PUBLIC LEADERSHIP STYLES

How attitude affects the realization of strategic projects

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The subject of this MSc. Thesis is strategic planning. This document is the product of the final research which I have undertaken for the Master Real Estate and Housing at the Delft University of Technology.

The aim of this study is to get a better understanding of the changes and development of the complex and multi-faceted world of urban development. What hits me is the speed at which the world changes and the opportunities that are generated. In the future I intend to take part in the development of rapidly growing cities with their enormous challenges and opportunities. In the past I have studied the field of Real Estate Development, taking a minor in change management and an elective course in multilateral diplomacy. This reflects my aspiration to seek new environments and to function in a multidisciplinary context, something which I have also encountered in the course of my study.

I started the graduation process during the first months of 2010, going through the process of formulating a problem statement I came up with, my first, and definitely not my last - research question. The research question along with the academic framework formed the basis for selecting relevant academic readings. In September 2010 I started at the Rotterdam Development Company as an intern, where I had the privilege to become an autonomous student researcher. Being close to practice gave me the opportunity to meet with the most relevant professionals for my study in Rotterdam, Bilbao and Paris. Looking back, a nostalgic feeling gets a hold of me; it has however been a great endeavour. The anecdote that I have repeatedly used to express my state of mind is the following: "Graduating is like learning how to swim – when you finally get the some breaths in a row – you’re pushed back under". Nevertheless the learning experience has been valuable, and although I might not be able to swim yet – I might have been washed up on shore.

First of all I would like to thank my mentor team, Drs. Ineke Bruil and Ir. Erwin Heurkens for their constructive and motivating feedback, helpful criticism and confidence. I also want to thank Drs. Lennert Middelkoop for his support and for granting me the opportunity to conduct my research at the Rotterdam Development Company. Special thanks go to Douglas De Carvalho and Harry Stevenson for checking and refining the writings in this thesis and to Janneke Louwaars, for putting this thesis in its final layout. In addition I would like to thank the Rotterdam Development Company and the van Eesteren-Fluck en van Lohuizen Foundation for their financial assistance in the study related travels to Bilbao and Paris.
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Sjoerd Louwaars
This research sets out to study the leadership styles that public development authorities adopt in the process from initiation to realization of strategic projects. In a broad sense the aim of this study is to gain a better understanding in how urban planners convert a vision to delivery of it. In this study the transformation will be referred to as the process of realizing strategic projects. This study focuses on the urban planning authority responsible for executing strategic projects, taking into account the increase of development complexity in recent decades. In a narrower sense the leadership style - also referred to as attitude or role - of the public development authority is assessed. The aim is to get an understanding of how public leadership styles affect the realization of a strategic project. The research question is:

**How can public leadership affect the realization of strategic projects in urban development?**

The motivation for this study is the increase of the dynamics and the unpredictable nature of the market environment in which cities act. Neoliberal concepts have changed the urban planning profession over the past 20 years to the extent it is no longer possible to claim that it is founded on the assumption that “only rationally acting individual actors operate in the urban development arena”. As a result the development of the urban environment has become increasingly complex. An increase of specialized actors (professionalisation), changing circumstances (policy, law, economics, and environment), financing constraints and mixed interests (inter and multi-organisational interests) result in a decrease of steering possibilities by urban professionals. Healey (2006) confirms this as she states ‘the development of urban areas [...] cannot be “planned” by government action in a linear way, from intention to plan, to action, to outcome as planned.’ The transforming urban conditions have resulted in a changing role for urban planners in realizing their spatial aspirations. Collaboration and participation with community and market stakeholders have become more important. It is therefore interesting to identify the leadership styles of urban development authorities.

**THEORETICAL STUDY**

The evolution of the urban planning practice gives a valuable historic perspective on leadership styles of urban development authorities. Assessing the schools of modernism and post-modernism provides a frame of reference for assessing contemporary urban development. The modernist planning school is inspired by the concept of the city as a
Urban planners attempt to reassess historically evolved cities, transforming them into rational concepts of organized spatial models. A strong emphasis on end state plans is expressed in the form of master plans. As a result of post-modernist ideals urban planning has created a more market and community oriented organic process. Post-modernist planners regard cities as ever-evolving engines for economic development. Holistic strategic plans - in which individual strategic projects make up the whole – have coalesced into a more evolutionary and goal oriented approach to urban planning. Post-modern principles are dominant in urban planning today. The shift from modernism to post-modernism provides a valuable frame of reference for assessing contemporary urban development. It needs however to be stressed that remarks on such an abstract scale do not represent reality to the fullest extent. In present-day planning, elements of both schools of thought can be found.

Planning based on individual projects has become the principal instrument of modern-day urban development. Strategic projects change the image of cities and regions, producing spatial transformations through complex city- and project management procedures. To effectively respond to new challenges urban planning councils developed new instruments to steer their urban development, their attractiveness and competitiveness. As a result of the Neoliberal perspective on the city as an economic engine, strategic projects are regarded as an instrument to contribute to the greater competitiveness of a city or region. This makes the relation between strategic, abstract ambitions and spatial projects essential. It is however complex to qualify the added value of such projects, which makes it even harder to quantify it. In an attempt to assess the value of strategic projects three aspects have been identified: (1) identity and image, (2) economic spin-off, and (3) political decisiveness. It needs however to be stressed that the quantification of the strategic projects’ added value is intricate.

Bruil et al (2004) discuss the role of public institutions and their (in)ability to steer the urban development process. She emphasizes the need for a strategic approach and a goal oriented, collaborative attitude of involved actors. Each actor operates out of his or her own interests; progress can be made when different interests are connected to common interests which results in a - possibly temporary - joint interest. A sound study into understanding this attitude requires an understanding of the conditions that can influence the realization of strategic projects. To structure the dynamics surrounding the realisation of strategic projects three facets have been identified; (1) the context, in which ever changing political, economic, socio-economic, technical, legal and environmental
conditions affect the public development authority in its quest to realize strategic project; (2) the process, in which directly involved market and community actors contribute to the realization of strategic projects; and (3) the public development authority itself, which is influenced by the context and process, and in turn influences the context and process by its leadership style.

