

“Positive” Gentrification, Social Control, and the “Right to the City” in Mixed-Income
Communities: Uses and Expectations of Space and Place

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ABSTRACT

Public policies supporting market-oriented strategies to develop mixed-income communities have become ascendant in the United States and a number of other countries around the world. Although framed as addressing both market goals of revitalization and social goals of poverty deconcentration and inclusion, these efforts at “positive gentrification” also generate a set of fundamental tensions—between integration and exclusion, use value and exchange value, appropriation and control, poverty and development—that play out in particular, concrete ways on the ground. Drawing on social control theory and the “right to the city” framework of Henri LeFebvre, this paper interrogates these tensions as they become manifest in three mixed-income communities being developed to replace public housing complexes in Chicago, focusing particularly on responses to competing expectations regarding the use of space and appropriate normative behavior, and to the negotiation of these expectations in the context of arguments about safety, order, what constitutes “public” space, and the nature and extent of rights to use that space in daily life.

Deconcentrating poverty has been a significant focus of urban policy over the past two decades, much of it focused on public housing. Deconcentration efforts are geared toward either dispersing poor people to less-poor communities or attracting higher-income residents to low-income neighborhoods. These goals are sometimes supported by the demolition and rebuilding of public housing complexes as new, mixed-income developments (Cisneros and Engdahl 2009; Popkin 2007; Popkin et. al. 2004). A major goal of these efforts is to integrate low-income and public housing residents into the fabric of the developments and the surrounding (regenerating) community, among higher-income residents, and in contexts of greater stability, safety, opportunity, and order.

This paper focuses on three mixed-income developments being implemented as part of the public housing transformation in Chicago. It examines the community dynamics around behavior norms, social control, and the use and appropriation of space and place generated by bringing together residents of diverse socioeconomic backgrounds in these contexts.

The strategy of reclaiming public housing complexes for mixed-income development is essentially an effort at “positive gentrification” (Cameron 2003)—public policy that harnesses private capital and market forces to attract higher-income residents and generate neighborhood revitalization while attempting to reduce segregation and foster inclusion. Public housing residents who return to these rebuilt developments thus return to fundamentally different contexts. These changes include a significantly improved built environment, lower levels of crime, more (and more targeted) supportive services, better integration into the street grid and better access to surrounding

neighborhoods, the promise (over time) of better neighborhood amenities, and new neighbors, most of whom differ from them in terms of income, occupation, education, cultural background, family structure, and life experience.

Such mixed-income development schemes have become ascendant in the United States and beyond, most notably the United Kingdom and the Netherlands (Lees 2008) but also in Canada, Australia, Ireland, Germany, and other parts of Western Europe. Such schemes generally claim to represent a potential “win-win outcome for all political persuasions” (Lees and Ley 2008: 2282). But they have also generated significant controversy and resistance, both on the ground from low-income residents and advocates (e.g., Goetz 2000; Pattillo 2007) and regarding the theoretical assumptions, values, and likely beneficiaries (e.g., Joseph, Chaskin and Webber 2007; Lees 2008; Pattillo 2007; Galster 2006). Perhaps most fundamentally challenging are critiques that emphasize the more negative assessments of the impact of gentrification. To what extent do these mixed-income efforts provide mechanisms to integrate low-income people into well-functioning communities with access to amenities and opportunities, and to what extent are they mechanisms to facilitate the appropriation of urban space by and for more affluent residents and the interests of capital in the context of a broader neoliberal agenda (Freeman 2006; Fraser and Kick 2007; Imbroscio 2008; Lees 2008; Pattillo 2009; Smith and Stovall 2008)?

The discourse on gentrification is complex, contributing competing views of the determinants (supply versus demand), outcomes (regeneration versus displacement), and value assessments (“emancipatory” versus “revanchist”) of the process (Lees 2000). As Lance Freeman (2006) makes clear, different people within gentrifying contexts have

different perspectives on its benefits and harms, and in some cases residents see both positive and negative aspects at once (see also Pattillo 2007). These kinds of observations have led some to suggest the need for a more “complex and ambivalent normative assessment” of gentrification (Cameron 2003: 2374).

These tensions—between integration and exclusion, use value and exchange value, appropriation and control, poverty and development—are often most concretely manifest in responses to competing expectations regarding appropriate normative behavior and the negotiation of these expectations in the context of arguments about safety, order, what constitutes “public” space, and the nature and extent of rights to use that space in daily life. Mixed-income developments throw these tensions into particular relief, and offer the potential of more deliberate and intentional efforts to manage them.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, we briefly identify some of the key assumptions that inform mixed-income development as a response to concentrated urban poverty and outline some of the key theoretical frameworks and current empirical knowledge that help clarify and explain these dynamics, with particular attention to issues of social control, the dynamics of gentrification, and arguments based on Henri Lefebvre’s (1996 [1968]) notion of the “right to the city.” Next, we briefly describe the study—methods, data, contexts—on which our empirical analysis is based. Finally, we provide a detailed analysis of the ways in which the dynamics of space and behavior play out across the three mixed-income sites in Chicago, with attention to perspectives on crime and disorder, differential expectations for behavior and the use of public space, the nature of and varying experiences with rules, rule enforcement, and the appropriation of

space, and some of the implications of these dynamics for understanding mixed-income development and its potential and limitations as a mechanism of “positive gentrification.”

