a specialist language which is not available to most people. This architectural jargon tends to confuse people who do not know the

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<sup>281</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 497.

<sup>282</sup>As is discussed above in Dreyfus’ analyze of Heidegger and Foucault.

language. The untrained individual cannot adequately engage with the design and is deaf to the witty banter in iconography. Such architecture may show a highly developed use of jargon and disregard for sensitivity to the material presence.<sup>283</sup> At the same time the sensitivity to the material presence is left neglected, unpracticed or undeveloped. Hence, this language free architecture, which may communicate with interested individuals, does not have as much of a chance to be practiced and improved. It is the practice and experience that cultivates; not the mere dreaming of *what if*.

However, I by no means wish to argue for an end to formalized architectural wit. To clarify, architecture may be both highly communicative in the discipline's language and show a sensitivity to the material presence. For example Brutalism with its succinct dismissal of communicating with neighbors and its righteous posture, warrants vast moments of pleasure to anyone who has confronted the process of small scale residential design or dwelled within a dense city that lacks appropriate thresholds between private and public critique. Brutalism seems to me to be an architect's architecture. The language it employs is clearly enriched by a familiarity with both the history and concepts of architecture. Yet there are material moments unpragmatically expressive of something more primitive than humanity which cannot fail to lure the digital denizen from their screens. And for those who have the background knowledge to contextualize and read the buildings, it is a bliss unmatched, as it formalizes anger against the absurdity of the hubris of modernity.

In contrast to spaces which develop skills of making determining judgments, architecture can aid reflecting judgments with moments of engaging indeterminate objects and horizons. Reflecting judgments are those for which there is no easy universal to subsume the particular under.<sup>284</sup> The reflecting power of judgment compares and holds together

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<sup>283</sup>For further discussion of architectural grammar in modern architecture see: Graafland, 2007.

<sup>284</sup>Kant, 2000, 15 §5 20:211.

representations as the mental faculties play with harmonious relations.

Kantian aesthetics structures beauty as that which is afforded by harmonious causal nexus which are systems of deep ecological balance. Aesthetics is not the study of specific types of subjective pleasures derived from art. It is a study of what objectively informs our subjective awareness of art. Some things are beautiful, some things are not; within Kant's aesthetic theory beauty is something debatable. Beauty is both the act of judging something that captivates us without promises of personal benefits and beauty is that which awakens the event of reflecting judgment. It is the event of authentic presence, as such it serves as witness to causality. Beauty is our expression of logos, what Kant calls the technique of nature. Beauty interweaves its perceiver with an all-encompassing causal nexus, a deep ecology. As beauty is primordial, it is our guide to that which is, regardless of the normative determining concepts of a given political, economical, historical regime. That which affords an event of Beauty is that which expresses its teleological relationship and in an event of Beauty the individual judges that expression. In this way, beauty is not subjective to the individual beholder, it is something existent independent of the perceiver.

In summary, all the problems discussed above — normalization, devalued matter and bodies, limitations on possibilities, the eternal return, artifactual theology — come together in this discipline's drive for overly branded, insipid materiality, iconographical architecture with false complexity and object façadism which affords cheap replications. The only way left open for resistance is to cultivate nimbleness and aesthetic judgment, reinvigorating architectural causal nexus which are harmonious to the deep ecology of nature's causal nexus.

## 1.4 New Bearings

Granting cultivation is a possible form of resisting problematic normalizing power relations, the remainder of the thesis examines aesthetic judgments and events of Beauty via a pair of primary approaches. From here on I would like to refer to the manifestation, expression, or rendering of the beautiful and the sublime as an *event of Beauty* or an *aesthetic event*. Technically Kant distinguishes three types of aesthetic judgments: that of the agreeable, beautiful or taste and the sublime.<sup>285</sup> However Kant tends to use the words aesthetic judgements or judgments of taste more narrowly to convey judgments of beauty in the third *Critique*.<sup>286</sup> He further distinguishes pure and in-pure aesthetic judgments, and focuses on pure judgments of beauty. Thus the use of the words event of Beauty or aesthetic event will consistently intend to convey a pure judgment which is usually one of taste (beauty) and sometimes one of the sublime.

The first approach is through an account at the level of the individual's mental faculties. In other words, the experience of beauty within the individuals observing it through considering various relations between the faculties of mind. The second move addresses the questions motivated; such as, *what kinds of objects and horizons evoke aesthetic judgments?* This part addresses the creation and purposiveness of beauty tied into the terroir of nature and art, as it brings into examination the topics of: causal nexus, telos ( $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ), artists, final causes, the distinction between art and nature and relevance of deep ecology. Some may protest that designing space according to Kant is a bit like the idea of manufacturing automobiles based on Biblical principles.<sup>287</sup> However, as the details of Kant's critical approach to aesthetics reveal a sensitivity towards our power to judge and thereby create, the wedding becomes less absurd.

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<sup>285</sup>Kant, 2000, 55 §6 1:167.

<sup>286</sup>Ginsborg, 2013.

<sup>287</sup>An objection posed by musical theorist Michael Hogle.



Lastly, the next chapters are not composed without humble hope to add to the painfully underrepresented study of the second part of Kant's third *Critique*. It should be noted the excellent scholarship contributed by Hannah Ginsborg, Henry Allison, Karl Ameriks, and Paul Guyer over the most recent few decades;<sup>288</sup> specifically secondary literature began to appear for the aesthetics in the late 1970s and the critique of teleology in the 1990s.<sup>289</sup> However, this only begins to rectify the offense of its predominant neglect for the prior two centuries.

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A synthesis of the introduction reveals that to cultivate the power of aesthetic judgment the individual must actively attend to their embodied mental faculties. As discussed above there are numerous means of cultivation that have been developed and recorded. Amongst them each, the indispensable aspect, is care. An individual may have a highly developed library of concepts or an adeptness at employing reason, but to cultivate aesthetic judgments demands an attentiveness to the present material situation. Kant's theory of the power of judgment proposes that when the individual is emerged in events of Beauty the faculties of mind attentively engage with the immediate present. Sublime horizons challenge and stretch the imagination, revealing its own gumption to behold both the vastness of nature and the insignificance of individuality. Objects of beauty afford the imagination a playfulness by the thickness of their perspectives. The desire needed to attempt to cultivate one's individual habits of judging, emerges from the witness of such events of Beauty. Kant concludes that through undertaking a detailed study of critique, discussion and debate, the individual is left with a vital mandate to act *as if* there is a subjective purposiveness to nature. The practical ramification of this charge is a radical materialism of the designed world.

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<sup>288</sup> Amongst many others, Zumbach, 1984; Makkreel, 1990; Zuckert, 2007.

<sup>289</sup> Ginsborg, 2013.

Within the field of architecture this development is nourished by an architectural causal nexus. Such a causal nexus is lent momentum by individual architects who care to cultivate themselves. In such cases, a rejection of false knowledge frees the architect to create spaces rich in beauty and sublime which in turn free others to cultivate. In order to understand what such spaces are like, I turn to Kant, for his careful and detailed analysis of the events, which interweave insights gained from sixty years of devoted contemplation that contributed once before to a societal enlightenment or resistance to the tutelage of the false knowledge of empowered dogmas.

*Kant, Falling into Beauty, Art Galleries*

## Chapter 2

# Chichu

*he or she does not create ex nihilo*

Through the thickened air well settled within the island's pathways, a rural road, lined with telephone poles, tall trees and weeds funneled the views as a companion and I gradually ascended a low hill on the small island within the Seto Inland Sea.<sup>1</sup> The humidity of late summer with the passing darkened clouds overhead weighed on our passage as we traced the incline believed to lead to the Chichu Art Museum. A museum privately owned by the Naoshima Fukutake Art Museum Foundation. The museum features permanent installations of works by three artists — Claude Monet, Walter De Maria, and James Turrell. Each artist's work is displayed in a self-contained gallery.<sup>2</sup> After the reassuring ritual of queuing for the tickets, stowing of coats, and presentation of maps, here performed in an outpost building, already enlivened by national tourists in the early hours, we were invited by irises, primrose, violas, and water lilies to stroll through a

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<sup>1</sup>Tadao Ando's Chichu (2004) museum sits on Naoshima, a 3.15-square-mile island southwest of Osaka and accessible only by boat or ferry. The population comes together at a castle town from the Edo Period (1603-1868) located in the center of the island, with narrow streets and wood houses, of which some are now used for art installations. For excellent printed images see: Ando, 2008, pp. 378-399.

<sup>2</sup>For further details see: Blaser, 2001.

recreation of Claud Monet's garden at Giverny.<sup>3</sup> Crossing the Japanese inspired bridge, replicated from Monet's home in the French country side, while hearing the local tourists and the delicacy with which they engaged the paths and flora, a simplicity overrode the impulse of witty intellectualist humor more readily called critique.

Once received into the complex and through the garden, a clear concrete wall surfaced alongside the old road. The wall snaps open to a smooth concrete walk, wide enough to allow cars, but clean enough to protest their crossing.<sup>4</sup> At the same time, the museum is linguistically announced via Japanese and English brushed metal typeface. Progressing along the path only the green of trees, the pale grey clouds and the cream walk meet the gaze. The museum building itself is excavated along a north-south axis from the top of the hill towards the sea, prompting the name Chichu, i.e., 'within the earth'. Still before it, the earlier wall is echoed, though taller and proportioned more for a slender basketball player to slip through, into a transitional space still open to the sky, yet gathering attention to the entry of a low and darkened tunnel, expressed in a faintly glazed concrete which at first reflects the sunlight, while the upper interior surface of the passage resists breaching parallel lines.

Within the cavernous tunnels cautioned light cuts the geometry while directing the course. Instantly amnesia settles over the prior setting of the heat baked hill blanketed by low grasses and shrubs. The environment is currently sterile yet apocalyptic images of plants weave layers into my vision. Perhaps the physical relief from the increasing heat of the day, and the absorption of the walls punctuated with seemingly oversized concrete stops or holes, resting like canvas awaiting paint, simply affords voracious flora

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<sup>3</sup>A complete list would include: water lily, stem rose, iris, aubrietias, christmas rose, primrose, snow-drop, violas, crocus, daffodil, pansy, forget-me-not, tulips viburnums, Dutch tulips, Dutch iris, seringats, peony, oriental poppy, doroniques, anolies.

<sup>4</sup>Here, I intentionally play with tense, to make the building itself seem present but the experience of it temporally variant.

growth. Or perhaps something of the monumental architectonics triggers a sense that this building will outlast the ability to take care of it and a future “Se Lorrain”, Claude Gellée (1602-1682), could paint his landscapes with a shepherd taking shelter in these coves.<sup>5</sup> The passage steps down a square courtyard, hugging to perimeter walls with faint markings of sedimentary layers, skirting the open void, with segmented grasses stretching up from the base, distantly related to bamboo. Then the path turns into a new tunnel, opened to the sky, with walls far taller than human scale, set at six degrees off the vertical, unsettling one’s gait, while emphasizing the descent into the earth as Ando intended.<sup>6</sup> Ando’s design affords the individual an embodied metaphor of returning to the earth, akin to the twelfth labour of Heracles which required him to fetch the multi-heading dog Cerberus from the underworld, or the Sibyls of later Ancient Greeks who inhabited the underworld, or as many bodies have done upon death. In Ando’s controlled return, a tentative threat seeps through the askew walls which reveal only a thin line of the sky far above, while the smoothness of matter and acoustics reassure that we are indeed safe, that this is not a walk through earthquake damaged landscapes into certainty of misfortune, but rather, is a rhythmic form to nature.

The geometrical labyrinth leads to circling a triangular courtyard, visible through a slight slit which keeps with eye level, while further descending. Rough cut foot sized stones line the triangle’s dry ground. The walls of the passage are stark and defer their presence to that of frame for the now intense sunlight cutting into the courtyard.

Some critics suggest that Ando’s idea was that in moving through the labyrinthine of passageways, the individual is coaxed *from* the rhythm of daily routines, invited to breathe differently and experience “an extraordinary world”.<sup>7</sup> That the purity of the

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<sup>5</sup>Friend to Nicolas Poussin, and one time assistant to Claude Dervet. Gellée gentle paintings of post bottle-neck Roman society often offer a subtle comfort of Beauty beyond a fall.

<sup>6</sup>Jodidio, 2006.

<sup>7</sup>Ando, 2008, p. 388.

geometry and the clearness of the materiality diverges radically from the habits of daily practice. These critics further say, the route through the labyrinthine emancipates the individual from daily life by providing something otherly and unfamiliar.

There is certainly something disparate about the space, but perhaps the more unsettling aspect of the design is its similarity to the everyday or rather the every-eve of the urban spacescape, with the abandoned alleys and lampposts of light, too far apart to illuminate one's path but bright enough to almost blind while within their umbrellic skirt. The passageways are more helpfully equated to a distilled version of the everyday, than a contrast to it. They are heightened and artistic echoes of everyday horizons. The passageway is familiar yet, stripped back from the unbalanced manifold of space devouring objects which denizen the urban spacescape. They resonate with the individuals' spatial intelligence, at least that of the urban city dweller.<sup>8</sup> We are accustomed to walking down endless corridors, and hallways to apartments, offices or parking spaces. With the International Style's rejection of the sustained human use of ground floors, streetscapes can compose concrete corridors with only shafts of light piercing the monotony.

The Chichu network of passages considers this familiar rhythm anew. It is refined, scaled and represented; appropriately to the visitor, cleared from chatter and endless attempts of commodifying the gaze as economical distractions plead for human attention. By vaulting from a template of the everyday, the building succeeds in luring its guest deeper into its cavities while a mixture of the fragility — expressed by fine neck hairs standing, felt muscles tensing, vision detailing the creeping shadows and lights which expose one's body as prey — is met with something assuring. Elements such as the human scale views onto geometrically controlled courtyards, finely tempered surfaces smooth to one's movements or the unquestionable daily care presented in its cleanliness,

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<sup>8</sup>Van Schaik, 2008, Jacquet and Giraud, 2012, pp. 293-312.

mediate the building fear.

The galleries are three in total: they house the work of Claude Monet, James Turrell, and Walter De Maria. The James Turrell gallery is divided into three spaces, each an individual work. The two smaller rooms are the *Afrum, Pale Blue*, 1968 and the *Open Sky* 2004. The primary exhibit is the *Open Field* 2000, which is an optical illusion. The individual is invited to kindly fall prey to tricks of scale and distance. Something Merleau-Ponty observed as:

“The distance from me to the object is not a size which increases or decreases, but a tension which fluctuates around a norm. An oblique position of the object in relation to me is not measured by the angle which it forms within the plane of my face, but [rather] felt as a lack of balance, as an unequal distribution of its influence on me.”<sup>9</sup>

It acts as a gentle means of demonstrating the learnt patterns of the perceptual horizon. It confirms afresh a popular story often told of the perceptual peculiarities discovered via the Ba Mbuti people. Due to the density of the vegetative growth in the tropical rain forest of the tribe’s exclusive environment, the people did not see familiar objects at a distance. When in 1960 a team of anthropologists led by Colin Turnbull, brought members of the tribe outside of the forest, an interesting aspect of their perceptual field was revealed.<sup>10</sup> The tribe members believed that objects in the distance were tiny versions of the familiar objects they knew, they did not perceive them as the same objects at a greater distance. When they walked up to the objects and saw the full size, they believed it was some sort of trickery. Turrell’s work affords the apathetic urban inhabitant to experience the somewhat magical workings of their own perceptual

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<sup>9</sup>Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 302.

<sup>10</sup>Turnbull, 1961.

horizon.<sup>11</sup>

Walter De Maria's gallery space is titled, *Time/Timeless/No Time*. It is a large rectangular space, cut of light grey concrete. Two shallow flights of width-wide steps invite the individual up to explore the space from various angles. In the divide between the two flights, a large pisenecer sphere of polished black granite sits posed for rolling down the next flight. Along the side walls are symmetrically placed sets of triplet golden rectangular rods. The hall is reminiscent of the Neolithic temples constructed on the Mediterranean islands of Malta and Gozo. The floating ceiling is slightly arched and detached from the perimeter, opening a border by which daylight pours through, slicing across the interior.

These spaces contributed by the Californian artists accentuate Ando's design for infinitude and finitude, leading to a pause in one's reflective connections, as a tranquil transitioning setting emerges. The vigor of the artist is not made banal by their further unity within Chichu, but rather like a renaissance polyphony is held together without compromise.<sup>12</sup> Here a long pale bench is already in use by a dozen chatting patrons. Shoes are gracefully slipped off and on, and comments are made in hushed tones in the low and shadowed foyer. An air of anticipation stole upon me, hastening the preparation of my feet.

From the darkened waiting room, soft indirect light came to constitute an excellent state of being. Akin to the movement of air felt when leaving a snow covered ground to enter a kitchen thick with winter's baking, an overwhelming sense of balance settles and melts the preceding stretch of coldness and lacking, not in a way to draw attention to the prior

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<sup>11</sup>Akin to Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology that sought to let us experience the magical existence of objects behind our back.

<sup>12</sup>In Ando's own words: "This history of collaboration with no compromise underlies the vigorous spaces of the Chichu Art Museum." Ando and Molinari, 2009, p. 8.



dissimilarity, but rather to provide something of comfort, warmth and completion; only adding value to the previous setting.

In the moments of standing, stepping, and shifting in Ando's Monet space, there occurs a manifestation of beauty through intentional design. A complete and crisp moment of a shared appreciation of life. One falls into beauty as one falls into love. Before it is known, one is submerged, wanting nothing other than to breathe within the newly arranged horizon of rich colors and misty matter. Without logic, one admires and contours the body with joyful glee at minute forms barely caught by passersby. Attention is nowhere and everywhere, Monet's paintings float as framed works of art, as an undivided reality that exists independently, and as a garden of late summer with the ripples of the pond's tides flowing.

The construction of the gallery is square, but not cubic. The walls are a rough plastered white, the floor is covered with two-centimeter Bianco Carrara marble cubes. The ceiling contains a square-pyramid opaque skylight, hidden and tempered by a flat white ceiling stretching to about half a meter from the walls. Along this interval the indirect light suffuses the interior.

The room does not feel square, nor do the corners seek abstract rendering. At the time I could not reliably relay if they were round or plumb; as it turns out they are round. Standing in the room with the softness of the marble impressing upon the feet through cotton slippers, the paintings emerge and the walls do not seek attention. The narrative of the art communicates a story of warm harmony. Claude Monet's *Le Bassin Aux Nymph éas*, Water Lily Pond series of 1915-1926, captures something awe-inspiring about the world, something commonly sought and momentary glimpsed, that which is more readily noticed than captured. Not that Monet captures it, anymore than Ando confines Monet's Water Lilies. They do not hold it, rather they make space for it by

working matter to resonate with its form, such that an independent beauty might linger. The paintings lure and welcome beauty to rest within their colors, oils and cloths for a while. Together the three canvasses echo techniques of nature. Perceiving this Ando formed a space that welcomes the paintings to dwell. One's attention is undivided and one sidesteps everyday temporality. The hundred years these paintings have seen, the relatively fresh construction of the room, or one's own decades through which habits are formed while moving about countless galleries, do not enter the composition. Nor does the future of how this structure would age, or the past and how cultural traditions have contributed to this experience. For in the moment beauty exists.

## Chapter 3

# Beauty & Sublime

“By the time of the Platonic dialogues Socrates was called *atopos*, that is, ‘unclassifiable.’ What makes him *atopos* is precisely the fact that he is a ‘philosopher’ in the etymological sense of the word; that is, he is in love with wisdom. For wisdom, says Diotima in Plato’s *Symposium*, is not a human state, it is a state of perfection of being and knowledge that can only be divine. It is the love of this wisdom, which is foreign to the world, that makes the philosopher a stranger in it.”<sup>1</sup>

### 3.1 Kant is Limited

One can legitimately question the impetus of Kant’s critical phase. Clearly, there is the pronounced desire to clip the budding hubris expressed by proponents of the empirical sciences, by revealing the foundational necessity of metaphysics and subsumption of the former by the latter. So much was communicated as early as 1771 in a letter Kant

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<sup>1</sup>Hadot, [1990](#), p. 492.

wrote to his loyal friend and former student Marcus Herz.<sup>2</sup> The letter shared Kant's intent for his 'mania of systematizing' his theory which aimed to situate metaphysics as the fundamental discipline of study, while limiting the jurisdiction of reason and the senses; leading to the apt working title of 'On the limits of Sensibility and Reason'. Kant developed these ideas within a culture absorbed with the theories of Isaac Newton (1642-1727), Galileo Galilei (1564-1642), Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), and Robert Boyle (1627-1691) amongst others who popularized the physical or empirical sciences. Such sciences popularized a mechanical framework to understanding nature. At the same time, metaphysics had enjoyed its last significant leap forward with Aristotle. People were openly questioning the need for any study of metaphysics *überhaupt*. The topic found a venue for debate as established as the Royal Prussian Academy and in 1763 the academy opened a competition for a new theory to justify and define the meaning of metaphysics. Kant's entry placed second to Moses Mendelssohn's, who won by confronting the query head on, as opposed to Kant's method of stalking this issue like prey.<sup>3</sup>

Kant insisted that even as you set out to ignore metaphysics you are probably engaging in metaphysics. Giving it up to avoid the fumbling of poor metaphysicians is as likely as giving up breathing to avoid impure air.<sup>4</sup> Along these lines the project of the first *Critique* is not merely to put metaphysics on a scientific grounding but to position it as the grounding for science and all other knowing and reasoning. That is, to demonstrate the study of metaphysics as the establishment of the first principles necessary to consider and grant if one is to think and communicate thought.

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<sup>2</sup>Kant, 1999, 127 10:122-3 Letter To Marcus Herz. June 7, 1771. *ibid.*, pp. 126-128.

<sup>3</sup>Mendelssohn's "On Evidence in Metaphysical Sciences" garnered first prize in the contest staged by the Royal Prussian Academy of Sciences on the question of whether metaphysical truths are able to have the same type of evidence as mathematical truths. In the 1763 essay, Mendelssohn argues that metaphysicians work with the same method of conceptual analysis as mathematicians. Mendelssohn, 1997.

<sup>4</sup>Kant, 2000, 14 §IV 20:210.

Kant is quite original in regards to understanding that sense and reason are limited, and how this is the case. In part, the first *Critique* is a polemic against Humeian skepticism that perceives the entirety of human cognition as attainable through unlimited human senses.<sup>5</sup> The Humeian system of empiricism presupposes a gap between the external world and cognition, with the sense organs being charged with bridging that gap. The fallibility of these organs and their limits pose an unresolvable problem for Hume's account.<sup>6</sup> Grounding all knowledge in sensory experience *alone*, ascribe the objectivity of science, to study of one's subjective sensory experience.<sup>7</sup>

In the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, Kant centralizes the question, *how is nature possible?*<sup>8</sup> For, if all that the human capacity of mind brings to the table is the activity of the sensory organs and no other structuring mechanisms, then how are any sensory perceptions with experience alone *structured* so that individuals may intentionally engage with them? We *must presuppose a system*, to understand the possibility of objections within our situation. To extend the point and paraphrase philosopher Dan Robinson; we live in a pandemonium of stimulation, in a raw chaotic aggregate;<sup>9</sup> there are sounds, textures, temperatures, colors, solidities, constancies, all abundantly swirling about and through us. How is it that out of this ocean of stimulation that we get papers and pens, friends, judicial systems, forests, airplanes and cities?<sup>10</sup> How does the (mostly) law-governed world of science arise out of this stimulation?<sup>11</sup> If the

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<sup>5</sup>Notes from Dan Robinson's lectures on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, Oxford University, spring 2011. Robinson, 2011 For further discussion see the text engaging the same topic: Robinson, 2012.

<sup>6</sup>Amongst other problems. Kant, 2000, 14 §IV, 20:210.

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, 14 §IV, 20:209 Perhaps a grounding in line with the above readings of Foucault or Frank Gehry.

<sup>8</sup>Kant, 2001, 17-20 §5 275-80.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*, 17-20 §5 275-80.

<sup>10</sup>Robinson, 2011.

<sup>11</sup>Mathematician Carl Friedrich Gauss (1777- 1855) eloquently expressed the concern in a letter to his friend Bessel (on April 9, 1830), "According to my most sincere conviction the theory of space has an entirely different place in knowledge from that occupied by pure mathematics. There is lacking throughout our knowledge of space the complete persuasion of necessity, which is common to mathematics; and so we must add, in humility, that if geometry and number are exclusively the product of our mind, space has a reality outside our mind and we cannot completely prescribe its laws.' In other words space has a

only skill we bring to the table is that of a receptacle of the sensory organs, we would consist of constant awe — like a baby at a fireworks display. Given that we are alive and able to comprehend our surroundings, the first thing we should accept is that we have the appropriate structure, equipment, disposition, matter, or intention laden body, to engage with the world. Accounting for how we are not in constant awe is the subject matter of the first *Critique* i.e., the a priori conditions for the unity of nature in time and space.

Even if one were to believe perhaps in a compromise between the two, that there is a shared inter-subjective component to sensory experience. This merely grounds the objectivity of science on collective subjective experience and still presupposes a non-sensory means of confirming intersubjective communication. Kant finds Humeian empiricism lacks a means to address the problem, let alone solve it. Philosopher Dan Robinson observes that Hume’s model is one of ‘What was that?’ as oppose to Kant’s “Lunar Excursion model”, in which the human faculties of mind have enabled us to travel to the moon and return safely, due to how our minds are set up, i.e., that we have the ability to anticipate a whole or world that we do not completely understand.<sup>12</sup> Kant’s model grants that we are not blank sheets of paper to be written on by the senses or arid stretches of sand to be formed by the wind.<sup>13</sup>

### all the same

However, is this fight against empiricism a convincing justification for the generating incentive of all three *Critiques*? For one, Kant was wary of trends and prioritized the importance of seeing beyond popular issues. He was all too aware that such issues wax

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nature ‘sui generis’, that is, of its own.” Kline, 1980, p. 87.

<sup>12</sup>Robinson, 2011.

<sup>13</sup>For example, you cannot prove the law of contradiction, because all proofs presupposes the validity of the law.

and wane with time; this being one of the motives for excluding culturally embedded phenomena or ontic examples from his *Critiques*. Perhaps rightly so, for the few he permitted have aged quite radically, provoking a strange effect on the reader, where the efforts of understanding the text are abruptly plunged from the tapestry of atemporal principles, descriptions and logic; to a radical grounding in the foreign (almost alien) locality of eighteenth century Prussia. However once the initial shock has passed the examples are actually quite clarifying. Though, to gain further value additional context is needed of Kant's milieu. Along these lines, I do question why Kant did not point to sunrises as beautiful or the night sky as sublime, for those seem timeless and accessible.<sup>14</sup>

Regardless, Kant would not have written the *Critiques* merely because it was a fashionable topic. While we can grant that Kant was concerned with defending the legitimacy of metaphysics and setting out the first principles of thinking; this may account for the first of the *Critiques* but not all three. When taken as a whole, the *Critiques* beg for a more inclusive motivation.

In short, the *Critique of Pure Reason* seeks to limit people's claims of knowledge so that the messy art of metaphysics can be practiced. Kant claims the practice is impossible if we do not separate the ideas of reason from the concepts of the understanding.<sup>15</sup> For example Kant rids his reader of the desire to find the transcendent as an element of knowledge. The transcendent may be reached by faith, imagination, hope, card games, tea leaves, and the likes. But these ideas can never be taken as knowledge, for knowledge must have a sensory basis. Therefore no one, (including church, state or market) may have a greater claim to knowledge of the transcendent. With the *The Critique of Practical Reason* (1788) Kant sets out categorical and hypothetical imperatives which

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<sup>14</sup>Though perhaps this may be something about the Königsberg skyline?

<sup>15</sup>Kant, 2001, 64 ff. §§40-1, 327 ff.

should lead to ethical behavior by developing the often wayward faculty of desire and use of reason.<sup>16</sup> Published between the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and *The Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) the trio establishes his moral groundwork.<sup>17</sup> The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* seeks to account for how and why we are able, to some extent, to successfully engage with the world. In other words, of how we can have a firsthand conformation or awareness of our individual experience of the world, which is shaped and temporized through embodied human faculties, matching up with objects and horizons independent of our existence.

Most succinctly Kant explicitly discusses the need for individuals to attempt “to cultivate their own minds” in the newspaper submission, *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* (1784), with the emergent motto — Dare to know! As well as the essay: *What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?* (1786), where he states:<sup>18</sup>

“Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-imposed immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one’s own understanding without guidance from another. This immaturity is self-imposed when its cause lies in lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. *Sapere Aude!* ‘Have courage to use your own understanding!’ — that is the motto of enlightenment.”<sup>19</sup>

With the first *Critique* we see Kant passionately striving to free his reader from false knowledge and overly enthusiastic rationalizations. In providing a systematic structure of existence, he stretches cognition to its limits and pauses there to draw the reader’s attention to very definite boundaries, freeing them from arid knowledge that bars them

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<sup>16</sup>Kant, 2002a.

<sup>17</sup>Kant, 2002b; Kant, 1996 (1797). The second *Critique* provides arguments for how two act ethically, if and only if, one is already inclined to do so.

<sup>18</sup>Kant, 1983; Kant, 1996b, pp. 41-48.

<sup>19</sup>Kant, 1983, 41–35.



from development and miss-prepares them from engaging with the world as it exists. By setting up the faculties of the human mind, systematically drawing out the principles necessarily assumed to survive in the everyday world; he employs the structure and principles to demonstrate that some commonly held beliefs are figments merely belied as knowledge. For instance, Kant finds such ideas as the nominal soul, transcendent god, or Man's supremacy to all life as transendents (as opposed to transcendental), ideas that can be hypothesized but not known as such.<sup>20</sup> These ideas are products of reason untethered to the confines of knowledge.<sup>21</sup> The faculty of reason can produce wide ranges of possibilities that go beyond the reach of knowledge. Ideas of reason are not ideas of what one knows. Reason can free the understanding of the otherwise necessary bondage that knowledge of the understanding has to experience and reason can extend the ideas beyond the purely empirically but only at the cost of rendering the ideas illusory.

Thus ideas sprung from reason are not justification for actions, but points for inquiry. Reason must learn to discipline itself, to spare itself self delusional conclusions. For example, take the existence of Krakens, i.e., intelligent giant squid creatures from the deep seas. In 2011 geologist and paleontologist, Mark McMenamin concluded that a fossil collection of nine Triassic ichthyosaurs (*Shonisaurus popularis*) discovered in Nevada's Berlin-Ichthyosaur State Park, which is referred to as the "socony source murder mystery," were actually evidence of prehistoric kraken intelligence.

After observing the more brutal hunting methods of the modern octopus, McMenamin came to the conclusion that the triassic ichthyosaurs remains had been collected in a

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<sup>20</sup>For Kant discussion of the transcendental see Book II *The Transcendental Dialectic* A339 ff, B 397 ff. Kant, 1929a, 327 ff.

