

**Document Version**

Final published version

**Licence**

CC BY

**Citation (APA)**

van Uffelen, N. (2022). Revisiting recognition in energy justice. *Energy Research and Social Science*, 92, Article 102764. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102764>

**Important note**

To cite this publication, please use the final published version (if applicable).  
Please check the document version above.

**Copyright**

In case the licence states "Dutch Copyright Act (Article 25fa)", this publication was made available Green Open Access via the TU Delft Institutional Repository pursuant to Dutch Copyright Act (Article 25fa, the Taverne amendment). This provision does not affect copyright ownership.  
Unless copyright is transferred by contract or statute, it remains with the copyright holder.

**Sharing and reuse**

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

**Takedown policy**

Please contact us and provide details if you believe this document breaches copyrights.  
We will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim.



Perspective

## Revisiting recognition in energy justice

Nynke van Uffelen

Delft University of Technology (TU Delft), Jaffalaan 5, 2600 GA Delft, Netherlands



## ARTICLE INFO

## Keywords:

Energy justice  
Recognition justice  
Critical theory

## ABSTRACT

Energy justice often distinguishes between different tenets, such as distributive, procedural and recognition justice. Recognition justice has a distinct status compared to the other two as its meaning seems the least tangible to grasp. In this article, a systematic literature study was conducted to the definitions and interpretations of recognition justice, showing that the concept currently refers to a large variety of phenomena. This diversity obscures what “recognition justice” actually measures. This paper aims to revisit the concept of recognition justice in energy justice by asking the following question: what does the tenet of recognition justice refer to, taking into account the philosophical roots of the concept? To do so, key texts from Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser were studied in-depth, resulting in four main insights: (1) there are two approaches to recognition justice; (2) actors can be (mis)recognised in multiple ways; (3) two different yet complementary methods for identifying instances of misrecognition can be distinguished; and (4) recognition justice cannot be reduced to other tenets of justice. These findings cumulate in a revisited definition of recognition justice as concerned with the adequate recognition of all actors through love, law, and status order. This definition structures the large variety of understandings in the scholarship, and it has the potential to provide a more fine-grained explanation of energy controversies, which advances the ultimate aim of making energy systems and policies more just.

### 1. Introduction

Concerns for the ethical aspects of energy systems originated in the environmental justice and climate justice literature, however the first articulation of energy justice in the academic literature dates from 2013 [1]. The energy justice scholarship, which has grown rapidly in the last decade, strives towards understanding what is (un)just in energy systems, driven by a commitment to making energy systems more just [2]. To do so, the most frequently used energy justice framework is the tenet-based one that includes distributive, procedural, and recognition justice [1]. Distinguishing different tenets of justice has descriptive and normative goals. On the one hand, the framework functions as a toolkit to analyse case studies in terms of justice; on the other hand, it structures the evaluation of certain policies and decisions, and aids the process of making policy recommendations.

Recognition justice has a distinct status compared to the other two tenets since its meaning seems the least tangible to grasp. As a result, recognition justice has been operationalised and measured in various ways. However, this diversity leaves a normative and an explanatory potential untapped. A better understanding of what it entails to be (mis)recognised can provide a more fine-grained explanation of energy controversies. Also, better understanding what (mis)recognition signifies

can aid the process of making energy systems and policies more just.

The notion of justice as recognition has a much broader history than currently seems to be taken into consideration in the energy justice literature. Elaborate reflections on the concept can be traced back to critical theory, in the works of philosophers such as Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. Drawing from Fraser's and Honneth's theories of justice, this paper aims to revisit the concept of recognition justice in energy justice by asking the following question: what does the tenet of recognition justice refer to, taking into account the philosophical literature on the concept?

To do so, a systematic study of the definitions and use of “recognition justice” circulating in energy justice literature was conducted (Section two). To solve the ensuing issues, the theories of Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth have been studied in-depth, including their roots in German idealism. From this, four key findings from this history of thought are presented (Section three). These learnings result in a revisited conception of recognition justice in energy justice (Section four).

### 2. The use of recognition justice in energy justice

This section aims to understand how recognition justice is currently defined and interpreted in the energy justice literature. To do this, a

E-mail address: [n.vanuffelen@tudelft.nl](mailto:n.vanuffelen@tudelft.nl).

<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2022.102764>

Received 3 December 2021; Received in revised form 15 July 2022; Accepted 3 August 2022

Available online 10 August 2022

2214-6296/© 2022 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

systematic literature study was conducted. In the databases Science Direct, Web of Science, and Scopus, all articles and reviews that mention “energy justice” in the title, abstract or key words and that also contain the word “recognition” in the article were selected. Further criteria were the English language; publication dates after 2012; and only full-length peer-reviewed articles and reviews were included. The resulting 285 articles were subsequently filtered; articles that only mention “recognition” in the bibliography or in a footnote and papers that do not define nor engage with the concept as a tenet were excluded. The final 196 papers (Fig. 1) were analysed in atlas.ti by searching for “recogn”, since this includes all relevant verbs and nouns such as “recognition”, “recognised”, and “recognitional”. The results were labelled according to two categories, namely (1) definitions and (2) the interpretations, understandings, or operationalisations of the concept when applied to the specific data or case study. In the remainder of this section, the definitions and interpretations of the concept that were found are explained and critically assessed.

