

The Effect of Culture and Political Structure on Participatory Policy Analysis

**Master Thesis
in
Engineering and Policy Analysis**

Ammar Maleki (1531964)



Thesis Committee:

Chairman: Prof. dr. Hans de Bruijn (Professor of POLG section)

First Supervisor: Prof. dr. Martin de Jong (Associate Professor of POLG Section)

Second Supervisor: Dr. Pieter Bots (Associate Professor of Policy Analysis Section)

**Faculty of
Technology, Policy & Management (TPM)**



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To all who struggle for the right of participation especially to Iranian freedom-seekers who for over a century showed iron determination and lasting endurance

Acknowledgment

Concurrence of my thesis inception with the reign of the most suffocating suppression wave in my country has given me a mixed feeling. While I was engulfed by disquietude as my parents being directly victimized by the very circumstances, I was being motivated and spiritually sustained by their steadfastness and encouragements. This makes feel indebted to them and requires me to reveal my most heartfelt gratitude and thanks. Moreover, companionship, patience and sympathy of my dear wife, Sepideh, were crucial ingredients for this composition to come to a consummation.

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Executive Summary

Policy analysis, among many alternatives, aims to propose a policy which can better meet the specific goal. Many different methodologies for policy analysis have been introduced. One of the contemporary methodologies is "participatory policy analysis" which intends to involve more actors who affect or are affected by a policy. This method applies the concept of "public participation". In fact, public participation has been introduced by the new wave of democratic decision making which is known as participatory or deliberative democracy. This new stream has absorbed many policy analysts and decision makers in some democratic countries to the extent that some countries have even operationalized this approach for policy making of controversial issues, and others have tried to transplant this methodology. Moreover, attempts have been made to introduce and export participatory approach to other democratic and undemocratic countries.

Although the concept of public participation and participatory democracy is very attractive and inviting, the quality and possibility of its application in different context is questionable, as the acknowledgement of context in policy analysis is a matter of importance. When we talk about context of policy analysis, two important contextual factors, among many others, spring to the mind, namely Cultural and Political context.

While many researchers emphasizes that participatory policy analysis (PPA) should be applied contextually, there is a lack of research on how to operationalize the issue. Therefore, this thesis research is defined to seek this mission through answering the following question:

"How can political and cultural context be taken into account in practice of public participation in policy analysis?"

In order to answer this question, following sub-questions are defined:

- What does public participation mean in participatory policy analysis?
- What politico-culturally-sensitive factors of participation can be recognized (in short, they are called "factors of participation" in this research)?
- What cultural indicators/dimensions which affect factors of participation can be recognized?
- What political indicators/indexes which affect factors of participation can be recognized?
- What would be the relation between cultural-political indicators and factors of participation? What framework can be developed?
- What do participatory practices (of policy analysis) in different countries show about the applicability and utilization of this framework?
- How may the framework help policy analysts in designing effective participatory practice in a specific cultural-political context?

To seek answers for these questions, initially the concept of policy analysis and its evolutionary process from traditional and expert-based approach to participatory style, and role of context in policy analysis in general and participatory policy analysis in particular are studied. Next, the concept of public participation is elaborated through studying the levels and purposes of participation, type of participants, and the methods or techniques of public participation. Afterwards, risk and challenges of participation are enumerated, and a number of "factors of participation (FP)" which are sensitive to politico-cultural context are identified. Thirteen FPs are introduced and classified into four main categories of factors: 1) basic drivers of public participation, 2) participants of public participation, 3) process and

interactions in public participation and 4) output of public participation. Next, the cultural and political indicators which steers these FPs are explored.

Hofstede's Theory, World Value Survey (WVS) by Inglehart, Schwartz cultural values orientations, cultural study of GLOBE project and Minkov cultural study, are the cross-cultural theories examined in order to extract measurable cultural indicators to explore the identified FPs. When analyzing each cross-cultural theory, the following elements were carefully considered; cultural dimensions, value items relevant to FPs, and last but not the least, challenges and criticism with regards to that theory. Moreover, in the study of WVS and Inglehart dimensions, the relation between cultural dimension and political structure is discussed. It is argued that although cultural and political factors might interact with each other, nevertheless we could see that the political system cannot necessarily be a representative of the national culture. After all, inter-correlations of all cultural dimensions from different theories are tabulated. The chapter is concluded by discussing the strengths and shortcomings of different cultural theories and corresponding dimensions and finally a number of cultural dimensions relevant to each FP are selected and categorized as primary or secondary indicators affecting FPs.

Subsequent to the recognition of cultural indicators three globally reputable research projects, namely Freedom in the World Survey, The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), in which governance indexes and democracy indicators are periodically calculated in the national level, are scrutinized in order to identify the most relevant political indicators to this thesis. These researches have introduced and evaluated several main categories of political items which in turn consist of subcategories, out of which five have been found to be more relevant to the FPs. In addition, another relevant political indicator, confidence in government index, which is calculated from the WVS data is introduced and employed.

Using two identified political indicators of this chapter, the "Participation Reluctancy Index" is proposed and defined. This index would be used to reveal that between citizens and power-holders which one is more reluctant to public participation. Finally, likewise cultural dimensions, the political indicators relevant to each FP are listed.

Exploiting the relation between cultural and political indicators and factors of participation (FP), a framework is developed for each category of FPs. In this framework, each FP is evaluated by national scores of some cultural and/or political indicators, every FP has two poles which are assigned to extreme scores of relevant indicators and are distinguishable by specific attributes.

In order to test the applicability of the developed framework, several cases have been studied utilizing the framework. For six countries, namely China, Brazil, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and France, the concept of public participation is evaluated in general. Then a comparative case study for a specific participatory method - consensus conference – would be done for some other countries. The framework is utilized to evaluate and compare consensus conferences on the same issue of genetically modified (GM) food in countries including Canada, Denmark, France and the United States. Another consensus conference on the same topic in Japan is also examined separately. Lastly, the framework is applied to a participatory stakeholder analysis in Egypt. The case studies show that the framework can effectively explain the influence of contextual factors. Furthermore, the case studies are also helped to revise and improve the framework in a reciprocal process.

It is revealed that the framework can provide awareness for policy analysts who want to employ participatory approach. This is in fact the descriptive application of the framework. Moreover, the framework can have the prescriptive application. Although this application

should be elaborated in a separate research, the practical application of the framework initiates at the end of thesis. The implication of each FP's attributes is indicated and accordingly can guide the analysts to select and adapt the purpose and method of participation. Some relevant features of known public participation methods are introduced and a tentative example of practical considerations for the case of Japan is demonstrated.

The research concludes with an indication of the considerations about the research/framework and gives some suggestions for future research. It is highly emphasized that there is a risk of stereotyping in using the framework. Therefore, it should be used as a flashlight to illuminate some hidden and unknown points of a context in which participatory policy analysis wants to be practiced. In conclusion, the developed framework should be applied as a guiding tool which *says something* about political and cultural context but refrain from saying *the final word*.

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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

FP: Factors of Participation
 FTF: Face to Face
 GM: Genetically Modified
 PPA: Participatory Policy Analysis
 PRI: Participatory Reluctancy Index
 SVS: Schwartz Value Survey
 WGI: Worldwide Governance Indicators
 WVS: World Value Survey

"With participation of culture, the culture of participation can be nurtured"

When for the first time I was doing a policy research to prepare an issue paper for dealing with the problem of littering, I found some different patterns of behavior in various countries which lead to different solutions. For instance, I understood that in some countries the problem was solved by locating more trash bins in spots but in another society the hidden cameras have been installed besides extra trash bins. In the latter, people were more disobedient while in the former people usually respect laws and regulations. Surprisingly, both countries were democratic and developed and there was not a big difference in level of education. So the cultural diversity displays its influence on my policy analysis. On the other hand, when I studied the problem of littering in my country, Iran, I found that political challenges between state and nation are also involved in addition to the cultural factors. Some people litter to show their objection against actions and bad performance of the government!! In fact, they perceive it as a way to show their distrust and dissent.

The mentioned story occupied my mind and incited me to think more about the influence of cultural and political factors on the policy researches and practices. Even whenever I have studied a method or approach of policy analysis, I pondered how local culture or political structure might affect the application of the method and its effectiveness. For instance, in participatory policy analysis approach, it is required that the voice of people is heard. That is, the government allows citizens to participate in the policy making process and express themselves. If a political structure prevents public participation or fabricates pseudo-participation, the results of policy analysis will be false. Therefore, a political precondition is required for the effective application of participatory approach. Moreover, citizens should be eager to participate and feel free to agree or disagree with an idea, option or policy. However, it may occur to one that what if participants were reluctant to express their objections against the higher authority in public? It can come from their cultural values in which the hierarchical order should be respected, and even if you do not agree with a decision you should not express it explicitly. Therefore, some cultural factors also play role in this process.

To put it simply, I wonder that when there are a lot of researches on the context sensitivity in transplantation of a policy (De Jong, Konstantinos, & Virginie, 2002), what about the transplantation of the policy analysis approach? In fact each policy analyst in the preliminary phase of the policy analysis may ask him/herself whether the specific analysis approach/model is suitable for use in any different political, cultural and historical context (Hermans, 2005).

Therefore, many questions and concerns arise about the issue: how can we materialize culture when it is the complex and untouchable property of the human being? If some cultural factors could be extracted, how can they be related to the policy analysis approach? How do political factors impact policy analysis style? Much more questions are germinated from these thoughts.

I have decided to perform an exploratory research to throw light upon the effect of cultural and political factors on participatory policy analysis, one of the contemporary approaches of policy analysis.

1-1 Research Questions

Regarding the exploration of the problem, the main question of this research can be formulated as following:

How can political and cultural context be taken into account in practice of public participation in policy analysis?

In order to answer the main question, following sub-questions arise:

- **Q1:** What does public participation mean in participatory policy analysis?
- **Q2:** What politico-culturally-sensitive factors of participation can be recognized (in short, they are called "factors of participation" in this research)?
- **Q3:** What cultural indicators/dimensions which affect factors of participation can be recognized?
- **Q4:** What political indicators/indexes which affect factors of participation can be recognized?
- **Q5:** What would be the relation between cultural-political indicators and factors of participation? What framework can be developed?
- **Q6:** What do participatory practices (of policy analysis) in different countries show about the applicability and utilization of this framework?
- **Q7:** How may the framework help policy analysts in designing effective participatory practice in a specific cultural-political context?

1-2 Research Methodology

Desk Research via Literature Review

This research can be called a type of exploratory desk research. First of all, I will study the literature to understand the evolution of policy analysis from rational to participatory style. Then the concept of participation will be scrutinized in order to find the influential factors of participation concerning the cultural and political context.

Next, different cultural theory and corresponding dimensions in the literature will be studied to find their similarities and differences and make a proper classification of cultural dimensions for this research. In addition, the democracy indexes and political indicators from some recognized international research projects would be examined. Through the findings, I will try to develop a framework to show the relationship between identified factors of participation and cultural-political indicators.

Case Studies via Secondary Content Analysis

Due to the fact that there are many research papers about implementation of participatory approach in technological policy analysis and many reports about public participation practices around the world, I will use them to test, evaluate and revise the framework. In fact, it will be a secondary content analysis by using the results of participatory practices. I try to study the cases of participatory practices in a variety of developed and developing countries with distinguished political and cultural context (e.g. the Netherlands, Egypt, France, the UK, Japan and etc.). Moreover, the comparative case studies would help me to improve the framework.

1-3 Overview and Structure of the Research

In coming chapters I will try to find answers for research questions step by step. Figure 1 represents the steps that we will take to answer each question.

In chapter two, I will review the evolution of policy analysis to have a better understanding of the role of context in policy analysis and the reasons for manifestation of participatory approach in policy science. Then the concept of public participation, its challenges and the role of cultural-political factors on participatory approach will be discussed. The factors of participation will be identified and introduced in this chapter. Therefore, in this chapter we will answer to first two research questions.

In chapter three, five cross cultural theories and their corresponding cultural dimensions will be investigated. Those cultural dimensions which affect factors of participation will be highlighted. Moreover, the methodology of each cultural study and the challenges of each theory will be discussed. The third research question will be answered in this chapter.

Chapter four is assigned to study of political indicators. Three main research projects will be reviewed and influential indicators on public participation will be extracted. In this chapter a new index will be extracted as well. The answer to the forth research question is sought in this chapter.

In chapter five, the relation between all cultural and political indicators and factors of participation will be summarized and a framework will be developed. Different components of the framework will be explained and, then, the framework will be utilized for some case studies. First, the application of public participation in general will be examined in some countries and then some practices of participatory methods will be evaluated by using the framework. Therefore, the fifth and sixth research questions will be answered in this chapter.

Finally, in chapter six, there will be conclusions and discussions. In order to answer the last research question, the implications of the framework and its possible prescriptive applications will be discussed. The report will be finished with indicating the considerations in using the framework and some suggestions for future research.





Figure 1: Overview of research steps to answer the research questions

Chapter Two: Participatory Approach in Policy Analysis

The focus in this research is on Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA). PPA is formed from the combination of two concepts: Policy Analysis and Participation. In this chapter I will review two mentioned concepts. In following sections I will try to find key features of these concepts and identify factors of participation which are influenced by cultural-political context. In the light of the findings of this chapter, cross cultural theories will be studied in the next chapter.



2-1 Policy Analysis: A Glance

2-1-1 History and Evolution of Policy Analysis

Policy analysis emerged from operations research and evolved through systems analysis (in the late 1950s and early 1960s) to policy analysis in problem-oriented work for governments in the 1960s and 1970s. For problems with few parameters and clear single objective, operational research techniques and optimization methods were used. But broadening scope of the problems and ever-increasing complexity of the context gave rise to the need for considering tradeoffs among multiple objectives. . In the analyses, qualitative and subjective consideration had to be taken into account. So, satisfaction took over optimization as the core criterion which means finding an acceptable or satisfactory solution for a problem instead of an optimal one. Moreover, uncertainty came to the consideration in analysis progressively. Therefore, to deal with the broad and uncertain issues, the expansion of traditional tools (mathematical modeling) to methods like surveys, focus group, scenario development and gaming became a necessity (Walker, 2000).

Policy analysis science has had an evolutionary changing pattern. In the beginning, the positivist mentality would dominant in which rationality and analytical techniques were the main essentials. Disappointed with the positivist current due to the lack of attention to socio-political reality, policy analysts drifted towards a post-positivist era. The post-positivist attitude admits interpretative, hermeneutic and critical approaches to the policy analysis knowledge and methods (Hoppe, 1999).

The positivist model of policy analysis is well-known as traditional model. It has been named and renamed by many authors. It has been recognized also as the synoptic-comprehensive model, the progressive model, the rational model or the production model of policymaking. It is claimed that these are general images of the same type of policy analysis, although they highlight different aspects of it. Traditional policy analysis believes in the benefits of the highest level of rationality, thus it emphasizes strongly on analytical methods and techniques. The traditional policy analyst applies quantitative methods like rational decision analysis, quasi-experimentation and modeling. So, in this model of policy analysis, scientific knowledge is much preferred over intuition, moral preferences, insights from experience or consensus among stakeholders (Mayer, 1997).

There are some currents in each of two perspectives – positivist and post-positivist – of policy analysis. Among others, participatory policy analysis is one of the current in post-positivist perspective (Hoppe, 1999). When the post-positivism claimed that traditional policy analysis is "blinded to political reality", the importance of contextual, interdisciplinary, problem-oriented inquiry of policy analysis has been reasserted (Lynn, 1999).

Looking from other perspective, in general, two styles of policy analysis can be distinguished: expert style and participatory style. In the former, the participation of policy-relevant stakeholders during the process of analysis is absent or negligible. In the latter, various policy-relevant actors such as stakeholders or citizens, participate and communicate interactively during the process of analysis (Mayer, 1997).

2-1-2 Definition of Policy Analysis

According to the literature, the most accepted and cited definition of policy analysis is proposed by Dunn who defines it as:

"An applied social science discipline which uses multiple methods of inquiry and argument to produce and transform policy relevant information that may be utilized in political setting to resolve policy problems" (Dunn, 1981, p. 35)

Mayer(1997) mentioned the interesting point in his dissertation that the development of participatory style of policy analysis has shown itself in the second edition of Dunn's book (1994) in which the importance of communication and public debate is appeared in the revised policy analysis definition. This time Dunn defines policy analysis as:

"An applied social science discipline that uses multiple methods of inquiry in contexts of argumentation and public debate to create, critically assess and communicate policy-relevant knowledge" (Dunn, 1994, p. 84)

Walker defines the purpose of policy analysis and explains it:

"Its purpose is to assist policymakers in choosing a course of action from among complex alternatives under uncertain conditions. The word 'assist' emphasizes that policy analysis is used by policymakers as a decision aid, just as check lists, advisors and horoscopes can be used as decision aids. Policy analysis is not meant to replace the judgment of the policymakers. The word 'complex' means that the policy being examined deals with a system that includes people, social structures, portions of nature, equipment and organizations; the system being studied contains so many variables, feedback loops and interactions that it is difficult to project the consequences of a policy change. The word 'uncertain' emphasizes that the choices must be made on the basis of incomplete knowledge about alternatives that do not yet physically exist, for a future world that is unknown and largely unknowable" (Walker, 2000, p. 12).

One of the main sources of uncertainties, among others, is external forces outside the control of the actors in the policy domain. "They include the economic environment, technology developments and the *preferences and behavior of people*." (Walker, 2000 Curse. author)

To my speculation, these preferences and behavior of people are partly caused by the culture. Then we can claim that understanding and considering cultural factors will decrease this type of uncertainty to some extent.

Knowing different perspectives of policy analysis and its definition, I am going to study and focus on the Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) - one of the contemporary approaches of policy analysis - in the next section.

2-1-3 Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA)

As mentioned above, the aim of policy analysis, in general, is to generate and transform policy relevant information to be utilized in decision making for resolving policy problems (Dunn, 1994). The supplementary term "participatory" refers to the greater involvement of those who affect and are affected by a policy problem in policy analysis process (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001).

There are several criticisms of the traditional policy analysis by many authors. This style has been accused of: scientism, decisionism, limited utility, lack of multi-disciplinarity and being technocratic and anti-democratic. Participatory approach claims that it has responses to these shortcomings (Mayer, 1997).

PPA is a method which would expand the range of actors (or stakeholders) involved in the consultation and make public policy in a discursive or deliberative mode. It entails a more horizontal than hierarchical policy-making process. It is more democratic in nature and allows policy and process to bilaterally reinforce one another. Although there is a risk that sometimes participants might not be happy with the outcomes, at least they can be satisfied with the process (Deleon, 1990).

Some policy scientists emphasize that "participatory policy analysis" should not be confused with "participatory policy-making" (Deleon, 1990; Walker, 2000). Deleon mentions that PPA is distinct from the immediate and direct involvement of the citizenry in policymaking or political decision-making. The difference is emanating from the basic concept of policy analysis which is to inform and advise the decision-maker, rather than making the final decision (Deleon, 1990). However, there is not consensus about the purpose of participatory policy analysis and, consequently, it is hard to distinguish the PPA from other form of participation practices in policy science. For instance, it is argued that citizen participation in policy analysis should not be seen as a means to educate the public or create expertise, although it can probably be an inevitable and admirable by-product. In fact, the purpose should be gathering information to advise policy-makers for making better decisions (Deleon, 1990). On the other hand, as will be shown in further sections, some authors believe that the participatory approach can be used for different purposes and in different level of participation. Therefore, sometimes even the border of policy analysis and policy making would be intercrossed.

By and large, there are a lot of challenges on the concept of participatory policy analysis. As Mayer indicates "the concept is ambiguous for two reasons: First the notion of participation has different meaning in different contexts and for different proponents of participatory model. Second, this ambiguity also applies to the concept of policy analysis itself" (Mayer, 1997, p. 9). We need to make clear what is meant by participation and what characteristics and challenges are embedded in it.

Furthermore, it should be mentioned that some other concepts in the field of policy science with other names have the similar function as PPA. "Participatory Research (PR)" is one of them which I consider as under the umbrella of participatory approach in this research. It is defined as participants' collaboration to solve problems and generate new knowledge in an ongoing learning and reflective process (Blackstock, Kelly, & Horsey, 2007). In addition, the term of "participatory development" or "community-based development" refers to participatory practices to engage local populations in development projects. It has also significant conceptual similarities with PPA in the sense of application of public participation.

2-1-4 Role of Context in Policy Analysis

Considering context in policy analysis is of great importance. In fact, the evolution of policy science shows us that traditional policy analysis approach in which scientific rationality and analytical methods were solely relied on to solve the public policy problem was not successful. The reason is that even the perception of rationality is affected by the context from which a policy problem emerges.

When one talks about context of policy analysis, two important contextual factors, among many others, spring to the mind: Cultural and Political context. Although the effect of each of these two contextual factors in policy analysis can be analyzed separately, they intertwine so indivisibly that I think they should be studied through constant juxtaposition.

There is no doubt that understanding features of the political and cultural context prior to conduct of a policy analysis is very important. Moreover, this understanding can influence the selection of policy analysis approach that an analyst needs to apply.

In the literature of policy science, some general remarks about the influence of political-cultural context on policy analysis can be found. It is argued that "the failures of most public policies have occurred today because of their inability to incorporate social norms and values in policymaking processes and, thus, in policy outcomes" (Wagle, 2000, p. 212).

Regarding political structure, it is claimed that the field of policy sciences has a sole objective to foster democracy and human dignity (Wagle, 2000). "Post-positivists attack the hierarchical structures of a top-down, mass society that enact elitist policies favoring the few

and indict policy analysts as handmaidens of power" (Lynn, 1999, p. 419). In particular, participatory approach of policy analysis is justified by some policy scientists because of its vital contribution to participatory democracy (Hoppe, 1999). Wagle (2000) indicates that the success of participatory approach relies on many factors like developmental stage of society, level of participation, leadership, politics, and people's attitudes towards the given policy problem. I will study these factors in coming chapters.

As far as culture is concerned, Geva May (2002) claims that in the policy process, the systematic method of policy analysis should be adapted to cultural context in order to maximize policy utility. He mentions that although many policy analysis models - majority of which come from American market - exist, very few of them are cultural/institutional context-sensitive. He argues that "examples of the need for divergent approaches in policy analysis methodology at its various stages (Problem Definition, Modeling and Criteria Choice, Alternative Choice, Argumentation, and Implementation) clearly show that, at each stage, reactions differ in different cultural contexts. Moreover, it is argued that the importance of cultural context is not just necessarily related to national differences but also to fractions or groups within those nation (Geva-May, 2002).

In conclusion, policy science is contextually sensitive. This claim can be almost seen between lines of all texts of policy science. The role of context on participatory approach of policy analysis will be discussed more in the further section. For this very purpose, prior investigation of concept of public participation seems to be indispensable.

2-2 Concept of Public Participation

Participatory approach aims to involve more actors into policy making process. Actors are organized or unorganized entities which are affected by a policy or can affect it. Normally, any discussion of participation in public policy science, in one way or another, necessitates coverage of the concept of "Public Participation". As suggested by the term, aim of "Public Participation" is to involve the public in the decision-making process. The term "public" can be inferred in diverse ways and can be interchanged with terms such as "citizen" or "stakeholders". The term of "participation" can also be replaced with "involvement" or "engagement". **In this research, the term "public" in "public participation" phrase, refers to all type of actors be it citizens and lay people, stakeholders, interest groups or experts.** This concept, in essence, entails the democratic value of engagement of the affected people or stakeholders in decision-making process in public policy domain.

2-2-1 Levels and Purposes of Public Participation

The public can be involved in public policy making in a number of levels. In the lowest level, there is just communication between experts or regulators and the public whereas in higher levels some degree of public input are asked. In the highest level of participation, public representatives (and even citizens themselves) are involved in the decision-making process itself. The lowest level employs top-down communication and a one-way flow of information, while the highest level can be characterized by two-way information exchange (Rowe & Frewer, 2000).

The most cited and well-known classification of the level of participation is the one done by Arnstein.



Figure 2: French student poster. In English, "I participate, you participate, he participates, we participate, you participate...they profit."

Source: (Arnstein, 1969)

The picture in Figure 2 carries a very important message about the philosophy of participation. It highlights that participation without redistribution of power can frustrate the powerless (Arnstein, 1969). Nevertheless, we can argue that in some cases and contexts, the purpose of participation might be discovering demands, taking information or even education and learning. In such cases, the distribution of power is not the aim of participation, hence to prevent any frustration it should be clearly and exactly explained in advance.

Arnstein (1969) introduced a ladder of citizen participation. The different rungs of the ladder, their categorization and perceived objectives are listed in Table 1.

Table 1: Rungs on the ladder of citizen participation and their explanation

Source: (Arnstein, 1969)

		Categorization	Explanation of perceived objectives
8	Citizen Control	Citizen Power	At the topmost rungs citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power
7	Delegated Power		
6	Partnership		Partnership enables citizens to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders
5	Placation	Tokenism	The ground rules allow citizens to advise, but retain for the powerholders the continued right to decide
4	Consultation		When they are suggested by powerholders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard. But under these conditions they lack the power to insure that their views will be heeded by the powerful
3	Informing		
2	Therapy	Nonparticipation	These two rungs describe levels of "nonparticipation". Their real objective is not to enable people to participate in planning or conducting programs, but to enable powerholders to "educate" or "cure" the participants
1	Manipulation		

It can be observed that in the ladder, each level of participation indicates a specific purpose of participation. The highest level of participation should have the purpose of delegating the decision making to citizens and the lowest level would have the aim of educating or curing the participants. In fact, it is a combination of level and the purpose of participation.

Although the level and purpose of participation is intertwined, I think we can find a definition and classification for levels of participation in which the purpose of participation is separated to some extent. Rowe and Frewer (2005) introduce three types of public participation which represents ways to interact and exchange information between sponsors (policy makers) and the public. They labeled these three mechanisms as public communication, public consultation and public participation. In Figure 3, the concepts of these three mechanisms are presented. These three types of public engagement, I presume, can indicate three levels of participation. It will be shown in coming sections that different methods of participation can entail one of these levels of participation, but with different purposes of participation. For instance, a consensus conference (will be introduced and explained later) has a type of 'public participation' according to the above typology. But the purpose of this conference can be consultation or partnership. It can also be the case for the method of referenda. While a referendum is categorized as 'public consultation', its purpose can be delegation of decision-making to the public opinion.

I redefine these three types as different levels of participation; however, in order to avoid confusion between these terms and the general phrase of public participation in our study, I rename them from '*public communication*', '*public consultation*' and '*public participation*' to '*information level*', '*consultation level*' and '*deliberation level*' of participation respectively. In Figure 3, these three levels of participation can be seen.




Figure 3: The three level (type) of public engagement;
adapted from (Rowe & Frewer, 2005)

Now in order to further clarify the distinction between level and purpose of participation in our study, I will elaborate different purposes of participation in the following.

According to the literature, different purposes can be identified for justification of participation. Innes (2004) enumerates five purposes for participation:

- 1- *Recognition of public preferences*: decision makers want to find out what the public's preferences are to receive a share in their decision
- 2- *Acquisition citizens' knowledge*: incorporating citizens' local knowledge to improve decision
- 3- *Advancing fairness and justice*: to realize needs and preferences of the least advantaged groups which are not recognized through the normal information sources
- 4- *Legitimize public decisions*: getting legitimacy for public decision
- 5- *Law requirement*: planners and public officials participate citizens because the law requires it

Moreover, Walters et al. reviewed some literatures to find purposes of citizens' involvement (participation) in decision making. They summarize their findings and introduce following five purposes:"

- 1- *Discovery*: Aid in the search for definitions, alternatives, or criteria.
- 2- *Education*: Educate the public about an issue and proposed alternative.
- 3- *Measurement*: Assess public opinion regarding a set of options.
- 4- *Persuasion*: Persuade the public toward a recommended alternative.
- 5- *Legitimization*: Comply with public norms or legal requirements." (Walters, Aydelotte, & Miller, 2000, p. 352)

Comparison of above descriptions reveals that terms "discovery", "measurement" and "legitimization", from the latter dichotomy, relatively matches those of "Acquisition citizens' knowledge", "Recognition of public preferences" and "Legitimize public decisions", from the earlier dichotomy, respectively. The purposes called "education" and "persuasion" are distinct from other purposes in both categorizations. In fact, according to Arnstein, these are corresponding to lowest two rungs of the ladder of participation and so they stand under the roof of nonparticipation. Nevertheless, it is believed that these two lowest levels of participation can be useful in some contexts. If we accept to regard some learning sessions as a part of participatory approach in policy analysis or decision making practices, then these two purposes can be justified.

Furthermore, the International Association for Public Participation (IAP2) introduces a spectrum of public participation. In their spectrum five purposes are defined corresponding to the five level of participation as follows:"

- 1- *Inform*: to provide the public with balanced and objective information to assist them in understanding the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or solutions
- 2- *Consult*: to obtain public feedback on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions
- 3- *Involve*: to work directly with the public throughout the process to ensure that public concerns and aspirations are consistently understood and considered
- 4- *Collaborate*: to partner with the public in each aspect of the decision including the development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution
- 5- *Empower*: to place final decision-making in the hands of the public" (IAP2, 2007).

It is obvious that in this spectrum, the level of "inform" and its goal represent a one-way communication. Although it seems to be nonparticipation, IAP2 still considers it a level of public participation in decision making.

However, there is an important point that in policy analysis, "input" is the key phrase which makes participation different from other forms of communication. For the purpose of analysis, the public participation is designed to consult, involve and inform the public, who affected by a decision, to have an input into the process of decision making (Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Moreover, it is argued that public participation is not just providing information to citizens but rather it should be interaction between the decision makers and the public who are going to participate (Creighton, 2005).

Therefore, in the process of public participation, in general, and participatory policy analysis, in particular, we should see how we could directly or indirectly obtain "input" from the participants. The element of input does not exist in one-way educational or training meetings and thus they cannot be assumed as participation in our scope.

To summarize all aforementioned participation purposes, In Table 2, purposes which would be applied in participatory approach of policy analysis are tabulated. In this list, the persuasion is not considered because it would be done after decision making and is not within the process of policy analysis. Moreover, the purpose of law requirements (or legitimization) is out of scope of policy analysis too. As Innes (2004) indicates, to fulfill such a purpose, public participation mostly would become a ritual or pseudo-participation. I think all other main purposes of participation are covered in the table.

Table 2: Relevant purposes of participation in participatory policy analysis
Sources: (IAP2, 2007; Innes & Booher, 2004; Walters, Aydelotte, & Miller, 2000)

Purpose of Participation	Description
Acquisition (Discovery)	To understand public's preferences and acquisition their local knowledge which helps in the search for definitions, criteria and alternatives
Inform	To provide the public with information about the problem, alternatives, opportunities and/or proposed solutions
Consult (Involve)	To obtain public feedback directly on analysis, alternatives and/or decisions
Co-decide (Collaborate)	To involve the public in development of alternatives and the identification of the preferred solution
Delegate (Empower)	To place final decision-making in the hands of the public

2-2-2 Who Participate?

Public participation, in general, refers to involving citizens or laymen who are usually the have-nots or the powerless. But they are not the only target group of involvement. Participation of more actors and stakeholders in policy analysis or decision making process is also a facet of participatory approach. Stakeholders are not necessarily powerless or have-nots. In some policy problems they are resourceful actors who can block a decision. Moreover, engagement of multi-disciplinary experts or scientists in a policy analysis process may be required. So, we can see that variant types of participants can be involved in a participatory practice.

The quality of the participants determines the effective method for participatory approach. The concern of participants is one of the important dimensions along which mechanisms of participation vary. Some processes are open to all who wish to engage, other mechanisms need only elite stakeholders such as interest group representatives, whereas there are some other methods which are limited to trained experts (Fung, 2006). Furthermore, we can also argue that the level and purpose of participation may be dependent on participants.

Sometimes, the type of participants shows itself in the naming of participatory methodology. For instance, the term "participatory stakeholder analysis" used by Bots and Hermans (2003), indicates who are involved in the process of analysis. It will be seen in future that names of some participatory methods say something about the expected participants (e.g. expert panels, citizen juries, etc).

2-2-3 Methods of Participation

Many public participation techniques can be found in the literature (Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Martin, & Gauvin, 2001; Geurts & Joldersma, 2001; IAP2, 2006; Mayer, 1997; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; Wilcox, 1994). In Table 3, some prominent methods with their main characteristics are listed. In chapter six, some features of these methods will, also, be presented in Table 47. Although many of these methods can be employed for participatory policy analysis (PPA), policy analysis literatures have only focused on a handful. It is argued that a relevant methodology for PPA has to satisfy both analytical criteria and process criteria (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001).

Some factors are influential in selection of a proper participatory method. Firstly, the level and purpose of participation is a major factor to determine the most relevant method (Reed, 2008). Many authors recommend methods for the different purpose of participation (Arnstein, 1969; Richards, Blackstock, & Carter, 2004; Wilcox, 1994). Secondly, the kind of policy problems and the stages of the policy process should be taken into account to select the technique (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001). Thirdly, I will argue that the contextual factors (cultural-political) are determinant for adoption of a proper method as well.

Moreover, *adaptation* of methods for different purpose, problems, stages and context is another important issue. For instance, it is emphasized that in order to engage some "hard-to-reach" groups, an adaptation of participatory methods is required because an *adoption* of ready-made approaches does not work (Nicholson, 2005). It will be contended here that cultural and political factors are important in adoption and adaptation of public participation methods.

Table 3: List and descriptions of public participation methods

Sources: (Abelson, Forest, Eyles, Martin, & Gauvin, 2001; Andersen & Jæger, 1999; Fishkin, Luskin, & Jowell, 2000; Geurts & Joldersma, 2001; Mayer, 1997; Petts & Leach, 2000; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005)

Methods of Participation	Description
Citizen jury	Lay panel with independent facilitator questions expert witnesses chosen by stakeholder panel. Meetings not generally open. Conclusions on key questions made via report or press conference.
Citizen panel	Consists of several hundreds/thousand citizens who represent the general population of an area. panel views are regularly sought using a survey instrument (e.g. postal, telephone surveys)
Community/public advisory committee	Small groups of people representing particular interests or areas of expertise, e.g. community leaders, meet to discuss issues of concern and provide an informed input.
Consensus conference	Lay panel with independent facilitator questions expert witnesses chosen by steering/planning committee. Meetings open to wider public. Conclusions on key questions made via report or press conference.
Deliberative polling	Begins by interviewing a random sample of the population. Following the interview, respondents are invited to come to a conference centre for a weekend of face-to-face discussions and are sent a balanced package of background information to encourage learning and thinking about an issue. After a weekend of information and discussion participants complete the same questionnaire as when first contacted.
Delphi method	A Delphi Survey is a series of questionnaires that allow experts or people with specific knowledge to develop ideas about potential future developments around an issue. The process involves several iterations of participant responses to a questionnaire and results tabulation and dissemination until additional iterations don't result in significant changes.
Electronic consultation	Aims to attain open response on a significance issue. A document is sent to non-selected people through, for instance, intranet site inviting email messages from citizens on the particular local issue with limited time available for open commentary.
Focus groups	Free discussion on general topic with video/tape recording and little input/direction from facilitator. Used to assess opinions/attitudes.
Gaming/Simulation /Policy exercise	A well-designed game is based on a simulated model derived from a real referent system. The structure of the referent system is translated into roles, rules of the game, and the scenario. Stakeholders act in simulated environments through role-playing and mutual communication.
Negotiated rule making	Working committee of stakeholder representatives (and from sponsor). Consensus required on specific question (usually, a regulation).
Public hearing/inquiries	Entails presentations by agencies regarding plans in open forum. Public may voice opinions but have no direct impact on recommendation.
Public survey (opinion poll)	Often enacted through written questionnaire or telephone survey. May involve variety of questions. Used for information gathering.
Referenda	Vote is usually choice of one of two options. All participants have equal influence. Final outcome is binding.
Scenario workshop (action planning)	A local meeting that includes dialogue among four local groups of actors: policy-makers, business representatives, experts and citizens. The participants carry out assessments of solutions to the problems, and develop visions for future solutions and proposals for realizing them. Before the workshop, a set of scenarios is written, describing alternative ways of solving the problem.