<sup>21</sup>For Kant's argument against the transcendental soul and argument against the unity and simplicity of the soul, see the *Third Paralogism: of Personality* A361-405 *ibid.*, pp. 341-67. Furthermore, for Kant's *Refutation of Mendelsson's Proof of the permanence of the Soul* see: B413-27 *ibid.*, pp. 372-80.

kraken lair and intentionally arranged as a self-portrait. The following snippet comes from his abstract of research presented at The Geological Society of America's annual meeting of 2011:

"We hypothesize that the shonisaur was killed and carried to the site by an enormous Triassic cephalopod, a "kraken," with estimated length of approximately 30 [meters], twice that of the modern Colossal Squid *Mesonychoteuthis*. In this scenario, shonisaur was ambushed by a Triassic kraken, drowned, and dumped on a midden like that of a modern octopus... The proposed Triassic kraken, which could have been the most intelligent invertebrate ever, arranged the vertebral discs in biserial patterns, with individual pieces nesting in a fitted fashion as if they were part of a puzzle. The arranged vertebrae resemble the pattern of sucker discs on a cephalopod tentacle, with each amphicoelous vertebra strongly resembling a coleoid sucker. Thus the tessellated vertebral disc pavement may represent the earliest known self-portrait."<sup>22</sup>

At best this might be a rational idea, but given that we have no experience of the kraken, it cannot be considered a matter of knowledge.<sup>23</sup> The guiding principle in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* is to confine the discussion of what we know to what we can know. There are elements of knowledge that we can assign concepts to, e.g., the behavior of modern octopi and the fossilized remains. There are then the ideas of reason, that play with connections between the two. But just because we can think it, does not mean we know it.

This reading grants room for Kant's critical theory to operate as a didactical cultivat-

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<sup>22</sup> *The Geological Society of America's annual meeting of 2011*.

<sup>23</sup> Akin to the existence of god, gods, and a punch line in a Jim Jarmusch film.

ing.<sup>24</sup> Taken from the Apollonian vantage point cultivation consists of three significant movements: first to rid the individual of false knowledge, second an enveloping experience of the infinitude of the world and one's own finitude, and third a disposition of unconcealment. The tripartite *modus operandi*:

- The dismissal of false knowledge. (Kant's first *Critique*)
- The stretching and humbling of soul, via an experience of the infinite and finitude of existence or a primary paradox. (Kant's third *Critique*)
- The mature disposition of unconcealing. (Kant's second *Critique*)

In the introduction to the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, the translator John Goldthwait states: "In order to know with finality what is possible to know in ethics, Kant felt we must first establish the limitations that bear on knowledge itself, knowledge of any sort."<sup>25</sup> Analogous to Socrates' employed logic to portray his interlocutor's limits, once these limits are established, the individual learns the skill of rejecting false knowledge, something that is not sufficient to act out merely once, but rather must become a regular habit, similar to the cleaning of one's home. As such, this echoing habit positions the individual to cultivate a nimbleness of their own reflective judgment.

With the second *Critique*, Kant demonstrates how one can live morally, i.e., what it is to be a mature human being.<sup>26</sup> The second *Critique* produces lessons in how to come up with the laws and codes of how to live according to our teleological purpose and thus to be moral beings who warrant happiness, but with this one must be interested in

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<sup>24</sup>For further discussion in support of this reading see: Kneller, 1990, p. 217 and Hengehold, 2002 Guyer, 1995.

<sup>25</sup>Kant, 1960, p. 9.

<sup>26</sup>As noted above, Kant's three *Critiques* do not numerically align with the three movements of cultivation of the self.

being moral. The second *Critique* is a conditional claim: if you are committed to living morally, then here is how you go about it.<sup>27</sup> The moral laws and maxims of the second critique are merely derivative or teased out from a more primitive force. The endless debates in the secondary literature regarding clever word or logical games are radically missing the point. Such critiques are akin to debates over where various passengers may stand on a ship when attempting to discern the direction the ship sails. In other words they are non-consequential issues, that show themselves as irrelevant when taken in the context of the third *Critique*.

Moral freedom is both; the freedom from causation by the lower sensuous desires and the freedom to act in accordance to a law of practical reason that we give to ourselves as rational beings. As early as his writing of *Observation on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, Kant was prepared to attribute the transformative, enlightening power to beauty and the sublime as a significant motivation of moral principle, as Kantian scholar Goldthwait points out “the dominating principle of the virtuous life, [Kant] asserts, is to be guided by the ‘feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature’”, which guides us to the *Critique* of the Power of Judgment.<sup>28</sup>

The third *Critique* provides the *why* of the *Critiques*’ paideia. It is a meditation on the causal experience of why someone would seek out morality. For we know Kant held two temporally antithetical beliefs: that man’s behavior is radically evil and that humanity is capable of creating a “Kingdom of Ends” on earth, i.e., a situation in which all life treats all life as ends in themselves rather than as means to ends.<sup>29</sup> In other words Kant

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<sup>27</sup> Akin to the Stoics and Epicureans as discussed in the introduction above.

<sup>28</sup> Kant, 1960, p. 25.

<sup>29</sup> Consider also Kant’s assertion: “This is therefore the hardest task of all; indeed, its perfect solution is impossible; from such warped wood as is man made, nothing straight can be fashioned.” Kant, 1983, 34 §*Sixth Thesis* 23 For further consideration of Kant’s claims of the evil nature of human beings see Kant’s short and lively essay, *On the common saying: That may be correct in theory, but it is of no use in practice*. Kant, 1996a, 277-309 8:273-313 or the secondary commentary found in: Fenves, 2003, 84ff.

is describing a world in which all individuals show care in their engagement with all other things, acting *as if* all formed matter has its own idiosyncratic causal nexus.<sup>30</sup>

The second *Critique* of the deontology develops laws of morals and the third *Critique* explains *why* — why this happens — why an individual works to shift their habits from radically evil behavior to earnest practices of good will. The third *Critique* is not what it is to being moral, but what brings on the change to commit to be moral, to study and practice good will, to cultivate judgment, or to try.

In his pre-critical and pre-prosaic work on the beautiful and the sublime, Kant quarters the character of human beings amongst the classical humors.<sup>31</sup> Taking the humors as archetypes on human temperaments, delineated as melancholy, sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic. Kant discusses them to the relevant degree of their own admirability. Hence, melancholy, the classifications of those most moved by the sublime, enjoys a rich and lively description. The sanguine disposition is predominantly given to a feeling for the beautiful, for example the sanguine individual “sees joy in himself and about himself, amuses others, and is a good companion. He has much moral sympathy. Others’ joyfulness makes him pleased, and their sorrow, downhearted.”<sup>32</sup> The choleric state of mind has a feeling for the splendid, which is a shallow or superficial “gloss of sublimity” which is a quality that deludes and moves by appearance. The choleric seems to have no gage of inner worth and judges merely on “the extent that he supposes he is considered so by others”.<sup>33</sup> They are thereby a “fool”. They are akin to the Stultitia as discussed in the chapter above in relation to the Stoic care of the self. In the following illustration, Kant draws on the choleric and raises a curious concern of the project as a whole. For Kant

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<sup>30</sup>Rather than employing the translation of Kingdom of Ends, I shall use the words of ‘Telosland’ or ‘land of  $\tau\epsilon\lambda\omicron\varsigma$ ’ from here on. Telosland was coined by Patrick Healy in a meeting in 2012.

<sup>31</sup>*Humors* as the “accepted classification on the temperaments”, Kant, 1960, p. 64.

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.*, p. 67.

<sup>33</sup>*ibid.*, p. 68.

comments that the choleric:

“...is only evil and common, and deludes and moves by appearance. The *choleric* one considers his worth and the worth of his possessions and actions to lie in the propriety or the appearance with which he strikes the eye. With respect to the inner nature and the reasons for action which the object itself contains, he is cold, neither warmed by true benevolence nor moved by respect. His conduct is artful. He must know how to take up all sorts of standpoints, in order to appraise his own bearing from the different positions of onlookers, because he seldom asks what he is, but only what he appears. As he has to be cold-blooded in the sly awareness and must not let himself be blinded by love, compassion, and sympathy, he will avoid many follies and vexations into which a sanguine person falls, who is fascinated by his immediate sensation. On that account he generally appears more understanding than he really is. His benevolence is politeness, his respect ceremony, his love concocted flattery. He is always aware of himself when he takes up the position of a lover or a friend, and is never either the one nor the other... he has no feeling for the beauty or the worth of actions, but for the judgment that the world might pass on them.”

The choleric character presents the greatest problem for my theory as a whole, for how can someone unmoved by beauty, allow beauty to move them, and aid in cultivating? Further if this character presents himself as being moved by the sublime, or as having loving and respectful feelings, perhaps there is doubt that cultivation is needed at all? And then with so many people running about with this type of personality, how is the land of Telos possible? They are wolves in sheep's clothing that has even tricked themselves into believing they are sheep, and builds sheltering stories about himself to

explain away eating up their fellow sheep.

Perhaps the solution lies in the non-functionalist distinction between *being moved* and *showing response*; for cultivation is more than merely observable behavioral. That is to say, to bypass the problem raised by the example of the choleric character, we must grant a subtle difference of responding to material situations. One manner is to be moved by the stimulus and the other is to enact a semblance of being moved. That there is pragmatic difficulty in discerning between the two, only further confirms the theory as it fits with firsthand observations about the world. People can be challenging to read. It can be difficult to tell the difference between someone who cares and someone who is merely presenting themselves as though they care. Interestingly, the description of the choleric as the semblance of care suits the desired relativistic care proposed in Foucault's didactic of cultivation. This difference highlights the role of second movement of cultivating through experiencing something farther reaching the human existence (i.e. logos or beauty & the sublime). Acting the role of care is not care, as the manner is not generated by a consistent drive, rather it is patterned after perceived trends. In other words, the wolf may generally be quite polite amongst the sheep, but given that there is an alternative generating manner for the particular wolf's to be amongst the sheep, at various intervals a few sheep will become supper.

The forth humor of the phlegmatic individual is omitted almost entirely as they has no noticeable degree of beauty or sublimity in their character.<sup>34</sup> Unfortunately, as Kant states, most people have a disposition of the latter two humors and "are among those who have their best-loved selves fixed before their eyes."<sup>35</sup> If the preponderance of people behave radically evil, it is hard to imagine how human society could reach the desired interplay of mutual respect and care of the whole which is pivotal to the

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<sup>34</sup>Kant, 1960, p. 70.

<sup>35</sup>*ibid.*, p. 74.

aim of Telosland.<sup>36</sup> Kant pragmatically provided a motivational cause, perhaps to save his readers from what Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) or Jean-Paul Sartre (1905-1980) would later celebrate. Kant proposes that the land of Telos is important enough to warrant the presumption that it is possible, and for it to be possible the human species must be granted infinite time to work things out. But these comports are transcendent, i.e., things we cannot know, but may hope. This is not the only occasion in which Kant puts forward hope over knowledge. The challenge then is to imagine what could draw individuals away from confidence in their semblance and lead them to perhaps put down their digital screens to the world and faith in multitasking, which may then allow, with care, a skill of extended attention.<sup>37</sup>

### with gumption

This reading of Kant takes account of two superficially contrasting views: that most people are pathologically radically evil and that to have a will is to have the possibility of a good will. The reading incorporates Kant's motivation to aid individuals' emancipation and pave a way for a society in which individuals treat each other as ends in themselves rather than as means to an end. I find a motivation worthy of attention for the three *Critiques* can be attributed to Kant's inclination to provide a didactical theory on cultivating, such that individuals may transition from premature being (i.e. chained by false and despotic tutelage) to mature moral beings.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>36</sup>For further discussion of Kant's jaded hope see Riley, with the well phrase claim: "The extraordinary thing about Kant is that he was able to look 'radical evil' and historical wretchedness squarely in the face and, without hoping for a miraculous upsurge of good will through 'a new creation,' was able to predict that the self-love which had hitherto generated war and misery might (by loving itself more wisely) finally embrace republican peace." Riley, 1986, p. 577.

<sup>37</sup>For a revealing study on the destructive effects of addiction to multitasking see Clifford Nass' *The Man Who Lied to His Laptop: What Machines Teach Us About Human Relationships*. Nass and Yen, 2010.

<sup>38</sup>Ultimately to behave ethically we must act *as if* nature is subjectively purposive. This claim is the topic of the final chapter below, *Nature & Art*.



This line of discussion might lead to positioning the autonomy of subjecthood as dominating Kant's metaphysical structure. Perhaps even, one may conclude that a Kantian individual could easily be a brain-in-a-vat, conjuring immaterial categories and having a meaningful life. However while this reading which suggests Kant's theory of judgment is comprehensively articulated by the first *Critique* has proven to be popular, it nonetheless lacks conviction when faced with Kant's third critique - that of Judgment. Recently attention has been given to the role reflective judgments, such judgment are portrayed in the third *Critique*, as judgments which inherently engage with the material presence and do not doom the individual to a disembodied transcendental autonomy. Theorist such as David Bell, Hannah Ginsborg and Béatrice Longuenesse have worked to adjust to the role of reflective judgments in Kant's overall philosophy, including the consequences for readings of the first *Critique*.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore this chapter is composed to expose the event of Beauty as the motivation for an individual to cultivate their own behaviors, habits and skills of judgment. Given the value of Kant's theory in this context, its analysis will focus on the aesthetic judging of beauty and the sublime. However as the depictions of beauty and the sublime are embedded in the critical apparatus as a whole, it is imperative to begin with a profile of the theory in general. The aim is to draw attention to a signal thread within Kant's beautiful (in the Kantian sense) tapestry, and that thread is his version of cultivating aesthetic judgment. It is not an attempt to resolve or justify the entirety of Kant's work or the two plus centuries of Kantian scholarship.

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<sup>39</sup>References here are drawn from Ginsborg, 2013; as follow respectively Bell, 1987; Ginsborg, 1990; Longuenesse, 1998.

**from stones, roosters and singing prisoners**

On the outset it is helpful to acknowledge that Kant very often takes recourse to legal systems. His argument style takes the form of: *Given that this is the case, what are the necessary claims absent without which this could not possibly be the case.* Kant was particularly interested in legal issues of boundary disputes. Repetitive interruptions by noisy neighbors lead him to looking into laws regarding boundary issues. The disturbance to his meditations and writing varied from neighborhood boys throwing rocks, to a crowing rooster, to prayer singing prisoners.<sup>40</sup> Kant's own argument style is a species of *derudeow trifton* (boundary issues) where one shows the pedigree of property claims, i.e., the pedigree of cognitive claim. The first *Critique* is something of a legal brief. He basically draws up a systematic account of how things must necessarily be to account for how things are. Then he dares the opposition to disprove his structure, or provide a more alluring alternative.<sup>41</sup>

Kant claims beauty and sublime are something both in us and beyond us. They transcend

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<sup>40</sup>Manfred Kuehn's biography on Kant details the occasions for relocation as such: " '[Kant] was driven out of his house by a neighbor, who held a cock on his property, whose crowing often interrupted Kant in his meditations. He offered to buy the animal from the neighbor at any price to obtain the peace from the loud animal. Yet he did not succeed to persuade the stubborn neighbor who could not at all comprehend how the cock could bother Kant.' Again, it was noise that made Kant move." Kuehn, 2001, p. 220, and "On July 9, 1784, Kant found it necessary to write to Hippel about noise. This time it was not the crowing of a cock, but the singing of prisoners. 'You were so good to promise to act on the complaint of the residents of the street at Schloßgraten in regard to the loud (*stentorische*) prayers of the hypocrites in the prison. I do not believe that they have reason to complain about the presumed danger to the salvation of their souls, if their voices are lowered so that they could hear themselves even by closed windows. . . and without screaming with all their might then. They could still receive the favorable judgment of the warden that they are god-fearing people. This seems to be their real concern anyway. He will hear them, and they are really asked only to discipline their voices to a degree that is sufficient for the pious citizens of our city to feel saved in their houses. One word to the warden... will be enough to curb this abuse and will help the person whose quiet state you have many times tried to help so graciously. . . ' ". *ibid.*, p. 270, and Kant also found difficulty with some of the boys from his neighborhood who "played in his street and threw stones over his fence. Complaints to the police did not help. The officers refused to act until someone in his household was hurt. Kant was bitter: 'There will only be a right to punish [them] when I am sick or dead!' ". *ibid.*, pp. 270-71.

<sup>41</sup>For examples of Transcendental legislation see: Kant, 2000: [14 §IV 20:210],[top of 15 §IV 20:211] and [18 §V 20:215]

our experience but are only apprehensible as a feeling, in particular the feeling of pleasure arising when mental faculties engage with each other harmoniously or with gumption. For Kant the essential way that we can know we are experiencing beauty and witnessing a beautiful object is when the faculties of imagination and understanding relate to each other harmoniously while beholding a beautiful object.

In concluding this introduction to Kant, it must be noted that the third *Critique* is not akin to the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* (1783), with which Kant attempts to restyle his metaphysical system for general accessibility. The analytics and dialectics of aesthetic and teleological judgments are not further reiterations of the determinate judgments that are laid out in the first and second *Critiques*. The *Critique of the Power of Judgment* champions the faculty of reflective judgment. The first *Critique* sets the ground work for the popularly accepted means of understanding the world through determining judgments, which are ‘top-down’, or normative, simplifications or categorization of the vibrant and reverberant world. One could claim that establishing a system of comprehending determining judgments is rightly positioned as the first step in an architectonic system of metaphysics, but that the challenge comes with understanding the innovative power of reflective judgments. Architecture provides a means of cultivating aesthetic judgment when the makers of the space have cultivated their own aesthetic judgment which enables them to design with a sensitivity and nimbleness to the underlying teleological relationship of means—to—ends.<sup>42</sup>

Spacescapes with a transparent causal nexus afford individuals a means of transitioning into a disposition of unconcealment. In other words, when individuals are situated within spacescapes that afford events of Beauty, they are more likely to act on an openness to

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<sup>42</sup>I.e. That which Kant calls upon with the words *supersensible substratum*, the principles of *not in vain* and *not by chance*, the principle of *causal nexus*, the *formative power of nature*, *nature’s techniques*, the *purposiveness of the whole of nature*, and what the Stoics more elegantly called *logos*.

events of Beauty. And with practice of openness to events of Beauty, they are then more prepared to appreciate increasingly subtle events of Beauty. This in turn frees them from the tyranny of their particular historical, social, political, and economic milieu, and allows them the ethical freedom to dare to know, which is anti-pragmatic as it is rewarding in itself. Schopenhauer insightfully describes the phenomenon as:

“If ceasing to consider the when, why and whither of things we concentrate ourselves on the what; not allowing abstract thought with its concepts to possess our consciousness, but sinking ourselves wholly in perception of the object; then we escape our individuality and will, and continue to exist only as the pure mirror of the object, with which we become identified; so that what is known is no longer the particular thing, but the idea and the knower is no longer an individual but the pure knowing subject.”<sup>43</sup>

The habits of cultivating aesthetic judgment distill as: (a) a willingness to postpone an immediate identification of the object by the understanding (which is the same as to say, a greater precision, tightness, or care of the concepts in one’s understanding enables greater opportunity for the object to prove itself as something more than just its typology), (b) a habit of identifying false complexities which trick the imagination into unbalanced or uni-directional causalities (e.g. such as is often employed in advertising or bad architecture), (c) a familiarity with the feeling of pleasure arising from an event of Beauty which encourages one’s recognition of and appetite for it.<sup>44</sup> The closest we can come to lifting the veil of Iris is in the event of Beauty, which is the experience

<sup>43</sup>The quotation is art theorist Carritt’s loose translation of Schopenhauer’s passage in *The World as Will and Representation* Carritt, 1914, p. 84.

<sup>44</sup>These propositions raise questions unfortunately beyond the current parameters of research. Yet a further study could be taken upon the inquiry of *can someone who has experienced much anti-beauty (life-hindering skills, affording dominant vantage points and efficient causality), feel pleasure when matching up representations of the beautiful to the world; given that what they bring to the table is so often met with anti-beauty?*

of mirroring the hermeneutical loops of teleology whereby *means*  $\circ$  *ends* via reflecting upon aesthetic objects and horizons.

### 3.1.1 Beauty is judging

#### Formal Beauty; judging taste

An event of Beauty awakens reflective judgment in the presence of transparent teleological objects, living things, or organic matter. Admittedly this raises questions, for example, what are these objects? How could such objects present their own teleological relationships transparently? These are the generating inquiries of the next part of the thesis, *Art & Nature*. The current question is what is conveyed with the notion of aesthetic judgment.

Kant acknowledges that his conclusions regarding taste may appear antinomic at first glance. Thus, in the second section of the *Critique of Aesthetic Power of Judgment*, he sets out to describe and resolve the apparent logical contradiction of judging taste. The simple argument starts with the first premise: people without taste will commonly claim that, “Everyone has their own taste.”<sup>45</sup> The second premise is the common place assertion that; “there is no disputing about taste”. Even if taste is objective, we cannot connect the objective grounds to the objective concepts, but it is good to argue about taste as it hopes or tries to bring about unanimity.<sup>46</sup> Lastly, Kant finds a proposition implicitly lying between the two, that “it is possible to argue about taste.”<sup>47</sup> Thus we have two claims: a thesis, that judgments of taste is not based on concepts. And the antithesis, that judgments of taste are based on concepts. Kant showcases the antinomy as follows:

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<sup>45</sup>Kant, 2000, 214 §56 5:338.

<sup>46</sup>*ibid.*, 214 §56 5:338.

<sup>47</sup>*ibid.*, 214 §56 5:338.

“I. **Thesis.** The judgment of taste is not based on concepts, for otherwise it would be possible to dispute about it (decide by means of proofs).

II. **Antithesis.** The judgment of taste is based on concepts, for otherwise, despite its variety, it would not even be possible to argue about it (to lay claim to the necessary assent of others to this judgment).”<sup>48</sup>

What is revealed by this discrepancy is one of the single more interesting points of Kant’s critical phase, that there is something other than concepts which is objective. Moreover we somehow are lucky enough to have access to the non-conceptual objective substances via our embodied power to aesthetically judge.

The capacity of aesthetic judgment is based on something akin to the earlier discussed notion of the logos, it is what Kant labels the *concept of the supersensible* which is purely (or merely) rational and indeterminate. It is that which grounds something as an object of sense, i.e., an appearance, hence the fuller title of; “Supersensible substratum of appearances.”<sup>49</sup>

However, Kant’s claim that a judgment of taste is based on the indeterminate concept of the supersensible substratum of appearances, is not the same as saying a judgment of taste is based on the thing-in-itself, because the things-in-themselves are transcendent and connected to particular objects. For example, when walking through the first threshold of Ando’s Chichu Museum, the concrete wall slotted for a basketball player’s gate affords the various manifestations, appearance or materiality that each individual senses and engages as they pass through. That which is the cause of the various renderings is the wall’s thing-in-itself. It is the assumed consistence of the formed matter regardless of individual variability, because it inherently encompasses and generates all

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<sup>48</sup>Kant, 2000, 215 §56 5:338.

<sup>49</sup>*ibid.*, 216 §56 5:339.

the possible variability. The supersensible substratum of appearance is not confined to one wall, one building or one object. It underlies all sensibility. It is an assumed realm of causes & grounds. In other words, the supersensible substratum is a merely rational idea of something that must exist in order to account for how things exist in the world, i.e., it is the pedigree of the event.

As is discussed in the introduction and in greater detail in the following part, *Art & Nature*, the supersensible substratum is the formal property of matter which is always in motion, and only conceivable through temporal extension, e.g., the waves of atoms, or the oscillation of ether upon impact, such that form is only possible through its relational movements of matter.<sup>50</sup> It is the formative power of this supersensible substratum that guides the normative powers of pleasure and displeasure in the power of judgment. But this discussion races ahead of itself by posing more complications and vague assertions, rather than grounded solutions. Thus presently, the topic turns to laying the groundwork for judging.

However, let me first briefly dispel the promise of a determining science of Beauty. If Beauty is the act of judging an object, which only certain objects afford, then might it follow that a science of what is and is not beautiful could be developed? Eighteenth century German intellectual discourse held an immediate hope for this possibility.<sup>51</sup> Could categories, types or elements be argued as having determinate aesthetic merit? Kant's aesthetic theory prohibits any such science of taste. For to do such confuses the order of grounding judgments and muddles the experience of aesthetic events. Determinate judgments must be grounded in more fundamental reflective judgment. Not the other way around. An activity of reflectively judging cannot be specified or categorized by

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<sup>50</sup>The phrase 'oscillation of the ether' is borrowed from Kant's *Opus Posthumum*. Kant, 1993, 11 21:375.

<sup>51</sup>For further discussion see: Schwarzer, 1993.

determinate judgments. A brief metaphor is to consider the possibility of recreating an analogue record from a collection of digital sound bites. The musical impressions absent in the void of the digital sound bite cannot be authentically manifested for an analogue record. Likewise the reflective interplay in a judgment of taste cannot be deciphered from the shallow abstraction of determined concepts. Any such derivative science would be inherently vulnerable to false knowledge propagated via normalizing power practices as it bridges the gaps in a self serving fashion.

## 3.2 Outline of Kant's Human Mind

### basics to know from the outset

In order to understand Kant's aesthetic theory, the products of his first *Critique* must be understood. The present section is designed to furnish the reader with a working understanding of Kant's systematic portrayal of the human mind. It explains the faculties of mind and their individual roles, so as to contextualize the experience of judging an event of Beauty.

Kant has a tendency to make use of the same term for different meanings. For example, consider the use of the terms: nature, judgment, representation, or cognition. It is only through the context of Kant's use of the term and the reader's familiarity with the overall structure of Kant's thinking that it becomes possible to unlock the details of his theory. Kant provides the following table at the closing of the first introduction to the *Critique* of the Power of Judgment.<sup>52</sup>

Do not let the rigidity of the chart mislead, the faculties must work together and fail

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<sup>52</sup>Kant, 2000, 45 §XI 20:245 Addition please note that at the end of the second introduction he exchanges "products for application to" and "purposiveness..." for "final end" and "In that at the same time law, i.e., Obligation" *ibid.*, 83 §IX 5:198.



Faculty of Mind	Higher Cognitive Faculties	a priori Principles	Products
Faculty of Cognition	Understanding	Lawfulness	Nature
Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure	Power of Judgment	Purposiveness	Art
Faculty of Desire	Reason	Purposiveness /final end	Morals /freedom

Table 3.1: The Higher Faculties of the Human Mind

alone. None of the faculties are autonomous. The structure is merely teased out of a whole and presented as such to help communicate the skills of mind. One might be correct to be “suspicious of eighteenth-century faculty psychology” as Ginsborg notes in her 2006 essay on primitive normativity.<sup>53</sup> Kant’s detailed system of faculties could be read as farcical as the cardinal humors or blood, phlegm, cholera, and melancholy, that denoted an individual’s physical and mental affects by the relative proportions in which they were present. The faculties could also seem as mythical as the deification of natural forces such as the north wind, the ocean, and the likes in ancient Greek society. However, Kant’s linguistically abstraction of various faculties as having roles and taking action is somewhat metaphorical.<sup>54</sup> They are various skills and capacities of the body, which empirical science assigns to particular part of the body with greater to lesser accuracy. However whether the faculty of judgment is the brain, spinal cord, distributed in various synapse throughout the body, is a system of micro-organisms forming our individual bodies, or is in our toes, is irrelevant to the present inquiry, as Kant’s faculties are metaphors.

In contemporary analytical philosophy it is more fashionable to use examples and draw out well selected phrases as conclusions to label the phenomenon. Fifty to a hundred years ago, with Gottlob Frege’s modernization of Logic, abstract clustering of letters

<sup>53</sup>Ginsborg, 2006a, p. 5.

<sup>54</sup>Ginsborg has argued that free play corresponds to a “phenomenologically identifiable element of the experience of art and beauty, and that free play is a metaphorical way of describing the nonconceptual claim to universality implicit in the judgment of beauty itself.”Ginsborg, 2011a, 6, in unpaginated edition.

and symbols where the trend of tools used to convey a metaphysical structure of how the mind works in the world. All these methods attempt to point to something more significant than the method itself. The divide can be understood in terms of the Logos / Mythos difference.<sup>55</sup> As discussed above, Logos (in the Stoical sense) is something inherent about the world (nature, universe, life, everything). As my argument will progress, Logos can be understood as the techniques of success for existing in the world (i.e. the techniques of nature; that everything must replenish what it devours and use what is stockpiled). Mythos, is a story attempting to point to the logos, or to inspire the audience to perceive the logos firsthand. Logos itself can not be ready-made and handed over neatly to someone, it is pre- or non-conceptual, it is outside of language, one's engagement with it must occur firsthand and only in the present moment. A good mythos is clear, entertaining, gives light to things the reader is curious about and stretches that curiosity to elements and events the reader or listener had not yet considered to query. It relieves the reader of conflating contrasting accounts and false knowledge perpetuated by historical, social, political and economical situations and makes room for further ingrowth like a William Morris or Augustus Pugin wallpaper pattern. But overall it ought to be clear and avoid vagueness which can lead to misinterpretation or abuse of the attention and authority granted by the audience.<sup>56</sup> Depending on one's audience, various mythos fit best. Akin to philosophy, the architectural object can be a mythos. The formed matter can afford the individual's attentive care and (analytical and embodied) intentions to engage with a firsthand expression of logos. With this said, there are many different styles of mythos, Kant's is one consistent with his contemporaries, that of psychologically analyzing the faculties of individual's capacities to engage with

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<sup>55</sup>William Wians' *Logos and Muthos* provides a detailed study of the ideas through an analyses of ancient Greek philosophy and literature. Wians, 2009.

<sup>56</sup>Foucault's genealogy of the truth teller comes to mind, however this is not what inspired this argument nor the particular sentiment intended.

the world.

Historically the faculties of the mind held an established hierarchy, by which the underdogs of imagination and sensation had only recently gained upward mobility in Kant's milieu.<sup>57</sup> An über-brief context of this development follows. Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) perceived sense perception as far too unclear for a systematic structure of its own, thus excluded it from the faculties of mind. His student, and a source of influence to Kant, Johann Christian Wolff (1679-1754) concurred that sensation is only confused perception and placed it as belonging to the lower cognitive faculties. Then, Wolff's student Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762) who was a poet in addition to a philosopher, argued in 1735 for an account of the logic of judgments about sensations that was analogous to, but not identical with reason, called the "analogon of reason".<sup>58</sup> Incidentally, Baumgarten is also the first to coin the term *aesthetics* as a discipline of study. Around 1766, a contemporary to Kant, Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781), introduced the importance of genius in art. Lessing claimed that genius is its own rule, that it alone is fruitful, and that it is that which allows the imagination free play. Kant's system of mind integrates the senses and imagination as key players (though far more the latter) and for this reason I have drafted the following table of these lower faculties.<sup>59</sup>

Along with the two tables it is vital to understand the following two uses of the term *representation* prior to processing. First definition: representation as *intuitions*. Intuitions

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<sup>57</sup>For further discussion of Kant's milieu as tied into beauty as an judgment affording cultivation see: Düsing, 1990 Düsing's wrote draws out implications for a moral attitude within Kant's third *Critique*. While I agree with his underlying thesis, Düsing's weighting of the details seems suspect to a lack of attention to the second half of Kant's critique, i.e., the *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment*.