SOCIAL CONTROL, GENTRIFICATION, AND THE “RIGHT TO THE CITY”

The theoretical assumptions that lie behind mixed-income development focus in different ways on the presumed benefits of integrating low-income people into neighborhoods with more affluent residents. Some focus on the ways in which such integration represents access to resources and benefits the city provides that were denied in the context of social isolation and concentrated poverty. These include access to the more diverse social networks of higher-income neighbors (“weak ties” or “bridging” social capital) that connect them to information and opportunity as well as increased responsiveness of political and market actors that can lead to greater access to improved services, amenities, and organizations (Freeman 2006; Granovetter 1973; Logan and Molotch 1987; Putnam 1995; Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Khadduri 2001).

Another guiding assumption behind mixed-income development is that integration would provide particular kinds of influence on (low-income) individuals’ attitudes and behaviors through the presence of middle class “role models” who promote and foster “mainstream” social norms and expectations (e.g., Wilson 1987; Anderson 1990; Kasarda 1990).

Social Disorganization, Social Control, and Crime

Assumptions about the possible value of mixed-income development with regard to social control draws on social disorganization theory. The presence of higher-income

residents is expected to facilitate social control and reduce crime for a number of reasons. First, communities with higher proportions of homeowners are likely to be more stable and thus have denser acquaintanceship networks (Freudenberg 1986; Sampson 1988; Sampson and Groves 1989), stronger attachment to organizations that contribute to social control, and more “collective efficacy” (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999). Second, higher-income residents are expected to be more likely to exert normative pressure to maintain order and safety in their neighborhood and to enforce rules and protect their investment (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997; Logan and Molotch 1987). Finally, law enforcement and other formal institutions that may contribute to neighborhood social control are likely to be more responsive and active in communities with higher-income people (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls 1997).

Heterogeneity and the Dynamics of Gentrification

It should be noted, however, that heterogeneity has also long been identified with social disorganization and crime (Shaw and McKay 1942) and can inhibit the development of the kinds of primary ties and flows of communication that undergird many informal mechanisms of social control (Kornhauser 1978; Gans 1962; Merry 1981). In such cases, social control tends to operate less through primary networks and more through relationships with and actions of local institutions and through agencies beyond the neighborhood (Hunter 1985; Bursik and Grasmick 1993).

Although reliance on social control mechanisms at these higher levels can be effective (Carr 2003), they may also generate conflict between groups who assign responsibility for particular conditions or infractions to specific groups “unlike”

themselves, or who have different orientations to what constitutes a violation of norms deserving of censure (Fischer 1982; Freeman 2006; Pattillo 2007; Chaskin and Joseph 2010). Definitions of what constitutes criminality are context-specific and change over time, but both normative and relative orientations to crime are generally grounded in the notion of *threat* (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). In this context, outward signs of disorder (litter, broken windows, graffiti) and expressions of incivility (loitering, panhandling, harassment, public drinking) are often seen to indicate more fundamental problems with safety and crime, leading residents to assume that they are at greater risk of victimization and providing “cues” to youth and others inclined to crime and antisocial behavior that such action will be tolerated. Along these lines, the causal argument promoted by the influential “broken windows” thesis is that such disorder *leads* to crime, and that policing disorderly behavior, including “taking informal or extralegal steps to help protect what the neighborhood had decided was the appropriate level of public order” (Wilson and Kelling 1982), is an effective way of preventing or reducing crime in any given area.

Visual cues certainly matter, and research has provided evidence of a relationship between disorder and perceptions of crime (Lewis and Maxfield 1980; Skogan 1990; Taylor and Hale 1986; Taylor and Covington 1993; Perkins and Wandersman 1993; LaGrange, Ferraro and Supancic 1992). However, the empirical basis for the causal link between disorder and crime rates proposed by the “broken windows” thesis has been challenged (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999).

Further, although there may be broad agreement across class and race lines about the desire for neighborhood safety and about a broad range of behaviors that would be considered disorderly and unacceptable in *any* neighborhood (Pattillo 1998), in

gentrifying contexts the line between acceptable and censurable behavior often shifts, leading to what Mary Pattillo (2007: 264) describes as a “progressive criminalization of ‘quality of life issues’” and an increasing tendency to censure legal behaviors (barbequing in public, fixing cars on the street, playing loud music in public) that some (generally higher-income newcomers to gentrifying neighborhoods) find distasteful (see also Freeman 2006).

The “Right to the City”

These tensions are in part grounded (at least tacitly) in assumptions about *rights*—about the line between the freedom to use and enjoy neighborhood space and the point at which such enjoyment infringes on the rights and enjoyment of others. Henri Lefebvre’s notion of the “right to the city” provides a useful framework to consider such tensions in the context of mixed-income development, the transformation of public housing, and efforts to promote “positive gentrification.” On the one hand, the integrationist orientation of these schemes responds to LeFevbre’s call for ending the segregation between social classes that is inscribed in the urban spatial order, providing the poor with access to lower-poverty areas and the environments, amenities, and opportunities they may represent (Duke 2009). On the other hand, the fact that these efforts are essentially market-driven strategies that privatize former public housing developments and rely to a large extent on attracting higher-income residents may lead to the privileging of exchange-value orientations that are specifically opposed to LeFevbre’s notions of city life, which prioritize use value and habitation. The right to the city, in LeFevbre’s view, includes both the right to *appropriation*, which concerns access, use, and enjoyment

rather than ownership, and the right to *participation* in decision making and the production of urban space.