2-3 Risks and Challenges of Participation

Public participation faces with some challenges and risks. Proponent of positivist and rational style of policy analysis highlight these risks to criticize participatory style. Some of the main challenges are listed in the following:

- 1- *Ignorance of the public*: Human inadequacies limit the public's capacity to be effectively involved in complex decision making. It is doubtful whether the public can understand significant concepts like uncertainty. Deficiency in the knowledge and reasoning abilities of the laymen is another concern (Rowe & Frewer, 2000).
- 2- *Cultural context*: The public's attitude, beliefs and motivation may limit the potential to contribute to complicated policy decisions (Cooke, 2001; Rowe & Frewer, 2000). Cooke et al. (2001) posits that social psychology should be considered in implementation of the participatory development.
- 3- *Cost of the policy process*: The use of citizens participation may increase the costs of the policy process because of increasing the time and resources involved (Kweit & Kweit, 1984).
- 4- *Potential of conflict*: Engagement of stakeholders and groups with different and opposite interests in a decision making process can make the potential of conflicts (Kweit & Kweit, 1984). It is believed that these methods antagonize the member of the public as they have to speak of the issues in polarizing terms (Innes & Booher, 2004). The probable conflict can negatively affect the mutual relations and also increase the cost of the process.
- 5- *Proper stage of analysis*: There is a challenge to define in what stage of policy analysis the participation should be employed to make it useful. If it happens prior to the problem definition stage, then the broadness of problem definers and their respective requirements might make the analysis unmanageable. If it were to occur lately in the implementation stage, its effectiveness would be questionable and the credibility of the approach would be gravely endangered (Deleon, 1990). However, the purpose and the level of participation could help to determine the proper stage for public engagement.
- 6- *Issues on the table*: Practice of participatory mechanism for some issues can make some conceptual problem and frustrate the procedure from the very start (Deleon, 1990). It is claimed that engagement is likely to fail "when strong social pressures or identities exist, conflict is deep, and the matter at hand centers on values rather than facts" (Mendelberg, 2002, p. 181).
- 7- *Choosing participants*: The selection process is challenging for initiator or analyst. The fact that which respondent groups should be nominated and who should be a representative, force the analyst to include some stakeholders and preclude others. Undoubtedly it is controversial to judge who is accredited to speak for the people (Deleon, 1990).
- 8- *Time*: Public participation can slow down the decision-making processes (Nicholson, 2005). It is claimed that in US these methods discourage busy and thoughtful people from wasting their time for what seems nothing more than rituals (Innes & Booher, 2004). It means that, in general, in the participatory process we expect to have much more wasted time although it can be controlled and reduced via an effective design of the participatory process.
- 9- *Pseudo-expectation*: Participation makes expectation for participants and if the implementation does not match expectations, it can generate disappointment (Barreteau, Bots, & Daniell, 2010; Nicholson, 2005). Moreover, it is alleged that when distrust lurks between citizens and officials, the authorities try to involve stakeholders in the decision process to gain their confidence. This creates credibility and trust between stakeholders and, in turns, leads to increased expectations. If the process ends in

delivery of the discussed objectives, a positive cycle of trust is developed but if it does not, then the initial distrust would be reinforced (Richards, Blackstock, & Carter, 2004).

- 10- *Consultation fatigue among participants*: If the process is very time-consuming and rounds and sessions would be repeated, it can cause the consultation fatigue among people (Nicholson, 2005).
- 11- *Dominant group*: Sometimes dominant but unrepresentative groups may capture the process of participation (Nicholson, 2005). It can jeopardize the fairness of the session and discourage other stakeholders or groups to participate. Moreover, pseudo-representatives can be imposed upon the participatory process mostly in undemocratic countries which leads to a fake public participation.

Actually, more items may be added to this list. We mention some challenges based on findings in the literature and reported experiences. It is of importance to be aware of them in the preliminary phase of the participatory process design. We will discuss that some of these challenges are intensified or relaxed by the cultural and political context in which public participation is practiced.

Furthermore, real participation faces a lot of barriers. Some of them are situational and others may be fundamental. reluctance of decision makers, policy analysts and power-holders to redistribute power on one hand and the inadequacies of the public, poor politico-socioeconomic infrastructure and difficulties of organizing a representative on the other, are significant roadblocks to achieve authentic participation (Arnstein, 1969). Moreover, some people may have very difficult living conditions and more urgent problems to deal with than taking part in participation activities (Nicholson, 2005). In the next section I will talk about the role of context.

It would be nice to end this part with the meaningful metaphor that Deleon used to describe participatory policy analysis. He says:

"The lottery metaphor - minimum investment of resources, low probability of payoff, and, if successful, immense returns - is instructive in the case for participatory policy analysis. As we have seen, the conceptual and operational problems inherent to the approach are formidable. But the benefits which could accrue to the effectiveness of the public policy process would be enormous." (Deleon, 1990, p. 49)

PPA resembles lottery because of uncertainty involved in participatory practice. As I said before, understanding cultural and political context can reduce the intensity of its uncertainty.

2-4 Role of Context in Participatory Approach

In this section I want to study the role of context in participatory approach. The context consists of many aspects. We can call different contextual factors namely social, economic, political, cultural, geographical and temporal factors. In this research, I will focus on cultural and political context. The main reason to select these two is that in participatory policy analysis, we have to deal with people - as participants - to understand their attitudes, perceptions, interests and expectations. Also, to design a participatory process we have to know how actors and people communicate and interact with each other and how they think, organize and behave when they are in contact with others. I believe that cultural factors can reveal some underlying features of a society appreciation of which are very helpful to have an effective public participation. On the other hand, the political structure determines some of the institutional and even mental barriers or facilitators of citizen involvement. There is no doubt that these two factors are affected by each other and by other contextual factors

as well. Nonetheless, I think that these two have enough distinct features to be examined separately.

The importance of context in participatory processes has been highlighted in the literature. Some authors believe that participatory process should be adapted for each specific context. They emphasize that high sensitivity to context in participatory practices means that it is very difficult to extrapolate from one case to another (André, Enserink, Connor, & Croal, 2006; Barreteau, Bots, & Daniell, 2010). Geurts (2001) emphasizes that one of the important variables that have to be part of a theory to anticipate the success of the application of participatory methods is context characteristics of the policy issue at hand. He reiterates that "the environment or context of a policy issue should be analyzed to provide suggestions on how to organize and facilitate participation in policy analysis" (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001, p. 304). Moreover, he maintains that the context characteristic which will influence the effects of participatory policy analysis refers to the structure of the policy network – which, to my mind, can be referred to cultural structure- and the nature of the institutionalized policy processes within the network - which can be referred to political system (Geurts & Joldersma, 2001). Nicholson declares that "many effective civic participation exercises may be location-specific and not translate well to other contexts" (Nicholson, 2005, p. 37). In his book, Mayer concludes that "Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) should be used contextually; a notion which refers to the fact that there is no single method of PPA applicable in all –or most- contexts...studying PPA from a general context requires comparative studies using experiments on participation in analysis: historically or cross-culturally, such as, do participatory procedure developed in Denmark work the same way and are they as successful in the United States, the United Kingdom or the Netherlands?" (Mayer, 1997, pp. 241-242)

Furthermore, some experiences in participatory development projects show that the specific form of participation may vary depending on the local conditions in project areas. Asian Development Bank mentioned in his report that the practice of applying a standard package of participation in all rural development projects without a clear purpose - by hiring NGOs, organizing beneficiary groups, conducting consultation workshops, providing training courses - is not necessarily effective or efficient (Asian Development Bank, 2004, p. 121). Also, in a policy research working paper of the World Bank, it is stated that key concepts that underpin community-based (or participatory) development, such as *participation* and *community* must be adequately detailed in a context specific manner. Based on the case study evidence, the report concludes that any naive application of these concepts by project implementers can lead to poor project design and to outcomes that are away from the stated intentions of projects (Mansuri & Rao, 2004).

Knowing the significance of the context in general, I am, now, going to discuss in brief the importance of cultural and political contexts in the following.

2-4-1 Cultural Context: Takes Its Importance for Granted

"Public participation and culture are intertwined; national, local, and professional cultures and their formal institutions co-determine the level and methods of public participation" (Enserink, Patel, Kranz, & Maestu, 2007). Although this statement shows the importance of cultural context in public participation, it seems that there is no thorough research about the role of cultural context in participatory practices. I found that the main attention of researches in participatory analysis is on the process of the participation and evaluation of the outcomes or success criteria. Papers about the weight of participants' characteristics are rare. Even when some criteria were introduced to evaluate the participants' satisfaction, there are no cultural differences between societies have been considered. However, recently researchers and practitioners have emphasized the necessity of cultural studies and

they recommend that more research should be done in this field (Abraham & Platteau, 2004; Deleon & Resnick-terry, 1999; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Reed, 2008).

Regarding comparative study about participatory policy analysis, Deleon states that although cross-fertilization between European and American scholars were synergistic and growing, one must certainly be careful of not ignoring social and cultural differences in participatory analysis (Deleon & Resnick-terry, 1999). Also Reed (2008) in his literature review about the stakeholder participation discusses the importance of the socio-cultural factors in adaptation of the methods to the decision-making context. As a tangible example of differences between cultures, he points out that "the amount of time that participants are likely to give up varies between cultures, and limited time may constrain the choice of methods" (Reed, 2008, p. 2424). At the conclusion of his paper, he recommends that "in order to design more effective and appropriate participatory processes, research is needed to better understand and prioritize the factors that lead stakeholder participation to stronger and more durable decisions in different contexts. There is a need to replicate and compare participatory processes in different socio-cultural and biophysical contexts, and to compare participatory processes applied using different approaches and methods in similar contexts" (Reed, 2008, p. 2426).

Moreover, experiences of the World Bank project in participatory development show the importance of involving cultural factors in the process. Mansuri (2004) in a critical review of community-based development argues that turning the pyramid of decision-making by giving beneficiaries voice and choice, should not result in ignoring the social and cultural context within which they live and organize themselves. Moreover, she mentions the challenges associated with participatory projects when an external agent performs it in a diverse culture:

"Several case studies suggest that the success of participatory projects may also be affected by how well heterogeneity is managed, by what resources and strategies are used to bring communities together, and by how effectively differences are debated. The involvement of external agents creates competition among different interests and incentives, and the success of projects may depend on how these incentives are aligned— whether by persuasion, ideology, consensus, good governance, domination by greedy elites, or sheer hard work by a group of altruistic individuals. This is another area where more research would be useful" (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, pp. 55,56).

Abraham and Platteau show that in the case of participatory development which is used as a new approach in aid programs in sub-Saharan Africa, the various aspects of the social and cultural fabric have a significant role. They described some values of societies, called tribal or lineage-based society, as "high degree of personalized relationship", "other-regarding norms", "strong beliefs in the role of ancestors and supernatural powers" and "strict respect of status and rank differences" (Abraham & Platteau, 2004). We will see that these values can be respectively explained by some dimensions of different cultural theories namely collectivism/embeddedness (Hofstede/Schwartz), traditional (Inglehart) and power distance/hierarchy (Hofstede/Schwartz). In next chapter, I will study these cultural theories and examine the various cultural dimensions and their application in participatory process design. Abraham puts forth that those cultural norms and values can cause difficulties and even preempt the participatory approach from achieving its expected outcomes (Abraham & Platteau, 2004). In addition, they mention that the political factors of an effective state are vital to make such an approach successful.

Furthermore, Johnston (2001) examines two participatory methods - Delphi survey and scenario analysis- to understand the role of cultural context in proper selection of a

methodology. As we know, the Delphi technique allows for individuals to express their judgment privately, and subsequently to adjust that judgment, again privately, against the averaged opinion of all respondents. So, in cultures that the important people can influence decision making, this method will work better to involve several stakeholders with different rankings. He precisely reasons that:

"In all organizations, nations and cultures where authority has a powerful hold or is highly regarded, whether because of age, position, achievements or status, the anonymity of the Delphi process has considerable attraction. Hence the anonymity is particularly valued in societies and organizations that are strongly hierarchical" (Johnston, 2001, p. 721).

In the next chapter, I will scrutinize the diverse cultural dimensions which explain how in different societies the power hierarchy is expected and accepted.

However, in contrast to the Delphi method, scenario analysis can be characterized as relying on creative imagination and, involving shared group processes rather than anonymous individual judgment. Learning through interacting is at the heart of the scenario technique. Johnston claims that these features are quite evidently more appropriate, and rewarded, in individualistic and highly verbal cultures (Johnston, 2001).

As a conclusion, this seems to be crystal clear that for further elaboration of participatory approach study and understanding of cultural context is of cardinal importance.

2-4-2 Political Context: The First Gate to Participation Hall

The gist of this section could be best represented by the below quotation by international Association for Public Participation (IAP2):

"While culture is an important differentiating factor between countries, other factors also affect the practice of public participation, such as each country's political system and history, and in particular the government's attitude towards public participation. Moreover, cultural influences on public participation are not static, and cultures change and intermingle as a result of many processes, including public participation itself. There is a complex interplay between cultural forces and political structures. Nevertheless, practitioners should carefully distinguish between the effects of culture and the effects of contemporary political structures. We should not be too quick to assume that all the differences in public participation across countries are due to cultural differences alone" (IAP2, 2009, p. 4).

The significance of the political context for participatory practices has been mentioned in the literature as well (Abraham & Platteau, 2004; Deleon & Resnick-terry, 1999; Mansuri & Rao, 2004; Richards, Blackstock, & Carter, 2004). Richards et al. in their policy research declare that without considering the wider institutional and political context, it is unlikely to consistently achieve satisfactory processes and outcomes in participatory approach. In addition to the importance of cultural factors, in her critical review of participatory development, Mansuri indicates the role of political structure:

"The effectiveness of participatory strategies may hinge on an explicit understanding of local structures of power, which both limit and enhance prospects for participatory development" (Mansuri & Rao, 2004, p. 14).

Participation conceptually entails the political philosophy of democracy. However, sometimes the relation of democratic structure and participation is similar to the metaphor of "the chicken and the egg causality dilemma". Participatory approach aims to democratize decision making; but it also requires a democratic political system in which public participation is permitted and facilitated. Therefore, public participation can only effectively be practiced in a society enjoying a certain level of democracy otherwise it would be a pseudo-participation just to fulfill a ritual.

In fact, participatory analysis and public participation are contemporary concepts to deepen and broaden the democratic way of governance in public policy making. Mayer (1997) explains two conceptions of democracy which have different consequences for the design and evaluation of participatory policy analysis. The first one is pluralist theory which is concerned with groups and their interest. Second concept is strong (or direct) democracy in which individuals and their empowerment are concerned. One of the major differences between these two concepts is that the emphasis of pluralist theory is on the outcomes like the distribution of benefits and burdens in society, while strong democracy emphasizes the educational and psychological effects of the participatory activity on participants. There is another classification of democracy in literatures similar to these two concepts. They are called protective democracy and developmental democracy which are conceptually the same with pluralist and strong democracy respectively (De Jong & Mentzel, 2001)

To my speculation, different styles of democracy and the degree of democratic practices in a political system can determine the compatible type of participatory policy analysis and the compatible methodology of participation. In the further chapter, I will extract a list of political indexes which can show the level of political rights and freedom in different countries. These indicators may help us more or less estimate which type of participatory methods can be practically and effectively practiced.

Furthermore, it is often claimed that political structure is representative of the culture of a society. It means that if the political system of a country is not democratic and people cannot express their views freely in the society, it originates from the cultural values of that society in which totalitarian way of governance is accepted. Although there is no doubt that some cultural traits can determine and consolidate the type of political structure, it is not true to judge the culture of a society based on its political structure. For instance, we can see that in some countries like Iran, in spite of having authoritarian regime, there is, to date, a long history of nationwide struggle for democracy and justice. In such a case, one should distinguish between cultural values of a nation and the imposed undemocratic political system. Lack of this distinction makes a misleading interpretation and can lead to a problematic misunderstanding of a society and its culture.

It is not wise to suppose that citizens in an undemocratic regime do not like to participate in democratic process and, consequently, conclude that the public participation in such society will fail necessarily. However, it does not mean that we should underestimate the role of undemocratic system to discourage the public from participation. Moreover, we can observe that in some undemocratic countries, people struggle for freedom and the right of choice and participation because they respect these values in their culture. We will see that, the public demand for participation in some undemocratic countries is as much as – or even more than – democratic countries. That is why I claim we should consider cultural and political contexts as two separate - but definitely interrelated – contextual factors.

In conclusion, my main claim is that although we can consider the type of political system of a democratic country as the representative of its culture, it is not authentic to certainly assume a political system of an authoritarian regime as the outcome of its culture. If someone believes in this misassumption then how one can explain the changes of political system in many former undemocratic countries to democratic ones in recent decades.

2-5 Politico-Cultural-Sensitive Factors of Participation (FP)

In order to examine the linkage between participatory approach and cultural-political context, which is the main objective of this research, we need to recognize those factors of participation which are, in turn, affected by political-cultural context. In this research I try to

identify such factors which I call it Politico-Cultural-Sensitive Factors of Participation and are abbreviated to FP(s).

We may find numerous factors that affect public participation from different aspects. For instance, in the literature, a number of evaluation factors/criteria for participation process have been identified (Blackstock, Kelly, & Horsey, 2007; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2004; van Duijn, 2007). These factors were introduced to evaluate public participation after its implementation to judge its success or failure. A list and explanation of these evaluation criteria can be found in Appendix 1. Although some of these factors may be common with FPs, they are not all those that we are seeking for. In fact we require some *ex ante* factors while evaluation criteria are *ex post* ones indeed.

Moreover, some factors which have been mentioned as risks and challenges of participation may be part of FPs. On the other hand, OECD (2001) introduced a list of factors for successful public participation. These factors affect government-citizen relation in policy making and can be listed in a sequential order of determinativeness. In Appendix 2, some of these factors, which are helpful for identification of FPs, are listed.

Furthermore, as far as cultural context is concerned, we need to recognize those factors that are affected by participants and not by process only. That is, even if we have some factors which are related to the process, it should be ones that are determined according to the preferences of people who are involved in the process. Therefore, based on what I have reviewed and studied in the literature consisting evaluation factors/criteria for public participation, aforementioned factors introduced by OECD and risks and challenges of public participation, I develop a list of politico-cultural-sensitive factors of participation (FP) for this study.




Figure 4: Identification of politico-cultural-sensitive factors of participation (FP) among other group of factors related to public participation

I should mention that these FPs have been identified in a tentative and reciprocal process during studying cultural and political indicators. I aggregate, summarize and categorize different factors to find a final list of FPs. In fact, FPs are a number of numerous factors which can affect public participation. FPs have common factors with other groups of factors and are distinguished by their sensitivity to politico-cultural context. In Figure 4 a schematic drawing of relation and position of FPs among other group of factors is depicted. Different segments of common factors between groups or independent factors of each group have been labeled by numbers in the figure and in Table 4 the list of these factors are indicated.

Table 4: List of different groups of factors related to public participation with the common and independent factors of each group's segment

Segment on Figure 4	Politico-Cultural-Sensitive Factors of Participation (FP)	Evaluation Factors of Public Participation	Factors affecting Government-Citizen Relations in Policy-Making (OECD)	Risk and Challenges of Public Participation
1	Process timing and Size (FP8)	Speed, Continuity	Urgency of Decision, Timing, Duration	Time, Consultation fatigue among participants
	Legal and political support (FP1)	Representativeness	Constitutional and/or legal basis for basic civil rights, Support at political level	Dominant group
	Acceptance of Powerless (FP4), Gender of Participants (FP5)	Inclusiveness, Accessibility	Restrictions on participation	Choosing participants
2	Power-holders Support (FP2)	Responsiveness, Openness	Support within the public administration	
	Process Format (FP7)	Structure	Tools used	
3	Dealing with Conflicts (FP13)	Conflict		Potential of conflict
4	Inter-party Trust (FP9)	Fairness, Transparency		
	Expressiveness (FP10)	Capacity to participate, Communication		
5	Public Demand (FP3)		Demand among citizens and civil society	
6	Role and Intention of Participants (FP6) , Respect for Rank (FP11) , Outcome Expectation (FP12)			
7		Resource accessibility	Resource available	
8		Involvement, Acceptance, Influence, Independence, Flexibility, Legitimacy, Quality of information,		
9			Impact on decision-making process, Initiator	
10				Ignorance of the public, Cultural context, Proper stage of analysis, Issues on the table, Pseudo-expectation

Now, I explain what these FPs are and how, hereafter, I will use them in the rest of the research. First of all, I recognized that four main categories for participatory practice can be

identified. These categories represent respective stages of public participation each of which consists of several factors of participation (FP). These categories and FPs are listed in Table 5 and explained in the following.

First of all, there are some main and basic drivers for public participation without which participation cannot realize. This category consists of three factors: legal and political support (FP1), power-holder support (FP2) and public demand (FP3). The first one is the main gate of participatory hall. If a political and legal system of a country hampers participation, the participatory approach can hardly be practiced. In fact, a minimum level of democracy and civil liberties should be available for realization of participation. Failure of FP1 can degrade and limit level of participation to nonparticipation or tokenism.

The power-holder support (FP2) is more affected by political culture than political structure. This factor reveals the extent to which the authorities accept and support sharing decision power with other stakeholders. It will be the second gateway of participation and the reluctance of the power-holder to involve others, keep the participatory door semi-closed. In chapter five and six, we will see that in many politically-legally democratic countries, like the UK, there is a lack of tendency of power-holders to effectively participate the public.

The third factor of first category is the public demand for participation (FP3). It can be considered the third pre-condition for effective participation. If two previous factors are analogized to gates of participatory hall which need to be opened for realization of public participation, the public demand is a necessary requirement to fill the hall with people. Cultural tendency for involvement is a crucial and determinant factor for public participation.

Table 5: Politico-Cultural-Sensitive Factors of Participation (FP)

Categories of Factors	Factor Code	Factor Name
1- Basic Drivers of Public Participation	FP1	Legal and Political Support
	FP2	Power-holders Support
	FP3	Public Demand
2- Participants in Public Participation	FP4	Acceptance of Powerless
	FP5	Gender of Participants
	FP6	Role and Intention of Participants
3- Process and Interactions in Public Participation	FP7	Process Format
	FP8	Process Timing and Size
	FP9	Inter-party Trust
	FP10	Expressiveness
	FP11	Respect for Rank
4- Output of Public Participation	FP12	Outcome Expectation
	FP13	Dealing with Conflicts

Second main category is associated with participants of public participation. The first factor of the category is related to acceptance of the powerless (FP4). This factor may determine that what type of participants are preferred and accepted to be involved in the participatory practice. That is, in some cultural context, participatory practice should involve resourceful stakeholders or experts, and participation of the citizens and laymen is seen as useless and meaningless.

Another factor in this category is related to the gender of participants (FP5). In some cultures different roles are defined for different genders. For instance, in some societies it is not common to involve females as facilitator, or sometimes even as participants, in decision

making process. On the contrary, the equal involvement of both genders in participatory practice is an important requirement of its legitimacy in some other cultures.

Furthermore, the role and intention of participants is another factor of this category (FP6). Participants may involve as independent individual who represents his/her points of view and alternatively, a participant can be a representative of a broader group or community. In some cultures, it is not common and accepted to participate for individual benefit and normally people are expected to seek the collective fulfillment. On the contrary, in some cultures, participants are supposed to seek their own personal benefit without concerns about others'.

Next, the process and interactions in public participation is the third main category. The first factor of this category is the process format (FP7). This factor determines which type of process is compatible with cultural traits of a society. Structure, style, arrangement and regulation of the participatory session should be adapted to cultural context. Sometimes even the format of the process determines the type of participants.

The next factor is process timing and size (FP8). This factor is related to the preference of duration and speed of the participatory process. In some cultures, short and fast process is preferable or tolerable while in others, a slow and long process can also be acceptable. The size of the process refers to the number of participants and the elaboration of the process.

Inter-party trust is another factor of this category (FP9). This factor is crucial for fruitful implementation of public participation. Trust between and within different actors should be taken into account because lack of trust can be a serious hurdle of public participation. On one hand, confidence in government and policy makers are determinant for persuading the public to participate and on the other hand, interpersonal trust within different participants and stakeholders are important as well.

Another factor which is very influential in the way of interactions in participatory session is expressiveness (FP10). This factor determines how participants communicate with others when they do not know each other. This factor accents cultural differences evidently since whereas some cultures are explicit and self-expressive in communication, others are modest and implicit.

The last factor of this category is the degree of respect for rank (FP11). In some cultures people with higher rank, either position or ascription or age, should be respected, while in other cultures it is not important "who you are" and what position, age and ascription you have. Hence, in latter cultures, confrontation and opposing others with higher rank is not a taboo. This factor would be important in the proper arrangement of participants in a participatory session.


Forth and the last category is about the output of public participation. One of the factors associates with outcome expectation of participants from participatory practice (FP12). In fact, it is conceivable that expectation of outcome is culturally affected and, so, in some cultures the optimized performance would be the main and probably only acceptable outcome of a process. Quantitatively optimized outcomes are sought by participants and decision makers and, therefore, qualitative outcomes like relationship and involvement are not desirable and satisficing per se. Even we can posit that such cultures are reluctant to use participatory policy analysis and they prefer to apply the rational and traditional approach of policy analysis.

The last factor regards dealing with conflicts (FP13). Some cultures are into compromise in conflict resolution while others persist to win. Perception of reaching to an agreement is an issue that should be seen under the light of this factor as well.

Now, having identified the factors of participation (FP), I am going to study cross-cultural theories in next chapter the central goal of which is to identify proper cultural indicators which can explain differences of FPs in various national contexts.

Chapter Three: Cross-Cultural Theories

My main argument for the necessity of studying the influence of cultural factors on participatory approach is that when people and their attitude, preferences, values and interests needed to be considered in policy analysis, then undoubtedly their culture penetrates into participatory process. Participation is meaningless without presence of a group of people. The manner in which people communicate, discuss, argue and make decision is culturally different. People's attitude, values, perception are also affected by their culture. Therefore, culture matters in participatory approach of policy analysis. In order to take culture into account, we need to have some measurable and comparable cultural indicators. Therefore, in this chapter I will study the cross-cultural theories in which many distinct cultural dimensions have been introduced and measured in societal and national level.



3-1 Culture and Its Many Dimensions

Culture and its operationalization is a controversial issue. In all different definitions of culture there is common emphasis that culture is the representative of shared values of a community. Extracting these shared values in societies is the main reason for the great attention given to cross-cultural studies.

Human mental program cannot be observed directly and what we can see is its manifestation in behaviors: words and deeds. Human mental program is partly unique and personal and partly shared with others (Hofstede, 2001). Indeed, understanding the shared values of a society can reveal some parts of human mental program which determine the attitude and behavior of a person. It may help scientist to anticipate, to some extent, the general expected pattern of human attitude and behavior.

3-1-1 Definition of Value and Culture

To have a definition of culture we need first to define value. Value is "a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over others" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 5). This is a simplified version of the precise definition by Kluckhohn: "A Value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available modes, means and ends of action" (Kluckhohn, 1951 as cited by Hofstede, 2001, p. 5)

One well-known definition of culture is as follows:

"Culture consists in patterned ways of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values." (Kluckhohn, 1951 as cited by Hofstede, 2001, p. 9)

When we want to apply a method of policy analysis in different societies we need to study national cultures and not just values. As Hofstede (2001) says, in study of values, individuals are compared while in study of cultures, societies are compared.

3-1-2 How to Study Culture?

There are some ways to study, compare and classify cultural differences each of which has its advantages and disadvantages:

First, one can look at the institutions that societies have created or adopted like observing different regimes (dictatorial or democratic) or different legal system (Anglo-Saxon common law or codified Roman law). This method is objective; but it can be misleading as societies borrow institutions and laws for non-cultural reasons. Second, it is possible to observe and compare behaviors (drivers or students). This approach seems also objective, but we can argue that behaviors do not always result from cultural background but from circumstances. Moreover, it can be difficult to find a proper explanation for observations that what cultural characteristic are embedded in a behavior. Third, a modern approach is to ask people, through questioner, what they think instead of looking at what people do. The method focuses on peoples' beliefs and values (what is true/false, good/bad, desirable/undesirable). The advantage of the method is that it is easily documentable and quantifiable. But there is the risk that people sometimes do not say what they think and distort their answers. Also, they can misinterpret questions. Sometimes people tend to answer what they believe the questioner likes to hear. Moreover, many people do not know exactly why they display certain behaviors. Selection of questions and respondents can sometimes lead to some meaningless results. However, if it performs skillfully, it can yield useful and meaningful outcomes (Minkov, 2007).

In this research, we use cultural theories based on the third approach. In order to avoid probable shortcomings of employing one cultural theory for development of a framework, I

will study five cultural theories and compare their cultural dimensions. Hopes are that through this methodology a wider scope of national culture could be covered and explained by the ultimate framework, although it can probably make some confusing and inconsistent outcomes as well.

3-2 Cross-Cultural Studies on National Cultural Dimensions

Measuring values and classifying them in modern approach is the first step to recognition and dimensionalization of national culture. Cultural dimension is a human construct which aims to represent a cluster of interdependent values bound by some similarity. A dimension is sometimes clearly distinguishable and sometimes almost invisible at first glance (Minkov, 2007). A dimension is an aspect of a culture that can be measured relative to other cultures (Hofstede, 2006a).

Hofstede is the founder of dimension paradigm which was introduced in his book in 1980. He showed that "cultural differences between modern nations could be meaningfully measured and ordered along a discrete set of dimensions, representing different answers to universal problems of human societies" (Hofstede, 2006b, p. 883). Hofstede derived four national cultural dimensions and added one later.

However, succeeding Hofstede's work, some other cultural dimensions were introduced by other scientists. Adding more dimensions was normal and expected due to the fact that each cultural dimension was extracted from different set of data in order to explain a phenomenon from different perspectives. Minkov argues that although cultural dimensions "are based on objectively existing phenomena, they are not the phenomena themselves but ways of describing them. Therefore, one and the same reality can be explained and presented in different ways, through different constructs" (Minkov, 2007, p. 23).

I understood that in few researches which study role of culture in policy analysis, Hofstede's theory and its dimensions have been often used. So I became curious to know what other cultural theory and national dimensions are about and whether we can find some distinguished dimensions from Hofstede's with which we can find other invisible characteristics of a culture. Moreover, I was not sure that Hofstede's dimensions are the best to describe the qualities which are important to know about public participation.

In coming sections, besides the cultural theory of Hofstede, I will review four other distinguished cross-cultural theories and their dimensions as well as the items and values embedded in the dimensions. These theories were developed by Inglehart, Schwartz, GLOBE Project and Minkov. We will also study the definition and perception of culture by each of them and probable challenges and critiques about each one. Concerning the main objective of the research, the cultural dimensions and value items which are highly relevant to factors of participation (FP) are identified as well.

3-3 Hofstede Cultural Theory

Hofstede defines culture as "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from another" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 9). As we mentioned before, the societal cultures are inherent in values, in the sense of broad tendencies to prefer certain states of affairs over others (Hofstede, 2006a).

Hofstede mentions that values are invisible part of culture until they become evident in behavior, but culture manifests itself through visible elements too. Symbols, heroes, and rituals are the visible elements which are subsumed under the term practices. He exhibits

the relationship between culture, values, and practices as the 'Onion Diagram' arguing that cultural values drive practices (Hofstede, 2001).

3-3-1 Methodology of Hofstede Study

We stated that Hofstede was the founder of the paradigm of dimensioning culture. He performed a large statistical analysis on a huge set of survey data from IBM subsidiaries in more than 50 countries (Hofstede, 2001). In such a method, the researcher tries to infer values from measuring beliefs, attitudes and personality via questionnaire. The methodology was factor analysis of different IBM questionnaire items to find as many independent factors (dimensions) as it is sufficient to conceptually explain external issues (problems).

Concerning correlation analysis calculated from the answers by the individuals, Hofstede warns about the distinction between analysis of individual-level and cultural-level. He mentions that individual-level correlations produce dimensions of personality while country-level correlations produce dimensions of national culture (Hofstede, 2006a; Hofstede, Hofstede, Minkov, & Vinken, 2008).

Moreover, Hofstede emphasizes that the influence of national wealth (Gross National Product per capita) should always be taken into account before correlating the dimensions with other data. He argues that two of the dimensions, Individualism and small Power Distance, are significantly correlated with wealth (Hofstede, 2006a). It is argued that differences in values that can be explained by economic factors do not need to be explained by cultural factors (Hofstede, 2006b).

Hofstede had empirically derived five cultural dimensions: Power Distance (related to the problem of inequality), Uncertainty Avoidance (related to the problem of dealing with the unknown and unfamiliar), Individualism-Collectivism (related to the problem of interpersonal ties) and Masculinity-Femininity (related to emotional gender roles), Long-versus Short-Term Orientation (related to deferment of gratification) (Hofstede, 2006b). In the latest version of his book (2010), he is going to add another new dimension, indulgence versus restraint, which is obtained from the cultural dimensions recently extracted by Minkov (I will study Minkov's cultural dimensions in this chapter).

Based on a specific formulation, the score of each dimension for every single country has been calculated and ranked. The final version of Hofstede's national cultural scores for six dimensions (Hofstede, 2010) can be found in Appendix 3.

3-3-2 Hofstede's Cultural Dimensions

In this section, five Hofstede's cultural dimensions are studied. Each dimension manifests a number of values, attitudes and behaviors of a society. In Hofstede (2001) many of these features can be found. In the following, I will study the definition of each cultural dimension and then I will identify and tabulate all those features of every dimension that are relevant to factors of participation (FP) - previously listed in Table 5.

Power Distance Dimension

Power Distance is defined as "the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. This represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from above" (Hofstede, 2001).

In Table 6, some features of small and large power distance cultures and the associated FP to each of them are listed.

Table 6: Differences between Small- and Large- Power Distance Cultures (Values, Attitudes and Behaviors) and relevant FPs

Source: (Hofstede, 2001)

Small Power Distance	Large Power Distance	Relevant FP
Openness with information, also to non-superiors	Information constrained by hierarchy	FP2
Powerful people should try to look less powerful than they are	Powerful people should try to look as powerful as possible	FP2
Citizens cooperate with authorities	Citizens wait for action by authorities	FP3
Subordinates expect to be consulted	Subordinates expect to be told what to do	FP3
Latent harmony between the powerful and the powerless	Latent conflict between the powerful and the powerless	FP4
Hierarchy means inequality of roles, established for convenience	Hierarchy means existential inequality	FP4,FP11
Students initiate some communication in class	Teachers initiate all communication in class	FP10
Less acquiescence in answering survey questions	More acquiescence in answering survey questions	FP10
Parents treat children as equals	Parents teach children obedience	FP11
Older people are neither respected nor feared	Older people are both respected and feared	FP11
All should have equal rights; Pluralist ideas about society	Power-holders are entitled to privileges; Elitist ideas about society	FP11,FP2

Uncertainty Avoidance Dimension

Uncertainty Avoidance is defined as "the extent to which the members of institutions and organizations within a society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous, or unstructured situations" (Hofstede, 2001).

In Table 7, some features of low and high uncertainty avoidance cultures and the associated FP are listed.

Table 7: Differences between Low- and High Uncertainty Avoidance Cultures (Values, Attitudes and Behaviors) and relevant FPs
Source: (Hofstede, 2001)

Low Uncertainty Avoidance	High Uncertainty Avoidance	Relevant FP
Much participation in voluntary associations and activities	Little participation in voluntary associations and activities	FP3
Layperson in key positions	Experts in key positions	FP4
Citizens competent toward authorities	Citizens incompetent toward authorities	FP4
Belief in generalists and common sense	Belief in specialists and expertise	FP4
Comfortable with ambiguity and chaos	Need for clarity and structure	FP7
Few and general laws and regulation	Many and precise laws and regulations	FP7
Openness to change and innovation	Conservatism, law and order	FP7
Preference for tasks with uncertain outcomes, calculated risks and requiring problem solving	Preference for tasks with sure outcomes, no risks and following instructions	FP7
Most people can be trusted	One can't be careful enough with other people, not even with family	FP9
Acceptance of foreigners as managers; Tolerance of diversity	Suspicion of foreigner as managers; Xenophobia	FP9
Citizens may protest government decisions	Citizens protest should be repressed	FP11
Favourable attitude toward younger people	Critical attitudes toward younger people	FP11
Younger people are respected	Older people are respected and feared	FP11
Compromising with opponents is safe	Compromising with opponents is dangerous	FP13

Individualism versus Collectivism Dimension

Individualism stands for a society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a person is expected to look after himself or herself and his or her immediate family only. Collectivism stands for a society in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them throughout their lifetime in exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 2001).