As Fig. 1 shows, the amount of articles that engage with the concept of recognition in energy justice has increased during the last decade. In the data, ten different *definitions* of recognition justice were detected (e.g. Table 1). These definitions are subsequently clustered by their respective starting points, namely (1) actors<sup>1</sup>; (2) laws and regulations; (3) decision-making procedures, and (4) culture. From the 196 articles, 27 (13,8 %) did not define recognition justice. A total of 40 articles (20,4 %) defined the concept without further engagement in the article. This could perhaps be explained by the conceptual differences and unclearities present in the scholarship due to the large variety in definitions. Articles that define recognition justice mention on average two different definitions.

The first cluster of definitions starts from identifying certain social groups. While a first definition argues that recognition justice pertains to “who” is recognised, affected, impacted, or responsible, a second prescribes attention directly towards (impacts on) vulnerable groups. However, both definitions do not signify what it actually means to recognise a certain group; defining recognition justice as *recognising certain groups* is rather circular. Also, the who-question is equally relevant for distributive and procedural justice tenets; “who is impacted or affected” can signify distributive or procedural injustices too. For example, from the 39 articles that adopt the vulnerability-definition, 14 actually interpret the data in terms of distributive justice (35,9 %), and 13 articles interpret recognition as inclusion (33,3 %). Lastly, an emphasis on the most vulnerable overlaps with fundamental intuitions of justice in general [3].<sup>2</sup> These actor-definitions do not clearly distinguish recognition justice from other tenets, obscuring its value in the energy justice framework. This is especially problematic given that 78 papers (39,8 %) define recognition justice in these terms.

The second cluster describes recognition justice in terms of recognising the rights and equality of actors through assigning legal rights in laws and regulations. In most cases, this is applied to humans; however, in some cases the concept is also applied to rights of non-human actors such as animals or (specific parts of) the environment. It seems valid that the equality, dignity, and intrinsic value of actors can be (mis)recognised through laws and regulations. However, there might be other ways in which actors can be (mis)recognised, such as in the cultural sphere. Therefore, it can be considered as a part of a definition; as the only definition, it is too narrow.

The third cluster takes decision-making procedures as its starting

<sup>1</sup> I use “actors” instead of “people” throughout the whole article to open up the theoretical possibility of recognising non-humans such as animals or natural systems.

<sup>2</sup> John Rawls indicated that utilitarianism, sacrificing a minority for the majority, conflicts with our basic intuitions of what justice is. In this sense, justice always holds a special concern for minorities, which can be interpreted as a concern for the most vulnerable.

point. The cluster combines definitions of recognition justice as concerned with fair representation, freedom from physical threats, and complete and equal political rights; including or representing all relevant voices in decision-making; recognising people’s needs, differences and interests (in policy-making); recognising experiences or perspectives (in policy-making); or recognising bodies of knowledge (in policy-making). These definitions all seem to take a procedural-institutional approach. As a result, there is a substantial overlap with procedural justice, which represents a concern for fair decision-making procedures, which automatically includes representation and inclusion of all relevant voices, equal political rights and the like. This observation is relevant, since a vast majority of authors define recognition justice in terms of procedural justice (N = 120; 61.2 %). Moreover, a total of 75 articles (38,3 %) interpret recognition justice as inclusion and representation in decision-making procedures, making it the most-used interpretation of recognition justice in the scholarship. It is intuitive that actors can be misrecognised in formal procedures, but reducing recognition to inclusion or representation narrows the definition of recognition justice to procedural justice completely, making it redundant as a separate tenet within the energy justice framework.

Lastly, many articles cite Nancy Fraser’s conception of recognition justice [4–6]. According to these authors, recognition justice refers to the cultural status order of society. Misrecognition occurs when such patterns are institutionalised in a way that prohibits the participatory parity of certain groups. However, only 25 of the 64 papers that mention this definition actually interpret or apply the concept in these terms; a majority takes decision-making procedures as a starting point (N = 37). A possible cause is confusion around the notion of “participatory parity”, a concept which is explained more in-depth in Section three, which seems to be interpreted often in terms of participation in decision-making procedures.

Besides the ten different definitions of recognition justice, thirteen different *interpretations* of recognition justice were coded. This indicates how the concept of recognition justice was interpreted in relation to the empirical data in the articles. Four interpretations were coded that were not explicitly present in any of the given definitions, namely (a) agency, indicating that recognition justice ought to recognise the agency of actors, including respect for their autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination (N = 11); (b) love, stating that recognition justice is about care, concern, and emotive connections with other human beings (N = 2); (c) distributive justice, interpreting that recognition justice is about fair distributions of burdens and benefits, which reduces recognition justice to the distributive justice tenet (N = 42); and (d) recognition justice is about recognising a certain issue, topic, or problem, by either indicating that it exists and/or that it should gain more attention - which mirrors a more colloquial use of “recognition”, dissociated from justice (N = 25). The full list of interpretations and their descriptions and frequencies are described in Table 2. On average, scholars adopt five different interpretations of the concept.