The literature study has provided a theoretical model; in the image below the quadrant distinguishes two axes that provide elements of public institutional positioning. The two axis delineate four public institutional roles in developing strategic developments: Regulator, Implementer, Collaborator, and Enabler. The model of public institutional attitude present a typology of leadership roles according to two dimensions: (1) the continuum between reactive and proactive public institutions focusing on the public institutional willingness to invest, take risks and responsibilities; (2) the difference between public institutions that adopt more directive top-down methods and those who adopt more interactive bottom-up methods. When assessing this model it needs to be stressed that there is not ‘one best or one single way’ to carry out the realization of strategic projects. As a result of the long term development process – stretching over several decades – paradigm shifts of public institutional attitude can occur as the result of changing circumstances or new insights. Finally it needs to be emphasized that in between the four extremes, there are many intermediate forms of public leadership. The model should not be regarded as a static structure – moreover, it provides an analytical and theoretical framework. Each development authority has several elements from all four leadership styles – in this study we aspire to identify the dominant style for a particular period.
Making the development of a strategic project feasible involves the manipulation of a complex web of numerous interrelated physical and social variables. This study argues that the leadership style of a public development authority can be an effective driver in the realization process. Since the realization of strategic projects spans several decades, shifts in leadership styles can occur. Three cases of strategic projects have been selected for in-depth case studies (the findings are based on expert-interviews, interviews with involved actors or other stakeholders, and desk-research): The Rotterdam Central District; Bilbao Abandoibarra; and Paris Rive Gauche. All cases are selected on the basis of the strategic urban significance of the projects. Each of the three selected cases plays an important role in the strategic plan for the city and region. As a result, several administrative levels are involved such as; national, regional, local and sub-local authorities. This administrative context requires a high level of public administrative coordination and collaboration. In addition, the selected cases are examples of strategic projects that aim to promote the competitiveness of the city or region – aspiring to create added value in socioeconomic terms. The high profile plans require a high level of interaction amongst public, market and community actors. These particular conditions have amplified the insights into the public development authorities’ leadership style.

EMPIRICAL STUDY

The combined municipal authorities of Rotterdam (dS+V, GW, OBR) are jointly considered the development authority in the Rotterdam Central District case. It is interesting to observe that the management principals have shifted throughout the realization of the Central District, having great consequences for the development attitude. During the first round (1997 – 2001) the Urban Planning Department (dS+V) in Rotterdam focused on a high quality urban plan. In addition, the focus was predominantly on a collaborative approach with grand players which resulted in a Public Private Partnership. During the second round (2001 - 2006) the Public Works Department (GW) chose a more pragmatic attitude with a highly technical focus. This had far reaching consequences for the development of the Central Station – neglecting the urban area component. During a controversial period with minimal collaboration, many technical aspects were tackled and the responsibilities for the project were clearly divided. In the third round (2006 - present), which is still underway, the Rotterdam Development Company (OBR) is focusing predominantly on facilitating and enabling initiatives that come from the market. Drawing up a consensus based vision for the area and actively involving locally oriented market stakeholders. Public-Private Partnerships are still considered, but the focus is more on a modest public institutional attitude.
The public leadership style of the city of Rotterdam in realizing the Central District development has affected the project in every consecutive round. The extent to which different rounds have complimented one another is arguable; the second round was a direct consequence of the first round. From a visionary and ambitions project the development was brought down to earth with a high dose of pragmatism. The third round, with a more collaborative behaviour can be regarded as a logical consequence of a period of a deterministic mind-set; the consecutive rounds are therefore part of the evolving process and need each other. A direct link between the public entity responsible and the attitude seems to exist. But a “higher power” that has decided on these changes appears non-existent. The organisational culture can therefore be regarded as an important intrinsic driver in the public institutional attitude.

Both Bilbao Ria2000 and Bilbao Metropoli-30 are considered the urban leadership in the Abandoibarra case. It proves to be challenging to pinpoint important shifts in the development of the Abandoibarra project, concrete paradigm shifts have not occurred until now. The model of public leadership styles that was developed during the literature survey is therefore more nuanced in this case study. On the one hand the project shows clear signs of a collaborative consensus building role through Bilbao Metropoli-30. The proactive involvement of public entities in using urban development as an economic engine has been the basis of the planning of the city, consequently resulting in a strategic approach to realising strategic projects. On the other hand, the executive efforts that have been made through Bilbao Ria2000 are predominantly directive; a high amount of public investments within a deterministic planning fashion indicate a more traditional development process. Therefore the nuance needs to be made that each organiza-
tion has several elements from both Directing and more Interacting elements in Bilbao’s efforts in realizing a strategic project.

![Diagram of public leadership styles Bilbao Abandoibarra](image)

*Figure 3: Shifts in public leadership styles Bilbao Abandoibarra*

The public leadership style of the city of Bilbao in realizing the Abandoibarra project seems to have affected its development, the evidence is however not as strong as in the Rotterdam case. The cause of the decline in effectiveness can be related to changing circumstances. During the first period, impressive progress is made in the redevelopment of the location, but over time the effectiveness seems to have declined as a result of a decline in the sense of urgency. The direct effects of the public leadership style can therefore be questioned. On the other hand the argument can be made that the City of Bilbao has succeeded in realizing its aspired strategic project, and the alignment of the complex administrative layers through Ria2000 has clearly complemented this. A widespread and shared sense of urgency can therefore be regarded as an important precondition for a successful realization of a strategic project.

In the realization of Paris Rive Gauche, SEMAPA is regarded the public development authority. SEMAPA was established to align the interest of various public entities, in particular those of the City of Paris and the SNCF. The development attitude predominantly focussed on executing public initiatives from a directing perspective. The economic crisis at the end of the 80s and the competition for tenants with the La Défense office development made public investments necessary—resulting in the development of the French National Library and a social housing project of 450 units completed in 1997. Due to a lack of community involvement during the first period SEMAPA was forced to develop a
system of active public involvement. The French tradition of planning does however still leave an important coordinating and managing role for SEMAPA. The highly increased academic program, an additional social housing and added public space are considered an enhancement to the public authority’s efforts to develop Paris Rive Gauche. Despite the incorporation of the communal opinion, the regulatory culture and the proactive development of public program have not caused a major shift in SEMAPA’s attitude. As a result of the global financial crisis (2008) a more patient and reactive approach was taken recently towards the development of Paris Rive Gauche. A shift in SEMAPA’s behaviour took place from proactive to a reactive leadership style.