In Table 8, some features of individualist and collectivist cultures and the associated FP to each of them are listed.

Table 8: Differences between Collectivist and Individualist Cultures (Values, Attitudes and Behaviors) and relevant FPs,

Source: (Hofstede, 2001)

Collectivism	Individualism	Relevant FP
Collective interests prevail over individual interest	Individual interests prevail over collective interest	FP6
Opinions predetermined by in-groups	Personal opinions expected	FP6
Expertise, order, duty, security provided by organization	Autonomy, variety, pleasure, individual financial security	FP7
Activities dictated by role and context	More self-started activities	FP7
High context communication	Low context communication	FP10
Togetherness does not demand speaking	Visits are filled with talking	FP10
High public self-consciousness	Low public self-consciousness	FP10
Students will not speak up in class or large groups	Students expected to speak up in class or large groups	FP10
More acquiescence in response to important questions	More differentiation in response to important questions	FP10
Openly sharing with a person one's feelings about him or her spoils cooperation	Openly sharing with a person one's feelings about him or her may be productive	FP10
Harmony should always be maintained	Speaking one's mind is a characteristic of an honest person	FP10, FP11
Attitude toward others depend on their group membership	Attitude toward others independent of group membership	FP11
Confrontation to be avoided	Confrontations are normal	FP11
Emphasis on belonging	Emphasis on individual initiative and achievement	FP11

Masculinity versus Femininity Dimension

Masculinity stands for a society in which emotional gender roles are clearly distinct: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. Femininity stands for a society in which emotional gender roles overlap: both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life (Hofstede, 2001).

In Table 9, some features of feminine and masculine cultures and the associated FP to each of them are listed.

Table 9: Differences between Feminine and Masculine Cultures (Values, Attitudes and Behaviors) and FPs*Source:(Hofstede, 2001)*

Femininity	Masculinity	Relevant FP
Belief in group decisions	Belief in individual decisions	FP3
More participation in voluntary activities and associations	Less participation in voluntary activities and associations	FP3
Sympathy for the weak	Sympathy for the strong	FP4
Minimum emotional and social role differentiation between the genders	Maximum emotional and social role differentiation between the genders	FP5
Small and slow are beautiful	Big and fast are beautiful	FP8
Stress on equality, solidarity, deal with feelings and seek consensus	Stress on equity, mutual competition, decisiveness and performance	FP12
Achievement in terms of relationship, quality of contacts and environment	Achievement in terms of ego boosting, wealth and recognition	FP12
Resolution of conflicts through problem solving, compromise and negotiation	Resolution of conflicts through denying them or fighting until the best man wins	FP13
Political discourse moderate	Political discourse adversarial	FP13

Long Term versus Short Term Orientation Dimension

Long-term Orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Short-term orientation stands for a society that fosters virtues related to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, preservation of “face”, and fulfilling social obligations (Hofstede, 2001).

In Table 10, some features of short and long term orientation cultures and the associated FP to each of them are listed.

Table 10: Differences between Short and Long Term Orientation Cultures (Values, Attitudes and Behaviors) and relevant FPs*Source:(Hofstede, 2001)*

Short Term Orientation	Long Term Orientation	Relevant FP
Quick result expected	Persistence, perseverance	FP8
Immediate gratification of needs expected	Deferred gratification of needs accepted	FP8
Personal steadiness and stability	Personal adaptability	FP13
Need for cognitive consistency, analytic thinking	Opposites complete each other, synthetic thinking	FP13

3-3-3 Challenges of the Hofstede Theory

There are many remarks and critiques on the Hofstede theory and dimensions. Among the critiques, the oldness of IBM data and their lack of representativeness of entire national culture are dominant. Regarding the latter, It is said that IBM employees whose values were studied are particular people who cannot necessarily reflect the average cultural values of their nations (Minkov, 2007).

However, it seems that Hofstede is aware of these shortcomings since he had no other available data in his hand. That is why he has mentioned in his recent paper that: "If I had to start from scratch now, I would select the most relevant data from presently available sources like the World Values Survey" (Hofstede, 2006a).

3-4 World Value Survey: Inglehart Theory

Ronald Inglehart is an American political scientist who is now director of the World Value Survey (WVS), an ongoing academic project by a global network of social scientists who conduct representative national surveys of the publics in over 90 countries to assess values and cultural changes in societies all over the world. They have done four waves of the survey so far in 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 and the fifth one is ongoing in 2010. WVS has built on the European Values Surveys first carried out in 1981. It is the largest representative national surveys of basic values and beliefs in 97 societies on all six continents, containing 88 percent of the world's population.

3-4-1 WVS and Inglehart Methodology

WVS data is attained through detailed questionnaires in face-to-face interviews; questionnaires from the most recent waves have consisted of about 250 questions. In each country, the questionnaires are administered to about 1,000 to 3,500 interviewees, with an average, in the fourth wave, of about 1,330 interviews per country and a worldwide total of about 92,000 interviews (Chai, Liu, & Kim, 2009).

The national-level data from the 43 societies obtained in the 1990 survey were factor analyzed. The factor analysis revealed that two main dimensions accounted for over 70 percent of the cross-national variance in more than twenty variables probing basic values across a wide range of domains, from politics to economic growth and sexual behavior. When the 1990 factor analysis was replicated with the data from 1995 surveys, the same two dimensions of cross-cultural variation emerged, even though the new analysis was included 23 additional countries from earlier study. Again in analysis of data from 2000 surveys, including more additional countries, the same two dimensions were found out. Hence, Inglehart asserted that these dimensions of cross-cultural variation are robust (Inglehart, 2006; Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

3-4-2 Inglehart Cultural Dimensions and WVS Items

Inglehart introduces two dimensions which reflect firstly cross-national differences between **traditional versus secular-rational** orientations toward authority; and secondly differences between **survival versus self-expression** values. He indicates that each society can be located on a global map of cross-cultural variation based on these two dimensions (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

These two dimensions are described based on their entailed values as follows:

"The Traditional versus Secular-rational values dimension reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not – but deference to the authority of God, Fatherland and Family are all closely linked. In traditional societies, a main goal in most people's lives is to make their parents proud; they idealized large families, and have large numbers of children. They also have high levels of national pride, favor more respect for authority and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all these topics" (Inglehart, Basafiez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004, p. 13).

"The Survival versus Self-expression dimension taps a syndrome of tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective well-being, civic activism, and self-expression that emerges in postindustrial societies with high levels of existential security and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, people in societies shaped by existential insecurity

and rigid intellectual and social constraints on human autonomy tend to emphasize economic and physical security above all; they feel threatened by foreigners, ethnic diversity, and cultural change—which leads to intolerance of gays and other out-groups, insistence on traditional gender roles, and an authoritarian political outlook... Self-expression values emphasize tolerance of diversity and rising demands for participation in decision-making in economic and political life" (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005, p. 56).

Table 11 shows the five items that are highly loaded into each of traditional versus secular-rational dimension and survival versus self-expression dimension, using a factor analysis of the World Values Survey data aggregated to the national level. The two dimensions explain 70 percent of the total cross-national variation among these 10 variables (Inglehart & Baker, 2000).

Table 11: Main items characterizing two Inglehart's dimensions of cross-cultural variation by nation-level analysis

Source: (Inglehart & Baker, 2000)

TRADITIONAL VALUES emphasize the following: (Explains 44 percent of cross-national variation)	Factor Loadings
God is very important in respondent's life	0.91
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination [Autonomy index]	0.89
Abortion is never justifiable	0.82
Respondent has strong sense of national pride	0.82
Respondent favors more respect for authority	0.72
(SECULAR-RATIONAL VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	
SURVIVAL VALUES emphasize the following: (Explains 26 percent of the cross-national variation)	
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self expression and quality of life [4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index*]	0.86
Respondent describes self as not very happy	0.81
Respondent has not and would not sign a petition	0.80
Homosexuality is never justifiable	0.78
You have to be very careful about trusting people	0.56
(SELF-EXPRESSION VALUES EMPHASIZE THE OPPOSITE)	

* 4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Index are extracted from the following question:

"If you had to choose among the following things, which are the two that seem most desirable to you:

- 1- Maintaining order in the nation
- 2- Giving the people more say in important political decisions.
- 3- Fighting rising prices.
- 4- Protecting freedom of speech.

A concern with domestic order is presumed to relate, above all, to the protection of property; in extreme situations, threats to domestic order can, of course, involve danger to one's life." (Inglehart, 1971)

These ten items are the selected ones from more extensive list of items that are used for the World Value Surveys. For each of two dimensions, Inglehart introduces more items which are, in turn, highly correlated with the factor scores generated by the mentioned 10 items

($r=.95$). In fact, each item involves dozens of additional variables. The list of these broader variables and their correlations with dimensions can be found in Inglehart and Baker (2000). In Table 12 and Table 13 for traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression dimensions respectively, I select and list some of those items which are relevant to the factors of participation (FP).

Table 12: Additional correlated items with the traditional/secular-rational values dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (Inglehart & Baker, 2000)

Correlated Values to Traditional Dimension	Correlation	Relevant FP
It is more important for a child to learn obedience and religious faith than independence and determination [Autonomy index]	.89	FP11
Respondent favors more respect for authority	.72	FP11
Respondent seldom or never discusses politics	.57	FP10
Expressing one's own preferences clearly is more important than understanding others' preferences	.56	FP13

Table 13: Additional correlated items with the secular/self-expression values dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (Inglehart & Baker, 2000)

Correlated Values to Survival Dimension	Correlation	Relevant FP
Respondent gives priority to economic and physical security over self expression [e.g. giving the people more say in important political decisions and Protecting freedom of speech]	.86	FP3,FP12
Men make better political leaders than women	.86	FP5
Respondent has not attended a meeting or signed a petition to protect the environment	.75	FP3
One must always love and respect one's parents regardless of their behavior (respect for the elderly)	.71	FP11
You have to be very careful about trusting people	.56	FP9
Respondent has not and would not take part in a boycott	.56	FP3
Democracy is not necessarily the best form of government	.45	FP3,FP2

The problematic issue about the Inglehart's dimensions, I presume, is that situational factors would be regarded as cultural factors. Although some long-lasting situational factors would affect or even shape cultural values, the distinction between these two is evident. For instance, survival dimension represents some features which are strongly affected by economic and political situation. Inglehart and Baker have shown the changes in the cultural values dimensions via comparing two waves of World Values Surveys from 1981 to 1998 (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). Their comparison shows that there are significant changes for many countries in survival dimension values within this short period of time. I believe, it can be meaningful evidence that the survival/self-expression dimension is a mixture of cultural and situational values and hence it changes due to the economic and political situations.

Inglehart emphasizes that "survival is such fundamental a goal that, if it seems uncertain, one's entire life strategy is impacted by that fact. Low levels of socioeconomic development not only impose material constraints on people's choices; they, also, are linked to low levels of education and information. This intellectual poverty imposes cognitive constraints on people's choices" (Inglehart, 2006, p. 128). It is also mentioned that economic development has a great influence on shifting away from absolute norms and values toward increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting, and participatory values (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). I like to restate the argument by Hofstede that differences in values that can be explained by

economic factors do not need to be explained by cultural factors (Hofstede, 2006b). Therefore, I believe that the survival dimension can be studied and applied as a situational factor rather than cultural one.

To examine my claim, thanks to availability of national scores for five waves of WVS which can be found in Appendix 3, I depict changes of cultural value scores over time for those countries whose dimensional scores are available for at least three waves of surveys. In Figure 5 we can see that for the majority of countries, the survival dimension has been changed remarkably within the period of 15 to 20 years whereas the changes in traditional dimension, as expected, is not significant. Hence, accordingly it could be predicted that the penetration of economic factor in this dimension manifest itself as a situational factor other than a cultural one. However, the various values embedded in survival/self-expression dimension still make it a valuable dimension to use in this study.




Figure 5: Changes in two cultural dimensions in some countries within 15 to 20 years based on WVS waves

Source of data: (Inglehart, 2007)

Generally speaking, the World Value Survey is one of the most extensive and updated data for using in cross-cultural studies for extracting national cultural dimensions. We will see in further section that a Bulgarian scientist, Michael Minkov, uses some of WVS items to extract and develop some distinguished cultural dimensions. We can expect that in future more application of this rich database would be employed in cross-cultural study in different disciplines.

Interpersonal Trust Index

One of the independent indexes that have been extracted from World Value Survey is interpersonal trust index. This index has been introduced and calculated by Medrano who is the director of the WVS archive and ASEP/JDS data bank (Medrano, 2008b). The index is measured based on the question item of WVS which asks people: "generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?" As it was seen above, trust item was one of the values embedded in survival dimension of Inglehart. Since interpersonal index is a separate and specific indicator to represent the trust between people in different cultures, I will use it as one of the cultural indicators to examine inter-party trust factor (FP9). Countries' score for this index can be found in Appendix 3.

Relation of Cultural Dimension and Democracy in Inglehart Theory

Inglehart (2006) argues that a society's ranking on the survival/self-expression index is strongly correlated with its level of democracy, with the correlation of 0.83. He uses the scores of the Freedom House ratings of political rights and civil liberties as the indicator of formal democracy. But he indicates that the measures by the Freedom House are limited because they "only measure the extent to which civil and political liberties are institutionalized, which does not necessarily reflect the extent to which these liberties are actually respected by political elites" (Inglehart, 2006, p. 131).

Distinguishing the difference between formal and practiced democracies, he defines the term "effective democracy" which reflects not only the extent to which formal civil and political liberties are institutionalized, but also measures the extent to which those are actually practiced. To construct such an index of effective democracy, the Freedom House measures of civil and political rights are multiplied by the World Bank's anti-corruption scores which can be seen as an indicator of "elite integrity" or the extent to which state power actually follows legal norms (Inglehart, 2006). When Inglehart examines the linkage between this measure of effective democracy and mass self-expression values, an amazingly strong correlation of $r = .90$ across 73 nations was found (Inglehart, 2006).

In the previous chapter, I claimed that cultural values and political structure can be unrelated and we should not assume a certain causality relationship between them. But the linkage that Inglehart has found between democracy and a cultural dimension may seem as a refutation of my claim. On the contrary, some findings from the analysis of the linkage between mass self-expression values and democratic structure endorse my claim. As can be seen in Figure 6, there are some outlier countries that show lower levels of democracy than what their publics' values of self-expression would predict (like Iran and China). These findings can lend weight to my claim that established political system cannot necessarily be representative of cultural values of a society. In order to explain these discrepancies, Inglehart mentions that countries like China, Iran and Vietnam have authoritarian regimes that are under societal pressure to become democratized and he anticipates that these nations will be liberated within the next 15 to 20 years! (Inglehart, 2006) In next chapter, I will investigate political indicators revealing the same fact to the some extent.




Figure 6 : Self-expression values versus effective democracy
Source: (Inglehart, 2006, p. 132)

3-4-3 Challenges about WVS Data

There are some remarks about the shortcomings of the WVS methodology. Littrell pointed out that the WVS data and samples indicate a selection bias toward the more highly educated. Moreover, it is said that higher than expected level of extreme responding in Latin America is also observed. In addition, it is claimed that a negative association between education and acquiescent response style has been widely reported in research, and the WVS data just show that it is a nearly worldwide phenomenon (Littrell, 2008).

3-5 Schwartz Cultural Value Orientations

Shalom Schwartz is a social psychologist and a cross-cultural researcher. He has a lot of valuable researches and publications on cultural studies across nations. He defines [cultural] values as "conceptions of the desirable that guide the way social actors (e.g. organizational leaders, policy-makers, individual persons) select actions, evaluate people and events, and explain their actions and evaluations" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 24). He points out that in this view, values are trans-situational criteria or goals (e.g. security, hedonism) which are ordered according to their importance by a social actor as guiding principles in life. Moreover, cultural value priorities are likely to be expressed in the ways that societal institutions (e.g. the family, education, economic, political, religious systems) function and define their goals and their modes of operation (Schwartz, 1999). He asserts that the prevailing value emphases in a society may be the most central feature of culture (Schwartz, 2006).

Like Hofstede, Schwartz also acknowledges that cultural value orientations are relatively stable although cultural values do change gradually. He mentions that cultural values emphases would change due to societal adaptation to epidemics, technological advances, wealth growth, contact between cultures and other exogenous factors (Schwartz, 2006).

3-5-1 Methodology of Schwartz Theory

While Hofstede derived his framework empirically, Schwartz developed his framework theoretically. However, he also has empirically examined his frameworks using large-scale multi-country samples. Schwartz, like other cross-cultural scientists, found greater cultural differences between countries than within countries, suggesting the frameworks could be used to compare countries (Ng, Lee, & Soutar, 2007).

Contrary to the method of inferring basic value priorities from responses to specific attitude and opinion items (what Inglehart did for instance), Schwartz used his own survey (Schwartz Value Survey(SVS)) that includes 56 value items to operationalize the values priorities of individuals. In SVS questionnaire, these abstract items (e.g., social justice, humility, creativity, social order, pleasure, ambition) are each explained in parenthesis by a phrase that further specifies their meaning. Respondents are asked to rate the importance of each "as a guiding principle in MY life" (Schwartz, 2006).

Schwartz used the "multidimensional scaling (MDS) technique" and "multivariate technique of smallest-space analysis" which is an alternative to factor analysis. This analysis produces two dimensional maps of positions of the values relative to each other (Hofstede, 2001). In Figure 7, a circular map of cultural level values, calculated from SVS, can be seen.

Unlike Hofstede and Inglehart who conceptualized their dimensions as independent and orthogonal factors, Schwartz considers interrelation of cultural value orientation based on compatibility among them. He mentions that the shared and opposing assumptions inherent in cultural values generate a coherent circular structure of relation among them. Such a structure reflects cultural orientations (or dimensions) which are compatible (adjacent in the circle) or incompatible (distant around the circle) (Schwartz, 2006). This perspective of cultural dimensions, forming an integrated and non-orthogonal system, distinguishes his approach from other cross-cultural scientists.




Figure 7: Map of cultural dimensions and included values for 70 cultural groups using MDS technique

Source: (Schwartz, 2006)

In order to extract national culture, he needed to choose a similar target group of people from all countries. Although no single occupational group represents a culture, he argues that school teachers may have a number of advantages for characterizing national value priorities. "As a group, they play an explicit role in value socialization, they are presumably key carriers of culture, and they probably reflect the mid-range of prevailing value priorities in most societies" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 34). Focusing on this single matched group, he asserted that a relatively pure representation of national differences in value priorities was obtained.

To test the robustness of conclusions from the teacher samples, he performed parallel analyses with data from samples of college students, from a wide variety of majors, in each of 40 nations. Interestingly, two independent sets of samples—teachers and students—yield almost identical mappings of world cultures. Schwartz reveals that the finding lends considerable legitimacy to the claim that the approach adopted by him accurately captures important aspects of cultural differences among nations and broader regions (Schwartz, 1999).

There is an important question that how the cultural values can be extracted from individual answers. It is argued that individual value priorities are a mixture of shared culture and of unique personal experience. Consequently, members of each cultural group share many values. Therefore, the average priorities attributed to different values by members of a society reflect the essence of their shared culture and reveal the underlying common cultural values (Schwartz, 1999). Finally, like Hofstede and Inglehart, he reaches to the cultural value orientations that characterize societies through averaging the value priorities of individuals in matched samples from each society (Schwartz, 2006).

3-5-2 Schwartz Cultural Value Types or Dimensions

We mentioned that Schwartz method to find cultural dimensions is based on the priorities of values in a society. It is important to first understand the conceptualization of basic values in his theory. He considers the following six features for basic values:"

(1) **Values are beliefs** that are linked inextricably to affect.

- (2) **Values refer to desirable goals** that motivate action.
- (3) **Values transcend specific actions and situations** (e.g., obedience and honesty are values that are relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family, friends, or strangers). This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations.
- (4) **Values serve as standards or criteria** that guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, people, and events.
- (5) **Values are ordered by importance** relative to one another to form a system of priorities. This hierarchical feature also distinguishes values from norms and attitudes.
- (6) **The relative importance of values guides action.** The tradeoff among relevant, competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors" (Schwartz, 2006, p. 143).

Considering three important issues that confront all societies, Schwartz derives seven types of cultural values. In the following we study each issue and associated types of values:

Issue I. Defining the nature of the relation between the individual and the group is the first basic issue confronting all societies. This is the same dimension labeled individualism–collectivism by Hofstede. The contrast of individualism–collectivism (or other similar concepts like independence–interdependence, autonomy–relatedness) include two major themes: (1) whose interests should take priority, the individual's or the group's? (2) to what extent are persons autonomous versus embedded in their groups? (Schwartz, 1999). This issue makes two dimensional poles which are defined as follows:

Conservatism: "A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order (social order, respect for tradition, security, obedience, wisdom)" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 27). This dimension was later renamed to **Embeddedness** in which people are viewed as entities embedded in the collectivity (Schwartz, 2006).

Autonomy: "cultures in which the person is viewed as an autonomous, bounded entity who finds meaning in his or her own uniqueness, who seeks to express his or her own internal attributes (preferences, traits, feelings, motives) and is encouraged to do so. It is possible to distinguish conceptually between two types of autonomy; the first refers to ideas and thought, the second to feelings and emotions.

Intellectual Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions (curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity).

Affective Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience (pleasure, exciting life, varied life)" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 27).

Issue II. Another basic issue that confronts all societies is to guarantee responsible behavior that will preserve the social structure. People must be motivated to consider the welfare of others, coordinate with them, and therefore manage the unavoidable social interdependencies (Schwartz, 1999). Two dimensional poles resolve this issue as follows:

Hierarchy: "A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (social power, authority, humility, wealth).

Egalitarianism: A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others (equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty)" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 28).

Issue III. The third basic issue that faces all societies is the relation of human beings to the natural and social world. One response is to master and change the world, assert control, bend it to our will and exploit it in order to further personal or group interests whereas the opposite one is to accept the world as it is, trying to fit in rather than to change or exploit it (Schwartz, 1999). Therefore, two dimensional poles are defined as:

Mastery: "A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion (ambition, success, daring, competence).

Harmony: A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment (unity with nature, protecting the environment, world of beauty)" (Schwartz, 1999, p. 28).

These seven value types in turn can form three bipolar cultural dimensions:

- 1- Autonomy versus Conservatism (Embeddedness)
- 2- Hierarchy versus Egalitarianism
- 3- Mastery versus Harmony

Table 14: Schwartz basic values corresponding to cultural level dimensions

Source: (Schwartz, 1999, 2009)

Bipolar Cultural Dimensions			
Cultural Dimension	Related Basic Values	Cultural Dimension	Related Basic Values
Embeddedness (Conservatism): A cultural emphasis on maintenance of the status quo, propriety, and restraint of actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group or the traditional order	forgiving	Affective Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive experience	a varied life
	wisdom		
	preserving my public image		pleasure
	devout		self-indulgent
	respect for tradition		an exciting life
	moderate		
	politeness		enjoying life
	obedient		
	self-discipline		
	honoring parents and elders	Intellectual Autonomy: A cultural emphasis on the desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own ideas and intellectual directions	broad-minded
	family security		freedom
	national security		creativity
	social order		
	clean		curious
	reciprocation of favors		
Hierarchy: A cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an unequal distribution of power, roles and resources	humble	Egalitarianism: A cultural emphasis on transcendence of selfish interests in favor of voluntary commitment to promoting the welfare of others	accepting my portion in life
	authority		equality
	wealth		social justice
			helpful
	social power		honest
			responsible
	influential		loyal
Mastery: A cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active self-assertion	capable	Harmony: A cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into the environment	unity with nature
	ambitious		
	successful		protecting the environment
	daring		
	independent		a world of beauty
	choosing own goals		a world at peace
	social recognition		

Data analysis of Schwartz Value Surveys, in which 45 basic values were rated by respondents in 70 cultural groups, reveals the values embedded in each of the cultural dimension as indicated in Table 14.

Schwartz basic values descriptions are too general which makes it hard to define a precise link between FPs and values, because it is not clear what interpretation of these values should be considered. In other cultural studies, there are questions which make the interpretation of the item easier and more convergent whereas it is not the case in Schwartz value survey.

However, similar to what I did for previous cultural theories, among basic values of each dimension, I select and list those values which to my judgment are conceptually related to factors of participation (FP). These value items and their short description are listed in Table 15. I think that emphasis and weight of each value in a national culture can affect people's attitude toward participation.

Surprisingly, I understood through studying the relation between cultural values and factors of participation that among basic values of SVS, there is no value representing "trust", which is an important attribute of individuals - and the culture as well - in social relationship.

Table 15: List of values of Schwartz Value Survey and relevant FPs

Source of values: (Schwartz, 2009)

Dimension	Basic Values Affecting Participation	Relevant FP
Embeddedness	MODERATE (avoiding extremes of feeling & action)	FP11
	HONOURING OF PARENTS AND ELDERS (showing respect)	FP11
	PRESERVING MY PUBLIC IMAGE (protecting my "face")	FP10
	OBEDIENT (dutiful, meeting obligations)	FP11
	FORGIVING (willing to pardon others)	FP13
Affective Autonomy	AN EXCITING LIFE (stimulating experiences)	FP7
	A VARIED LIFE (filled with challenge, novelty and change)	FP7
Intellectual Autonomy	BROADMINDED (tolerant of different ideas and beliefs)	FP4,FP2
	CURIOUS (interested in everything, exploring)	FP3,FP10
Hierarchy	SOCIAL POWER (control over others, dominance)	FP4,FP2
	AUTHORITY (the right to lead or command)	FP4,FP2
	HUMBLE (modest, self-effacing)	FP10
Egalitarianism	EQUALITY (equal opportunity for all)	FP2,FP4,FP5
	SOCIAL JUSTICE (correcting injustice, care for the weak)	FP4
	LOYAL (faithful to my friends, group)	FP6
	HELPFUL (working for the welfare of others)	FP3,FP6
Mastery	SOCIAL RECOGNITION (respect, approval by others)	FP10
	INDEPENDENT (self-reliant, self-sufficient)	FP10
	CAPABLE (competent, effective, efficient)	FP12
	SUCCESSFUL (achieving goals)	FP12
Harmony	A WORLD AT PEACE (free of war and conflict)	FP13

3-5-3 Challenges about Schwartz Theory

About Schwartz cultural scores, it is said that some of his country ranking are not sensible and made puzzlement for scientists. For instance, it is claimed that "the Affective Autonomy scale, which includes the values "Enjoying life," "Pleasure," "Exciting life," and "Varied life," finds East Germany scoring the 3rd highest out of 38 countries and Italy scoring the 2nd lowest. The Conservatism Scale, consisting of such values as "Honoring elders," "Politeness," "Self-discipline," and "Clean," finds the United States ranking ahead of Japan. In addition, the Mastery Scale, consisting of such values as "Choosing own goals," "Independent," and "Daring," finds Chinese samples endorsing these more than any other culture in the world" (Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholz, 2002, p. 907). Hence, it seems that these scores may not satisfy the face validity according to some recognized stereotypes of these countries.

3-6 Cultural Study of GLOBE Project

GLOBE (Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness) is a multi-phase, multi-method project in which a worldwide network of researchers is examining the interrelationships between societal culture, organizational culture, and organizational leadership. More than one hundred and fifty social scientists and management scholars from 61 cultures, representing all major regions of the world, are involved in this long-term programmatic series of cross-cultural studies which began officially in 1993 (House, Javidan, & Dorfman, 2001). This project is one such effort to answer two fundamental questions: first, in what way are human communities different or similar? Second, why? GLOBE intends to explore the cultural values and practices in a wide diversity of countries, and to identify their impact on organizational practices and leadership attributes (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002).

GLOBE project conducted surveys in 62 societies among 15427 middle managers respondents from two or three types of industries (financial, food processing and telecommunication). The number of respondents by country ranged from 27 to 1790 with an average per country of 251 respondents (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).

The GLOBE research program defines culture as "shared motives, values, beliefs, identities, and interpretations or meanings of significant events that result from common experiences of members of collectives and are transmitted across age generations"(House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p. 5).

In order to measure culture, GLOBE project distinguishes between cultural values and cultural practices. They explain the differences between these two and justify it as follows:

"The common cultural attributes we have chosen to measure are indicators of shared modal values of collectives. These values are expressed in response to questionnaire items in the form of judgments of What Should Be. Emphasis on values grows out of an anthropological tradition of culture assessment. Another measure of culture, modal practices, is measured by indicators assessing What Is, or What Are, common behaviors, institutional practices, proscriptions and prescriptions. This approach to the assessment of culture grows out of a psychological/behavioral tradition, in which it is assumed that shared values are enacted in behaviors, policies, and practices. This assumption will be tested as part of Project GLOBE" (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, p. 5).

It is claimed that one of the important consequences of distinction between values and practices in GLOBE project is the finding that each one is related to important, but distinct, phenomena. For instance, reported cultural practices (but not values) are associated with a large variety of societal phenomena such as economic and societal health, national competitiveness, life expectancy, and the Human Development Index. On the other hand, reported cultural values (and not practices) are associated with reported attributes of outstanding leadership across GLOBE countries (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).

3-6-1 Methodology and Saliencies of GLOBE Project

The research by GLOBE is claimed to be theory-driven in which they first specified the general nature of the constructs that they wanted to measure before writing cultural items for each dimension or developing GLOBE scales. This critical step determines how the questionnaire items should be written and what kinds of statistical analysis should be

performed to assess the adequacy of the scales (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).

The methodology used in GLOBE project to measure cultural dimensions entailed two major innovations:

Firstly, in an attempt to resolve the logical problems inherent in aggregation of individual-level self reports, GLOBE respondents were asked to give ratings that described not themselves but their society. Therefore, the aggregation of respondents' ratings to higher levels is not implicitly defining culture as the aggregate of individuals' self ratings but as the aggregate of their perceptions of others as a social group (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006; Smith, 2005).

Secondly, as it is mentioned before, respondents completed two sets of ratings, one describing their society "as it is" to measure practices and second, "as it should be" to measure values of a society (Smith, 2005). GLOBE projects indicates that in this way they were able to empirically assess the widespread but never tested assumption that cultural values drive cultural practices. As said before, the concept of relationship between culture, values and practices is visualized by Hofstede as the "Onion Diagram" (Hofstede, 2001, p. 11). The statistical analysis of GLOBE's data shows that there is a negative correlation between cultural values and practices. Javidan argues that a plausible explanation for this negative correlations can be that the onion assumption is too simplistic to be helpful (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).

Furthermore, one of the issues in cross-cultural studies is that whether wealth influence must be removed from cultural-level analyses or not. The GLOBE researchers believe that wealth is complexly interconnected with many factors to be studied and can be neither discarded nor treated as a proxy for other aspects of culture. But GLOBE team, contrary to Hofstede, thinks that it is not wise to conclude that national wealth is an antecedent of culture but instead they believe that the relation between national culture and economic growth can be co-evolutionary. Javidan argued that the relationships among wealth and national culture are so intertwined that they cannot be easily isolated, and thus cause and effect relationships, although intuitively appealing, are hard to verify empirically. He indicates, for instance, a society with the performance oriented culture can prosper and as a result can better educate its people who will contribute more to their societies (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).

3-6-2 GLOBE Cultural Dimensions

Nine cultural dimensions are studied in GLOBE project which are labeled and described as follows:

- "1. *Uncertainty Avoidance* is defined as the extent to which members of an organization or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance on social norms, rituals, and bureaucratic practices to alleviate the unpredictability of future events.
2. *Power Distance* is defined as the degree to which members of an organization or society expect and agree that power should be unequally shared.
3. *Societal Collectivism* reflects the degree to which organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective distribution of resources and collective action.
4. *In-Group Collectivism* reflects the degree to which individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or families.
5. *Gender Egalitarianism* is the extent to which an organization or a society minimizes gender role differences and gender discrimination.
6. *Assertiveness* is the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships.

7. *Future Orientation* is the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying gratification.

8. *Performance Orientation* refers to the extent to which an organization or society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement and excellence.

9. *Humane Orientation* is the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies encourage and reward individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind to others" (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002, pp. 5-6).

These cultural dimensions were measured separately for values and practices and their scores for each country has been calculated and tabulated in the GLOBE book and can be found in Appendix 3. (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004).

Likewise Hofstede dimensions, some values, attitudes and behaviors are associated with each of GLOBE's cultural dimensions. These features are numerous and can be found in GLOBE book. In Table 16 we list some of those features, for each dimension, that are relevant to factors of participation (FP).

Table 16: Expected values, attitudes and behaviors in societies with high or low score in each GLOBE's cultural dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004)

High Score in	Low Score in	Relevant FP
Uncertainty Avoidance		
Show stronger resistance to change	Show less resistance to change	FP7
Be orderly	Be less concerned with orderliness	FP7
Document agreements in legal contacts	Rely on the word of others; they trust rather than contractual arrangements	FP7, FP9
Have a tendency toward formalizing their interactions with others	Have a tendency to be more informal in their interactions with others	FP9, FP10
Power Distance		
Information is localized	Information is shared	FP2
Different groups have different involvement and democracy does not ensure equal opportunities	All the groups enjoy equal involvement and democracy ensures parity in opportunities and development for all	FP2
Followers accepted and are expected to obey without question	Followers accepted and are expected to question when in disagreement	FP3, FP11
Rank and position in the hierarchy have special privileges	Rank and position in the hierarchy have no special privileges	FP11
Societal Collectivism		
Individuals are likely to engage in group activities	Individuals are likely to engage activities alone	FP3
People emphasize relatedness with groups	People emphasize rationality	FP3, FP6
Group goals take precedence over individual goals	Individual goals take precedence over group goals	FP6
In-Group Collectivism		
Communication is indirect	Communication is direct	FP10
Individuals have fewer social interactions but interactions tend to be longer and more intimate	Individuals have more social interactions but interactions tend to be shorter and less intimate	FP10
Individuals make great distinction between in-groups and out-groups	Individuals make fewer distinction between in-groups and out-groups	FP10
Gender Egalitarianism		
Afford women a greater role in community decision making	Afford women no or smaller role in community decision making	FP5
Assertiveness		
Have sympathy for the strong	Have sympathy for the weak	FP4
Act and think of others as opportunistic	Think of others as inherently worthy of trust	FP9
Value direct, explicit and unambiguous communication	Speak indirectly, ambiguous-emphasis face-saving	FP10
Value expressiveness and revealing thoughts and feelings	Value detached and self-possessed conduct	FP10
Stress competition and dominance	Stress solidarity and cooperation	FP13
Future Orientation		
Planning for the future; value long-term success	Solving current problem; value immediate reward	FP8
Performance Orientation		
View feedback as necessary for improvement	View feedback and appraisal as judgmental and discomforting	FP11
Value what you do more than who you are	Value who you are more than what you do	FP11
Attach little importance to age in promotional decisions	Pay attention to age in promotional decisions	FP11
Emphasizing result more than people	Emphasize seniority and experience	FP12
Value and reward, assertiveness, competitiveness and individual achievements	View assertiveness as socially unacceptable and have high value for sympathy	FP12
Humane Orientation		
Others are important	Self-interest is important	FP6
Members of society are responsible for promoting well-being of others: the state is not actively involved	The state provide social and economic support for individual's well-being	FP6
People are urged to provide social support to each other	People are expected to solve personal problems on their own	FP6

The interesting and also confusing finding about the GLOBE project is that the correlation between the cultural values and cultural practices is negative for most of dimensions. These surprising correlations have been explained by Javidan (2006) based on the fact that societies which are deprived of a value are more vigorously in pursuit of it ; and conversely, nations that enjoy a value adequately, like to keep it and even they might be saturated and want to moderate it. In Figure 8 the average scores of practices and values for societies in different quartiles are shown and the argument by Javidan to explain the differences between these two can be seen as well.

