

# MONUMENTS FOR RECONCILIATION

How spatial interventions can create circumstances for reconciliation in the Israel-Palestine conflict

## *History Thesis*

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April 2021



## INTRODUCTION

The Israel-Palestine conflict is a traumatic experience that continues to harm the Israeli and Palestinian societies because of the violent effect it has on the underlying basic structures of social life - inevitably damaging a sense of community. Trauma is a form of realisation of the lack of belonging to a community of support, through which a part of the self was affected (Kalinowska, 2012).

This causes not only the disappearance of a part of the self but also the trust in family, community and governmental ties. The severe damage of the psychological safety net is disastrous for the trauma-processing individual. This also aggravates the processing of trauma as a collective experience, which requires a certain degree of group integration (Homans, 2010).

Disturbances in the grief processing of the Israeli and Palestinian population result in cultures that are no longer able to create meaningful stories from experiences of a past trauma and that have the tendency to transform the trauma into inviolable stories with a sacred status. This *traumatropism*, prevents the two societies from going through a healthy healing process. Instead, a build-up of victimisation and hostility is transferred to succeeding generations (Keynan, 2016; Kalinowska, 2012). The Israeli and Palestinians do not only tend to ascribe validity to their victims but also transform this victimisation into a mobilising force (Sorek, 2008). In this case, the defeats and the disturbances in the grieving process aggravate the conflict because both societies cling more strongly to their beliefs.

Reconciliation in the Israel-Palestine conflict requires careful consideration of individual memory. The individual and collective memory are inextricably linked (Olick, 2014). Individual memory is stored internally in one's mind (Hirst and Manier, 2008). The abundance of physical spaces of remembrance in Israel demonstrates that the material nature of collective memory is not unlike in most of the western world (Tanović, 2019). On the contrary, Palestinians tend to have fewer official memorial spaces since mourning in the Arab culture is more introverted. Palestinians mostly prefer to memorise in private stories, in private ritualistic visits to sites of trauma and to a small extent in literature, theatre and songs (Sorek, 2008; Bshara 2007; Khalili, 2007, 65-89). These writings induce new symbols into the Palestinian commemorative semiotics and are thereby important for the transmission of memory. For example, *the sad oranges*, described by the writer Ghassan Kanafani, became an iconic Palestinian symbol even among those not familiar with Kanafani, and the poetic imagery of Mahmud Darwish also became more commonly known when they are sung by popular singers (Bshara, 2007). The creation of external memories is even further avoided since monuments commemorating national warriors are associated with the West by media such as the secular nationalist newspaper Filastin (Sorek, 2008).

Both the externalised and the internalised manner of remembering add a mental representation of an event from the previous generation to its own identity and to the interpretation of current events. This is resulting in a chosen trauma making it impossible to distinguish the present as a separate set of political and psychological forces, and victimisation and hostility remain part of the two societies (Kalinowska, 2012).

Collective memory can only be changed if a remembrance is able to substantially and comparably modify individual memories into a single rendering through transmission, convergence and stability (Hirst and Manier, 2008). If the individual memories of one event are not the same or individuals have not experienced the same event, inevitably, there will be a transmission of memory. Subsequently, in order to come to a convergence of a similar mnemonic representation, a shared sense of humanity among victims and perpetrators defined by the Zulu term Ubuntu is important (Keynan, 2020; Hirst and Manier, 2008). This relational cultural ethic is increasingly used in literature as a reconciliation method in a non-African context society (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2020). Finally, this shared rendering must remain stable over time (Hirst and Manier, 2008).

However, the cultural differences of commemoration complicate coming to a convergence of a single render of the traumatic event. To date, research has been limited to the psychological basis of memory and the sociological impact that empowers individuals to overcome their trauma and members of a traumatised society to not relate to their bereaved citizens as the enemy but rather consider them as fellow-sufferers. Yet, it is not clear what the possibilities are to bridge the cultural differences of commemoration in order to achieve reconciliation. Therefore, the central question in this paper is: *What are the cultural differences in the processing of a trauma, visible in the existing commemorative places in Israel and Palestine, and how can these be bridged in order to create circumstances for reconciliation?*

In the first chapter, the difference in Western and Arab mourning is explicated by comparing two Israeli and two Palestinian memorials.

The first couple of memorials commemorates the same event from 1948, called the War of Independence in Israel and the Nakba in Palestine. Although the Israeli Monument to the Negev Brigade of Dani Karavan in Beer Sheva (1963-1968) and the Naif Sam'an's Palestinian monument in 'Ailabun (1983) commemorate the same event, the spatial design of the two monuments differs greatly. The Monument to the Negev Brigade is a land art memorial that dramatizes the story of the members of the Palmach Negev Brigade who fell fighting in 1948 by accentuating the contrast between architectural elements as darkness and light, and inside and outside (Tanovic, 2015; Honnef et al., 2000). The monument built on the external wall of the cemetery in 'Ailabun commemorates the event of 1948 in which fourteen men were excreted by the Israel Defence Forces and other residents were expelled from the Christian village. Any form of the heroism of the victims and cause of their death are completely absent from the design of the modest monument (Sorek, 2008).

Next, a comparison will be made between The Military Cemetery on Mount Herzl (1960) and The cemetery in the mosque of the refugee camp in Shatila (1982) form the second memorial couple and both fulfil a dual function as a cemetery. After the War of Independence, there was a need to design war memorials and military cemeteries in addition to the sacred topography, which until then served as the main form of commemoration. The Military Cemetery on Mount Herzl is an icon within this new monument type that shows and celebrates the heroic sacrifice of the fallen soldiers (Maoz, 1996).

The cemetery in the mosque of the refugee camp in Shatila was used because the real cemetery outside the boundaries of the camp was impossible to reach. The cemetery has been incorporated into the daily lives of the camp inhabitants, reinforcing the nationalist narrative of their history like the Military Cemetery but also allowing for the appropriation of the memory and lives of the refugees themselves (Khalili, 2007, 113-49).

Chapter two examines the similarities in the spatial design of commemorative places and how this can be used to contribute to reconciliation through the process of bereavement process of a traumatic memory as defined by Hirst and Manier (2008).

Finally, chapter three addresses existing reconciliation formats that are exemplary for or may contribute to overcoming the barriers for a joint cemetery to function as a potential contributor to the reconciliation process. These initiatives are discussed according to a subdivision of Moaz (2011).



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## CULTURAL COMPARISON OF COMMEMORATION THROUGH MONUMENTS

Reconciliation memorials have often been described in literature as highly valuable in places where conflict has ended and questions arise about what it means to live together after so much violence and losses (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2020). The Kigali Genocide Memorial Center in Rwanda, for example, provides moral education after the genocide against the Tutsi and opens a debate about the past, and Judith Mason's artwork *Blue Dress* successfully contributes to representing the stories of the South Africans whose lives have been destroyed in the Apartheid (Bieler, 2020; Gobodo-Madikizela, 2020).

For this reason, an attempt has been made to find examples of reconciliation monuments in Israel and Palestine, in order to demonstrate the capacity and inability of monuments to function as a starting point for reconciliation in the conflict between the two states. This knowledge would be used to highlight the valuable characteristics of the monuments and suggest other ways of reconciliation where the monuments fall short. Although the Nakba or the War of Independence is frequently commemorated and many monuments to this event have been made especially in Israel (Tanovic, 2015), no reconciliation monuments have been realised. The reconciliation discourse usually starts taking place once the armed conflict is over. With the Israeli-Palestinian conflict being still active, reconciliation and its monuments are probably still far away (Schwake, 2021).

Therefore, this chapter will aim to examine how both cultures deal with grief and the process of coping with violence and loss. By comparing two sets of monuments, a greater understanding is obtained of the similarities and differences of this processing. The following chapters look at how Ubuntu can be used in the corresponding traditions and how existing programmes can be complementary to bridge the differences within the traditions.

The first two monuments that will be compared are The Military Cemetery on Mount Herzl and The cemetery in the mosque of the refugee camp in Shatila. They are similar in their typology and function as burial site. The second set of monuments to be examined are the Monument to the Negev Brigade and a monument in 'Ailabun. They are comparable as they memorialise the same event.