From this literature study it can be concluded that there is a great diversity in definitions and understandings of recognition justice. The concept currently refers to a large variety of phenomena in the scholarship. And although concepts such as rights, identity, values, experiences, needs and differences seem somehow related, a systematic understanding of the nature of these relations is lacking. The diversity in definitions and understandings obscures what “recognition justice” actually measures, leading to incoherencies and confusion in the scholarship. To better understand what the tenet refers to, the key texts that represent the roots of the concept were studied in-depth.

### 3. From critical theory to energy justice: four take-away points

The concept of justice as recognition has a rich history that far precedes the energy justice scholarship, starting with Fichte’s explorations in the 18th century until more contemporary efforts in critical theory by Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth [7]. Without pretending to do full




Fig. 1. The final number of contributions, categorised per year.

Table 1

The definitions of recognition justice in the energy justice scholarship and their descriptions, including the number of articles that mention this definition, clustered by their starting points.

Starting point	Definitions	Recognition justice is concerned with...
Actors (N = 78)	1 Who (N = 54)	“Who” is recognised, affected, or impacted
	2 Vulnerable groups (N = 39)	(The impact on) vulnerable groups
Laws and regulations (N = 39)	3 Legal rights, dignity, equality, and laws (N = 39)	Recognising the rights, intrinsic dignity, and equality of actors (humans and/or non-humans) through laws and regulations
	4 Representation, freedom from threats, and political rights (N = 12)	Fair representation, freedom from physical threats, and complete and equal political rights
Decision-making procedures (N = 120)	5 Inclusion in procedures and processes (N = 72) of:	Including or representing all relevant voices in decision-making
	6 ● Needs/differences/interests (N = 46)	Recognising people's needs, differences, and interests
	7 ● Experiences/perspectives (N = 21)	Recognising people's experiences, and perspectives, perceptions, viewpoints, world-views, paradigms, visions, conceptions, understandings, and feelings
	8 ● Knowledge (N = 21)	Recognising (and adequately valuing) different bodies of knowledge and understandings
Culture (N = 71)	9 Status order, including epistemic dimensions (N = 64)	How the status order, e.g. patterns of cultural value, is institutionalised, giving rise to processes of marginalisation, ignoring, disrespect, degradation, devaluation, ... of groups of people
	10 Cultural identity (N = 12)	Recognising cultural and collective identities

justice to the work of the philosophers in this study, I will present four key take-away points from an in-depth literature study on Honneth's and Fraser's theories of recognition, as their perspectives currently represent the two main approaches to the concept [8]. These insights result in a proposal for a revisited conception of recognition justice as a tenet in the energy justice framework.

### 3.1. Two approaches to recognition justice

A first observation that was drawn from the literature study is that there are two different approaches to recognition justice. Each approach has its own definition, normative ground, and method of investigation. A schematic overview of the two approaches can be found in Table 3. The first approach (chronologically), Honneth's recognition as self-realisation, will be described in Section 3.2. The second approach, which defines recognition justice in terms of the cultural status order, is described in the remainder of this section.

Nancy Fraser places recognition justice in the cultural realm. She calls her stance the “status model of recognition”: she understands recognition as concerned with the cultural *status order*, or *patterns of cultural value*. Cultural values are always hierarchical: something is always more valuable than another thing. For example, executives are often valued more than homeless people [9].

Such value systems are institutionalised or deeply embedded in institutions.<sup>3</sup> Institutions ought to be interpreted in the broadest sense here; Fraser mentions marketised and non-marketised institutions such as “legal, political, cultural, educational, associational, religious, familial, aesthetic, administrative, professional, intellectual” institutions [5, p. 58]. Conversely, value patterns can be embedded in both formal and informal institutions, the latter being “associational patterns, long-standing customs or sedimented social practices of civil society” [4, p. 114].

Recognition injustices therefore “targets injustices it understands as cultural, which it presumes to be rooted in social patterns of representation, interpretation, and communication. Examples include cultural

<sup>3</sup> Institutions ought to be interpreted in the broadest sense here; Fraser mentions marketised and non-marketised institutions such as “legal, political, cultural, educational, associational, religious, familial, aesthetic, administrative, professional, intellectual” institutions [5, p. 58]. In other words, value patterns can be embedded in both formal and informal institutions; informally, Fraser talks about “associational patterns, long-standing customs or sedimented social practices of civil society” [4].

**Table 2**

The interpretations of recognition justice in the energy justice scholarship and their descriptions, including the number of articles that adopt the interpretations, clustered by their starting points.