	Quartile 1	Quartile 2	Quartile 3	Quartile 4	Interpretation
Uncertainty avoidance	5.01 3.99 -1.02	4.30 4.72 0.42	3.89 4.83 0.94	3.46 4.95 1.49	Societies in 1st quartile of practices have desire for less UA, 4th quartile societies desire more UA
Future orientation	4.46 5.12 0.66	3.99 5.53 1.54	3.67 5.65 1.98	3.27 5.63 2.36	Societies in 1st quartile of practices have less strong upward aspirations for FO than societies in 4th quartile
Power distance	5.80 2.69 -3.11	5.47 2.64 -2.83	5.18 3.09 -2.09	4.89 2.19 -2.70	All societies have downward aspirations for PD, strongest is for 1st quartile. Asymmetrical relationships exist among quartiles
Institutional collectivism	4.78 4.48 -0.30	4.42 4.48 0.06	4.06 4.77 0.71	3.73 5.21 1.48	Societies in 4th quartile of practices have strongest upward aspirations for IC
Humane orientation	4.71 5.32 0.61	4.23 5.40 1.17	3.90 5.46 1.56	3.51 5.53 2.02	Societies in lowest quartiles have strongest upward aspirations for HO
Performance orientation	4.62 5.79 1.17	4.24 5.95 1.71	3.97 5.96 1.99	3.56 6.08 2.52	All societies aspire to be more PO. Those in 4th quartile have strongest upward aspirations for PO.
In-group collectivism	5.87 5.72 -0.15	5.55 5.79 0.24	5.04 5.55 0.51	4.04 5.62 1.58	Societies in lower quartiles have upward aspirations for in-group collectivism, but societies in 1st quartile are content with current levels
Gender egalitarianism	3.83 4.72 0.89	3.54 4.52 0.98	3.21 4.61 1.40	2.90 4.21 1.31	All Societies desire more GE, 1st quartile societies have least strongest upward aspirations for GE while those in 4th quartile have most upward aspirations
Assertiveness	4.63 3.51 -1.12	4.27 3.65 -0.62	3.99 4.14 0.15	3.66 3.99 0.33	Societies in highest quartiles have moderate downward aspirations for Assertiveness

Top line in each row=average As Is, middle line=average Should Be, bottom line=difference between average Should Be and average As Is).

Figure 8: Average practices and values scores for societies in different quartiles and the interpretation of their differences

Source: (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006, p. 902)

Now, an important question arises that between two types of cultural dimensions (values or practices) which should be employed. GLOBE advises that it depends entirely on the research question of interest. They discuss in the GLOBE book that values are more related to something like conception of effective leadership while practices are more relevant for societal phenomena (Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006).

3-6-3 Challenges of the GLOBE Study

There are some weak points about the GLOBE study. A main limitation is its relatively small number of samples, with an average of only 250 respondents per culture, which can be inadequate for describing societal values and practices (Terlutter, Diehl, & Mueller, 2006). The previously discussed theories (Hofstede, Inglehart, Schwartz) are all based on significantly larger number of samples.

Another major limitation is that respondents were middle managers in companies and this class of people cannot be representative of a whole nation. the same critique applies to Hofstede and Schwartz study as well (Terlutter, Diehl, & Mueller, 2006).

Moreover, GLOBE dimensions are reprehended since some of them are significantly inter-correlated and, so, they can be considered very similar facets of one dimension (Minkov, 2007). For instance, the correlation between GLOBE's uncertainty avoidance and future orientation is 0.76 for practices and 0.67 for values.

On the other hand, there is also criticism of the way of operationalization of values by GLOBE project. Hofstede put forth that it is not logical to understand someone's values in terms of preference about the behavior of others in one's society. He mentions that these two do not coincide necessarily because, for instance, if I want to be powerful, it does not mean that I should want others to be powerful or if I can accept risk it does not follow that I shall want others to do the same. Therefore, it is argued that the GLOBE values measures may have no logical linkage with other measures of values, done by Schwartz and Inglehart (Smith, 2006).

However, I think that extracting the cultural features of a society by asking an individual to judge about others have advantages especially for measuring cultural practices. Usually people do not like to judge themselves in a negative way even though they respond anonymously. But, when they suppose to evaluate other people and their society, they feel more relaxed to tell the real practices and behaviors, especially negative ones. Yet, it seems justified that GLOBE's cultural values (should be) cannot be comparable with the values measured by others whereas cultural practices (as is) can be indeed.

3-7 Minkov Cultural Study

Michael Minkov is a fresh researcher on cross-cultural studies. He has recently published his book and introduced three cultural dimensions through which he wanted to present "what makes us different and similar" (Minkov, 2007). He is a disciple of Hofstede and co-author of the latest version of his book as well.

He points out that according to some estimations, cultural clashes is responsible for up to one third of failures in international business initiatives. On the other hand, in many international conflicts, the differences are ascribed only to different types of leadership, political systems or religions. These misassumptions create the false perception that if a dictator were deposed or a regime changed, people's values and behaviors could be altered drastically by a short period (Minkov, 2007). This naivety would result in many harsh consequences in many parts of the world.

Minkov declares that "people who have lived in one and the same society for a long time often have very similar values even when they belong to different religions. Inversely, the followers of one nominally identical religion can differ greatly in their values and behaviors" (Minkov, 2007, p. 5).

From his point of view, cultural values have two similarities with religion values: first, they do not have a shared universal rationale. Many of these values are deeply rooted in the human psyche and can hardly change when they become ossified from relatively young age. Second, just like religious conversion, cultural transformation does occur in individual and is often painful. Most people are more comfortable holding the values that they grew up with

(Minkov, 2007, p. 6). Some important cultural transformations occur but only as a result of changes in the environment like change in a nation's enrichment and technological adaptation (Minkov, 2007).

Moreover, he believes that the rationality of cultural values is culture-specific. We cannot call some values irrational on the ground that they are not compatible to our framework of logic. As Hofstede puts it, rationality betrays nationality, and the other way around. For many reasons, what is right, acceptable, logical and rational in one culture may be considered just the opposite in another (Minkov, 2007).

When we say that a particular social phenomenon has a cultural component, what we have in mind is a durable pattern in the thinking and behavior of a particular human population, shared by many, but not all, of its members (Minkov, 2007, p. 13). In some western culture, people are suspicious of the notion of "shared culture". For instance when someone asked Americans who a typical of US culture is, they said that everybody is different and there is nothing typical (Minkov, 2007). However, Minkov warns that in any cross-cultural studies we should beware of overgeneralization and stereotyping.

3-7-1 Methodology of Minkov Cultural Study

Minkov asserts that dimensions of culture do not exist in any objective sense. He mentions that cultural dimensions are human construct to explain societal phenomena. A dimension is underpinned by a group of values or attributes which usually go together. Therefore, different grouping of cultural attributes by different scientists can make different cultural dimensions and, thus, we should identify which grouping clarifies the particular contrasts that interest us (Minkov, 2007; Smith, 2008).

Similar to GLOBE project, Minkov used "theory-driven approach" to find two dimensions of his theory. A researcher defines some items which seem to capture the dimension that he/she is interested in. Then, in the factor analysis, the items which were chosen selectively would be examined to see whether the theory predicts items properly (Minkov, 2007).

He defines three cultural dimensions based on World Value Survey (WVS) data. He indicates that his model does not account for all existing cross-cultural differences and for instance he does not address issues related to so-called power distance because he believes that Hofstede extensively and convincingly treated it (Minkov, 2007).

Furthermore, Minkov uses a lot of anecdotes in each section of his book as illustrations to verify his claims about the different cultural traits in various nations.

3-7-2 Minkov Cultural Dimensions

Minkov defined three cultural dimensions: Exclusionism versus Universalism, Indulgence versus Restraint, Monumentalism versus Flexumility (Flexibility and Humility). In this section we study these dimensions and find correlated values which are influential on factors of participation.

Exclusionism versus Universalism (Collectivism vs. Individualism)

Exclusionism is defined as "the cultural tendency to treat people on the basis of their group affiliation and reserve favors, services, privileges, and sacrifices for friends, relatives or other groups that one identifies with while excluding outside from the circle of those who deserve such privileged treatment. While exclusionist often strives to achieve harmony and good relationships within their own group, they may be quite indifferent, inconsiderate, rude, and sometimes even hostile, toward members of other groups. Universalism is the opposite cultural tendency: treating people primarily on the basis of who they are as individuals and disregarding their group affiliation" (Minkov, 2007, p. 101). Minkov uses also the terms Individualism and Collectivism to show pattern of treatment of people as individuals or on the basis of their group membership. He does not refer to tendencies of doing things

individually or in groups and not also feeling of personal independence versus group dependence.

However, he declares that with this cultural dimension he wants to contrast some of the main cultural values and practices of the west with the rest (Minkov, 2007). The items from WVS that have been used by Minkov to extract this dimension are: A025, D018, D019, A125, and A035 (World Value Survey, 2009).

In Table 17, some prominent cultural features of Exclusionism/Universalism dimension which are related to the concept of participation are listed and the relevant FP is indicated as well.

Table 17: Features related to Exclusionism/Universalism dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (Minkov, 2007)

Salient Features of Exclusionism (Collectivism)	Salient Features of Universalism (Individualism)	Relevant FP
Less gender egalitarianism	More gender egalitarianism	FP5
Less trust to people (out-groups)	More trust to people	FP9
Oblique and implicit communication	Direct and explicit communication	FP10
Sharp distinctions between in-groups (relatives and friends) and out-groups (stranger and distance acquaintance)	Blurred distinction between in-groups and out-groups	FP10
Introverted; communicate less with out-group members	Extroverted; communicate much with out-group members	FP10

Indulgence versus Restraint

Indulgence is defined as "a tendency to allow relatively free gratification of some desire and feelings, especially those that have to do with leisure, merrymaking with friends, spending and consumption, casual sex and sexual networking. Indulgence results in a greater incidence of some types of impulsive violent crime, especially rape and assault. In the rich world, it also predicts higher illegal substance abuse. Indulgence tends to boost happiness and create a perception of freedom, health and control over life. Cultural restraint stands for the tendency to curb the gratification of the above mentioned desire and feelings. It depressed happiness and the perception that life events can be controlled and makes people feel relatively unhappy" (Minkov, 2007, p. 149).

In cultures where people have the feeling that their actions are limited by different social norms and prohibitions, and they are brought up to think that enjoyment of leisurely activities and spending are somewhat wrong, there is not much happiness. Whereas freedom of action is preferred to government intervention, even in spite of income inequality in some Latin Americans and African countries, we can see more happiness and indulgence scores of such countries. Also indulgent cultures tend to have less red tape than the restrictive societies. Moreover, in indulgent cultures the work-versus-leisure balance is tilted toward leisure than in restrictive cultures (Minkov, 2007). In Table 18, prominent cultural features of Indulgence/Restraint dimension which are related to the concept of participation are listed and the relevant FP is indicated as well.

Table 18: Features related to Indulgence/Restraint dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (Minkov, 2007)

Salient Features of Indulgence	Salient Features of Restraint	Relevant FP
A feeling of personal freedom and life control	A feeling that one's freedom of action is severely restrained by various social norms	FP7
Leisure are very important	Leisure are not very important	FP7

Monumentalism versus Flexumility

Monumentalism dimension "stands for pride and high self-regard, demonstration of status and generosity with money, favors and services, a willingness to show superiority through interpersonal competition, avoidance of dialectical feelings and thoughts, consistency between feelings and their outward expression, and acceptance of one right set of norms and beliefs imposed by people in authority, including greater religiousness. One of the results of this combination is poor achievement in self-improvement activities that require persistence. Cultures at the opposite end of this dimension (flexumility) are characterized by the opposite characteristics" (Minkov, 2007, p. 204). Table 19 shows some cultural features of Monumentalism/Flexumility dimension which are related to the concept of participation and the relevant FP is indicated as well.

Table 19: Features related to Monumentalism/Flexumility dimension and relevant FPs

Source: (Minkov, 2007)

Salient Features of Monumentalism	Salient Features of Flexumility	Relevant FP
Pride and higher self-regards	Humility and lower self-regard	FP10
Uncritically obedience to authority	Less respect for authority	FP11
personal superiority and interpersonal competitions	Cooperation and equality	FP13
Immutable values and beliefs; Absolutist thinking	Flexible values and beliefs; Dialectical thinking	FP13

The scores of these cultural dimensions for almost 70 countries are calculated and listed in Minkov's Book (2007).

3-7-3 Challenges of Minkov Cultural Theory

The emphasis on describing differences between West and the rest of the world (Minkov, 2007, pp. 50 , 58) is the main purpose of Minkov's first dimension. , This emphasis, from my perspective, has negatively impacted his interpretations. It seems that in spite of Minkov non-western uprising, he has been captivated by the "West". In the summary list of features of cultural dimensions, he put all the negative features for exclusionism (collectivism) which he claims is a non-western culture. I think features that he attached to exclusionist (collectivist) cultures, sometimes even cannot satisfy a face validity standard. For instance, he claimed that "stronger and more overt racism" is a salient feature of exclusionist (collectivist) culture and is rare in western societies. If I want to use an anecdote like what he does frequently in his book, I can point out the motto of European football champions in 2008 which was "United against Racism". It means that there were some symptoms of racism in European countries that the advice of anti-racism concept became a necessity. Neo-Nazism is still a challenge in Germany with a universalistic (individualist) culture. However, it is completely understandable that in poor and uneducated exclusionist societies, disastrous racial war and massacre are rampant but it can be explained more by the situational factor of poverty and illiteracy rather than cultural dimension of collectivism. Moreover, the bias against nonwestern societies shows itself in the list of cultural features for exclusionism in which there is no positive consequences for this cultural orientation. Even though he argues in a part of his book that collectivism has a protective effect against illegal substance abuse (Minkov, 2007, p. 94), this positive feature was not mentioned in the summary list of salient features of collectivism!!

Furthermore, he does not explain convincingly about the ranking of some countries like Japan and South Korea since they are located in exclusionist culture but have many positive features of so-called western countries. They enjoy high quality of life and do not suffer from many negative features of exclusionism. In conclusion, I think that many situational factors are considered cultural attributes in Minkov theory which can be misleading.

3-8 Comparison of Cultural Dimensions in Different Theories

In the prior sections we reviewed five cross-cultural theories and many cultural dimensions. A summary of some general information of these five theories can be found in Table 20.

Table 20: The summary of general information about five cross-cultural theories

Cross-Cultural Theory	Respondents Class	Date of Data Collection	Number of Respondents	Number of Nations/Countries	Methodology
Hofstede	IBM employees	1968-1972	116000	53 (More than 80 in latest version)	Questionnaire (factor analysis)
WVS: Inglehart	Representative of all classes	1981-1984	25000	20	Face to face interviews (factor analysis)
		1989-1993	61000	42	
		1994-1998	75000	52	
		1999-2004	96000	67	
		2005-2008	77000 (257000 aggregated)	54 (80 aggregated in four waves)	
Schwartz	Teachers and Students	1988 -2005	43000	73	Questionnaire (smallest-space analysis)
GLOBE	Middle managers	1995-1999	15400	62	Questionnaire (factor analysis)
Minkov	Using data of WVS			50 -70	factor analysis

Now, there is a question that what is the interrelation of these many dimensions and to what extent they are correlated or independent. In this section I show the relation between different cultural dimensions by means of studying correlations between them.

In many literatures, aforementioned cultural dimensions are compared and their correlations are discussed (Hofstede, 2001; House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002; Inglehart, 2006; Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006; Littrell, 2008; Minkov, 2007; Ng, Lee, & Soutar, 2007; Schwartz, 2006; Smith, 2005). If I want to explain the correlation and differences between several dimensions of each theory, it needs a lot of text. Instead I have just made a table to show the statistical correlation between all various dimensions of these five theories. I am sure that the numbers in Table 21 can talk and reveal a lot about interrelations of cultural dimensions. However, I just indicate some major points in brief about the relations between distinguished cultural dimensions.

Due to the fact that Hofstede's cultural dimensions are the first ones in this paradigm, normally all succeeding theories would study the correlation between their cultural dimensions and Hofstede's.

Inglehart indicates that self-expression values are defined in very similar terms to Hofstede's emphasis on personal autonomy and self-fulfillment as core elements of individualism (Inglehart, 2006, p. 125). Obviously we can see high correlation of 0.74 between self-expression dimension and individualism. Moreover, Inglehart argues that intellectual autonomy and affective autonomy from Schwartz dimensions have the same essence of self-expression values. In fact all of these variables reflect the tendency to free choice (Inglehart, 2006). However, the correlation of self-expression dimension with Schwartz autonomy (aggregation of both affective and intellectual autonomy ~0.60) is not as strong as with Hofstede's. Even we can see in Table 21 that there is another Schwartz dimension which has higher correlation with self-expression than autonomy dimensions (egalitarianism with 0.72). As I argue before, It can be due to the fact that survival/self-expression dimension consists of broad and diversified values and entails some situational factors as well. Schwartz (2006) also argues that his harmony/mastery dimension have almost low correlation with Inglehart dimensions. The reason is that harmony/mastery is the only cultural dimension not

strongly related to socio-economic development and that is why Inglehart survival/self-expression dimension cannot explain it.

Moreover, Inglehart traditional/secular-rational dimension also has overlap with Schwartz autonomy/embeddedness dimension. Interestingly, although there is a significant correlation between these two, they array nations somewhat differently. For instance, Bulgaria, China, and Estonia rank in the low 10% on tradition/secular-rational (that is, they are all secular) but in the bottom third on autonomy/embeddedness. In fact, while the autonomy/embeddedness dimension gives less weight to religious faith, the centrality of religion in the Inglehart index may explain this difference in country locations on the two dimensions. Their high secular-rational rankings may be due to a breakdown of religious faith and absolute standards of traditional morality during decades of communist rule. At the same time, the low scores on autonomy/embeddedness suggest that the culture still stresses finding meaning through ties to the in-group (Schwartz, 2006, p. 150).

About the comparison of Hofstede and Schwartz dimensions, there are significant correlations between individualism/collectivism dimension and most of Schwartz dimensions. Also power distance dimension have correlation with conservatism and affective autonomy. But it appears that Schwartz egalitarianism and harmony dimensions have elements that are not captured by Hofstede's dimensions (Ng, Lee, & Soutar, 2007).

Considering the relation between GLOBE cultural dimensions and Hofstede's, beforehand we expect to have high correlation between some of them since six cultural dimensions in GLOBE project have their origin in Hofstede's dimensions (House, Javidan, Hanges, & Dorfman, 2002). Nevertheless, we see that there is no significant correlation between GLOBE's cultural values and Hofstede dimensions while GLOBE's cultural practices correlate better with them. Hofstede himself argues that measures focused on what "should be" can represent abstract sense of "desirable" rather than our more pragmatic preferences for what we "desire" to achieve on a day-to-day basis. That is why we see rather modest correlations between GLOBE values scores for nations and the supposedly equivalent scores on dimensions with similar names introduced by Hofstede (Smith, 2005). However, there are some discrepancies between correlations which are presented in GLOBE book and ones that mentioned in papers by Javidan (2006). For instance in the book the correlation between GLOBE assertiveness practices and Hofstede masculinity dimension is 0.42 and significant while in the paper this is 0.29 and insignificant. In Table 21 we insert the correlation between GLOBE's cultural practices and Hofstede's dimensions calculated by Javidan (2006). One of the strange correlations is between Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance and GLOBE uncertainty avoidance practices which is significantly negative (-0.42). When we look at the questions and interpretation of these two in their cultural study, this discrepancy can be understood. Whereas Hofstede's dimension examines how members of society avoid uncertainty and ambiguity by making rules, norms and orderliness, GLOBE's practices dimension asks people to estimate how much rules, norms and orderliness are there in the society. Hence, in the latter people report how much uncertainty avoidance is in the society while in the former people express how much uncertainty avoidance they prefer to be. In this way, we expect that GLOBE uncertainty avoidance values (should be) have the positive correlation with Hofstede dimension and actually they have (0.32) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, p. 140).

On the other hand, it is claimed that the GLOBE values (should be), and not practices, correlate more closely with the Schwartz values dimensions (Smith, 2005). In Table 21 the correlation between these two is mentioned.

Furthermore, the correlations between Minkov's cultural dimensions and others' have been discussed through his book (Minkov, 2007). I gathered these correlations in the table to make it easier for comparison and interpretations.

Table 21: Significant correlations between various cultural dimensions

←	Theory Developer →	Minkov			Hofstede					Schwartz							Inglehart	
	Cultural Dimensions	M1	M2	M3	H1	H2	H3	H4	H5	S1	S2	S3	S4	S5	S6	S7	I1	I2
Minkov	Exclusionism (vs. Universalism) (M1)																	
	Indulgence (vs. Restraint) (M2)																	
	Monumentalism (vs. Flexumility) (M3)	.55	.54															
Hofstede	Individualism (vs. Collectivism) (H1)	-.74		-.46														
	Power Distance (H2)	.73			-.51													
	Uncertainty Avoidance (H3)																	
	Masculinity (vs. Femininity) (H4)																	
	Long (vs. Short) term Orientation (H5)			-.57														
Schwartz	Embededdness (Conservatism) (S1)				-.55													
	Hierarchy (S2)				-.53													
	Mastery (S3)							.53										
	Affective Autonomy (S4)	-.53			.45				-.53									
	Intellectual Autonomy (S5)				.53													
	Egalitarianism (S6)				.49													
	Harmony (S7)						.45											
Inglehart	Traditional/Secular-Rational (I1)	.62	-.47	.95	-.49	.56				.57			-.53	-.60				
	Survival/Self-Expression (I2)	.66	-.61		-.74	.72	.55		-.53	.66	.41		-.55	-.57	-.72			
GLOBE Practices (Values)	Uncertainty Avoidance (G1)	-.59				-.70	-.42 (.32)			(.74)			(-.67)	(-.61)			.55 (-.54)	.78 (-.88)
	Future Orientation (G2)						-.58			(.50)			(-.43)	(-.46)			(-.70)	.61 (-.69)
	Power Distance (G3)					.78		.40										
	Societal collectivism (G4)			-.58														
	In-group Collectivism (G5)	.85			-.82	.52		.44		.66			-.67	-.59				.82
	Performance Orientation (G6)			.52														
	Humane Orientation (G7)						-.48											
	Gender Egalitarianism (G8)	-.55						.58							(.65)			
	Assertiveness (G9)														(-.44)			

Sources: correlation between: Schwartz(1994) and Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001, Exhibit 5.17; Ng, Lee, & Soutar, 2007), Inglehart(1997) and Hofstede (Hofstede, 2001, Exhibit 5.18), Schwartz and GLOBE values (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004, Table 8.8), Hofstede and GLOBE practices(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004; Javidan, House, Dorfman, Hanges, & Sully de Luque, 2006), Inglehart and GLOBE in-group Collectivism practices (Minkov, 2007), Minkov and Hofstede (Littrell, 2008), Inglehart and Schwartz (Schwartz, 2006), Inglehart and GLOBE uncertainty avoidance practices (values) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004 , Table 19.12), Schwartz and GLOBE uncertainty avoidance values (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004`, Table 19.11), Schwartz and GLOBE Collectivism practices (values) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004`, Table 16.9), Schwartz and GLOBE Future Orientation practices (values) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004`, Table 13.10a), Inglehart and GLOBE Future Orientation practices (values) (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004`, Table 13.10b), Minkov and others except Hofstede (Minkov, 2007)

Note: The numbers in parentheses are related to cultural values of GLOBE.

3-9 Summary of Relation between Factors of Participation (FP) and Cultural Dimensions

In the last section of this chapter, I explain which cultural dimensions, from now on, in this study, will be employed. Based on following considerations, a framework of relation between politico-cultural indicators and FPs will be developed in chapter five.

First of all, if we want to use all cultural dimensions from different theories to examine each factor of participation (FP), it will be too complicated and somehow confusing in practice. However, we studied several cultural theories to enrich our research and make it more reliable and thus we do not want to just rely on one cultural theory and its dimensions. As a result, it will be a dilemma of whether to construct our model simple and user friendly but questionable, or complex and confusing but plausible. I try to find a way between the two.

In order to use various cultural dimensions in a non-confusing way, I take four measures:

Firstly, I remove some of cultural dimensions which are not adequately reliable or they are biased based on my aforementioned argumentations. Therefore, based on what I have argued about the partial interpretation of Exclusionism/Universalism dimension by Minkov and also because of its high correlation with in-group collectivism dimension of GLOBE project, I lay aside this dimension from my framework.

Secondly, I try to reduce the number of cultural dimensions through considering just one of those dimensions which are highly correlated. Thus, regarding the fact that Monumentalism/Flexumility dimension of Minkov is very similar to traditional/secular-rational cultural dimension of Inglehart, with highly significant inter-correlation of 0.95, I will just consider the latter in this study.

Thirdly, some of cultural dimensions whose interpretation is problematic or with outdated national scores would be put aside from the framework. Accordingly, I decide that Schwartz cultural value dimensions are not taken into account as main dimensions in the framework for some reasons: First of all, each dimension of Schwartz theory includes some basic values that sometimes are too distinguished and so we cannot consider the dimension as indicator of its specific item. Moreover, there are no separate scores for these basic values to be used. Also, sometimes it is hard to interpret that what the basic values was really inferred by respondents because of its short and abstract explanation. Finally, the updated national scores of Schwartz cultural dimensions are not available with the only data I could avail myself of dating back to 1994 when, in a paper, scores pertaining to teacher samples were presented. Altogether, I do not consider Schwartz dimensions in the framework but I recommend that they could be used as complementary indicators for deeper understanding of a cultural context when main cultural dimensions cannot explain and clarify a particular case.

Lastly, for each factor of participation (FP), I classify remaining cultural dimensions into two categories of primary and secondary indicators. That is, considering the importance and relevance of a cultural dimension for a FP, it is classified to primary or secondary indicators. Primary indicators of each FP are those dimensions that their definition, attributes and implications are much more relevant to the corresponding FP in comparison to other dimensions. Other cultural dimensions which have influence on a FP but not as much as primary ones would be considered secondary (or checking) indicators. I will explain more the reasons behind the selection of each cultural dimension as primary or secondary indicator in next chapter when the framework will be developed.

To sum up, all factors of participation (FP) and associated cultural dimensions (indicators) that will be used in our framework are listed in Table 22. Similar table for political indicators will be generated in next chapter and eventually the final framework, including both cultural and political indicators, will be developed in chapter five.

Table 22: Summary of relevant cultural dimensions with factors of participation (FP)

Categories of Factors	Factor Code	Factor Name	Relevant Cultural Indicators (Dimensions)
1- Basic Drivers of Public Participation	FP1	Legal and Political Support	---
	FP2	Power-holders Support	<i>Primary indicators:</i> power distance; <i>Secondary indicators:</i> survival/self-expression;
	FP3	Public Demand	<i>Primary indicators:</i> power distance; societal collectivism; survival/self-expression;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> uncertainty avoidance; masculinity/femininity;
2- Participants in Public Participation	FP4	Acceptance of Powerless	<i>Primary indicators:</i> uncertainty avoidance; masculinity;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> power distance; assertiveness
	FP5	Gender of Participants	<i>Primary indicators:</i> gender egalitarianism;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> masculinity/femininity; survival/self-expression;
3- Process and Interactions in Public Participation	FP6	Role and Intention of Participants	<i>Primary indicators:</i> Individualism/collectivism; human orientation;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> social collectivism;
	FP7	Process Format	<i>Primary indicators:</i> uncertainty avoidance; individualism/collectivism;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> indulgence/restraint;
	FP8	Process Timing and Size	<i>Primary indicators:</i> Future orientation; long/short term orientation;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> masculinity/femininity;
	FP9	Inter-party Trust	<i>Primary indicators:</i> Interpersonal trust index; uncertainty avoidance;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> assertiveness;
4- Output of Public Participation	FP10	Expressiveness	<i>Primary indicators:</i> Individualism/collectivism; in-group collectivism; assertiveness;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> traditional/secular-rational; power distance;
	FP11	Respect for Rank	<i>Primary indicators:</i> Power distance; individualism/collectivism; traditional/secular-rational; uncertainty avoidance;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> performance orientation; survival/self-expression;
	FP12	Outcome Expectation	<i>Primary indicators:</i> masculinity/femininity; performance orientation;
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> survival/self-expression;
4- Output of Public Participation	FP13	Dealing with Conflicts	<i>Primary indicators:</i> masculinity/femininity; assertiveness; traditional/secular-rational (monumentalism/flexumility);
			<i>Secondary indicators:</i> long/short term orientation; uncertainty avoidance;

I should mention that in Table 22, whenever we have power distance dimension, the measures of cultural dimension of Hofstede and cultural practice (and not value) of GLOBE

project are meant. In fact, my recommendation is to, if scores for both are available, consider scores by Hofstede and do the checking through scores of GLOBE. If there are any meaningful contradictions between these two, then the interpretation of GLOBE's cultural value score may be of help.


Moreover, in this study, we only use the dimension of uncertainty avoidance by Hofstede. In fact, as I highlighted before, because cultural practice of uncertainty avoidance by GLOBE has the meaning completely different from Hofstede's, its use can be misleading.

Furthermore, we use only cultural practices (and not cultural values) of GLOBE's dimensions in our framework. However, understanding and careful interpretation of GLOBE's cultural values can be helpful for analysts who have interest in examining a cultural context through more different perspectives.

In next chapter, I will study political indexes which are influential on factors of participation (FP) and then we try to develop a framework to link these cultural-political indicators with FPs.

Chapter Four: Political Indicators and Democracy Indexes

Political system and legal structure of a country is the first gateway to allow the public to enter to the participation hall. In previous chapter we study cultural factors and their effect on public participation. I have discussed that we should distinguish between cultural and situational factors. In fact, it is supposed that cultural factors change very slightly and slowly, so we can hardly see a significant fluctuation in national cultural dimensions in a short period of time. On the other hand, situational factors can change in a short or medium term. Political and economic factors are main examples of situational factors. Although they are also influential factors, their influence can change more easily and quickly than cultural ones. In this chapter I try to find some political indicators which might affect public participation. For this purpose I study a number of governance indexes from different reliable international researches. In following sections, I examine three international studies in brief and then the relevant indexes which affect factors of participation (FP) would be extracted.



4-1 Political Systems and International Indexes

It is obvious that political and legal structure can foster or hamper public participation. In fact it is the first preconditions that political system and power-holders allow citizens and stakeholders to involve and influence in decision making process. Democracy is in fact a method of governance in which people decide how a country to be governed and what public policies to be made. There are different types of democratic systems and various levels of democracy as well. That is, every democratic structure does not consider similar role for citizens in policy making. As it is mentioned in section 2-4-2, there are two main streams of democratic systems: pluralist democracy and direct democracy. They are sometimes called representative and participatory democracy respectively. In the former, people elect their representatives who will be ones making policies and perform decision making. In the latter, in addition to elect representative, the public also involve in decision making through public participation. Participatory or deliberative democracy is a contemporary concept which is in its practical developing stage. Public participation is the main constructing brick of this structure which is not completely baked yet.

Beyond the democratic systems, there are some semi-democratic or undemocratic political structures that hardly or never let people to have their voice in policy making. In such systems, people can neither involve through their representatives nor directly.

In order to distinguish different type of political systems, we need to have some indicators to give an applicable estimation of the political will for participation in different countries. There are some ongoing international researches that evaluate periodically the democratic and political rights in various countries all over the world. In the following sections, I briefly explain three of them which are globally known and cited in political scientific literature: The Economist Intelligence Unit's democracy index by the Economist, Freedom in the World by Freedom House and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) by the World Bank. Moreover, another indicator – confidence in government – is introduced which is a byproduct of World Value Survey and can be categorized in political factors.

4-1-1 Freedom in the World Survey

The **Freedom in the World** survey is an annually report by an American institute, Freedom House, which measures the degree of democracy and political freedom as experienced by individuals in 194 countries. It is claimed that "the research and ratings process involved 33 analysts and 16 senior-level academic advisers. The 10 members of the core research team headquartered in New York, along with 24 outside consultant analysts, prepared the country and territory reports. The analysts used a broad range of sources of information - including foreign and domestic news reports, academic analyses, nongovernmental organizations, think tanks, individual professional contacts, and visits to the region - in preparing the reports" (Freedom House, 2008b).

The survey evaluates freedom - the possibility to act in different domains outside the control of the government and other centers of potential domination- based on two main categories: *political rights and civil liberties*. (Freedom House, 2008b)

The **political rights** are measured by questions which are grouped into three subcategories: 1) Electoral Process, 2) Political Pluralism and Participation, and 3) Functioning of Government. The **civil liberties** questions are grouped into four subcategories: 1) Freedom of Expression and Belief, 2) Associational and Organizational Rights, 3) Rule of Law, and 4) Personal Autonomy and Individual Rights.

These subcategories are scored separately according to specific scaling (Freedom House, 2008a). Finally all raw points and scales are aggregated in order to calculate a rating which determine whether a country is classified as Free, Partly Free, or Not Free by the survey (Freedom House, 2008b).

One of the advantages of Freedom in the World study is that it provides scores of each subcategory separately. Hence we can find scores of those subcategories which would be relevant to public participation. Having a precise look at the questions of each subcategory, I found that two subcategories of civil liberties can influence on our factors of participation. In the following these two subcategories and the contained sample questions are mentioned:

Freedom of Expression and Belief; sample question items: Is there open and free private discussion? Are there free and independent media and other forms of cultural expression?

Associational and Organizational Rights; sample question items: Is there freedom of assembly, demonstration, and open public discussion? Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations?

As we will see in next section, there is a similar index of civil liberties by another study, the Economist Intelligence Unit's Index, but it represents both socio-personal liberties and self-expression rights together, hence it cannot be a good indicator for indicating the level of political support for public participation. Fortunately, these rights have been separated in categories by Freedom in the World and it provides subcategory scores as well. Therefore I will use two above subcategories in order to examine the factor of legal and political support for public participation (FP1) in different countries. The scores of these two political indicators for different countries can be found in Appendix 3.

4-1-2 The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy

The Economist Intelligence Unit's index is based on the assumption that measures of democracy which only reflect the situation of political freedoms and civil liberties are not "thick" enough. They do not cover sufficiently or at all some features and qualities of substantive democracy. It is argued that freedom is an essential component of democracy, but not all of them (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). Therefore, the Economist Intelligence Unit's index, collected by The Economist, examines the state of democracy in 167 countries using broader categories than what is done by Freedom House.

The Economist Intelligence Unit asserts that a crucial, differentiating aspect of their measure is that "in addition to experts' assessments they use, where available, public opinion surveys - mainly the World Values Survey. Indicators based on the surveys predominate heavily in the political participation and political culture categories...In addition to the World Values Survey, other sources that can be leveraged include the Eurobarometer surveys, Gallup polls, Latin American Barometer, and national surveys" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, p. 19).

The Economist Intelligence Unit's index of democracy is based on the ratings for 60 indicators (items) grouped in five categories: 1) Electoral process and pluralism; 2) Civil liberties; 3) Functioning of government; 4) Political participation; and 5) Democratic political culture. Each category has a rating on a 0 to 10 scale, and the overall index of democracy is the simple average of the five category indexes based on which, countries are placed within one of four types of regimes; Full democracies (scores of 8-10), Flawed democracies (score of 6 to 7.9), Hybrid regimes (scores of 4 to 5.9), Authoritarian regimes (scores below 4). (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008)

As far as public participation is concerned, we found that two of these categories are very important and determinant. In the following, these two categories and corresponding relevant sample items for participation are mentioned:

Democratic political culture; (sample items: Is there a sufficient degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin a stable, functioning democracy; Degree of popular support for democracy; Perception of democracy and public order)

Political participation; (sample items: Extent of political participation; Membership of political parties and political non-governmental organizations; Authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation)

In order to use these two indicators (or indexes) in a proper way, we should understand and distinguish what they measure. From the study of the items which measure these indicators (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008), it is revealed that 'democratic political culture' represents to what extent people in a society value democratic way of governance. The other indicator, political participation, on the one hand indicates to what extent people participate in political activities and on the other hand, to what extent the government encourages the public to participate. While the former indicator reveals the tendency of people to participate, I argue that the latter should be considered an indicator of government's (power-holders') role in participation.