<sup>58</sup>"In his Reflections on Poetry, published in 1735 Baumgarten, 1954 Baumgarten claimed that the so-called "lower faculties" of sensation, memory, and imagination had a logic of their own analogous to, but not identical with, that of reason. Reason's method involves making sensations clear and distinct through abstraction, definition, and demonstration. But beauty is destroyed by the tools of reason precisely because these processes minimize the sensuous, concrete, and individual nature of the beautiful." Kneller, 1990, p. 218.

<sup>59</sup>This is not Kant's table, I have put it together myself as an aid to clarity.

Table 3.2: Lower Faculties of the Human Mind

Faculty of the Mind	a priori principles	application to (what it works with)	products
Faculty of Imagination	compositionality (apprehension, comprehension)	sensory perception (intuitions)	manifold of intuition (representation)
Faculty of Sensation	perception of world (capacity to perceive the world)	things-in-themselves	sensory perception (intuitions)

are mental items. They are the perception of objects through the senses, i.e., the representations by which an object is given to us. For example, intuitions can be of furriness, chestnut hue, softness, wiggly-ness. Likewise they are also called sensory perceptions, sensory details, sense data, datum, etc. A manifold of intuitions is the representation of a particular object, e.g., the representation of Ponty (who is a particular dog).<sup>60</sup>

Second definition: representations as *concepts*. Concepts are mental items. They are general representations. They are the concept with which one labels, identifies, or categorizes an individual or group of objects. They are the representations through which objects are thought, e.g., Vizsla, Pointer, dog, mammal, animal or being.

### 3.2.1 Styles of thinking

Kant teases out five primary faculties of the human mind. The faculties of **cognition** and **desire** mirror each other; where the faculty of cognition *understands* what exists and the faculty of desire *dreams up* what might be. Driving the mind in thought is the **feeling of pleasure and displeasure**, it acts like the tiffany of the orchestra with its normative force pushing the piece on and pulling all elements into line with its rhythm.<sup>61</sup>

<sup>60</sup>This character, Ponty, will occur as a steadfast example throughout this thesis, he is my beloved dog, a crafty Hungarian Vizsla.

<sup>61</sup>Where the tiffany takes its cue from is of importance to the artist of architecture.

The faculty of cognition engages with the empirical and knowable world with its key role as: *subsumer of manifolds of intuitions under particular concepts*.<sup>62</sup> In other words, it recognizes a particular composition of sensory details as complying with a general rule and labels it with the known identity. The understanding is the rule book of the faculty of cognition and in this sense the faculty is legislative.<sup>63</sup> For example, it is the faculty of understanding that recognizes the representation of two slanted white lines, on the ground, as a place to park a car. This does not have to be a linguistic assessment, it may be iconographical. Kant's system of faculties of mind (or noted mental abilities) is not confined to the empirical science of the day. Thus they may be skills of the brain, of the neurological system, of some finer system of engagement skills disbursed throughout the matter of the body, or of some collective rhythm of a complex ecosystems of micro organisms which compose the human body.<sup>64</sup> The set of laws the faculty of understating employs are empirical laws guided by nature. Nature is a colorful word, yet here it just means: all that exists. The cognition collects empirical laws as approximations based on nature's techniques. It affords us to gather consistencies coming together as a recognizable set of laws; as Kant observes:

“[Nature] is free from all the restrictions of our law-giving faculty of cognition, and it is a mere presupposition of the power of judgment, in behalf of its own use, always to ascend from empirical, particular laws to more general but at the same time still empirical ones, for the sake of the unification of empirical laws, which grounds that principle. And one can by no means charge such a principle to the account of experience, because *only under the presupposition of it is it possible to organize experiences in a systematic way*.”<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>Kant, 2000, 167 §35 5:287.

<sup>63</sup>see: *ibid.*, 14 §IV 20:210 and *ibid.*, 80 §IX 5:195.

<sup>64</sup>*et al.*, 2009; Savage, 1977; Ng and Bassler, 2009.

<sup>65</sup>Kant, 2000, 14 §IV (20:210) emphasis my own. See also; “Thus it is a subjectively necessary transcendental presupposition that such a disturbingly unbounded diversity of empirical laws and heterogeneity

Kant's argument of this can be most briefly stated as follows. Given that the world works or at least seems to work with some consistencies, and given that we as humans are able to recognize and collect sets of laws or approximations as to how the world works, we must have an apparatus to perceive the world as it works. We can attempt to understand that apparatus as a prior principles that must be granted to make sense of the world as experienced. We do this as individuals and as societies by collecting sets of laws which we act upon. The combination of these a priori principles and empirical or collected laws afford the anticipation of a whole (or the world) which we cannot fully understand.

The basic role of the faculty of cognition is to deal with representations of the world and assign identities to them. In contrast, the faculty of desire recapitulates past sensory intuitions that are not currently in use to represent an object in the world.<sup>66</sup> The faculty of desire directs these maverick sensory details or intuitions, and composes them in new ways which may have the potential to be created in the world, should other events fall in line. This is how human beings create new things; i.e., new objects and concepts.

Amidst these two faculties of mind —the faculty of cognition and the faculty of desire— is the active power of judgment. It neither labels nor creates. The power of judgment works with the faculty of cognition, the faculty of desire and the imagination,<sup>67</sup> to discriminate and judge.<sup>68</sup> It directs via a subjective feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

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of natural forms does not pertain to nature, rather that nature itself through the affinity of particular laws under more general ones, qualifies for an experience, as an empirical system." Kant, 2000, 14 §IV 20:209.

<sup>66</sup>This begs the fundamentally question of why are the sensory details sometimes taken up by the faculty of desire and sometimes the faculty of cognition? I.e. how do we know we know? And the issue of sensory hallucinations.

<sup>67</sup>Kant, 2000, 83 §IX 5:197.

<sup>68</sup>*ibid.*, 90 §1 5:204.

### 3.3 Metaphorical Thought Experiment

The following is an attempt to illustrate the structure of Kant's system of the human mind through a metaphorical thought experiment. Its value, like that of John Searle's *Chinese Room* or Thomas Nagel's *Bat Query*, is to create a narrative of the connections between the faculties and of their roles for those not at home in the Kantian dialect. It could be critiqued as a rather naive attempt at portraying one of the more arduous philosophies of mind. Yet, although it is accessible, sounding nothing akin to the volume of Kantian scholarship, it nevertheless draws out the complications of Kant's aesthetic theory and the recent debates regarding pre-cognitive thinking (preferably labeled, *non-conceptual thinking*), normativity of concepts, and later the role of teleology — as seen in the debates between Hannah Ginsborg, Henry Allison and Paul Guyer.<sup>69</sup> In turn this is indispensable for providing concrete criteria to critique architectural affordance of events of Beauty, and how such events may awake a will to cultivate taste and resist normalizing power practices.

#### 3.3.1 An un-beautiful thing, a judgment of cognition

The first scenario. Let us visualize the human mind as a riverbank cove. Alongside a wide river there is a sandy beach cove where a child plays, a mother stands near watching over and a grandmother sits back taking in the scene. It is a special day, traditionally celebrated by a succession of decorated floats parading down the river one by one.<sup>70</sup>

As the festival floats appear, the waves push up upon the river embankment bringing

<sup>69</sup>See: Ginsborg, 2004; Guyer, 2007 and Rorty and Schmidt, 2009, pp. 24-45 Furthermore, see also Hanna, 2011 for an interesting argument employing Kant's non-conceptual thinking to justify rationality in animals.

<sup>70</sup>The metaphor is inspired by a visit to the town of Takayama, Japan. The small town of Takayama is famous for the temples and small-scale sake distilleries. There is the yearly parade of floats through town (not actually on a river), which is visible by the scattered houses with functioning extra tall doors, to house these floats.

new sand grains. The child has excellent vision and aptly handles the sand to form representations of the passing floats.<sup>71</sup> The mother has a program of the parade, but is rather shortsighted or nearsighted (myopia), and thus looks at each sand sculpture and connects it up to one of the floats in her program book, patting the child on the head with each match. This process and connection comes accompanied by an overall warming and sunny temperament of the riverbank cove. This is a determining judgment which is also known as a judgment of cognition.

### 3.3.2 A reasonable idea, a judgment of desire

The second happening. Later in the day after no floats have passed by for a while, the grandmother, being mischievous by disposition, suggests to the child, ‘wouldn’t it be fun if you constructed a network of canals? Or built the sand up as high you could?’ So the child sculpts the sand already about but the mother cannot match the sculptures to anything in her program book. Nevertheless, the representation may be ideas for next year’s new floats.

## 3.4 Alignment of Elements

The riverbank scene is such that the festival floats represent objective things in the world.<sup>72</sup> As they float down the river, the faculties of sensation and imagination have direct access. The sand represents the intuitions (also known as sensory perceptions); as it is plentiful and each grain by itself is not that expressive. For what is a mere impression of woolliness on its own? Or redness? But how can one deny the importance

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<sup>71</sup>This metaphor is not intended to recall the homunculi of alchemy.

<sup>72</sup>Here, by objective things I mean those that existent regardless of being perceived.



Faculty of Mind	Cognitive Faculty	A priori Principles	Products
Faculty of Cognition	Understanding	Lawfulness	Nature
<i>Mother</i>	<i>program book</i>	<i>matching</i>	<i>parade</i>
Imagination	Compositionality	Capacity to Compose	representations
<i>Child</i>	<i>playing child</i>	<i>playing with sand</i>	<i>sand compositions</i>
Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure	Power of Judgment	Purposiveness	Art
<i>Weather</i>	<i>sunny and overcast</i>	<i>normative power of weather</i>	<i>unconcealment</i>
Sensation	Perception	Things-In-Themselves	Intuitions
<i>Beach</i>	<i>gathering hands</i>	<i>Floats</i>	<i>sand</i>
Faculty of Desire	Reason	Purposiveness	Morals
<i>Grandmother</i>	<i>grandmother's suggestions</i>	<i>mischievousness</i>	<i>new floats</i>

Table 3.3: Schedule of Kant's faculties of the human mind with the riverbank scenario

of redness to the overall impression of an object?<sup>73</sup> The faculty of sensation is the overall structural matter of the riverbank cove. Its shape effects how the sand is collected. The child represents the faculty of the imagination. Which although it is still called a 'lower faculty of the mind' as is the tradition of the time, within Kant's theory, the imagination emerges with a significant role in the overall process of thinking. I have intentionally used the political minefield of childhood for the imagination; as children are both considered less than adults, warranting less rights, and at the some time are considered more insightful and uncorrupted. The imagination represents the forms of the objects and is capable of occasionally recalling signs of concepts. It can also superimpose one image upon another to come up with a common measure. It has access to the object, as well as the ability to compose the sensory perceptions of the object. However, it must generally yield to the mother or grandmother who stand over subsuming or provoking the compositions. Admittedly, this assumed submissiveness may present a breakdown in the accuracy of the allegory, as children do not consistently yield to a caregivers' authority. Nevertheless for Kant, the imagination is generally submissive to the faculties

<sup>73</sup>Consider the color blinds' outfits.

of cognition and reason. Though, as I shall argue in the following chapter, the cultivation of the aesthetic judgment develops the authority of the imagination in combination with the faculty of spirit; as is common to the naturally born genius.

The imagination does not deal with concepts just as the child does not have access to the program book. It arranges sensory details such that the understanding can subsume the arrangement under a concept. The program book represents the laws of nature, as humans have come to understand them. It is the collection of general concepts of what is known about the world. Drawing on the argument of the introduction, these laws of nature are vulnerable to normalizing power relations and can fossilize as false knowledge. When the child's composition of sand can be easily matched up to a float in the program book then the judgment is a determining judgement. This provides an immediate satisfaction to everyone involved. That is, when the object in the world is represented by the imagination and determined by the power of judgment, subsuming it under a general concept of understanding, the faculty of the mind experiences a feeling of pleasure. This is how Kant by-steps the abyss between the independent objects in nature and our knowledge of them. A chasm which plagued his contemporary empiricist.

The second scenario, in which the mischievous grandmother prompts the child to create sand sculptures without reference to festival floats symbolizes the workings of reason. Reason plays with the imagination's ability to recall prior impressions or manifolds of intuitions without need of referencing a current object in nature. Depending on the desire of reason and the resourcefulness of the imagination, anything can be formed in the sand. As it does not correspond to floats on the river or in the program book, it therefore cannot legitimately be considered an item of knowledge but rather is an idea.<sup>74</sup>

Of course, ideas can be constructed and tested, which can create new objects in the world

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<sup>74</sup>Akin to the prehistoric artistic Krakens.

and thereby new concepts in the understanding; and thus new knowledge.

This system of the objects of the world and the faculties of mind working together accounts for why we in these bizarre and fragile bodies have been able to create a contemporary society, with moon visits, buggies on Mars, towers of babel 830 meters high, and so on. Something about the way we perceive the world is matching up with the world itself, for we are not merely “groping about” in the dark.<sup>75</sup>

### 3.5 Active Power of Judgment

Kant’s style of description is methodically systematic such that drafting a chart of judgments increases the ideas’ accessibility:

Table 3.4: Judgments

Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure		
<i>judgments of cognition</i> cognitive cognitive good/bad	<i>judgments of feeling</i> non-conceptual imaginary beautiful/unnoticed	<i>judgments of desire</i> non-cognitive sensory agreeable/disagreeable
Determining Judgments logical judgments good rep’s is of concept: :and is esteemed interested via reason presupposes or produces a need spirit concept: :abstract grouping of occurrence in world is objective objective universally valid judgment immediate and mediate good in itself and good for something feeling of pleasure= =judging of concept postulates accord	Reflecting Judgements judgments of taste beautiful rep’s of object: :and pleases disinterested and free — human: animal and spirit rep of manifold of intuition: :object in world is subjective and objective aesthetic universal valid judgment mediated beautiful through reflection feeling of pleasure= =judging of object ascribes agreement	judgements of senses agreeable sensations: :and existence of object gratifies interested via senses presupposes or produces need animal sensations and wanting obj to exist : :object in world is subjective — immediate agreeable in itself feeling of pleasure= =judging of object confined to individual

<sup>75</sup>Kant, 2000, 14 §IV 20:210.

Kant structures the feeling of pleasure and displeasure as the subjective drive in judgment making. I see the motivation for dividing the feelings of satisfaction as a means to establish the ever important experiences of something that is both subjective and objective, that a phenomenon can bind together matter of mind (i.e. can bridge mind to mind), and open a firsthand experience of other human minds.<sup>76</sup> He finds that with every judgment a feeling of satisfaction can be one of three styles recognizable as good, beautiful and agreeable. We do not feel the pleasure differently, rather the style by which the pleasure relates to its relevant object differs. The pleasure is metaphorically akin to the rhythm that matches a judgment to an object. If the object differs — e.g. concept, technique of nature, sensory thing — then it is the binding process between the two that varies and adapts rather than the phenomenal experience of the guiding force.<sup>77</sup> In other words, affirming a reflective judgment is always a pleasant feeling, but the way that the feeling reveals the object can be good, beautiful or agreeable.

However, this is a significant claim as it shifts the priority of cognition in assessing mental capacities. The traditional philosophical approach inherent to modernity is prioritizing the cognitive faculty, which most highly values the development of discriminating, categorizing, identifying and conceptualizing mental capacities. Cognitive judgments are based on perception, such as, the judgment that the dog is sitting. The claim is that judgment via the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, re-ranks the traditional hierarchy of mental capacities and opens space for non-cognitive thought, i.e., judgments without concepts. As noted above, Kant's employment of terms can afford undue bewilderment because he often makes use of the same term to convey different meaning or hold different positions. This is the case with the word *judgment*. Hence, I have drafted the

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<sup>76</sup>A phenomenon addressed eloquently as: "Under the charm of Dionysian (or tragic) art the bond between man and man is knitted up; even alien nature, hostile or enslaved, celebrates once more the reconciliation with man, her long-lost child. (Nietzsche, op. cit. p. 24 §I)." Carritt, 1914, p. 50.

<sup>77</sup>Kant, 2000, 94 ff. §5 5:209 ff.

following chart to locate the uses of the term in the relevant context.

Table 3.5: Three Commonly Discussed Capabilities

Faculty of the Mind:	Faculty of Cognition	Power of Judgment	Faculty of Desire
<b>Which employs:</b>	the understanding	judgments	reason
<b>which has:</b>	a library of <i>concepts</i>	styles of <i>judgments</i>	a library of <i>ideas</i>
<b>examples are:</b>	concept of dog	determining judgments	idea of hope
	concept of book	reflecting judgments	idea of love
<b>which the latter examples further divide to manifest as:</b>	concept of writing	aesthetic judgments	idea of friendship
	concept of documentation	teleological judgments	idea of the union

The aim of the chart is to clarify the claim made above (that all judgments are guided by the power of judgment) by structuring how the different meanings of judgment hold together according to Kant. Secondly, it is a notable claim as it declares that all judgments are value laden. For a judgment is bestowed only when it reaches a satisfaction via the normative guide of pleasure and displeasure. The feeling of satisfaction is manifested in the three different styles, ‘book’ still comes as a positive or negative pleasure. However this does not entail that one cannot say, ‘this is a book’, without somehow judging it as a good or bad book. One does not need to conclude that the book is good or bad to judge the book. Rather, feelings of pleasure and displeasure helps to match up the concept ‘book’ to the representations of the object. Hence when the representation in the mind matches up with the object in the world a minimal feeling of pleasure is experienced.

This phenomena of the way our bodies are set up to comprehend the world may explain why over time our species has manifest vast injustices which are unharmonious to nature’s techniques. If my reading is correct, our embodied cognition helps us engage with the world by feeling pleasure when mirroring objects in the world. In other words, we experience pleasure when we echo the manner of matter inherent to the object. When

the manner of matter inherent to the object is a manner of injustice (i.e. devouring without replenishing or stockpiling without using —  $\curvearrowright \rightarrow$  uni-directional and hierarchical causal relations, ); and we echo that manner, we still feel pleasure as we are successfully mirroring the object. Thus the mechanism we use to engage the world operates in such a way that we feel pleasure when echoing injustice. Injustice begets injustice. This would account for why there are practices of devouring and hoarding or why ecosystems/biosystems can become unbalanced. We do not inhabit a world where the techniques of nature are universally practiced. It would be simple to critique of Kant's theory with the objection that if techniques of nature are to balance and harmonize means & ends and cause & grounds (*means*  $\odot$  *ends*.), then why may we observe discord and injustice? If this reading is correct, then the injustice is a byproduct of the way we are set up to make sense of the world.

This is way cultivating nimbleness is important. Because, in rejecting an over reliance on ready-made concepts and positioning one's posture to be open to the habits of successful relationships of circular causes & grounds, one not only becomes more enabled in their own engagement with the world, but additionally becomes a generator of such patterns of practice for others.

### 3.5.1 Styles of satisfactions

Drawing the distinction between the beautiful and the agreeable is both a difficulty of and development in Kant's aesthetic theory. It hinges on the limitation of Kant's playing field of metaphysics. Kant is not seeking to provide a psychological or biological model of the world. He is attempting to establish what can and cannot be universally claimed.<sup>78</sup> The study of taste aims to establish something that is universal and non-

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<sup>78</sup>Some terms that are similar and important to have clear. *Transcendental* just means that if all human beings died, the principles discovered would still hold true and govern the world. Transcendental

conceptual by pointing to a universally accessible, firsthand experience. Kant believes there must be something underlying life. He argues that there is something about the world that is formative in itself, in addition to (or regardless of) our collective or normalized interpretation of it. Therefore to tease out a category which may provide a bridge to something universally inherent in the world itself, Kant separates three styles of satisfying feelings of pleasure. This is a bridge that individuals can directly experience and do not have to rely on dematerialized abstractions which are vulnerable to corruption.

In short, the agreeable is non-conceptual and non-normative but not universal. The good is universal but conceptual and normative. The beautiful is non-conceptual and universal. Thereby, that which is beautiful, is that which is not limited to interpretations by various physically inconsistent human bodies, but rather inherent to the functioning of the world itself which everyone has the capacity to experience firsthand regardless of their collection of concepts, education, or social, political, historical and economical background.


The beautiful is a subjective experience of an objective state of mind. As such the beautiful affords us to have firsthand experience of other minds and of something greater than ourselves, which Kant hopes will lead to the will to behave ethically and practice something akin to the moral maxims laid out in his second *Critique*.<sup>79</sup> But first Kant

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principles are not ‘our’ principles, as they govern regardless of our awareness of them. We are fortunate that through history our culture has been able to figure out a few of them, to a degree of reliability. Transcendental truths are generally thought of as natural truths. *A priori principles* are basically the same thing, but in cultural practice the term is a bit more plastic, and broader than transcendental. *A priori* basically means we do not have to empirically validate the claim, to know its truth, we know it through thinking about it. *Universality* is again similar. It means in all situations where this thing occurs, it will be true. I.e., the idea holds true in all situation it occurs. Furthermore, generally examples of universal truths are of constructed truths. They are truths that we grant as an account of something that necessarily cannot be discovered via experience of all the possible cases. For example consider the concept of the natural numbers reaching to infinity.

<sup>79</sup>Which could ultimately lead to a society of humanity behaving ethically and incurring *Telosland*.

must refine what is conveyed in discussing the beautiful so that he does not fall prey to (Scottish) common sense. Therefore, when we experience an object as satisfying; Kant claims this satisfaction may come from one of three sources. The way Kant describes an individual's experience of engaging with an object ready to hand can be drawn with the following broad brushstrokes of a tree of judgment types.<sup>80</sup>



### the good

In judging the good, the representation is of a concept interesting to the individual via the faculty of reason and awakens a respect, esteem, or approval.<sup>81</sup> It presupposes or produces a need of the concept for the individual. The satisfaction is bestowed when the representation of the concept correlates with an abstract grouping of occurrences in the world.<sup>82</sup> For example, the concept *book* is applicable to all objects that have the

<sup>80</sup>Kant has a very particular use of the term *interest* as is discussed shortly.

<sup>81</sup>See sections §§4-5, 5:207—5:211 Kant, 2000 for full discussion of the good.

<sup>82</sup>Kant notes that all creatures of spirit (i.e. rational beings) afford this experience.



quality of written expression of thoughts in an intentional structure. Thus in judging what currently lays before you, this particular collection of written ideas, the faculties of mind will compare the current representation to the general concept and determine if this thing is indeed a book. Can the faculty of cognition subsume a representation under a concept without judging it? No, the subsumption is the judgment, it is the determining judgment that this collection of intuitions is this concept. Nothing more and nothing less. However, to judge if something is good or bad is a reflective judgment and in such cases the concept must be compared to ideas of reason. Which is the subject of the second *Critique*, and outside the scope of the thesis.

How is the good different from beauty? How can one tell if what one's dealing with is good or beautiful? Moreover, why are things just good, beautiful or agreeable? What is sublime? The good is something related to general things, such as dogs are good or bikes are good. The good pleases through reason alone.<sup>83</sup> Good pleases with interest, for example it pleases as a concept when something is good in itself and as an end when something is good for something.<sup>84</sup> Good is applicable to things that can be generalized or to the generalization itself, rather than particular objects, because it is a judgment that comes from the faculty of desire,<sup>85</sup> and employs the ideas of reason to devise the laws of what is good.<sup>86</sup> So in this why Kant divides off abstract concepts from the realm of beauty, while maintaining their worth and common sense desirability.

### the agreeable

For Kant's theory of taste we need to assume everyone is capable of being aware of a pleasure that occurs when one's mental faculties are in a harmonious relation to each other.

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<sup>83</sup>Kant, 2000, 92 §4 5:207.

<sup>84</sup>*ibid.*, 92 §4 5:207.

<sup>85</sup>*ibid.*, 94 §4 5:209.

<sup>86</sup>As is demonstrated in Kant's second *Critique*.

However, whether or not everyone cultivates this capability is a different issue. Kant is aware that there are many things about people's individual take on the world that cannot be assumed as given just because someone is human. In a study of metaphysics the agreeable is necessarily excluded for it is an empirical claim and cannot be known *a priori*. Thus charms and physical enjoyment cannot be presupposed from the standpoint of transcendental philosophy.<sup>87</sup> As discussed below, the traditional distinction lies between sensations and intuitions of the object. Where sensations are alteration in the individual experiencing the object and intuitions are the qualities of the object itself. In other words, intuitions are the form in which the matter relates to itself which may be the manner of matter echoed in perception. Sensations are merely the alterations in the individual perceiver's body which need not echo the manner of the objects' matter. Sensation may take the object's manner of matter and mingle it with the perceiver's own desires and expectations so that the object's manner of matter is not echoed. The goal of this distinction seems to be to eliminate petty ontic arguments of varieties in everyday preferences. However, one could argue that these differences of preferences arise due to the varying degree of sensitivity amongst individuals; akin to the degree of skills of chess playing or horse riding based on variety of development. In other realms of life, it is granted that skills may be cultivated with practice and concentration. Some people are disposed to developing a greater quality of the skill due to their physical make up, build or life long habits. Nevertheless, it is generally taken that abilities can be improved given the right opportunities, motivations, and practice.

Additionally, Kant partitions objects of sensual pleasure from those of beauty. If he did not divide off the agreeable, then any number of objections could be made by pointing to differences experienced between individuals.<sup>88</sup> The issue here is the subtlety of difference

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<sup>87</sup>Kant, 2000, 173 §39 5:293.

<sup>88</sup>In a 1914 publication on the theory of beauty, aestheticist E.F. Carritt aptly discerns: "[Kant's] main object was to show that the satisfaction derived from beauty is not, as Hume had maintained,

between sensually desirable objects and things that inspire certain mental reactions or developments. His examples of the difference amongst the agreeable are the preference for the color violet and the joy of wind instruments over that of strings. Debates today tend more towards iphone versus android or ipad versus kindle. But why is something agreeable rather than beautiful?

The agreeable is a gratification that accompanies the representations of sensation and the existence of the object close to hand. It presupposes or produces a material need, and it is purely subjective, i.e., “restricted to his own person”.<sup>89</sup> It occurs when the *sensation* and *want* of the object’s existence matches up with an object in the world. Because there is a want of the existence of the object the individual is interested, invested, even biased to the object. This element of inherent bias is an active distinction between the beautiful and agreeable, as it conceals the power to reflectively judge.

Furthermore, an agreeable object has charms, [*Reize*], which are explicitly contrasted with beautiful forms.<sup>90</sup> Put most simply, charms are obscured forms of Beauty. Beautiful forms are not in anyway revealed to us through interest in charms or societal habits of civilizations’ inclination to refine various styles of charms.<sup>91</sup> Such agreeable pleasures which play to an individual’s physical matter may become important to society and generate great interest, but they mask their teleological power.<sup>92</sup> As they do not create

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sensuous, arbitrary, empirical and subjective. He is prepared for an aesthetic battle analogous to the one which he has fought for knowledge; and as that turned on the ‘synthetic judgements *a priori*’ of pure mathematical intuition, so here he believes that the key of the situation is our judgment of a pleasure universally communicable, yet independent of concepts. In other words, why do we say; ‘This is a pretty pattern’, and believe ourselves to be speaking objective truth, though we have no interest in the thing, nothing of any purpose which it serves, and no moral or scientific concept of what type of thing it ought to be?” Carritt, 1914, p. 64.

<sup>89</sup>Kant, 2000, 97 §7 5:212.

<sup>90</sup>*ibid.*, 177 §41 5:297.

<sup>91</sup>*ibid.*, 177 §41 5:297.

<sup>92</sup>In Kant’s words: “However, this interest, attached to the beautiful indirectly, through an inclination to society, and thus empirical, is of no importance for us here, for we must find that importance only in what may be related to the judgment of taste *a priori*, even if only indirectly.” *ibid.*, 177 §41 5:297.

an event of Beauty, they cannot provide a gateway to experiencing the formative power of nature. Which in the greater context, is the ultimate Kantian aim, because in experiencing the formative power of nature, he believes we will fall in line with this power's intentions, which leads to a habit of ethical behavior. Examples of charms are things like modifications of light in the coloring or sound in the tone.<sup>93</sup> They can be contained in language such as the telling of entertaining stories or tones of merriment, but merely for momentary entertainment.<sup>94</sup> Yet then what is a beautiful color; as in, the "beautifully colored birds' feathers" *schonfarbige Vogelfedern*.<sup>95</sup> In the third *Critique* Kant is inconsistent in his understanding of charms and the claim that an individual let alone without society would not adorn their hut or self, seems incomplete or inconsistent. I think he cuts too much off from his theory in order to make it hold up to critique, akin to Edmund Husserl and his ever slighting phenomenological methodology.<sup>96</sup> This issue is taken up further in the following part of the thesis, *Art & Nature*. Where insights from Kant's final synthesis adventually published as his *Opus Posthumum*, are compared with the idea of the agreeable and why Kant changed the footnote in the third addition of the third *Critique* to allow color as a form of beauty.<sup>97</sup> Förster argues that the change results from Kant's contemplation on the connection between the mechanical powers and the ponderability of matter, which lead Kant to change the "which I very much doubt" to "about which I have very little doubt" in the assertion:<sup>98</sup>

"If one assumes, with Euler, that the colors are vibrations of the air immedi-

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<sup>93</sup>Kant, 2000, 181 §42 5:302.

<sup>94</sup>*ibid.*, 184 §44 5:305.

<sup>95</sup>*ibid.*, 177 §41 5:297.

<sup>96</sup>Husserl is well known for developing a method of inquiry which brackets the object of study within the horizon of possibility. Moreover, his own interest in perfecting the apparatus of the phenomenological method overtook his own study of the phenomena sought to be disclosed. Husserl likens the over attention to sharpening the tool to a story he shared about his childhood in 1929. As a child he had been given a pocket knife, of which he found the blade ever too dull. Thus he sharpened the metal until it had the strength of a toothpick and was of no use for cutting. Tymieniecka, 1970, p. XXIX

<sup>97</sup>See: Kant, 2000, 109 §14 5:224 and Förster, 2000, p. 47.

<sup>98</sup>Kant, 2000, 109 §14 5:224 and Förster, 2000, p. 27.

ately following one another, just as tones are vibrations of the air disturbed by sounds, and, what is most important, that the mind does not merely perceive, by sense, their effect on the animation of the organ, but also, through reflection, perceives the regular play of the impressions (hence the form in the combination of different representations) (about which I have very little doubt), then colors and tones would not be mere sensations, but would already be a formal determination of the unity of a manifold of them, and in that case could also be counted as beauties in themselves.”<sup>99</sup>

The uniqueness of beauty lies in its potential to warrant disinterested interest which reveals firsthand the overlap between our own cognition of the techniques of nature. Yet, with the beautiful we linger in the state of mind it affords, could that not easily be confused with the phenomenon of wanting the object’s existence? Perhaps though for Kant, the issue is more than the desire to be with the object; it is the reflection that the object is desired.