One of the impacts of neoliberal urban reform has been the increasing privatization of urban spaces, and a decrease in the kinds of “civic functions” that open public space can perform, in favor of more highly regulated spaces that restrict use to specific kinds of activities and behavior (Mitchell 2003). The arguments behind such restrictions often focus on the primacy of maintaining order, which often “trumps rights” in determining the use of and access to public space (Mitchell 2003: 6).

But what “counts” as disorder? What behaviors are reasonably open to monitoring and control? What interests are at play in defining these choices? What are the assumptions about public space that inform the development of community norms around these issues? To what extent does the integrationist project that undergirds mixed-income development influence these dynamics, and in what ways?

CONTEXTS, METHODS, AND DATA

The analysis that follows is based on in-depth interviews, field observations, and a review of documentary data concerning three mixed-income developments that are part of the Chicago Housing Authority’s Plan for Transformation. *Oakwood Shores* is the development taking the place of Ida B. Wells/Madden Park on the south side of Chicago. At full build-out with a projected 3000 units, Oakwood Shores will be the largest of these three new developments and is being developed through a partnership between a for-profit developer responsible primarily for the for-sale component and a nonprofit developer with significant experience creating and managing mixed-income housing

around the country. The latter has responsibility for the rental components and social service provision, as well as for spearheading much of the resident engagement and “community building” inputs.

Park Boulevard represents the transformation of Stateway Gardens, a collection of eight high-rise buildings constructed between 1955 and 1958 as part of the “State Street Corridor.” The project is being developed by a team of two private, for-profit firms, and was designed to include an equal mix of relocated public housing, affordable, and market-rate units. The development plan for Park Boulevard also includes the creation of a non-profit organization—Stateway Community Partners—to manage the social support and community-building efforts in the new development.

Westhaven Park is the second phase of the redevelopment of Henry Horner Homes, a primarily high-rise development on the city’s west side. The first phase of redevelopment began prior to the Plan for Transformation in 1999, and consisted of a set of town-house style units built exclusively for public housing residents. Because of the concentration of these 200 units of public housing—often referred to as the “Superblock”—located directly in the middle of the mixed-income development, Westhaven Park will have a larger proportion of public housing residents than any other site. It will also have the lowest proportion of for-sale units. The project is being developed by a development team that includes two private, for-profit developers, and management of the rental properties is handled by a subsidiary of one of these firms. Resident supports and services are contracted out to local non-profit service providers.

Although in many ways reflective of other gentrifying contexts, these sites differ from them in several important respects. First, central to each development is an explicit

focus on promoting income mix and integration. Thus, although tensions around issues of displacement are very much alive in response to relocations prompted by the Plan for Transformation (e.g., Bennett, Smith and Wright 2006), the likelihood of complete population turnover is somewhat mitigated by the low-income unit set-aside of at least one third of development units in each case. Furthermore, there are numerous efforts made to facilitate social mixing including building design and physical integration of subsidized and non-subsidized units and various community-building activities (Chaskin and Joseph 2010). Second, because of how they are designed, built, and managed centrally, there is a degree of centralized control over the determination of rules, monitoring processes, and enforcement that is not the case in gentrifying neighborhoods in which the play of many actors—renters, homeowners, developers, elected officials, community organizations, public agencies—play multiple and only sometimes coordinated roles. Third, rather than the infill development and renovation that characterizes most gentrifying contexts, these developments entail the wholesale demolition and reconstruction of the physical infrastructure. This creates a relocation-and-return dynamic, with public housing residents being temporarily moved away and then brought back concurrently with the gentrifiers to the “new” community. Unlike more typical gentrifying neighborhood transitions where the middle class are the sole newcomers, in this context all residents are in some ways “new” to the redeveloped housing complex, complicating questions of “turf” claims and rights. Finally, as part of a formal, structured, city-wide initiative, these sites are being developed under a defined set of processes and constraints (i.e., a relocation rights contract for public housing residents), in a highly politicized and litigious environment, under much public interest and scrutiny.

A total of 225 interviews were conducted over two waves of data collection (conducted approximately 18 months apart in 2007 and 2008-2009, respectively), including panels of both resident and stakeholder key informants. Resident interviewees were randomly selected from developer occupancy lists in each site and included residents of different housing tenures, including 23 relocated public housing residents, 21 residents of “affordable” units (either rented or owned, subsidized by tax credits), and 21 residents of “market-rate” units (again, either rented or owned). Most residents were interviewed twice over the course of the two waves of data collection, but because the pace of occupancy was delayed in Park Boulevard at the time of the first wave of fieldwork, resident interviews from Park Boulevard are only available for the second wave.

Stakeholder key informants included a total of 66 individuals involved in some way in the Transformation, either as “development-team” stakeholders (developers, service providers, and property managers), as “community stakeholders” (such as service providers, community activists, and public officials active in the neighborhoods in which these developments are being built), or as “macro-level” stakeholders—participants and active observers operating at the city level in connection with the Transformation (including officials with the Chicago Housing Authority and public housing advocates).

Interviews were guided by a semi-structured interview instrument comprised primarily of open-ended questions covering a core set of topics, with some specific variations targeted to particular interviewees based on their position and role. Interviews were recorded digitally and transcribed in their entirety, then coded for analysis using the N’Vivo qualitative data analysis software program. Documentary data and, especially,

data from 318 structured observations of community meetings, programs, events, and interactions, allow us to contextualize interview data within the specific dynamics of each site, and provide both a check on and new insights into the dynamics described by interviewees.