My argument is that when people do not participate, some reasons can be counted for it; firstly, because they do not believe in participation which is showed itself in the first above indicator; secondly, because people might think that their participation is not seriously taken into account and so participation is ineffective and useless; thirdly, because there are not enough encouragements, incentives and drivers by government for public participation. In my estimation, second and third reasons show responsibilities of the government to foster participation. Hence, the essence of 'political participation' indicator should be seen in the item which evaluate whether authorities make a serious effort to promote participation or not.

In conclusion, categories of 'political participation' and 'democratic political culture' are indicators which affect respectively two factors of participation: 'power-holder support' (FP2) and 'public demand' (FP3). Public demand is a crucial factor for substantive democracy in general and public participation in particular and this fact has been indicated precisely in the report of the Economist Intelligence Unit:

"Democracy is more than the sum of its institutions. A democratic political culture is also crucial for the legitimacy, smooth functioning and ultimately the sustainability of democracy. A culture of passivity and apathy, an obedient and docile citizenry, are not consistent with democracy...Participation is a necessary component, as apathy and abstention are enemies of democracy. Even measures that focus predominantly on the processes of representative, liberal democracy include (although inadequately or insufficiently) some aspects of participation. In a democracy, government is only one element in a social fabric of many and varied institutions, political organizations, and associations. Citizens cannot be required to take part in the political process, and they are free to express their dissatisfaction by not participating. However, a healthy democracy requires the active, freely chosen participation of citizens in public life. Democracies flourish when citizens are willing to participate in public debate, elect representatives and join political parties. Without this broad, sustaining participation, democracy begins to wither and become the preserve of small, select groups" (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008, p. 16).

The scores of these two indicators for various countries can be found in Appendix 3. Furthermore, from the comparison of scores of these two indicators, I found that a useful index can be extracted which could explain the type and level of reluctance or willingness to participation.

Participation Reluctancy Index

As I argued above, 'democratic political culture' and 'political participation' indicators can be assigned to FP2 and FP3 respectively. But it will be interesting and useful to know what the differences of scores for these two indicators can reveal about a country. I argue that the

significant difference of these scores is meaningful and can show reluctance or willingness of one of the two wings of participation: the public and power-holders. That is, if the score of democratic political culture is significantly higher than the score of political participation, it means that public demand for participation is much higher than support of power-holders for it. Thus, in such a case, power-holders might be hindrance of participation. On the contrary, if the score of political participation is meaningfully higher than score of democratic political culture, it can be inferred that power-holder support for public participation is higher than public demand. Hence, people reluctance to participate might be a restraining factor. If the difference between these two indicators is in a normal range, we can conclude that there is a proportional balance between the public demand and power-holder supply of public participation in a society. Therefore, I define "Participation Reluctancy Index (PRI)" as the difference of democratic political culture score minus political participation score. The PRI scores for different countries are calculated from scores in Appendix 3 and are illustrated in Figure 9.




Figure 9: Scores of Participation Reluctancy Index (PRI) for different countries

I assume that a band between 1 to -1 is a "balance zone" or "normal range" within which countries have proportional demand and supply of public participation. As far as a country's score is far from this band, it goes to one of the poles of public reluctance or power-holder reluctance to participation.

Furthermore, I should mention that the PRI index just display the difference of those two indicators and not about the absolute scores, thus it does not reveal anything about the potential and practical possibility of public participation in countries. In fact it shows only the proportionality of public demand and power-holder support for public participation. For instance, as we can see in Figure 9, the UK as a democratic country has a high PRI score whereas Jordan as an undemocratic country is in the normal range. That is, although the feasibility and facilities of public participation in the UK is much higher than Jordan, PRI score shows that power-holders in the UK do not pave the way of participation proportional to the public demand.

Interestingly, we can see from the graph that Iraq is located in the high negative range which means that the support of power-holders for participation is higher than willingness of people and it is in agreement with reality to a great extent. In next chapter, when I will review case studies, the plausibility and robustness of PRI index will be examined.

4-1-3 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)

The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is a research project by World Bank which reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 212 countries and territories for 1996, 1998, 2000, and annually for 2002-2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009).

According to the WGI latest report, "the indicators are based on several hundred individual variables measuring perceptions of governance, drawn from 35 separate data sources constructed by 33 different organizations from around the world...As in past years, the WGI are based exclusively on subjective or perceptions-based data on governance reflecting the views of a diverse range of informed stakeholders, including tens of thousands of household and firm survey respondents, as well as thousands of experts working for the private sector, NGOs, and public sector agencies" (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009, pp. 2 , 4).

They assign the individual measures and use an unobserved components model to construct six aggregate governance indicators in each period. In addition to estimate of each governance indicator, the report includes margins of error that indicate the unavoidable uncertainty associated with measuring governance across countries. They claim that these margins of error have decreased over time with adding new data sources to their aggregate indicators (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009).

The indicators measure six dimensions of governance as follows: 1) Voice and Accountability, 2) Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, 3) Government Effectiveness, 4) Regulatory Quality, 5) Rule of Law, and 6) Control of Corruption.

Among these dimensions, the first one, based on its definition, is affecting the concept of public participation. It is defined as:

Voice and Accountability (VA): "capturing perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media" (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2009, p. 6).

According to the above definition, we observe that this indicator conceptually entails two subcategories of Freedom in the World - Freedom of Expression and Belief and Associational and Organizational Rights. Therefore, besides those two, we would use this one as secondary indicator to examine the factor of political and legal support (FP1).

In fact, using the conceptually similar indicators from different sources would make our framework more reliable.

The units in which governance indicators are measured follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This indicates that virtually all scores lie

between -2.5 and 2.5. The score of "voice and accountability" dimension for numerous countries can be found in Appendix 3.

4-1-4 Confidence in Government Index

In the previous chapter, World Value Survey (WVS) and its cultural implications were discussed. It is one of the largest worldwide surveys which cover various aspects and issues of social life. As I argued before, some of the measured items in that survey can hardly be considered as cultural values. These items are affected by political and situational context. One of such items is the question about confidence in the government. It is asked from respondents that "could you tell me how much confidence you have in The Government: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? Medrano who is the director of the WVS Archive and ASEP/JDS data bank developed an index of "Confidence in Government" based on this measure (Medrano, 2008a).

In our study, we use this index to evaluate the trust between the public/stakeholders and the government. It would be one of political index which affect the "inter-party trust" factor of participation (FP9). Countries' score for this index can be found in Appendix 3 as well.

4-2 Summary of Relation between Factors of Participation (FP) and Political Indicators

In the last section of this chapter, all political indicators (indexes) which affect factors of participation (FP) are listed in Table 23. Likewise cultural dimensions, the political indexes also classified as primary or secondary indicators. However, because the relevant political indicators are not as much as cultural ones, most of them are classified as primary indicators. As it is expected, the first factor of participation (FP1) is totally affected with political indexes. This FP is examined by three political indicators, one of which is considered secondary indicator. The reason is that those two primary indicators are subcategories which specifically can evaluate relevant rights of participation and representativeness whereas the secondary indicator is a combination of other civil rights. So I assume that it is better to be applied as checking indicator.

Moreover, we can observe that most of political indexes are associated with the first category of FPs, basic drivers of public participation. The only indicator which is related to interactions in public participation (third category) is confidence in government which is a part of inter-party trust (FP9) indeed. However, I am still doubtful whether this indicator has a cultural root or political origin. However, as I think that the political structure and government performance can affect the level of public confidence in the government, so this indicator can be regarded mainly as situational factor than cultural one and hence it is more reasonable to put it among political indicators.

Table 23: Summary of relevant political indicators with factors of participation (FP)

Categories of Factors	Factor Code	Factor Name	Relevant Political Indicators (Indexes)
1- Basic Drivers of Public Participation	FP1	Legal and Political Support	<i>Primary indicators:</i> freedom of expression and belief; association and organization rights; <i>Secondary indicators:</i> voice and accountability;
	FP2	Power-holders Support	<i>Primary indicators:</i> political participation;
	FP3	Public Demand	<i>Primary indicators:</i> democratic political culture;
2- Participants in Public Participation	FP4	Acceptance of Powerless	---
	FP5	Gender of Participants	---
	FP6	Role and Intention of Participants	---
3- Process and Interactions in Public Participation	FP7	Process Format	---
	FP8	Process Timing and Size	---
	FP9	Inter-party Trust	<i>Primary indicators:</i> confidence in government index;
	FP10	Expressiveness	---
	FP11	Respect for Rank	---
4- Output of Public Participation	FP12	Outcome Expectation	---
	FP13	Dealing with Conflicts	---

In next chapter, cultural and political indicators which affect on factors of participation are aggregated to develop a framework. It will be discussed that what different scores of the indicators can imply for participatory practice and by utilization of some case studies, the framework will be examined.

Chapter Five: Development of a Framework and Case Studies

In this chapter, we aggregate our knowledge from prior chapters to develop a framework which can be employed by policy analysts and participatory practitioners. The framework aims to use some quantitative indicators for understanding the qualitative contextual attributes.


I hope this framework can provide a better understanding of politico-cultural context of a society at the beginning stages of designing and implementation of the participatory practice. In addition, the framework might be helpful for evaluation of a participatory practice through examining the role of political-cultural context in the failure or success of a practice.

On the other hand, I am afraid of stereotyping, overgeneralization or malfunction of the framework. The framework does not want to judge about cultures and give a definite prediction about the consequences of participatory practice in different countries. In fact, the framework wants to be an assisting tool to advise analysts about differences between cultures and their various perceptions, preferences and behaviors which may affect public participation. Without such awareness, policy analysts might transplant a participatory method in a society in which some traditional and behavioral codes of interactions, for instance, do not compatible with the process.

Furthermore, knowing the level of political support for public participation is a matter of importance. The framework employs some political indicators to throw light upon the political structures in different countries and their supporting or opposing participation.

Finally I should indicate again that the framework is going to assess only the cultural and political aspects of a context. There are a lot of other aspects and contextual factors which should be considered to examine a participatory practice.

In the following sections, I introduce and explain components of the framework and then the way it should be utilized. Next, by using the framework, some participatory practices in different countries are evaluated and the effect of politico-cultural factors on participation will be discussed for the case studies.



5-1 Relation of Cultural-Political Indicators and Factors of Participation: A Framework

In chapter two, we introduced the politico-cultural-sensitive factors of participation and they were classified in four categories. Those categories imply stages of participation which should be followed sequentially. In this chapter, we develop a framework for each category to represent the relation between factors of participation (FP) and cultural-political indicators that have been studied before. In Table 24, the framework for the first category of basic drivers of public participation is illustrated. The same structure of framework will be repeated for other categories and FPs. In the following the different components of the framework are described.

5-1-1 Components of the Framework

In each framework, we have four main columns which are repeated for all FPs. In the first column, the factor of participation (FP) and the classification of indicators – primary or secondary – are indicated. The second and fourth columns are assigned to two extreme values of indicators. In the top of these polar columns, the corresponding attributes of the FP are mentioned.

The third column, which is in the middle of those opposite poles, is assigned for national scores of cultural and political indicators. This column consists of three sub-columns which display the range of national score of indicators. High, medium or low scores of indicators determine that in which sub-column the scores must be located. In fact the national scores of each indicator can be divided to three ranges: low, medium and high range. The appropriate range of each national score can be determined from the score table. I should mention that all national scores of cultural dimensions and political indexes can be found in the table of Appendix 3.

In the first rows of that table, "low limit of medium range" and "high limit of medium range" are indicated and accordingly any score lower than the "low limit of medium range" is located in low range of that indicator and any score higher than the "high limit of medium range" is positioned in high range of the indicator.

As an example, if the score of cultural dimension (or political index), is categorized within low range, then it should be located to the sub-column related to low level of that dimension (or index). Thus, the position of national scores for all indicators are determined in the framework and then it can be inferred for each FP that which attributes are more relevant for the country under study.

5-1-2 Explanation of the Framework for Different Categories

Now, I am going to explain each part of the framework for different FPs and related indicators of Table 24.

The FP1, legal and political support, is affected by three political indicators. Freedom of expression and belief is an indicator to evaluate to what extent people are free to express themselves in a society. It is one of the main preconditions of public participation. Another political indicator is association and organizational rights. It is an important indicator to represent that whether in a country people can be freely organized in groups for claiming their collective interest and demand. This indicator reveals that whether formal associations, NGOs and interest groups are real representative of the segment of population or they might be fabricated groups made by governments as pseudo representatives. These two indicators are adopted from Freedom in the World research. The third indicator for FP1 is an index by WGI study and entails the content of two first indicators together. That is why it is considered secondary indicator as checking and supporting one. Generally speaking, if there is any meaningful contradiction between the primary and secondary indicators, an analyst should be cautious about interpretation of this factor of participation.

The second factor of participation in the framework is power-holders support (FP2). The factor assesses the acceptance of public participation by power-holders, considering both cultural and political indicators. Actually, after FP1 which is a sine qua non, this is the second important driver of public participation. When power-holders are reluctant to involve people or other stakeholders in the process of decision making, having a free and open political system is not adequate.

Table 24: Framework of relation between factors of participation (FP) and politico-cultural indicators for category 1

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range*			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives				Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives	
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief				Low freedom of expression and belief	
	High associational and organizational rights				Low associational and organizational rights	
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability				Low voice and accountability	
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders				Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders	
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance				High power distance	
	High political participation				Low political participation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)				High survival (Low self-expression)	
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation				Less public's tendency for participation	
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture				Low democratic political culture	
	High societal collectivism				Low societal collectivism	
	Low survival (High self-expression)				High survival (Low self-expression)	
	Low power distance				High power distance	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance				High uncertainty avoidance	
	Low masculinity				High masculinity	

* H=High, M=Medium, L=Low; the range of indicators' score can be determined from Appendix 3

FP2 is affected by cultural dimension of power distance. Based on the definition of power distance, it is the extent to which the powerless expect and accept unequal distribution of power. Since expecting and accepting is a mutual interaction between power-holders and the powerless, power distance affects the inclination of both parties towards participation. Moreover, political participation is the indicator which measures whether authorities make a serious effort to promote political participation or not. On the other hand, the acceptance of the democracy as the best form of governance was embedded in survival/self-expression dimension. I argued that survival dimension should be considered as situational indicator which shows the economic and welfare state of a society. Hence, it is understandable that in a country that the main concern is survival, power-holders can hardly support participation which seems fantasy to them. On the contrary, in the country with less fear of survival and more demand of self-expression, authorities might have to involve others. However, since survival dimension does not have as direct influence as those two on FP2, I consider it as secondary indicator.

Third factor of participation – public demand (FP3) - is another necessary requirement. Even if both FP1 and FP2 are in favor of participation, without demand of the public the participation will not be formed. As we can see in the framework, there are many cultural dimensions affecting FP3. The influence of power distance and survival dimensions on FP3 is similar to what explained above for FP2. Moreover, societal collectivism is an indicator which measures the tendency of people for team work and engaging in group activities. Hence, I regard it as one of the primary indicators.

Furthermore, index of democratic political culture represents the degree of societal consensus and cohesion to underpin democracy. Higher democratic political culture results in more demand for participation in decision making process. Although it is measured as a political index, nevertheless it seems to have properties of a cultural indicator as well. Finally, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity dimensions also influence on FP3 to some extent. Hofstede (2001) asserts that participation in voluntary activities and associations are attributed to low scores of these two dimensions. Therefore, I consider these cultural dimensions as secondary indicators affecting FP3.

As an example and to illustrate how the framework should be filled, in Table 25 a sample of filled framework for the Netherlands is presented. In the section of case studies, the implications of this table will be discussed.

Table 25: Sample of the filled framework of category 1 for the Netherlands

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range				Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←				Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	16				Low freedom of expression and belief
	High associational and organizational rights	12				Low associational and organizational rights
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	1.53				Low voice and accountability
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	←				Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance	38				High power distance
	High political participation	9.44				Low political participation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.39				High survival (Low self-expression)
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	←				Less public's tendency for participation
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture	10				Low democratic political culture
	High societal collectivism	4.62				Low societal collectivism
	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.39				High survival (Low self-expression)
	Low power distance	38				High power distance
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance		53			High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity	14				High masculinity

Table 26 shows the framework for second category of FPs which is related to participants in public participation. This category also consists of three FPs. Acceptance of the powerless is FP4 which shows to what extent decision makers are willing to involve actors with no power like laymen and ordinary citizens. As we mentioned before, the term of public in this research refers to all different actors who can affect or may be affected by a policy regardless their power. Public participation in some countries is accepted as far as stakeholders, experts and influential organized groups to be involved. It means that in their estimation participation of the powerless is meaningless and redundant whereas in other

cultures presence of laymen is essential for public participation. FP4 is examined by two primary cultural indicators and two secondary ones. Uncertainty avoidant cultures prefer to see that decisions are made by experts and not laypersons. Due to their anxiety from uncertainty, it is understandable why they prefer avoiding involvement of the powerless in the process of policy making. On the other hand, masculinity/femininity is another influential dimension on FP4. Masculine cultures have sympathy for the strong while on the contrary feminine cultures have sympathy for the weak.

Furthermore, power distance also play role in the level of acceptance of the powerless. In fact, this dimension is responsible for the level of harmony between the powerful and the powerless. By the way, since the main effect of power distance can be seen on FP2 and FP3, it is employed as secondary indicator for FP4. In addition, assertiveness dimension like masculinity/femininity indicates the preference of sympathy with the strong or the weak. In fact, assertiveness is one of the qualities embedded in masculinity dimension. Hence, we use it as checking and backup indicator for evaluation of FP4.

Table 26: Framework of relation between factors of participation (FP) and politico-cultural indicators for category 2

Category 2: Participants in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range*			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless				Less attention to voice of the powerless
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance				High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity				High masculinity
Secondary indicator(s)	Low power distance				High power distance
	Low assertiveness				High assertiveness
FP5: Gender of Participants	Both gender should participate				Male participation is preferred
Primary indicator(s)	High gender egalitarianism				Low gender egalitarianism
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity				High masculinity
	Low survival (High self-expression)				High survival (Low self-expression)
FP6: Role and Intention of Participants	Participate as individual for self-benefit				Participate as representative for collective-benefit
Primary indicator(s)	High individualism (Low collectivism)				Low individualism (High collectivism)
	Low human orientation				High human orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low societal collectivism				High societal collectivism

* H=High, M=Medium, L=Low; the range of indicators' score can be determined from Appendix 3

The second factor of this category (FP5) is regarding to gender of participants. The factor examines whether both genders are expected to participate equally or only participation of males are preferred. For this aim, the main cultural indicator is gender egalitarianism which evaluates the equality of gender roles in a society. In addition, masculinity/femininity dimension is used as supporting indicator because the gender equality is part of its content. On the other hand, the survival dimension can also affect on FP5 from other perspective. When there is a high survival concern in a society, normally role of men (as the main responsible for livelihood) would be highlighted. Hence, in such societies the public might think that important decisions should be made by men. Conversely, countries in the pole of self-expression are more after equality of gender roles. Masculinity and survival dimensions are employed as secondary indicators for evaluation of FP5.

Role and intention of participants (FP6) is the last factor of this category. This factor indicates that how participants in different cultures may perceive their role and intention for involvement in participatory practice. Three cultural dimensions affect FP6. First of all, individualism/collectivism determines whether people participate with individualistic opinion and intention or with collective and representative role and purpose. Moreover, human orientation dimension represents to what extent a culture gives priority to other-interest versus self-interest. Finally, societal collectivism evaluates whether in a society group loyalty is encouraged even if individual goals suffer. I was really in doubt to consider the societal collectivism as primary or secondary indicators because its quality is actually relevant with FP6. However, I consider it as secondary indicator but I can say that it could also be taken into account as primary indicator.

The framework for third category is illustrated in Table 27. This category consists of five FPs which affect process and interactions in public participation. Process format (FP7) of a participatory practice can be formal, conventional and structured or be informal, innovative and flexible. Cultural attributes of a society can say something about the preferred form of the process. Uncertainty avoidance dimension stresses that whether clarity, structure, precise regulation and order are necessitated or not. It also distinguishes those cultures which are open to change and innovation and those which are conservative. Hence it is one of the primary indicators for FP7. Individualism/collectivism is the second main indicator. It is argued that in collectivist cultures, activities mostly are dictated by role and context while in individualistic cultures, activities are more self-started (Hofstede, 2001). In fact, it is said that collectivist culture emphasizes on context and regulations (Triandis, 2004). On the other hand, restrain/indulgence dimension represents to what extent in a culture, personal freedom, life control and indulgence are important. While in indulgent culture having fun and enjoying of an activity is of interest, in restraint culture respecting to social norms and traditions are crucial. Thus it is reasonable to consider this dimension as secondary indicator for FP7.

The other factor of this category is the process timing and size (FP8). The factor indicates the preference of short and fast process with small group of participants versus acceptance of long and slow one with large number of participants. The future oriented cultures are into planning and long-term success. Therefore such cultures are more tolerant for slow and long process. Acceptance of long and slow process versus short and fast one, to some extent, can also be inferred from long/short term orientation dimension. However, we should be aware that this dimension entails some other attributes like respect for tradition and being perseverance. So using these two dimensions as primary indicators can reveal the tendency of a society to short-slow versus long-fast process of participation. Moreover, the mottos of "small and slow is beautiful" versus "big and fast is beautiful" show diverse mentalities of feminine and masculine culture respectively. Hence this dimension regards as secondary indicators for FP8.

The next factor of this category is inter-party trust. FP9 measures trust between different components of a participatory session: between government (policy makers) and participants or within participants (stakeholders, experts, citizens). Trust is a crucial item for initiating the effective participation. Lack of trust not only might be a hindrance for persuade the public to participate, but also it can be reason of cynicism to outcomes of a participatory practice. To evaluate FP9, interpersonal trust and confidence in government indexes are used. These two have been derived from the data of World Value Survey. Moreover, uncertainty avoidance dimension manifests whether people and out-group members can be trusted or not. So we have three primary indicators for examination of FP9 in the framework. In addition, since assertiveness dimension reveals, to some extent, the quality of trust in its content, thus it is employed as secondary indicator for FP9.

Table 27: Framework of relation between factors of participation (FP) and politico-cultural indicators for category 3

Category 3: Process and Interactions in Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range*				Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP7: Process Format	Acceptance of innovative, informal and unstructured process					Preference of conventional, formal and structured process
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance					High uncertainty avoidance
	High individualism (Low collectivism)					Low individualism (High collectivism)
Secondary indicator(s)	Indulgence					Restraint
FP8: Process Timing & Size	Acceptance of slow and long process with small group					Preference of fast and short process with large group
Primary indicator(s)	High future orientation					Low future orientation
	Long term orientation					Short term orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity					High masculinity
FP9: Inter-party Trust	High trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)					Low trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)
Primary indicator(s)	High interpersonal trust index					Low interpersonal trust index
	Low uncertainty avoidance					High uncertainty avoidance
	High confidence in government index					Low confidence in government index
Secondary indicator(s)	Low assertiveness					High assertiveness
FP10: Expressiveness	Communicative, speak one's mind, explicit and self-expressive in communication with others					Non-communicative, modest, face-saving, implicit and self-censorship in communication with others
Primary indicator(s)	High individualism (Low collectivism)					Low individualism (High collectivism)
	Low in-group collectivism					High in-group collectivism
	High assertiveness					Low assertiveness
Secondary indicator(s)	Secular-rational					Traditional
	Low power distance					High power distance
FP11: Respect for Rank	Indifference of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and acceptance of confrontation, oppose and criticize					Importance of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and avoidance of confrontation, oppose and criticize
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance					High power distance
	High individualism					Low individualism
	Low uncertainty avoidance					High uncertainty avoidance
	Secular-rational					Traditional
Secondary indicator(s)	High performance orientation					Low performance orientation
	Low survival (High Self-expression)					High survival (Low Self-expression)

* H=High, M=Medium, L=Low; the range of indicators' score can be determined from Appendix 3

Expressiveness (FP10) is another important factor for interactions in public participation. This factor is highly affected by some cultural dimensions. First of all, individualism/collectivism is determinant in a way of communication of participants. In individualistic cultures, individuals are mostly communicative and explicit and they easily speak their mind. On the contrary, in collectivist cultures people are modest, implicit and non-communicative. In individualistic culture people are self-expressive and they do not censor their opinions in communication with others whereas it is reverse in collectivist cultures. These attributes are almost the same for individualism/collectivism dimension (by Hofstede) and in-group collectivism dimension (by GLOBE). Moreover, assertiveness

dimension also characterizes that to what extent a culture values direct, explicit and unambiguous communication versus speaking indirectly, ambiguous and emphasis face-saving. These three cultural dimensions are the primary indicators to evaluate FP10. There are other two cultural dimensions that are regarded as secondary indicators. Power distance entails some characteristic of expressiveness indirectly. From its content, it is inferred that the powerless avoid initiating communication in power distant cultures. Furthermore, I argue that traditional/secular dimension has an item that indirectly manifests expressiveness: "respondent seldom or never discusses politics". This item, in my estimation, can reveal a kind of self-censorship or non-expressiveness. It can be also referred to a kind of apathy to politics or fear from the consequences. If this is a case, then it is not a cultural indicator but situational one indeed. However, I think this dimension can be considered a secondary indicator for FP10.

The last factor of this category is respect for rank (FP11). This factor examines whether rank and seniority are important for people in their interactions or not. FP11 also evaluates to what extent participants confront, oppose and criticize others. Power distance is evidently has influence on FP11. Teaching obedience and respect for the older are indispensable part of nurturing in power distant cultures. Uncertainty avoidance dimension distinguishes attitudes toward younger people in different cultures and acceptance of protest against government decisions as well. Moreover, individualism/collectivism explains whether confrontation should be avoided or not. This dimension also reveals that whether attitude toward others depends on their belonging and their group membership or not. Another primary indicator for evaluation of FP11 is traditional/secular dimension. The main items of this dimension distinguish the importance of obedience and respect for authority in different cultures. In addition, we have three other influential cultural dimensions which are classified as secondary indicators. Performance orientation dimension measures the importance of "what you do" versus "who you are". The value of feedback and importance of age in promotional decisions are also attributed to this dimension. Moreover, survival/self-expression dimension has an item which measures the respect for parents regardless their behaviour. In my opinion, it can be a secondary indicator to show respect for the older in general.

The last segment of the framework belongs to output of public participation and is demonstrated in Table 28. This category includes two factors of participation. FP12 indicates outcome expectation in different cultures. This factor distinguishes between those cultures that expect and prefer concrete success and quantitatively optimized outcomes from a policy process versus cultures that expect and accept qualitative outcomes like involvement, relationships and satisfaction. The primary cultural dimensions affecting FP12 are masculinity/femininity and performance orientation. Masculine cultures are recognized with their stress on mutual competition, decisiveness and performance. Such cultures also seek achievement in terms of ego boosting, wealth and recognition. Conversely, feminine cultures stress on equality, solidarity and seek consensus. They consider achievement in terms of relationship and quality of contacts. Hence the perception and expectation of acceptable outcome for these cultural poles are different. Performance orientation dimension has similar attributes of masculinity dimension. It represents to what extent cultures value and reward success and individual achievements versus value for sympathy. Furthermore, there is another cultural dimension which affects FP12. The main attribute of survival/self-expression dimension is known by giving priority to economic security versus giving people more say in decisions. It can be understood that in survival pole, performance and quantitative outcomes are more important than qualitative achievements like involvement or relationship. That is why I take this dimension into account as secondary indicator.

The last factor of participation is about dealing with conflicts (FP13). This factor examines to what extent different cultures do compromise in conflicts. There are some cultural factors

determine the inclination of various cultures toward compromise or defeat. First of all, masculinity/femininity dimension distinguishes between cultures resolving conflicts through denying others and fighting until one wins vis-à-vis those cultures trying to resolve conflicts through compromise and negotiation. Political discourse is moderate for one pole and is adversarial for another. Moreover, assertiveness dimension reveals to what extent in a culture, competition and dominance is preferred to cooperation and humility. In addition, monumentalism/flexumility cultural dimension, which is highly correlated with traditional/secular dimension, distinguishes between cultures with immutable values and flexible ones. Traditional dimension also emphasizes that one's own preference is more important than understanding other's preferences. These three indicators are the primary ones for evaluation of FP13. On the other hand, some other dimensions manifest the influence on FP13 to some extent. The fact that compromising with opponents is safe or dangerous is an attribute entails in uncertainty avoidance dimension. Also, long term orientation represents cultures in which adaptability is observed while short term cultures indicate steadiness and stability. Attributes of these two dimensions are influential on dealing with conflicts and in my estimation, they should regard as secondary indicators for FP13.

Table 28: Framework of relation between factors of participation (FP) and politico-cultural indicators for category 4

Category 4: Output of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range*			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP12: Outcome Expectation	Expect and accept of involvement, relationship, satisfaction and consensus as qualitative outcomes				Expect and preference of concrete result, success and quantitatively optimized outcomes	
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity				High masculinity	
	Low performance orientation				High performance orientation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)				High survival (Low self-expression)	
FP13: Dealing with Conflicts	Mostly compromise in conflicts and cooperate to seek win-win game				Hardly compromise in conflicts and compete to seek lose-win game	
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity				High masculinity	
	Low assertiveness				High assertiveness	
	Secular-rational (Flexumility)				Traditional (Monumentalism)	
Secondary indicator(s)	Long term orientation				Short term orientation	
	Low uncertainty avoidance				High uncertainty avoidance	

* H=High, M=Medium, L=Low; the range of indicators' score can be determined from Appendix 3

Now, via the framework, we understood what the relation between different cultural and political indicators and factors of participation is. These attributes for each pole of FPs can have some implications for participatory practice which will be discussed in the last chapter. In the next section, the applicability of the framework will be examined through its utilization in several case studies.

5-2 Case Studies of Participatory Practices

In this section, the framework is going to be utilized for some cases of public participation in different countries with various cultures and political structures. In fact, case studies can show the robustness of the framework. As we will see, the framework explains many consequences of cultural and political context in a participatory practice. This section is divided to two main subsections. In the first one, for several countries, I analyze public participation in general. That is, the concept and basic drivers and elements of public participation for some countries are examined. Thus, mainly the first category of FPs will be under study. The second subsection is assigned to comparative case studies of specific participatory (policy analysis) methods like consensus conference. In that section, besides the evaluation of category one, all other categories of FPs will be examined for different cultures. However, I should emphasize that in this section, we will have a secondary case studies in which I study the report and papers on participatory practices done by other researchers. So in many cases it is not possible to extract enough data about the whole process of participation or some factors that is needed for evaluation of all FPs. By the way, I tried to find some cases with adequate description and details about the participatory practice which can show the consequences of cultural-political context.

5-2-1 Public Participation in General: National Cases

In order to study general aspects of public participation, I will use two main sources of information. One of them is a study by International Association for Public Participation (IAP2). In 2005, IAP2 in cooperation with another American foundation, started work on a joint research project to explore public-government decision-making in twelve countries across all continents. They used literature review, findings and field work between 2006 and 2008 including one-on-one interviews with individuals in local and national government, public participation practitioners and NGO representatives who were involved in public participation activities (IAP2, 2009). Another source of information is findings of case studies in water and river basin management projects in the European countries. In addition to these main sources, some other sources will be used occasionally in this section.

In the following, the method of analysis is that the scores of indicators for each country, from Appendix 3, is filled in the framework and then evidence from the case study are compared and discussed.

Public Participation in China

I start case studies with China. The scores of indicators for first category of FPs are observed in Table 29. From the framework, it is obvious that there are serious legal and political hurdles for public participation in China. FP2 also shows that power-holders' support for participation is very low. IAP2 reports that according to an NGO leader in china, people always think that public participation should be performed under the leadership of the government or the communist party. "Sometimes if there is a public hearing, you cannot put everyone at the meeting place. Only the people who have been approved can go the meeting place and attend the hearing" (IAP2, 2009, p. 29).

Experience of public participation in environmental policy making in China reveals that central and local governments are concerned about participation in community programs because they fear that people involvement could empower local communities and challenge their fundamental authority (Enserink & Koppenjan, 2007).

Table 29: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for China

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range				Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives				→	Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief			4		Low freedom of expression and belief
	High associational and organizational rights			2		Low associational and organizational rights
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability			-1.72		Low voice and accountability
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders				→	Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance			80		High power distance
	High political participation			2.78		Low political participation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)			-1.16		High survival (Low self-expression)
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation				?	Less public's tendency for participation
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture		6.25			Low democratic political culture
	High societal collectivism	4.67				Low societal collectivism
	Low survival (High self-expression)			-1.16		High survival (Low self-expression)
	Low power distance		(5.02)	80		High power distance
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance	30				High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity			66		High masculinity

Regarding public demand (FP3), we can see diverse scores for indicators. It comes from the fact that each indicator represents a different aspect of public demand. In spite of political barriers and low acceptance of powerless for participation, a rather high score of democratic political culture is seen which indicates the high tendency of Chinese people for participation. Moreover, the high score of societal collectivism shows that people in China tend to team work and engage in group activities. It is one of the prominent cultural features in the country indeed. An NGO leader in China said “each time the government wants to organize this opportunity to participate, there are more candidates applying for it. They had to turn down, have to delete many people from the list, because there are not enough seats” (IAP2, 2009, p. 29).

On the other hand, survival concern is one of the discouraging factors for public participation. It means that when people have to think of survival, the priority of participation in decision process is of lower importance and consideration. A federal administrator in China said that many Chinese who participate want to know whether they can get any compensation for being affected by that project (IAP2, 2009).

Furthermore, high power distance can also influence the public demand but for the case of China, the score of power distance by GLOBE project does not approve the score of Hofstede which is an estimated value. GLOBE's score indicates a medium level of power distance for China (shown in the parentheses). We can interpret it that the score by GLOBE is more recent and it could be an indicator of change in people's attitude towards the power distribution over recent 40 years.

Finally, from Figure 9, we can see that China has a high score (3.47>>1) of Participation Reluctancy Index (PRI). It means that the public demand for participation in China is much higher than the support of power-holder for it. This fact was also observed in Figure 6 in which the emphasizing on value of self-expression in China was higher than corresponding effective democracy practicing there.

Public Participation in Brazil

In Table 30, scores of indicators for Brazil are indicated. Contrary to China, there is high support of legal and political structure for public participation in Brazil. However, scores of FP2 show that power-holders are not advocate of public engagement. Political participation index is almost low which indicates the reluctance of official authorities to involve people.

Table 30: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for Brazil

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←			Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives	
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	15			Low freedom of expression and belief	
	High associational and organizational rights	10			Low associational and organizational rights	
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	0.51			Low voice and accountability	
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	→			Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders	
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance			69	High power distance	
	High political participation			4.44	Low political participation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)		0.61		High survival (Low self-expression)	
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	→			Less public's tendency for participation	
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture		5.63		Low democratic political culture	
	High societal collectivism			3.94	Low societal collectivism	
	Low survival (High self-expression)		0.61		High survival (Low self-expression)	
	Low power distance			69	High power distance	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			76	High uncertainty avoidance	
	Low masculinity		49		High masculinity	

IAP2 reported that in Brazil, "a local administrator noted that local government decisions are often constrained by the state government. This means that people can become disappointed in the local government, when it approves a project and later is forced to cancel it" (IAP2, 2009, p. 12).

Moreover, FP3 scores reveal that public demand for participation in Brazil is not too much. NGO leader in Brazil explained that "a formal, vertical, paternalistic relationship was established between the State and society, and this meant that the society started to wait for the State to take action, not making any moves themselves" (IAP2, 2009, p. 10). These traits can be explained by high scores of power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Moreover we know that in cultures with high uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity, voluntary activities by people are unpopular.