Figure 4: Shifts in public leadership styles Paris Rive Gauche

The public leadership style of the City of Paris in realizing Rive Gauche has affected the project. After a period of deterministic planning the French national Library was completed, but due to a lack of community involvement the project received criticism from community action groups. The establishment of a permanent community consultation committee ensured the hearing of the public interests in the process. The consecutive phase is characterized by a high number of public programs. After its completion the global financial crisis changed market conditions. The development principles resulted in a degree of public flexibility in realising Paris Rive Gauche, perhaps this is the best example of a development authority intrinsically altering its behaviour – although it can still be seen as a response to a changing market environment. A set of flexible guiding principles, incorporated throughout can therefore be regarded as an important condition for a successful realization of a strategic project.
As a result of the empirical study the claim can be made that shifts in public leadership styles directly affect the realization of strategic projects. Empirical evidence has indicated that there is no one best way, for public development authorities to lead. Cities are subject to ever changing circumstances and self-organizing actors, therefore situational leadership styles are commendable. Situational leadership holds a promise to public development authorities in dealing with changing circumstances during the realization of strategic projects. The following remarks can be made concerning public leadership styles in realizing strategic projects. The Paris Rive Gauche case provides an interesting insight concerning the contextual circumstances; an initial frame of reference setting out realization principles results in a degree of flexibility. Developing a strategic project through separate autonomous projects provides the means to react to changes in contextual circumstances. The Bilbao Abandoibarra case offers an understanding in the participation process, a widespread and shared sense of urgency is an important precondition for a successful realization of a strategic project. Joint problem-ownership unites and speeds up the process of finding consensus for development. The Rotterdam Central District case provides an interesting consideration regarding the organisational culture of the public institution. Organisations interacting with one another bring their own expertise, experience and school of thought to the table. Thus it is desirable to assess the organisational culture of the public institution since it plays an important role in the realization of strategic projects.

The conclusion can be drawn that the contingency approach as a basis for the theoretical model has been supported through the empirical studies already reviewed here. Different environments and circumstances call for diverse leadership styles. In addition, the various locally-bound cultures and traditions have significant impact on the means and baseline position of public development authorities. The extent to which generalizations can be made in relating the three strategic projects is questionable. The practice of urban development is interlinked with a great diversity of factors and dynamics. Local differences in political traditions, market conditions, socioeconomic culture, physical constraints, legal settings and environmental issues make every country, region and city different. Even projects within a city may require different leadership approaches, and because of the sheer size of the analysed projects, locations within a project might even involve a nuanced leadership style.
APPLICATION TO PRACTICE

Individual leadership styles can be related to a particular set of public instruments that help steer the realization of a strategic project. Adams and Tiesdell (2010) define three types of instruments that can be adopted by urban planners. They argue that impact in the urban development process operates through three types of policy instrument, intended respectively to shape, regulate and stimulate markets (Tiesdell and Allmendinger, 2005). Market-shaping instruments, such as “development”, “regulatory” and “indicative” plans, set an important context for market actions and transactions, especially by offering a “political position statement” (Healey, 1992) about the kinds of development that are likely to be favoured by the planning authority. Market regulation instruments, such as development control and restrictive covenants attached to land transfers, restrict the parameters of market actions and transactions. In recent years, at least in the UK, extraction of community benefits from developers in the form of planning gain, has increasingly accompanied market regulation, with the effect that the concept of planners as market actors has become even more familiar in practice. Market stimulation instruments, such as development subsidies and compulsory purchase, lubricate market actions and transactions (Adams and Tiesdell 2010). In regards to this study the three types of instruments cannot be allocated to particular leadership styles – a cocktail of instruments is required for any of the styles to become the most effective. Still the various leadership styles have a natural tendency towards those types of policy instruments. To make the connection from theory to practice this application will elaborate on a study that has been conducted in the Dutch context, there is however a high level of overlap with the work of Adams and Tiesdell.

The work of Braun et al. (2011) provides a valuable assessment of steering mechanisms for development authorities in their quest to realize urban development – the application of their work to this research is highly complementary. It helps in making the abstract model applicable in practice. The provision needs to be made that this application of the model only refers to the Dutch context – as a result of varying cultures, regulations and traditions, steering instruments differ highly between Spain, France and The Netherlands. Still the application of the public leadership style model in regards to the Dutch context might prove valuable in taking the same step in another system. First of all Braun et al. (2011) confirm that the “role” – in this study referred to leadership style - of development authorities requires a dynamic perspective. It is argued that as a result of changing circumstances a shift in leadership style is required. Secondly the scholars appeal for more awareness by
professionals involved in the development of the urban environment, they argue that recognition of the four steering mechanisms results in fuller and integrated resolutions. Again it needs to be emphasized that in between the four leadership styles, there are many intermediate forms of public leadership. The model should not be regarded as a static structure – moreover it provides an analytical and theoretical framework. Each development authority has several elements from all four leadership styles, thus the same applies to steering mechanisms.

**Regulator:** Market Regulatory instruments (zoning plans, building codes and permits) are examples of legal frameworks governing the development of an area. A regulatory structure informs the market primarily what is allowed in an area, it thus discourages undesired initiatives. The development authority needs a system in which market initiatives are provoked.

**Implementer:** Market-shaping instruments (municipal visions, plans and notes) provide information based on policy objectives of the development authority, focus on potential investments and spatial interventions. This way the development authority can provide stability and demonstrate decisiveness. Development authorities can impose power through expropriation of land.

**Enabler:** Market activating instruments (creating and aligning internal and external affairs) focus on reducing risk and ensuring trust and commitment. Development authorities aim on an increase in the accessibility and reliability of information. Transparency amongst actors results in an awareness of interests and resolves in combined efforts to realizing common objectives.

**Collaborator:** Market stimulating instruments (subsidies or direct stimulations) can provide profitable market conditions for initiatives and increase the chances to a feasible business case. Public investments in socio-economic and / or physical space create an added value. Actively exploring Joint ventures and public-private partnerships opportunities articulate public commitment.

It remains a question how urban professionals can take the public leadership styles model into account while coping with the day to day challenges. Can the public leadership model change the way in which development authority’s act and interact in their quest in realising strategic projects? Maybe not but increasing awareness of the impact of leadership roles in development planning could be very productive. It is ar-
gued that planners already serve as market actors, shaping, regulating, activating, and stimulating market activity. But, crucially, planners do not necessarily see themselves playing this role, and are neither aware of their leadership style. The result is that their influence and effectiveness might not be applied to the fullest. The change that is required is not for planners to become urban leaders, but rather to realize that their behaviour can facilitate the development of strategic projects.