FINDINGS: THE DYNAMICS OF SPACE AND PLACE

Our findings focus on three dimensions of community dynamics around space and place in these three mixed-income communities. First, we explore perspectives of crime and disorder in the three sites and the relationship between perspectives regarding issues of safety and threat, on the one hand, and more general “incivilities” on the other. Second, we analyze the kinds of behavioral expectations and cultural assumptions that lie behind these perspectives, and the relationship between them and considerations of use and exchange value. Finally, we investigate the ways in which formal rules, rule enforcement, and perceptions of fairness inform appropriations of space that generate or reproduce conflict, challenging notions that mixed-income development promotes low-income residents’ social inclusion and their “right to the city.”

Perceptions of Crime, Safety and Disorder

Issues of crime, safety, and disorder are clearly salient for residents of all three developments, though different relative emphases are apparent both across sites and among different residents. Residents with whom we spoke at Oakwood Shores, for example, were relatively more likely to discuss property crimes, mostly along the lines typical in many urban neighborhoods—car break-ins, some vandalism, the occasional

report of a home burglary—than were residents in the other two neighborhoods. This was especially true among homeowners there.

Beyond property crime, concerns about violent crime—especially that associated with gangs, drugs, and guns—were more prevalent and more often discussed by residents at Westhaven Park and Oakwood Shores, with gang and drug activity a more common concern among residents (especially relocated public housing residents and homeowners) at Westhaven Park. Relocated public housing residents with whom we spoke had a somewhat different orientation to these issues than that of homeowners. While the latter more frequently discussed the need for more (and more effective) policing or complained about the impact on their children of witnessing such activity, relocated public housing residents were more likely to take a defensive stance in response to these problems, seeking to avoid entanglements (“no one don’t bother me, I don’t bother them”) or getting erroneously caught up. As a Westhaven Park resident put it:

I caught myself walking up to the park and kept a u-turn right back here. I said I’m not going to no jail. [The police] go up to talk to some girls I know, and [the girls] got drugs on them. They think I’m there with them. I’m go to jail for them? No thank you. I left.

It’s important to note here the role that the Superblock at Westhaven Park plays in both heightening attention to issues of gang- and drug-related crime and serving as the presumed source of many of these problems. Indeed, much of the “trouble” across sites, but especially in Westhaven Park and Oakwood Shores, was seen by many respondents to originate from nearby public housing complexes still standing or from visitors to relocated public housing residents in the mixed-income developments.

It's also important to note that although concerns about crime exist among residents of the new developments, they are for most people not overriding, and lower-income renters (both relocated public housing residents and renters of "affordable" units) clearly note that their current environment is significantly safer than the neighborhoods from which they moved, and that these improvements in crime, an increased sense of security, and the quieter atmosphere of the developments are major benefits of the new developments (cf. Joseph and Chaskin 2010). Indeed, reported crime in the police beats that surround the developments has been trending downward, and in most cases these declines were substantially greater than in the city as a whole. Between 1999 (when the Plan for Transformation began) and 2008, there was a drop of approximately 63 and 65 percent, respectively, in the number of index crimes reported in the police beats surrounding Oakwood Shores and Park Boulevard, and a drop of about 21 percent in Westhaven Park (see Figure 1). This compares to an overall drop of about 25 percent for the city as a whole. These annual trends, however, mask some volatility over the course of each year. Quarterly crime reports indicate periodic peaks in criminal activity, particularly during the warmer-weather months (see Figure 2), which likely contribute to residents' perspectives on crime and safety, and are clearly reflected, for example, in the concerns voiced at monthly Community Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) beat meetings.

[INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]

Still, the vast majority of complaints levied by residents across sites—most often (but not exclusively) homeowners and market-rate renters—concerned not crime per se, but a broad range of "incivilities" centered around public behavior and the use of public

space, and especially (but not exclusively) focused around the actions of unsupervised youth. This was evident both in our interviews and in the public discourse at CAPS meetings and other public forums, and is true even in Westhaven Park, where specific concerns about violent crime and safety were most common and most strongly stated.

Several examples of behaviors causing concern came up with some consistency: Youth fighting in the park, “hanging out” in the streets, parking lots, and in front of doorways, making noise in the alley, throwing trash, swearing; people drinking in the park, playing loud music, arguing in the street; residents “hanging out” during the day and late at night. In most cases, these incidences were discussed more as annoyance than threat, though several residents interpreted them as incipient dangers and took them as cues to stay away. As an owner of an affordable unit at Westhaven Park put it:

Like the loitering that takes place. It’s kind of like they’re bouncers. It’s like if you walk in, sometimes they look at you funny. . . . That’s the reason why we don’t use those places.

In some cases, such activity creates ambivalence, a questioning of how much to be concerned, how much to feel threatened, and how best to respond. As an owner of a market rate unit in Oakwood Shores put it:

I mean for the most part our neighbors are pretty cool. . . . But there are some people who are probably not real good to know and I would say that their behavior’s probably not illegal, but it’s not acceptable to everybody. There’s a lot of cursing. There’s a lot of fighting in public. There’s some violence. There’s just—I really can’t say, ’cause it’s not illegal. There’s nothing you could do about stuff like that, but it’s just not—it doesn’t make for a very friendly environment.