Another important item which has been observed in the research by IAP2 was about the acceptance of the powerless voices. A Brazilian local administrator observed that "technocrats often lack experience dealing with the general public, and they need to be sensitized because they think that what they know is important. They do not take the population's knowledge into account" (IAP2, 2009, p. 13). In order to examine how the framework can explain this observation, I evaluated the scores of FP4, as illustrated in Table 31, and I found that in Brazil, the attention to voice of the powerless is low as expected.

Table 31: Utilization of the framework for FP4 for Brazil

Category 2: Participants in Public Participation					
Factors		National Score Range			
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless			→	Less attention to voice of the powerless
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			76	High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity		49		High masculinity
Secondary indicator(s)	Low power distance			69	High power distance
	Low assertiveness			4.25	High assertiveness

Public Participation in the United Kingdom

According to the literature on public participation, in the United Kingdom, including Scotland, there is a high degree of centralization within which the central government controls as much as 70% of local authorities' finances, leaving very little power for decision making, action, and revenues at the local level (Enserink & Koppenjan, 2007; IAP2, 2009). Consequently, there are barriers for participation and the tendency for highly top-down approaches to governance, even at the local government level. A public participation practitioner mentioned that this is one of the biggest problems in the United Kingdom (IAP2, 2009).

In Table 32, our framework is utilized for case of the UK. It is crystal clear from the scores for FP1 that legal and political structure completely supports public participation. Moreover, we can see that public demand for participation is also in high level in the UK according to FP3 scores. Nevertheless, from what mentioned above, we understood that there is a serious hindrance for public participation in the UK. This hindrance is needed to be explained. Some researchers tried to explain it through evaluation of cultural dimensions, specifically power distance, but it was not persuasive (Enserink, Patel, Kranz, & Maestu, 2007; Patel & Stel, 2004). As it is illustrated in Table 32, power distance in the UK is low; hence it is not the reason for power-holder reluctance. The indicator which can explain the lack of attention to public participation in the UK is political participation index. According to Economist Intelligence Unit, the UK political participation score is the lowest in the developed West (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2008). It can also explain why it is claimed that Britain is probably the most centralized country in the OECD (IAP2, 2009). As I argued in section 4-1-2, political participation index represent the tendency of power-holders to involve the public in the decision making process. The UK score for this index is 5 and it is located in the lowest limit of medium range. Accordingly, in the framework, an arrow beside the score shows its inclination towards low range. Moreover, the reluctance of power-holders to participate people is evidently explained by the "Participation Reluctancy Index" that I introduced in previous chapter. As illustrated in Figure 9, the index score for the UK is 3.75 which is one of the top three scores of power-holder's reluctance for participation. Among full democratic countries, this is a conspicuous outlier score.

Table 32: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for the United Kingdom

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range				Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←				Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	16				Low freedom of expression and belief
	High associational and organizational rights	12				Low associational and organizational rights
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	1.33				Low voice and accountability
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	→				Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance	35				High power distance
	High political participation		5→			Low political participation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.68				High survival (Low self-expression)
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	←				Less public's tendency for participation
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture	8.75				Low democratic political culture
	High societal collectivism		4.31			Low societal collectivism
	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.68				High survival (Low self-expression)
	Low power distance	35				High power distance
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance	35				High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity			66		High masculinity

Abram and Cowell in their comparative study of implementation of participation in Scotland and Norway found that whereas officers in the "Scottish case agonized over how to involve everybody and how to engage key actors and elected members in producing a comprehensive plan, Norwegian actors had greater powers and lesser ambitions (Abram & Cowell, 2004). This attribute in the UK is assigned to the type of traditional democratic system which is known as representative democracy. In such a system, "elected representatives, at both the national and local levels, claim legitimacy and thus view public participation as in conflict with their role of representing the public that elected them"(Enserink, Patel, Kranz, & Maestu, 2007).

As final evidence, I want to refer to the ADVISOR project which has reviewed the evaluation public participation processes of five water related projects in Portugal, Greece, Spain, The Netherlands and also the United Kingdom. The report about the participatory practice in the UK explains that "The inclusion of individual farmers in the participation process was done in the discussion of the action program (third formal public consultation). This was the first time in the entire consultation process that they were given the opportunity to represent themselves directly, and represented a broadening of the consultation process. Despite the formal consultation process, the farmers' opinions were not taken into account and the public participation can be seen more as an informative process rather than an inclusive one. The participation process failed to provide the opportunity for interaction or for exposing different views to informed reflection and debate. This undoubtedly contributed to a polarization of opinion and fuelled confrontation between farming and environmental interests" (Videira, Antunes, Santos, & Lobo, 2006, pp. 26-27).

Public Participation in the Netherlands

The Netherlands is one of the countries in which public participation is traditionally and frequently practiced. In Table 25, as a sample of filled framework for first category of FPs, scores for the Netherlands were mentioned. We can obviously see that for all FP1, FP2 and FP3, the Netherlands' scores are highly in favor of conducting public participation. Hence, the framework can completely explain the reality.

Enserink et al. in the evaluation of participatory practice of water management indicate that "the centuries-old water boards are considered to be the basis for the so-called Dutch 'consensus culture' or 'polder model'. More specifically, they strongly favor the reaching of agreements and aim for the prevention of conflicts rather than the application of authoritative solutions and hierarchical decision making" (Enserink, Patel, Kranz, & Maestu, 2007).

As an empirical evidence, in the ADVISOR project - evaluation of public participation processes of five water related projects in European countries including the Netherlands - it was reported that the Dutch case was the only one in which participation has succeeded to promote higher levels of public impact in the reviewed decision-making processes. The authors mentioned that "the public was involved in the Dutch project from the beginning of the process. The inhabitants of the area were involved in the conception of the project. Furthermore, there were several public hearings at different stages of the process that allowed the public to express their opinions and influence the project design and its inhabitants were the main actors in the Dutch case study. The Central Government and the NGOs also played an important role during the development of the project" (Videira, Antunes, Santos, & Lobo, 2006, p. 26)

Public Participation in France

In the last part of this subsection, I utilize the framework for the case study of public participation in river basin management in France. In Table 33, the filled framework for France is demonstrated. Scores for FP1 indicate strong legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives. Regarding power-holder support we see that the high score of power distance and also the medium score of political participation can be inferred that authorities do not warmly welcome to public participation or at least control it. Patel and Stel (2004) report that the form of PP is strongly determined by the governance structure, which usually resists to external pressure for change.

They also indicate that "competent authorities in France consider stakeholder involvement with great caution and apprehension. This is largely influenced by civil society appearing divided, ill organized and dependent upon political forces. Ultimately the intervention of stakeholders, or non-governmental actors, is perceived as being illegitimate and democratically problematic" (Patel & Stel, 2004, p. 26). Moreover, the authors of the report about participatory river basin management in France "refer more specifically to Frances' traditionally complicated, multilayered governance structure within which the central actors, the water authorities and basin committees, are accused of providing a structural bias against the intervention of new interests" (Patel & Stel, 2004, p. 26).

Table 33: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for France

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←			Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives	
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	15			Low freedom of expression and belief	
	High associational and organizational rights	12			Low associational and organizational rights	
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	1.24			Low voice and accountability	
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	→			Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders	
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance			68	High power distance	
	High political participation		6.67		Low political participation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.13			High survival (Low self-expression)	
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	←			Less public's tendency for participation	
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture	7.5			Low democratic political culture	
	High societal collectivism		4.2		Low societal collectivism	
	Low survival (High self-expression)	1.13			High survival (Low self-expression)	
	Low power distance			68	High power distance	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			86	High uncertainty avoidance	
	Low masculinity		43		High masculinity	

Furthermore, the interpretation of scores in the framework for public demand is not as easy as for FP1 and FP2. At first glance, based on the high scores of democratic political culture and self-expression dimension, it is inferred that there is high public tendency to participate in France. But because of high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance scores, some kind of resistance or deformation of public participation is expected to be seen. In fact, as a result of combination of democratic culture, high power distance and high uncertainty avoidance, the public participation appears in forms of protest and demonstration instead of participatory meeting and negotiations. In the case study of river basin management, it was reported that informal experience of public participation through the form of public demonstration hindered discussions and negotiations. In fact the public struggle has been conducted outside the institutional framework, usually on the streets (Patel & Stel, 2004). Authors emphasize that "although such forms of public participation are very powerful means for citizens to express their opinions, they will remain obstacles to social learning" (Patel & Stel, 2004, p. 30).

In the next part, the whole framework will be utilized for evaluation of practices of participatory methods in some countries.

5-2-2 Case Studies on Participatory Methods

After using the framework in previous section to evaluate public participation in general, now I will employ the whole framework to assess some practices of participatory methods for which reports and scientific papers have been published. For these case studies, I perform a secondary content analysis to understand to what extent political and cultural context affected participatory practices and how our framework can explain the process and consequences.

Comparison of Consensus Conferences in Four Countries: Canada, Denmark, France and the United States

In this part, we examine consensus conference, one of the well-known and globally used participatory methods, in some countries for which comparative data is available. These conferences were held on the same topic of genetically modified food (GM food). First of all, a short history and explanation of consensus conference is represented. Then our framework will be utilized for these countries based on the indicator scores of each country. In order to put it simple and comparable, I do not put the numerical score in the framework and instead I locate the first letter of countries' name in the appropriate range of national scores. Hence, in one framework, all four countries can be studied and compared.

Consensus Conference is a participatory method developed in Denmark. In fact Denmark is the grandparent of this citizen participation process when in 1987 the Danish Board of Technology (DBT) started using a transformed version of the US consensus conference, and adapted it to its own traditions of public participation. While the original US version was designed to bring together panels of experts to arrive at a consensus on research findings, Denmark took this consensus model but considered a lay citizen panel in dialogue with experts (Einsiedel, Jelsoe, & Breck, 2001).

Consensus Conference is a public meeting to involve ordinarily citizens in technology assessment or any other policy analysis issue. The conference is a three to four-day public conference in which experts and citizens would have a dialogue. It consists of three main bodies: the citizen or lay panel, the expert panel and the planning/steering committee. Citizen panel consists of about 14 people which are selected from many volunteers by steering committee. The citizen panel formulates the questions to be asked in the conference, participates in the selection of expert panel to answer them and produces the conference report. The expert panel is selected in such a way that opposing views can emerge and be discussed. The planning/steering committee has the main responsibility of making sure that the process would be run democratic, fair and transparent. The citizen panel would be prepared about the topic in two weekends. In the main conference, on the first day experts answer to the questions from the citizen panel. The second day would be for discussion between citizen panel, expert panel and the audience. On the third day, the citizen panel produces a final report which is an expression of the extent to which they can reach consensus. At the end of the third day or on the morning of the fourth day, the citizen panel read the final document to the experts, audience and the press (Andersen & Jæger, 1999).

Knowing the general characteristics of consensus conference, we start to examine factors of participation for four case studies. We evaluate and discuss the process and outcome of four consensus conferences which were held in France in June 1998, in Canada and Denmark in April 1999 and in the USA in 2002, all of them on GM issue.

In Table 34 the framework of first category of FPs is utilized for all countries. The position of the score of each indicator for every country indicates in the table with the first letter of country's name (C for Canada, D for Denmark, F for France and U for the United State). As

expected, for all countries that have democratic political system, indicators of FP1 are fully in favor of public participation. Regarding FP2, all countries except France, have highly support of power-holders for public involvement. I should mention that in previous section, FPs of the first category for the case of France were explained and discussed. Interestingly, among four countries, France is the only country for which factors of power-holder support (FP2) and public demand (FP3) are partly not in favor of public participation. To avoid repetition, I do not explain the French scores and instead, I give some evidence from the consensus conference report approving the reluctance of French power-holder to involve citizens. Dryzek and Tucker indicate that "while France is, of course, an electoral democracy, there are few avenues for public opinion to make itself felt between elections. Policy decisions about new technologies are normally made behind closed doors by the relevant political, bureaucratic, and scientific elites" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 868). Furthermore, it is obvious from the framework that public demand is very high in Denmark. Einsiedel et al. stated that "since the end of the 19th century, adult education and local debate have been an important part of Danish cultural and political life. Thus, the consensus conference model, as it has been developed in the Danish context, had a specific historical origin in the learning processes related to technology controversies in Denmark and a basis in Danish political culture" (Einsiedel, Jelsoe, & Breck, 2001, p. 85).

Table 34: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for Canada (C), Denmark (D), France (F) and the US (U)

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←CDFU			Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	CDFU			Low freedom of expression and belief
	High associational and organizational rights	CDFU			Low associational and organizational rights
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	CDFU			Low voice and accountability
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	←CDU F→			Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance	CDU		F	High power distance
	High political participation	CDU	F		Low political participation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High Self-expression)	CDFU			High survival (Low Self-expression)
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	←CDU ←F			Less public's tendency for participation
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture	CDFU			Low democratic political culture
	High societal collectivism	D	CFU		Low societal collectivism
	Low survival (High Self-expression)	CDFU			High survival (Low Self-expression)
	Low power distance	CDU		F	High power distance
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity	D	CF	U	High masculinity

In United State and Canada the tendency to team work (embedded in societal collectivism) is not as much as Denmark. In France, due to its high score of uncertainty avoidance and power distance, the reluctance of people to participate can be expected.

Regarding second category, Table 35 shows the filled framework for four countries. Attitudes toward acceptance of the powerless (FP4) are different between countries. While Denmark has high attention to voice of the powerless, French culture hesitates to accept the

lay people involving in decision process. Canada is more similar to Denmark but United State is inclined to other pole. In this regard it is said that "the consensus conference model is consistent with the dominant Danish egalitarian and participatory ethos" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 867).

High scores of uncertainty avoidance, power distance and assertiveness result in less acceptance of powerless in France. In case of the US, although its uncertainty avoidance and power distance are low, but high masculinity and high assertiveness lead to less acceptance of ordinary citizen in policy making process. There is a subtle difference between the case of France and the US. In France, as we observed from the scores of FP2, the power-holders in general do not support the participatory approach with involvement neither stakeholders (organized groups) nor ordinary citizens. In report of the consensus conference in France, it was mentioned that "some deputies argued that citizens should not have any role beyond voting in elections. Parliamentarians were not keen on any of their authority being delegated to another body. Some thought lay citizens would not be able to understand complex technological issues" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869). Moreover, it was reported that when a film of the consensus conference was shown in the national assembly in France, there were the reaction of silence and amazement at the ability of ordinary citizens to deliberate complex issues. In addition, not only the authorities are reluctance to citizens' involvement but also a degree of skepticism revealed in the press coverage about the wisdom of entrusting key roles to ordinary citizens (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

On the other hand, in the US, power-holders support public participation via involvement of organized group and stakeholders but not ordinary people. That is why the scores of FP2 for the US show the support of power-holders whereas the scores of FP4 represent the reluctance to accept the powerless. In fact it is a subtle and important difference between FP2 and FP4 which should be carefully considered.

In the literature it was stated that in the US "while federal government agencies routinely run public consultation exercises on proposed regulations and other decisions, it is rarely the case that particular sorts of participants — such as lay citizens — are recruited or empowered. Consultation is dominated by already organized groups with an interest and stake in the issue" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 870). In the case of consensus conference in the US, "the state legislature paid little attention — though one legislator wrote to the president of the University of New Hampshire complaining about the university's involvement in what looked like policy making, involving citizens who could not possibly have the requisite expertise" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871). It was also reported that in the coverage of the consensus conference, a columnist in the conservative Washington Times ridiculed the idea of letting citizens "vote" about scientific issues (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

We found in the framework that Canadian masculinity and assertiveness is not too low. It can explain the remark by Einsiedel et al. that in the traditional Canadian approach consultation has been generally limited to key stakeholders.

As far as gender of participants (FP5) is concerned, we can see that all countries are almost the same. We presume that participation of both gender in different bodies of the consensus conference are expected and accepted. High masculinity of the US refers to performance orientation of American culture and is not related to inequality of genders. Low survival and high self-expression value is another confirmative indicator for gender egalitarianism in these countries.

Regarding FP6, we can see that although all countries are individualistic, their human orientation scores are different. We studied that in high human orientation cultures, others are important and people feel responsibility for promoting well-being of society while on the other pole, self-interest is important and the government is responsible for individual's well-being. Denmark has a high score of this dimension as well as high score of societal collectivism which also indicates the priority of group goals over individual goals. On the contrary, France has a low score of human orientation. The US scores also indicate that they

are not zealous of collectivist benefits and social welfare. It can be expected from the dominant capitalist culture in the US.

Table 35: Utilization of the framework of category 2 for Canada (C), Denmark (D), France (F) and the US (U)

Category 2: Participants in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless	← CD U → F →			Less attention to voice of the powerless
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity	D	CF	U	High masculinity
Secondary indicator(s)	Low power distance	CDU		F	High power distance
	Low assertiveness		CD	FU	High assertiveness
FP5: Gender of Participants	Both gender should participate	← CDFU			Male participation is preferred
Primary indicator(s)	High gender egalitarianism	CDF	U		Low gender egalitarianism
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity	D	CF	U	High masculinity
	Low survival	CDFU			High survival
FP6: Role and Intention of Participants	Participate as individual for self-benefit	CD → ← FU			Participate as representative for collective-benefit
Primary indicator(s)	Individualism	CDFU			Collectivism
	Low human orientation	F	U	CD	High human orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low societal collectivism		CFU	D	High societal collectivism

It was reported that in spite of the Danish model of random selection of participants in which the absence of self-interest would be guaranteed to some extent, in two American consensus conferences, they use advertisement to recruit participants and the consequence was greater participant self-selection. It means that potentially those most interested in the issue were most likely to volunteer (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871).

Table 36 represents the utilized framework of third category - process and interactions in public participation - for four countries. First of all, the scores of FP7 reveal that except France, other countries are for innovative and flexible process. It can explain why Denmark and the US were the main developer of many innovative participatory methods. For instance, 'consensus conference' and 'scenario workshop' were originated in Denmark and 'citizen jury' and 'deliberative polling' were invented in the US. Canada was also very enthusiastic to employ these innovative methods. On the contrary, French uncertainty avoidance has made them cautious to use new methodology. The French Office in Parliament for Evaluation of Science and Technology (OPECST) is a counterpart of Danish Board of Technology (DBT). While DBT has been the main organizer of participatory practice in Denmark, like consensus conference, OPECST was against sponsoring participatory technology assessment. It was reported that former OPECST director opposed the consensus conference idea (even after visiting Denmark). Nevertheless, the main initiative that for the first time a consensus conference on GM food was held in France "came from the office of newly appointed Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, who wanted to appear innovative in response to a knotty issue" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 868).

Table 36: Utilization of the framework of category 3 for Canada (C), Denmark (D), France (F) and the US (U)

Category 3: Process and Interactions in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP7: Process Format	Acceptance of innovative, informal and unstructured process	← CDU F→			Preference of conventional, formal and structured process
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance
	High individualism	CDFU			Low individualism
Secondary indicator(s)	Indulgence	CDU	F		Restraint
FP8: Process Timing & Size	Acceptance of slow and long process with small group	C→ ←D U→ F→			Preference of fast and short process with large group
Primary indicator(s)	High future orientation	CD	FU		Low future orientation
	Long term orientation		F	CU(D?)	Short term orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity	D	CF	U	High masculinity
FP9: Inter-party Trust	High trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders, policy makers)	←C ←D F→ U→			Low trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders, policy makers)
Primary indicator(s)	High interpersonal trust index	D	CU	F	Low interpersonal trust index
	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance
	High confidence in government index			CFU	Low confidence in government index
Secondary indicator(s)	Low assertiveness		CD	FU	High assertiveness
FP10: Expressiveness	Communicative, speak one's mind, explicit and self-expressive in communication with others	←CDFU			Non-communicative, modest, face-saving, implicit and self-censorship in communication with others
Primary indicator(s)	High individualist	CDFU			Low individualism
	Low in-group collectivism	CDU	F		High in-group collectivism
	High assertiveness	FU	CD		Low assertiveness
Secondary indicator(s)	Secular-rational	DF	C	U	Traditional
	Low power distance	CDU		F	High power distance
FP11: Respect for Rank	Indifference of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and acceptance of confrontation, oppose and criticize	←CDU F→			Importance of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and avoidance of confrontation, oppose and criticize
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance	CDU		F	High power distance
	High individualism	CDFU			Low individualism
	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance
	Secular-rational	DF	C	U	Traditional
Secondary indicator(s)	High performance orientation	CDFU			Low performance orientation
	Self-expression	CDFU			Survival

The scores for second factor of this category (FP8) indicate that in Denmark slow and long process with small group of participants is accepted while in the US and France and also in Canada to some extent, the reverse is preferred. Here an implausible score of short-term orientation for Denmark was reported by Hofstede which contradicts its future orientation score. Moreover, the score of future orientation for Canada assigns only to English speaking part and so it makes hard to judge about Canadian society in whole.

Regarding empirical evidence, as it was reported for the consensus conference in France, a short timescale was enforced (Lieberman & Taylor, 2005). Interestingly, comparison of the consensus conferences in Canada and Denmark reveal the different attitude toward timing

of the process. Einsiedel et al. reported that "the Canadian final public conferences were done over a three-day period, with the lay panels producing their reports in a marathon overnight session that lasted well into the early morning hours. The Danish conference was held over four days to allow the lay panel more time to write its report" (2001, p. 89). About the size of the participatory process, we can see that the participatory methods developed by Denmark include small number of participants, about 15 to 25 persons for consensus conference and scenario workshop. On the contrary, participatory methods established by Americans consist of large number of participants, about 50 to 500+ for deliberative polling (Fishkin, Luskin, & Jowell, 2000). Moreover, it is pointed out that recently "the America-Speaks Foundation organizes deliberative 21st Century Town Meeting's that involve hundreds of participants meeting for a relatively short time - partly on the grounds that politicians and the media find it harder to ignore such numbers than the 15 or so that a consensus conference involves" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 872). It cannot be ignored that the size of population in a country can surely affect on the preferred number of participants in a participatory method. It might also explain to some extent why in the American methods the large number of participants is preferred.

Regarding inter-party trust factor (FP9), the framework shows that there is not too much confidence in the government in France, Canada and the United States. For Denmark, there is no score for this index but from scores of similar Scandinavian countries, it can be inferred that there should be high trust to the government in Denmark. Moreover, we can observe that there is obvious lack of interpersonal trust in France. Also for the US, the lack of trust to some extent is noticed. On the contrary, Denmark enjoys of high interpersonal trust whereas the situation for Canada is moderate.

Empirical evidence from consensus conferences confirms the observation from the framework. In case of French consensus conference, it was reported that in spite of efforts of steering committee to assure the lay panelists of the trustworthiness and benevolence of the French government, there remained mistrust on the part of the lay participants because the government seemed already to have decided about the growth of GM maize (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

The emphasis on the transparent process by Danish government might be an important cause of trust in the country. One of the Member of Parliament in Denmark stated that reports of consensus conferences "are better than opinion polls because they are less biased, there is no hidden agenda and the methodology is explicit and clear. With opinion polls in the newspapers you never know who is behind them and what is the agenda" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 867). It is asserted that in Denmark when powerful interests are disregarded by the content of citizens' reports, the authorities do not organize to undermine the credibility of the consensus conference (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). It is completely in contrast to experience in France, where power-holders have sometimes tried to shut down such forums.

In the case of Canada, the skepticism to the power-holders can be seen from the final report of the consensus conference by lay panel. The final report indicated that regarding the ethical consideration of GM food, a lack of trust between public and industry and government is apparent. The report also distrustfully enumerates some concerns of lay panel: "We are concerned that public participation opportunities may not exist in the future. We are concerned that our recommendations will not be incorporated into policy development. We are concerned that available information is highly biased" (Calgary Citizens Panel, 1999).

Finally in American consensus conference, it was reported that the political legitimacy which lies in acceptance of a larger public and key political actors was lacking. For the consensus conference, a GM company promised to send a representative, but they cancelled at the last moment. One anti-GM group refused to participate on grounds of expected pro-GM bias of the process. In conclusion, It is argued that in an American system "in which inputs normally

take the form of advocacy, it is hard to get partisans to accept that the forum is not going to be biased somehow against their interests" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 871).

Next factor of participation is expressiveness (FP10). There are not too much sayings about these factors for these four countries due to the fact that primary indicators reveal that these countries are self-expressive and explicit in their communication. In the reports of consensus conferences, as expected, I could not find any evidence to show non-communicative, modest and self-censorship in the interactions of participatory sessions. In further case studies, a different manner of expressiveness in other countries will be studied.

The last FP of this category has the same scores for all countries except France again. Considering the privilege for authorities and the highly ranked (FP11) is not the case for Denmark at all. Because of the traditional and religious culture of Americans, their greater respect for authorities was reported (Inglehart, Basafiez, Diez-Medrano, Halman, & Luijkx, 2004). Furthermore, high uncertainty avoidance and power distance of French people reveal that they are not indifferent in confrontation with authorities. It can be expected that although French people express themselves and occasionally oppose the decision makers, but imperceptibly they respect and regard the authorities. It was reported that in the French consensus conference, "the lay citizens proved more critical and less compliant than expected by the sponsors, even though their final report was not radically at variance with existing government policy" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869).

Finally, FPs associated with output of public participation are evaluated. Regarding outcome expectation (FP12), as illustrated in Table 37, the scores of masculinity dimension for four countries reveal the difference between them. It is evident that the US highly values for success, performance and optimized outcome while, on the other pole, Denmark appraises relationship, satisfaction and consensus. Also, the scores of France and Canada indicate that they incline toward right pole rather than left one.

In evaluation of the consensus conference in the US, It was stated that "the GM food issue plays out somewhat differently in the United States than in Denmark and France. GM agriculture is very big business in the United States, GM crops having made great inroads with a minimum of public fuss. The level of public anxiety on this issue is lower than in Europe" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 870). It clearly shows the importance of performance versus other qualitative consequences of the issue in the US.

There is remarkable evidence to see the difference of attitudes between Danes and Canadians in this respect. Survey findings on biotechnology revealed that Canadians more than Danes equate biotechnology with economic competitiveness. In the 1996 Eurobarometer survey, whose questions were replicated in Canada, in response to the statement "we have to accept some degree of risk from modern biotechnology if it enhances the country's economic competitiveness", only 30 percent of Danes agreed while 61 percent of Canadians consented (Einsiedel, Jelsoe, & Breck, 2001). It indicates to some extent the cultural differences between two countries regarding the outcome expectation. Moreover, the output of Danish consensus conferences is important to the extent that it can lead to parliamentary questions to ministers, asking why they do not follow the citizens' recommendations (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

On the other hand, empirical evidence from the consensus conference in France shows the inclination of power-holders towards economic growth rather than consensus. Although it was claimed that the main purpose of such a technology – GM food - is to "assure both higher economic growth and social acceptance", nevertheless the French authorities believe that uninformed public opinion is an obstacle to progress and needs to be overcome by education (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). It is also considerable that the term of 'consensus' itself would be dubious in France and hence the name of 'consensus conference' was changed to 'citizen conference'. It was argued that the term of consensus would not be suitable to the

French context where it could be inferred a 'halfhearted consensus' based on some ambiguous compromise (Lieberman & Taylor, 2005). However, contrary to Canadians and Americans, French citizens in lay panel did not accept the economic benefit of biotechnology at expense of people's health. It was reported from the conference that "the debate framed largely in terms of differences between French and American approaches to food and life, contrasting the American stress on artificiality and quantity of production and consumption to the French stress on naturalness and quality" (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008, p. 869).

Table 37: Utilization of the framework of category 4 for Canada (C), Denmark (D), France (F) and the US (U)

Category 4: Output of Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP12: Outcome Expectation	Expect and accept of involvement, relationship, satisfaction and consensus as qualitative outcomes	← D CF → U →			Expect and preference of concrete result, success and quantitatively optimized outcomes
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity	D	FC	U	High masculinity
	Low performance orientation			CDFU	High performance orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival	CDFU			High survival
FP13: Dealing with Conflicts	Mostly compromise in conflicts and cooperate to seek win-win game	← D ← CF → U →			Hardly compromise in conflicts and compete to seek lose-win game
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity	D	CF	U	High masculinity
	Low assertiveness		CD	FU	High assertiveness
	Secular-rational (Flexumility)	DF	C	U	Traditional (Monumentalism)
Secondary indicator(s)	Long term orientation		F	CDU	Short term orientation
	Low uncertainty avoidance	CDU		F	High uncertainty avoidance

The way of dealing with conflicts (FP13) is the last factor of participation in the framework. It is understandable from the countries scores that the US and Denmark again stand in two opposite poles. I found from the reports of consensus conferences that in case of the United States, whenever different parties think that there is a possibility of bias and conflicts, instead of negotiation and compromise, they withdraw the session (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008). It means that the stakeholders are only seeking for their win otherwise they do not participate. On the contrary, in Denmark we observed that in the GM consensus conference all the relevant actors with opposing views participated and played their allotted roles and followed the proceedings under neutral directing of Danish Board of Technology (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

The scores of FP13 for Canada and France show their middle position between compromise and defeat in conflicts. The fact that, in spite of critical and negative opinions of French citizens in the consensus conference, finally their report was not too radically opposing with government policy can show the sense of compromise in their culture. However, we observed that French authorities, on the other hand, in some cases do not compromise and try to impose their interests (Dryzek & Tucker, 2008).

To sum up, this case studies show that how we can explain the effect of political and cultural context by utilization of the framework developed in this research. In order to examine the framework for different context, in next section another case study for the same method of participation (consensus conference) on similar issue (GM food) will be discussed.

Evaluation of Consensus Conference in Japan

The first consensus conference in Japan was held in 1998 on gene therapy (Wakamatsu, 1999). After that, in 2000 another consensus conference on the subject of genetically modified (GM) food was held in Japan. Consensus conference on GM food was common in Europe and elsewhere and following those experiences, the Japanese government decided to use this form of public participation to investigate policy issues related to the subject (Nishizawa, 2005). Nishizawa thoroughly reported and evaluated the process of this recent consensus conference in Japan. I utilize the framework to anticipate the effect of politico-cultural context on participatory practice in Japan and I will mainly use Nishizawa's paper as empirical evidence to examine to what extent the framework outcomes are plausible and helpful. Occasionally I use some evidence from the first consensus conference in Japan as well. First of all I explain some general data about the recent consensus conference and then I sequentially fill the framework of each category and mention the empirical evidence for each FP, if available in the literature.

For consensus conference in 2000, according to the procedure of this method, "the lay-panel members were recruited through various media, including newspaper advertisements and flyers. The organizer's active recruitment resulted in as many as 479 applications in 26 days. The steering committee then selected 18 people (nine male and nine female) from across Japan to avoid possible selection bias in terms of geographical location, sex, age and occupation. The ages of the lay panel, for instance, ranged widely from 20 to 74. Their occupations varied as well: there were civil servants, office workers, a physician, a self-employed person and a student. At the same time, the steering committee selected 18 specialists to give presentations to the lay panel for the preparatory meetings or answer the key questions to be posed by the lay panel at the main consensus conference. Their profiles varied (from natural scientist to consumer advocate), as did their positions on transgenic foods. Among the experts were: a Government official from the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Labor (MHLW); a writer and a severe critic of transgenic foods; Vice President of Monsanto Japan - multinational agricultural biotechnology corporation; and the Secretary General of an umbrella organization of consumer associations in Japan. Overall, the GM consensus conference was structured similarly to the Danish consensus model" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 481). This consensus conference was the first one initiated by the Japanese government which took place at national level.

In Table 38, the filled framework with Japanese scores for the first category of FPs is displayed. Regarding FP1, it is clear that the political and legal system have adequate support for public participation. The fact that several citizen engagement practices were held in the country can be evidence of it (Nishizawa, 2005).

The scores of indicators for FP2 show that power-holders support is not high; so, we can expect to have authorities' resistance for participation to some extent. Nishizawa reported that although Ministry of Agriculture initiated the participatory session, "agency officials themselves expressed ambivalence towards citizen engagement: on one occasion, they implied their intention to integrate the deliberation outcomes into policymaking, but, on another occasion, denied this. Their reaction was logical in light of the tradition of public policymaking in Japan, which is generally perceived as a traditional, elitist society, largely expert-dominated and with relatively little public involvement" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 482).

Table 38: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for Japan

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	←			Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives	
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief	13			Low freedom of expression and belief	
	High associational and organizational rights	10			Low associational and organizational rights	
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability	0.95			Low voice and accountability	
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	→			Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders	
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance		54		High power distance	
	High political participation		6.11		Low political participation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High self-expression)		-0.05		High survival (Low self-expression)	
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	←			Less public's tendency for participation	
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture	8.75			Low democratic political culture	
	High societal collectivism	5.23			Low societal collectivism	
	Low survival (High self-expression)		-0.05		High survival (Low self-expression)	
	Low power distance		54		High power distance	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance	
	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity	

Scores of primary indicators of public demand factor (FP3), represent that there is almost high tendency of the Japanese for involvement. The high score of democratic political culture indicates high tendency of citizens to participate. In addition, high societal collectivism shows their high spirit of team working. On the other hand, high uncertainty avoidance and high masculinity culture can be inferred that the Japanese are not enthusiastic too much for participation in voluntary associations and activities and so encouragement from the government to activate their tendency to participate can be effective. However, these two dimensions are secondary indicators and they have more sayings about other FPs.

The public tendency to be involved in decision process was reported by Nishizawa. She argued that "Japanese Government changed its original position and transferred the debate on GM food from the scientific to the public arena because there was a strong popular movement towards more transparent policy decisions and political change. Since the 1980s, the public administration has suffered severe critical attacks on its secrecy and lack of transparency" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 486)

Moreover, I like to mention that the score of Participation Reluctancy Index (PRI) for Japan is illustrative and confirmative of above remarks. Japanese PRI score is 2.64 that shows the power-holder reluctance for participation. This score also can explain why in recent years the Japanese asked for more involvement in decision process to increase the government transparency.

Table 39: Utilization of the framework of category 2 for Japan

Category 2: Participants in Public Participation						
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)	
		H/L	M	L/H		
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless	→			Less attention to voice of the powerless	
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance	
	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low power distance		54		High power distance	
	Low assertiveness	3.69			High assertiveness	
FP5: Gender of Participants	Both gender should participate	→			Male participation is preferred	
Primary indicator(s)	High gender egalitarianism		3.17		Low gender egalitarianism	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity	
	Low survival		-0.05		High survival	
FP6: Role and Intention of Participants	Participate as individual for self-benefit	→			Participate as representative for collective-benefit	
Primary indicator(s)	Individualism		46		Collectivism	
	Low human orientation		4.34		High human orientation	
Secondary indicator(s)	Low societal collectivism			5.23	High societal collectivism	

Concerning factors related to participants in public participation, Table 39 illustrates scores of relevant indicators for Japan. First of all, high scores of uncertainty avoidance and masculinity dimensions indicate that the attention to voice of the powerless and laypersons may not be too much in Japan. Wakamatsu reported that up to 1998, there were almost no public forum in which the general public or ordinary citizens consider the issues and problems in science and technology in order to arrive at a decision by themselves. It is often believed that these issues are difficult to understand and they should rely on expert judgment (Wakamatsu, 1999). The experience of consensus conference gives more confirming evidence. Nishizawa declares that in spite of the standard Danish model of consensus conference in which it is common that the lay panel decides which experts are to be invited, in Japanese case it was the steering committee, not the lay panel, that nominated the members of the expert panel (Nishizawa, 2005).

Moreover, About FP5, we can see from the framework that in Japanese society the role of genders are not equal. So it can be expected that decision making process is occupied by males more than females. In consensus conference, among 11 expert panelists and 7 steering committee members, as far as I checked by names, there was only one female (Hirakawa, 2001).

According to indicator scores for FP6, Japanese culture is neither too individualistic nor very collectivistic. So a dominant intention for participation cannot be defined. However considering the high societal collectivism, it can be inferred that in general group goals take precedence over individual goals.