The argument for distinction between the agreeable and the beautiful revolves around the idea that the agreeable is immediately perceived as what it is, i.e., gratifying. Whereas the beautiful is not immediately perceived as anything at all, but rather that which warrants further contemplation. A judgment of taste is delayed. Thus an agreeable architectural object may be something sensual with charms, something immediately desirable to the visitor. Such as Herzog & de Meuron’s Prada Boutique (2003) in the Aoyama district of Tokyo; where upon seeing the bubbling diamond windows, one is drawn into the Prada store, and upon emerging through the broken diamond door, one proceeds to ascend the whimsical escalation to physically consume the space. However this architecture does not offer the delayed judgment of beauty and thereby can not

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<sup>99</sup>Kant, 2000, 109 §14 5:224.

lead to cultivating nimbleness. The judgment that accompanies an agreeable object determines the collected sense perceptions into a fixed form, and it finds pleasure in the object irrelevantly of its further consequences. That is, should the agreeable object be a chocolate tart, the consequences of its impact on one's summer attire or pocket book are immaterial to the desire to consume the tart. In this sense, the agreeable object spurs a vested interest in its existence. It is a vested interest because the individual perceiver wants the object's existence regardless of consequence. In comparison to the disinterested interest in the beautiful object where its existence is not already determined as desirable, and such a conclusion is not immediately identified.

Furthermore, there must be no personal interest in the object. Kant asserts that a judgment of taste, by which something is declared to be beautiful, must have no interest in the object being judged.<sup>100</sup> For example, one may judge that their friend's recently acquired Eileen Gray *Monte Carlo Sofa* is beautiful, but this does not mean that one must want the chair in their own home. This is because to have interest conceals the event of judgment. To question whether or not the object fits into one's own life or daily habits is removed from the experience of being open to the object itself. An event of Beauty may not be contextualized by the individual's priory collections and judgements, because the event is one of uncontextualized openness to the present. It is a lingering in the indecision of the object's dominant aspects, because beautiful forms lack dominating aspects and are harmonious. To consider the object in light of one's own desire for the object would call into play an artificial structuring, and would be studying a semblance of the object, rather than the object itself. After an aesthetic judgment, then the individual may pragmatically consider the interest; e.g., would the sofa fit through my window, would my dog hurt his head on that corner, would my

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<sup>100</sup>Kant, 2000, 176 §41 5:296.

friends think me pretentious, would it complement the Josef Hoffmann *Sofa Cabinet* already earmarked for the sitting room, and so forth.

In a similar line, concepts cannot be involved in the event of judging beauty or sublime. With the involvement of concepts, the individual would be comparing the compositions of the imagination to a concept in the understanding. As concepts are normative and societal, they are inherently hierarchical, as the structured and organization of the manifolds of intuition have been designed before. Concepts thereby overpower the imagination and put an end to the playful representation of the object. Concepts exist within the closed system of human knowledge. This is how normalizing power practices can employ false knowledge which incites individuals to internalized market-led pastoral power relations whose unrelinquishing drive for categorization commodifies marginal practices. With his aesthetic theory, Kant's aim is to identify an event that occurs regardless of human knowledge, something more primordial or primitive that links us to the world itself.

### **an aesthetic event**

The event of an aesthetic judgment, (i.e. a judgement of taste or an event of Beauty), *is* one's self awareness of a feeling (subjective) of pleasure, a pleasure which arises from the physical make up of our human bodies (objective) and the mental faculties which come along with the objective makeup. Thus we each individually have an inborn (via our physical and basic make up) power to aesthetically judge the world about us, and when we live in a society we have the ability to communicate that independent judgment, anticipating and demanding the same of others.

Kant argues that to say 'this is beautiful for me' is inaccurate; that rather when we say

‘this is beautiful’ we do not expect but rather demand others to agree.<sup>101</sup> Hence because we commonly assert aesthetic judgments as universals, they are. As Kant writes, “We are justified in presupposing universally in every human being the same subjective condition of the power of judgment we find in ourselves,” which is the pleasure arising from observing our faculties in a particular relationship to each other.<sup>102</sup> However the *because we say so* argument, also common to analytic philosophy, may lack in conviction.<sup>103</sup> Mercifully, Kant’s other arguments prove more permissive, for if we are to have any judgments of taste we need to assume differences.<sup>104</sup>

Once an object has spurred the state of mind necessary to judge the object as beautiful (a process which will be discussed in detail in the immediately following section), the demand comes for others to agree about the judgment, rather than for the continued existence of the object itself. The existence of the object is not a property above and beyond the object. It is the object itself. For Kant, in the event of Beauty, there is no object that does not exist. The distinction between the beautiful and agreeable in this line is one of wanting to be in possession of the object. In experiencing the agreeable, the individual wants the object to be *near*, *with*, or *consumed* by themselves. Whereas with the beautiful, the individual finds pleasure in the object itself. The object can exist, here, there or somewhere else. The interest is not vested, invested or biased.<sup>105</sup>

In short, beauty differs from the agreeable and the good via the ideas of reflection, interest, assertion, and need. However, this discussion uncovers the question of overlap; can an object be both beautiful and agreeable, or perhaps all three, beautiful, agreeable

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<sup>101</sup>Kant, 2000, 97 §7 5:212.

<sup>102</sup>*ibid.*, 170-1 §38 5:290.

<sup>103</sup>This is in reference to the linguistic turn found in analytic philosophy over the last century. The coinage is my own.

<sup>104</sup>Kant, 2000, 98 §7 5:213.

<sup>105</sup>Perhaps, the colloquialism regarding love, ‘I just want them to be happy’, may serve as a familiar example for the disinterested interest. Perhaps though, if one has not experienced that style of love, the example will only compound the challenge of distinguishing the agreeable from the beautiful.



and good. Perhaps, but the means of satisfying each of these judgments vary. This is why it is helpful to think of beauty as the *event of Beauty*; as in the *event* of a sunrise, with the agreeableness of the warmth on one's cheeks from the reach of the sun, the concept of this being good because vitamin D is good for one's health, and beauty as the pleasure of representing the harmonious interplay of forms on the horizon.

### 3.5.2 Beauty; the third happening

A float appears composed of a thriving ecosystem with: a peaty loom, mosses, flowers, moths and beetles, springs and the likes. It is a last minute addition to the parade, so it is not in the mother's program book. Nonetheless the waves push up new sands and the child begins to compose it, the mother looks back and forth between the sand sculptures and the program book but cannot find a connection and does not announce the identity. The child continues to play with the form, highlighting certain aspects over others, playing with different features of the structure, and shifting from vantage point to vantage point, each of which seem balanced. The mother puts down the program book and simply watches the child, the child continues with the sand arrangements and the mother continues to enjoy watching these new arrangements materialize. The situation as a whole is pleasant and comes with a rich feeling of pleasure that all elements enjoy and linger in. This is the free beauty where no concepts are presupposed, but it is more than the float not being in the program book.

Kant incorporates the notion of 'no interest in the object' of beauty through the ideas of *free beauty* and *adherent beauty*. Free beauty has no concept of what the object ought to be. His examples of free beauty include: flowers, birds (along with their colorful plumage), crustaceans, foliage (in borders or wallpaper), and music fantasias.<sup>106</sup>

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<sup>106</sup>Kant, 2000, 114 §16 5:229.

Adherent beauty has a concept of what an object ought to be or the perfection of its form and presupposes a concept of the object's *end*. Kant's examples are: humans, horses, and buildings.<sup>107</sup> Because adherent beauty contains a presupposed end, the individual's reflection upon the object's various vantage points in the causal nexus is unbalanced (as the end vantage point is artificially favored).<sup>108</sup> This unbalance hinders the power of reflecting judging, unless the individual is either ignorant to the normative hierarchies of the idealized forms, or if the individual is able to intentionally bracket off the social-historical-political concepts of ends. It is an object's inherent teleological relationship (a relationship that rests on a circular movement between the means & ends / *means*  $\circ$  *ends*) that evokes events of Beauty. Here, we see that adherent beauty's teleological relationship is unbalanced because of its focus upon the ends, thereby such objects are not harmonious and do not express Beauty.

One may ask, is the experience of the child replicating these life giving systems the feeling of pleasure that comes with an aesthetic judgment of beauty? Not exactly. As discussed in the judgment section, the satisfying of an aesthetic judgment accompanies the matching up of representations to objects in world. However the limitations of what type of object affords an aesthetic judgment to be satisfied involves the aesthetic of beauty in nature's techniques. *The significance of the beautiful float is that, it itself manifests a transparency of circular causal and grounding relationships.* With the beautiful float and the child (i.e. the object and the imagination) the beautiful object has *no* ideal vantage point, perspective, or angle. The object is as a whole and only as such,

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<sup>107</sup>Kant, 2000, 114 §16 5:230.

<sup>108</sup>In an extended endnote or 'general remark' on the section, Kant notes that the regularity of the garden will please the visitor at first but once the regularity of the order has been understood, the pepper garden will no longer entertain the visitor, but "rather impose upon the imagination a burdensome constraint, whereas nature, which is there extravagant in its varieties to the point of opulence, subject to no coercion from artificial rules, could provide his taste with lasting nourishment." *ibid.*, 126 §'General remarks on the first section of the Analytic' 5:243.

expresses techniques of nature.<sup>109</sup>

If an object has an optimal grip (i.e. a dominant perspective, a best angle, a hierarchical form, a categorizable ideal), then the power of judgment affirms pleasure when the dominant perspectives are represented (and when this representation is subsumed under a general concept, a determining judgment is made). With the beautiful there is no best angle, so the guiding power of judgment is able to affirm pleasure when there is a lack of dominance — affording a free-play of the imagination.<sup>110</sup> In other words, without an optimal grip, or concept applicability, the imagination is free to compose and recompose the sensory impressions of the object, in a way that brings pleasure because the composed representations **are** matching up with the object itself; the object being an expression of nature, i.e., a beautiful object. None of the individual facets are the definitive perspective - hence it does not afford a simplistic, generalized concept, which is why we linger in this space, with this object, for each facet lures us to the next and defies our ability to label or conceptualize it.

In short, beauty differs from the agreeable and the good via: reflection, interest, assertion, and need. Judgments of beauty are lead by feelings (i.e. feelings of pleasure and displeasure),<sup>111</sup> they make claim to universality, instilling a sense that the object ought to be judged as beautiful but despite this may not be proven,<sup>112</sup> they are not the confirmation of a pre-determined purpose or aim of the object,<sup>113</sup> and finally they are

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<sup>109</sup>Consider the experience granted by Ando's Monet room in the Chichu Museum, or the *Basse Yutz Flagons*, how one wants to circle, hold and rotate the serving container. Or, think of one of the more successful paintings by Piet Mondriaan, the utter balance of the canvas, the colors, the lines and such. Or, consider Katsushika Hokusai's *The Great Wave off Kanagawa* (1830-1833), which can linger with one's thoughts for years after it is seen.

<sup>110</sup>See: Bell, 1987 and Crowther, 1989 for support of the analysis of the phenomenological experience of the non-conceptual, free-play of the imagination.

<sup>111</sup>Kant First Moment §§1-5

<sup>112</sup>Second Moment §§6-9

<sup>113</sup>Third Moment §§10-17

normative.<sup>114</sup> But what is left ambiguous is how we ontic-ally or practically position objects into these structures, i.e., how this prepares us to sort and discuss the objects of the world. Moreover, what would the distinction come down to, that which can be categorized and that which cannot? Yet perhaps Kant accounts for this when providing an almost phenomenological or psychological account of individuals' attempts to figure out if an object is merely agreeable or indeed beautiful.<sup>115</sup> This account most interestingly draws the role of the concept into center stage for the ontic structuring of experiencing beauty.

### aesthetic versus objective universal judgments

What role then does the concept play in universal judgments? An aesthetic universal judgment does not depend on concepts and is not logical.<sup>116</sup> In addition, it is not an objective judgment, but a subjective judgment. *Objective universal valid judgments* concern concepts of things and as such must be generalizable. For example, consider the concept of *library*. It is a universally valid judgment that libraries are intended to contain an orderly collection of books. When reading this one may imagine physical books, but contemporary libraries have come to challenge this association, however at minimum they still do hold an orderly collection of digital books. For example, the public library: Bexar County Judge Nelson Wolff in San Antonio, Texas, U.S. (2013) will be the first all-digital public library system. Other recently commission library buildings have de-emphasized the position of four-dimensional books; such as Zaha Hadid's Library and Learning Centre in Vienna, Austria (2012), Snøhetta's Bibliotheca Alexandrina in Egypt (2002) and Toyo Ito's Tama Art University Library in Hachioji, Tokyo, Japan

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<sup>114</sup>Fourth Moment §§18-22

<sup>115</sup>Kant, 2000, 118 §17 5:234.

<sup>116</sup>*ibid.*, 19 §8 5:214.

(2007). Perhaps with time digital books will shift to collections of chapters of books, to free floating quotations from books; echoing the transformation of the unity of a record of music being made in a room, to compact disc, to signal songs and snippets present as sound bites. Nevertheless, the judgment regards a collection of concepts, in this case the concepts of: library, orderly, and books. It is not a judgment that requires one to be present in a library beholding, let us say a collection of eighteenth century Prussian books, and it may be held abstractly when walking through the woods and daydreaming about such places. However, it is a judgment that must be able to be conceived in individual human minds, thus subjectively. Different people when imagining the concept of library will likely envision very different spaces, but as long as the minimal accepted qualities of the concept are present, then the space may be labeled as a library. It is only with further discussion, definitions and concepts that less general libraries can be communicated, designed and constructed.

Contrarily an *aesthetic universally valid judgment* may not be generalized to the level of concept.<sup>117</sup> That is, there is not a collection of elements, such as ‘orderly’ or ‘books’ that can provide a reassuring rule to what is beautiful. Rather particular specimens of general concepts are beauty, e.g., the judgment that ‘this particular book is beautiful’ is possible.<sup>118</sup> That which can be generalized or abstracted from the experience of beauty which affords the judgment the label of *universality*, is the predicate of beauty extended “over the whole sphere of those who judge.”<sup>119</sup> So even though there is no logical concept to process or abstractly identify objects as beautiful, there is still something about the act of judging that can be abstracted. In other words, a predicate of beauty operating is from the objects themselves to the individuals who judge — the universality is the harmonious lingering all beautiful objects afford. This universality is what affords the

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<sup>117</sup>Kant, 2000, 100 §8 5:215.

<sup>118</sup>*ibid.*, 100 §8 5:215.

<sup>119</sup>*ibid.*, 100 §8 5:215.

metaphorical bridge between minds and is discussed in greater detail in a few paragraphs below. The experience of a beautiful object provides a generalizable situation in the minds of observers.<sup>120</sup>

The simplest distinction between aesthetic and objective universally valid judgments is that aesthetic judgments subsume via relation and sensation, while logical judgments subsume via a concept or law (connected to the object and determined by the collective dialectic it is embedded within). Objective universally valid judgments are generalizations that must be able to be valid for everyone who represents an object through its concept.<sup>121</sup> Whereas aesthetic universally valid judgments are generalizations that must be valid for everyone who is open to an experience of beauty, i.e., who has some degree of nimbleness.

Putting aside the details of the situation in the human faculties of mind for a moment, let us turn to one of the prerequisites this claim brings about, i.e., the judgment must occur afresh each time. An aesthetic judgment is a “singular” judgment.<sup>122</sup> The experience of beauty is wrapped up with how the different parts of the mind relate to each other while experiencing the object of beauty. To have the faculties of mind relate to each other in this particular and harmonious way, an object of beauty must be present. The experience of beauty is the reaction to an existent material object. Thus, it is the rose I am gazing at that is beautiful. That all roses are beautiful is a derivative judgment, what Kant calls an *aesthetically grounded logical judgment*.<sup>123</sup> But those kind of judgments cannot be made without first experiencing the beauty oneself.

This discussion raises the question requiring memory of beauty, i.e., how can one have a

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<sup>120</sup>This account is akin to what Deleuze dubs as the *aesthetics of the spectator* in relation to Kant’s judgment of taste.

<sup>121</sup>Kant, 2000, 100 §8 5:215.

<sup>122</sup>*ibid.*, 100 §8 5:215 and 169 §37 5:289.

<sup>123</sup>*ibid.*, 100 §8 5:215.

memory of a beautiful object if beauty is the judgment and the judgment must be made afresh?<sup>124</sup> Though the query of memory of beauty warrants analysis outside of the confines of this thesis, it is interesting to consider the possible directions of analysis. An aesthetically grounded logical judgment could be the memory itself. Here the memory would reform each occasion that the faculty of reason, or even imagination, calls upon it. Or perhaps memories may appear when something present in the material world provokes the memory, as is often noted with smell. In this case, the material presence would still play an influential role in the event of beauty and account for why memories are often weaker than the firsthand experience. Or the memory of beauty could have less to do with the object itself, and more with one's subjective experience of pleasure. Or the imagination may hold onto various manifolds of intuitions and may at some points like 'to take them out' and dust them off or see if they could help compose the current situation. In some of these structures, memories of beauty would contain concepts akin to aesthetic grounded logical judgments; while in others, memories would require sensory intuition from the material presence. I tend to think of memories like cicadas. They burrow deep into the moist dark places of the earth, bearing new life in their own form. Recklessly emerging at various intervals in abundance, overtaking the horizon. Providing nourishment and play with those amongst them and then fade with a few persistent flutterings until only the husks populate the landscape. Granting the complexity of memories, two things are certain, one is that memories of beauty can never be as complete as the event experienced afresh and two, that they can never be relived, for the material world only exists in the present. The material world of the past does not exist anywhere.

In addition to aesthetic judgments necessarily occurring afresh and firsthand; if the judg-

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<sup>124</sup>For an alternative considerations of memory see Rawes' analysis of Kant's reflective subject in terms of Plato's recollected geometry or later in terms of Bergson's matter and memory. Rawes, 2008b, 29-31 & 133 ff.

ment about an object is to be universally communicable, then the state of mind (while the representations of the object are judged) must serve as grounds for the judgment with pleasure as a consequence. In other words, the state of mind existent while aesthetically judging a representation of an object must be universally communicable before having a feeling of pleasure. However only cognition (or representations of cognition) can be universally communicated and cognition relies on concepts (as abstractions and normative rules). That is, the ingredient *concepts* makes the judgment objective and hence universal. So what can be objective or universal in an aesthetic judgment which does not use concepts? Kant points to the “state of mind” or the configuration of the faculties of mind in relationship to each other, i.e., the position and activities the faculty of mind take to each other while reflecting upon the object and making the judgment.<sup>125</sup> The effect that the object has on the faculties of mind vary endlessly in details, but are always processed in the same configuration amongst themselves. While no general law or concept about the object can be justified, there is a general law about the effect of the object on the human mind; in particular how the faculties of the human mind relate to each other when such a type of object is present and admired afresh.<sup>126</sup> The *configuration* is the general law, the universal, and the objectivity. In Kant’s words:

“Now this merely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which the object is given, precedes the pleasure in it, and is the ground of this pleasure in the harmony of the faculties of cognition; but on that universality of the subjective condition of the judging of objects alone is the universal subjective validity of satisfaction, which we combine with the representation of the object that we call beautiful, grounded.”<sup>127</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>Kant, 2000, 103 §9 5:218.

<sup>126</sup>*ibid.*, 102 §9 5:217.

<sup>127</sup>*ibid.*, 103 §9 5:218.



This experience, brought on by the representation of the object in-itself, brings pleasure; it is not the concept of the mental faculties in such an arrangement that brings the pleasure, but the active arrangement itself.<sup>128</sup> There is a configuration between the factuality that is “indeterminate” and in “unison”, the harmonious play of the faculties does not trigger a determining judgment.<sup>129</sup> The faculties are “enlivened through mutual agreement”.<sup>130</sup> The activity is indeterminate in that through the stimulus of a given representation it is in unison. It is an object that generates the mental representation that stimulates the indetermining acting of the mind’s faculties. That the cause of these activities originates solely from an object affords the universality of the judgment.

But then, this begs the question: are all aesthetic judgments positive, is a *judgment* an aesthetic judgment or merely a cognitive, determining judgment of the understanding? I.e., ‘this is a beautiful object’ — or this is just a ‘door handle’, ‘painting’, or ‘floor’. Must the answer be yes or it is not an aesthetic judgment? For if it is the reflection itself that warrants the label beautiful, what would that mean? Objects are beautiful or are simply a thing, a thing that can be easily labeled and identified. To immediately identify is to deny an object’s beauty. This is one space where there is room to cultivate judgment of taste, i.e., in the ability to forestall the subsumption by the understanding should the object warrant playfulness by the imagination. Hence aesthetic universally valid judgments are valid for everyone who cares to uncover events of Beauty.

### 3.5.3 Other minds

By whittling the experience of beauty down to a very singular judgment, Kant is able to get to something extraordinary in the capacity of human beings. That is, an experience

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<sup>128</sup>Kant, 2000, 104 §9 5:219.

<sup>129</sup>*ibid.*, 104 §9 5:219.

<sup>130</sup>*ibid.*, 104 §9 5:219.

that is entirely of our own, subjective and cannot be derived or arrived at via logic or normative concepts and as such is independent of the individual's socially, economically, historically and politically embedded knowledge. But nonetheless, is an experience that is expected of others. It is an experience that shows us point blank, the community of mind, i.e., the share-able experience of humanity.

This is why events of Beauty are essential to cultivating nimbleness and resisting normalizing practices of power. It also presents opportunity for architects and architecture to contribute to cultivation and resistance.

While beauty is subjective to the individual it is still brought about by the objects in the world. We are always already embedded in a situation. It is possible to suggest that the faculty of reason or spirit could provoke the imagination to compose a multitude of representations out of past intuitions which in turn the faculty of understanding could enjoy. If in such a case the individual's faculty of reason or spirit expresses the techniques of nature then it would be labeled as *genius* by Kant. In such cases it is the spirit that is active and the body that manifests the aesthetic idea in matter.<sup>131</sup>

The key factor in creating the harmonious relationship between the imagination and the understanding is to consider that individuals are constantly in a body and in a world with objects, and to some extent are continuously judging their surroundings, thus it is rare to find the occasion where the imagination can dwell on a single object or intuitions of past objects. For the imagination to really be allowed exclusively the time to linger on an object or past intuition of objects, the representations need to be fluidly folded together such that each composition flows into the other, so that the understanding may not tear the reflection apart and abstract a simplified concept of it. An event of Beauty is the only thing which warrants this behavior. In other words, all objects which express

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<sup>131</sup>The role of the genius is addressed in the chapter below on *Art & Nature*..

this fineness of form are beautiful for that is what it is to be beautiful. The richness or *thickness* of the flowing of folding and unfolding is the assumed teleological relationship of an underlying force, which can be called a formative power of nature.<sup>132</sup> Hence, in the process of judging, the representations are matching up to the richness or fineness of form existent in the material presence itself. The pleasure guides the judgment to linger in the flow of representations which echo the manner of the object itself.

If we briefly revisit the riverbank thought experiment and increase the metaphorical scope of the scenario, we find that the river contains many coves with the same roles at play, i.e., other people. If in the neighboring embankment the child sculpts a single representation when witnessing the beautiful float, then that faculty of imagination is defunct. For example, as the float with the multifaceted thriving eco-system drifts by, and the child represents the sand in merely one random form, say of a horse, then there is something amiss with the individual embankment, as the sand sculpture of a horse does not match up to witnessing the beautiful float. Or if in another embankment the child begins to be playful with the new sands washed up by the beautiful float and the mother cuts short the sculpting by announcing, ‘that’s just a wall’ (or any other concept), then they too are wrong, because what they are doing does not match up to the independent object in the world. However, just because the child down the riverbank makes a mistake about representing the float, does not mean that we cannot represent things. As for example, just because a mathematician can make mistakes in his formula, does not mean that we cannot know anything about mathematics.<sup>133</sup>

Concepts are simplifications of experience, they are useful by being more shallow, superficial and thinner than experience itself. They allow us to communicate outside of

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<sup>132</sup>See Kant’s discussion of free formation and transition “through a leap” in §58. Kant, 2000, 221-5 §58 5:346-51 See also Kant’s discussion of the concept of a natural end in §77. *ibid.*, 274-8 §77 5:405-10.

<sup>133</sup>For Kant’s own discussion of mathematicians see §2 *Concerning the Kind of Cognition which can alone be called Metaphysical* of the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*. Kant, 2001, 9 §2 266.

our immediate spatial-temporal sphere. Concepts are also susceptible to false knowledge as they are established through historical, social, economical and political context. The mother who subsumes the multitude of sculptures by labeling them *just a wall* is one of the more predominant expressions of normalization. The hypercategorization of the conceptual world leaves the individual misaligned with the material presence. In this light, the understanding holds no superiority in rank over the other various mental faculties. Events of Beauty defy the understanding's habit of simplification, by enchanting it and luring it to relax, to give undivided attention, or to care. Moreover, it is only the configuration brought on by the beautiful object that affords such lingering.

At the same time it is interesting to question why we know that one scenario with the child making the multitude of gnarly sand sculptures is correct and the other child making the horse is wrong. Why is the horse wrong? Kant would pose the negative argument of; 'if what we are doing is not matching up with what is in the world, than *how are we doing it?*' If the way our faculties engage with the world is not matching up to the world then we are merely groping in the dark; and if you want to assume that, then you eliminate yourself from the argument by denying the space for discourse.

### 3.5.4 Mathematical sublime

So far the focus of aesthetic judgments has been on experiencing beautiful objects. However aesthetic judgments are also possible through experiencing sublime horizons. Kant claims that the pleasure of contemplation is a pleasure in the sublime of nature.<sup>134</sup> Contemplative pleasure has universal participation, awakens awareness of the sublime's supersensible vocation, and has a moral foundation. Kant further argues that in turn, it is this moral law that justifies a predisposition for a satisfaction in everyone because

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<sup>134</sup>Kant, 2000, 172 §39 5:292.

the moral law is grounded in reason.<sup>135</sup>

Let us play with a fourth scenario of the riverside beach scene. All the characters or faculties are still there basking in the summer sun, when upon the river comes the head of a new float. It is marvelously detailed with colorful sequences, and reflective surfaces, and patterns weaving in on themselves, with room for further ingrowth like an arabesque or the forth style of Roman Wall Painting (20ce—79ce).<sup>136</sup> This is an exceptional float, the child perks up and begins to compose the sand and the float continues to proceed along the river water. However, the float is so long and seemingly endless like a formless object (i.e. a horizon) that no matter how skillfully the child composes the sand to represent parts of the float, before a judgment can be made, the child still needs to compose more aspects of the float. So the sand flies about with the child ferociously constructing the sculpture with greater and greater speed and skill, but the sand falls away before the whole of the float can be represented. The mother cannot grasp what the child is composing but at the same time the grandmother perks up and can logically compose a scenario accounting for the details perceived.

The ability for the imagination to apprehend the intuitions of the formless object are sufficient, but it cannot comprehend the whole of the formless object. The understanding has no concept to subsume the manifold of intuitions under. However, at the same time, the faculty of reason has an idea of the formless object, in this case the idea of infinity. This is the idea of magnitude, that through mathematical sublime there is no measuring stick other than the whole itself, i.e., the idea of infinite vastness.<sup>137</sup>

The experience stretches the imagination, strengthening it while at the same time hum-

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<sup>135</sup>“This pleasure must necessarily rests on the same conditions in everyone, since they are subjective conditions of the possibility of a cognition in general...” Kant, 2000, 172-3 §39 5:292.

<sup>136</sup>Kleiner, 2009.

<sup>137</sup>See selection A; *On the Mathematically Sublime* Kant, 2000, 131-143 §§25-27, 5:248—5:260.

bling it, for it recognizes that there are things beyond its ability to represent and comprehend. The mind reassures itself by recognizing its own gumption, that it tried, that it could *apprehend* the situation by intuition, even if it could not *comprehend* in the moment and represent the form. This is the experience of mathematical sublime. By experiencing it, an individual is met with the surpassing magnitude of nature, the inadequacy of one's own faculties to grasp nature and the reassurance via the attempts to try. This experience exercises the mind and in particular stretches the imagination; which is essential for cultivating nimbleness.

### 3.5.5 Dynamic sublime

The final float in this extended thought experiment is that of the dynamic sublime. It is a treacherous and fearsome dragon, with shards of crystals for shark rows of fangs, shimmering rubies for eyes, wings constructed from elephant ribs, and an unpredictably slashing tail made from the beaks of octopi. The child goes about composing the sand, the compositions are frightful. The float is terrifying but also understood as non-threatening, for it is on the river, and not coming to the beach. The dynamic sublime fills the observer with foreboding and fear while also providing a safeguard from it as the floats never come to the shore. If the float did come to shore, then it would not be a sublime experience. It would then be something else, perhaps a near or complete death experience. With the sublime the imagination is humbled and stretched by its own willingness to try. And although the description here is of a vast beast, Edmund Burke's observation should be recalled, i.e., that the scorpion is as fearsome as the lioness.

It is this experience of terror that reveals one's gumption which awakes the individual's willingness to try. If the rhythm is just right, and the sublime experience which shakes the individual's collection of hierarchical concepts of previously perceived and in-

ternalized limitations, if at that moment (while the false ground of normalized relations is still somewhat fluid or susceptible to being questioned and critiqued), the individual is then enfolding into beauty and echoes the harmonious relationships of nature's techniques, then the individual may cultivate nimbleness in apperception of far more powerful relational practices than those derivative ones internalizing false authority of a given political, social, historical and economical milieu.

Much of the sublime in architecture is about the framing; the frame itself, the 'view' it frames, the movements it frames — both to perceive movement of other life and to move oneself in sublime gestures. Framing is the intentional (both motor and or analytical) subtracting of images from the world (in the Deleuzian sense). Framing is the intentional positioning of nonhuman and human beings in relations which richly engage each other and challenge each other to stretch their capacity of apprehension.

In short the conditions for an aesthetic judgment can be summarized as follows: the present, the event of Beauty, and the situation or event in which the individual enjoys reflecting upon the object at hand because the object's form is true to its causal nexus and the individual is successfully nimble. If such provisions are met, then the imagination freely composes sensory intuitions provided by the object's form (or horizon's formlessness) and the understanding accepts all compositions as valid without an identifying concept, without interest, without self awareness, and as that which is pleasurable in it of itself. Later, an interest in the object may occur, which is the pleasure in the object's (or horizon's) existence.<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>138</sup>Kant, 2000, 176 §41 5:296.