### 1.1 Shared Typology: Cemetery

#### *1.1.1 Israel: Mount Herzl*

Before the War of Independence in 1948, Zionists were not used to commemorate through monuments, as figurative representations are prohibited in the Jewish tradition. The written word was therefore the primary means of remembrance (Azaryahu, 1992). The few monuments created are in honour of Zionist martyrs. Monuments were not applied to commemorate leaders. These were commemorated by the names of streets and settlements (Amir, 2006).

The war of independence was a major event in the formation of the state of Israel and has become highly mythological in Zionist history. It is associated with triumphs and sacrifices and the players in the story are therefore seen as heroes. These players are celebrated as if they



are the personification of the highest value of the Israeli community. This hero cult can be seen in the commemoration practises of the War of Independence which is almost equivalent to the remembrance of the fallen soldiers (Bilu and Witztum, 2000; Azaryahu, 1992). Commemoration practises traditionally took place in written script and so the remembrance of this mythical war of independence also took place in books and poems. However, the significance of this had become so great that the desire to create monuments to anchor memories in the landscape grew strongly. After the war of independence, Zionism, therefore, faced a difficult task of bringing together the Jewish remembrance tradition that disapproved figuration with modern nationalism, which aimed to claim territory and create a collective identity (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Handelman, 2004; Azaryahu, 1992).

Monument-making was of particular importance to two groups in Jewish society: the bereaved families and the government (Brog, 2003; Azaryahu, 1992). Initially, the memorials to the War of Independence were mainly created by the bereaved families on a private or local scale. The divergence of these monuments, according to the bureaucrats of commemoration, would obstruct the unified narrative of the creation of the state of Israel, leading the public council for the commemoration of the soldier to formulate a concept for monumentality in 1951 (Azaryahu, 1992). This concept includes a centrally planned uniform geographic and historical representation of the national history of the war. The large number of uniform monuments had to and has become the trademark for Israeli culture (Amir, 2006; Bilu and Witztum, 2000; Azaryahu, 1992).

However, this disapproval of personal monuments was anything but a denial of the tragedy of the bereaved families. They were viewed as heroic figures themselves and dignified representatives of the fallen soldiers since they were willing to sacrifice their loved ones and had made enormous efforts to endure the pain. The Israeli government assumed it would soften the families' personal grief by incorporating the tragedy of the dead soldiers into a larger national meaning system (Bilu and Witztum, 2000).

Not only from the concept but also in the aftermath of the territorial division of Israel and Palestine, the placement of a national monument to Israel in the capital Jerusalem was a strategic choice (see Figure 1). The national cemetery on the mountain in Jerusalem derives its strength from being an official translation of the two-part myth of the State of Israel (Azaryahu, 1996). The first part of the myth deals with the historical narration of the state starting with a founding father, presented by the tomb of the founder of the Zionist movement Theodor Herzl and the name of the national cemetery, and the second part of the myth celebrates the exploits of the fallen soldiers which becomes visual in the grand layout of the cemetery (Brog, 2003; Azaryahu, 1996).



**Figure 1** Military cemetery on Mount Herzl: grand layout with uniform graves including national flags overlooking Jerusalem National Memorial Hall For Israel's Fallen (Sindel, 2017)

Although Mount Herzl is exceptional in its national character and its spatial design dealing with the slopes of the hill (see Figure 2), Mount Herzl is also part of the carefully prepared plan of 1951. This comes visible in the tombstones on Mount Herzl which are similar to the gravestones in the seven other military cemeteries, namely in Tel Aviv, Haifa, Kfar Warburg Netanya, Afula, Rosh Pina and Nahariya (Katz, 2014; Azaryahu, 1996). Mount Herzl is thus placed in a unified network of commemorations (Azaryahu, 1996). The tombstones are absent of any form of figuration and are hence in line with the earlier Jewish tradition (Azaryahu, 1992). Not only are the tombstones of Mount Herzl related to other military cemeteries, but they also make no distinction in design between the person who is commemorated. The plane stones only record name, rank, parents' names, and place and date of birth and death. In this way, they contribute to a common commemoration rather than a personal remembrance (Ben-Zion, 2012).

Commemorations of these heroes buried on Mount Herzl was declared to be a sacred obligation to reinforce the narrative of the state of Israel and thus create a sense of belonging. On invented days, such as national remembrance days and birthdays, collective mourning takes place in military cemeteries (see Figure 3). In these ceremonies, Mount Herzl as the national cemetery does not take a special role in relation to other military cemeteries to emphasise belonging to a larger whole. (Amir 2006; Azaryahu, 1996; 1992).



**Figure 2** Site shows height differences of the cemetery. The cemetery does not distinguish between the rank or unit of soldiers (Ginsburg, 2014)




**Figure 3** Soldiers celebrating the 65th anniversary of the Holy Land (Vos Iz Neias, 2013)

Until the mid-1950s, Israeli war memorials were only aimed at commemorating the War of Independence. After the Sinai war in 1956, the War of Independence was no longer seen as an isolated story, but as the first war of succession. In this year the establishment of the Sinai campaign came also into being, which stimulated the weaving of the new war waged that year into the monumental landscape (Amir, 2006; Azaryahu, 1992). On some monuments only extra names were added, in other locations completely new monuments were created (Brog, 2003; Azaryahu, 1992). The latter approach is also reflected in the spatial development of the military cemetery on Mount Herzl. A large expansion took place with new graves to include fallen soldiers from the more recent wars in the national narrative of the Jewish state (see Figure 4) (Brog, 2003; Azaryahu, 1996). These newly added tombs are spatially separated and historically structured by making use of the height differences of the terraces on the hill (see Figure 2) (Azaryahu, 1996).

Another war in succession was the failed Lebanon War that followed in 1982. It sparked a major uprising that led to an anti-government protest platform formed by bereaved families. They no longer wanted their grief to be used for national affairs and claimed, among other things, being able to choose the type of graves and the corresponding inscription of the tombstone for their sons themselves (Katz, 2014; Brog, 2003). In addition to private graves, there were also private initiatives to integrate the memory of the fallen soldiers into daily life by means of battle heritage centres realised in concrete thus still in line with the design tradition of the



national monuments. This privatisation of commemoration intensified not only because Israelis had become more economically stable and thus could afford their own memorial sites, but also because their identity as Israelis was increasingly established (Brog, 2003).



**Figure 4** Addition of graves of recently fallen soldiers in the trail route of Mount Herzl (The Department for the Commemoration of the Fallen Soldiers, Ministry of Defense, 1996)

### 1.1.2 Palestine: Shatila Mosque

Palestinians consider trauma as a recoverable distortion of history. As if they are in a hallway of transition, in which you can go backwards or forward indefinitely (Ghanem, 2004). Because of this attitude to the trauma, only a few spatial memorials are created as these would irreversibly close the door to the past. Palestinians are therefore more inclined to commemorate in the spoken or written word and only in memory places that are connected to the dead body (Sorek, 2008).

These commemorative places exist in great numbers and often have an everyday character that has been transformed for the burial of martyrs such as the primary school in Ain-al Hilwa and the Nadja nursery in the Burj – al-Shamali camp. The mosque in the Shatila refugee camp in Lebanon is a well-known example of an everyday place that has been converted into a cemetery by the camp's inhabitants (see Figure 5) (Khalili, 2007, 113-49). This transformation took place after an extremely violent Lebanese militia entered Palestinian refugee camps on the night of September 16, 1983, murdering residents while the Israeli army controlled the escape routes (Constantine, 2012). The cemetery just outside the camp was no longer accessible after that night so the mosque was used as a burial ground, despite the dead being normally buried directly in the earth. The bereaved ones decorated the tombs and interior of the mosque with flowers, palm leaves, and photographs of the deceased (see Figure 6) (Giannou, 1991). Weekly visits to the mosque were incorporated into the daily life of the camp residents and during special holidays they read the Fatiha prayer (Khalili, 2007, 113-49).

