Print Email Facebook Twitter Forecast-based mechanisms for demand response Title Forecast-based mechanisms for demand response Author Methenitis, G. (TU Delft Intelligent Electrical Power Grids; Center for Mathematics and Computer Science) Kaisers, Michael (Center for Mathematics and Computer Science) la Poutré, J.A. (TU Delft Intelligent Electrical Power Grids; Center for Mathematics and Computer Science) Date 2019 Abstract We study mechanisms to incentivize demand response in smart energy systems. We assume agents that can respond (reduce their demand) with some probability if they prepare prior to the real-ization of the demand. Both preparation and response incur costs to agents. Previous work studies truthful mechanisms that select a minimal set of agents to prepare and respond such that a fixed demand reduction target is achieved with high probability. In this work we additionally consider the balancing responsibility of a retailer under a given demand forecast and imbalance price: The retailer is responsible to purchase additional reserve capacity at a high imbalance price to cover any excess in the demand. In this extended setting we study mechanisms that request only a subset of prepared agents to respond since the reduction target depends on the realization of the demand: We propose: (i) a sequential mechanism that in each round embeds a second-price auction and is truthful under some mild assumptions for the setting, and (ii) a truthful combinatorial mechanism that runs in polynomial time and uses VCG payments. We show that both mechanisms guarantee non-negative utility in expectation for both agents and the retailer (mechanism), and can further be used for simultaneous downward and upward flexibility. Last, we verify our theoretical findings in an empirical evaluation over a wide range of mechanism parameters. Subject Demand forecastDemand responseMechanism design To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:8827c2fd-c716-42b6-a4bb-62514150353e Publisher International Foundation for Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (IFAAMAS) ISBN 9781510892002 Source 18th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2019, 3 Event AAMAS 2019, 2019-05-13 → 2019-05-17, Montreal, Canada Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights © 2019 G. Methenitis, Michael Kaisers, J.A. la Poutré Files PDF Methenitis2019forecast_au ... ersion.pdf 1.32 MB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:8827c2fd-c716-42b6-a4bb-62514150353e/datastream/OBJ/view