### 3.6 Beautiful or Just a Floor

#### Only Beauty and Labels?

If the power of judging finds little pleasure in contemplating the objects, then it merely labels the object from the understanding's library of concepts as for example a 'door', 'wall', 'window' or 'room'. Setting aside the worry of agreeableness versus beauty, we are left with an object that is either beautiful or not beautiful. Should it prove to be not beautiful, then what is the object? It is a token of a categorical type. For example, the object is an apartment floor, insignificant in that the thinly polymer coated, photographs of pine wood floorboards afford a singular vantage point. If the faculty of judgment is not taken in by the representative playfulness of the object's components, then the object is labeled as a determining concept (by a determinate judgment). The 'boards' are shallow and clumsy, what they compose is simply a floor. It does not afford the faculties to reflectively linger or harmoniously play, it warrants the understanding to subsume the object under a known category. Once the object is determined as a floor, then it can then be judged to be a good or bad floor. As my pragmatist interlocutor once proposed, it is a good floor if it holds my weight. In other words, once an object has missed the opportunity to evoke an event of Beauty, it may then be evaluated on culturally established norms, such as pragmatism, historical cohesion, monetary value and the likes. Granted there is debate as to what degree of ugliness Kant is willing to grant. Ginsborg provides an excellent assessment of allowing for disinterest judgments of ugliness, by deying that these involve a characteristic feeling of displeasure. Rather he suggests that we judge something as ugly if it lacks beauty in a context where beauty is expected.<sup>139</sup> Ugliness is a contextual determining judgment, not the opposite of a non-conceptual reflecting judgment. This is to say that there is no space for the object

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<sup>139</sup>Ginsborg, 2013, §2.3.



to be *aesthetically* judged as ugly in Kant's metaphysics. In the process of echoing the manner of the object's matter there is not a feeling of displeasure which may be judged as ugly.

If the faculties of mind linger within the object's presence, forming and reforming its representations, finding pleasure and recognizing that all people should be capable of apprehending and comprehending the situation which simulates the harmonious relations, then it is an event of Beauty, such as Carlo Scarpa's thresholds at the *Brion-Vega Cemetery*, (1970-72).<sup>140</sup> But should the object already be known as something, then the experience of the object is interjected with a template of how the object is known to be determined, i.e., a concept. When a concept of what the object ought to be dominates the process of composing the intuitions by the imagination (the process of representing the object), the understanding (which is guided by feelings of pleasure and displeasure) is lured to overly simplify the process by the determining power of judgment. In this event the object is not found to be beautiful, and it cannot provide a bridge between minds because it is no longer a raw expression of the present object which anyone should be able to experience. Rather the object is something the understanding should have already stored in its library of concepts. It is something that is taught through education and exploration, which is something limited by the individual's historical, social and political background. The concept and identification of the object with the concept remains universal, but it needs to be learnt via experience. In other words, with life experience in one's embodied situation, one collects a library of concepts. These concepts may be from one's own observations about the world or second hand observation by others.

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<sup>140</sup>Scarpa's works in general portrays considerable attention to detail, dedication to projects and an ability to produce particular embodied experiences. Dodds and Tavernor, 2002, p. 257, Albertini, 1988, p. 7, and Soroka, 1979, p. 3.

An interesting by-product of this reading of Kant's aesthetic theory is that objects are either aesthetic (i.e. beautiful or sublime),<sup>141</sup> label-able (i.e. judged to be a this or that concept), or simply immediately agreeable or disagreeable (things like apple cake and liver dumplings). It is inherently interesting that Kant's theory affords the agreeable to be disagreeable but not the beautiful to be ugly. Or more precisely, there is no exact opposite to free beauty. Unlike some theorists who may claim Kant finds nothing ugly, it must be clarified that some things are certainly ugly, such as the furies, famine and the devastations of war, but it is not an aesthetic judgement that leads to this observation.<sup>142</sup> My reading of Kant keeps his didactic motivation central, a motivation I see as attempting to provoke individuals to dare to know and to intentionally engage and direct their own system of belief or knowledge in line with their own firsthand experience of the world and nature's formative force. Given that part of our make up affords us to successfully function by releasing pleasure when we match up what ever is present in the world about us with our own embodied mental faculties, there is the direct or immediate tutorship of the material world on our embodied habits. In events of beauty our representation of harmonious free-play of objects free of hierarchy, thriving causal nexus where means-cause-ends and those same ends ground the means, the echoing of such relationships reinforces, or ingrains or stretches the links or synapse of these positive habits in line with nature's techniques. However, when we work with objects with broken causal nexus, i.e., ones where the means cause the ends but the

<sup>141</sup>From here on I shall simplify this collection of terms to the capital Aesthetic.

<sup>142</sup>See: Kant, 2000, 190 §48, 5:312 for Kant's assertion of furies famine and the devastations of war as ugly. Contrarily some theorists claim Kant thinks nothing is ugly; see: Shier, 1998, in particular the assertions: "It is my contention that within Kant's aesthetics, there cannot be any negative judgements of taste." *ibid.*, pp. 142-3 "This conclusion will be seen to follow directly from two conditions which Kant must hold as necessary for all judgements of taste about beauty (whether affirmative or negative), along with a bit of Kant's philosophy of mind. Those two conditions restricting all judgements of taste are (i) that such judgements must be made independently of determinate concepts and (ii) that such judgements must have universal subjective validity." *ibid.*, p. 143 For a direct rebuttal see Christian Wenzel's *Kant finds nothing ugly?* Wenzel, 1999 or for a counter argument see Paul Guyer's *Kant on the Purity of the Ugly* Guyer, 2004.

ends do not ground the means, relations that deplete without replenishing or objects with dominating vantage point and strict hierarchies, as our mental faculties echo these depleting relationships, such habits, connects or synapses are strengthened or reinforced. Hence, contrary to Kantian scholar Henry Allison's assertion that we must include space for "negative judgments of taste" if we expect to adequately interpret Kant's theory of taste,<sup>143</sup> from my stated position of didactic motivation, it is better to avoid drawing the reader's attention to depleting relationships, which are the ugly, as it strengthens those habits of mind. This is also why this thesis seeks to persuade the reader to avoid bad architecture and its insipid material objects as a means of rehabilitating the artistic mind of the architect.

Kant expresses this line of reasoning in the following passage:

As far as the discipline of the inclinations is concerned, for which the natural predisposition in respect to our vocation as an animal species is quite purposive but which make the development of humanity very difficult, nature still displays even in regard to this second requisite for culture a purposive effort at an education to make us receptive to higher ends than nature itself can afford. There is no denying the preponderance of the evil showered upon us by the refinement of taste to the point of its idealization, and even by indulgence in the sciences as nourishment for vanity, because of the insatiable host of inclinations that are thereby aroused. . . Beautiful arts and sciences, which by means of a universally communicable pleasure and an elegance and refinement make human beings, if not morally better, at least better mannered for society, very much reduce the tyranny of sensible tendencies, and prepare humans for a sovereignty in which reason alone shall have power; while the

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<sup>143</sup>Paraphrased from Henry Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Allison, 2001, p. 138.

evil that is visited upon us partly by nature, partly by the intolerant selfishness of human beings, at the same time calls forth, strengthens, and steels the powers of the soul not to be subjected to those, and thus allows us to feel an aptitude for higher ends, which lies hidden in us.<sup>144</sup>

Given the importance of avoiding vast preponderance of evil showered upon us and drawing our attention to the beautiful, the next relevant perplexity exposes itself in regards to how our presupposed ideas about objects may block us from experiencing them as beautiful. Kant's nuanced understanding of this has raised debate regarding whether there is room for beautiful architecture within his theory of aesthetics.<sup>145</sup> The following passage from §16 of the *Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment* helps to fuel the contention:

In the judging of a free beauty (according to mere form) the judgment of taste is pure. No concept of any end for which the manifold should serve the given object and thus which the latter should represent is presupposed, by which the imagination, which is as it were at play in the observation of the shape, would merely be restricted.

But the beauty of a human being (and in this species that of a man, a woman, or a child), the beauty of a horse, of a building (such as a church, a palace, an arsenal, or a garden-house) presuppose a concept of the end that determines what the thing should be, hence a concept of its perfection, and is thus merely adherent beauty, which properly concerns only form, hindered the purity of the judgment of taste, so the combination of the good (that is, the way in which the manifold is good for the thing itself, in accordance with

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<sup>144</sup>Kant, 2000, 300-1 §83 5:433.

<sup>145</sup>Wilson, 1996, p. 16.

its end) with beauty does damage to its purity.

One would be able to add much to a building that would be pleasing in the intuition of it if only it were not supposed to be a church; a figure could be beautified with all sorts of curlicues and light but regular lines, as the New Zealanders do with their tattooing, if only it were not a human being; and the latter could have much finer features and more pleasing, softer outline to its facial structure if only it were not supposed to represent a man, or even a warrior.<sup>146</sup>

The fact that the man, horse, or building is tethered to presupposed concepts of their ideal forms blocks the imagination's opportunity to play with various compositions.<sup>147</sup> According to this observation the type of object which has a dominating idealized form is blocked from awaking an event of Beauty. Updated examples might be the female body (an image which seems more pervasive than that of the warrior's), a car, and perhaps still buildings. I think this is the major issue with normalizing patterns of identity. Marginal practices can present anxiety or just mere indifference as they fail to meet presupposed expectations. The phenomenon in architectural school (or any specialized discipline) of artifactual theology gains its grounding in this habit of adherent judgments. However, this would lead to a rather counter-phenomenal account (and be devastating towards my reading) if Kant had not qualified the above claim with the possibility that individuals may put aside such presupposed ideal concepts and engage the object afresh as if it is a free beauty:

“A judgment of taste in regard to an object with a determinate internal end would thus be pure *only if* the person making the judgement either had no

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<sup>146</sup>Kant, 2000, 114-5 §16 5:230.

<sup>147</sup>*Blocks*, as in Foucaultian power blocks.

concept of this end or *abstracted* from it in his judgment.”<sup>148</sup>

Hence, although the “normal idea”<sup>149</sup> of how a man, horse, or building ought to look — an idea that is composed by the imagination’s act of superimposing examples upon each other which renders an average<sup>150</sup> — can commonly dominate a judgment of taste, if the individual is able to “abstract” this idea from their act of judging, then the object may warrant beauty. Hence, the man, horse or building can be freely beautiful within Kant’s aesthetic theory.

*Before elaborating on Art & Nature there is a short interlude of descriptive critique of an architectural object that could have, but failed to afford nimbleness cultivating events of Beauty.*

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<sup>148</sup>Kant, 2000, 115 §16 5:231, emphasis my own. The claim continues as: “But in that case, although this person would have made a correct judgment of taste, in that he would have judged the object as a free beauty, he would nevertheless be criticized and accused of a false taste by someone else, who considered beauty in the object only as an adherent property (who looked to the end of the object), even though both judge correctly in their way: the one on the basis of what he has before his sense, the other on the basis of what he has in his thoughts. By means of this distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty with free beauty, the other with adherent beauty, the first making a pure, the second an applied judgment of taste.”

<sup>149</sup>*ibid.*, 119 §17 5:235.

<sup>150</sup>*ibid.*, 113-4 §15 5:234-5.

## Chapter 4

# Tate Modern

Herzog & de Meuron's Tate Modern (2000) does not create spaces in which the techniques of nature are ready to hand. The Tate Modern had the opportunity but failed to produce spacescapes affording the effects the sublime and beautiful have on the individual that are essential to the cultivation of aesthetic judgment. It is important to make clear that the following critique of the Tate Modern is not in regards to its success as a tourist attraction, its space for artist, its closeness to budget, the timely management of its completion, or its popularity and success as an institution. This critique steps outside of these popular measurements and merely evaluating the architectural object on its affordance as a space to cultivate nimbleness via Kant's finely structured depiction of the events. This analysis however does not confuse the implicit criteria I have ascertained through my reading of Kant for that of Herzog & de Meuron or the Tate board of trustees.

**background**

London's public collection of modern art forged a homestead in 2000 within a decommissioned, oil-fired power plant. About two millennia prior to the Tate Modern's opening, its location on the south side of the river Thames bustled with a settlement built by the Romans shortly after their arrival to Britain in 43c.e. Over the years the area has been home to small communities, medieval palaces with their associated decadences, and then by the closing of the sixteenth century was known as a type of pleasure grounds, which offered gambling, brothels and theaters, such as Shakespeare's Globe which opened in 1599 in a location that would turn out to be just east of the Tate Modern after four centuries of mixed feelings resulting in various reforms and allowances. Henry VIII mandated closure of the brothels leading to a derelict and deserted atmosphere which in turn attracted industry. By the mid-eighteenth century the composition of the area had shifted to industry in the form of gas works, iron foundry, glass making, distilleries, breweries and spurred unplanned human density. In the later nineteenth century about ninety thousand people crowded the Bankside ward. Then with the urban deindustrialization of the early twentieth century and the heavy bombardment of the Second World War, the south side of the river grew depopulated and detached. In 1947 Sir Gilbert Scott designed the building in question as an oil-fired power plant that was envisioned as a "new kind of cathedral" of "pure energy".<sup>1</sup> In this image Sir Gilbert Scott's plant mirrored the St Paul's cathedral which sits directly across the river. However with rapidly shifting use of technologies, the plant was shutdown merely thirty-four years later in 1981 and left vacant until 1995 when work began to transform the building into a public space for art.

The Swiss architectural firm Herzog & de Meuron captured the role through an inter-

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<sup>1</sup>Blazwick and Wilson, 2000.



national competition with around a hundred fifty entries.<sup>2</sup> The six finalists were Tadao Ando, Rafael Moneo, Renzo Piano, David Chipperfield, Jacques Herzog & Pierre de Meuron, and Rem Koolhaas.<sup>3</sup> Herzog & de Meuron were the only finalists to propose retaining the majority of Sir Gilbert Scott's constructed design.

### **a critique by the punter**

Whether it was their first question or not, access to the south bank needed to be achieved. Unfortunately like Carlo Scarpa's new bridge to the *Fondazione Querini Stampalia* museum in Venice,<sup>4</sup> the bridge construction did not proceed smoothly. When the Tate Modern opened in 2000 the bridge was deemed unsafe to cross. The disastrous effects of Arup's engineering mishap forced the bridge's closure for the first two years after being opened for two days. Prior to this, the Arup engineering firm had an excellent reputation from their work on the Sydney Opera House and the Centre Pompidou in Paris.<sup>5</sup> Yet the delays in opening the access bridge should not distract from critique of the overall design. Moreover the design of the bridge was executed by alternative architects to those who designed the object of the museum itself. Although, Herzog & de Meuron had resolved a bridge design with " 'the idea of this little mound [that] would be... coming from the bridge, you could go down in different directions, and not need to go back in order to go there, for instance. So this little slope with trees on it would give the possibility to go in all directions.' " <sup>6</sup> The Tate project team rejected the proposal by Herzog & de Meuron and hired alternative architects to design the bridge.

Eventually access to the south bank was achieved with the new footbridge designed

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<sup>2</sup>Blazwick and Wilson, 2000, p. 18.

<sup>3</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, p. 18.

<sup>4</sup>A bridge proposal that the city's councilors found to defile the window, and sparked a debate which escalated to the city suing Scarpa for illegally practicing as an architect.

<sup>5</sup>ARUP website 2013.

<sup>6</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, pp. 121-2.

by Norman Foster and Anthony Caro, engineered by Arup and called the *Millennium Bridge*; aptly named to repeat the visual clues as to the time of its design. As I walked along this bridge on a typical overcast day, I found the process rather cumbersome. My gate seemed to quicken as those amongst me slowed, panhandlers set up shops mid-pathway, creating further bottle-necks, while school groups attempted to occupy the breadth of the narrow bridge and the occasional, disgruntled, yet well-weathered, cyclists pushed along. There are signs at either end addressed to cyclists, requesting them to walk their bikes. Why space could not be allocated for such an energy effective transport is beyond me.

The bridge did not sway, but it was too narrow for its use. It is unadorned and yet still manages to look cluttered with technical material of causal efficacy. It announces its aim as quick transit which is rendered impossible by its slender breadth. Perhaps if there were outposts, there could be places for idlers to step aside and gaze out at the London skyline. Or perhaps groups of school children could be tethered together in single file lines to dutifully trek across. But as it stands, it is a 325 meters long steel bridge linking the city of London at St. Paul's Cathedral with the Tate Modern Gallery at Bankside with massive congestion problems and little material richness to distract oneself from the monotony.

In this why the bridge is successful to appealing to the individual's embodied spatial intelligence, at least those who frequent London's streets, tunnels and alleyways. The bridge provides little space to negotiate movement and an immediate desire to progress, replicating the experience of the tube, alleyways, escalators, tunnels, and even some main streets. Once reaching the south end of the bridge two choices are presented both leading to wrap the individual back around and glimpse a view across the river to the city profile. Then in an uncertain river front open space, one walks along onto a large

concrete pad, turns left, and there is the building.

The building is a heavy dark brick rectangle box, with a clouded white glass rectangular box sitting on top like a brimless hat. There are vertical glass windows evenly spaced along the façade. The main entrance is actually past the front of the building and down a ramp into the basement of the east side of the box. Through that entrance, there is an interior ramp to ‘level 1’ of the gallery. This allows for the introduction to impress the volume of the main interior void by burrowing under the building and emerging within its renown. I however entered through the front which I had taken as the intended entrance, given the large painted typeface reading *entrance* above the two doors on either side of the retained and disused brick chimney. This is reportedly a common mistake. This entrance is called the ‘River Entrance on Queen’s Walk.’ It consists of two central doors and enters directly on to ‘level 2’ and an unceremonious coat check. Feeling as though I was somehow sneaking in without paying,<sup>7</sup> I lightly treaded along to a small staircase and entered the main cavity of the structure, the Turbine Hall, the magnitude of which is impressive.

Overall the structure boasts 10,000 square meters of gallery space, of which 3,300 square meters can be claimed by the hall alone.<sup>8</sup> I have seen photographs of sculpture exhibits of the *The Unilever Series* scaled for this space, such as the massive slides of *Test site* (2006) by Carsten Höller, or a park lawn with spring bulbs which show themselves as darts when closely examined, or the scaled models of city populations, *Global Cities - in a Changing World* (2007) by Neutral: Christian Grou<sup>9</sup> and Tapio Snellman.<sup>10</sup> However, on my visit the 150 meters or 500 foot tall Turbine Hall was unfortunately unadorned,

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<sup>7</sup>Although all of London’s public museums are currently free (2013).

<sup>8</sup>The Turbine Hall is 3,300 sq m (35,520 sq ft) as noted on the Tate Modern website. [Tate website 2013](#).

<sup>9</sup>b.1969, Born Romania, works in London

<sup>10</sup>b.1969, Born Finland, works in London

unwelcoming and dusty.

Herzog & de Meuron have emphasized the industrial character of the building through their use of polished concrete, untreated wooden floors and plain white walls contrasting with intentionally sturdy black girders. The exhibition galleries were intended to resemble common rooms, with robust walls, plain ceilings and oak-lined thresholds, rather than the fleeting quality of movable partitioned spaces that are sometimes associated with modern art galleries. The overhead light fittings are hidden in deep boxes and show only as translucent glass rectangles flushed with the ceiling, to emulate the quality of natural light on every floor. The floors are either rough-cut unpolished oak, which should develop a natural patina over time from the footsteps of millions of visitors, or polished concrete. Set into these floors are the forthright cast iron grids of the air vents.

The architecture has received detailed praise, such as the following by popular essayist Alain de Botton:<sup>11</sup>

“If one had to pick a single building that could convince a despairing British citizen of this country’s many remaining virtues and of its plentiful possibilities for the future, it would have to be Tate Modern. This is a building that has earned itself an importance in the national psyche that extends far beyond its size or its conventional and mediocre art collection. The building as a whole, from its signage to its toilets, its recessed strip-lights to its restaurants, has become an advertisement for what Britain should be like. Much as the Houses of Parliament or Buckingham Palace once reflected back to our forebears the values that they hoped their nation would embody, so the Tate now throws back to us an idealized vision of Britain. We don’t so much like Tate Modern as hope to be like it: with its relaxed seriousness,

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<sup>11</sup>Whose mother-in-law was on the Tate committee.

its unstudied cool, its classlessness, its intelligence and its sense of play. It is a building that invites us to mould ourselves in its image, it is the most seductive role model we have.”<sup>12</sup>

De Botton’s observational assertions hit closer to home than intended. The Tate Modern formalizes normalizing market-led pastoral power relations. It does invite the individual to mould themselves in its image. As well, it does claim the fashionably desirable styles of ‘related seriousness’, ‘unstudied cool’ and ‘classlessness’. But just as these idealized concepts are commodified in the larger political, economical social sphere, they too are falsely presented here. And the individual with hope and reassurance seeks knowledge that does not materialize.

The Tate Modern falls prey to normalizing practices. When visiting the building in person the source of de Botton’s praise is elusive. For one there is nothing relaxed about the space except the cleaning. The central shaft reverberates sounds such that low murmurs vibrato to crescendos with a single sneeze. The lack of directive route through the building, which perhaps is where de Botton’s ‘relaxed feeling’ comes from, generates anarchy as teams of children and pairings of gentlemen clash with tours of tourist at each oversized threshold. Due to the scale of the doorways claiming a ‘plenty of room for all’ feeling, visitors push through, yet as the physical bodies attempt to enact the misleading spatial clues, elbows and toes are bruised.

As to the claim of classlessness by de Botton and others, the origins of the structure certainly lends to such praise. The humble setting of the south-side of the river alone welcomes shared accessibility. Britain’s governing class has tried before to ‘elevate’ the working classes through design and art, as witnessed in the creation of the Victoria and Albert Museum, a space created with the hope of attracting workers away from the

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<sup>12</sup>Botton, [2010](#).

public houses to be uplifted by emergence in good craft and design.<sup>13</sup> The industrial history of the Tate Modern building as a power plant inhabited and tended by workers suggests the possibility of a familiarity, at least theoretically. However the design lets us down. Once a visitor has properly entered through the main cavity, they ride an extended escalator to arrive at a grand poster of a closed entry gallery. In other words, the first and most promoted gallery is restricted to paid entry.<sup>14</sup> Adjacent to the primary gallery bustles a stunning restaurant with matching prices. Thus, like classes on a train, people are immediately separated into those with and without expendable purses.

These minor inconveniences aside the problem with the Tate is more fundamental, it is that of failed potential. Far worse than the broken promise of a classless spacescape, which sparks ad hoc quibbles of expenditure and impromptu calculation of time remaining and future engagements; it is the lost opportunity of creating a space that affords non-conceptual thought. At the Tate Modern, individuals are repetitively targeted with social, historical, political, and economical direction. The intended main entry hall is flanked on the left with the museum shop. A venue that is desirable and profitable as it provides visitors access to unique products and the museum with a healthy stream of revenue, however its placement at the Tate Modern at the immediate entrance clouds the overall building's ability to generate a transformative experience as it immediately propositions the individual's understanding to be occupied with non-presentness. In other words, situating the shop at the entrance blocks the visitor from the possibility of cultivating their aesthetic judgment, by preoccupying their understanding with practical matters such as: 'Would Ponty like that toy?', 'Did Mimi Berry really design a bag just for the Tate?' 'How can they ask that much for a greeting card?' and the likes. Ideally such concerns will fade as the visitor continues deeper into the museum, but the grand

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<sup>13</sup>Jones and Bedford, 1856, 157 ff. Goodwin, 1990, p. 30.

<sup>14</sup>This is of course other than the Turbine Hall, which is not necessarily, but could be considered a gallery.

moment of entrance, the primary threshold from city to art is lost.<sup>15</sup> Other museums contain extensive shops without impeding the individual's engagement with the elective space of the art galleries. Consider architectural objects such as the earlier discussed Chichu Museum by Tadao Ando where the shop is unpretentiously tucked away after the cafe. Or Marcel Breuer's (1902-1981) Whitney Museum, where the shop handsomely occupies the scope of the underground floor. Or consider also Herzog & de Meuron's megalithic de Young Museum, exquisitely crafted in San Francisco's central park, whose shop is discretely connected through corridors and a transitional space. Hence, it is possible to incorporate the museum shop without negatively impacting the individual's engagement with events of Beauty.

Secondly, at the Tate Modern the opportunity is lost again as the individual moves from the vastness of the Turbine Hall's void to the relative intimacy of the levels for art. The mechanical instrument of the escalator could sweep the individual up and require a stillness of the body and calming of the chatter in anticipation of the unknown. Perhaps a feat attempted by Benthem Crouwel Architects within Amsterdam's Stedelijk Museum. Interior to the recent (2013) addition, is a basement space allocated to video media. From these subterranean media caverns, the individual is processed through a transitional space consisting of recorded human humming and clucking noises, played while ascending an escalator through a narrowed growing white plastic archway. The transition is protracted by the escalator's delivery of the individual to a further transitional space of a rectangular room, with unmarked doors, hidden corners and a strategically placed window—thick as a fish tank, oval and positioned to be leaned into, as one observes the

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<sup>15</sup>However, it should be noted that in de Botton's recent arguments regarding art, as seen with his text *As a Rule* (2013) and recent interviews, de Botton sympathetically portrays the potential of the art gallery's shop as a market hall providing access to well made tools. Citing for example the Rijksmuseum's most popular item of a Rembrandt dish towel, could be a towel made with the quality of Rembrandt style rather than a poorly made towel with an image of Rembrandt's work. Botton & Jodn Armstrong, 2013; Botton, 2013.

active exterior grounds of the museum, a screen portraying erratic movements, that are eerily similar to the digital recordings on display below.

However, what is offered to those entering the Tate's main cavity of galleries, is the announcement of categorizing the individuals based on their determined properties of 'class'. The building schema classifies the individual and in return, the individual classify themselves in the predominate practices of biopower, as chronicled by Foucault, and the opportunity for a harmonious and concept-free playfulness of the imagination is diminished. The subsidiary floors, akin to the second class train compartments, teem with confused and tired looking visitors, who occupy more of the spatial spotlight than the art. This discord of the visitor and art is manifested by the elongated and wide shape of the gallery rooms. Walls with paintings are curtained by bodies, justified to crowd into the stout rooms given their scale and proportions. The material properties in the space are well considered, yet poorly implemented. The craftsmanship of the building falls far short of that of the architect's design. Awkward gaps between walls and floors, detailing of fixtures, and random spacings in the stairwells are only a few elements distracting the flow of aesthetic reflection. Though the architects' aim for the galleries may have been to express the space via details of matter as Harry Gugger [an active architect of Herzog & de Meuron's for the Tate project] summarizes as "with this timber floor, which has a rough surface, or with these cast-iron grilles, where you have an almost emotional link to them through the roughness of the oak and the familiarity of the cast iron, we make the room more of a membrane for the art' ".<sup>16</sup> However overall, "Gugger expressed his unhappiness at the quality of work he was seeing on the site. 'I still can't cope with the situation over here. I think the general level of quality is terrible. They are now building shutters on the second floor and just the way they are putting

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<sup>16</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, p. 318.



them up is setting a level of quality which affects the other guy following on. He thinks, “If this guy didn’t care, why should I” In the middle of a row of five floors grilles, they just left one out.’ What Gugger had seen was not just a grille missing from a hole: there was no hole either. ‘And no one tells me and there’s nobody I’m supposed to tell, so who knows about this?’ ”<sup>17</sup> Though sometimes the small battles over quality and design were won by the architects, like with the design of the floor grilles, or with the issue over the roof light in the Turbine Hall.<sup>18</sup> Gugger and Herzog came up with a solution for the roof light, and the person who tended to the budget, Ian Fraser, suggested that if the grid was made more cosmetic and a simpler, cheaper means of access installed above it, they could save some money, but the Architects refused and “eventually had their way”.<sup>19</sup>

However, this discrepancy is well documented as a breakdown between the architectural firm and the team of Tate staff and donors who led the project.<sup>20</sup> Herzog & de Meuron’s Jacques Herzog and Harry Gugger clearly had different expectations, and experiences of quality than the Tate team, likewise the Tate team had a more grounded awareness of the limitation of their project and craftsmen. Karl Sabbagh’s *Power into Art* documents the development of the Tate Modern in ‘fly on the wall’ detail. If we are to grant his uninterrupted access to the process, then quite clear conclusions can be drawn regarding the animosity between the Tate team and the Swiss architects. The difference of strategy led the head of the Tate team, Nick Serota to hire a British architect to negotiate with Herzog and Gutter in their own language of architecture.

“As a result of the concerns Serota expressed to Herzog & de Meuron at their

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<sup>17</sup>Cook, 1999, p. 234.

<sup>18</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, p. 75.

<sup>19</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 79,80.

<sup>20</sup>People involved in the Tate project, known as the *Tate team*: Stuart Lipton, Peter Rogers and Ron German at Standope Properties; Nick Serota and Peter Wilson at the Tate, along with Dawn Austwick who had been appointed by the Tate as its Project Director, *ibid.*, p. 68.

first design meeting, a British firm of architects called Sheppard Robson had been appointed to work with the Swiss architects, and Ian Blake welcomed this. ‘Until Sheppard Robson came on board, there was a problem caused by the difference between what we wanted and what Herzog & de Meuron have tried to preserve as part of their culture. So the whole thing has been a growing up process really for them’.<sup>21</sup>

However the addition only added to the disturbed relationship, and Gugger noted it was merely a disruption to their design process. The Tate team wanted a cheap building and worried that Herzog & de Meuron’s quality standards were too high.<sup>22</sup> The Tate team employed subtle and direct means of limiting Herzog & de Meuron control over the project.<sup>23</sup> It is also noted that Blake accused Herzog & de Meuron of lacking honesty and “in Blake’s view, they were all being too lenient on the up-and-coming architects from Switzerland.... They should have been kicked into touch much earlier.”<sup>24</sup> However in matters of honesty, “When the Tate team met to discuss what they might do with any spare contingency money, they kept the meeting a secret from the architects. They believed that the architects would not be able to control themselves.”<sup>25</sup> However, the background story explaining the deficiency of the construction process should not dismiss the critiques of the architectural object as it exists, although the utter lack of respect shown to the architects and the multitude of contradicting influences on the design do help to account for the dominating disjointed, non cohesive and unfinished atmosphere of the overall experience of visiting the museum. It is almost as if the building has manifested the ethical disfunction of its creators.

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<sup>21</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, p. 66.

<sup>22</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 88-9.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, p. 70.

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, p. 101.

<sup>25</sup>*ibid.*, p. 102.

Returning to the individual's experience of the layout of the space, let us consider the final components of the design. While traversing the stairs in hopes of reaching the famed *Swiss Light*—the two-story opaque glass roof running the length of the top of the building—one passes the members-only club, where a security person eyes passer-byers from behind an impromptu folding table behind which and through clouded glass limbs are elusively visible. The Swiss Light is the outward signal of the building's metamorphosis in function. For the public use, it houses a restaurant-cafe that claims the magnificent views of the city's riverside stretch. Thus again, the individual is forced to abandon any possible reflective judging of forms and submit themselves to commercial processing.