The palm leaves are typical of Islamic cemeteries since they are the symbol of the concept of Rahmah, mercy (Hanna, 1978). The photographs of the deceased family members or famous martyrs also play a special role in the commemoration of Palestinians (see Figure 7). They testify that the deceased still live on in the memories of the communities they left behind. These photographs in the form of posters in the city or private monuments in homes, serve as the starting point of conversations in Palestinian culture and give rise to commemoration in the form of historical narratives. If the person depicted in the photo is asked about, Palestinians will

talk extensively about the highs and lows of the life concerned. However, if a tape recorder is present, a political-historical story will be told in which the martyrdom reveals the suffering of the Palestinians and demands sympathy from outsiders (Khalili, 2007, 65–89; *Ibid*, 113–49). The consequence of varying response depending on who is facing them is that it hampers personal reconciliation with Israelis.

The martyrdom reminds the community of shared lives and dead and concretises Palestinian national history. Since the Palestinian martyr's cemeteries in Lebanon embody national heroism, the nationalist political institutions have used the private mourning rituals to construct a narrative of the nation. The daily religious visits to the cemetery are thus framed by national institutions as national holidays and political demonstrations (Khalili, 2007, 113–49).

The key that a woman wore around her neck during one of these protests has also become a national symbol of the longing for the original domesticity and of the torment that the eternal quest for return entails (Bshara, 2007). For instance, this key can be seen in the gate of one of the largest Palestinian refugee camps called Aida.

The shared grief that has been used by nationalists to create a Palestinian nationality, along with the desire for understanding, is being adopted to provide an alternative to the Judeo-Israeli historical narrative of the events of 1948 (Sela and Kadish, 2016; Bshara, 2007; Khalili, 2007, 113–49). In order to bring the individual victimisation of the Palestinians to international attention, human experiences have been exposed through forty oral testimonies of refugees in order to provide a Palestinian meaning to the Nakba as well and thus to overcome the international wall of indifference to the Palestinian situation (Bshara, 2007). The different remembering of deceased family members in private and public as described by Khalili (2007) makes it very unlikely that these testimonies are a good representation of the personal feeling, but rather a political-historical story about the suffering of Palestinians. The talk of Palestinians instead of Palestine in the Oslo Agreement of 1993 shows that the testimonies succeeded in conveying the suffering (Sela and Kadish, 2016).

### *1.1.3 Comparison*

By comparing the cemeteries, it emerges that in both societies the cemeteries function as a meeting and connecting place for the grieving process. There are therefore numerous cemeteries in Israel as well as in Palestine.

However, the way of mourning is different. The grieving process stems from a different spirituality so that there are many images or no images at all (Khalili, 2007, 65–89; *Ibid*, 113–49; Azaryahu, 1992). Although both cultures had no background with remembrance through monuments as is done now – in the Jewish faith any figurative representation was forbidden (Azaryahu, 1992) and in Arab culture, history is seen as something laborious and a monument makes an event irreversible (Sorek, 2008; Ghanem, 2004) – there arose more small initiatives of bereaved families to make monuments after the War of Independence or Nakba (Sorek, 2008; Khalili, 2007, 65–89; Brog, 2003; Azaryahu, 1992). The main difference is the way the government has dealt with these initiatives (Bshara, 2007). The Palestinian nationalists used the mourning rituals of the individual integrated into daily life to tell their narrative (Sela and Kadish, 2016; Bshara, 2007; Khalili, 2007, 113–49). On the contrary, bureaucrats in Israel strived to counteract the diversity of the small initiatives to form a unified story about the history of the Israeli state (Azaryahu, 1992). Hence, a law has been created to make all monuments official and uniform and thus define a territory as well (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Handelman, 2004; Azaryahu, 1992). However, the bereaved families rose up against this because they no longer wanted their grief to be used for national affairs (Katz, 2014; Brog, 2003). This privatisation of commemoration, which has generated more variation and figuration of the spatial design of cemeteries and inclusion of memory of the fallen soldiers into daily life (Brog, 2003), brings the psychological and spatial characteristics of memorials in Israel and Palestine closer together.



**Figure 5** Shatila mosque (The Palestinian Museum Digital Archive Project, n.d.)



**Figure 7** Special role of photographs in Palestinian commemoration (Dray, 1993)



**Figure 6** The tombs and interior of the mosque is decorated with flowers, palm leaves, and photographs of the deceased (Dray, 1993)

## 1.2 Shared Event: War of Independence or Nakba

### 1.2.1 *Israel: Monument to the Negev Brigade*

The Sinai War in 1956 turned out not to be the only war that followed the War of Independence. The Six-Day War (1967), the War of Attrition (1970), the Yom Kippur War (1973) and the Lebanon War (1982) also added to the historical narrative of the state of Israel. The justification of these wars by Israel legitimises the loss of human life in the past and the possible loss of them in the future. Looking back and forward to the fight for an independent state is reflected in the architectural manipulation within the memorial design that is typical of Israel (Amir, 2006). This manipulation of the visitor is obtained by a special kind of order of opposing spatial forms referring to the losses in the past and the likely losses in the future. Examples of this duality in spatial forms are open-closed, dark-light, below-above, and near-far (Tanovic, 2015) and can be seen in Yigal Tumarkin's Mitzpe Mo'av in Arad (1968), Kikar Levena of Dani Karavan in Tel Aviv (1988) or National Memorial Hall in Jerusalem designed by Kimmel Eshkolot Architects (2017). However, these diametrically opposed shapes are only perceived by the movement of the visitor through the monument (Eshel, 2018). The necessary presence of the visitor is in line with Heidegger's (2001) perspective that a work of art cannot exist without its visitors, nor without its surroundings.

The interweaving of the environment with the monument is another recurring theme in the Israeli discourse of monuments. Many monuments blend into the surroundings as a symbol of life and continuity and reinforce the feeling of continuous growth towards the future by using a view to the distance (Amir, 2006). This strategy was also applied in the historical museum Yad Vashem museum by Safdie Architects (2005).

The Monument to the Negev Memorial of Dani Karavan embodies Heidegger's (2001) view that art is not something that can be "applied", but must be integrated with its surroundings in its materials and form (Restany, 1992). The Monument to the Negev Brigade is a land art memorial that memorises the story of the members of the Palmach Negev Brigade who fell fighting in 1948. The monument is made out of cement geometrical figures and seems to arise out of a hilltop of the Negev desert (see Figure 8) (Eshel, 2018; Azaryahu, 1992). From the moment that losses from other wars were also included in the commemoration discourse, the realisation of cement monuments became more common (Brog, 2003), among others seen in the Open Doors Monument in Rishion LeZion Holocaust Memorial Park by Luis Yee Jr. (2009) and A. Mansfield's Monument for the Fallen in Beit Shean (1960). Cement is associated with basic strong infrastructure and therefore functions as a symbol of the construction in the development of a powerful and rooted Israeli state (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Brog, 2003).

Figure 9 shows the usage of the hilltop's views to frame the surroundings and connects them yet in another way with the narrative of the continuity of the history of the Israeli state (Eshel, 2018; Azaryahu, 1992).

The Monument to the Negev Brigade Memorial is also part of the Israeli memorial tradition by aiming to produce contrasting experiences with a duality in spatial forms as past-future forms and the verticality contrasting the overall horizontal composition, and in architectural elements as darkness and light, and inside and outside. The contrast only emerges through the encounter and engagement of the visitor with the Monument to the Negev Brigade. The monument, therefore, accentuates the long corridors which connect the opposing spaces (see Figure 10) (Eshel, 2018; Amir, 2006).

The dome in Figure 11 is probably the best example of the dramatization of the event in 1948 by combining the encounter with the visitor and the principle of the juxtaposition of darkness and light, and inside and outside. The dome thus becomes a spiritual space where the visitors step out of everyday life to gain an ethical perspective on the events and possibly an






**Figure 8** By making use of local materials, the monument seems to arise out of a hilltop of the Negev desert (Opachevsky, 2017)



**Figure 9** Usage of the hilltop's views to frame the surroundings as reference to the narrative of the continuity of the history of Israel (Jacobs, 2003)



**Figure 10** Long corridors with a duality in spatial forms which connect the opposing spacesforms which connect the opposing spaces (Browns, 2013)



**Figure 11** juxtaposition of darkness-light, and inside-outside (Jacobs, 2003)

existential perspective on their lives (Amir, 2006; Heidegger, 2001). By walking through more of these spaces and reading the engraved poems, songs, verses, historical records of the 1948 war, names of the 324 soldiers who died in this war, their diary passages, and the badge of the Palmach, the monument offers a space for the individual and communal experience and reflection and thus tries to open a conversation (see Figure 12) (Eshel, 2018).