This study has led to an assessment of the leadership styles of public authorities in realizing their goals through strategic projects. A theoretical model for public institutional attitudes was developed and three cases have been studied. The challenge however remains, which is exemplified by the following quote by Socrates; “The more I learn, the more I learn how little I know.” Numerous remarks can be made concerning the way in which this newfound knowledge can be effectuated in practice. What are the key drivers that set the scene for a leadership style shift? Which leadership styles fit best with a particular set of circumstances? How can development authorities proactively monitor and anticipate change? And finally, perhaps the most important question – which needs require the assessment of the previous questions; how can development authorities intrinsically adopt leadership styles that can thrust forward the realization of strategic projects? - Thereby obtaining a valuable instrument to effectively convert a vision to delivery.
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This chapter introduces the topic of this research and the academic conditions for the study. First the motivation for this study will be presented as a point of departure. After a brief introduction the problem statement is presented. Consequently the main research question will be formulated, supported by sub-questions. The sub-questions are formulated – the sub-questions will gradually provide knowledge to answer the main question. After presenting the research questions, an academic framework will be introduced that demarcates the study. The academic framework consists of two concepts that will provide a layout for research. Another invaluable component of the research design is the research method. This shows how the research process has been executed. The case study research method will be introduced along with the selected cases. Finally the overview of the research design will be presented in a research diagram.

1.1 INTRODUCTION

Actively organizing our environment is a central aspect of our civilization. Early humans led a nomadic existence, relying on hunting and gathering for sustenance. Between 8,000 and 10,000 years ago, systematic cultivation of plants and the domestication of animals allowed for more permanent settlements. During the fourth millennium BC, the requirements for the “urban revolution” were finally met: the production of a surplus of storable food, a system of writing, a more complex social organization, and technological wisdom. Distinct characteristics of urban planning are found in the remains of the cities in north-western India and Pakistan. These settlements emerged circa 2600 BC and are regarded as the earliest examples of deliberately planned and managed cities (Ellis 2002).

Cities exist for many reasons, and the diversity of urban forms can be traced to the complex functions that cities perform. Cities serve as centres of knowledge, trade, and manufacture and accommodate people, businesses and visitors. In general terms cities have a concentration of talent, mixture of peoples, and economic surplus. Over time cities have provided a fertile ground for the evolution of human culture such as: arts, scientific research and technical innovation. The challenge however is how to facilitate the diversity of functions that exist in a place. The
The focal point of this study is to address how urban planners implement projects. How can mental concepts be translated to real life projects that facilitate a city?

So what are the goals that urban planners aspire to realize? Contemporary cities pursue various kinds of economic, political, spatial, and socio-cultural ambitions (Hubbard & Hall 1998). Globalization and liberalization of the world have had their impact on planning methods. Over the past few decades urban policy no longer aspires to guide or regulate the direction of economic growth so much as to fit itself to the grooves already established by the market in search of the higher returns (Smith 2002). As a result of a more dynamic and unpredictable market environments, cities are forced to become more pro-actively involved in securing their positions in the global competitive context. Increasing economic competitiveness between cities and regions, and the transformations into a knowledge based society has resulted in a business based- and goal oriented urban policy. Professional management of the urban environment is necessary to deal with such perspectives (Joustra 2005).

Consequently, what means do urban planners have to realize such ambitions? To effectively react to new challenges cities have developed new instruments to steer their urban development, attractiveness and competitiveness. This study focuses on the instrument of strategic planning. Cities that develop strategic plans aspire to become more proactive in realizing their ambitions. According to Zhang (2002) the strategic plan usually addresses three questions, namely, “What status should the city achieve?” “What status can the city possibly achieve?” and, “How can such a desirable status be achieved?” Burgess and Carmona (2009) state that the Strategic plan is a holistic project addressing inter-sec-tored development objectives. The plan is a framework consisting of proposals for medium and long-term action accompanied by a mechanism for short-term micro planning. Strategic plans contribute to the development of a city by defining the long term goals and objectives, and how to allocate resources to realize them. Strategic plans consists of autonomous projects that combined constitute the whole. The crux is thus to understand the challenges that cities face in realizing ambitions through strategic projects.

1.1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Urban planning has become increasingly complex over the past decades. An increase of specialized actors (professionalisation), complex conditions (policy, law, economics, and environment), financing con-
Constraints and mixed interests (inter-organizational interests) result in a decrease of steering possibilities in the strategic planning profession. Healey (2007) confirms this as she asserts that “it is widely recognized that the development of urban areas [...] cannot be ‘planned’ by government action in a linear way, from intention to plan, to action, to outcome as planned.” Within the research challenge, three main difficulties are highlighted to explain the difficulties authorities encounter when implementing plans and projects. The difficulties are: (1) adaptive character of the city; (2) financial inabilities; and (3) inter-scalar characteristic of planning.

The first challenge of implementing strategic plans and projects is the adaptive character of the city. The reason for this is because the city is subject to millions of people of widely diverse class and character, and it is the product of many builders who are constantly modifying the structure of the city for reasons of their own. Lynch (1960) states that a “city might be stable in general outlines for some time, but it is ever changing in detail”. Lynch furthermore argues: “only partial control can be exercised over its growth and form. There is no final result, only a continuous succession of phases.” Thus, cities cannot be seen as bureaucratic structures on which plans can be imposed and enforced. The aim of implementing a strategic plan is not to control development, but rather promote or enable urban development.

Secondly the challenge of implementing strategic plans and projects is the financial inability to invest in the urban environment by the public sector. Cities lacked the resources to sustain the costs of redevelopment, the rapid urban expansion, infrastructure and the development of highly subsidized housing and public facilities. Cities furthermore lack the financial means to enforce the strong development control powers that underpin planning (Burgess and Carmona 2009). In addition, the recent global economic and financial crisis has further weakened the financial position of development authorities, while market parties are increasingly hesitant in taking risks.

As a third challenge of implementing strategic plans and projects, the inter-scalar characteristic of the city is assessed. Wu (2002) describes this challenge in a study of the city of Shanghai; the multi-level governance and the scaling down of decision-making units represent an increasing social complexity that has diminished the governing capacity of Shanghai. Consequently, Shanghai has required some type of institutional network to be established with its satellite cities and regions in order to integrate key territorial, economic, and political elements into a governable society. The institutional network supports the implemen-
Swyngedouw et al. (2002) state “the situation of Shanghai demonstrates that urban strategies serve the purpose of strengthening the competitive position of their satellite, regional, and local economies in today’s changing national and global competitive environment”.

Changing methods for achieving urban ambitions have resulted in a changing role for urban planners in the development of strategic projects. Whereas previously a top-down approach towards implementing plans was the norm, more recently, a more bottom-up approach is increasingly has emerged. Collaboration and participation with community and market stakeholders have become more important. It is therefore interesting to understand the role of the urban planner with regards to other involved stakeholders.