The shell of the abandoned power plant harbored the capacity for Kantian dynamical sublime. The magnitude of the central void, the history of the site, the thickness and absorbance of the original materials, the grandness of a design that was far too readily declared obsolete, and the collected gamble and failure built into the material as they aged unused. Sir Gilbert Scott's abandoned *Cathedral of Pure Energy* had the possibility to afford a constructed experience of the sublime. But the heightened expression of privilege, disjointed layout of art, details of enclosed thresholds and materiality fail to meet these possibilities.

Unlike Ando's creation of sublime through the architecture of Chichu, the Tate Modern actually is threatening. Hence, in a way the sublime experience is half created, for there is the feeling of fear but not the shelter or security from which to reflect. No spaces are scaled for the human body. Even the common reprieve of the 'rest-room' is inappropriately scaled, here, far too small, its narrowed passageway through the low ceiling, darkened corridor which is however rendered virtually impassible should any one of the hundreds of mothers attempt to utilize the changing table. Or fear might over take

the individual with good reason as an episode of dehydration, should they not reach the signaler low flow drinking fountain almost unhygienically adjacent to the bathroom doors. Or one could fear the then fashionable rusted matter left at unanticipated intervals for scenic enrichment, which jut out potentially puncturing the guest. The stairs are rough and almost intimidating, as well as uncared for as paint chips and dust collects in hidden finger to figure sized alcoves, which admittedly Herzog & de Meuron partner Harry Gugger had expressed vast disappointment with. However the architect's concerns rarely effected these outcome as the Tate team had taken to responding to similar comments in the style of, "If Harry wants to go and look at it beforehand and then throw everything out of his pram, the ice cream off the cornet, because something isn't right that we're dealing with, that's Harry's lookout."<sup>26</sup> However the concerns were rarely resolved.

The elevators are packed. The escalators are grand in length but thin in quality. Each level is vast and unwelcoming, the layout is confused and circular. Though Herzog & de Meuron did pay attention to the traditional lines of the power station, their design leaves the front and back of the building disjointed, a problem that other architects had addressed.<sup>27</sup> The attempts of quiet banter are amplified repulsing in a roaring chatter. There is no space to safely meditate on the experience.

The Tate Modern offers the frightful but not a human shelter from which to reprieve and overcome it. The disjointedness of this effect may be due to the inability of the Tate team to trust the architects to design the building or for the architects to argue their case. Either way the discord is manifest in their creation and the individual is left to render the depleting spacescapes afresh.

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<sup>26</sup>Sabbagh, 2000, p. 317.

<sup>27</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 28-9.

## Chapter 5

# Art & Nature

*let people have their pastries and prostitutes but keep them from bad art!*<sup>1</sup>

**to recapitulate** The aim of this thesis has been to examine the event of Beauty as depicted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and to apply this characterization to elective architectural spaces, such that it may motivate individuals to cultivate their own nimbleness in relation to a formative force of nature. The thesis acknowledges that something is awry with our relation to the world and that giving care to beauty might help. Intentionally cultivating a nimbleness to the material presence is a form of resistance to normalizing power relations which amongst other things, are manifest in bad architecture as fossilized blocks of power averting the imagination from playfulness. The proposal is for individual architects to cultivate their self by first rejecting false knowledge and then developing aesthetic judgment by freshly engaging with sublime horizons and beautiful objects, such that they develop a greater sensitivity towards the purposiveness of the matter they form to create architecture. In turn this may help others to do likewise by

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<sup>1</sup>Plato, the Republic.

providing spacescapes that afford cultivating nimbleness; effectively creating a positive feedback loop of an architectural causal nexus. In short, as argued in the above chapters; the identified problem is the normalizing practices operant in bad architecture, a form of resistance is cultivating nimbleness, a means of cultivating nimbleness is engaging sublime horizons and beautiful objects. The question then becomes, how does one engage beauty and sublime? One answer lies in art and nature.

Turning to art and nature means to turn towards: objects, things, beings, or horizons with *nexus finalis* (a nexus of final causes), and circular causal relations (descending and ascending).<sup>2</sup> To be clear, in this reading the word object is a general term for anything that acts as a coherent system of parts. There are many subcategories of objects, such as natural objects/ products or artifacts. An object can refer to the brick on my desk, the painting on my wall, the puppy at my feet, myself, the building a work in, the farm where the turnips I now eat grew, the national farming headquarters, the nation state of the netherlands, and so forth. An object is something holding itself together via the manner of the matter of which it is composed. The interesting aspect to the object in regards to art and architecture is what style of manner holds the parts together. Along such lines, Kant describes the descending and ascending relationship of parts of a system as: “if conceived as a series, would carry with it descending as well as ascending dependency, in which the thing which is on the one hand designated as an effect nevertheless deserves, in ascent, the name of a cause of the same thing of which it is the effect.”<sup>3</sup> Nexus finalis is inherent to “natural products”, which are created without rational intentionality and without the causality of the concepts rational beings abstract from nature.<sup>4</sup> A natural

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<sup>2</sup>Kant, 2000, 234 §61 5:360 and *ibid.*, 244 §65 5:372.

<sup>3</sup>*ibid.*, 244 §65 5:373 Additionally in terms of earlier thoughts of non-Kantian ideas, it is also a turning towards the ontologies of deep ecology and healthy biosystems. For further examination of health in ecosystems see the well researched paper: Wallace et al., 1996 For a traditional model of thinking about biosystems see: Pechurkin and Somova, 2008.

<sup>4</sup>Kant, 2000, 245 §65 5:374.

product's parts persist as a whole, by being both the cause and effect of their form.<sup>5</sup> Teleological objects have a hermeneutical loop of causes & groundings or means & ends / *means*  $\circ$  *ends*. Kant argues in the *Critique of the Teleological Power of Judgment* that a formative substratum perambulates the material world, maintaining a rhythmic and circular causal loop between means & ends. Kant calls the *means*  $\circ$  *ends* causal loop, a causal nexus of nature's end or nature's nexus finalis. Moreover he argues that people experience it through the power of teleological judgments.

Teleology grants a purposiveness to nature that is not governed by rules or concepts of our understanding, which nevertheless affords our comprehension of parts of the world. In other words, the human power of judgment is afforded comprehensibility of nature, by nature's ruleless purposiveness. Subjective purposiveness is something that can be felt but not used as a measure; it is what Kant calls *lawlikeness*.<sup>6</sup> Lawlikeness is something that only acts like a law but is not a law itself, because laws are merely things that human-type beings can understand. Nature must have something beyond human understanding; a lawlikeness. Nevertheless, even with a subjective purposiveness, nature is not an intelligent being as far as we are justified in knowing.<sup>7</sup>

At the same time turning towards art and nature is a turning away from *nexus effectivus* (a nexus of efficient causes),<sup>8</sup> uni-directional causal relations (descending),<sup>9</sup> and an anthropocentric world view — all of which are led to by social, historical, economical normativity, that guides by matching up our own habits of judgments and action with the purposiveness of systems of biopower in the Foucaultian sense.<sup>10</sup> The human fac-

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<sup>5</sup>Kant, 2000, 245 §65 5:374-5.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, 233 §61 5:359.

<sup>7</sup>*ibid.*, 233 §61 5:359 For further discussion of the philosophers metaphysical views about the origins of organisms see: Ginsborg, 2006d, 9 ff.

<sup>8</sup>Kant, 2000, 233 §61 5:360.

<sup>9</sup>*ibid.*, 244 §65 5:372.

<sup>10</sup>See the above section 1.1.1 *historical background of the problem at hand*, for detailed examination of Foucault's account of biopower.

ulties experience (a posteriori) nexus effectivus as “connections that constitute a series (of causes and effects) that is always descending”, and are predominantly categorizable by the understanding.<sup>11</sup> This practice of derivative judgment was analyzed above in the context of normalization and false knowledge. In this sense the nexus effectivus affords determinate judgments which categorize the world such that we may understand it. But the connection is uni-directional and eventually is exhausted; much like the disposable widgets that colonize contemporary spacescapes.

Art and nature are labels for the objects and horizons which afford events of Beauty and thereby aesthetic judgments. The strength of this chapter is in showing that within Kantian aesthetics art and nature are not mere inert things. They are dynamic, active systems of material parts; having and holding together their unity. In creating art the individual freely acts as a part of nature, working within a vaster system of transient relationships. This final chapter’s aim is to analytically uncover this phenomenon in the context of creating architectural objects.

### 5.0.1 Eleven

Thirty spokes share the wheel’s hub; it is the center hole that makes it useful.

Shape clay into a vessel; it is the space within that makes it useful.

Cut doors and windows for a room; it is the holes which make it useful.

Therefore profit comes from what is there; usefulness from what is not there.<sup>12</sup>

*Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu*

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<sup>11</sup>Kant, 2000, 244 §65 5:372 Kant also calls them real causes as opposed to the ideal causes of nexus finalis, as he asserts that this labeling would make clear that there can only be these two kinds of causality. *ibid.*, 244 §65 5:372.

<sup>12</sup>Feng and English, 1972, p. 11.



### 5.0.2 An artist

Keeping with Kant's inconsistent use of terms, Kant employs the name *artist* to both those commonly viewed by society as an artist and to the rather different depiction he develops of the artist as creator of pure *aesthetic art*.<sup>13</sup> Art is commonly considered as something conceptual that can refer to and play with its embedded normative collection of knowledge. The playfulness is by knowing the rules and jumping in and outside of them. However, for such art to be appreciated the perceiver needs to know the rules.<sup>14</sup> For example the classical Hindusthani music of India works with additional scales to that of non-India music. Ethnomusicology and Systematic Musicology theorist, Nazir Ali Jairazbhoy (1927—2009), explains that should a composer play with the traditional tonal and scalar basis of North Indian music; in terms of the structure of melody, the effect of the drone, ornamentation and intonation, or the function of accidentals; those familiar with the rules, will be able to appraise the composers understanding and experimentation within the tradition.<sup>15</sup> Those unaware of the formal rules will not be able to distinguish the composer's musical cleverness. Likewise, people schooled in architectural iconography will find wit in a building that plays with traditional rules and symbols. Consider for example Rem Koolhaas' *Byzantium* (1995) apartment building at the foot of Vondelpark in Amsterdam. This early work of Koolhaas' mixes the architectural iconography within its overall structure. The particular playfulness is akin to that of Cubism, where all the sides are seen from one.<sup>16</sup> The street front of the building exposes

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<sup>13</sup>For Kant's discussion of purity in art and beauty see: §§16 & 17. Kant, 2000, 114-20 §§16&17 5:229-36.

<sup>14</sup>Furthermore, consider Kant's reflection upon the beautiful song of the bird which cannot be brought under any musical rules. *ibid.*, 126 § 'General remarks on the first section of the *Analytic*' 5:243.

<sup>15</sup>Jairazbhoy, 1995 I extend my gratitude to Abel Erwtaman for this reference.

<sup>16</sup>It should be stated these observations are my own, rather than those stated on the OMA website, which are: "Byzantium adjoins one of the busiest metropolitan sites in the Netherlands on one side and on the other a quiet rustic lane next to the Vondelpark, the Zandpad. This contrast defines the theme of the hybrid building: the design tries to do justice to both conditions by using the metropolitan scale to screen the idyll." *OMA website* 2013.

windows scaled for the street front of skyscrapers, scaled for rear windows anticipating minimal light, and a turret incorporated into the lower corner of the street front and colored in a contrasting mustard yellow.<sup>17</sup> Hence, to a trained architectural eye, the building is droll to hilarious. It shows a rich knowledge of expectations of how the building ought to be composed and a boldness in intentionally restructuring those parts. However to those non-architectural minded passerbyers, the building seems absurd or just poorly executed. I have overheard comments like, “Well, they must have got a deal on those windows, but then run out midway through.” Such a recourse to economical justification for the design is telling in its own right.

Aesthetic art is not referential, it is expressive. It opens a moment for an event of Beauty. It is a phenomenon that Patrick Healy perceives in the architectural object as:

“[T]he success of architecture being to allow the undifferentiated mass of the entire organ which still allows each part its purpose, without hindering or causing the body to suffer, thus our way of valuing the perfection and completeness of building is according to the measure we have of living creatures.”<sup>18</sup>

Kant defines the artist is that of a *genius* who creates spacescapes by forming matter in line with a supersensible formative force of nature; “the measure we have of living creatures”.<sup>19</sup> Genius is a talent for producing without rule. Its products must serve as exemplary, i.e., as standard rules for judging. Aesthetic art spatializes a nexus finalis organized object for our experience. It does this with the faculty of spirit.<sup>20</sup> The faculty of spirit has a means of producing thought that is not logistical. These non-linguistically

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<sup>17</sup>OMA website notes this as “participating in the Amsterdam tradition of ‘failed’ skyscrapers”. [OMA website 2013](#).

<sup>18</sup>Healy, 2004, p. 58.

<sup>19</sup>Kant, 2000, §13 p233.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*, 192 §49 5:314-5.

thoughts act as counter parts to ideas of reason.<sup>21</sup> With taste you can (successfully) judge beautiful objects; with genius you can produce beautiful objects.<sup>22</sup> Genius is the combination of imagination and understanding acting in union. Kant calls this the “*happy relation*”.<sup>23</sup> To some extent it may seem that genius is an inherited trait, for example Kant states: “**Genius** is the inborn predisposition of the mind **through which** nature gives the rule of art.”<sup>24</sup> However, if the ‘inborn predisposition’ is thought of as an embodied range to be developed upon willingness to try, then genius can be something cultivated with care. In this sense the artist must be someone who is sufficiently nimble and sensitive to the workings of the world as a whole. In order to do this the artist needs to free themselves from conceptual concerns. This is similar to the way sports scientist portray skilled sports people or Merleau-Ponty’s notion of motor intentionality. It is a cultivation that affords the individual freedom from having the rules dominating their actions, so that their driving intentionality is reflective of the materially present situation. Sports scientist, Mark Smith recently published findings on the body’s attention in the lead up to a golf swing draws the difference between amateur and professional golfers. By using functional magnetic resonance imaging techniques, Smith observed a difference in the brain’s patterns of activation during the pre-shot moments. In particular Smith finds:

“By examining the neural events in the brains of golfers while they are visualizing their normal golf swing, or performing their mental pre-shot ritual, researchers have begun to show that during these periods of mental rehearsal there is less neural activity in the brains of better players. At the lower-skill level, the typical swing is a complicated array of moves and adjustments,

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<sup>21</sup>Kant, 2000, 192 §49 5:314-5.

<sup>22</sup>*ibid.*, 189 §48 5:311.

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*, 194 §49 5:317.

<sup>24</sup>*ibid.*, 186 §46 5:307.

errors and corrections, anticipation and worry. Simply trying to organize thoughts and plan movements ahead of the strike can result in intense brain activity. With diminished brain activation occurring as skill level increases, it has been concluded that as a consequence of practice and experience, the tour player's brain becomes less activated during these periods as their movement creation and shot planning becomes more automatic.”<sup>25</sup>

Smith goes on to suggest that as the professional player's mind is not occupied with rules, they are able to make micro adaptations to the particularities of the moment, such as a subtle breeze or very slight currents of warm air. Almost seventy years early, Merleau-Ponty describes the phenomenon as:

“I experience the movements as being a result of the situation, of the sequence of events themselves; myself and my moments are, so to speak, merely a link in the whole process and I am scarcely aware of any voluntary initiative... It all happens independently of me.”<sup>26</sup>

According to Merleau-Ponty, we find ourselves in spatial situations that our bodies physically and intuitively engage with. We acquire skills through our experience of living in a complex and varied world and our capacity to learn through engaged experience.<sup>27</sup> Looking at the phenomenon reveals the theory that human beings have a primary mode of engagement with space in which the body responds to situations in the designed environment in a non-rule-governed fashion with non-representational motivators.

The point is that genius includes this freedom from conceptual rules which in turn affords

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<sup>25</sup>Smith, 2013.

<sup>26</sup>Merleau-Ponty, 1962, p. 105.

<sup>27</sup>For a more interestingly account see the philosophical text on the subject, such as most admirably studied by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). Merleau-Ponty, 1962; Merleau-Ponty, 1964c; Merleau-Ponty, 1968 Or see philosopher Hubert Dreyfus highly accessible phenomenological account of skill acquisition, *A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition as the basis for a Merleau-Pontian Non-representationalist Cognitive Science*.

intentionality to fluidly engage a formative force of nature; the art is in the swing. Again, think of the Jedi knights as the warrior Stoics of the Star Wars mythos, who in clearing their mind could work with the force.<sup>28</sup> Yet, Kantian cultivation is more complex than embodied skills in that its architectonic aim is for ethical behavior and freedom. However the detailed research regarding the event itself is helpful in ‘fleshing out’ Kant’s abstract theory.

The artist thereby engages with matter in a style which aids the matter to express its own causal nexus. Kant’s artist is someone who brings out the material purposiveness (the ends), through objects, which are in turn works of art. However, this definition differs radically from the accepted view of the artist in late eighteenth century Prussia or our contemporary global society. These latter two understandings of the artist are perhaps more in line with each other than Kant’s with his contemporaries — in that both popular views of the artist afford an artistic expression of concepts. An account that aestheticist E.F. Carritt crisply assesses as:

“Dante with all his instinctive poetic followers, Spenser, Shelley, Wordsworth, and in a less self-conscious sense St Francis, form with the two great philosophers a dazzling crowd of witnesses. So we must not forget the solid, if somewhat stolid, body of common opinion upon the other side: that beauty is a snare, that purity is puritanical, that artist - and here Plato is a lost leader - have often much to be forgiven them.”<sup>29</sup>

Kant shows little interest in attending to the popular view of the artist or in defining which objects are art, but rather is concerned with why it makes sense to structure ideas

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<sup>28</sup> As discussed above, in section 1.2.1, *Philosophy of cultivating* and observed in a lecture by philosopher Diana C. Fleming, logos is something akin to the Star Wars Jedi’s notion of *the force*. Lectures in Ancient Philosophy, Berkeley 2002..

<sup>29</sup> Carritt, 1914, p. 34.

in certain ways, and what beauty can lead to in society. However, such a limited recognition of art is rather unconventional and poses eddies for misreadings. So for the sake of clarity, Kant’s classification of art “in the proper sense of the term” will be dubbed as *aesthetic art*.<sup>30</sup> Aesthetic art is created with the power of aesthetic judgment; it involves imagining, understanding, spirit and taste.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, it must have purposiveness of form and must still be free from constraints of arbitrary rules, as if it were a product of nature without a designer.<sup>32</sup> As such, it promotes cultivation of mental powers for social communications, by spatializing primordial relationships for experience. In Kant’s words:

“Even beauty in nature, i.e., its agreement with the free play of our cognitive faculties in the apprehension and judging of its appearance, can be considered in this way as an objective purposiveness of nature in its entirety, as a system of which the human being is a member, once the teleological judging of nature by means of natural ends, which have been made evident to us by organized beings, has justified us in the idea of a great system of the ends of nature. We may consider it as a favor that nature has done for us that in addition to usefulness it has so richly distributed beauty and charms, and we can love it on that account, just as we regard it with respect because of its immeasurability, and we can feel ourselves to be ennobled in this contemplation — just as if nature had erected and decorated its magnificent stage precisely with this intention.”<sup>33</sup>

To digest the claim, consider the following series of points. A natural end relates to the object and its system of parts via its form. A natural end is only possible through its

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<sup>30</sup>Kant, 2000, 50 §XII 20:251.

<sup>31</sup>*ibid.*, 197 §50 5:320.

<sup>32</sup>*ibid.*, 185 §45 5:306.

<sup>33</sup>*ibid.*, 251 §67 5:380.

relationship to the whole. Natural ends are organized beings and must be both their own cause and effect. Things of the understanding (i.e. things the understanding can understand and assign a concept to) are the things that are effects of other's causes. They are not their own cause. When a cause effects another thing without the other effecting it, this is called *nexus effectivus*, efficient causes. For a natural end, the cause of its effects are caused by itself. It is self effecting *nexus finalis* - final cause. A thing that is a natural end has parts that are possible only through their relationships to the whole. Hence the scope of the system might encompass more than the traditionally isolated or autonomous object. The thing must determine everything a priori, everything contains in itself as its concept idea. The parts must be combined into a whole by being reciprocally the cause and effect of their form, as the ground for the cognition of the systematic unity of the form.<sup>34</sup> The important difference between, efficient causality and final causes is the relations of the parts to each other amongst the whole.<sup>35</sup>

The art that Kant is often quoted as dismissing as merely representations of nature is best called *referential art*. This style of art is created by the artist acting as a rational being outside of nature.<sup>36</sup> Such works are often called art in general society and can claim the more common understanding of the term. Referential art calls upon the power of determining judgment in connecting various concepts or ideas to the object. It is the type of art Kant refers to with the popularly cited line of: "A beauty of nature is a **beautiful thing**; the beauty of art is a **beautiful representation** of a thing."<sup>37</sup> The pleasure in witnessing such an object of art comes from matching up various concepts to the object; as discussed above in the Koolhaas example. Referential art can sometimes result in

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<sup>34</sup>Kant, 2000, 245 §65 5:373.

<sup>35</sup>This does raise questions for a further study of *is there any efficient causality in Nature? Does a tree ever use the bird as a means to an end? If so, is that particular tree out of harmony and in depleting situation? Lastly, does any fully functioning or healthy Nature still remain on this planet?*

<sup>36</sup>Kant, 2000, 246 §65 5:375.

<sup>37</sup>*ibid.*, 189 §48 5:311.

new ideas or connections for the perceiver, but the experience is inherently conceptual and culturally embedded. It may warrant a determining judgment of adherent beauty, but never that of free or pure beauty. It is referential to past experiences and normative ideas; and often playing with past ideas to bend convention and relay an interesting insight of the individual's society. Thus it needs not warrant the techniques of nature which afford cultivation. For Kant the consequential difference does not lie between art and nature; it is between aesthetic and referential art.

### 5.0.3 That which affords aesthetic judgments

In Kant's terms of a non-pluralist understanding of art: aesthetic art must be freely made and beautiful. Kant is surprisingly direct in prescribing a need for freedom while creating art, in his words, "only production through freedom, i.e., through a capacity for choice that grounds its actions in reason, should be called art."<sup>38</sup> This is the freedom of cultivated maturity as discussed above in the first chapter of the first movement of philosophically cultivating the self by rejecting false knowledge from one's political, social, economical, and historical milieu. It is the capacity to willfully cast aside the pre-determined categorizations of the world ready to hand, and to allow one's own solitary powers of apperception to freshly render the possibilities of one's horizon. This line of thinking could be seen as a glorification of the human mind and reason, yet in the context of the *Critique of Judgment*, it is a means of decentering, dispersing and un-'blocking' power, by claiming that individuals have immediate and primary access to the world.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>38</sup>Kant, 2000, 182, §43 5:303.

<sup>39</sup>*Blocking* in the Foucaultian sense of normalized power relations created within subsections of society where blocks of pastoral power codify means of individual's attempts to unite oneself with oneself — a self that is not a 'true transcendental self', but one willfully formed by the individual. Power relations that were later co-opted by the Church and employed as a means of training the individual to internalize disciplines that benefited existing power relations. As discussed above in section 1.1.1, *the historical background of the problem at hand*.



In the context of the artist, this immediate access must be employed during the act of creation.

At the same time aesthetic art is a product of a formative force of nature, as Kant asserts, “it is the technique in nature and not that of the causality of the powers of representation of human beings which is what is called *art* (in the proper sense of the word).”<sup>40</sup> In other words, art is manifest via beings acting as parts of nature who echo the techniques of nature. In other words, the artist is embodying the techniques of nature while creating the artistic object. And when embodying a formative force, the artist is free from pre-determined results. Granted this may superficially merit the rebuttal of, how may one both embody a formative force and be free in the same moment? As is discussed below, the particularities of this force constitute non-deterministic details amongst the drive for non-hierarchical relational properties. In this way, it is a dynamic force for universal freedom; as freedom begets freedom.

To a greater or lesser extent our embodied system of coping with the world has afforded us (as a species and as individuals) to gain knowledge of nature. The short and long term pragmatic style in which we learn and engage the world is through the feelings of pleasure and displeasure, which guide our faculty of reflective judgment. When we echo the internal and transient relationships within the material bodies before us, we experience pleasure. Likewise when we fail to echo the vibrant matter, we feel displeasure, which subtly guides us to match up with the existent material objects and horizons about us.<sup>41</sup>

In this sense, we do not need to always employ concepts in order to engage the world. This phenomenon is what leading Kantian scholar Hannah Ginsborg initially explains as “perceptual normativity” (2006) and later as “privative normativity” (2011). Ginsborg

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<sup>40</sup>Kant, 2000, 50 §XII 20:251.

<sup>41</sup>See above section 1.1.1, *material presence* for detailed discussion of this account of the power of judgment.

has contributed a significant wealth of insightful interpretations and ramifications of Kant's critical period.<sup>42</sup> Her recent development of the notion of primitive normativity has arisen out of genuine understanding of Kant's philosophical motivations as opposed to a more common entanglement with derivative qualifications of text or fetishism of terms.<sup>43</sup> In her words:

"Perceptual experience, on this proposal, involves the awareness of its own appropriateness with respect to the object perceived, where this appropriateness is more primitive than truth or veridicality. This means that a subject can take herself to be perceiving an object as she (and anyone else) ought to perceive it, without first recognizing the object to fall under a corresponding concept."<sup>44</sup>

It is roughly the idea that there is something about the way we engage with objects that affords us access to something significant about the object itself which is more primitive than the definable qualities of the object. That is we take ourselves to be perceiving the object as we *ought*. Somehow we seem to be able to pick up on the unity of the thing rather than the representational semblance of its definable qualities.<sup>45</sup> Primitive normativity is the innate ability to apprehend the generating unity of the object itself,

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<sup>42</sup>Ginsborg, 2013 Other works that have indubitable influence or confirmed my reading of Kant are: Ginsborg, 1990; Ginsborg, 1991; Ginsborg, 1995; Ginsborg, 2001; Ginsborg, 2002; Ginsborg, 2003; Ginsborg, 2004; Ginsborg, 2006a; Ginsborg, 2006b; Ginsborg, 2006d; Ginsborg, 2006c; Ginsborg, 2006e; Ginsborg, 2008; Ginsborg, 2010; Ginsborg, 2011b; Ginsborg, 2012; Ginsborg, forthcoming; Ginsborg, 2011a.

<sup>43</sup>For example consider the debate between Paul Guyer and Karl Ameriks as played out in: Guyer, 1995, Ameriks, 1995. Or Habermas' reading of Kant with focus almost exclusively on the first *Critique*, see: Habermas, 1987, in particular note pages 260 and 302.

<sup>44</sup>Ginsborg, 2006a[ p1]

<sup>45</sup>*ibid.*, p. 18 or consider the proposition: "The awareness of normativity is... primitive: we are simply aware that we are perceiving as we ought, without that awareness depending on the appreciation of anything either about our way of perceiving or about the object." *ibid.*, p. 20 Additionally Ginsborg's example involving Wittgenstein, Kripke's Skeptical Problem, numbers and what ought to come next. (2011) Ginsborg, 2011b Ginsborg, 2012 and Ginsborg, forthcoming. Or the example of a child sorting cubes and pyramids, Ginsborg, 2006a or the issue of why blue or green and not *grue* & *bleen* and why cube rather than sphere or *sphube*. Ginsborg, 2006c particularly pages 15ff.

beyond its derivative properties and which does not require a concept. For clarification consider the claim:

“My proposal thus respects the primitive character of perception relative to thought by denying that we must possess the capacity to entertain thoughts about, say, apples, as a prior condition of being able to perceive an apple as such. It remains true, as on the conceptualist view as standardly understood, that we cannot perceive something as an apple if we do not have the capacity to entertain thoughts involving the concept apple. For I cannot perceive something as an apple, on this view, without conceiving it to be an apple, and hence judging that it is an apple. But my carrying out the synthesis through which I come to perceive it as an apple is not guided by my antecedent recognition that, say, this is an apple and that apples have white insides. Rather, I judge the thing to be an apple, and to have a white inside, precisely in virtue of carrying out that synthesis.”<sup>46</sup>

It is through the syntheses that we concoct these concepts, the concepts which guide our synthesis of the object are not necessary primary, they can be (like in the train car example), but that is lazy perception and vulnerable to normalizing power relations.<sup>47</sup>

To clarify, the concept of primitive normativity is a means of thinking about reflective judgments in general. Redirecting this process to aesthetic judgment leads to the following description. When we have a sensitivity to engage with the forms of causal relations pulsating within such objects and horizons by echoing their manner, we experience pleasure, and when these formal relations are the manner of successful techniques of nature,

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<sup>46</sup>Ginsborg, 2008, p. 75 For ease of relating this argument to the above examination of Kantian aesthetic judgments, please note that contemporary Kantian scholars tend to use the term synthesis where Kant used composed or composition in the third *Critique*.

<sup>47</sup>See sections above 1.1.1, *in anticipation* and *false knowledge* for discussion of concept-led cognition.

we experience the pleasure of a judgment of taste.

### teleological judgments ... “in the pursuit of experience”

Teleology is merely a tool for humans to understand the world and offers something positioned between a theological view and a mere chance mechanistic view.<sup>48</sup> Talk of purposiveness is merely subjective to us, it is how our power of judgment works.<sup>49</sup> In Kant’s words, “What is at issue is therefore a special character of our (human) understanding with regard to the power of judgment in its reflection upon things in nature.”<sup>50</sup> The theory takes nature as a system of purposes in which everything is teleologically connected to everything else through relations of purposiveness.

Kant attempts to ground the power of judgment through the teleological claim that in order to have any judgments at all, we must assume: nothing happens in vain, nor by chance and there is an intentional cause. This leads to the claim that the ‘end of nature’ must extend to everything that lies in its product. In other words, everything that is a product of nature must be determined by nature’s end (end as the goal, aim or purpose.)<sup>51</sup> Kant draws out a step by step analytical justification for the necessity of assuming a somewhat magical formative force bubbling out from a supersensible substratum which reveals itself to us through the forms various objects relate to themselves and to that which is around them (i.e. their horizon). Teleology is the appeal to ends, purposes or goals. A teleological judgment is a judgment about the purposiveness of nature. In the following passage Kant ties together his thinking on the issues of matter, form, natural end, the whole of nature and that nothing in nature is in vain:

<sup>48</sup> “in the pursuit of experience” Kant, 2000, 274 §77 5:405.

<sup>49</sup> *ibid.*, 276 §77 5:407.

<sup>50</sup> *ibid.*, 275 §77 5:405.

<sup>51</sup> *ibid.*, 248 §66 5:377.