The Monument to the Negev Brigade was a forerunner in the field of adding soldiers' feelings, which became more common after the Yom Kippur War (Brog, 2003). In this war, 2500 soldiers died and 7000 were injured (Bilu and Witztum, 2000). This great trauma broke the hero cult that denied the combat stress reactions hidden from the public eye and partly suppressed the individual memory of the bereaved family members. Soldiers who perished in subsequent confrontations with the Palestinians were no longer seen as heroes fighting for the benefits of the state, but as sacrifices for the government and the army. After the Yom Kippur War, a monument was no longer just a remembrance place but also a place for war education in which the personal narratives of the soldiers were included (Brog, 2003; Bilu and Witztum, 2000).



**Figure 12** Usage of many descriptions (Jacobs, 2003)

### *1.2.2 Palestine: monument in 'Ailabun*

In the first half of the twentieth century, the Palestinians adopted various Western ideologies of commemoration through monuments and abandoned the idea that this would prevent a possible return to the past (Sorek, 2008; Gelvin, 1998). The spatial memorial sites that have been constructed since then are largely still linked to dead bodies and commemorate the Nakba. This is also reflected in the marble monument in 'Ailabun, which is built on the external wall of the cemetery (see Figure 13). Naif Sam'an, an artist from the village, created this monument in 1983 with the financial support of a friend to commemorate one of the Nakba events of 1948 in which fourteen men were executed by the Israel Defence Forces and other residents were expelled from the Christian village (Sorek, 2008).

The memorial depicts a mother holding her dying son whose blood pours from gunshot wounds. This image refers to the Pieta icon on which Maria has Jesus in her arms after he is taken from the cross. The names of the victims are also present with the title '*Ailabun's victims, 10/20/1948*'. However, any form of the heroism of the victims, cause of their death and a mentioning of Nakba are completely absent from the design of the modest monument (Sorek, 2008; 2002).

This absence is in line with other Palestinian monuments that have been realised in Israel.



These monuments are less focused on memories of the Nakba and Palestinian traditions of commemoration, such as the glorification of martyrs or the presence of photographs to facilitate their realisation in Israeli public spaces. They are often even more modest in their spatial form and in their focus on human sorrow than is already usual in the Palestinian tradition (Sorek, 2008). Also, flags or political statements such as the use of the word Nakba are absent, so the monuments are not seen as part of a national set of symbols or resistance (Handelman and Shamgar Handelman, 1997).

From the 1990s onwards there was a shift in this philosophy and the local cemeteries and other historical sites began to serve as Palestinian pre-Nakba symbols of resistance (Bar, 2020; Bshara, 2007). Since the 1950s and 1960s, Israeli cities have grown strongly and former Palestinian cemeteries have been taken for the expansion of the cities. Rural cemeteries like the one in 'Ailabun were more often preserved but still suffered from neglect due to Jewish anti-Muslim sentiments and real estate restrictions. Yaakov Yehoshua, the head of the Muslim and Druze Department in the Ministry, admitted that he was unable to educate the rest of the Jewish population in Israel to respect the sacred sites of other religions (Yehoshua, 1962). Hence, in 1991 inspired by the successful ultra-Orthodox Jewish group Atra Kadisha that fought for the protection of its cemeteries, the Al-Aqsa association was founded to maintain and protect Palestinian cemeteries and other Muslim shrines (Bar, 2020; Al-Aqsa Association, n.d.). This was the first step of resistance to demonstrate to Israel and the rest of the world that there was a Palestinian culture before the Jews, according to their story, as the chosen ones, cultivated an uninhabited desert (Bshara, 2007; Al-Aqsa Association, n.d.). To reinforce this statement, Palestinian officials and experts have drawn up a world heritage list of twenty Palestinian shrines of value to human history. This pre-Nakba history does not only become visible through the historical sites themselves but is also exhibited in folkloric museums such as the Ethnographic and Art Museum at Birzeit University and in described in literature like *Before their Diaspora* and *All that Remains* of Walid al Khalidi (Sela and Kadish, 2016; Bshara, 2007).



Figure 13 Monument in 'Ailabun (Sorek, 2008)

### 1.2.3 Comparison

When the monuments for the same event are compared, primarily differences can be seen. However, the monuments do have in common the connection with their environment although with conflicting symbolism. Many Israeli monuments blend into the environment and frame the site's surroundings as a symbol of life and continuity (Eshel, 2018; Azaryahu, 1992). Palestinian monuments are also site-specific as they are always connected with the dead body (Sorek, 2008). So in the Palestinian case, these commemoration places are not about life, but about death.

Looking at the design language, it becomes clear that Israel attempts to tell a continuous historical story and to make a political statement with the production of new monuments (Amir, 2006). This is reflected in the extensive texts about the faith and the event that the monument remembers (Brog, 2003; Bilu and Witztum, 2000). The desire to create a larger narrative is also evident in the abstract form language through the dramatization produced by the duality in spatial forms (Tanovic, 2015; Amir, 2006).

On the contrary, Palestinian monuments tell individual stories. These narratives focus on human grievance without a political agenda, which is not depicted in grand abstract architectural gestures and elaborate texts, but in a figurative monument of modest size (Sorek, 2008; Handelman and Shamgar Handelman, 1997). However, it is striking that from the 1990s onwards there was a shift in this philosophy and the historical local cemeteries began to serve as Palestinian pre-Nakba symbols of resistance in order to demonstrate to Israel and the rest of the world that there was a Palestinian culture before the Jews occupied the land (Bar, 2020; Sela and Kadish, 2016; Bshara, 2007; Al-Aqsa Association, n.d.). This change results in a similarity in the purpose of the monuments, which is to tell a historical story and thus claim the right of the land. Israel conveys this by realising new monuments, while Palestine protects its already existing commemorative places.

## 1.3 Conclusion

Reconciliation memorials have proved highly valuable for starting reconciliation in places where the conflict has ended, such as in South Africa and Rwanda. They can contribute to the understanding that the other is not an enemy, but a fellow sufferer. As the Israel-Palestine conflict is still active, among the many monuments commemorating this conflict, there are as yet no monuments of reconciliation that could generate this understanding.

The literature research and the case studies show that two aspects are of great value in the discourse of monuments in Israel and Palestine, namely the personal mourning and the political statement. The political statement focuses specifically on claiming territory and gaining international sympathy for their mourning.

When the existing monuments of Israel and Palestine are compared, it can be concluded that in both cultures monuments were created from a desire of the bereaved families to mourn. This mourning process for the fallen soldiers or martyrs was adopted in an opposite way to tell a story through the hero cult. The Jews have more recently settled in what is now called Israel. The Israeli government is therefore actively realising monuments to create a national narrative. In order to make a powerful and unified political statement, Israel has made all personal memorial initiatives impossible through a top-down approach. This creates an Israeli identity for its citizens and propagates an international story regarding the ownership of the land. On the other hand, the memorials in Palestine are mainly built through individual initiatives in daily life settings and are thus strongly focused on personal mourning.

The difference in the focus of the monuments on providing a place for personal mourning or making a political statement is reflected in the design of the monuments. Israeli and Palestinian



monuments are nearly always site-specific, but as Israel has many more monuments with different typologies, the Israeli monuments discourse extends beyond the shared cemetery typology. Israeli monuments are uniform and grand in their size, in their abstract architectural gestures, and in their narrative inscriptions, providing a dramatic look at the past and future of the state. Citizens' initiatives for Palestinian monuments are often of modest size and mainly look back on a modifiable past. The monuments reflect on the events in the absence of text with figurations or photos of the deceased.