1.1.2 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE

In a broad sense the aim of this study is to gain a better understanding of how urban planners can transform ambitions into real life projects, in this study this transformation will be referred to as the process of realizing strategic projects. This study will focus on the urban development authority responsible for executing strategic projects, taking into account the increase of development complexity. In a narrower sense the public leadership style – also referred to as attitude or role - of the development authority will be assessed. The aim is to get an understanding of how the public leadership style affects the realization of a strategic project.

1.1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION

The research question is the methodological point of departure. In the previous section the problem statement has been introduced, elaborating on the increased complexity of the urban planning practice, and leading to an assessment of the role of the development authority in realizing strategic projects. The research question narrows down the problem statement and translated the research objective into a more concise formulation. The aim of this study is to getting a better understanding in the development complexities that surround the implementation of strategic interventions to realize more abstract ambitions. The aspiration to understand how strategic projects can be realized lies at the heart of the urban planning practice. The challenge for the development authority is how to position themselves in relation to the market and the community in the realization process, in order to achieve the desired development.
The main research question is a product of the problem statement that was introduced in section 1.1.1. This research sets out to study the urban strategies that concentrate on the development of strategic urban development. The aim of this research is to get insights into the difficulties involved in creating conditions for such a development. The research question has been formulated as follows:

**How can public leadership affect the realization of strategic projects in urban development?**

Several supporting research questions have been formulated. The literature study analyses the dominant planning paradigms in contemporary urban development, the utility of strategic projects and their drivers, and will eventually aim to define public leadership styles. The latter sub-question is used and furthered in the empirical part of this study by assessing three cases of strategic urban developments.

**Sub questions: Literature study**
1. What are the dominant planning paradigms in contemporary urban development?
2. What is the utility of strategic projects in contemporary urban development?
3. What factors influence the realization of strategic projects?
4. How can public leadership be defined?

**Sub question: Empirical study**
5. What are the public leadership styles in three selected strategic projects?
1.2 ACADEMIC FRAMEWORK

This section will elaborate not on what will be studied, but how it can be studied. After a short introduction the research framework provides the structure that makes the research feasible. First the study will be demarcated by introducing the analysed development phases. The distinction will be made by presenting the difference between project and process management. In addition a theoretical model is used to structure the research, and shows how the focal elements of the research project relate to one another. A model that has inspired this study is Kingdons’ (1995) model of flows which derives from Public Administration; it has been applied to the urban area development field by Bruil et al (2004). The core model used in this study is the steering model of de Leeuw (2002) which originates from Business Management and has been translated to real estate project management by Lousberg (2004).

1.2.1 PROJECT AND PROCESS MANAGEMENT

When assessing the role of the development authority in realizing a strategic development the demarcation of the process is essential. Both the models of flow and the steering model prove to be valuable to describe the process. Within the process there are however also differences in approach. Complimentary to the increase of complexity the distinction between process and project management needs to be made. In general terms project management can focus on direct steering by Money, Organization, Time, Information and Knowledge. The reason for this is the fact that a project is more tangible and responsibilities are often better divided. The challenge with process management is however that through an on-going and iterative process products will be delivered which are not in existence. Thus the process defines the project.

One of the core theories of urban area development process regards the different phases of the development process. This is presented in figure 6 on the following page:

1. Initiative phase
2. Plan development and feasibility phase
3. Realization phase
4. Maintenance phase
5. Redevelopment phase
This study focuses on the process management of an urban area development. Therefore ambition to understanding the realization of a strategic development can be interpreted as the process from initiative towards plan development. When a plan is defined through political consensus, financial means, technical solutions and legal conditions then the project management can start. But the process towards these aspects will be the main focus of this study. This study thus focuses on the process, from ambitions to the project definition, which can be regarded as the initiative phase and then plan development phase.

1.2.2 DE LEEUW STEERING MODEL

The model developed by de Leeuw derives from the Business Management domain. The connection made between it and Project management is established since projects within public administrative processes share similar features. The model is a representation of steering mechanisms that are exercised to achieve a result. To explain the steering model by de Leeuw some basic principles need to be elaborated. De Leeuw first of all distinguishes three important dimensions in the management of a project; uncertainty, unpredictability and ambiguity. Secondly de Leeuw supports the contingency theory; de Leeuw (2002) states that: “There is no universally effective way of managing- the appropriate way to manage is dependent on the circumstances”. Finally the model is based on three dominant aspects of administrating a project; (1) achieving objectives with people; (2) steering a course; and (3) problem solving and designing solutions.

Figure 6: Urban Development Cycle

Process management
Processes are defined as having inputs (holistic goals and objectives), outputs (unique goals and objectives) and the energy required to transform inputs to outputs.

Project management
A project is defined as a temporary endeavour, having a defined beginning and end, undertaken to meet unique goals and objectives.
Having determined the previous baselines de Leeuw first defines two entities in his steering model: the controlling unit (CU) and the controlled system (CS). The controlling unit has one or more steering mechanisms to influence the controlled system. The effect of the steering is monitored and the information returning is evaluated. De Leeuw furthermore identifies the concept of a context surrounding the controlling unit and the controlled system. The external context influences both the controlling unit and the controlled system. The contextual input enters the controlled system; there it is processed to a final output which then enters the context again. The output of one process can consequently be the contextual input of the next controlled system; this reflects the inter-scalar characteristic of many processes. The model is presented in Figure 7.

![Figure 7: De Leeuw steering model](image)

The steering model of de Leeuw provides the focal elements of this study. The model is complimentary to process management since it underlines the dimensions of uncertainty, unpredictability and ambiguity. De Leeuw furthermore simplifies the complex reality in which the realization of a strategic project is embedded. The controlling unit can be regarded as the development authority, this organization influences the realization process of the strategic project (Controlled system), but is itself also influenced by the process. The community and market can be considered the important stakeholders within the process. If the market perspective would have been chosen in this study it would be regarded as the controlling unit. The means it would use to influence the community and public authorities would then be part of the process. Both the public institution and the process of interaction between the market, community and the development authorities are surrounded by contextual circumstances. The contextual circumstances can be considered
the environment in which the realization of the strategic project is embedded. Critical issues that can influence both the development authority and the process of interaction are changing politics, economic cycles, rules and regulations and technological advance. The ways of dealing with these issues of these issues and the interactions will be examined in depth.