“It is therefore only matter insofar as it is organized that necessarily carries with it the concept of itself as a natural end, since its specific form is at the same time a product of nature. However, this concept necessarily leads to the idea of the whole of nature as a system in accordance with the rule of ends, to which idea all of the mechanism of nature in accordance with principles of reason must now be subordinated (at least in order to test natural appearance by this idea). The principle of reason is appropriate for it only subjectively, i.e., as the maxims that everything in the world is good for something, that nothing is in vain; and by means of the example that nature gives in its organic products, one is justified, indeed called upon to expect nothing in nature and its laws but what is purposive in the whole.

It is self-evident that this is not a principle for the determining but only for the reflecting power of judgment, that it is regulative and not constitutive, and that by its means we acquire only a guideline for considering things in nature, in relation to a determining ground that is already given, in accordance with a new, lawful order, and for extending natural science in accordance with another principle, namely that of final causes, yet without harm to the mechanism of nature.”<sup>52</sup>

Teleological judgments are reflective, they assert that nature is governed by purposes and although such assertions exceed our empirical evidence, it may be useful for doing science to act as if such judgments have cause. Kant attempts to justify the teleological power of judgment based on observations about nature, the empirical sciences, and reasoning in the form of: if not this, than what else accounts for the phenomena? He hypothesizes the meaning of things such as grass, verim, mosquitoes, tapeworm, dreams, beauty and

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<sup>52</sup>Kant, 2000, 250 ff. §67 5:379 Additionally see: Ginsborg, 2004 for a critique of Kant’s ‘merely’ regulative claim.

the nation state.<sup>53</sup> In particular he analyzes the mechanism of objects — both organic and artifactual. Art exists amongst the two. Art is artifactual in that it is a created object, yet it is organic, in that it is created with natural processes. Human beings are parts of nature and when a human being is able to act in both the relation to their free intentionality and the larger context of nature, then aesthetic art is created.

Teleology is a study applied to the unity of an object's material system. The manner of the object's matter is what the individual perceiving the object echoes, which is also the unity of the object grasped by a primitive normativity. In this sense teleology opens the study of the manner of matter. Kant asserts that certain object's parts have a pattern of behavior that can not be explained without reference to its causal nexus. These certain objects are organic organisms as opposed to inert artifacts. Organic organisms have a nexus finalis, which means that the manner in which the parts relate to each other is with a united aim, a purpose or a unity.<sup>54</sup> The interesting point is that objects of art share this manner of matter — this nexus finalis.

By arguing for the power of teleological judgments, Kant eludes the need to claim that organisms (i.e. systems of matter) have rationality or embody a god, while maintaining an explanation for the organism's observable capacity to self-generate, grow, reproduce and regenerate or repair itself more than merely mechanical.<sup>55</sup> Kant crafts an argument admitting mechanistic processes within an overall purposive system of nature. As Ginsborg provides a succinct pastiche of Kant's point as:

“But he adds a crucial qualification: if we adopt this hypothesis we must “in

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<sup>53</sup>Kant, 2000, 250 ff. §67 5:379 and discussion of the nation state is found in a footnote on *ibid.*, 246-7 §65 5:375.

<sup>54</sup>Unity as found on *ibid.*, 234 §61 5:360.

<sup>55</sup>see: *ibid.*, 264 ff. §73 5:393 ff for Kant's refutation of such presuppositions. Ginsborg states the point as: “Appeal to natural teleology may justify the assumption of an intelligent cause of nature, but it cannot justify the assumption that this cause has wisdom, let alone that it is infinite in every respect, and in particular supremely wise (§85, 441).” Ginsborg, 2013, §3.6.

the end ascribe to the universal mother an organization which is purposively set up towards [gestellt auf] all these creatures" ([419]) We can allow that "something organic [can be] produced from something else which is organic, even if it is specifically different from it" (419n.). However, we cannot allow "the production of an organized being through the mechanism of crude unorganized matter," for that hypothesis is "absurd" (ungereimt) (ibid.).<sup>56</sup>

Given our limited understanding of matter, we cannot assume that all objects and organism are merely mechanical. That is, Kant claims that no species could originally develop out of unorganized matter as such. Chains of organisms can be made, but the mechanism depends on living matter, whose possibility we can understand only in teleological terms. We can never know exactly what is going on, although it is possible that there are more clever beings who can know. We cannot because we have a discursive knowledge of nature rather than a capacity for intuitive thinking. Hence we must subordinate mechanism to teleology,<sup>57</sup> and search for the mechanical explanation as far as possible and ultimately recognize a need to appeal to purposes.

On the other hand, organisms (as opposed to artifacts) cannot be explained in terms of a designer's intentions.<sup>58</sup> Without a creator, it is nature herself that operates as a system of purpose. This does not mean that Kant claims we may objectively know that nature has an aim. But rather, that we can not help but assume nature has an aim, if we want to study and engage with it. If we could act as if anything was possible at any point from mere chance, then life would be dream-like; with shifting gravities, morphing forms and fleeting connections. A situation Lucretius most poetically describes in the first book of *On the Nature of the Universe*:

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<sup>56</sup>Ginsborg, 2004, p. 43.

<sup>57</sup>Kant, 2000, 282 §78 5:414.

<sup>58</sup>"We cannot regard [organisms], like artifacts, as arrangements of material parts whose unity is externally imposed." Ginsborg, 2004, p. 54.

“For if things came out of nothing, all kinds of things  
 could be produced from all things. Nothing would need a seed.  
 Men could arise from the sea, and scaly fish  
 from the earth, and birds hatch in the sky.  
 Cattle and farm animals and wild beast of every kind  
 would fill alike farmlands and wilderness,  
 Breeds all mixed up, all origins confused.  
 Nor could the fruits stay constant on the trees,  
 But all would change, all could bear everything.  
 For lacking its own generative bodies  
 How could a thing have a mother, fixed or sure?<sup>59</sup>

Lucretius resolves the issue by introducing the primal atom as the source which limits the possibilities of what may be.<sup>60</sup> Lucretius’ primal atoms are limited in style and shape, thereby confining the possible combinations. They also have a given tendency of falling downward in the void with random swerves.<sup>61</sup> The fall and swerves account for the creating of manifolds of primary atoms and thus objects. Kant’s primal unit of matter, which he later comes to call the ether,<sup>62</sup> seems to have only one ‘shape’ and does not have a necessarily downward mobility with random swerves; as he finds this absurd.<sup>63</sup> Kant’s account thereby requires the assumption of a subjective purposiveness,

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<sup>59</sup>Lucretius, 1997, 8 lines 159-167.

<sup>60</sup>Lucretius continues the argument as:  
 “But as it is, since each thing is created  
 From fixed specific seeds, the source from which  
 It is born and comes forth into the shores of light  
 Is its material and its primal atoms.  
 That is why all things cannot be born of all things,  
 Because in each dwells its distinctive power. *ibid.*, 8 lines 168-172.

<sup>61</sup>*ibid.*, 42 219.

<sup>62</sup>Or caloric Kant, 1993 and Förster, 2000 and earlier referred to as a transient monad in the tradition but not details of Leibniz. Carpenter, 1998, 51 ff. §1.3.

<sup>63</sup>Kant, 2000, 263 §72 5:391.



at least to a collection or system of matter at the level of the organized object (i.e. an organism).<sup>64</sup> An organized object or organic body is something where every part is there for the sake of the other, in Kant's words: "reciprocally as end and, at the same time, means".<sup>65</sup> An organized object's inner objective material purposiveness can be abstracted as:

1. producing offspring.
2. preserving itself as an individual; takes in nourishment and converts it into what it needs.
3. various parts of the individual mutually maintain one another in existence and hence maintain the whole individual's existence.<sup>66</sup>

Everything that is a product of nature must be determined by Nature's end (*end*: as in goal, purpose or *telos*).<sup>67</sup> The effect of the whole is determined by supersensible dynamic unity of grounds and cause, which is beyond the blind mechanism of nature. In this sense, the ends of nature are the grounds for the explanation of their existence and nature's purposiveness.<sup>68</sup> Hence, the aim or ends of nature are both the grounds for nature and their purposiveness — their cause and effect; nature's nexus. This is, in Kant's words, "a great system of the ends of nature which in turn must be why nothing is in vain or happens by chance."<sup>69</sup>

To summarize the argument, human life is not mere engagement with events of Beauty.

At some point determining judgments are made, stored and then employed as abbrevia-

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<sup>64</sup>For further discussion of Epicurean philosophy as it function oppositely to Kant's purposiveness see: Long, 1977 In particular the passage: "Epicurus denied that stars and animals must be explained by final causes. Purposiveness is not a feature of the world, which came into being as a result of purposeless movements and combinations of atoms." *ibid.*, p. 71.

<sup>65</sup>Kant, 1993, 64 21:210.

<sup>66</sup>Kant, 2000, 242 ff. §64 5:370 ff.

<sup>67</sup>*ibid.*, 248 §66 5:377.

<sup>68</sup>*ibid.*, 249 §67 5:377 ff.

<sup>69</sup>*ibid.*, 248 §66 5:376.

tions for engaging with the world. To collect knowledge about the world we must open up a closed system of reason founded by the teleological power of judgment. Determining judgments exist within a closed system of reason. To determinately judge and collect categories of knowledge we must metaphorically open a set of which adheres to a handful of given premises and thus affords us to understand aspects of the world. It is a subset of a whole which we can never fully know, but ought to assume. The class of human knowledge is a closed (albeit infinite) set of knowledge about a more complex whole (a set of all sets). The knowledge set we have been working with in the western intellectual realm, continuously assumes three things, which in Kantian terms can be summarized as: nothing is in vain, nothing is by chance, and an imaginary focal point of nature's purposiveness. The closest we can understand this regulative idea is through related rules (concepts) of the understanding which must logically converge at a point outside our understanding, which he calls a *focus imaginarius*.<sup>70</sup> An imaginary focal point is proposed when there are numerous strands seeming to converge in an area just outside of our knowable field. In the case of the power of teleological judgments, the *focus imaginarius* is a subjective purposiveness to nature. We must act as if these things are true in order to work within our historically collected frameworks of the empirical sciences and knowledge, which is the generalization of experience via systems of concepts. These premises grant us the possibility to work with the principles of causality, consistence and economy. Knowledge can not be grounded on nihilistic rejection of meaning, i.e., without the assumption that things are knowable we cannot hope to know anything.

Likewise we must assume events have causes or else we cannot precede to uncover these

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
<sup>70</sup>See: §77 for Kant's crucial analysis of the *as if* structure and grounding of the power of judgment on an assumed end of the whole of nature. Kant, 2000, 274-9 §77 5:404-11 Furthermore see Kant's *Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic* for primary discussion of the *focus imaginarius*. Kant, 1929a, 533 A644 B672 Additionally, see Förster's discussion of the role of the *focus imaginarius* in terms of Kant's final synthesis. Förster, 2000, p. 84 Lastly, see the section above 1.1.1 *material presence* for further situating of the *focus imaginarius*.

causes. The idea of nature's purposiveness grants that there is a cause and grounds to everything in nature. Hence we open a playing field in which we can record observations about the world and test out ideas, but just as Frege's logic was ultimately rendered 'arbitrary' by Russell's Paradox of the set of all sets that does not include itself, Kant's closed system of human knowledge is merely a mythos.<sup>71</sup>

In short Kant's broad metaphysical structure relevant to creating and producing art and architecture looks like this, if read as a tree from ground up:

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<sup>71</sup>Frege was interested in a means of communication that dealt with logical truths. Frege's explicit definition of Numbers affords Russell's paradox of the set of all sets that does not include itself. Frege defines Numbers explicitly as extensions of concepts. Frege's explicit definition of Numbers states: "The Number which belongs to the concept  $F$  is the extension of the concept 'equal to the concept  $F$ '" Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic*, §68 This attempt to define Numbers draws upon the understanding that if given any concept  $F$ , then the notion of equinumerosity can be used to define the concept ranging over concepts. That is, 'equal to the concept  $F$ ' is the concept of equinumerosity that ranges over the concept  $F$  and the extension. By these means, Frege collects all of the equinumerous concepts to a given concept  $F$  into a single extension. Frege defines 0 as Number  $x$  ( $x \neq x$ ) and defines 1 as Number  $x$  ( $x = 0$ ), that is, as Number  $x$  ( $x = \text{Number } y$  ( $y \neq y$ )). With these definitions of 0 and 1, Frege utilizes mixed identities. With the inclusion of extensions, the paradox arises by considering the set of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set appears to be a member of itself if and only if it is not a member of itself, hence the paradox. Some sets, such as the set of all coffee beans, are not members of themselves. Other sets, such as the set of all non-coffee beans, are members of themselves. So if we call the set of all sets that are not members of themselves  $S$ . If  $S$  is a member of itself, then by definition it must not be a member of itself. Similarly, if  $S$  is not a member of itself, then by definition it must be a member of itself. Russell's paradox stems from the notion that any condition may be used as an extension. Therefore, attempts at resolving the paradox have typically concentrated on various means of restricting the principles governing the existence of extensions. Restricting the domain, however, is not a move Frege was ultimately willing to make. Any restriction of the domain would render the method detached from pure logic, therefore becoming an arbitrary model of knowledge; which was an inevitability Frege adventually accepted. Frege, 1980; Frege, 1997; Sluga, 1980; Dummett, 1991; Bourdieu, 1990; Hale and Wright, 2001.



At the base there is the Transcendent which as unknowable; however the focus imaginarius may be uncovered by thinking about the how transcendental laws meet. The transcendental laws are derived from logical reasoning and generalizable observation about the world. The interaction between transcendental laws and matter through time gives rise to Forms (forms as fluid shapes that are always in motion). When spirit is added to these forms the possibility of human beings manifest. Then when human beings exercise cultivation, it gives to rationality and freedom; When this freedom and rationality is limited by the will, it leads to Ethics, and when all humans practice this manner of behavior it ultimately to Telosland.

It seems the freedom that is essential to Kant's artist is not the nihilist freedoms of Nietzsche, Sartre, or Foucault in which there are no knowable bindings of the individual. Rather it is an embodied, pre-cognitive freedom of cultivation which sets aside (at least in the moment) the historical, political, economical, and social structuring of individuals' intentionality; confinements that are most poetically and popularly chronicled by Foucault. Normative conventions open ready-made structures of the material world with which the individual engages. These structures are like pathways through forest, providing ready-made trails. They are also like rivets in sheet metal, fastening together rational ideas in unnatural forms. In the creation of art the individual must be unhindered by the guiding forces of such conventions. Perhaps because conventions, like all abstractions, cannot be finely tuned to the particularities of a present situation. And that nimbleness, fineness of care, is needed to engage with the richness of matter's possibilities when creating an object of beauty.

It is interesting to consider whether Kant would have welcomed the phenomenon of a pairings or a group of people creating an object as aesthetically artistic; as is found with artist teams like Kazuyo Sejima and Ryue Nishizawa (of SANAA), Jacques Herzog & Pierre de Meuron, or Alison and Peter Smithson (with Brutalism). Could a situation be distilled that held true to Kant's ingredients but was implemented by more than a single person? In such a case there is more than one perspective acting in the moment. It would show that the importance of artistic creation lies in the free engagement with the supersensible substratum by beings that are in tune with it. And it would negate worries about the particularity of the embodied form of those creating the object. Hence, non-human beings could also be artist.<sup>72</sup>

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<sup>72</sup>However Kant is ungenerous with his reading of animal creators, claiming the bird who designs their nest is merely acting out of mechanical instinct.

#### 5.0.4 Echoing epiphanies

For Kant a repeating concern is the need to grant a self-organizing unity. This unity can be present in individual human beings, in organisms, ecosystems, artists, the creation of art, and in events of Beauty.

Aesthetic art is dissimilar from “science”, “handicraft”, and “products of nature”.<sup>73</sup> However there is difficulty in lining up these three distinctions to Kant’s overall structure of objects. A sympathetic reading of Kant’s claims on art in general,<sup>74</sup> is to say that artistic objects are produced with intentionality while acting within a material situation true to the formative power of nature.<sup>75</sup>

#### art versus science

Firstly the distinction between art and science lies in the role of concepts. Art is a practical skill and science is a skill of theoretical knowledge. The difference is between “**to be able** and **to know**”.<sup>76</sup> To create art or beauty one must be able. To conduct science, one must know how to apply rules and which rules to apply.<sup>77</sup> A science is something that can be done as soon as one knows what should be done. Science employs the power of determining judgments in that it is a collection of concepts that can be applied to objects in the world. Whereas, art is something that may be known but yet not mastered by the individual attempting to do it. The creation of art has little to do with knowledge. However, Kant’s somewhat simplistic categorization of art and science shows little resemblance to the contemporary practice of empirical sciences; which at

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<sup>73</sup>Kant, 2000, 183 §43 5:304.

<sup>74</sup>*ibid.*, 183 §43 5:304.

<sup>75</sup>Searle’s coined phrase, *intentionality-in-action*, comes to mind (Searle, 2009, p. ix) as does the more recent, Alva Noë’s *action-in-perception*. Noë, 2004.

<sup>76</sup>Kant, 2000, 183 §43 5:303 A distinction reflective to that of the Greek *technê* and *epistêmê*, as discussed above in the section 1.2.1.movements of cultivation.

<sup>77</sup>*ibid.*, 183 §43 5:304.

least within the high levels fields of physics or medicine seems far more creative then merely applying rules to observations.<sup>78</sup> However, Kant might then have considered such people as artist.

### **art versus handicraft**

If someone creates an object without freedom, then it is either a handicraft or a product of nature. A handicraft is created without freedom, in the sense of being produced without moral intentionality.<sup>79</sup> At the concrete and practical level, what this means is that while the product is being made, there are no ad hoc choices being made. There must be an act of intentionality, a will that drives the action, or a faculty of spirit that shapes the process of creation. Products of nature, such as the honeycomb or nest, are created merely mechanically, as they create without moral of free intentionality. This is attributed to an inherent and structural lack of access to reason; as is presumed of the actions of bees and birds. Whereas the human being who manufactures a handicraft object, may structurally have the possibility of employing reason, they just do not employ it in the moment due to various circumstances; be them ethical, social, economical or historical. At base, art requires an open individual agency in the present material moment, both in the act of judging and shaping.

For example, say a wooden door handle is being created to be an artistic object. If the individual crafting the piece acts with sufficiently developed nimbleness, then as the various strikes shape the object, the individual can sense the current move that is best for the particular wood and door. The moves are not subject to the history of wood or expectations and are freely chosen by the individual. The individual simultaneously acts

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<sup>78</sup>For example consider the research on the placebo effect which contemplates the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty by medical physician Oron Frenkel: “A Phenomenology of the ‘Placebo Effect’: Taking Meaning from the Mind to the Body” Frenkel, 2008.

<sup>79</sup>Kant, 2000, 183 §43 5:304.

as a part of the larger system of nature. The final form is not an inevitable outcome of nature, but is limited to possible outcomes of the given matter and employs nature's techniques.

Art is that formative aspect of nature as it inspires an individual in a moment of presence — in a moment void of reflection upon what could be or what once was, but in reflecting with what is, and in that moment creating something that did not need to be (made). There must be the freedom of choice in the moment of choice, as that choice is not about what could be, but what is presently becoming.<sup>80</sup>

These causal nexus (of means-causing-ends and ends-grounding-means) act as the binding rhythm that an artist must emulate or embody while creating art. With this participation within to a causal nexus the artist employs their own intentionality on the immediate resources ready to hand. So there is choice, but only within a set of possibilities. The sculptor can strike with varying intensities or angles, but within a general course of form, such that the resulting object is of balance and echoes nature's manner of matter; without greed or dominant aspects and without merely replicating or representing patterns found in natural settings. However, if the wooden door handle is being created without freedom of a rational capacity, then the individual does not have choice (not even from within the limited set of nature's techniques) and the process is merely mechanical. In such a case, the individual cannot alter their process as the object is formed and fine tune with the subtlety necessary to create a beautiful thing. Hence the object will be less or unable to resonate the richness of beauty. Kant considers these objects handicraft. Handicraft is the production of objects for money or remuneration without spirit.<sup>81</sup> Whether or not the creator has cultivated nimbleness, for various reasons, they are barred from using it while creating the object. The line between art

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<sup>80</sup>Kant, 2000, 50 §XII 20:251.

<sup>81</sup>*ibid.*, 183 §43 5:304.



and handicraft is not drawn between particular guilds or professions, but rather within each guild by the degree of the individual's opportunity to carry out their skill with spirit.

In terms of the issue of scaleability of matter; observations on the manner of matter applies to the level of the ether in an object, the *bricks* in a wall,<sup>82</sup> the walls in a building, the buildings in a city, the cities on a plant, and so forth. At the concrete and pragmatic scale of the bricks in the building, the parts can be the bricks, floor boards, windowsills, voids, people, flora and fauna. These parts need to be accounted for as they need to be positioned as active parts of the system that self-generates. As liberally discussed above Tadao Ando's Chichu is a prime example of such an object.

### art versus instinct

The issue of originality often surfaces in architectural debates. If referential art is dismissed from warranting Kantian pure beauty and the assumption that some sort of abandonment to a supersensible force is necessary for creating aesthetic art, then how does genius differ from instinct? Or how do beautiful architectural objects differ from vernacular buildings?

Kant claims that products of nature are distinguished from art, as they are created from instinct and without reasonable participation of the particular being currently creating the object. In this sense he opens the section on art in general with the following distinction;

“**Art** is distinguished from **nature** as doing (*facere*) is from acting or producing in general (*agere*), and the product or consequence of the former is

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<sup>82</sup> (*Bricks* being symbolic for any kind of building material)

distinguished as a **work** (*opus*) from the latter as an effect (*effectus*).”<sup>83</sup>

However given that we must perceive nature as if it exhibits subjective purposive, all of nature is the art of a unity beyond our current capacity to understand. On the other side of the coin, art is created by a genius and is created in line with this vaster system, and is thereby the product of the formative power of nature.

Kant claims that bees and birds do not create art, as they are merely carrying out instinct which is an inner nature. Although he consents that the overall composition of bees & honeycombs and birds & nest is perhaps the intentional product of an overseeing creator. In Kant’s words:

“For although people are fond of describing the product of the bees (the regularly constructed honeycombs) as a work of art, this is done only on account of the analogy with the latter; that is, as soon as we recall that they do not ground their work on any rational consideration of their own, we say that it is a product of their nature (of instinct), and as art it is ascribed only to their creator.”<sup>84</sup>

In this sense the production of the object, when taken as a whole is the artistic object. Yet what does this entail? In considering the subtlety of grace with which birds form their nests, their attentiveness to new materials, and the eccentric styles of individuality; it is hard to justify that the process is merely mechanically pre-determined and void of freedom of choice.<sup>85</sup> Moreover, why would it make sense to assume a life form emerged in sublime horizons and engaging with beautiful objects fails to cultivate nimbleness? Why explain such behavior as mere acts of instinct?<sup>86</sup> Likewise why explain so much human

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<sup>83</sup>Kant, 2000, 182 §43 5:303.

<sup>84</sup>*ibid.*, 182 §43 5:303.

<sup>85</sup>For a discussion on the care with which a bird designs her nest in the dialectic of interior architecture see Mark Taylor’s contribution to *Intimus*: Taylor and Preston, 2006, pp. 339-344.

<sup>86</sup>For further discussion of this topic, see Hanna’s attempts to pull an argument for rational animals

action as reasoned, rather than as instinct peppered with moments of reason? Granting that language and categorization of concepts as knowledge is derivative of cultivating nimbleness and that the employment of reason and imagination is something we can never directly witness in another's mind, why disconnect the observable behaviors of willful intentionality in non-human life forms?

Recent research studying the interactions between flora and fauna led to a relevant discovery. The team lead by Daniel Robert (a professor of Bionanoscience), Dominic Clarke (a physicist), Heather Whitney (a botanist), and Gregory Sutton (a biologist), found that flowers use caffeine to maintain relationships with bees and send out electric signals for communication.<sup>87</sup> They found that the flower manipulates the electric field in anticipation of the coming bee, and then continue to change the electronic field for a short period after the bee has departed. In the words of the team's report, "E[lectronic]-fields play a thus far unappreciated role in plant-insect interactions. The present study raises the possibility of reciprocal information transfer between plants and pollinators at time scales of milliseconds to seconds."<sup>88</sup> The changes in the electric field can communicate to the bee how much nectar the flower has to offer. Some signs can say, 'Sorry, temporarily out of nectar, but please try again later,' while others beckon the bees to visit. Robert thinks that the flowers can be honest or dishonest in their communication with the bees. As science reviewer Ed Yong writes on the findings:

"[Flowers] that carpet a field and require multiple visits from pollinators will evolve to be truthful, because they cannot afford to deceive their pollinators.

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from Kant's text in: Hanna, 2011 Or see Donna Haraway's argument for trans-species egalitarianism, social bonding and companion species (amongst other premises) in Haraway, 2003 or Haraway, 1997 Or see novelist Jonathan Franzen's observations on birds, and crossing between the style of thinking of song birds, as merely non-human animals, to finding an overpowering need to bury one, in Franzen, 2013.

<sup>87</sup>Clarke et al., 2013. Additionally, there is an excellent interview with the researchers on Science Friday, *Getting the Springtime Buzz on Bees* Flatow et al., March 08, 2013.

<sup>88</sup>Clarke et al., 2013, p. 2.

Bees are good learners and if they repeatedly visit an empty flower, they will quickly avoid an entire patch. Worse still, they'll communicate with their hive-mates, and the entire colony will seek fresh pastures. 'If the flower can signal that it is momentarily empty, then the bee will benefit and the flower will communicate honestly its mitigated attraction,' says Robert.

But some flowers, like tulips or poppies, only need one or two visits to pollinate themselves. 'These could afford to lie,' says Robert. He expects that they will do everything possible to keep their electric charge constant, even if a bee lands upon them. They should always have their signs flipped to 'Open'." <sup>89</sup>

Clearly further research is needed to prove the sentient qualities of flora, but with findings like these anthropocentrism may begin to loosen its strangle hold within the dominating system of biopower. However, even if intentionality is granting to flora and non-human-fauna, they still might not qualify as artist in a Kantian sense. They may be equivalent to vernacular builders. In other words, although the teleological analytic concludes that we must act as if all matter has subjective purposiveness, that purposiveness need not be artistic.

While Kant clearly regards the potential of human beings as superior to that of insects or mushrooms, he acknowledges that to nature, the plethora of life is equally pursued. Consider for example Kant's later text of the *Tugendlehre*: "Man in the system of nature is a being of little significance and, along with the other animals, considered as products of the earth, has an ordinary value."<sup>90</sup> This sentiment of the scalability of life can be

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<sup>89</sup>Yong, 2013.

<sup>90</sup>Kant, 1994, pp. 96-97, translated by Patrick Riley and found in his excellent text: Riley, 1986, p. 566 For further engagement with Kant's *Tugendlehre* see the recently published Trampota, Sensen, and Timmermann, 2013. In particular chapters 6-8 which analyze Kant's later thinking on virtue are of relevant interest here.

noted in his earlier work of *Universal Natural History and the Theory of the Heavens*. It is most colorfully in his retelling of a popular story regarding a man of den Haag and comments of the lice inhabiting the forest of a poor man's head. It goes something like this:

“ ‘Those creatures who live in the forests of a beggar's head,’ he says, ‘had for a long time thought of their dwelling place as an immeasurably large ball and themselves as the masterworks of creation. Then one of them, whom Heaven had endowed with a more refined soul, a small Fontanelle of his species, unexpectedly learned about a nobleman's head. Immediately he called all the witty creatures of his district together and told them with delight: ‘We are not the only living beings in all nature. Look here at this new land. More lice live here.’ ”<sup>91</sup>

The story's context is in the text of the possibility of life beyond the stars. By calling attention to the hubris of the lice on the beggar's head, Kant hopes to show how silly it is to think that life would not exist else where. At the same time we can see that Kant has a bit of a sense of humor towards the potential of sentient creatures. More importantly, he grants that the forces of nature play with more scales than merely the human. His point is that nature cultivates life, and all life is equally pursued by nature.

In short, Kant seeks the possibility of beauty within these means of expression via matter and not the normative concepts of art or architecture. For Kant, only objects which inspire events of Beauty can be considered as examples of art. Therefore art has been defined as something practiced by a freely and reflectively judging individual, in a moment which requires skills of action and not merely knowing what the action ought to be. Finally, it is something that is taken on by the individual of their own will and not

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<sup>91</sup>Kant, 2008, 136 §3.

out of necessity or the confinements of other's purse and watch. Though it is possible to be remunerated for creating art, it can not be a driving force, as nature and will must take that position.

## 5.1 A Grasp

*Art is our richest grasp for the supersensible substratum.*

Kant draws his readers' attention to a distinction between the unity of a system which is the manner in which the parts relate to each other and the semblance of habits preformed by a derivative template of rules. It is akin to the distinction he draws upon in his early work in, *On the Observation of the Beautiful and Sublime*, that of the melancholic and choleric temperament.<sup>92</sup> It is the distinction between the unity of the system generating its manner versus the manner being driven by piecemeal forces or rules. It is most eloquently labeled as that of the *modus aestheticus* (feeling of unity) and *modos logicus* (principles).<sup>93</sup> In other words, between manner and method. In terms of the architectural object the comparison of Tadao Ando's *Chichu* with the dissonance of the *Tate Modern*, is demonstrative of Kant's aesthetic & logicus distinction.

The connection between teleological and aesthetic judgment revolves around Kant's need to ground his metaphysical system on the imaginary focal point of the *means*  $\circ$  *ends* causal nexus. Once he does that, then he is able to justify his definition of art as that which is freely created by human-type beings when they are acting as parts of nature. Art is something springing from nature and a part of nature. The object itself is more of a dynamic organism than an inert artifact. The way in which its parts relate to each other affords its self-generation, growth and repair. This capacity may exist in the

<sup>92</sup>As is examined above in the section 3.1.*all the same*.

<sup>93</sup>Kant, 2000, 196 §49 5:318-9.

relationships between the matter of the object we carry around as art and those who care for it.<sup>94</sup> But beautiful art is cared for, is repaired and grows.

Berlin artist Johannes Gollin, insightfully muses that art is the event of the creation, not the remnant of the event. That is, the presence of creation, of engaging with the materials, being taken over, willing, aiding, and lingering in the making, is itself the art. Like music is the event of music being played in a room and not the record of the event or the digital sound-bites. The object left behind is the evidence of an event of art. However the object is also the recipe for an event of Beauty. As an organic body or organized object, the material aesthetic object harbors both these events. As such, art exist as a larger material system of the object. At the 2013 AIA National Convention in Denver, Cameron Sinclair, Co-founder of Architecture for Humanity asserted: “When you build a beautiful building, people love it. And the most sustainable building in the world is the one that’s loved.”<sup>95</sup> The materiality of the building needs to be considered as its dynamic system of material parts. People, insects, plant life, bacteria are all part of it. The attempted sterilization of the non-human life forms is highly dysfunctional. In a simple case it has been proven that designs incorporating space for lifeforms like bacteria lead to better results. Sister Noella Marcellino, a nun in Connecticut, employed a traditional means of making cheese in wooden barrels before the state banned her due to hygiene and sterilization practices.<sup>96</sup> Sister Noella then undertook a doctorate in microbiology from the University of Connecticut. In researching the topic, her findings show that the

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<sup>94</sup>This is not the same as the ancient idea of the *Automata*. As art historian David Summers describes as: “The idea of an *automaton*, a work of art that moves itself or, perhaps better, one with its own desires, a mind of its own, is as old in Greek literature as the ideal of imitation, to which it is in fact closely related. When Homer described the visit of Thetis to the forge of Hephaestus to ask him to make armour for her mortal son, Achilles, she finds him working at twenty wheeled tripods to go back and forth at his wish from his bronze house to the assembly of the gods (*Iliad* XVIII. 373-7); Hephaestus’ bellows also work themselves, and he is attended by golden maiden whom he has endowed with mind, sense, voice and strength (417-20).” Summers, 2003, p. 326.