However, shifts can be observed that bring the essence of the monument discourse of Israel and Palestine closer together. Palestine has recognised that it must offer political resistance to the strong international Israeli narrative. The Palestinian nationalists take the individual stories about the grief of the bereaved ones told by the everyday monuments as an example of national oppression. Historic sites, especially cemeteries, are used to demonstrate to Israel and the rest of the world that there was a Palestinian culture before the Jews occupied the land and thus claim land.

In Israel, there is an opposite movement visible in which the bereaved families claim their right to decide for themselves how to commemorate their lost one. This privatisation of commemoration has generated more variation and figuration of the spatial design of cemeteries, creating more similarities in the spatial characteristics of Israeli and Palestinian cemeteries.

In sum, Israel and Palestine share the typology of the cemetery, as the wish of commemoration in both societies stems from the desire of the bereaved ones to mourn. Israel was strongly focused on conveying the political statement and has used a top-down approach to make this statement in the creation of an entirely new monument landscape. This approach is loosening because the mourning of the bereaved families was not enough reflected in the commemoration. In contrast, the monuments in Palestine strongly represent individual stories of mourning, but do not convey a uniform political statement. Hence, Palestinian nationalists use these personal stories and historical sites as examples of national oppression. There is a great difference in approach and therefore also in the external characteristics of the monuments, but the shift on both sides brings the essence of the commemoration closer together.

## USE OF MONUMENTS IN THE BEREAVEMENT PROCESS OF TRAUMATIC MEMORY

In the first chapter, the similarities and differences between Israeli and Palestinian commemorative places are outlined. This chapter will discuss the similarity in typology. Both societies commemorate their fallen heroes in numerous cemeteries. Communal mourning connects the live ones of the population of one state. I will examine whether universal mourning in cemeteries can be used to achieve reconciliation. The underlying theory and the possible implications will be structured using the reconciliation process, consisting of transmission, convergence, and stability, as described by Hirst and Manier (2008).

### 2.1 Transmission

Not every individual or society has experienced the same events and a single event is not always interpreted identically (Hirst and Manier, 2008).

For example, Israel shares a collective trauma of the extermination of six million Jews in World War II and terrorism that remains imminent, and Palestine shares the expulsion of 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland (Kahanoff, 2017). Besides the incomparable nature of these events, subsequent generations have not experienced these traumas themselves, but carry the pain of their ancestors (Keynan, 2016; Kalinowska, 2012). In addition, the dual designation of the War of Independence or Nakba already indicates a different interpretation of this event. The Israelis were the ones who settled and expelled the Palestinians and the Palestinians are the expelled ones.

The divergence of traumas of an individual or society and the variety of interpretations of the same event give rise to many individual memories. Two concepts play an important role in achieving transmission of these memories: public representation and mental representation. Public representation includes textbooks and monuments and is capable of altering mental representations. Conversely, the mental representation is able to change the public representation of trauma through conversation and thus trigger a shift in the uniform public view of the trauma (Hirst and Manier, 2008; Bilu and Witztum, 2000). Due to the top-down approach of the government, public representation in Israel strongly prevailed. On the one hand, this led to enabling the bereaved ones to express their loss and grief in collective symbolism. On the other hand, the separation of heroic role prescriptions and private misery often resulted in the aggravation of the sense of loss (Bilu and Witztum, 2000). This shows that it is of relevance that public and mental representations mutually and equally change each other.

However, people tend to engage in a conversation about mental representation within their own group (intergroup kinship). In these dialogues, stereotyping information is more likely to be shared than stories that deviate from it (Kahanoff, 2017). This allows transmission within one group to be achieved quite quickly but creates even more distance from the hostile group (intragroup kinship) as the prejudices about the other are maintained.

This is highly present in the Israel-Palestine conflict. In both societies mourning functions unifying and much value is attached to cemeteries to commemorate their lost heroes together, either on a local or national scale as was concluded in the first chapter. The high occurrence of commemoration in cemeteries indicates that the grieving process is not yet complete. This

is a positive given for reconciliation, as an unprocessed trauma is essential for reconciliation (Pearcy, 2020). The privatisation of commemoration in Israel has generated more variation and figuration of the spatial design of cemeteries and incorporated commemoration into daily life (Brog, 2003). Despite the great difference in the common mourning rituals of the event in 1948 in cemeteries and the strong transmission within the two groups developing a polarisation between the two populations resulting in both clinging to their own truth, brings the Israeli privatisation the rituals of Israel and Palestine slightly closer together. This benefits the creation of a non-state related communal cemetery with scope for the personal grieving process.

The Israeli historiography of this truth is based on documents well preserved in state archives, while Palestinian historians must rely on oral history. The latter source is not generally recognised as reliable, leading to an unequal production of knowledge about the nature of the War of Independence of Nakba (Craimer, 2006; Moyn, 2011). For instance, Israel has modified the Arabic names of the originally Palestinian villages and cities into a Hebrew variant, but the Palestinians refuse to use these new and official names in the vernacular (Swedenburg, 1995). This example confirms the asymmetrical power relation and illustrates the international denial of the Palestinians' oral resistance.

The Palestinian narrative used to be completely absent in this well-documented Israeli narrative. As compensation, a new history has been written that does include the Palestinian refugee perspective. However, this rewriting was done by Israelis who have a consciousness of history and a mindset that exclude Palestinians. Therefore, there is no encounter at an emotional level in the new narrative (Gutman, 2015; Rousseau and Foxen, 2010).

The asymmetrical power relation in historiography as well as on a political and military level must be recognised in order to initiate the transmission of a memory according to the Mahanya tradition of Buddhism. This tradition states that transmission starts with a reciprocal interaction that creates compassion for the other. For this creation, it is important that you place your group on the same level as the other group and that you can exchange place with the other group (Kahanoff, 2017; Rousseau and Foxen, 2010).

This inequality in the historiographical, political and military power relation is difficult to overcome with a cemetery, which is why the next chapter will discuss initiatives that may be able to deal with this. However, a cemetery can act as an encounter. In a shared cemetery where Israelis and Palestinians mourn side by side and commemorate their heroes, the hostile populations could see each other's grief and overhear intergroup conversations of the other group – which are often more emotionally charged than intragroup conversations (Kahanoff, 2017). A repetitive encounter between grieving Israelis and Palestinians would theoretically involve a slow acknowledgement of the suffering of the other. This contributes to developing Ubuntu, the understanding that the other is not an enemy but a fellow sufferer, and to initiate transmission (Keynan, 2020).

However, the strong territorial separation complicates locating a shared cemetery. That is why I propose to create a cemetery in Israel where Palestinian and Jewish Israeli people meet as a starting point. In addition to a practical basis of accessibility, a transmission of memories is likely to be obtained more quickly between Palestinian and Jewish Israelis than between expelled Palestinians and Israelis since there is less inequality to be bridged.

The presence of some Palestinian cemeteries in Israel indicates that there is already a certain tolerance of Israel for the Palestinian narrative. Based on a cemetery near Haifa, the one in the first chapter described cemetery in 'Ailabun, and the Mamilla cemetery, I will substantiate the presence of this toleration and create conditions for the shared cemetery.

The outcome of the conflict over the cemetery near Haifa reveals some recognition and tolerance for Palestinian memorial sites of the local government. The local Jewish council had plans to extend the road to the Nesher local council near Haifa, causing an expropriation of a part

of an Islamic cemetery. This resulted in strong retention and demonstrations by the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Ultimately, a compromise was reached in which a bridge would be built over the cemetery so that no graves would have to be destroyed (Fenster, 2006). This example indicates that the local planning apparatus has recognised the cemetery as a place of remembrance, although this is not considered such at the national level.

The cemetery in 'Ailabun also shows the possibilities for the presence of Palestinian cemeteries in Israel. The prerequisite for existence is that the cemetery is small and modest and does not stimulate political resistance (Sorek, 2008).

However, the existence of activist heritage protection associations like Al-Aqsa and the controversy they created surrounding the construction of the Museum of Tolerance next to the Islamic Mamilla Cemetery in Jerusalem, which dates back to the 11th century, reminds us that an intervention for reconciliation should not be located on an existing cemetery (Bar, 2020; Campos, 2015; Al-Aqsa Association, n.d.).