Starting point	Interpretations	Recognition justice is concerned with...
Actors (N = 40)	1 Who (N = 18)	“Who” is recognised, affected, or impacted
	2 Vulnerable groups (N = 30)	(the impact on) vulnerable groups
Laws and regulations (N = 51)	3 Legal rights, dignity, equality, and laws (N = 51)	Recognising the rights, intrinsic dignity, and equality of actors (humans and/or non-humans) through laws and regulations
	Representation, freedom from threats, and political rights (N = 0)	Fair representation, freedom from physical threats, and complete and equal political rights
Decision-making procedures (N = 116)	4 Inclusion in procedures and processes (N = 75) of:	Including or representing all relevant voices in decision-making
	5 ● Needs/differences/interests (N = 53)	Recognising people's needs, differences, and interests
	6 ● Experiences/perspectives (N = 27)	Recognising people's experiences, and perspectives, perceptions, viewpoints, world-views, paradigms, visions, conceptions, understandings, and feelings
	7 ● Knowledge (N = 43)	Recognising (and adequately valuing) different bodies of knowledge and understandings
	8 Status order, including epistemic dimensions (N = 49)	How the status order, e.g. patterns of cultural value, is institutionalised, giving rise to processes of marginalisation, ignoring, disrespect, degradation, devaluation, ... of groups of people
	9 Cultural identity (N = 14)	Recognising cultural and collective identities
Culture (N = 53)	10 Agency (N = 11);	Recognising the agency of actors, including respect for their autonomy, sovereignty and self-determination
	11 Love (N = 2)	Care, concern, and emotive connections with other human beings
New categories (N = 71)	12 Distributive justice (N = 42)	Fair distributions of burdens and benefits
	13 Issue (N = 25)	Recognising a certain issue, topic, or problem, by either indicating that it exists and/or that it should gain more attention

**Table 3**

An overview of the main differences between the two main approaches to recognition justice.

	Why misrecognition is unjust	Recognition justice =	Object of investigation	Method of investigation
Self-realisation model	Harms practical relation-to-self	Undistorted relation-to-self	Harm to relation-to-self	Identify subjective experiences of misrecognition
Status order model	Interferes with parity of participation in social life	The cultural status order allows all to interact as full peers in social life	The effect of institutionalised patterns of cultural value on the social status of actors	Deliberate whether the institutionalised patterns of cultural value prevent participatory parity

domination (being subjected to patterns of interpretation and communication that are associated with another culture and are alien and/or hostile to one's own); nonrecognition (being rendered invisible via the authoritative representational, communicative, and interpretative practices of one's own culture); and disrespect (being routinely maligned or disparaged in stereotypic public cultural representations and/or in everyday life interactions)” [21, p. 13]. In other words, according to Fraser, institutionalised cultural value systems can cause instances of misrecognition.

When it comes to her normative stance, Fraser claims that misrecognition is wrong because it prevents people from participating equally “as peers in social life” [4]. This is what she calls “participatory parity” [21, p. 36]. If an institutionalised status order prevents people from participating as a peer or “full partner in social life”, then that status order is unjust and ought to be de-institutionalised [21, p. 30]. Note that it is not only about participation in decision-making on a political level, but about participation in all forms of social life, including raising your hand in class and sitting in a bus. The notion of participatory parity should therefore not be confused with procedural justice: it is much broader. Fraser's notion of participatory parity certainly includes political participation, but it goes way beyond that: it penetrates all interactions in social life.

### 3.2. (Mis)recognition in different ways

Fraser's definition is often adopted in the energy justice scholarship (N = 64), although only 25 of these articles actually interpret or apply the concept in these terms. Honneth's self-realisation approach to recognition justice, on the other hand, is not yet considered in energy justice: only one contribution that cites Honneth's conception of recognition justice was found through the literature study [10]. This implies

that Honneth's theory of recognition, including the early thoughts about recognition in philosophy, has been forgotten in the energy justice scholarship. This is unfortunate, since Honneth's categorisation has the potential to structure the diversity in definitions that has appeared in the energy justice scholarship over the years.

The second key learning stems from Fichte's, Hegel's, and Honneth's writings: actors can be (mis)recognised in different ways. Before explaining this, it is important to note the distinction between elementary recognition and recognition in a certain respect [7]. *Elementary recognition* indicates the mutual recognition of persons that simultaneously constructs a person's identity. This is the type of recognition that the philosopher Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762–1814) envisioned. Fichte stipulated that humans are fundamentally socially constituted. The “I” must recognise the other as a free individual and the other must do the same [11]. This mutual recognition is necessary for the existence of human I-hood, freedom, and self-consciousness.

In the energy context, it does not seem very useful to speak of this elementary recognition. *Recognition in a certain respect* comes closer to the colloquial use of the term [7]. Normally, somebody is recognised as something and with regard to a certain feature. To give an example: it has little meaning to say that a certain group is not recognised in a participatory context; rather, it is more useful to state that some people are misrecognised as epistemic agents that contribute valuable knowledge in the debate, to give an example.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Note that “recognition” is not the same as “identification”: while identification is value neutral (“I identify you as a black person”), recognition always implies to a certain extent a positive evaluation of the feature one is recognised as. In that sense, ‘acknowledgement’ comes closer, but it still seems ‘less ambitious’ than ‘recognition’ [7]. Recognising *someone* as *something* implies both an acknowledgement and a positive attitude towards it.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) developed this train of thought further. Hegel distinguished three spheres in society, namely the family, the state, and civil society. Within each sphere, there exists another relation of recognition, namely love, law, and community of value respectively. Inspired by Fichte, Hegel stated that all three recognition-relations are needed for an individual to prosper. Wrong relations of recognition, such as slavery, are harmful to our identity: relations of mutual recognition in all three spheres in society are necessary for the self-consciousness and autonomy of individuals.