But for most, the concern is more about order and propriety than about threat. As a market-rate renter in Westhaven Park put it:

I should not have to not want to go outside because . . . there's a bunch of other people out there loitering, hanging out, and doing whatever. Next thing you know, there's garbage all around and that's not being taken care of.

As we explore in the next section, these concerns are reflected in residents' normative expectations for neighborly behavior and the ways in which they ascribe meaning to the source and appropriateness of particular behaviors among their neighbors.

Behavioral Expectations, Cultural Assumptions, and Perspectives on Use and Exchange Value

When discussing basic expectations regarding behavior and neighborhood norms, most respondents—regardless of race or ethnicity, whether of low- or higher-income, owners or renters, developers or property managers or service providers—talked in different ways about respect and common sense as essential guiding principles. And virtually everyone is appreciative of the need for and value of having rules governing basic behavioral expectations in the development, assuming they are reasonable, appropriately enforced, and fairly applied. Where there is some disagreement, however, is over where the line between proscribing behavior and tolerance for difference should be drawn, about who decides, and about apparent double standards with regard to rules and rule enforcement.

Tensions around delineating this boundary stem in part from a market orientation and concern about investment that privileges exchange value over use value. The concern

here focuses on maintaining a sense of the place as a community that is well-ordered, well-maintained, and stable, where the resources a homeowner invests are likely to increase in value over time and where market-rate renters will feel they are getting comfort and value for their money. Certain kinds of behavior, or evidence of certain kinds of “disorder”—from groups of idle people “hanging out” on corners or in front of buildings to storing personal items or hanging laundry in plain view on balconies to washing or repairing cars in the street to barbecuing and playing loud music in public spaces—are seen in this light as negative cues for potential investors and (higher-income) renters, and as ultimately damaging to the property values of those who have already invested. As a community stakeholder in Westhaven Park put it:

I’m a market-rate person, you think about your property value So, yeah, you may like the kids on the block and think that they’re cool and think they should be hanging out but, at the same time, you don’t want people driving around seeing them hang out because it may give the wrong impression of the, of your property value, you know.

These kinds of concerns lie behind some of the design choices made by developers (privileging private space over shared public spaces at the block level; the placement of parks and the orientation of new housing to existing parks), and some of the rules development teams have created proscribing particular kinds of activity.

But use and exchange value are intimately tied in the context of land and development (Harvey 1988), and although exchange-value orientations are clearly an important contributor to the tensions around acceptable behavior and the use of public space, even more prevalent among respondents’ (particularly residents’) perspectives

were concerns stemming from differences in values regarding appropriate *use*. These values are themselves rooted in differing orientations to, and differential privileging of, particular sets of behavior and life-style choices that are often ascribed to a difference of “culture” and, in particular when focused on opprobrious or disorderly behavior, to assumptions about underclass or “ghetto” culture associated largely with public housing residents. Though often unstated and difficult to tease out in discussions of “culture,” race is a critical dimension of the social dynamics at play here, and often informs assumptions about individuals’ housing background and lifestyle choices.

Many examples of this problematic behavior, though neither particularly threatening nor obviously related to issues of safety, are generally agreed-upon nuisances that negatively impact the quality of life of at least a plurality of other residents. Loud music, shouting, and raucous behavior late at night disturbs people trying to sleep, and is particularly disruptive to those who work in the mornings. Careless disposal of trash or active littering creates physical disorder and potential health risks. Annoyance at these kinds of activities is not limited to homeowners or market-rate renters.

In other cases, however, the behavior at issue—hanging laundry out on balconies; leaving shoes outside apartment doors; walking down the street eating a bowl of cereal; stepping outside in bare feet or in pajamas—are more innocuous and opinions about its appropriateness are more clearly a matter of preference. Much of the behavior at issue here concerns the very presence of (primarily black) people in the public view, congregating openly for leisure or without apparent purpose—behavior that gets labeled by those opposed to it as loitering, a censurable offense. As the renter of a market-rate unit at Westhaven Park put it:

I think when you start hanging out like that, it makes it look more like a quote/unquote ghetto. So I don't like that. I don't like that part of the area, where people sort of just hang out and they gather, because it's not—there's nowhere to sit. There's no—I mean, it's not really a good place for people to gather, right outside the door.

Some (higher-income) residents see the relative merits of their set of use-values as taken for granted. As the owner of a market-rate unit at Park Boulevard suggested with reference to a resident who had to be corrected about the propriety of putting a sign on her apartment door asking guests to take their shoes off before entering, “She just didn't know that it wasn't proper to do that. She didn't know any better.”

Others are bemused by the controversy: What's wrong with hanging out? And many others recognize this as a dilemma rooted in different expectations for behavior that is fundamentally about preference, grounded in prior experience. And a number of residents note the different valence placed on such behavior, depending on when and where it occurs and, perhaps most centrally, who's doing it. As the owner of an affordable unit in Westhaven Park noted:

Well, if you're low income, I think that they look at you differently. . . . If a whole bunch of low-income people were just like hanging out in front of a building, it looks a little different than if me and four or five other people that are owners are hanging out in front of the building. It just looks different, so people can say whatever they want.