## 2.2 Convergence

The transmission process may have to be looped through many times before individual memories change or align and convergence is achieved (Hirst and Manier, 2008). If the intergroup transmission proves to be successful within both the Palestinian Israeli and Jewish Israeli populations, an intragroup conversation and shared convergence could emerge.

Hirst and Manier (2008) describe that convergence is sometimes easily obtained within a small group, but it is difficult to distribute this convergence among entire populations. This is important to facilitate reconciliation of the conflict. Therefore, the principle of the shared cemetery must be expanded all over Israel and the expelled Palestinian population must also be involved later in the process. Involving the non-Israeli Palestinians is complicated by Israel's political, economic, and military superiority that dominates the built environment and its commitment to claim territory. Besides the transformation of originally Palestinian into Jewish villages and towns and the realisation of many monumental commemoration spaces, these spatial manifestations include the construction of The Separation Wall and military installations within the West Bank which complicate the coexistence of the populations on both sides of the border (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Beckmann, 2001). Building a joint cemetery in Israel follows logically from this dominance in the built environment, but it is worth noting if this is desirable as it maintains the current inequality.

If the aforementioned physical barriers can be removed, it is likely that the transmission process has to be repeated several times in order to achieve a single convergence within the entire Israeli and Palestinian population.

## 2.3 Stability

Individually shared memories do not constitute collective memories unless they remain stable over time (Hirst and Manier, 2008). Therefore, a frequent encounter has to be ensured to provide awareness of shared victimhood. Only then will stability in the individually shared memory be obtained, upon which a collective memory can follow.

In the case of a joint cemetery, a repeated meeting can be established since the mourning of the bereaved family will never go. Brog (2003) states that the death of children in combat is perceived as untimely and unnatural since war is a human construct and therefore not beyond control. Thus, the grieving process of the bereaved family will eventually be a basic given in their lives.

To guarantee stability, the cemetery must be a safe place. Other joint initiatives such as The Parents Circle<sup>1</sup> and Zochrot<sup>2</sup> are seen as highly controversial and are therefore recurrently threatened (Schwake, 2021). To ensure the safety of the mourning visitors, a joint cemetery is likely to be a reconciliation solution for when the conflict diminishes or nears its end.



## 2.4 Conclusion

The two societies and their individual citizens have not experienced the same events. Israelis suffer from collective extermination in World War II and ongoing terrorism in the present and Palestinians live in exile and cannot return to their homelands to this day. Also, the two societies experience the same event differently: one as expellees and the other as expelled. The difference in perception results in a great variation in individual memories. These individual memories are displayed in public and mental presentations, which can alter each other to achieve transmission of trauma memory.

Cemeteries are common examples of public representations in both Israel and Palestine. In these cemeteries, mental representations are mainly shared intergroup in which stereotyping stories are more often communicated than deviations from the standard. Which again creates a wider gap between the two populations. This divide is compounded by the asymmetrical power relation created by the difference in the documentation of historiography, politics and military forces. The asymmetrical power relation hampers transmission because the populations must be able to place themselves on the same level as the other.

The privatisation of commemoration in Israel has resulted in more attention to personal grief in the spatial design of cemeteries which is more in line with Palestinian cemeteries and can be used in the creation of a non-state related communal cemetery with scope for the personal grieving process. In this cemetery, Israelis and Palestinians mourn side by side and commemorate their heroes, the hostile populations could see each other's grief and intergroup conversations of the other group could be received by making use of already existing commemoration rituals. A repetitive encounter between grieving Israelis and Palestinians would entail slow recognition of the suffering of the other. These insights are necessary foundations for starting a reconciliation process.

The presence of some Palestinian cemeteries in Israel indicates that there is already a certain tolerance of Israel for the Palestinian narrative. However, the controversy surrounding the construction of the Museum of Tolerance next to the Islamic Mamilla Cemetery in Jerusalem shows that an intervention for reconciliation should not be placed in an existing cemetery and that the conflict is still too raging to create a tolerance gesture without hurting the suppressed. Personal resistance to going to a reconciliation cemetery is accompanied by physical barriers that also stem from differences in political dominance and views. The Israeli dominance in the built environment creates territory-demarcating elements that make it difficult for the populations in and outside Israel to come together in one cemetery. Moreover, the threatening of a number of joint initiatives shows that there are still too many political differences that prevent a joint mourning space from being safe.

<sup>1</sup> Parents Circle Family Forum (PCFF) is an Israeli-Palestinian organisation which creates a safe space for bereaved families in which they talk about their loss to recognise that they are both singular humans being.

<sup>2</sup> Zochrot is a Jewish-Israeli initiative that focuses on remembering the Palestinian Nakba.

## RECONCILIATION FORMATS IN PRACTICE

Chapter two shows that a joint cemetery can theoretically be successful if political barriers that lead to personal resistance and physical constraints to a visit are removed.

The great tenacity of both societies to cling to their own political narrative can be seen as a closed melancholic circle of memory activities. The circle must be broken in order to be able to look to the future (Keynan, 2020). Only then can the asymmetrical power relation be addressed and insight can be gained that mutual responsibility is borne for the past. To break this circle and to start the transmission process through mutual empathy and responsibility, a shared safe space is needed (Ricoeur, 2002). The initiatives that provide this are divided by Maoz (2011) into four categories: the Coexistence Model, the Joint Projects Model, the Confrontational Model and the Story-Telling Model.

This chapter will discuss some initiatives that may contribute to overcoming these three types of barriers in practice using these four reconciliation models. It will explore whether similar projects to the joint cemetery have been successful and whether there are additional reconciliation formats with which the political, personal and physical barriers can be bridged so that Israelis and Palestinians can recognise each other as equals and show compassion for the other.

### 3.1 Coexistence Model

Coexistence occurs already naturally in Arab-Jewish mixed cities such as Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel-Aviv-Jaffa, Lydda, Ramla, Acre, and Upper Nazareth (Mavroudi, 2012). Research by Falah, Hoy and Sarker (2000) showed that the Arab and Jewish population of these cities experienced the sharing of urban space and its facilities as positive. The Arab participants in the study considered the coexistence in Haifa to be the most positive, which was ranked second by the Israeli participants. The positive experience of sharing the public facilities offers perspective for the acceptance and use of a joint cemetery. An example of an intervention in the shared urban space of Haifa is the playground for local Arabic and Jewish children called the Turtle Salvador Bobbie (2002) by Seeds for Peace (Seeds for Peace, 2016).

To promote mutual sympathy on a personal level even further, the Coexistence Model addresses the non-controversial agreements between Israelis and Palestinians and avoids painful disagreements to promote mutual sympathy on a personal level (Maoz, 2011). An example of this model is the Parents Circle Family Forum (PCFF). PCFF creates a safe space for bereaved families in which they talk about their loss to recognise that they are both singular humans being which is similar to the main goal of the joint cemetery. Instead of considering the other as the cause of the conflict and as the one that should be blamed for your own loss, the Coexistence model implies the Ubuntu concept by aiming to show that the other is a fellow sufferer, thereby making an attempt to break the melancholic course of mourning rituals by grieving together (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2020; Keynan, 2020).

Although the Coexistence Model together dominates in usage amount over the other

meeting programmes, there is much criticism of this model as well. The focus on the basic similarities and the avoidance of political issues can precisely result in the strengthening of the existing structural relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians (Maoz, 2011). For this reason, Walter Stephan and Cookie Stephan (2001) state that the Coexistence Model is only suitable for children who are not yet able to deal with the complexity of the conflict cognitively and emotionally. The research of David (2019) also shows that the differences between the populations and the dominance of Israel are actually perpetuated by the model. Since a story is told in which one uses the terms I / we and you / you and one searches for *People Like Us*, belonging to different populations is emphasised and their identity generalised. This criticism proves the assumption in the second chapter that, prior to the coexistence initiatives, other models are needed to already remove the political barrier partly.