These three spheres of recognition have been further conceptualised and linked to justice by the contemporary philosopher Axel Honneth. Honneth describes in detail the three ways in which people want, need, and expect to be recognised, namely through love, law, and cultural appreciation [12]. He connects these societal relations to specific *practical relations-to-self*.<sup>5</sup> In recognition through love, we learn self-confidence; through laws, we find self-respect; through cultural appreciation, we find self-esteem. A healthy identity is established through good relations of recognition. And if we are not recognised properly in one way or another, we develop different psychological injuries or distorted relations-to-self. Thus, Honneth's normative stance is as follows: misrecognition is wrong, not necessarily because it interferes with participatory parity, but because a distorted relation-to-self is wrong; and each human is worthy of having an unharmed self-identity.

First, there is recognition through *love*. Love refers to relationships “constituted by strong emotional attachments among a small number of people” [20, p. 95]. It involves emotional ties, affection, and care. When you are recognised through love, you acquire the capacity to be alone and independent, precisely because you can rely on others. In other words, in recognition through love we acquire *self-confidence* or *self-trust*. But if we are misrecognised through love, we lack self-confidence. Honneth regards love as the most fundamental form of recognition: it is the prerequisite for all other kinds. It is hardly possible to develop self-respect or self-esteem in case of a truly distorted relation-to-self caused by a lack of love. This makes the normative imperative that accompanies recognition through love extremely strong. And since relations of love are highly dependent on societal structures and institutions, energy policies or systems that prevent people from developing loving relationships can be considered unjust [13, p. 37]. Think for example of high energy prices that prevent households from creating a comfortable and stress-free home.

The second form is recognition through *law*. The law is based on the equality principle: it is general and impersonal and it describes the duties and obligations that we all have towards one another [2, p. 143]. Therefore, through legal relations we are recognised according to our general features, namely as humans. Through the law, actors can recognise each other's dignity, freedom, equality, autonomy and so on, for example through assigning legal rights and duties. If such laws are in place, we learn to see ourselves as autonomous, free, moral agents. This way, we gain *self-respect* [14]. Being misrecognised through laws leads to a diminished self-respect; people experience that their autonomy or moral agency is not being taken seriously. They might feel that they are “less human” than others, or less deserving of certain rights. An example is a law that does not protect lithium miners from unsafe working circumstances [15]. This law can make people feel unworthy of protection, or undeserving of the same amount of respect than the company owner would receive. Another example is a decision-making process that does not involve citizens [16]. People might feel that their capacity for autonomous moral decision-making is being disregarded. Paternalistic

<sup>5</sup> Fraser does not want to phrase recognition in psychological terms: she does not agree with Honneth here.

policy-making processes of this kind can stir feelings of powerlessness in people and consequently also frustrate policy-makers.

The third is recognition through *cultural appreciation* [5].<sup>6</sup> We want to be recognised for our specific contributions to society, our accomplishments, our achievements – that which distinguishes us from others [12]. We are always part of an intersubjectively constituted value community that assigns a hierarchy of social worth to forms of life. This translates for example in the higher valuation of certain jobs or accomplishments, in terms of wages or honour. When you are recognised through cultural appreciation, you acquire *self-esteem*: you experience that your achievements or abilities are recognised as valuable by other members of society [12]. Misrecognition through cultural appreciation leads to low self-esteem. People might feel that their contributions to society are worth less, that their knowledge or opinions are less valuable, or that they themselves are no asset to society. Think for example about the potential impact of coal mining phase-out on the self-esteem of workers [17].

The fact that actors can be (mis)recognised in different ways shapes the second valuable take-away point from critical theory to energy justice. If actors can be recognised in different ways, then recognition injustices can also happen on multiple accounts. To give an example: to say that “X is misrecognised in the policy process” can mean many things. It can mean that X is not recognised through the law as a stakeholder worth participating; this would indicate a harm in self-respect. However, it can also mean that X's input was not sufficiently taken into account. In this case, X's contribution to the epistemic community is not valued as much as X feels it should have, which is misrecognition through cultural appreciation. Applying these nuances in energy justice might prove useful in explaining in what way people feel misrecognised exactly. According to Honneth, different types of misrecognition pertain to different aspects of one's identity, and this could be relevant in the diagnosing phase of injustices. Once it is clear which recognition injustice occurs, a more precise problem analysis can be made.

Honneth's categorisation of recognition through law, cultural appreciation, and love, can structure the diversity found in the definitions and understandings of recognition justice from the literature study. When taking into account Fraser's notion of status order, one change could be made to this categorisation: people can be (mis)recognised through law, love, and status order. Here, “cultural appreciation” is redefined in Fraser's terms as “status order”. The reason for this choice is that Fraser's notion of “cultural status order” is much more encompassing than how Honneth describes “cultural appreciation”. Honneth focuses on the valuation of people's contributions to society, and his examples mostly focus on labour. Fraser's examples also include, for example, the Black Lives Matter movement.