1.3 RESEARCH METHOD

This paragraph will first introduce the case study research method. Then the selected cases will be presented and the main source of information will be elaborated. The cases are selected on expectation of outcome and accessibility of information. After elaborating the cases the interview method will be presented and the interview questions will be elaborated.

1.3.1 CASE STUDY RESEARCH

The research method chosen for this research is a case study. The decision to aim for a case study research was made because it can bring about an understanding of the complex and multi-faceted issue. Through case study research qualitative aspects such as conceptual circumstances and collaborative behaviour can be analysed. Case studies emphasize detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of conditions and their relationships. Researchers have made wide use of this qualitative research method to examine contemporary real-life situations and provide the basis for the application of ideas and the extension of methods. The following definition is given for case study research:

A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.

Yin (2003)

Critics of the case study method believe that the study of a small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing reliability or generality of findings. Therefore one of the main aspects to consider when using the case study research method is the triangulation of data. This entails that certain hypothesis need to be based on different sources of data. This contributes to the objectiveness of the research. Because case study research generates a large amount of data from multiple sources, systematic organization of the data is important to prevent the researcher from becoming overwhelmed by the amount of data and to prevent the
researcher from losing sight of the original research purpose and questions. Again triangulation of data can give structure to the research. Data has been acquired from the following sources:

- Strategic urban plans;
- In depth interviews;
- Academic writings.

1.3.2 CASE SELECTION

The decision has been made to start by analysing the city of Rotterdam as preparation case, through which additional information on the study method will be acquired. The aim is to create a base of experience for further research. After this an additional two cases have been selected.

The cases are selected on the basis of expectations on their information content. Within the information oriented selection the strategy has been selected to aim for ‘maximum variation cases’. This selection is based on obtaining information about the significance of various circumstances for case process and outcome e.g., the three cases are different on specific dimension: Location (context); Problem statement (urban development); and development authority (Entrepreneur). In the following scheme it becomes clear that all three cases vary on all these criteria. However, what the cases have in common, is that the strategic urban development, is a part of a more holistic strategic urban ambition.

The three cases that will be studied are: Rotterdam Central District; Bilbao Abandoibarra; and Paris Rive Gauche. First the general case characteristics will be presented in figure 8, after which a more detailed argumentation for selecting the cases will be provided.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Strategic development</th>
<th>Start</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Development authority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Case A: Rotterdam</td>
<td>Central District</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>National Gov.</td>
<td>Ds+V, GW, OBR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case B: Bilbao</td>
<td>Abandoibarra</td>
<td>1989</td>
<td>City-council</td>
<td>Ria2000, Metrololi-30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Case C: Paris</td>
<td>Rive Gauche</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>President Mitterand</td>
<td>SEMAPA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 8: Case information*
All cases are selected because of the strategic significance of the projects. Each of the three selected cases plays an important role in the strategic plan for the city and region. As a result several administrative levels are involved; federal departments/ ministries, provincial/ regional authorities and local and sub-local municipalities. This administrative context requires a high level of public administrative coordination and collaboration. In addition the selected cases are examples of strategic projects that aim to strengthen competitiveness of the city or region – aspiring to create added value in socio-economic terms. The high profile plans require a high level of interaction amongst public, market and community actors. It is expected that the way in which development authority’s deal with this will provide insights into the public leadership style, attitude or role.

The strategic projects have however not simply been selected for their similarities, expectations of different administrative cultures also contributed to the current selection.

**Rotterdam Central District**  
The Central District case is chosen under the hypothesis that it will provide information about a consensus driven development authority. The Dutch urban planning context is in general terms stakeholder oriented, regulations guide the consultation process. Neoliberal concepts such as Public-Private Partnerships were experimented with in the 90s and underline this collaborative culture. The hypothesis is that the realization of the Rotterdam Central District is the result of development authority consensus building. The hypothesis proved to be a good starting point but needs to be nuanced, interesting insights were however found.

**Paris Rive Gauche**  
Paris Rive Gauche is selected on the basis of some initial research into the development of the French National Library. This presidential project is a good example of a deterministic process. In addition the French administrative context can be regarded as highly institutionalized with a strong role for public authorities. In some ways it seems to be the opposite of the Rotterdam Central District case. The hypothesis is that the realization of Paris Rive Gauche is the result of development authorities’ decisiveness. The hypothesis proved to be an interesting basis in general terms, but not nuanced enough in the Paris Rive Gauche case, interesting data was however obtained.
**Bilbao Abandoibarra**

The Abandoibarra case is selected under the expectation that a strong administrative body was in place (Ria2000), and that it was combined with a market and a community oriented approach (Metropoli-30). Comparing with the previous two cases the Abandoibarra case is expected to be an example for both the development authorities’ decisiveness and the consensus building mechanisms. The hypothesis concerning the two administrative bodies proved not to be accurate, nevertheless interesting data was acquired.

**1.3.3 IN DEPTH INTERVIEW**

The qualitative research interview seeks to describe the meanings of and the central themes in the life world. The main task in interviewing is to understand the meaning of what the interviewees say (Kvale 1996). Interviews are particularly useful for getting the story behind a participant’s experiences. The interviewer can pursue in-depth information around the topic. Interviews may be useful as a follow-up to certain respondents of questionnaires, e.g., to further investigate their responses (McNamara 1999).

In this study the standardized, open-ended interview method has proven to be too stringent towards obtaining the data. This method uses the same open-ended questions which are asked to all interviewees; the approach facilitates faster interviews that can be more easily analysed and compared. The disadvantage is however that none of the cases analysed can be structured into set-up-specific questions. Therefore this study used the “unstructured” interviewing method. This method involves direct interaction between the researcher and a respondent. It differs from traditional structured interviewing in several important ways. First, although the researcher may have some initial guiding questions or core concepts to ask about, there is no formal structured instrument or protocol. Second, the interviewer is free to move the conversation in any direction of interest that may come up. Consequently, unstructured interviewing is particularly useful for exploring a complex topic such as the public leadership style in strategic urban developments. However, there is a price for this lack of structure. Because each interview tends to be unique with no predetermined set of questions asked of all respondents, it is usually more difficult to analyse unstructured interview data, especially when synthesizing across respondents (Trochim 2006). Therefore a set of questions was set up initially as a guideline, and as a result of a thorough literature survey the comments of the interviewee were put into a theoretical context.
The interview questions were subdivided into two parts: (1) questions focusing on obtaining basic case knowledge (2) questions focusing on particular public leadership styles. A distinction is made between the context and the process resulting in: Question A; How did the development authority anticipate to changes in the context? And Question B; How did the development authority design the participation amongst stakeholders?