### 3.2 Story-Telling Model

By including the political aspect in the conversation, the Story-Telling Model aims to gain an understanding of the total complexity of someone's own and other people's story about the conflict. When Israelis and Palestinians share their personal stories in relation to the political events, confidence and empathy are created and the complexity of the conflict situation is better understood (Bar-On, 2002, 2006). However, it is difficult, if not asking too much, to tell a story that is both personal and political and that comes across as authentic as well as not hurtful or alienating. A narrative will only induce a conflict transformation if it contains all these aspects (Bekerman, 2007).

The trend that some Israeli bereaved families feel emotionally unrepresented by the Israeli state and create more personal memorials individually offers a perspective for formulating a story with both emotional and political significance. In addition, Seeds for Peace trains local people to use their knowledge of both the Israeli and the Palestinian side of the conflict to help transfer the story (Seeds for Peace, 2016). This education of local people is of great importance since research by Ghanem (2020) demonstrates that pro-Palestinian initiatives that are supported with money from donor countries often appear to be counterproductive in rebalancing the asymmetrical power relation. This financial support for Palestine triggered a backlash from Israel, tightening its grip on their occupations and striving to expand the scope of their occupations. Besides this, the money support also confirmed the Israeli stereotyping that Palestine is inferior and dependent.

#### 3.2.1 Political and personal barrier

The organisation Combats For Peace (CFP) makes use of the Story-Telling Model. The organisation brings together former Palestinian and Israeli soldiers who were involved in violence in the same region. Most soldiers in the organisation are mentally or physically injured and suffer from PTSD or moral injury (Keynan 2020; Bilu and Witztum, 2000). By having conversations about their past as a soldier and their political view of the conflict, CFP attempts to remind the soldiers that the other is not the enemy but has a shared identity of a non-violent combatant who is committed to ending the conflict (Keynan, 2020). By making use of the Story-Telling Model, the soldiers come closer together.

#### 3.2.2 Political and personal and physical barrier

Street theatre is an expression of the story-telling model that arises from citizens' initiatives in which barriers are broken between Jews and Palestinians at a personal, political and physical level. Theatre was already widely used as a Palestinian commemorative practice and is now deployed more often by Palestinians and Jews together to allow alternative meanings (Mavroudi, 2013; Khalili, 2007, 65-89; Yerushalmi 2007; Ben Zvi 2006). Street theatre thus puts the neighbourhood in which the play takes place in another socio-cultural and political context

(Mavroudi, 2013; Fenigstein 2007; Walsh, Kuriansky and Toppano, 2007). This initiative shows that a new function can put the existing environment in a new cultural and political light. A joint cemetery could possibly be such a function or street theatre could be combined with the cemetery, as is often done in Palestinian tradition, to create a more inclusive context.

### 3.3 Joint Projects Model

In order for the joint initiatives to succeed, as was the case with street theatre, it is important that the initiatives originate from two populations themselves. This is emphasised by several outcomes of the joint projects model. This model is based on the assumption that working together towards a higher goal reduces hostility and increases sympathy. The common identity thus obtained will transcend the separate identities of the Israelis and Palestinians (Maoz, 2011). Depending on the project, this model can lift personal, political and physical barriers.

#### 3.3.1 *Personal barrier*

The project is a tangible process with a visible outcome to outsiders. The process and the final product reflect the success of the intragroup collaboration (Maoz, 2011). This fact can be approached both positively and negatively and will be illustrated by an example of a soccer team with both Israeli and Palestinian players which mainly focusses on the personal barrier. Research by Zuabi (2008) demonstrates that intragroup attitudes improved in the soccer team. This may have been due to interdependence between players from different backgrounds. The contribution of the weaker group, the Palestinian players in this case, can entail increased self-esteem and command respect from the politically stronger Israel (Maoz, 2011). If this soccer team often wins, this success is visible to outside viewers. However, suppose the soccer team is not extremely successful. The failure of the soccer team will only emphasise the inability to reconcile for the outside viewers.

#### 3.3.2 *Physical barrier*

The Joint Project Model can be used to collectively find alternatives to the spatial restrictions imposed by Israel. Palestinians are not authorised to build and therefore, along with their Jewish neighbours, add temporary elements to the public space to reach both an Israeli and Palestinian audience (LeVine, 2007). An example of this is the Holiday of Holidays festival in a low-income Palestinian neighbourhood in Haifa. This multi-ethnic festival celebrates Christmas, Ramadan and Chanukah at the same time. By using both the built environment and religious traditions which approach is similar to that of the joint cemetery, a condition is created for coexistence (Gazit and Latham, 2014). Criticism of this festival, however, is that Jewish dominance is reinforced by the fact that Palestinians are only able to celebrate their religious festivals in public if they are combined with a Jewish tradition (Kallus and Kolodney, 2010). While this is an important and worrying note, it does not apply to the creation of a joint cemetery, as it must incorporate both religions.

The joint spatial subversion of the spatial restrictions becomes also apparent in healthcare. Hospitals in the Occupied Territories have limited recourses at their disposal and due to the harsh Israel mobility regime - such as checkpoints, the Separation Wall and physical obstructions - proper healthcare cannot be provided (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Beckmann, 2001). Physicians for Human Rights is a joint project bringing together Israeli and Palestinian health professionals to voluntarily provide weekly health care to the people of these regions. It successfully offers an alternative social purpose of spaces and infrastructures to the imposed use of space by the Israeli government (Handel, 2010). The success of Physicians for Human Rights provides perspective to bring the populations on both sides of the border together in a joint cemetery.



### 3.3.3 Political barrier

A joint project that addresses the content of conflict, but unlike the aforementioned joint projects does not arise entirely from the two societies themselves is the writing of a common educational curriculum. A study of Goldberg (2017) to the joint writing of education material shows that conventional singular narrative education diminished interest in the other's perspective, even if it contained some self-critical information. Empathetic education with two narrative perspectives increased this interest.

However, in the project there was twice an imbalance in the level of involvement between the Israelis and the Palestinians, allowing this project – or other joint projects involving disparate involvement – to reinforce existing stereotypes of Jews as overly dominant and controlling and of Arabs as lazy and passive (Goldberg, 2017; Maoz, 2004).

Firstly, the Palestinians did not want to make use of the teaching materials in their education. The joint education material has therefore only been used to a small extent in Israel in the education of Jewish and Arab Israelis (Goldberg, 2017).

Secondly, a lower level of involvement of the Palestinians was reflected in the conciliation of the Jews in their storyline. Arab students have interpreted the teaching material with the double perspective as a Jewish recognition of the Palestinian narrative and the responsibility that the Jews bear for it. This fulfils the need of a weaker party in the asymmetrical power relation that is increasingly recognised by Israeli organisations like Zochrot (Orr and Golan, 2014) that acknowledge the Nakba. On the contrary, the Arab perspective showed no empathy for Jewish suffering, which is necessary for reconciliation. While this inhibited the success of the joint project, it nevertheless helped reduce the defences of intergroup narratives on intragroup agreements (Goldberg, 2017; Shnabel et al., 2009).

## 3.4 Confrontational model

As the writing of a common educational curriculum showed, Israel is slowly gaining an understanding of the Palestinian perspective, but the Palestinian resistance to cooperating remains. Political issues must therefore be addressed more frequently before a collaboration such as a joint cemetery can be established. The confrontational model could be effective in this respect. In the model, issues as political asymmetry and discrimination, and dilemmas as the definition of Israel as a Jewish democratic state and the inability of Palestinian national identity are explicitly discussed (Maoz, 2011).

Due to the direct approach to the asymmetrical power relation, the model is able to offer a more complex perspective on the conflict. However, there is a fine line between constructive direct confrontation and verbal and spatial abuse. As a result, there is no longer any question of the *safe space* described by Ricoeur (2002) and direct confrontation would ensure alienation and distrust of Israelis and Palestinians (Maoz, Bar-On and Yikya, 2007). The discussable border of confrontation becomes apparent in the resistance to the monumental and colonial character of Israeli interventions in the built environment offered by the Palestinian research and activist group Decolonizing Architecture (Gazit and Latham, 2014). This group confronts by transforming and manipulating architecture that strengthens the power of Israel. For example, Decolonizing Architecture has written pacifist graffiti on military posts and has transformed an Israeli watchtower overlooking Bethlehem into a Palestinian bird-watching tower.