Adopting this tripartite categorisation of love, law, and status order, unifies and structures the different meaningful dimensions of the concept that are now scattered throughout the energy justice scholarship in one single conception of recognition justice.

### 3.3. Two methods to detect misrecognition

Third, both the self-realisation model and the status order model propose different methods for detecting instances of misrecognition. This section provides a brief discussion of both methods and their (dis)advantages, which adds methodological rigour to detecting misrecognition in the energy justice scholarship.

First, Honneth claims that recognition injustices can be detected through the (large-scale) articulations of experiences of injustice.

<sup>6</sup> In *The Struggle for Recognition*, Honneth calls this “recognition through solidarity”; on the recognition-page in the *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* it is described as “recognition through esteem”. However, I judge recognition through cultural appreciation the most clear and unambiguous.

Honneth claims that misrecognition is immediately felt by subjects as a psychological injury, harm, or injustice. In his later writings, Honneth mentions a “moral sensorium”; people have some kind of internal automatic registration system of injustices [20, p. 153]. Misrecognition leads to psychological injury, and this harm is immediately experienced by our normative sensorium. Honneth observes for example that resistance and protest are not motivated by abstract ideals of justice, but by the experience of violence to “intuitively presupposed conceptions of justice” [22, p. xiv]. It is people’s experiences of injustice that spark societal struggle. Studying these experiences lead to discovering recognition injustices.

However, people’s experiences of misrecognition are neither sufficient nor necessary as a method to detect instances of misrecognition. For one thing, experiences of injustice are *not sufficient* for identifying misrecognition. If we base the legitimation of claims of injustice solely on experiences of misrecognition, even the neo-Nazi’s might have a ground to stand on. And that goes against our intuitions of what justice essentially entails.<sup>7</sup> For another, experiences of injustice are also *not necessary* for legitimate claims of injustice since one can realise that an injustice is happening without experiencing harm to one’s own identity. Think for example of high-income households standing up for the interests of the energy poor. Moreover, injustices can occur without an emotional response by the victim. This is because our moral sensorium is not always reliable, a fact that Honneth acknowledges as well. An example is a household in energy poverty. The members of this household may have become socially isolated hardly have visitors or visit others themselves, which might lead to the lack of realisation that their house is heated way below average [19–21]. The family members may have become used to the inconvenience and do not realise their situation is actually unjust. Socialisation and internalisation have shaped their expectations so that they do not experience an injustice.<sup>8</sup> In other words, there can be injustice without experience of injustice. The human moral sensorium can be crucially flawed through socialisation in an unjust system and is therefore not to be blindly trusted.

As experiences of injustice are neither sufficient nor necessary for detecting misrecognition, Fraser proposes an alternative method to detect recognition injustices. Different people interpret the effects of institutionalised values on participatory parity in different ways. No single authority, such as a philosopher, should decide whether misrecognition occurs - and the misrecognised subjects themselves alone are no sufficient standard either, given the arguments above. Therefore, she argues, “the norm of participatory parity must be applied dialogically and discursively, through democratic processes of public debates” [21, p. 43]. To detect recognition injustices, Fraser proposes the method of organising a (public) deliberation on whether institutionalised patterns of cultural value interfere with a group’s participatory parity.

However, there is a problem with this procedural method to detect misrecognition as well. Fraser formulates this herself: “There is an unavoidable circularity in this account: claims for recognition can only be justified under conditions of participatory parity, which conditions include reciprocal recognition.” [2, p. 44] In other words, the participatory setting might be prone to certain value systems that hinder participatory parity in the dialogue itself. Fraser justifies her approach

<sup>7</sup> Honneth recognises this issue; in the seventh chapter of *The Struggle for Recognition* he claims that mass action is a better indication of injustice, since it would indicate that many people experience misrecognition. However, this does not fully solve the problem at hand.

<sup>8</sup> Hegel gives the example of an 18th century lord who regularly beats his maid [7]. According to the norms of that time, the lord was considered – also by the maid – to be decent and masculine. The maid’s self-understanding is so distorted that she deems herself to be unworthy of more respect. Examples like this in the energy context are still scarce. Honneth’s concept of “hidden morality” might be a valuable concept for investigating injustices that remain hidden [22].

by pointing out that deliberation is by nature reflexive: there must be room to critically reflect on the cultural assumptions of all participants.

To sum up, Honneth suggests that misrecognition can be detected by investigating (collective) experiences of misrecognition, in cooperation with academics studying the formation of groups in protests, resistance, and controversies. In contrast, Fraser argues for a democratic deliberation about whether an institutionalised value system constitutes impedes with participatory parity in social life.

As a last remark, Honneth’s and Fraser’s methods of detecting misrecognition are not incompatible. Instead, they can be seen as complementary. To give an example: to detect whether misrecognition occurs, people’s experiences of injustice could be investigated, followed by a reflection on the experienced injustices with the relevant stakeholders. Combining both methods shapes a stronger methodological framework to detect instances of misrecognition.