Race and class play into this dynamic in sometimes complex ways. In some cases, as above, it serves as a proxy for whether the people seen “hanging out” are “low-

income” or “owners.” In other cases, race can play into the desire of some African-American residents to distance themselves from their more affluent neighbors’ (and property management’s) assumptions about difference—“I trust my [condo] neighbors, but not the project folks; I know how ghetto people are,” as one renter of an affordable unit put it—or to maintain identity in the face of countervailing pressures from lower-income neighbors. As a renter of a market-rate unit at Oakwood Shores put it:

I’m an African-American black female. I have a master’s degree. I mean I don’t stunt my growth because of the environment that I’m in and I talk a little bit to the kids. I give them things to try to draw some attention to myself so that I can communicate with them, but I also have—on the other side of that, I can see that there’s some jealousy and envy from lack of understanding because I’m not going to revert to some of their negative ways which is, you know, the talk, the walk, the clothes. I’m not gonna do that. I’m gonna be me. And my car’s been scratched up. My mirror’s been broken off. I can’t put my name on the mailbox. They keep taking it off. I mean going through stuff like that and it’s very frustrating and very discouraging because it’s my own people, you know.

Whatever the source, level of importance, or particular valence placed on these attitudes and preferences regarding behavior, these differential use values clearly also have exchange-value implications. Since people with more spending power have greater degrees of freedom to exercise choice in selecting a neighborhood to live in and the kind of unit to buy or rent, the general preferences they hold with regard to neighborhood norms of behavior are likely to hold relative sway. To maintain standards in accordance with these preferences, mixed-income developments codify specific rules and

circumscribe certain behaviors and the use of space in particular ways, as we explore in the next section.

Rules, Enforcement, and the Appropriation(s) of Space

In most cases, the rules developed within the context of mixed-income developments by property developers and management are no different than those that govern any rental community or condominium: on-time payment of rent and fees, keeping noise down after a certain hour at night, maintaining property upkeep. In some cases, they may be different in degree more than in kind: How loud is too loud? How late is too late? What are the individual consequences residents face for the actions of their guests? A key issue, to which we will return, is the question of who establishes and enforces these rules. In these new developments, in addition to property managers and developers, homeowner associations hold wide discretion and responsibility for setting rules by which all residents must abide.

These basic rules extend to all residents (though some more specific rules—like prohibitions against barbequing or owning pets—do not apply to owners), although there are different perspectives on the extent to which they are uniformly recognized, monitored, and enforced. There are, for example, different concerns regarding the kinds of infractions more likely to be made by renters, particularly low-income renters, who are seen as more likely to engage in illegal activities than their higher-income neighbors.

For some residents—particularly owners across all three sites, but especially at Westhaven Park, and particularly focused on low-income renters—these concerns are seen as related to more general issues, creating a kind of gray area that links a focus on

illegality to one on other kinds of behavior that are not criminal—and may not even be threatening—but that are seen as undesirable. The following comments by the owner of a market-rate unit at Westhaven Park make this link seamlessly:

I think the message that [property management is] sending is: We care. We want you to live in decent housing but we also want you to care, but—and we don't want people living in the housing who are going to, you know, mess it up. And that's drug dealing. That's prostitution. That's, you know, selling cigarettes out of the back of your place. That's loitering at, you know, at 2 a.m. That's people swinging by in the car with the loud music. You know that the whole kind of attitude.

For the most part, development stakeholders see these rules as related both to maintaining order in the development and as a foundation for broader (positive) socialization necessary for low-income (and especially relocated public housing) residents to get ahead. As an Oakwood Shores development stakeholder put it:

We try to work through the folks that we have, preparing people for moving into the community. That's a huge part of what we do, because how you start is how you finish. People have to be prepared for living in this community. There's an expectation. . . [and] living in the market is very different.

Or, in the words of one from Westhaven Park:

My biggest hope is that we change the behavior of the kids, that maybe this breaks the chain of the cycle, that what these mixed-income communities are doing is sort of demonstrating to the next generation what's acceptable and what's

not, what kind of goals they might have that they might not have had otherwise when they see other people doing certain things.

Although the rules are applicable to all residents, the lion's share of concern about them, and the primary attention paid to preventing and responding to infractions of them, is focused on low-income renters, especially relocated public housing residents. Many discussed these rules and the increased surveillance of behavior in the developments as a source of stress (cf. Joseph and Chaskin 2010). Others accept them as a fair trade for the improvement in living standards provided by the new development. As a relocated public housing resident in Westhaven Park put it:

The rules are what is expected. I mean what can you say? You come from the projects and you get blessed with a brand new apartment that's built from the ground. What more can you ask for? You come out of the projects where there's rats, roaches, floods, no heat half the time, no lights half the time. So I'm grateful. I have no complaints.

Where these rules connect with broader issues regarding the goals of integration and the notion of a "right to the city"—particularly the right of appropriation—are with regard to the delineation between public and private space and expectations regarding behavior within these spaces. In effect, concerns regarding both safety and the promotion of particular standards of behavior lead to the appropriation of space in two, countervailing, ways.

The first is the privatization of space on the part of development teams and homeowner associations that reduces and redefines, to some extent, what counts as "public." Part of this is a function of design, which for the most part privileges private

(and privately controlled) space over common areas. This includes a preference for individual entrances and private balconies as well as the demarcation of common spaces that can be effectively monitored and managed, such as community rooms available for resident group meetings and functions.