Yet research by Maoz (2001) shows that the organisations applying the Confrontational Model often appear to be highly socially just with Jewish and Arab representation at all levels of the organisation. This close cooperation is reflected in the situation of the village Bedouin. The Arab and Jewish activists partner up against the forced urbanisation and rebuild the already destroyed villages in the area (Gazit and Latham, 2014; Yiftachel, 2009). Also in the villages as Budrus, Biddu, Bil'in, and Nil'in, there are communal protests against the building of the wall and a Palestinian-Israeli mobilisation is taking place in these border areas (Gazit and Latham, 2014).

There is not just an inter-ethnic confrontation in these regions with the forced interventions in the building environment, but Jewish-Israeli organisations such as Bimkom and Zochrot have also realised that no future exists for reconciliation if these practices are maintained (Orr and Golan, 2014).

### 3.5 Conclusion

In sum, a joint cemetery can theoretically be successful if personal, physical and political barriers are removed. In this chapter some reconciliation initiatives divided into four models are discussed that may contribute to overcoming these three types of barriers.

The joint cemetery can be reckoned with the Coexistence Model and is comparable to PCFF, which also belongs to this model. PCFF creates a safe space for bereaved families in which they talk about their loss to recognise that they are both singular humans being. Criticism of this states that focussing on personal similarities and omitting political issues can precisely result in the strengthening of the existing structural relations between the Israelis and the Palestinians. For this reason, Walter Stephan and Cookie Stephan (2001) argue that the Coexistence Model is merely suitable for children, which is reflected in the playground for local Arabic and Jewish children in the Arab-Jewish mixed city Haifa by Seeds for Peace. Not only children make use of shared facilities, but adults also consider the natural coexistence in mixed cities as positive. This offers a perspective for the acceptance and use of a joint cemetery. Similar to PCFF is the CFP which, in addition to the personal barrier, also includes the political aspect in the conversation. CFP belongs to the Story-Telling Model which aims to gain an understanding of the total complexity of someone's own and other people's story about the conflict.

The Story-Telling Model can also offer an alternative social purpose of spaces and infrastructures to the imposed use of space by the Israeli government. Street theatre is a local citizens' initiative that shows that a new function can put the existing environment in a new cultural and political light. The Joint Projects Model, which attempts to demonstrate interdependence through collaboration, can lift the physical barrier as well. For example, the communal Holiday of Holidays Festival, like a joint cemetery, places the built environment in a new personal and cultural context by simultaneously celebrating Jewish, Islamic and Christian religious traditions. Although the street theatre and festival are successful initiatives, they have been criticised for their tendency to reinforce Jewish dominance since the non-Jewish inhabitants are only able to share their narrative and traditions in public if they are combined with a Jewish point of view. This criticism, however, does not apply to the creation of a joint cemetery, as it must incorporate both societies.

The writing of a common educational curriculum shows that the Joint Projects Model can also address the political content of the conflict. In this project, it becomes clear that Israel is beginning to understand the Palestinian narrative, but that Palestine does not show empathy for the Jewish suffering yet. Therefore, political issues must be addressed more frequently by the Confrontational Model before a joint cemetery can be established. A complicating factor of this model is the fine line between confrontation and verbal or spatial abuse. This can be seen in the practices of Decolonizing Architecture, which shows the political and physical dominance of Israel in a provocative manner. However, there are also peaceful protest movements against Israeli dominance in villages like Bedouin, in which the different ethnicities together stand up for Palestinian rights. It is important that movements like this stem from the Israeli and Palestinian society itself, as reconciliation initiatives supported by foreign money often turn out to promote rather than break the Israeli dominance.



## FINAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This thesis has investigated how cultural differences in the processing of trauma, visible in the existing commemorative places in Israel and Palestine, can be bridged in order to create circumstances for reconciliation. To achieve reconciliation, a process of transmission, convergence and stability must be completed. The transmission phase becomes apparent in mental and public representations, which can alter each other to achieve transmission of traumatic memory. The Israeli and Palestinian mental representations of the events in 1948 differ greatly since the two societies and their individual citizens have not experienced the same events when the War of Independence or Nakba took place and had another role as expellees or the expelled ones. These mental presentations are captured differently in the public representation due to an asymmetry in historiographical, political and military forces.

The divergent public representation of the traumatic memory is reflected in the design and initiation of the creation of monuments. The state-regulated Israeli monuments are uniform and grand in their amounts, size, abstract architectural gestures, and narrative inscriptions, providing a dramatic look at the past and future of the state. Citizens' initiatives for Palestinian monuments are often of modest size and mainly look back on a modifiable past. The monuments reflect personal grief in the absence of text but with figurations or photos of the deceased.

The visibility of the asymmetrical power relation in the monumental discourse hampers the reconciliation process because the populations must be able to place themselves on the same level as the other and to switch of position. However, one of the few traditional similarities in the memorial practices - the mourning of their heroes on cemeteries – and the recent changes in commemoration leading to privatisation in Israel and internationalisation in Palestine can be used to prevent further dispersion. Since cemeteries in 'Ailabun and near Haifa demonstrate that Palestinian cemeteries in Israel are recognised and respected by local governments, a joint cemetery in Israel could apply the Ubuntu concept to function as a starting point for reconciliation between Palestinian and Jewish Israelis. The controversy surrounding the construction of the Museum of Tolerance next to the Islamic Mamilla Cemetery in Jerusalem shows that an intervention for reconciliation should not be placed in an existing cemetery and that the conflict is still too raging to create a tolerance gesture without hurting the suppressed.

In order to achieve a single convergence within the entire Israeli and Palestinian population, a frequent encounter providing a repeated transmission process is complicated by a personal resistance to going to a reconciliation cemetery as well as physical barriers. The Israeli dominance in the built environment creates territory-demarcating elements that make it difficult for the populations in and outside Israel to come together in one cemetery.

Moreover, stability cannot be guaranteed since the threatening of a number of joint initiatives shows that there are still too many political differences that prevent a joint mourning space from being safe.

A joint cemetery can theoretically be successful if these personal, physical and political barriers are removed. Its concept belongs to the Coexistence Model, which aims to remove the personal barrier. Natural coexistence in Arab-Jewish mixed cities shows that sharing public

facilities can be experienced as positive. However, the results of initiatives of the Coexistence Model have already demonstrated that a joint cemetery can only function as a reconciliation place if other models are also used.

The Story-Telling and Joint Projects Model unite the personal and political story to place the existing environment in a new cultural and political light. In this manner, the physical barriers within and across the Israeli border have already been bridged several times.

Nevertheless, the cooperation projects of these models also show that the Palestinians, unlike the Israelis, still find it difficult to recognise a different political perspective. It is therefore important that the Confrontational Model is also used to continue to draw attention to the asymmetrical power relation.

To conclude, the suggestion to use a joint cemetery as a starting point for reconciliation brought us to the core barriers of reconciliation. The manner in which I reached this suggestion and the models that I propose to remove these barriers are entirely based on photos and literature about the monuments and the interventions in the current conflict situation. It has not been possible to investigate the monuments and the interaction of its visitors or to conduct interviews with the population about their personal experience of the conflict. The ideas reflected in this thesis thus represent the Israeli perspective more strongly as I analyse the conflict with my Western view and through a medium in which the Israeli narrative is better documented.

Therefore, it would be preferable if the initiatives come from local Palestinian and Israeli NGOs instead of international aid. This aid maintains the asymmetrical balance of power and is less able to determine when it is safe enough for certain reconciliation interventions and when the societies are ready for it. If the barriers have locally been removed so that a safe joint cemetery can be realised in one region, this does not mean that the population from another region in which the barriers may still exist cannot still threaten the joint cemetery.

A suggestion for future research would thus be to involve the local population in the research. In order to propose a realistic and less western biased reconciliation strategy, it is important to know what possibilities for removing the three core barriers in order to achieve reconciliation the populations themselves suggest and to what form of reconciliation initiatives they are currently open.



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