### 3.4. Recognition justice in relation to other tenets of justice

The fourth key learning pertains to the relation between the different tenets: recognition justice cannot be reduced to another tenet of justice. The literature study shows that the most frequent definition of recognition justice pertains to fair decision-making procedures, focusing mainly on inclusion and fair representation, and 75 articles understand and interpret the concept in terms of procedural justice. Moreover, 42 articles describe their recognition-related findings in the language of distributive justice. However, for both Honneth and Fraser, recognition entails more than fair procedures or a fair distribution of benefits and burdens. Both authors convey that (mis)recognition can occur in more situations than in decision-making processes or in the distribution of benefits and burdens.

However, Honneth and Fraser do disagree about the relations between the tenets of justice. Honneth claims that all injustices – including procedural and distributive ones – can be traced back to misrecognition (the so-called “normative monism” stance) [5]. Fraser on the other hand denies that distributive injustices are a mere derivative of recognition injustices. She proposes a “two-dimensional” or a “perspectival dualist” conception of justice [21, p. 3]. She argues that recognition justice and distributive justice are two separate dimensions, analytical perspectives or tenets of justice, if you will.

The multiple tenet tradition within energy justice leans towards Fraser’s standpoint. Therefore, her arguments for distinguishing different tenets of justice are worthy of discussing briefly. The main argument for her perspective dualism is that recognition injustices and distributive injustices have different causes. On the one hand, recognition injustices have roots in the cultural status order; the source is cultural and fixing it requires “cultural or symbolic change” [21, p. 13]. Distributive injustices on the other hand are “rooted in the economic structure of society. Examples include exploitation (having the fruits of one’s labor appropriated for the benefit of others); economic marginalization (being confined to undesirable or poorly-paid work or being denied access to income-generating labor altogether), and deprivation (being denied an adequate material standard of living)” [21, p. 13]. Fixing distributive injustices requires “economic restructuring of some sort”, or redistribution [21, p. 13]. Since recognition and distributive injustices have different roots, they are to be considered as inciting different families of claims of injustice. According to Fraser, in reality most injustices are caused by a mix of both in a certain proportion that “must be determined empirically in every case” [21, p. 14]. So, every instance of injustice can be scrutinized in terms of recognition too, since misrecognition always plays a more or less significant role.

Interestingly, Fraser speculates that “the political”, which she defines as concerned with “decision-making procedures”, might be a third dimension of justice [21, p. 68]. According to Fraser, a key issue of the political is “problem of the frame”: who should participate in decision-making, who are the relevant social actors? (This is, ironically, exactly how recognition justice in energy justice is often understood, as

represented by the actors-cluster of definitions.)

To sum up, both Fraser and Honneth convey the message that recognition justice is not just a derivative of another tenet of justice, such as procedural or distributive justice. As a result, a more clear definition of recognition justice, making crisp its uniqueness in relation to the other tenets, would be a merit to the energy justice scholarship.

#### 4. Conclusion: revisiting recognition justice

In this paper, I have argued that the current understanding of recognition justice in energy justice is not satisfactory. A total of ten different definitions and thirteen understandings circulate, obscuring what the concept aims to measure. To understand what the tenet of recognition justice refers to, the roots of the concept have been studied in-depth through the works of Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser. From this, four main insights were retrieved that enrich the understanding of recognition justice in energy justice:

1. There are two approaches to recognition justice, namely the self-realisation model and the status order model;
2. Actors can be (mis)recognised in multiple ways, namely through laws, the cultural status order, and through love;
3. Two different yet complementary methods to identifying instances of misrecognition can be distinguished, namely investigating experiences of injustice articulated through protests and resistance, and deliberating the effect of the status order on participatory parity;
4. Recognition justice cannot be reduced to other tenets of justice, such as procedural or distributive justice.

These insights result in a proposal for a revisited understanding of recognition justice in energy justice: I propose that recognition justice is concerned with the adequate recognition of all actors through love, law, and status order. Recognition through *love* depends to a large extent on social arrangements, such as energy infrastructure and affordable prices. Through *laws*, actors can recognise each other's dignity, intrinsic value, and equal moral standing, for example through assigning rights and duties to communities, animals, or nature. And lastly, through the *status order* actors can recognise the value of certain cultural identities and their (epistemic) contributions to society, for example by taking seriously rather than dismissing the needs, perspectives, concerns and knowledge of indigenous communities, or by supporting workers who are victims of regional coal phase-outs. The advantage of distinguishing between different spheres of recognition is that it has more descriptive and explanatory potential when applying the concept to empirical data. The proposed definition takes into account that (mis)recognition can occur in different ways, which can bring much needed nuance in energy justice analyses.

Integrating Fraser's and Honneth's perspectives as such is rather unorthodox, as Fraser's and Honneth's theoretical-normative positions are very opposed to each other. Honneth defines adequate recognition as an undistorted relation-to-self, while Fraser defines it in terms of participatory parity. However, the proposed definition still leaves room for the different normative starting points. Researchers can evaluate relations of recognition through love, law, and status order as just or unjust with either principle as yardstick.