In Table 40 scores of FPs related to process and interactions in public participation are displayed. From the FP7 indicator scores, it can be anticipated that the Japanese may prefer conventional, formal and structured process due to their high uncertainty avoidant culture. It means that the new methodology of decision making in general and innovative citizen involvement in particular may welcome with hesitation. Nishizawa explains how the content

of consensus conference has been changed in Japanese context. She mentioned that although "the deliberation process was radical and structurally and organizationally very different from conventional conflict-resolution methods in Japan, nevertheless, the content of the deliberation was nothing like as radical. Rather, it mirrored the conventional policy style of consensual and technocratic decision-making and the conformist attitude in Japan" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 486). It shows that the innovative format of the participatory process was loaded with traditional content indeed.

Table 40: Utilization of the framework of category 3 for Japan

Category 3: Process and Interactions in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP7: Process Format	Acceptance of innovative, informal and unstructured process	→			Preference of conventional, formal and structured process
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance
	High Individualism		46		Low Individualism
Secondary indicator(s)	Indulgence		42		Restraint
FP8: Process Timing & Size	Acceptance of slow and long process with small group	←			Preference of fast and short process with large group
Primary indicator(s)	High future orientation	4.29			High uncertainty avoidance
	Long term orientation	88			Short term orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity
FP9: Inter-party Trust	High trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)	→			Low trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)
Primary indicator(s)	High interpersonal trust index		79.6		Low interpersonal trust index
	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance
	High confidence in government index			64.4	Low confidence in government index
Secondary indicator(s)	Low assertiveness	3.69			High assertiveness
FP10: Expressiveness	Communicative, speak one's mind, explicit and self-expressive in communication with others	→			Non-communicative, modest, face-saving, implicit and self-censorship in communication with others
Primary indicator(s)	High individualist		46		Low individualism
	Low in-group collectivism		4.72		High in-group collectivism
	High assertiveness			3.69	Low assertiveness
Secondary indicator(s)	Secular-rational	1.96			Traditional
	Low power distance		54		High power distance
FP11: Respect for Rank	Indifference of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and acceptance of confrontation, oppose and criticize	→			Importance of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and avoidance of confrontation, oppose and criticize
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance		54		High power distance
	High individualism		46		Low individualism
	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance
	Secular-rational	1.96			Traditional
Secondary indicator(s)	High performance orientation		4.22		Low performance orientation
	Self-expression		-0.05		Survival

Indicators of FP8 estimate that in Japan, slow and long process might be accepted. Japan also is known for its slow decision making process. Japan has a future oriented culture which shows their attention to planning and long-term success. It can explain why Japanese are

known for their slow decision making process. It can be concluded that the four-day consensus conference was not a lengthy consultation session for the Japanese.

Regarding factor of trust (FP9), it is observed that the lack of trust between citizens and the government is prominent. It necessitates more transparency of the process of public participation to absorb the confidence of the public. The questionnaire filled by lay members prior to the first consensus conference in Japan, revealed that "most of them (15 out of 19) have little faith in the current politicians" (Wakamatsu, 1999, p. 29). Moreover, it seems that interpersonal trust is also not too high since there is high uncertainty avoidance in Japan.

Primary indicators of FP10 indicate that Japanese culture is not explicit and direct in communication with others. In fact they seem to have more inclination to face-saving and self-censoring in communication. Moreover, as far as respect for rank is concerned, it can be inferred from the scores of FP11 that the Japanese are not too indifferent about the status and seniority of persons and so they might hesitate to confront and oppose against high ranks, although they are not too obedient. On this issue, there is some interesting evidence reported from the consensus conference in Japan. Nishizawa's interviews with lay panelists revealed that the involvement of governmental authorities had influence on the discussion at the deliberative session. She mentions in his paper that "a panel member explained the unspoken, subtle strategy taken by the lay panel to bring the state-involved deliberation to a successful conclusion without jeopardizing their future participation...Several other panel members also said that they refrained from suggesting extreme opinions such as a total ban on GMOs. This self-restrained reaction seen in the statements by several lay panelists corresponds to the "conflict avoidance behavior" that has been described as an important behavioral norm of the Japanese" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 483).

Regarding output of public participation, the last part of the framework which is displayed in Table 41, scores of FP12 represent that in Japan, there is an inclination towards the performance and achievement instead of involvement and relationship. In case of consensus conference on GM food, authorities disclosed that their expectation from the public participation is to see acceptance of the current achievement in GM foods since the Japanese government has invested too much in advancing industrial development of biotechnology (Nishizawa, 2005). It means that the consensus on reduction or restriction policy of GM food might not be accepted and adopted. Nishizawa reported that "the plan thus emphasized the importance of maintaining Japan's current competitive advantage in the analysis of rice genomes and, at the same time, the general public acceptance of biotechnology that was considered to reinforce Japan's competitive advantage in this field" (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 485).

Finally, scores of FP13 reveal that in Japan, compromise is more accepted than confrontation in dealing with conflicts. Low assertiveness and high score of flexibility and humility (flexumility which is measured via score of traditional dimension) mean that the Japanese tend to be flexible and defer confrontation. Moreover, Japanese have long term orientation culture which means they consider the future consequences of their today's action and thus they may try to prevent conflicts in advance. But, on the other hand, high uncertainty avoidance and masculinity indicate that they might be reluctant or cautious to compromise with opponents.

As empirical evidence, Nishizawa pointed out the way of strategic and political behavior of lay panelist in confrontation with authorities during the consensus conference and cited from a scientist that "this behavioral pattern is the "essence" of the Japanese style of conflict management. It is neither self-sacrifice nor spontaneous consensus, but rather a strong desire to avoid direct conflict, particularly with Government authority (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 484)". On the other hand, Hirakawa (2001) emphasizes that we should bear in mind that the initiative of this kind of public participation by Japanese government is principally oriented toward the promotion of public acceptance. It means that in the probable conflict

on the issue between the public and the government, Japanese government sought for persuasion and not consensus. Accordingly, it was reported that the decision makers finally did not accept to integrate the outcome of the consensus conference into management decision and it created a tension between them and the lay panel members (Nishizawa, 2005). This behavior of government can be explained to some extent by high masculinity and uncertainty avoidant culture in Japan.

Table 41: Utilization of the framework of category 4 for Japan

Category 4: Output of Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP12: Outcome Expectation	Expect and accept of involvement, relationship, satisfaction and consensus as qualitative outcomes	→			Expect and preference of concrete result, success and quantitatively optimized outcomes
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity
	Low performance orientation		4.22		High performance orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival		-0.05		High survival
FP13: Dealing with Conflicts	Mostly compromise in conflicts and cooperate to seek win-win game	←			Hardly compromise in conflicts and compete to seek lose-win game
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity			95	High masculinity
	Low assertiveness	3.69			High assertiveness
	Secular-rational (Flexumility)	1.96			Traditional (Monumentalism)
Secondary indicator(s)	Long term orientation	88			Short term orientation
	Low uncertainty avoidance			92	High uncertainty avoidance

In conclusion, in this case, using the framework and the cultural-political indicators, we could explain some underlying factors of what Nishizawa observed. To sum up this case study, I want to refer to some final remarks by Nishizawa in which she emphasized to the importance of contextual factors in a participatory practice. She indicates:

"We have seen how contextual factors have influenced the process and outcome of an institutionalized citizen-deliberation practice. We have stressed that, among other factors, the existing framework of public acceptance of GM crops, a technocratic policy style and the particular cultural norm of conformity prevented effective citizen deliberation from taking place. Based on these observations, it is extremely difficult though not impossible, to entirely isolate citizen-deliberation conduct from the influence of the social environment in which it is practiced. Like other policy processes, that of citizen deliberation cannot be entirely isolated from its wider social, political and cultural context. Without both an acknowledgement and a better understanding of the dynamics of the relationship between citizen deliberations and their social environments, the success in practice of deliberative approaches may be severely limited...The fact that particular deliberative mechanisms are based on sound theories does not mean that they will necessarily produce sound results in specific instances. Similarly, the fact that such mechanisms have been found to work well in practice in one social environment does not mean that they will necessarily work equally well in another. While different countries may use the same term, 'citizen deliberation', its explicit and implicit meanings vary in different national and cultural contexts. The transfer of a particular policy process from one culture to another can therefore result in a conflict of values between the process and its new social environment." (Nishizawa, 2005, p. 486)

Case Study of Participatory Stakeholder Analysis in Egypt

In the last part of this section, I utilize the whole framework for another method of participation which was called participatory stakeholder analysis and applied by Hermans (2005) in water resource management in Egypt (NWRP project). In this participatory practice, some stakeholders from different governmental bodies (ministries) and another Egyptian interest group (environmental agency) were involved.

As it can be seen in Table 42, low scores of FP1 indicators for Egypt show that there are serious legal and political barriers for public participation. Moreover, from the FP2 scores, it is expected to see reluctance of power-holders to involve other actors in the policy-making process.

In practice, we see some evidence in NWRP project. In that project, Dutch consultants tried to use a participatory stakeholder analysis in the form of meta-game. Hermans narrated that in the project activities, mainly national government actors had been involved and representatives of other actors namely farmers, industries and citizens were absent. He also emphasized that "reaching a real involvement of all actors and institutions in a complicated decision making process [of Egypt] proved to be a difficult challenge" (Hermans, 2005, p. 71). These observations were expected from FP1 and FP2 scores of the country.

Based on the scores for public demand factor (FP3), we can infer that there is lack of tendency of the public for engagement in Egypt, however it can be seen that one of the important indicator - democratic political culture - is not too low.

Table 42: Utilization of the framework of category 1 for Egypt

Category 1: Basic Drivers of Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	→			Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Primary indicator(s)	High freedom of expression and belief			5	Low freedom of expression and belief
	High associational and organizational rights			2	Low associational and organizational rights
Secondary indicator(s)	High voice and accountability			-1.2	Low voice and accountability
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	→			Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance			80	High power distance
	High political participation		4.44		Low political participation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival (High Self-expression)			-.50	High survival (Low Self-expression)
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	→			Less public's tendency for participation
Primary indicator(s)	High democratic political culture		5		Low democratic political culture
	High societal collectivism		4.36		Low societal collectivism
	Low survival (High Self-expression)			-.50	High survival (Low Self-expression)
	Low power distance			80	High power distance
Secondary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity

Table 43 represents the second category of FPs for Egypt. The middle to high range of FP4 scores indicate that Egyptian authorities prefer to involve strong stakeholders in policy making process rather than powerless citizens. It is something that was obvious in the case

of NWRP project in which no representative of the powerless like farmers, ordinary citizens or even NGO members (if exists!) presented. Hermans indicated that in the project "mainly national government actors had been involved in NWRP's activities... the group of actors involved in the formulation of strategies should be expanded to include representatives of other actors such as farmers, industries, citizens and members of parliament" (Hermans, 2005, p. 92).

Moreover, FP5 score of low gender egalitarianism indicates the preference of male involvement in decision making process in Egypt, yet its masculinity score is not too high and in the middle range. However, my personal interview with Hermans reveals that there were some involved females in the NWRP project.

Furthermore, due to the collectivist culture and high scores of FP6 in Egypt, it is expected that participants mostly involve in the process as a representative of their community seeking for collective benefits. Probably this factor can explain the behavior which have been seen in NWRP project and described by Hermans: "If other members in a social group have established the importance of certain objectives, it is not appropriate to argue against their importance and dismiss some of those objectives at the expense of others" (Hermans, 2005, p. 95).

Table 43: Utilization of the framework of category 2 for Egypt

Category 2: Participants in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless	→			Less attention to voice of the powerless
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance
	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity
Secondary indicator(s)	Low power distance			80	High power distance
	Low assertiveness		3.91		High assertiveness
FP5: Gender of Participants	Both gender should participate	→			Male participation is preferred
Primary indicator(s)	High gender egalitarianism			2.9	Low gender egalitarianism
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity
	Low survival			-.50	High survival
FP6: Role and Intention of Participants	Participate as individual for self-benefit	→			Participate as representative for collective-benefit
Primary indicator(s)	Individualism			38	Collectivism
	Low human orientation			4.6	High human orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low societal collectivism		4.36		High societal collectivism

Regarding process of public participation, we can infer from the scores of FP7 in Table 44 that the Egyptian policy maker may prefer to have conventional, serious and formal process and consequently they avoid innovative, unfamiliar and informal session. Case study of NWRP project reveals that Egyptian authorities did not accept the participatory metagame approach. Hermans mentions that the applied method "was considered to be too much like a "game" and this was expected to disappoint some of the senior officials in NWRP's project committees" (Hermans, 2005, p. 88). I assert that even the terminology of the method in specific culture can have a significant effect on the perceptions of decision makers about it. Using term of "Game" in a very serious and restraint culture can be seen as something odd

for the name of policy analysis method. People in such cultures may hardly accept to have a role playing gaming as a serious method for decision making. They normally think that decision making is a process of real challenge. Hence, in their estimation, playing a game as policy analysis methodology would be ridiculous. I think, in such cultures, if only the terminology of the method changes from the "gaming" to "simulation", it can actually influence on the perception of policy makers. As a personal experience, I remember that it was hard for me to understand how the game sessions in a postgraduate course can be helpful and learning. I, as an Iranian person from the almost uncertainty avoidant and restraint culture, assumed that those gaming sessions in a master course are fun with no real serious educational content while probably it was not the case for a student from the Netherlands. In fact, such cultures prefer to use familiar and conventional approach and they normally hesitate to employ new, innovative and unknown methods.

Furthermore, scores of FP8 indicate that the short and fast participatory process may be preferred in Egypt rather than long and slow one. Hermans indicates that "further use of the participatory metagame approach would therefore require a long term effort, lasting for more than a year. As a result, the decision was made not to pursue further the use of the participatory metagame approach with the project's real actors" (Hermans, 2005, p. 88).

Considering interactions between participants, from the FP9 scores, we find that there is a lack of interpersonal trust in Egypt. In general, it means that out-group stakeholders and participants hardly trust each other and so they do not easily reveal their interests, objectives, preferences and resources. In the case of game practice, this index may explain why some policy options and informal factors did not reveal by the actors. As Hermans explains, in NWRP project such unclear and hidden agenda were observed: "in reality, both the options and the behavior during negotiations are influenced by implicit and ambiguous power structures, hidden agendas and cultural sensitivities. Real negotiations would be different from the ones simulated in the participatory metagame" (Hermans, 2005, p. 84).

Scores of FP10 are eye-catching because almost all main and secondary indicators emphasize on the dominant cultural characteristics of modesty, face-saving, non-confrontation and self-censorship in communication with others. These cultural features can explain some behaviors seen in NWRP project. Hermans in his final remarks about the unsuccessful utilization of participatory metagame in Egyptian project mentions that: "analysis of options and metagame analysis are part of the "conflict analysis" family of models, meaning that conflicts among actors are used as a starting point for analysis. The cultural dimensions show that generally policy makers in Egypt are not comfortable with pinpointing conflicts bluntly and openly, but are more likely to deny conflicts and to either repress them or to deal with them in a more indirect and subtle way. This means that the presentation of analysis results has to be done with care, not emphasizing the potential conflicts, but rather placing the emphasis on the room for compromise" (Hermans, 2005, p. 94).

Table 44: Utilization of the framework of category 3 for Egypt

Category 3: Process and Interactions in Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP7: Process Format	Acceptance of innovative, informal and unstructured process	→			Preference of conventional, formal and structured process
Primary indicator(s)	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance
	High individualism			38	Low individualism
Secondary indicator(s)	Indulgence			4	Restraint
FP8: Process Timing & Size	Acceptance of slow and long process with small group	→			Preference of fast and short process with large group
Primary indicator(s)	High future orientation			3.8	Low future orientation
	Long term orientation			7	Short term orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity
FP9: Inter-party Trust	High trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders, policy makers)	→			Low trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders, policy makers)
Primary indicator(s)	High interpersonal trust index			37.2	Low interpersonal trust index
	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance
	High confidence in government index		119		Low confidence in government index
Secondary indicator(s)	Low assertiveness		3.91		High assertiveness
FP10: Expressiveness	Communicative, speak one's mind, explicit and self-expressive in communication with others	→			Non-communicative, modest, face-saving, implicit and self-censorship in communication with others
Primary indicator(s)	High individualist			38	Low individualism
	Low in-group collectivism			5.49	High in-group collectivism
	High assertiveness		3.91		Low assertiveness
Secondary indicator(s)	Secular-rational			-1.6	Traditional
	Low power distance			80	High power distance
FP11: Respect for Rank	Indifference of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and acceptance of confrontation, oppose and criticize	→			Importance of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and avoidance of confrontation, oppose and criticize
Primary indicator(s)	Low power distance			80	High power distance
	High individualism			38	Low individualism
	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance
	Secular-rational			-1.6	Traditional
Secondary indicator(s)	High performance orientation		4.15		Low performance orientation
	Self-expression			-0.5	Survival

I should explain that this attribute is different from what we will see in FP13 which is associated with the dealing with conflicts. In fact cultural dimensions embedded in FP10, show the tendency to avoid confrontation but when the conflict happens, based on FP13 cultural indicators in Egypt, compromise is not sought easily. This two should not be confused.

Another important factor which is considerably observed in Egyptian culture is the respect for "who you are" and not necessarily for "what you do". It means that regards for authorities, elders and family ascription are a norm in the communication with others. Hence, opposing and criticizing authorities and elders in public session is not accepted and expected. Hermance describes that "the preferences stated by the actors prior to their negotiations suggested that two of the actors in the game, the National Organization for

Potable Water and Sewage Disposal (NOPWASD) and the Ministry of Health and Population (MHP), were not satisfied with the final outcome. Nevertheless, they did agree with this outcome in the test workshop, showing behavior that could not be explained by the metagame model and stability analysis. The fact that NOPWASD and MHP did not exercise their blocking power suggests that the participants in the test workshop viewed the other actors, especially the Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (MWRI) and the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation (MALR), as more powerful. Indeed, in reality, MALR is perceived to be a powerful entity in Egypt's public sector" (Hermans, 2005, p. 83). Therefore, based on Egyptian culture and also political system, it was expected to observe such a consideration, not opposing against the high ranked and powerful actor in the process. These concerns are inherently taken into account in such a culture but it can be surprising for a policy analyst from a different culture. Accordingly Hermans mentions that understanding the existence of hidden power of MALR cannot be considered an important outcome of the participatory practice because "these lessons may have been more valuable for the researcher and the Dutch consultants than for the Egyptian engineers, who probably knew this all along" (Hermans, 2005, p. 85).

Finally, in Table 45 the filled framework of category 4 is illustrated. Regarding the expectation of output, Egyptian scores for FP12, especially the high score of survival dimension, indicate that there is an inclination to use methods which are quantitatively more optimized and can guarantee the successful performance. Thus, generally speaking, they might prefer rational decision making tools rather than qualitative methods like participatory approach. Then it might explain why in NWRP project, according to Hermans, mathematical decision support models were preferred to participatory method (2005). Furthermore, scores of indicators for FP13 declare that Egyptians have moderate culture in dealing with conflicts. We discussed before about the way by which Egyptians try to avoid conflict or defer it. Nevertheless, because of their traditional (monumentalist) culture, one can expect that Egyptians might tend to solve conflict, if happens, mostly through competition rather than cooperation. In gaming terminology, it means that zero-sum game may be preferred to non zero-sum game.

Table 45: Utilization of the framework of category 4 for Egypt

Category 4: Output of Public Participation					
Factors	Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Left Pole)	National Score Range			Attributes associated with mentioned level of indicators (Right Pole)
		H/L	M	L/H	
FP12: Outcome Expectation	Expect and accept of involvement, relationship, satisfaction and consensus as qualitative outcomes	→			Expect and preference of concrete result, success and quantitatively optimized outcomes
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity
	Low performance orientation		4.15		High performance orientation
Secondary indicator(s)	Low survival			-0.50	High survival
FP13: Dealing with Conflicts	Mostly compromise in conflicts and cooperate to seek win-win game	→			Hardly compromise in conflicts and compete to seek lose-win game
Primary indicator(s)	Low masculinity		53		High masculinity
	Low assertiveness		3.91		High assertiveness
	Secular-rational (Flexumility)			-1.6	Traditional (Monumentalism)
Secondary indicator(s)	Long term orientation			7	Short term orientation
	Low uncertainty avoidance		68		High uncertainty avoidance

In conclusion, I should emphasize that what I have mentioned in these case studies are all some possible implications of cultural dimensions and political indicators. There are a lot of


other contextual factors which can affect on the participatory process. We can expect that other stronger situational or personal factors may completely reverse what are inferred from this framework. However, knowing the factors of participation and corresponding cultural and political indicators can be helpful and guiding for designing, selecting and implementation of a proper participatory method.

In this section, using empirical information that was available in the literature, I examined the framework through its utilization for some cases with various political-cultural contexts. Moreover, we can use the framework and FPs to give some recommendations for conducting a better and more effective participatory practice.

In next chapter, I will make conclusions and discuss some implications and prescriptive application of the framework.

Chapter Six: Conclusions, Implications and Recommendations

In the final chapter, the summary of what have been done so far is reviewed and discussed and then the implications of the framework are perused. In order to initiate the prescriptive application of the framework, some features of different participation methods are scrutinized and a tentative example for the case of Japan is presented and, accordingly, some practical considerations are extracted. Finally, considerations about the research and the framework are discussed and the research will be ended with suggestions for future research.



6-1 Conclusion and Discussion

In this research, the central objective was to explore how cultural and political factors might affect participatory practices of policy analysis. For this purpose, first of all in chapter two, the concept of policy analysis and its evolutionary process from traditional and expert-based approach to participatory style was briefly perused. The role of context in policy analysis was discussed and then the Participatory Policy Analysis (PPA) was defined and explained. Next, I elaborated the concept of public participation through studying the level and purpose of participation, type of participants and the methods or techniques of public participation. Afterwards, risk and challenges of participation were enumerated and then the role of context in participatory approach was scrutinized. The importance of cultural and political context in participatory practices was discussed and the concerns of researchers and practitioners on the issue were pointed out. At this point, the necessity of a thorough research about the role of contextual factors on participatory approach became apparent. Then, I searched to extract a number of "factors of participation (FP)" which were sensitive to politico-cultural context. These factors were selected from many possible categories of factors which are related to participation. Finally, I finished the chapter with introducing thirteen FPs which were classified into four main categories of factors: 1) basic drivers of public participation, 2) participants of public participation, 3) process and interactions in public participation and 4) output of public participation. In this stage, I started to search for the proper cultural and political indicators which steer these FPs.

In order to find quantitative cultural indicators, I have studied several cross-cultural theories in chapter three. I have started by studying the definition of culture, value and cultural dimensions. Then, the methodology for extracting national cultural dimensions was explained and thereafter five distinguished cross-cultural theories were examined: Hofstede's Theory, World Value Survey (WVS) by Inglehart, Schwartz cultural values orientations, cultural study of GLOBE project and Minkov cultural study. For each cross-cultural theory, the methodology, cultural dimensions, value items relevant to FPs and lastly, challenges and criticism regarding the theory were explained. Moreover, in the study of WVS and Inglehart dimensions, the relation between cultural dimension and political system was discussed. It was argued that although cultural and political factors might interact with each other, we could see that the political system cannot necessarily be the representative of the national culture. At the end of chapter three, inter-correlation of all cultural dimensions from different theories has been tabulated. Finally, through discussion of strengths and shortcomings of different cultural theories and corresponding dimensions, a number of cultural dimensions relevant to each FP were selected and categorized as primary or secondary indicators affecting FPs.

After recognizing cultural indicators, some political indexes were studied in chapter four. I examined three globally reputable research projects in which governance indexes and democracy indicators would be periodically calculated in the national level: Freedom in the World Survey, The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy and Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). These researches have introduced and evaluated some main categories of political items which in turn consist of subcategories. Five of those subcategories were found more relevant to the FPs. In addition, another relevant political indicator which would be calculated from the WVS data was introduced and employed. Moreover, using two political indicators of this chapter, I have defined the "Participation Reluctancy Index". This index would be used to reveal that between citizens and power-holders which one is more reluctant to public participation. Finally, similar to cultural dimensions, the political indicators relevant to each FP were listed at the end of chapter four.

From the relation between cultural and political indicators and factors of participation (FP), a framework was developed in chapter five. I separated the framework for each category of

FPs. In the framework, each FP is evaluated by national scores of some cultural and/or political indicators. Every FP has two poles which are assigned to extreme scores of relevant indicators and are distinguishable by specific attributes. The components and implication of indicators for each FP were described and discussed. Then, the framework was utilized for some case studies. For six countries namely China, Brazil, the UK, the Netherlands and France, public participation was evaluated in general. After that, a comparative case study for a specific participatory method - consensus conference – has been done. First, the framework was utilized to evaluate and compare four consensus conferences on the same issue of genetically modified (GM) food in countries including Canada, Denmark, France and the US. Then, another consensus conference on the same topic in Japan was examined by using the framework. Lastly, the framework was applied to a participatory stakeholder analysis in Egypt.

This research originated from the fact that context or, in more precise words, culture and political structure play a significant role in public participation. At the end of the research, based on the theory and practical cases, I come to the conclusion that cultural and political context are of a great importance, attestation for which is aptly provided through the framework developed in the research. In this study, effort was made to bring to light the irreplaceably monumental role that adequate indicators derived from different cultural theories and various political indexes in a comparative and complementary way can play for appreciation of influential factors of participation in each context. As a result, and in the light of the developed framework scientific explanations for some otherwise inexplicable cases was made possible. For instance, we understood that the formal political structure of the UK, which is completely democratic, and also the cultural dimension of power distance in the UK, which is almost low, cannot reveal and explain the barriers of public participation in the UK. But, the framework distinguished between legal-political support and power-holder support for participation and in this way the relevant indicators could describe the different attitudes of British power-holders and people towards participation. Moreover, the Participation Reluctancy Index (PRI) disclosed why the UK has the lowest political participation among other developed countries. This example and also other observations from PRI index indicated that cultural characteristics and political system might be in contradiction with each other. That is, in some cases when the public inclined towards more participation, the political structure or power-holders withhold public participation.

Furthermore, other case studies showed that the framework could explain to a large extent the effect of cultural and political factors on the process, interactions and expectations of participatory practices. We found that why consensus conference is successful and effective in Denmark but not too favored and fruitful in other contexts like France, the US and Japan. We observed that in the case of Japan, cultural traits of modesty, face-saving and respect for seniority caused the self-censorship of lay panel which is not in accordance with the philosophy of consensus conference. Also, we observed that in the US, the selection method of lay panel was self-selection which is typical of American culture and differs from the original procedure of Danish consensus conference. The case of Egypt revealed the importance of the format and even the terminology of a participatory method in such a culture. Many of these observations would be explained and, indeed, could have been anticipated by the framework.

The above discussion explains the descriptive application of the framework. But I believe that the framework can be used also in a prescriptive manner. In fact, recognition of the implication of the state of each FPs in the framework can lead a policy analyst/participatory practitioner to a prescriptive use of the framework. However, I should emphasize that study of the prescriptive application of the framework requires an independent research in continuation of this study.

6-2 Implications from the Framework

In previous chapter, we developed a framework and implemented it for some cases. We polarized each factor of participation (FP) based on the score level (high, medium, low) of related indicators. Each pole entails some attributes of a FP. For instance, in the framework of the first category of FPs in Table 24, it is mentioned that the right pole of FP1 suggests "legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives". These are attributes of the corresponding FP. In addition to these attributes or characteristics, we can expect some implications from these attributes for participatory practice. Since the final objective of such a research is provision of an applicable and usable guideline for policy analysts, these implications can be instrumental to design or select a compatible process and method of participation. Although the framework itself is the main deliverable of this research by which the political-cultural traits of a policy context and their effects on the participatory process can be understood, knowing implications of the framework is crucial for the next step of designing effective participatory practices. The implications of the framework can be manifested in some major elements of participation which are explained and summarized in the following:

Level and Purpose of Participation: The state of some FPs, directly or indirectly, can affect the possible level of participation. If there is a weak support for public participation from legal and political system (right pole of FP1) or from power-holders (right pole of FP2), then we cannot expect to have higher rungs of participation ladder. In such cases, one way communication between power-holders and other actors might be observed. Also the power-holder reluctance for public participation leads to lower impact of the process on decision making which means a lower level (or purpose) of participation. Moreover, high public demand (left pole of FP3) for participation can lead to request for higher level of participation.

Furthermore, it is implied that the purpose of participation can be influenced by the state of outcome expectation (FP12). When the outcome should be an optimized performance, the purpose of public participation would not be more than consultation, but if public satisfaction and consensus are sought, the highest level (or purpose) of participation might be practiced.

Type of Participants: I mentioned before that the term "public" in this study refers to any actor who affects or is affected by a policy problem either with a sort of power (e.g. wealth, expertise, position, resource, influence) or without any (ordinary citizens, lay person). However, state of FPs in different context determines, to some extent, which type of participants would be accepted or rejected to be involved in public participation. Actually, the level of acceptance of the powerless (FP4) determines whether lay people are invited to participation or only organized and strong stakeholders are involved. Moreover, restraint or openness about gender of participants (FP5) should be considered as well. Regarding the role and intention of participants (FP6), for collectivist pole, it is inferred that participation of representatives is preferred over that of individuals.

On the other hand, the state of process format (FP7) can indicate the preference of type of participants. That is, the preference of formal and serious process in some cultures implies involvement of the influential actors and authorities. On the contrary, acceptance of informal and friendly participatory session might mean that ordinary citizens are also tolerantly welcome to participate. Furthermore, the factor of trust (FP9) can carry implication for involvement of the foreigners in the participatory process. Finally, in uncertainty avoidant cultures in which the level of trust to others is low, people hardly trust foreigners.

Method of Participation: All FPs of the third category, process and interactions in public participation, have implications for designing or selecting a proper participatory methodology. Each method of participation has some distinguished features which should be taken into account in order to adopt a compatible methodology for specific context. For example, the state of FP7 suggests that whether flexible format of a process is preferred or structured format. This format is determined by the participatory method. As far as process timing and size (FP8) is concerned, the duration and number of participants of the method should be considered. Moreover, the presence of independent facilitator is crucial for the specific state of FP9, FP10 and FP11. When there is a lack of trust between and within participants, if participants culturally are modest and non-communicative, and also if the attendance of highly ranked persons overshadow the participatory session, then an impartial facilitator should be engaged. For these mentioned circumstances the medium of interactions or information transfer, namely face to face (FTF) or non-face to face, is also influential. This feature is one of the significant differences of participatory methods. Regarding dealing with conflicts (FP13), it is also implied that non FTF methods might be more effective for those contexts in which different stakeholders are not into compromise in conflicts. In addition, lack of inter-party trust implies higher request for transparent process which is also an important feature of a methodology. In the next section, a summary of features for different methods of participation will be listed.

Risk and Challenges of Participation: We can observe some implications of FPs as risks and challenges of participation. First of all, there is always risk of pseudo-representativeness in the context that legal and political hindrance for public participation exists (right pole of FP1).

It is implied that in the case of public reluctance (right pole of FP3), there is a need for incentives to encourage the public. Sometimes, these motivations are provided through compensations, subsidies or educational program, all of which increase the cost of policy process. Moreover, regarding FP8, having slow and long participatory process not only can take too much time but also can cause consultation fatigue among participants. Potential of conflict is another risk that arises from attributes of some FPs. Despite being explicit, speaking one's mind and criticizing overtly (left pole of FP10 & FP11) can help to elucidate the interests and opinions of participants; yet it can lead to conflicts as well. On the other hand, having deliberative participation in contexts that people do not easily compromise in dealing with conflicts (right pole of FP13) can result in intensifying of conflicts.

In summary, in Table 46 the implications corresponding to each pole of FPs are listed. I should mention that these implications are not necessarily symmetrical for opposite poles and consequently for some poles no specific implication is indicated.

Table 46: Implications related to each FP's attributes

Factors	Attributes associated with Left Pole	Attributes associated with Right Pole
FP1: Legal and Political Support	Legal support and political acceptance of public participation and easy access to real stakeholders and representatives	Legal barriers and political hindrance of public participation and hard access to real stakeholders and representatives
Implications		Risk of pseudo-representativeness; Lowest level (purpose) of participation;
FP2: Power-holders Support	More acceptance and support for public participation by power-holders	Less acceptance of public participation by power-holders
Implications	High level (purpose) of participation; FTF methods; Higher impact of participation on decision-making;	Non FTF methods; Lower level (purpose) of participation; Enactment of legal requirement; Risk of participants' selection bias;
FP3: Public Demand	More public's tendency for participation	Less public's tendency for participation
Implications	Demand for higher level of participation;	Incentives for participation; More publicity campaign;
FP4: Acceptance of Powerless	More attention to voice of the powerless	Less attention to voice of the powerless
Implications	Acceptance of lay people involvement;	Acceptance of (strong) stakeholders involvement; Necessity of facilitator;
FP5: Gender of Participants	Both gender should participate	Male participation is preferred
Implications	Necessity of female inclusiveness;	Caution about female facilitator;
FP6: Role and Intention of Participants	Participate as individual for self-benefit	Participate as representative for collective-benefit
Implications	More individual opinions; More attention to personal fulfillment;	Preference for participation of representative; More representative opinions; More attention to social welfare;
FP7: Process Format	Acceptance of innovative, informal and unstructured process	Preference of conventional, formal and structured process
Implications	Having fun and informal setting; Flexible process; Citizens can be participants;	Serious and formal setting; Predefined process; Participants are stakeholders;
FP8: Process Timing & Size	Acceptance of slow and long process with small group	Preference of fast and short process with large group
Implications	Risk of consultation fatigue;	Higher legitimacy due to number of participants.
FP9: Inter-party Trust	High trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)	Low trust between and within participants (the public, stakeholders and policy makers)
Implications		Necessity of independent facilitator; Necessity of transparent process; Clarify expectations in advance; Cautious of trusting to out-groups or foreigners;
FP10: Expressiveness	Communicative, speak one's mind, explicit and self-expressive in communication with others	Non-communicative, modest, face-saving, implicit and self-censorship in communication with others
Implications	Possibility of polarization and conflict;	Importance of facilitator; Usefulness of Non FTF methods;
FP11: Respect for Rank	Indifference of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and acceptance of confrontation, oppose and criticize	Importance of the highly ranked (age, position, ascription) and avoidance of confrontation, oppose and criticize
Implications	Possibility of conflict;	Separation of sessions for different ranks; Importance of facilitator; Effectiveness of Non FTF methods;
FP12: Outcome Expectation	Expect and accept of involvement, relationship, satisfaction and consensus as qualitative outcomes	Expect and preference of concrete result, success and quantitatively optimized outcomes
Implications	Participation as a target; Participation as substitute to rational approach; Involve laymen; Highest level of participation; Lack of high performance;	Participation as a means; Participation as complementary to rational approach; Involve influential participants; Preference of few number of participants; Consultation purpose of participation;
FP13: Dealing with Conflicts	Mostly compromise in conflicts and cooperate to seek win-win game	Hardly compromise in conflicts and compete to seek lose-win game
Implications		Risk of intensify conflicts; Usefulness of Non FTF methods

What is the Implication for Undemocratic Countries?

it is seen that the first factor of participation reveals the support of legal and political structure for participation. I analogized this factor (FP1) to the main entrance gate for public participation. If the political system of a country is authoritarian, this gate might be completely closed. Then there is a question that what will be the benefit of knowing political-cultural indicators in such a context? Does it mean that we could not have public participation in such countries? Or does it mean that another form of participation would emerge?

I think having such a framework can be of help for undemocratic countries as well but from a different aspect. From my point of view, in undemocratic countries that the public demand for participation is significantly more than political freedom to participate, we could expect transformation of 'public participation' to 'public protest'. In fact, public protest is a form of public participation in those societies that people are completely proscribed from involvement in decision making process. Public protest can be also a form of participation in democratic countries when the public in some occasions are not allowed to be involved in decision making or when the conventional ways of public participation cease to work.

In the case of public protest, once again, I believe that knowing cultural context is a matter of importance. In fact, cultural traits of a society can determine which protest methods would be preferred to be employed by the citizens since we have a variety of methods for public protest as well, namely legal protest, civil disobedience, non-cooperation, civil disobedience and radical protest. Likewise participation methods, each protest method would have specific features which would be preferred in particular cultural and political context. For instance, it is seen that in some countries the public protest is non-violent and peaceful whereas in others the method of public protest would be radical.