Another part of this is a function of rules that are meant to limit resident access to and use of common areas not explicitly designated for social uses. This entails the privatization (and concomitant restrictions on use) of common outdoor spaces that might otherwise be seen as public—such as streets, playgrounds, the area in front of buildings, alleyways, the areas behind buildings—and those that might more readily be understood as private—front steps, parking lots—but available for the use of development residents and their guests. Relocated public housing residents and renters of “affordable” units across sites frequently noted these prohibitions, some with particular rancor. As the renter of an affordable unit at Westhaven Park put it:

You can't go onto the front. They don't want you on the front. They don't want you on the back. You can't barbeque. I ain't never lived nowhere where you can't go out to the back of your house and barbeque. You a prisoner in your own house.

Or, as a relocated public housing resident at Park Boulevard stated:

They must have been sitting out on their porch or sitting outside on the crate or something but they put notices in all their mailboxes telling them that was very ghetto. You know: You're not allowed to congregate in front of the property.

Well, where do you want me to go? Where do you want me to go?

Rules limiting access to such spaces or governing behavior within them are in place across all three sites, created to limit disturbances and curtail visible “hanging out.”

As a development stakeholder at Park Boulevard explained:

They’re used to being able to stand outside in the hallway or in front of the building and cuss each other out and all that. You can’t do that here. That’s a violation of your lease. In the projects, you could do that.

To the extent public park space in or near the developments exists, development teams encourage their use. As a relocated public housing resident in Westhaven Park noted:

They prefer for you to go to the park and play and talk, which I guess [hanging out outside in the development] does bring down the property value, but . . . as far as like if you sitting in the back not making a lot of noise, I mean you just want to sit in the back where you live and just, you know, be comfortable, then I don’t think there should be anything wrong with that, as long as you’re not causing harm to anybody. But they want you to go to a park.

Parks, however, are not always conveniently located, and are also frequently a source of disappointment or conflict grounded in the kinds of differential expectations regarding use described above. As the owner of a market-rate unit at Oakwood Shores describes:

Well, people barbecued at [the park] at the walking track. I mean—and they do like serious barbecues. One night there was like tons of cars out there and it’s like out of place to me. . . . I mean [some people] like to walk around that track. And then people are like competing with this barbecue smoke and music and whatever

else is going on out there. So it's almost like there are two different groups that are using the park for almost two different purposes.

These design choices and the enforcement of rules are partially effective at curtailing some of the behaviors development stakeholders and higher-income residents wish to limit, enforced both through vigilance on the part of property management (who send out letters, call residents in violation into the office for warnings and counseling, hold meetings to hear resident concerns and mediate disputes) and through the actions of residents (who report transgressions to management, intervene informally with their neighbors, call the police). But they also lead to a countervailing process, on the part of some residents and, in some cases, members of the broader public, to (re)appropriate such privatized space for social interaction, recreation, and leisure. In some cases, this may just be a matter of single individuals or small groups standing in front of buildings or pulling up chairs to socialize outside. In other cases, the appropriation of space is more active—kids running up and down the street and between cars in the parking lots or playing in the alleys; parties being held on the street to eat, drink, and listen to music—that causes sometimes curiosity, sometimes anger, on the part of neighbors. The owner of an affordable unit at Oakwood Shores, to give just one example of a common complaint, describes a particular evening in which “mobs of people” set up a late-night party behind her building, “totally invading[ing] the parking area.”

To some extent, these two kinds of appropriation are mutually reinforcing: The privatization of common areas, a lack of accessible public space, and rules perceived as overly restrictive or inconsistently enforced leads to the informal reclaiming of such space for social uses, while the use of spaces in front of buildings, in parking lots, and on

the street to socialize—as well as some kinds of activities in public parks—leads to complaints by some higher-income residents and/or censure by property management.

CONCLUSIONS: INCLUSION, CONTROL, AND THE RIGHT TO THE CITY

Deconcentrating poverty through mixed-income development provides a potential mechanism to reduce the isolation that low-income families experienced in the dense, highly segregated, and concentrated poverty contexts represented by the public housing complexes from which they came, but it also generates a set of basic tensions between integration and exclusion, use value and exchange value, appropriation and control. Concerns about crime, safety, and social order contribute to these tensions, but more fundamental are values and expectations about “appropriate” use and behavior. These tensions are similar to those that have begun to be documented in other gentrifying contexts (e.g., Freeman 2006; Pattillo 2007), but are thrown into particular relief by the magnitude of social distance between residents at either end of the socioeconomic spectrum in these developments. They are also conditioned by the particular dynamics put in play by virtue of the public policy that shapes these developments—as efforts to promote “positive gentrification”—and the nature of its implementation as a joint venture between the State, private developers, and nonprofit organizations. This includes both an explicit intent to integrate low-income people (especially former public housing residents) into these new communities through a range of services, supports, and community-building activities. It also includes the establishment of centralized, corporate mechanisms for setting, monitoring, and enforcing rules that govern key aspects of the social life of the developments, including those concerned with access to and use of space.

The potential for integration—in the sense of inclusion and access to the potential benefits of city life—that mixed-income development represents is complicated by these factors. Within these contexts, social interaction across income and housing tenure has been limited, in spite of their spatial integration ([AUTHORS] in press; Graves 2010; Joseph 2008; Kleit 2005; Tach 2009). Access to new amenities and resources as they develop—well-maintained housing, cleaner and safer environments, higher quality stores, recreational facilities, better schools—is improving. But in terms of the promise of the “right to the city” that mixed-income development might be seen to provide, the rules governing access and use both protect and restrict resident rights, privileging to a large extent the rights of private property over public access and public order over specific kinds of individual freedom.