The proposed definition of recognition justice as a concern for the adequate recognition of all actors through love, law, and status order structures the large variety of definitions and interpretations of the concept that currently circulate in the energy justice scholarship. Future research may be needed to apply these concepts more in-depth to energy contexts; to further explore the possibilities of recognising non-human actors; and to experiment with and test the validity of the different methods for detecting misrecognition. Yet, the proposed categorisation can provide a more fine-grained explanation of energy controversies, and such analyses can subsequently aid the process of making normative evaluations to make energy systems and policies more just.

#### Declaration of competing interest

The author declares no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper.

#### Data availability

Data will be made available on request.

#### Acknowledgements

This project has received funding from the NWO-AES Crossover programme under project number 17621. The content of this article does not reflect the official opinion of NWO. Responsibility for the information and/or views expressed in the article lies entirely with the author(s).

#### References

- [1] D. McCauley, R. Heffron, H. Stephan, K. Jenkins, *Advancing energy justice: the triumvirate of tenets*, *Int. Energy Law Rev.* 32 (2013) 107–110.
- [2] K.E.H. Jenkins, B.K. Sovacool, N. Mouter, N. Hacking, M.-K. Burns, D. McCauley, *The methodologies, geographies, and technologies of energy justice: a systematic and comprehensive review*, *Environ. Res. Lett.* (2020), <https://doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/abd78c>.
- [3] J. Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Revised ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1999.
- [4] N. Fraser, *Rethinking recognition*, *New Left Rev.* 3 (2000) 107–120.
- [5] N. Fraser, A. Honneth, *Redistribution or recognition?*, in: *A Political-Philosophical Exchange* Verso, London, New York, 2003.
- [6] B. Danermark, L.C. Gellerstedt, *Social justice: redistribution and recognition - a non-reductionist perspective on disability*, *Disabil. Soc.* 19 (2004) 339–353, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09687590410001689458>.
- [7] M. Iser, *Recognition*, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2019, <https://doi.org/10.1145/544317.544327>.
- [8] T.S. Judith Butler, Axel Honneth, Amy Allen, Robin Celikates, Jean-Philippe Deranty, Heikki Ikäheimo, Kristina Lepold, Lois McNay, David Owen, *Recognition and Ambivalence*, Columbia University Press, New York, 2021.
- [9] E. Awad, S. Dsouza, R. Kim, J. Schulz, J. Henrich, A. Shariff, J.F. Bonnefon, I. Rahwan, *The moral machine experiment*, *Nature* 563 (2018) 59–64, <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-018-0637-6>.
- [10] F. Boamah, E. Rothfuß, *'Practical recognition' as a suitable pathway for researching just energy futures: seeing like a 'modern' electricity user in Ghana*, *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.* 60 (2020), 101324, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2019.101324>.
- [11] D. Breazeale, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, in: E.N. Zalta (Ed.), *Stanford Encycl. Philos.*, Summer 201, Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2018. <https://plato-stanford.edu/tudelft.idm.oclc.org/archives/sum2018/entries/johann-fichte>.
- [12] A. Honneth, *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1995.
- [13] M. Powers, R. Faden, *Structural Injustice*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019.
- [14] M. Moyaert, *The Struggle for Recognition*, 2010, <https://doi.org/10.5840/philtheol2010221/25>.
- [15] B.K. Sovacool, A. Hook, M. Martiskainen, A. Brock, B. Turnheim, *The decarbonisation divide: contextualizing landscapes of low-carbon exploitation and toxicity in Africa*, *Glob. Environ. Chang.* 60 (2020), 102028, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2019.102028>.
- [16] E. Cuppen, O. Ejderyan, U. Pesch, S. Spruit, E. van de Grift, A. Correljé, B. Taebi, *When controversies cascade: analysing the dynamics of public engagement and conflict in the Netherlands and Switzerland through "controversy spillover"*, *Energy Res. Soc. Sci.* 68 (2020), 101593 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2020.101593>.
- [17] P.Y. Oei, H. Brauers, P. Herpich, *Lessons from Germany's hard coal mining phase-out: policies and transition from 1950 to 2018*, *Clim. Policy* 20 (2020) 963–979, <https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2019.1688636>.
- [18] S. Bouzarovski, H. Thomson, M. Cornelis, *Confronting energy poverty in Europe: a research and policy agenda*, *Energies* 14 (2021) 1–19, <https://doi.org/10.3390/en14040858>.
- [19] F. Bartiaux, C. Vandeschrick, M. Moezzi, N. Frogneux, *Energy justice, unequal access to affordable warmth, and capability deprivation: a quantitative analysis for Belgium*, *Appl. Energy* 225 (2018) 1219–1233, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.04.113>.
- [20] F. Bartiaux, R. Day, W. Lahaye, *Energy poverty as a restriction of multiple capabilities: a systemic approach for Belgium*, *J. Hum. Dev. Capab.* (2021) 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1080/19452829.2021.1887107>.
- [21] A. Honneth, *Moral consciousness and class domination: some problems in the analysis of hidden morality*, in: C.W. Wright (Ed.), *Fragm. World Soc. Essays Soc. Polit. Philos.*, State University of New York Press, New York, 1995.