Finally, we can claim that culture and political structure play contributory role in public protests and, therefore, the role of cultural factors in the selection or adoption of public protest method can be the subject of a separate research.

6-3 A Glance to the Prescriptive Application of the Framework

In this exploratory research, I tried to answer seven sub-questions regarding the main research question which asks how political and cultural context can be taken into account in practice of public participation in policy analysis. The first six questions were descriptive or explanatory but the last one was prescriptive question. In previous chapters I answered to the first six questions and now time is ripe to embark upon expansion of the last. In fact, I used the developed framework for its descriptive application heretofore and now I want to explain how the framework, based on the aforementioned implications, can have a prescriptive application. The complete elaboration of this application is out of scope of this research but I try to represent how the implications of FPs according to interpretation of cultural and political context can lead a policy analyst to effectively design or select a participatory process and methodology.

6-3-1 Design or Selection of Participatory Methods

The method of participation is the most important element of participatory practice. Although we should consider that other elements like level of participation, purpose of participation, type of participants and stages of policy analysis are important as well, method of participation is the core element of a participatory practice which eventually encapsulates other elements. In this section I collect a list of features for some well-known participation methods. These features were pointed out when the implications of FPs discussed. Therefore, knowing the attributes and implications of FPs for a specific political and cultural context in addition to having the features of each methodology given in Table 47, could help a policy analyst to select or design a proper participatory method for that

specific context. In the first column, Table 47 lists participatory methods which were previously defined in Table 3 in section 2-2-3. The second column indicates number, type and selection method of participants. The selection method denotes whether participants will be randomly selected, self-selected or can be anyone from the population. The third column displays the level of participation that theoretically the method can entail.

Table 47: Features of public participation methods

Sources: (Fishkin, Luskin, & Jowell, 2000; OECD, 2001; Rowe & Frewer, 2000, 2005; van Asselt Marjolein & Rijkens-Klomp, 2002)

Participation method	Participant types, numbers and selection method	Level(s) of participation	Time scale /Duration of process	Facilitator	Medium of interactions	Transparency of the process
Citizen jury	12-20 citizens selected by stakeholder panel to be representative of local population	Deliberation	4-5 days (long)	Yes	FTF	Moderate
Citizen panel	a few hundred to several thousand people	Consultation	Short/Periodic	No	Non-FTF	Low
Community/public advisory committee	Small group represents views of various groups or communities	Consultation	Medium/Periodic	Yes	FTF	Variable but often low
Consensus conference	10-16 selected citizens by steering committee; 10s experts	Deliberation	2-day preparation, 3-day conference (long)	Yes	FTF	High
Deliberative polling	50 to 500+ randomly selected citizens	Deliberation	2 weekend days (medium)	Yes	FTF	High
Delphi Method	5-50 experts or knowledgeable citizens	Consultation	Short/several times	No	Non-FTF	Low
Electronic consultation	anyone with access to the internet	Consultation	short	No	Non-FTF	High (if it shows results online)
Focus groups	5-12 selected citizens	Consultation	3 hours per session (short)	Yes	FTF	Low
Gaming /Simulation /Policy Exercise	8-12 stakeholders	Deliberation	1/2-day simulationn (medium)	Yes	FTF	High
Negotiated rule making	Small number of representative stakeholders	Deliberation	Uncertain but strict deadline	No	FTF	Low
Public hearing/inquiries	Interested citizens, True participants are experts and politicians making presentations	Information or Consultation	1-day each session	No	FTF (Possibility of Non FTF questioning)	Moderate
Public survey (opinion poll)	100s or 1000s of representative population	Consultation	Single event, usually lasting some minutes (short)	No	Non-FTF	Moderate
Referenda	All member of national population	Consultation	Single point voting (short)	No	Non-FTF	High
Scenario workshop (action planning)	10-30 member of policymakers, experts, citizens, investors	Deliberation	2-day workshop (long)	Yes	FTF	High

The level of participation in the table is according to categorization which I have defined in Figure 3. So, it does not actually refer to the purpose of participation. The next column represents the time scale of the participatory process. The presence or absence of facilitator for methods is indicated in the fifth column. Medium of interactions which can be face-to-

face or non face-to-face communication is the next feature of methods in the table. Another column shows whether the output of the participatory method is structured or unstructured meaning that whether a predefined output like acceptance/rejection of statements/options would be resulted or any probable outcome can be expected. The last column of the table indicates the level of transparency of the participatory method.

A policy analyst or participatory practitioner can manipulate the features of a method to design a proper participatory process based on the political-cultural context in which public participation would be practiced.

The features mentioned here for each method are extracted from the literature and represents a typical and procedural properties of these methods. However, it is possible to find that one of these methods have been applied elsewhere with features) different from what mentioned in the table (e.g. different type, number or selection method of participants. For sure, it is possible to add and elaborate these features but it is left for future research.

6-3-2 Adaptation of Other Elements of Participatory Policy Analysis

Besides method of participation, some other elements of participatory policy analysis can be adapted according to politico-cultural context. Here, I briefly point out to two main elements.

Purpose of Participation

It can be perceived from the framework that the purpose of participation should be compatible with the factors of participation. As we have seen in the list of implications in Table 46, some attributes of FPs limits the purpose (or so-called level) of participation. Some attributes of FPs (e.g. right pole of FP2) implies the low impact of participation outcome on the final decision making. It means that in that case, the purpose of participation, according to Table 2, cannot be in high level of delegation or even co-decision. Therefore, in such a case the purpose of participation could not be more than 'consultation' in practice.

If an analyst knows beforehand about the attributes of a political-cultural context, then the expectation from the participatory practice could be more realistic and, accordingly, the proper or plausible purpose of participation can be adopted.

Someone may criticize that this pre-assumption about the context can lead to acceptance of pseudo-participation or tokenism in some contexts and hence no efforts to promote the purpose of participation in such contexts will be performed. I should emphasize that the aim of the framework is not to disappoint participatory practitioner to accept the possible hindrance of participation in a specific context and degrade the purpose of participatory practice intentionally. Instead, I want to show that awareness of possible barriers for real and effective participation can help practitioners to find a wise solution to penetrate to the context and persuade the opponents to submit higher purpose of participation. Knowing the sensitivities and characteristics of a politico-cultural context can help the analyst to design the participatory practice in an evolutionary manner.

Stages of Policy Analysis

Regarding the participatory approach in policy analysis, one of the main issues is the proper stage of policy analysis in which public participation should be applied. There is a controversial discussion of which stage the public should be involved. Some believes that participation should be conducted from the beginning stage of problem definition whereas others argue that public participation at the inception can make the policy process very complicated and ineffective. On the other hand, it is reasoned that the purpose of participation should be adapted to the stages of policy analysis (Walters, Aydelotte, & Miller, 2000). Moreover, the urgency of the problem is another important factor to decide about the proper stage of citizen engagement.

I think that political-cultural context will shape the expectation of which stages of policy making the public should be involved. For instance, in high survival context the proper stage of public involvement cannot be the same as the low survival one. However, I did not study the relation of stages of policy analysis and the participatory practice in this research; but I want to point out that in a prescriptive application of the framework, this is one of the elements that should be adapted to politico-cultural context.

6-3-3 Tentative Example of Prescriptive Application of the Framework

In order to illustrate the practical application of the framework for designing a proper participatory practice, I use FPs' attributes and implications for the case of Japan to make a list of practical considerations for its politico-cultural context. This is a tentative example and it needs to be more elaborated and investigated for more precise suggestions. In table 48, the considerations for participatory practices in Japan will be mentioned and briefly explained. Accordingly, some probably compatible methods of participation for the case of Japan are mentioned.

Table 48: Tentative example of practical application of the framework for the case of Japan

Practical Consideration for Public Participation in Japan	Explanation
Requirement of law enforcement for public participation	Since there are adequate legal and political support for public participation in Japan, by having some law enforcement the power-holders resistance can be alleviated
implausible purposes of participation: delegate or co-decide	Due to traditional expert-oriented decision making and high reluctance to involve the powerless, the purpose of participation should be realistic and evolving. Purpose of consultation can be achievable and makes less resistance among the power-holders. It can also empower the public for seeking of higher purpose of participation in future.
Independent facilitator	Due to the lack of trust to the government as well as being modest, face saving and implicit in communication, the presence of independent and active facilitator in face to face meetings is crucial.
involvement of organized and influential representative (e.g. NGOs, local communities)	Involvement of organized and strong representatives of citizens can be more accepted than presence of individuals. In fact the practice of participation from bottom level in NGOs or local communities can lead to introduce influential representatives who cannot be ignored by policy makers.
Structured and formal process	The participatory session should be predefined and orderly. It seems that flexible and informal session is not taken serious.
High transparency of the process	The fresh experience of public participation in addition to the lack of trust to policy makers requires high transparency of participatory process otherwise citizens will be skeptical to public participation from the beginning.
Separation of the high ranked and the public in participatory session	In order to avoid self-censorship of participants in the participatory process, it is better to exclude the formal authorities from the session. Thus, lay people can express themselves without hesitation.
Benefit of Non- FTF methods	Since the lay people culturally prefer to avoid criticizing and opposing in a public meeting, the utilization of non face-to-face method can be fruitful. In anonymous participation, many explicit and radical opinions on the issue can be emerged which do not reveal in FTF sessions.
Probably compatible methods: Based on the mentioned considerations, the following methods could be suggested as compatible ones with the Japanese politico-cultural context. FTF Methods: • Citizen/public advisory committee • Deliberative polling: • Scenario workshop Non-FTF Methods: • Electronic consultation • Public survey • Referenda	

In conclusion, the relation between all factors of participation, political and cultural indicators and important elements related to public participation, which all have been applied in this research, is depicted in Figure 10. In fact, the figure is the extract of the research.

Relational Diagram of All Factors and Elements in the Research




Figure 10: Relation of all different factors, indicators and elements related to public participation used in this research

6-4 Considerations about the Research

6-4-1 Limitations of the Research

There are some limitations in this research which might have negatively impacted the framework. First of all, available cultural dimensions and political indicators have not been developed for our specific purpose. In fact, among many dimensions and indicators, I tried to find the proper ones which can explain something about factors of participation. These cultural dimensions and political indexes entail many values and attributes which could not be separated for specific use. That is why some cultural dimensions are used as influential indicators for several FPs. However, it can be one of the limitations for any kind of research like this. I should also add that, unfortunately, the scores of World Value Survey items were not available to me and thus I could not use these items independently. Having access to these items could be of a massive utility for selecting better and more precise indicators for each FP.

On the other hand, there are many critiques about cross-cultural theories and dimensionalization of culture. Each cross-cultural theory has its criticism and challenges some of which were pointed out in chapter three. However, although mentioned before, I shall reiterate that using several cross-cultural theories through the comparative and complementary application of their dimensions would make our framework more plausible and reliable.

Furthermore, factors of participation (FPs) have been identified in this study based on my effort to find relevant politico-cultural sensitive factors in the literature. As my time and capabilities were limited, it is possible that some factors have been ignored unintentionally. The framework provides utter flexibility for addition of any politico-culturally sensitive factor in future. Besides, although I did my best to cluster the similar factors of participation through reevaluation of factors and examining their unifiability, it is possible that some FPs seem redundant and could be incorporated into another factor. If more case studies or theoretical argument can reduce the number of FPs, it is welcome as well.

Finally, using case studies through secondary content analysis has limited the research to the findings which mentioned in the literatures. This supplemented by the fact that there was not enough empirical evidence to represent the consequences of contextual factors made it impossible to evaluate each FP for the context of case study. This limitation can be removed by performing original case studies in future research.

6-4-2 Precautions in Using the Framework

The misinterpretation and misuse of the framework has been my main concern from the beginning of this research. In fact, when one intends to operationalize the complex concept of culture, there is always a danger of simplification or stereotyping. Moreover, any allegation of generating a generic manual for policy analysts, in which "do's" or "don'ts" eventuating in successful participatory practice for different political-cultural context are prescribed, is doomed to face the criticism of being unscientific and a cause for disappointment in the case of failure of participatory practice. Thus, what I aimed to do was the exploration of political and cultural indicators on the one hand, and those factors of participation which are affected by these indicators on the other. Then I tried to find the relation between these factors and indicators to make a framework which can be employed as a flashlight to illuminate hidden and unknown points of a context in which participatory policy analysis aims to address. Therefore, the developed framework should be applied as a guiding tool which ***says something*** about political and cultural context but refrain from ***saying the final word***.

Furthermore, similar to the emphasis by cross-cultural scientists (Hofstede, 2001; Minkov, 2007), I should mention again that the framework should be used in cultural level and not individual one. That is, when there is not adequate number of people from different groups

of society involved in a participatory practice, using framework would be misleading and useless. We know that cultural differences are not in individual level but in aggregated level of individuals. Hence, the framework should be used to examine a participatory practice in which a variety of actors/citizens are going to participate.

6-5 Suggestions for Future Research

This research is an initiation to study the effect of politico-cultural context on methods of policy analysis in general and participatory approach in particular. There are some suggestions for further elaboration and development of this research:

- Although I tried to study various cultural theories, specifically recent ones, I did not use the cultural theory by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) due to time limitation. In fact, I had a trade-off between Trompenaars and Minkov studies and I chose the latter on the ground that it was more recent and less studied. However, I think that addition of the cultural dimensions by Trompenaars can enrich the research even though it might make the framework more complicated.
- The updated and ongoing data from World Value Survey can be very helpful if a researcher conducts a purposeful data analysis on the WVS items. We observed that the cultural theory of Minkov was an effort to reuse WVS data to extract new cultural dimensions. Since the WVS items are broad and globally inclusive, they can be very useful for extracting a specific indicator, cultural or political, for evaluation of particular issue like public participation. Moreover, as WVS has been being repeated in different waves, the data can be analyzed to observe the evolution of a specific indicator in a society over time.
- In this research, there was no primary case study and instead we used a secondary content analysis of others' case study reports. In the wake of this limitation some required details of the process could be availed of to evaluate FPs. Also, it was not possible to examine how changing some features of the participation method could, favorably or adversely, affect effective public participation in a particular context. So, the findings of this study should be examined through performing some comparative case studies in a specific cultural-political context. It means that in a country, for instance, we could perform two different participatory practices with and without considering the attributes and implications of cultural-political context. Then we can evaluate to what extent considering these contextual factors in designing the participatory practice could be fruitful.
- In future researches, the different methods of participation which have been originated from different countries (e.g. citizen's juries invented in the United States, consensus conferences invented in Denmark, planning cells invented in Germany, deliberative polling invented in the United States, citizen's panels used by the U.K, etc.) should be studied to understand how the cultural characteristics of the context might affect the features of the methodology proposed there.
- This type of research in which one of the approaches/styles of policy analysis is examined – e.g. participatory approach - can be employed to study the effect of cultural and political context on application of other style/methodology of policy analysis like adaptive policy analysis or game theory. To my speculation, understanding of cultural and political factors is crucial for having a wise selection or adaptation of policy analysis approach/methodology for different contexts.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Evaluation Factors (Criteria) of Public Participation

Evaluation Criterion	Definition
acceptance	Legitimacy of the process outcomes according to those affected by them
accessibility	Limitations as to who may participate
capacity building	The development of social networks and skills to enable participants to collaborate during the implementation phase and in future projects
communication	Flow of information towards and among participants
capacity to participate	Individual's ability to value different points of view and willingness to learn as well as their possession of required skill, knowledge, qualification, or capacity
conflict resolution	The degree of disagreement during process (both between participants as between process and its environment)
context	The context of the process
continuity	Time between process activities or communication on the process
cost-effectiveness	Adequateness to accomplish the process' purpose within its cost limitations
emergent knowledge	The influence of local knowledge on the outcome of the process
fairness	The degree in which the process is free from bias, dishonesty and injustice
flexibility	The degree in which the process is susceptible or adaptable to contextual changes
inclusiveness	The number of opinions that is considered in the participatory process
independence	The degree in which the process is influenced or controlled by exterior parties or events
influence	The degree in which the evolution of the process is determined by the participants
involvement	The degree of involvement of participants in the process (intensity*time)
legitimacy	The degree in which the process is in accordance with established rules
openness	The degree in which the outcomes remain unsettled until the final decision making phase of the participatory process
protection of (core) values	Whether the participants' core constituencies are satisfied, including expectations
public awareness	The degree in which the public knows a participatory process is organized that concerns them and what may be their role in this process
quality of information	The reliability of the sources
representativeness	The degree in which the participants represented correspond to the population affected
responsible leadership	Whether the sponsor is perceived as reliable and being capable of rational thought and action by the participants of the process
responsiveness	The attitude of the sponsor to changes in the process or its environment
resource accessibility	The number of difficulties participants meet when asking for specific resources to facilitate their participation in the process
social learning	The creation of an agreed and clearly defined vision, objectives and goals for the process
speed	Whether the process proceeds rapidly
structure	The degree in which the participants' roles and responsibilities, and the process phases and objectives are defined
substance	The degree in which the quality of the substance is preserved
transparency	The degree in which participants and affected population are able to see what is going on and how decisions are being made

Source: (van Duijn, 2007)

Appendix 2: Factors Affecting Government-Citizen Relations in Policy-making

I. General factors for government-citizen relations in policy-making	
Constitutional and/or legal basis for basic civil rights	Yes/No
Basis for government-citizen relations	Law/Policy/None
Support at political level	High/Low
Support within the public administration	High/Low
Demand among citizens and civil society	High/Low
II. Specific factors for government-citizen relations in policy-making	
Who?	
Initiator	Politician/Public official/Civil society
Level of government	National/Regional/Local
Restrictions on participation	Yes/No
Participation	Open/Closed
Threshold for participation	High/Low
What?	
Urgency of decision	High/Low
Impact of decision (scope)	Restricted/Universal
Impact of decision (time)	Short-term/Long-term
When?	
Timing	Early/Late
Duration	Short/Long
Frequency	Ad hoc/Ongoing
How?	
Tools used	Traditional/New
Channels	Bilateral/Multilateral
Impact on decision-making process	High/Low
Impact on content of final decisions	High/Low

Source: (adopted from OECD, 2001, p. 72)

Appendix 3: National Scores of Cultural and Political Indicators

Countries	Scores of Hofstede's and Minkov's study * [1]						Scores for the GLOBE Study ** [2]																		
							Assertiveness		Societal Collectivism		In-Group Collectivism		Future Orientation		Gender Egalitarianism		Humane Orientation		Performance Orientation		Power Distance		Uncertainty Avoidance		
	Power Distance	Uncertainty Avoidance	Individualism (vs. Collectivism)	Masculinity (vs. Femininity)	Long-term Orientation (vs. Short-term)	Indulgence (vs. Restraint)	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	Practices	Values	
Minimum Score	11	8	6	5	0	0	3.41	2.68	3.41	3.79	3.46	4.98	3.06	4.49	2.45	3.34	3.29	4.85	3.34	5.09	4.14	2.21	3.09	3.2	
Medium low limit **	48.2	49.6	40	41	40	40	3.954	3.944	4.15	4.514	4.624	5.604	3.788	5.226	3.098	4.084	4.022	5.274	4.02	5.662	4.94	2.846	4.022	4.228	
Medium high limit **	66.8	70.4	57	59	60	60	4.226	4.576	4.52	4.876	5.206	5.916	4.152	5.594	3.422	4.456	4.388	5.486	4.36	5.948	5.34	3.164	4.488	4.742	
Maximum Score	104	112	91	95	100	100	4.77	5.84	5.26	5.6	6.37	6.54	4.88	6.33	4.07	5.2	5.12	5.91	5.04	6.52	6.14	3.8	5.42	5.77	
Albania						61	15	4.57	4.39	4.28	4.3	5.51	4.98	3.69	5.17	3.48	4.04	4.4	5.16	4.57	5.47	4.44	3.47	4.45	5.17
Algeria						26	32																		
Andorra						61	62																		
Argentina	49	86	46	56	61	20	62	4.18	3.18	3.66	5.29	5.51	6.07	3.1	5.73	3.44	4.89	3.94	5.5	3.63	6.28	5.56	2.3	3.63	4.62
Armenia						21	71	4.29	3.83	4.31	4.47	4.14	5.82	4.09	5.21	3.41	5.02	4.32	5.6	4.37	5.99	4.81	2.77	4.4	3.99
Australia	36	51	90	61	21	60	63	4.59	2.85	4.34	4.78	4.89	5.32	4.47	5.15	3.18	4.83	3.77	5.68	4.47	6.12	5	2.52	5.1	3.65
Austria	11	70	55	79	60	63	4.59	2.85	4.34	4.78	4.89	5.32	4.47	5.15	3.18	4.83	3.77	5.68	4.47	6.12	5	2.52	5.1	3.65	
Azerbaijan						61	22																		
Bangladesh	80	55	20	55	47	20																			
Belarus						81	15																		
Belgium (total)	65	94	75	54	82	57																			
Belgium (Dutch speaker)	61	97	78	43																					
Belgium (French speaker)	67	93	72	60																					
Bolivia							3.78	3.68	3.96	5.03	5.44	5.91	3.55	5.56	3.45	4.65	3.99	5.11	3.57	5.98	4.46	3.31	3.32	4.64	
Bosnia						70	44																		
Brazil	69	76	38	49	44	59	4.25	3.06	3.94	5.57	5.16	5.17	3.9	5.6	3.44	4.91	3.76	5.52	4.11	5.98	5.24	2.59	3.74	5	
Bulgaria	70	85	30	40	69	16																			
Canada (total)	39	48	80	52	36	68																			
Canada (English speaker)							4.09	4.15	4.36	4.2	4.22	5.94	4.4	5.34	3.66	5.04	4.51	5.58	4.46	6.13	4.85	2.73	4.54	3.73	
Canada (French speaker)	54	60	73	45																					
Chile	63	86	23	28	31	68																			
China	80	30	20	66	87	24	3.77	5.52	4.67	4.52	5.86	5.12	3.68	4.7	3.03	3.73	4.29	5.34	4.37	5.72	5.02	3.01	4.81	5.34	
Colombia	67	80	13	64	13	83	4.16	3.45	3.84	5.27	5.59	5.99	3.35	5.52	3.64	4.85	3.72	5.43	3.93	6.15	5.37	2.21	3.62	4.92	
Costa Rica	35	86	15	21			3.83	4.04	3.95	5.14	5.26	5.94	3.64	5.1	3.56	4.59	4.38	5.08	4.1	5.78	4.7	2.66	3.84	4.58	
Croatia	73	80	33	40	58	33																			
Cyprus						70																			
Czech Rep.	57	74	58	57	70	29																			
Denmark	18	23	74	16	35	70	4.04	3.59	4.93	4.41	3.63	5.71	4.59	4.49	4.02	5.2	4.67	5.59	4.4	5.82	4.14	2.96	5.32	4.01	
Dominican Rep.						13	54																		
Ecuador	78	67	8	63			3.98	3.57	3.82	5.19	5.55	5.81	3.66	5.62	3.09	4.42	4.45	5.13	4.06	5.95	5.29	2.36	3.63	4.95	
Egypt	80	68	38	53	7	4	3.91	3.22	4.36	4.72	5.49	5.39	3.8	5.6	2.9	3.34	4.6	5.13	4.15	5.71	4.76	3.2	3.97	5.24	
El Salvador	66	94	19	40	20	89	4.49	3.67	3.74	5.6	5.22	6.28	3.73	5.89	3.23	4.66	3.69	5.38	3.72	6.37	5.56	2.76	3.68	5.27	
Estonia	40	60	60	30	83	16																			
Ethiopia	64	52	27	41	32																				
Finland	33	59	63	26	38	57	4.05	3.91	4.77	4.34	4.23	5.6	4.39	5.24	3.55	4.47	4.19	5.8	4.02	6.23	5.08	2.46	5.11	4.04	
France	68	86	71	43	63	63	4.48	4.44	3.57	4.2	5.27	4.66	5.88	3.74	3.95	3.81	4.71	3.6	5.91	4.43	6.1	5.68	2.96	4.66	4.65
Georgia						38	32	4.15	4.29	4.03	3.79	6.18	5.58	3.45	5.45	3.52	3.83	4.17	5.48	3.85	5.63	5.15	2.86	3.54	5.23
Germany						40																			
Germany (East)						78	34	4.77	3.24	3.67	4.86	4.59	5.38	4.04	5.36	3.17	4.97	3.45	5.56	4.16	6.24	5.7	2.74	5.19	4.02
Germany (West)	35	65	67	66	83		4.66	3.21	3.97	5.07	4.16	5.40	4.41	5.06	3.25	5.06	3.3	5.63	4.42	6.27	5.48	2.66	5.35	3.98	
Ghana	77	54	20	46	4	72																			
Greece	60	112	35	57		50	4.55	3.05	3.41	5.41	5.28	5.47	3.53	5.17	3.53	4.84	3.44	5.28	3.34	5.79	5.35	2.57	3.52	5.16	
Guatemala	95	101	6	37			3.96	3.65	3.78	5.16	5.54	5.95	3.35	5.78	3.14	4.49	3.91	5.24	3.85	5.96	5.47	2.49	3.44	4.85	
Hong Kong	68	29	25	57	17	17	4.53	4.8	4.03	4.35	5.33	5.11	3.88	5.52	3.26	4.27	3.72	5.38	4.69	5.71	4.94	3	4.17	4.52	
Hungary	46	82	80	88	58	31	4.71	3.42	3.63	4.57	5.31	5.58	3.31	5.74	4.02	4.65	3.39	5.48	3.5	5.97	5.57	2.59	3.26	4.74	
India	77	48	48	58	51	28	3.7	4.65	4.28	4.59	5.81	5.22	4.04	5.43	2.89	4.4	4.45	5.2	4.11	5.87	5.26	2.58	4.02	4.58	
Indonesia	78	49	14	46	32	39	3.7	4.5	4.27	4.96	5.5	5.46	3.61	5.49	3.04	3.71	4.47	5.06	4.14	5.54	4.93	2.38	3.92	5.04	
Iran	58	59	41	43	14	40	4.04	4.99	3.88	5.54	6.03	5.86	3.7	5.94	2.99	3.75	4.23	5.61	4.58	6.08	5.43	2.8	3.67	5.36	
Iraq	80	68	38	53	25	17																			
Ireland	28	35	70	68	24	65	3.93	4	4.57	4.55	5.12	5.72	3.93	5.18	3.19	5.07	4.96	5.45	4.3	5.99	5.13	2.66	4.25	3.94	
Israel	13	81	54	47	38		4.19	3.74	4.4	4.25	4.63	5.69	3.82	5.17	3.21	4.66	4.07	5.51	4.03	5.71	4.71	2.72	3.97	4.34	
Italy	50	75	76	70	6																				

Appendix 3: Continue

Countries	World Value Survey - Scores of Inglehart Dimensions [3]										WVS [4]	WVS [5]	The Economist Intelligence Unit's Index of Democracy		Freedom in the World (2008): Civil Liberties [7]		WGI (2008) [8]
	Wave 1 (1981)		Wave 2 (1990)		Wave 3 (1995)		Wave 4 (2000)		Wave 5 (2005)				[6]	[6]	[7]	[7]	
	Traditional/Secular	Survival/Self-expres	Traditional/Secular	Survival/Self-expres	Traditional/Secular	Survival/Self-expres	Traditional/Secular	Survival/Self-expres	Traditional/Secular	Survival/Self-expres							
Minimum Score	-1.15	-1.07	-1.62	-1.34	-2.01	-1.91	-2.07	-1.88	-1.94	-1.68	7.9	22.9	1.1	3.1	3.0	0.0	-1.74
Medium low limit **	-0.05	-0.066	-0.256	-0.008	-0.49	-0.35	-0.478	-0.292	-0.38	-0.068	63.94	91.34	4.666	5.878	8.2	4.8	-0.43
Medium high limit **	0.5	0.436	0.426	0.658	0.27	0.43	0.318	0.502	0.4	0.738	91.96	125.56	6.444	7.252	10.8	7.2	0.22
Maximum Score	1.6	1.44	1.79	1.99	1.79	1.99	1.91	2.09	1.96	2.35	148.0	194.0	10.0	10.0	16.0	12.0	1.53
Albania					0.52	-1.56	0.07	-1.14			51.2	115.9	4.44	5.63	12	8	0.13
Algeria							-1.48	-0.74			45.3	107.5	1.67	5.63	7	6	-1.05
Andorra									0.8	1.62	40.8	68.1			16	11	1.34
Argentina	0	-0.3	-0.46	0.03	-0.6	0.71	-0.95	0.36	-0.66	0.38	40.6	63.2	5.56	5.63	14	11	0.32
Armenia					0.55	-1.31					51.8	85.2	3.89	3.13	8	5	-0.66
Australia	-0.34	1.14			-0.18	1.96			0.21	1.75	92.4	79.5	7.78	8.75	16	12	1.36
Austria			0.23	0.8			0.25	1.43			70.2		7.78	8.13	16	12	1.36
Azerbaijan					-0.14	-1.38					44.2	178.7	3.33	3.75	6	3	-1.23
Bangladesh					-1.24	-1.1	-1.21	-0.93			47.7	173.9	4.44	3.75	7	6	-0.61
Belarus			0.93	-1.12	0.67	-1.72	0.89	-1.23			85.2	102.2	3.33	4.38	3	0	-1.60
Belgium (total)	0.09	0.08	0.4	0.77			0.5	1.13			63.0		6.11	7.5	16	12	1.37
Belgium (Dutch speaker)																	
Belgium (French speaker)																	
Bolivia											48.8	99.9	5	3.75	15	10	-0.01
Bosnia					0.09	-0.56	0.34	-0.65			32.4	59.3	4.44	5	11	8	0.00
Brazil		-0.95	-0.38	-1.29	0.02				-0.88	0.61	17.5	85.7	4.44	5.63	15	10	0.51
Bulgaria		1.28	-1.33	0.9	-1.23		1.15	-1.52	1.13	-1.01	50.9	69	6.11	5.63	14	11	0.60
Canada (total)	-0.52	1.04	0.07	1.31			-0.16	1.72	-0.26	1.91	85.9	79.9	7.78	8.75	16	12	1.43
Canada (English speaker)																	
Canada (French speaker)																	
Chile			-1.1	-0.2	-0.81	-0.08	-0.87	0.12	-0.87	0	34.4	105.5	5	6.25	16	12	0.98
China		1.79	-1.13	0.79	-1.23	1.2	-0.93	0.8	-1.16		120.9	180	2.78	6.25	4	2	-1.72
Colombia					-1.71	0.34	-1.67	0.68	-1.87	0.6	30.9	120	5	4.38	12	6	-0.26
Costa Rica											48.9	72.3	6.11	6.88	16	11	0.98
Croatia					0.72	-0.51	0.08	0.31			38.7	104.1	6.11	5.63	14	12	0.48
Cyprus									-0.56	0.13	51.2	108	7.5	7.5	15	12	0.89
Czech Rep.			1.24	-0.11	1.07	0.33	1.23	0.38			48.8	62.2	6.67	8.13	16	12	1.02
Denmark	1.6	1.44	1.25	1.2			1.16	1.87			131.9		8.89	9.38	16	12	1.48
Dominican Rep.					-1.05	0.33					74.7	87.6	3.33	5.63	15	11	0.14
Ecuador											72.7	104.8	5	3.13	15	11	-0.22
Egypt							-1.69	-0.64	-1.61	-0.46	37.2	118.9	4.44	5	5	2	-1.19
El Salvador							-2.06	0.53			60.4	103.2	3.89	5	15	8	0.06
Estonia			1.3	-0.88	1.27	-1.3	1.27	-1.19			48.4	100.3	5	7.5	16	12	1.03
Ethiopia									-0.85	-0.36	55.2	57.2	5	6.25	7	3	-1.30
Finland	0.63	0.82	1.21	1.26	0.68	1.01	0.84	0.94	0.82	1.12	117.5	128.1	7.78	8.75	16	12	1.48
France	0.54	0.13	0.38	0.71			0.52	0.94	0.63	1.13	37.9	58.6	6.67	7.5	15	12	1.24
Georgia					-0.04	-1.34			-0.04	-1.31	38.2	69	4.44	4.38	11	7	-0.25
Germany											75.8	48.5	7.78	8.75	15	12	1.34
Germany (East)			1.06	0.6	1.74	0.58	1.44	0.42	1.46	0.26							
Germany (West)	0.83	-0.07	1.23	0.69	1.55	1.52	1.17	0.44	1.31	0.74							
Ghana					-1.66	-0.05			-1.94	-0.29	17.4	142.2	4.44	4.38	14	11	0.48
Greece							0.77	0.55			54.6		6.67	7.5	15	11	0.88
Guatemala							-1.7	-0.17			51.9	142.2	2.78	4.38	12	8	-0.26
Hong Kong									1.2	-0.98	82.4	112.9	5	5.63	15	10	0.49
Hungary	0.17	-1.07	0.46	-1.06	0.79	-0.77	0.4	-1.22			44.8	87.8	5.56	6.88	16	12	1.00
India			-0.49	-0.91	-0.54	-0.69	-0.52	-0.6	-0.36	-0.21	52.5	107.9	5.56	6.25	13	10	0.45
Indonesia							-1.07	-0.5	-0.47	-0.8	16.9	111.5	5	6.25	12	9	-0.14
Iran					-1.4	-0.34	-1.22	-0.45			21.8	97.5	3.33	5	5	2	-1.48
Iraq									-0.4	-1.68	82.6	120.5	6.67	4.38	5	3	-1.26
Ireland	-0.92	0.59	-1.1	1			-0.91	1.18			72.1		7.78	8.75	16	12	1.40
Israel							0.26	0.36			48.3		8.33	7.5	14	12	0.69
Italy	0.18	-0.6	0.11	0.53			0.19	0.85	0.13	0.6	60.8	54.1	6.67	8.13	15	12	0.96
Jamaica													5	6.25	15	9	0.61
Japan	1.41	-0.41	1.62	-0.12	1.79	0.37	1.91	0.54	1.96	-0.05	79.6	64.4	6.11	8.75	13	10	0.95
Jordan					-1.46	-0.97	-1.61	-1.05			62.0	170.1	4.44	5	9	5	-0.71
Kazakhstan													2.78	4.38	7	4	-1.01
Korea (South)	1.08	-0.74	1.11	-0.65	0.96	-0.64	1.13	-0.55	0.61	-1.37	56.9	91.4	7.22	7.5	14	11	0.59
Kuwait											48.5		2.78	5	9	6	-0.53
Kyrgyzstan							-0.15	-0.91			33.7	70.5	3.89	4.38	10	7	-0.72
Latvia			1.21	-0.6	1.33	-0.89	0.72	-1.27			35.9	77.2	6.11	5.63	16	12	0.86
Lithuania		0.68	-0.64	0.96	-1.45	0.98	-1				52.8	74.9	6.11	6.25	16	11	0.85
Luxemburg							0.42	1.13			53.9		7.78	8.75	16	12	1.50
Macedonia Rep.					0.31	-1.02	0.12	-0.72			29.5	22.9	6.67	3.75	11	7	0.16
Malaysia									-0.73	0.09	17.7	150.9	5.56	7.5	8	5	-0.58
Mali									-1.25	-0.08	44.8	137.8	3.89	5.63	15	9	0.28
Malta							-1.53	-0.03			42.2		6.11	8.75	16	12	1.21
Mexico	-1.15	-0.26	-0.3	0.09	-0.81	0.3	-1.47	0.53	-1.47	1.03	41.7	72.6	5	5	14	9	0.08
Moldova					0.36	-1.91	0.46	-1.69	0.47	-1.28	36.7	65.9	6.11	5	10	6	-0.27
Montenegro					0.58	-1.12	0.86	-1.24			68.2	70.3	5	5.63	12	10	0.25
Morocco							-1.64	-1.09	-1.32	-1.04	27.4	109	2.22	5.63	8	6	-0.70
Namibia											50.8		6.67	6.88	15	12	0.57
Netherlands	0.73	0.9	0.77	1.99			0.84	1.94	0.71	1.39	90.8	54.					