<sup>95</sup>[ArchDaily 2013](#).

<sup>96</sup>Marcellino and al., 2001.

wooden barrels produced more hygienic cheese, as the particular combinations of the wood, dairy, and bacteria, created spaces for beneficial bacteria to thrive, who then keep the harmful bacteria in check. As opposed to the stainless steel barrels, which created no room for the beneficial bacteria to create a self-balancing system, which control the harmful bacteria. In a similar vein, only a fraction of the building is concrete and glass; just like the human body is composed of only ten percent human DNA and ninety percent micro bacteria. The research of molecular biologist Bonnie Bassler not only show that the human body is a system of micro bacteria and human DNA, but that the bacteria communicate with each other in what is called “quorum sensing”.<sup>97</sup> This empirical research radically correlates to this reading of Kant’s theoretical findings. We are each individually a system of parts; parts subjectively relating to each other. We are the unity of the manner of our matter. We are the matter composing larger unities, such as the architectural object. Architects need to study biology and merge with the original idea of landscape architects as composers of living systems.<sup>98</sup>

Aesthetic art affording pure beauty is an event that occurs in a material presence with the freedom of mental faculties driven by a harmonious combination of nature’s formative forces and the manner of the matter involved. Aesthetic art can only be achieved when the individual creating it is acting as a part of nature. The earlier posed question of whether or not teams of people can create together remains open, what is clear as that these people must act in unison, as if they were of one spirit.<sup>99</sup>

<sup>97</sup>*Bacterially Speaking* Bassler and Losick, 2006 and “Bacterial Quorum-Sensing Network Architectures” Ng and Bassler, 2009. For further discussion of the creation of society amongst the continuity of living, including social interactions at the level of bacteria, see Yoshimi Kawade’s *On the Nature of the Subjectivity of Living Things* Kawade, 2009.

<sup>98</sup>For an example of this line of thinking is played out in landscape architecture, see canonical first wave urbanist Randolph Hester’s recent publication: Hester, 2006.

<sup>99</sup>An idea reminiscent of the original human beings Aristophanes tells of in *the Symposium*, who were “rounded whole, with back and side forming a circle”, but unfortunately too ambitious and behaved outrageously by attacking the gods, such that Zeus had to slice each human in half like “they cut hardboiled eggs with hairs”. Plato, 1999, 22, 22-26 189e ff.



Bad architecture manifests uni-directional (descending) systems of vibrant matter, condemning them to false hierarchies which exhaust gracelessly. Devoured parts expire, others that once intertwined with them are left without reference or bridge and languish in a confused manner. Stockpiled parts corrode without movement. These parts are the transient ether, the micro scale bacteria, the human scale windowsills, bricks, or floor planks, the human thinking bodies themselves, the architectural spacescapes, the city, the earth and so forth.

### final assessment

If appreciating beauty is so desirable, then why is it common to cringe at art openings? If beauty has a desirably transformative impact, then how does one account for evidence of individuals living in beautiful places who do not have ethical habits or nimble dispositions? Clearly individuals may inhabit remarkable manors, houses, castles, cities, villages and landscapes without cultivating nimbleness.<sup>100</sup> Given the argument is that events of Beauty awaken the individual's will to try to act with care, then what accounts for the empirically evident discrepancy? Or in more detail, given the collection of claims: that beauty and sublime are afforded by material objects and horizons, that those objects and horizons are universally identifiable by the experience they awake within our various faculties, and that willful development of certain habits increase the sensitivity to these material affordances; then how does one account for the perceivable habits of individuals fortunate to inhabit beautiful and sublimely affording material spacescapes?

For Kant, pure beauty and sublime give us a firsthand experience of a supersensible substratum. Beauty and sublime ground us and connects us to the whole. They express how to be better beings, how to come in harmony with a rhythm of nature's techniques;

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<sup>100</sup>A point observed and detailed by E.F. Carritt in *Theory of Beauty*, 1914. Carritt, 1914, p. 34.

the experience is beyond our ability to categorize it or reproduce it. We cannot sense and thereby cannot understand the supersensible substratum, but in the experience of beauty and sublime we echo it. Moreover it is an experience we adore, we linger within. This is the formative force of nature that the didactical theories of cultivating the self strive for the individual to engage firsthand. It is the event that must happen again and again as echoing epiphanies. By contextualizing Kant's terms and ideas within his broader theory and demonstrating it through the concrete objects of architecture, a critical argument emerges for cultivating an openness to reflectively judging objects and horizons. An event of Beauty is able to kindle reflective judgment to the degree of the object's teleological transparency. The skill posed to develop is one of reflecting upon the material presence, and the skill of suspending the power to subsume intuitions under collected concepts of knowledge. In other words, developing taste is cultivating a nimbleness in judging the material presence afresh and not a skill of classifying objects.

The substratum of the supersensible plays amongst its parts and produces forms that move like waves of the ocean when moving through time. The surfacing of these forms compose our world. These forms have the potential of beauty and sublime, yet some are far from it. Hence, perhaps why we can 'cringe' at art opening is because there a hope or surviving expectation for beauty or sublime, and what we are confronted with is mere adherent beauty, artifactual theology or attempts at witty iconography.<sup>101</sup>

Beauty is absent when forms have been classified so completely that our habit is to label before appreciating afresh. That is, when the understanding steps in too soon and does not give the imagination opportunity to play with other representations. Beauty

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<sup>101</sup>Perhaps it is additionally fair to note that the attendants have not necessarily cultivated their nimbleness. And while viewing countless collections of art, which may have exposed them to events of Beauty, the first movement of rejecting false knowledge has not be attempted. Thus at art openings one is confronted with wasted opportunities and individuals professing tran-subjectivating, normalizing power relations in the style of the particular social, historical, political, and economical milieu of art opening attendants.

also steps aside when the object is too far removed from the supersensible, i.e. when it becomes an artifact. In such objects, the matter has been composed poorly, abused, or treated as a means to an end, with efficient cause, such that the object itself is worn out as it drifted from the replenishing loop, ( $means \odot ends$ ), to the uni-directional nexus effectivus ( $means \curvearrowright \rightarrow ends$ ) and no longer forms itself via the patterns of the supersensible substratum. In short it is too derivative. It no longer operates with nature's techniques, nor does it express the formative power of nature. Such objects are mere artifacts created in vain. Nature creates nothing in vain, but perhaps living beings do when employing abstracted rationality without limits. The artifacts created have nexus effectivus, and merely afford a label, not an event of Beauty. When living beings act is if they are not a part of nature, they can then produce objects which fail to afford pure beauty.

Cultivating judgment is both openness to beauty and awareness of tricks; tricks generated by market-led, false knowledge and existent in bad architecture. An assessment of the quality of an object which leads to a judgment regarding the object's affordance of beauty or sublime draws upon the richness of contemplation and structural architectonics of Kant's aesthetic theory and metaphysics. Something is not beautiful because it is, for example, chestnut, gracefully balanced in proportion, and pregnant with movement. The secondary qualities or canonical categorizations of sense datum cannot be repackaged as means of aesthetic assessment. These qualities are derivative from the unity of the object. They are the short hand abbreviations of judgments that Kant seeks to dispel as a means of judging pure beauty. However, the individual *can* judge an object's *adherent* beauty by its collection of secondary, sensory qualities, as the qualities have been evaluated and ranked by the system of biopower the individual is embedded within. But this is not the beauty that affords cultivation. The clearest quality assessment of pure beauty that

may be teased out of Kant's critical period is that of the causal nexus. If the qualities of an object's causal nexus act as a circular means-causes-ends and ends-ground-means relationship (nexus finalis), then the object affords an event of beauty and an aesthetic judgment.

In short, for our own freedom of engagement with the world and for life as a whole, we must act *as if* all matter has subjective purposiveness. For although architecture of the second movement of cultivation, of pure beauty and sublime, cannot prevent a global collapse, it can convey something very important, that beauty is the event of judging a system of deep ecological balance or a harmonious causal nexus. Though the overall project is an anti-pragmatist argument, building beauty is akin to the tree, who in her last known flowering season puts out her most profuse and enchanting display of blossoms, diverting all energies into hope for the next cycle. That one flower may seed and begin again, to start anew with the memory of what was leant. The knowledge which architects can form into embedded experiences of the body in material space cannot be forgotten in an age of forgetfulness: *to replenish what is devoured and makes use of what is gathered*. The object, if it is to be judged beautiful, cannot be merely the inert, silent matter of artifacts. The quality of the object therefore is assessed on the manner of its matter, on the style in which parts relate to each other or in the melody of its unity that dynamically has and holds together.

# Appendices

## Appendix A

# Foucault's version; Care of the Self

### a detailed examination

As noted above in the introduction, Foucault places the emergence of the *epimeleia heautou* into philosophy primarily through Plato's text of the *Alcibiades*.<sup>1</sup> In this period the *epimeleia heautou*, like marriage, was something only useful to the elites for furthering one's political presence.<sup>2</sup> The student of the *epimeleia heautou* was inevitably a young man, with a background of education and socializing practices, who desired to transition from a role of dominated child to a role of dominating adult. He was considered to be in need of training to become an active member of the *polis*. To be a political citizen he needed to gain the respect of his fellow citizens and the larger society by learning to govern himself.<sup>3</sup> The young man is seen as lacking knowledge and thus in need

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<sup>1</sup>Foucault, 2001, p. 31.

<sup>2</sup>*ibid.*, p. 74.

<sup>3</sup>Foucault, 1988, p. 23.

of a specialized trainer, i.e., a philosopher teacher. The two must then form a love relationship.<sup>4</sup> Through the love relationship the young man is told to attend to himself, to apply his mind to himself, to know himself. The philosopher teacher is ready-to-hand to give personalized advice, encouragement and knowledge through Socratic dialogue. From what I can tell, Foucault's attention to the Socratic-Platonic practice of the self seems to take place during the early period of Plato's philosophy. The method is still primarily negative with the goal of relieving the student from misconceptions so that he may freely appreciate his own self and thought processes. Once the young man passes through this threshold, he is then ready to hold a governing position of power amongst fellow citizens. At this point he no longer needs the philosopher teacher as a guide and the student is qualified to govern himself and others.

It should also be noted that Foucault observes that before the Socratic-Platonic moment many older techniques of the care of the self were practiced by ancient Greeks in order to have access to knowledge and truth. Some such techniques were purification, withdrawal and concentrating in a fashion of "gathering up the soul".<sup>5</sup> The Socratic-Platonic moment acts as a recorded catalyst of subsequently philosophies which redevelop the *epimeleia heautou*.<sup>6</sup> In particular this moment heralds the Hellenist period that Foucault labels; 'A golden age of the cultivation of the self' and then the later 'Christian Asceticism'.<sup>7</sup> However, Foucault indicates an underlying relevance of the Greek

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<sup>4</sup>Foucault, 1988, p. 37.

<sup>5</sup>Foucault, 2001, pp. 47-8 As well as, "For the Pythagoreans, the examination of conscience had to do with purification." Foucault, 1988, p. 33 or "The goal was the purification of the conscience using a mnemonic device." *ibid.* and "There are techniques for concentrating the soul. The soul is something material. The soul, the breath, is something that can be disturbed and over which the outside can exercise a hold. One must avoid dispersal of the soul, the breath, the pneuma. One must avoid exposing it to external danger and something or someone having hold over it. One must avoid its dispersal at the moment of death. One must therefore concentrate the pneuma, the soul, gather it up, condense it, and unite it in itself in order to give it a mode of existence, a solidity, which will enable it to last, to endure, and hold out throughout life and not be scattered which death comes." Foucault, 2001, p. 47.

<sup>6</sup>*ibid.*, p. 173.

<sup>7</sup>(p30) Christian Asceticism is not discussed in detail in the 1982 lectures. There are only intermediate links made between a few Hellenist notions and ideas flourishing in Christian practices. For example "As

*epimeleia heautou* to the subsequent developments of the Christian techniques of the self as controlled practices of the individual's consciousness.<sup>8</sup> Foucault's own account of the self is one that utterly rejects the human subject as have a ready-made self or ego.<sup>9</sup> He takes the individual as an "artifact" and is constituted by actions upon others, thereby as agents and not as victims.<sup>10</sup> His own thinking on the self indubitably colors his reading of the ancient Greek practices.

In *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* lectures, Foucault sets out the Socratic-Platonic moment as that in which the *subject* emerges as something it in of itself.<sup>11</sup> The research was for "a work devoted entirely to the problem of techniques of the self in Antiquity, and without any particular reference to sexuality."<sup>12</sup> Hence, these lectures take on greater significance given the singularity of their discourse. The idea is that of the "emergence of the subject" from social practices of division, theoretical projections, and practices of the self.<sup>13</sup> As Foucault states, "my objective... has been to create a history of the different modes by which in our culture, human beings are made subjects. My work had dealt with three modes of objectification which transform human beings into subjects."<sup>14</sup> As an aside, it should be noted that Foucault does not explicitly support or advocate the Greek practice of *epimeleia heautou*. In a series of working sessions with Paul Rabinow and Hubert Dreyfus, when asked if we are to learn how to behave from studying the ancient Greeks, Foucault adamantly responds in the negative, explaining that "you can't find

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you know, this interplay between a universal principle which can only be heard by a few, and this rare salvation from which no one is excluded a priori, will be at the very heart of the theological, spiritual, social and political problems of christianity." Foucault, 2001, p. 120.

<sup>8</sup> *ibid.*, p. 524.

<sup>9</sup> For a revealing analysis on the significance of Foucault's groundless self upon the care of the self via a comparison with Heidegger's study of care, see William McNeill's second chapter *Care for the Self; Ordinary ethics in Heidegger and Foucault*, in McNeill, 2006, pp. 53-76.

<sup>10</sup> [235]hacking1986self Albeit, McNeill's passing comment on Kant's engagement with the self as a "transcendental-practical self", leaves much to be desired. *ibid.*, p. 63.

<sup>11</sup> Foucault, 2001, p. 30.

<sup>12</sup> *ibid.*, p. 515.) "This course remains like.. a scout of this lost book." p516.

<sup>13</sup> Respectively, *ibid.*, pp. 512, 513, 547.

<sup>14</sup> Foucault, 1982, p. 777.



the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people.”<sup>15</sup> In working with the text of the ancient Greeks and the *epimeleia heautou* he strives to bring to our attention the social development of subjectification as a historically bound presence; which is not an inevitable or unavoidable way of viewing ourselves.<sup>16</sup> Additionally consider that in his final interview Foucault notes that ‘All of antiquity seems to me to have been a profound error.’<sup>17</sup>

To summarize and structure; the Socratic-Platonic moment may be defined by the following qualities. The scale concerns societal issues.<sup>18</sup> The individual undergoes *epimeleia heautou* in order to better govern himself so that he may in turn govern society.<sup>19</sup> Thus the temporary power relationship between the philosophy teacher over student is transposed upon completion to that of a citizen over society. The pedagogy is of the love relationship between a philosophy teacher and a young man.<sup>20</sup> The young man is seen as ignorant and through the relationship with the philosopher teacher gains knowledge. The knowledge he gains is of his own ignorance, that he knows more than he thinks he does and by these means the student gains principles of knowledge.<sup>21</sup> The philosopher teacher serves as a model, he must be competent and lead the student to discovery via Socratic Dialogues.<sup>22</sup>

Furthermore, the age of the student is limited to the period between childhood and adulthood.<sup>23</sup> The range of people who are encouraged, expected and allowed to undergo this process are the elites. Finally the techniques employed are discussion and debate

<sup>15</sup>Foucault, 1984b, p. 343 and for further context see: Dreyfus, Rabinow, et al., 1982)

<sup>16</sup>Foucault, 1982, p. 781 and Kritzman and Smart, 1994, p. 244 But surely Foucault would not really intended such an encompassing generalization.

<sup>17</sup>Foucault, 2001, p. 516.

<sup>18</sup>*ibid.*, p. 33.

<sup>19</sup>*ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>20</sup>*ibid.*, p. 37.

<sup>21</sup>*ibid.*, p. 128.

<sup>22</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>23</sup>*ibid.*

by which the student is to turn to himself and find his true nature by the individual recollecting himself. The student must turn away from appearances, acknowledge his own ignorance, decide to care for his self and recollect the self, i.e., to know oneself is to know the truth and to know the truth is to free oneself.<sup>24</sup> The techniques are thereby an intimacy shared between teacher and student, with established and ad hoc tactics of hermeneutical discussion.

There is ambiguity as to which method exactly Foucault is referencing to the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* during the classical period. It is interesting to remember here that Plato abandons the practice of Socrates dialogue in his own thinking, as he becomes acutely more positive in his philosophy. Furthermore the school Plato founds decisively was to teach Plato's philosophy, not Socrates or any other divergent theories. At Plato's death, Aristotle was considered his leading participant, but their philosophies were too divergent, and Plato left the school to a less accomplished nephew.

During the second and third century of the Roman Empire, the people with means grew rather fascinated with most things Greek. Hadot comments that:

“Hellenic thought had the strange capacity to absorb the most diverse mythical and conceptual themes. All the cultures of the Mediterranean world thus eventually expressed themselves in the categories of Hellenic thought, but at the price of important shifts in meaning that distorted the content of the myths, the values, and the wisdom of each culture, as well as the content of the Hellenic tradition itself.”<sup>25</sup>

Interest in Classical Greek art, plays, and philosophy conveyed an individual's culture and social status. Hellenist philosophers structured the method to cultivate with an

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<sup>24</sup>Foucault, 2001, pp. 209-10.

<sup>25</sup>Hadot, 1990, p. 490.

explicit understanding of the individual as initially misinformed, mis-formed or deformed.<sup>26</sup> This notion of individual deformation is demonstrated most explicitly with the notion of the *Stultitia* and the dismissal of false knowledge becomes more elaborate.<sup>27</sup> The worst disposition to have is one of the *Stultitia*, that is, the pre-philosophical state in which the individual is restless, irresolvable, and in bad health.<sup>28</sup> They are unable to filter the representations of their environment due to lacking the power of *discriminatio*.<sup>29</sup> They cannot settle on anything or be satisfied by anything.<sup>30</sup> They cannot “will properly”, they do not will their self, and cannot escape from these habits by themselves.<sup>31</sup> They are unable to live properly, hence the philosophical training of the *epimeleia heautou* becomes a necessary medical intervention.<sup>32</sup> The intervention must be provided by someone other than the *Stultitia*.<sup>33</sup> This other person is the philosopher who reforms, re-clarifies and corrects the *Stultitia*, so that the *Stultitia* can direct their life towards its objective which is the fulfillment of the self in old age.<sup>34</sup> A successfully cultivated individual can will freely, absolutely and will oneself.<sup>35</sup> However, it is a life long ‘struggle’ and one’s attention must be turned to the self for life.<sup>36</sup> There are similar overtones of Foucault’s own view of the life long struggle of resistance to dominating power regimes. Scholar Paul Veyne points out that “Foucault did not attack the choices

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<sup>26</sup>Foucault, 2001.

<sup>27</sup>*ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>28</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>29</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>30</sup>*ibid.*, p. 130.

<sup>31</sup>—MF:HS”.

<sup>32</sup>For further elaboration of philosophical interventions as medical see: Gill, 1985. For example: “Ancient doctors were not unaware of what we call ‘mental’ illnesses, although their main concern was with what we call ‘physical’ illnesses.” *ibid.*, p. 316 and “Philosophers, by contrast, were very much concerned with the area of psychological, and sometimes claimed to be ‘doctor’ of psychic diseases. However, they mostly seem to have had in mind what we should regard as moral failings rather than mental illness.” *ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>33</sup>“The subject can no longer be the person who carries out their own transformation, and the need for a master is now inserted here.” Foucault, 2001, p. 130.

<sup>34</sup>*ibid.*

<sup>35</sup>*ibid.*, p. 133.

<sup>36</sup>*ibid.*, p. 208.

of others, but the rationalizations that they added to their choices.”<sup>37</sup> Hence the Stultitia may seem to be a rather unbecoming individual, yet the issues are not with their actions onto others, but with their actions onto themselves.

To short the aim was for the individual to cultivate their life to be harmonious with the dynamic logos of nature, with the ongoing aid of the philosopher (in the Greek schools) or friend (for the Hellenic Romans). Some Roman Stoics, such as Marcus Aurelius, predominately maintained the *epimeleia heautou* via letters.<sup>38</sup> The teacher was no long required to be a philosopher and could be a friend. Foucault states that at the same time it was a common practice amongst wealthy Romans to keep a philosopher in one's house for consultation on everyday matters. He comments that the practices is an “interesting example of the way in which guidance became, was becoming, or had no doubt already become for some time, a completely normal and natural experience.”<sup>39</sup> At the same time Hellenistic counselors “become genuinely integrated in the daily mode of being.”<sup>40</sup> Although Foucault somewhat patronizingly depicts the role of Roman philosophers in his account of the care of the self, in the time of Seneca's generation, philosophy was gaining respectability. Brad Inwood remarks, “Seneca grew up in an environment where a philosophical life was coming to be taken for granted as a realistic option for young Roman men of wealth and standing.”<sup>41</sup> Although Greek remained the substantive language for thinking and writing philosophy, by this the intellectual milieu was open to at least a local, “micro-climate” which affording Seneca to write and work in Latin thus creating a “rare example of first-order Latin philosophy.”<sup>42</sup> In the opening up philosophy to Roman's native tongue, the prospects of young philosophers did gain a feasibility

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<sup>37</sup>Veyne, 1993, p. 6.

<sup>38</sup>Foucault, 1988, p. 30.

<sup>39</sup>Foucault, 2001, p. 163.

<sup>40</sup>*ibid.*, p. 144.

<sup>41</sup>Inwood, 1995, p. 66.

<sup>42</sup>*ibid.*, pp. 68 & 75.

beyond Foucault's suggestions.

The central practices of the treatments prescribed self reflection at some point each day, by which the individual thought over his activities of the day. For example the individual will "draw into myself and take stock of my day.... to unroll the scroll of his life and of time passed."<sup>43</sup> With the late Roman's this drawing into oneself is prompted by the philosophical guide. Additionally the individual writes to his philosopher or friend about these activities. The writing is prescribed regardless of whether or not they live with their guide, as the process itself is taken to develop one's familiarity with their own drives.<sup>44</sup> The letters are noted to include three aspects of the individual's practices; health and regime, family and religious duties, and lastly love.<sup>45</sup> Here the concern with the self is still of the individual's actions not his thoughts and desires.<sup>46 47</sup>

For example consider the Stoic practice where the individual undergoes tests or thought experiments to learn that *what does not depend on us is not evil*. The *praemeditatio malorum* (premeditation of misfortunes and evils) is a systematic imaging of the worst events occurring in the present moment. It requires the individual to believe the worst is always certain and therefore not evil. For example, the individual tells themselves that their child is being molested and murdered, and that it is happening now, and the goal was to see that it is not evil because it is out of their control. Anything that the individual cannot change is not evil and should be expected. Therefore it is best

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<sup>43</sup>Foucault, 2001, p. 162.

<sup>44</sup>See Catharine Edwards' excellent analysis of the impact of Seneca's letters along this lines in *Self-Scrutiny and Self-Transformation*. Edwards, 1997.

<sup>45</sup>Respectively, Foucault, 2001, pp. 159,160,161.

<sup>46</sup>Regarding the Stoics - letters between Aurelius and Fronto. "The letter is the transcription of that examination of conscience. It stresses what you did, not what you thought. That is the difference between practice in the Hellenistic and imperial periods and later monastic practice." Foucault, 1988, p. 30.

<sup>47</sup>Romanticism "is not the love of some transcendent object but rather a certain way of experiencing our lives, our ordinary desires and fulfillment, and the larger natural order in which we are set." Taylor, 1989, p. 372.

to emotionally detach from loved ones in the present. The intent of the exercise is to expose the necessary order of things. Hence the individual accepts that the only concern is their relation to the world, not the world itself. Thereby the individual can avoid pain via detachment.<sup>48</sup>

The Epicureans were “savagely opposed” to this exercise remarking that we have enough problems in the present without additionally having to worry about evils that, after all, could very well not happen:

Epicurus supposes that distress is inevitable whenever we feel struck by an evil, even if this evil was foreseen and expected or is already well established. For time does not lessen it nor foresight lighten it, and it is foolish to think about an evil which may occur but which equally may not: any evil is painful enough when it arrives, and always to be thinking that we may suffer misfortune is itself a perpetual evil: even more so if this evil does not come, for then one has plunged pointlessly into voluntary misery.<sup>49</sup>

The Epicureans sought to change their environment and focus on strong friendship bonds. To achieve such aims, the general strategy led them to the countryside and to arrange themselves in secure compounds.

The *epimeleia heautou* must be considered as taking shape in two distinct ways for attempting to satisfy the pursuit of the transcendental; *directly* and *indirectly*. In the direct fashion the individual explicitly and electively studies prescribed techniques composed by prior critical thinkers. Individuals express the pursuit prematurely when following a general social-political pattern derivative of the explicit philosophies. This transpires

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<sup>48</sup>“At the same time, he explains that we must not be attached to things we cannot control or master but must attend to our representation of things, for this is what we can really control and master and what we can use (khrestai).” Foucault, 2001, p. 141.

<sup>49</sup>Cicero Tusculan Disputations III.XV.32 — Cicero, 2007.

when particular teachings of a philosophical school are popularized, generalized and interwoven to networks of communication, urban spacescapes, and governing bodies (which are not necessarily limited to the government). There is some consistency in the notion that people tend to run away from their own uniqueness. To exist in the ready made style of a historically derived way being. That when people act without expressing their own style, they miss out on life, and this in turn leads to the world as a whole missing out on its richness. For the Greek Hellenic philosophers the practices are executed in schools by the Stoics and in communities for the Epicureans. For the Roman philosophers the practices move further afield from an educational setting and develop as a form of private counseling.<sup>50</sup> Finally Foucault acknowledges that the christians take over the Stoic practices of the care of the self. Other than the elaborated described art of cultivation in classical antiquity, the following notes a brief overview of other practices of cultivation. The early Christians borrowed many Stoic techniques to build a fully classified system of behavior and feelings upon their original informal networks of people insuring burial rights for the body.<sup>51</sup> With modernity, scientist and psychoanalyses have attempted to classify the development of self. Through Freud and Lacan we came to understand our individuality as formed in childhood and through the actions of our parents. With Karl Young we saw the long stretch of human history as always embracing archetypical figures of deities. Through the natural sciences we learned of patterns of behaviors innate in all life forms of adaptation and survival.<sup>52</sup> While political theorist of the eighteenth century questioned the individual's present ability to be free and how they could emancipate themselves from the noose of the elites and form their own individuality. And again,

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<sup>50</sup>Hellenic is more a "school form" e.g. Epictetus... But there is also a Roman form - that is more of the "private counselor". "Between two individuals whose social status is always unequal." Foucault, 2001, p. 142.

<sup>51</sup>Zuck, 2005; Curl, 1980; Lindsay, 2000; Boyd, 1978; Grierson, Mango, and evgenko, 1962.

<sup>52</sup>Gill, 1985p307 types of psychotherapy— orthodox: Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian, or Kleinian and less orthodoxly: Laingian or Lacanian

a form of cultivation is echoed within contemporary marketing theory; which employs techniques of colors, images, and slogans, to adapt the individual's behavior to be that of the ultimate consumer.<sup>53</sup> As the various ideas of ethical behavior change, so do the methods of development.<sup>54</sup>

Foucault strives to show the misleadingness of the contemporary idea that we form our own identity individually and of our own accord, independently of a political-social milieu of powers relations. While he believes it is possible, and even desirable to form an individual and aesthetic identity, he argues that it is more common that individuals' default identification is manipulated by established, yet evolving, power relations successful at maintaining the influence of those in charge.

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<sup>53</sup> "Architecture defines spatial relationships and by extension social relations. Architecture defines the spaces in which we live and work, as well as the urban spaces which serve as the backdrop for our daily lives." (P55 Architecture and Advertising - Elizabeth Hornbeck) Is this still true. Or has architecture let us down, in creating interesting enough spaces to hold our attention and has made way for the surrender to the mobile web culture.

<sup>54</sup> The observations could be an echo of Hadot's account of ancient philosophers, best summarized as: "So each school will elaborate its rational depiction of this state of perfection in the person of the sage, and each will make an effort to portray him. It is true that this transcendent ideal will be deemed almost inaccessible; .... In this transcendent norm established by reason, each school will express its own vision of the world, its own style of life, and its idea of the perfect man. This is why in every school the description of this transcendent norm ultimately coincides with the rational idea of God." Hadot, 1990, pp. 492-3.



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# CURRICULUM VITÆ

## CURRICULUM VITÆ

Karan AUGUST (Oakland, 1980) is an international scholar with a demonstrated record of excellence in theoretical research and teaching architectural seminars and lectures. She has taught architectural theory, philosophy, art history and studio courses since 2007. Her area of specialty is in aesthetics as manifest in architectural designs, primary from modern to contemporary architectural works. Her formative academic training was in the rigorous philosophical school at UC Berkeley. After which she respectfully engaged with the wider world, via slow travel and becoming a citizen of New Zealand, falling in love with design and undertaking a Masters of Architecture for which she was honored with the highest distinction, and again relocating to the Netherlands to study for a doctor of philosophy, under the wing of a great philosopher of architecture at the distinguished Delft School of Design.

Her MArch applied Merleau-Pontys research into embodied consciousness to the architecture of Carlo Scarpa. Her PhD examines the event of Beauty as depicted by the philosopher Immanuel Kant and applies the characterization to elective architectural spaces, such that it may motivate individual architects to cultivating their own nimbleness to reflectively judge as a ground up, multi-node, rhizomatic means of resistance to normalizing power practices. Her future research plans are to leap from ideas uncovered in the dissertation and rigorously pursue an inquiry regarding: Technological Distance and Aesthetic Affect. Her plan is to delve ever deeper in the Kants third *Critique* and the phenomenon of *Lebenskraft*—life force, as Kant's aesthetic and teleological philosophy offers richness for uncovering processes at work in contemporary aesthetic practices.