**Basic case knowledge:**

+ What was time line of the transition from initiation to strategic project?
+ What were the main breakthroughs in the process of progress?
+ Who are the main stakeholders?
+ What were the (power)relations amongst stakeholders?
+ What was the role of the development authority?
+ What were the (power)relations amongst public authorities?

**Public leadership styles investigation:**

A How did the development authority anticipate to changes in the context?

+ What events in the context had a major impact on the outcome of the Strategic Project?
+ What events in the context were expected?
+ How did the development authority anticipate such events?
+ What events in the context were unexpected?
+ How did the development authority react to such events?

B How did the development authority design the participation process amongst stakeholders?

+ What interaction had a major impact on the outcome of the strategic project?
+ What interaction was stimulated?
+ How was the interaction stimulated?
+ What interaction was unexpected?
+ How did the development authority react to such interaction?
1.4 MODEL OF RESEARCH DESIGN

Figure 9: Model of research design
During the last century urbanization has interconnected with all aspects of cultural, social and technological change. In 1900 approximately 13% of the world’s population was living in urbanized areas. 100 years later roughly half of the globe’s vastly increasing population lives in cities. According to the UN State of the World Population 2007 report the world has reached an invisible but momentous milestone: “For the first time in history, more than half the human population, 3.3 billion people, live in urban areas.” Every day 200,000 people migrate from rural to urban areas and by 2030 the population living in cities is expected to swell to almost 5 billion. As a result of this immense growth an enormous challenge lies ahead of twenty first century urban planners.

This chapter aspires to review the critical points of current knowledge in urban development including substantive findings as well as a theoretical contribution to practice – resulting in a theoretical model on public leadership styles towards realizing strategic projects. First an analysis of the dominant paradigms will be presented, focusing on the evolution from master planning towards Strategic Planning. Both concepts will be elaborated upon by placing them in the context of the modernist and post-modernist theory. The remark is made that within strategic planning individual projects constitute to the planning of the whole. As a result this survey will further dwell on strategic projects, elaborating on their significance to a city or region. The added value of strategic projects is debated and the complexities to implement such projects are presented. Descending further the development complexity will be asserted and subdivided into; process, context, ambitions and public intuition. Ultimately this survey will conclude with the theoretical model which defines the public leadership style in realizing strategic projects.

2.1 MASTER PLANNING

A comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of a community, embodies information, judgment, and objectives collected and formulated by experts to serve as both a guiding and predictive force.

Haar (1955)
The idea that cities should be built according to a preconceived plan is almost as old as urban living itself and evidence of the ‘master planning’ of cities can be found at all stages of historical development since antiquity. It was only after the Second World War that master planning became the dominant way in which cities are planned. The next section will first introduce the Keynesian theory, as one of the leading concepts that influenced society in its time. Then the modernist movement within architecture and urban planning will be presented. Finally the reasons for the decline of the master planning movement as the dominant planning style between the 1945 and the late 1970s will be discussed.

2.1.1 KEYNESIAN THEORY

Keynesian economics argues that private sector decisions sometimes lead to inefficient macroeconomic outcomes, therefore Keynesian scholars advocate active policy responses by the public sector (Sullivan et al. 2003). Within economics, this rationalist movement results in the idea that states should apply active control over its markets. This can be done by monetary policy actions by the central bank and fiscal policy actions by the government to influence its internal markets. Interpretations of Keynes have emphasized his focus on the international coordination policies, the need for international economic institutions, and the ways in which economic forces could lead to war or could promote peace (Markwell 2006).

The application of the Keynesian theory in urban planning is characterized by a rational organization of power. A key role for the public sector is recognized in the development and organization of urban areas. The means found to create an unified layout for the city was to introduce a strong development authority that has a variety of planning tools to implement plans. Urban planning councils exercise influence within a regulatory framework of a master plan, codes and regulations. Private rights to develop and use urban land should be guaranteed although they also need to be restricted when it is in the public interest. A range of instruments facilitated the development and transformation of the city. The following aspects of a master plan institutionalized the power of planning departments:

+ A desired blueprint or end-state;
+ The designation of areas for urban development;
+ The control and zoning of land uses;
+ The planning of infrastructure improvements and standards;
+ The rationalization and reordering of the existing and future uses of urban space.
2.1.2 MODERNISM

The modernist architectural, planning and design ideologies were dominant thought the 1930s to the 1960s. This movement is based on strong interventionist powers for the state, regional and local authorities. One of leading figures of this movement is architect and urban design theorist Le Corbusier. He proposed a city as an audacious and compelling vision of a brave new world (Evenson 1969). His ideas concentrated on creating better living conditions and a better society through housing concepts.

Based on the ideas of Le Corbusier and using new skyscraper-building techniques, the modernist city stood for the elimination of disorder, congestion, and the small scale, replacing them with rational plans and widely spaced freeways and tower blocks set within gardens. Housing destruction during the Second World War led many cities to subsidize housing blocks. Planners used the opportunity to implement the modernist ideal of towers surrounded by gardens.

The general goals of modernist urban planners were inspired by an attempt to rebuild cities into modern cities and in this effort the ‘spatial models’ and the dominant modernist architectural and planning tradition desires and end-state vision expressed in the form of master plans. Burgess and Carmona (2009) review the goals of master plan developments as followed:

+ Strict spatial separation of residential, industrial and commercial functions and land uses;
+ Concentric, linear or sectored patterns of urban land use;
+ Primacy of central city locations for administrative and commercial uses;
+ Improvements in transport and infrastructure based on privatized and public transport systems;
+ Redevelopment destructed inner city areas through demolition and clearance;
+ Promotion of housing, architectural and urban projects based on modernist cultural values;
+ Clear definition of the urban ‘edge’.

Later metropolitan development plans were another important instrument and where concerned with drawing up the economic, fiscal and social framework for realizing the physical transformations embodied in the master plans.
2.1.3 DECLINE OF MASTER PLANNING

By the early Seventies the Keynesian mixed economy models and modernization strategies started to be criticized. Neoliberals argued that the government should withdraw from their direct involvement in market processes; it should eliminate market bottlenecks and adopt market-oriented strategies that encourage the private sector to become more involved in public tasks.