These priorities have generated a challenging daily experience for many low-income residents, who feel constrained, observed, and at risk (“walking on eggshells” as one described it) of losing their housing if they fail to toe a particular, imposed line defining their behavior—even as they recognize and appreciate that their overall quality of and satisfaction with their living arrangements has improved (Joseph and Chaskin 2010). One response to this might be to dismiss these concerns as unimportant, arguing that the normative expectations being set in these communities are dominant for good reason, and over time low-income residents who are uncomfortable with them will become socialized to them or move on. This perspective clearly understates the difficulty of the choice imposed, as low-income people have significantly fewer housing options available to them, and relocated public housing residents have taken up residence in these communities as their “permanent” housing choice; leaving could mean losing their right

to public housing subsidy. Instead, relocated public housing residents in these contexts are more likely to withdraw socially, isolating themselves and avoiding engagement or interaction ([AUTHORS] in press; Graves 2010; Chaskin and Joseph 2010; Joseph and Chaskin 2010; Tach 2009), hardly the outcome looked for in a policy meant, in part, to promote inclusion and integration. This orientation to the problem also ignores the fact that such normative expectations were developed within—and are reflective of—a broader context of inequality, and simply defaulting to them privileges the rights and preferences of one (more affluent, more influential) group over another without due process.

Thus, we conclude that mixed-income development, at least as implemented and experienced at these three developments in Chicago, fails to avoid fundamental social challenges common to other gentrifying neighborhoods, such as differential influence over accepted behavioral norms, stigmatization based on race and class, and general discomfort and distance based on perceptions of difference. Despite the greater degree of corporate control over life in these developments, the first few years of these new communities show little progress towards bridging the huge social divides among residents and in fact display troubling signs of increased tension and alienation.

Given the goals of inclusion and integration informing the policies that drive these developments, and the ongoing role of both public authorities and mechanisms of private governance within them, are there, instead, ways to negotiate particular preferences and maximize access and inclusion in ways that contribute to a collective right to the city—protecting the desire for order, safety, and sound investment without overly constraining individual freedom and access to public space? We suggest three potential directions.

The first concerns design and the allocation of public space. The degree to which communal, civic space is limited in favor of private spaces increases the likelihood of appropriating available space for activities that some find objectionable. Addressing this requires both the allocation and *integration* of public spaces within neighborhoods, as well as promoting general access to them. Rather than integrated, mixed-use communities (commercial development, for example, is left to later phases, and most park space is either located on the periphery or associated with condominium governance, raising issues of access), the sites are essentially residential. But simply increasing public space may not be sufficient to address conflicts over its use given the different orientations to what is “appropriate” in such spaces. This may require fostering different orientations to the city in general, particularly the notion of city life, as Iris Marion Young (1999: 236 ff.) puts it, as a “normative ideal” that finds pleasure in difference, embraces inclusion, and celebrates the public sphere and public space, which is by definition accessible to anyone.

The second concerns governance and participation. We have focused on issues of appropriation, but the second leg on which the right to the city argument stands is participation—the engagement of citizens in remaking the city through vision, deliberation, and action. Although the mixed-income developments have included some representation of public housing residents in the planning and decision-making process (primarily on the “working groups”—comprised of representatives from the housing authority, the developers, property management, service providers, city council, public housing advocates, and generally a couple of public housing residents—that oversee development design and roll-out) and through some public, deliberative forums, renters in general, and low-income renters in particular, have limited opportunity to participate in

ongoing planning, deliberation, and decision-making regarding a range of aspects of community life. Developers and property management are primarily responsible for setting, monitoring, and enforcing rules in these developments (and through this, to a large extent informing the tenor of daily life), and are informed in this work by communication and pressure from resident groups, among whom owners are the most highly organized. While homeowners associations provide a kind of basic governance function for owners, tenants associations are not generally in evidence, and those that had been present—notably the Local Advisory Councils (LACs) representing public housing residents prior to the transformation—have been officially replaced by the newly created CHA Ombudsman, who works to address public housing residents’ concerns system wide. More inclusive deliberation and decision-making about issues of shared concern in the new developments, through forums and associations that provide voice to residents across income and housing tenure, may be a key element of more equitable and ultimately more sustainable mixed-income communities.

The third concerns greater intentionality and investment around opportunities for inclusion through organizational infrastructure and institutional strength. Cultivating and strengthening organizational “places” that provide opportunities for both provision and shared use—stores, coffee shops, recreational facilities, schools—may diversify the kinds of spaces available to residents, integrate their activities into the broader community, and provide a range of neutral grounds on which to find some common ground—or greater comfort in difference. To date, the developers and CHA have been consumed by the tasks of financing and constructing the new buildings, marketing to residents, managing the sales and lease-up process, and resolving post-occupancy challenges. Where there has

been attention to institutional improvements around the development—a retail strip at Park Boulevard, a charter school at Oakwood Shores—these activities have been largely disconnected from the mixed-income community-building process and not intentionally leveraged for the potential to create shared space and place. Given the often wide social and economic gulf that is made more evident by the proximity of relocated public housing residents to higher-income neighbors, it seems imperative to explore ways in which the design of public space, the governance of shared space, and joint use of local institutions can help counter the possibility that these developments are contributing to a divided city rather than fostering integration and inclusion.

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Figure 1
Total Index Crimes Reported Annually 1999-2008




Figure 2
Total Index Crimes Reported Quarterly, 1999-2009