This movement had great influence on the way that cities are planned. Development authorities were seen as inefficient bureaucratic organizations that constrained and derailed the economic growth of cities and regions. Master plans were too comprehensive, their preparation was expensive and time consuming, and they were based on unrealistic projections of urban population worth and the public investment resources required meeting the plan. Burgess and Carmona (2009) consider the following grounds for the decline of the master planning movement:

+ Cities lacked the resources to sustain the costs of redevelopment, the rapid expansion infrastructure and the development of highly subsidized housing and public facilities;
+ Cities had neither the power, nor the institutional capacity, nor do the financial means to enforce strong control powers that underpin master planning and development;
+ Highly centralized nature of the planning system resulted in inflexible bureaucracies with weak interdepartmental co-ordination;
+ Top-down planning processes excluded local interest and communities from decision making;
+ End-state plans limited urban growth, the face of the socio-economic and political reality. The separation of plan making from decision-making in municipal infrastructure and service budgets are regarded as a major weakness;
+ Planning based on detailed and comprehensive plans of this type are inflexible, and poorly articulate with and even hostile to the forces that propel urban planning;
+ Master plans were increasingly dominated by spatial and land issues. It became clear that problems such as inner city unemployment, criminality and environmental deterioration had been excluded from the planner’s brief.
2.2 STRATEGIC PLANNING

Strategic Planning consists of a number of concrete urban projects, strategically chosen, which once completed could act as generator loci in the urban fabric and infuse it with a new modernity.

Bohigas (2003)

During the eighties rapid technological developments particularly in transport, telecommunications and computerization began to bring about a structural transformation in the global economy. As a result globalization processes accelerated and lead to significant changes in the urban planning field. It became clear that major shifts were occurring in the concepts underpinning urban planning. Previous attempts to restructure and order the city as a whole using holistic master plans were increasingly abandoned. The Keynesian mixed economy model and welfare state was now to be abandoned in favour of the free market and a minimal state model. Neoliberal ideals on economic, social, political, spatial and environmental issues propelled a transformation of initiative towards the private sector.

The next section will first introduce the Neoliberal theory, as one of the leading concepts that influenced society in its time. Then the post-modern movement within architecture and urban planning will be presented. Finally the success of the strategic planning movement as the dominant planning style between the 1980 and the start of the 21st century will be discussed.

2.2.1 NEOLIBERAL THEORY

Neoliberalism is a market-driven paradigm of economic and social policy and is based on neoclassical theories of economics that maximize the role of the private business sector in determining the political and economic priorities of the state. Neoliberals tend to see the world in terms of market metaphors. Referring to nations as companies is typically Neoliberal, rather than liberal. In such a view Deutschland GmbH competes with Great Britain Ltd, BV Nederland, and USA Inc. The nation-firm is selling itself as an investment location, rather than simply selling export goods (Treanor 2005). During the 1980s Neoliberal ideas result in policies designed to make the nation, region or city more attractive as an investment location.
Neoliberals recognize urban growth as a vital element for economic growth and social development. Cities are seen as ‘engines of growth’ that add value to products, provide services to regional markets and attract manufacturing and service investments. As Sassen (2000) states it: ‘Cities have become the strategic nodes through which the new economy can be planned and facilitated’. The new conviction is that only market pricing mechanisms can provide the right incentives.

Changing macroeconomic conditions have had great impact and lead to fundamental transformations and adjustments to the organisational and spatial structure. Deregulation and the reform of regulatory regimes in land, housing, finance, infrastructure services and labour markets were seen as essential for increasing the overall levels of urban productivity and efficiency. Neoliberal planning policies aim to improve urban productivity and efficiency. The key aspects of Neoliberal planning are:

+ Markets and privatization;
+ Deregulation or reform of regulatory regimes;
+ Political –administrative decentralization;
+ Increased popular participation;
+ Institutional and management capacity on a city-wide basis.

2.2.2 POST-MODERNISM

The Post-modernist architectural, planning and design ideology rose during the 1970s and 1980s as a reaction to the modernist line of thought. Post-modernism is a tendency in contemporary culture characterized by the rejection of objective truth. Jameson (1991) describes post-modernism as the “dominant cultural logic of late capitalism.” Important trends associated with the post-modern movement are globalization, multinational capitalism, and consumer capitalism. Post-modernism in the urban context began within architecture, urban planning and design as a response to the perceived blandness, hostility, and utopianism of the modernist movement. Modernists focus on the pursuit of a perceived ideal of perfection and attempted harmony of form and function. Post-modernists rejects the notion of an objective truth, instead focusing on methods, forms, styles and fashions available.

During post-modern time urban and building design became a major catalyst for stimulating urban development and urban regeneration. Cities are rediscovered as important political and cultural centres. Design furthermore aims to constitute itself in a way that attracts foreign capital and workers. Developing urban attractiveness resulted in the introduction of marketing, aiming on generating symbols and messages
that projected the city’s presence in the global scenario. The priority
given to competitive advantage, the creation of attractive cityscapes, the
pursuit of efficiency and productivity and the need to restructure or de-
velop the city in a global context result in a new relation between form
and function. This needs to be applied explicitly to the realm of urban
planning. (Burges, Carmona 2009)

One of the main instruments for post-modern planning is strategic plan-
ing. Strategic planning can be seen as a response to the criticism on the
main modernist planning tool: master planning. The significant differ-
ence between master planning and strategic planning derives from their
different concepts of what a city is. In master planning the view of the
city as a clearly-defined spatial and functional entity is a leading prin-
cipal. Cities are seen as cohesive and integrated structures. In this line
of thought cities can become good, healthy and efficient places to live
through rational planning interventions at the urban scale. The mas-
ter plan governs the planning of the projects. Strategic planning does
recognize the city as a whole, but argues that it is less clearly defined
and demarcated then the modernist notion. The concept of defining a
place has changed from strict land use zones to a more infrastructural
and network basis. The focus of strategic planning has descended to the
parts – individual areas, nodes and infrastructure networks. In strategic
planning individual projects constitute to the planning of the whole.

2.2.3 STRATEGIC PLANS

Strategic plans aim to improve traditional planning by being closer to
reality, resources and stakeholders. It recognizes the need to define ur-
ban objectives in terms of the existing economic-, social- and cultural
dynamics. The Strategic plan is a framework consisting of proposals for
medium and long-term action accompanied by a mechanism for short-
term micro planning. Strategic plans contribute to the development of a
city by defining the long term goals and objectives, and how to allocate
resources to realize them. Ideally these plans, programs and projects
support economic efficiency, social equity and environmental sustain-
ability. Overall the following advantages are identified in strategic plan-
ing in comparison to master planning (Burgess and Carmona 2009):

+ A more rational use of human and economic resources at urban
  and regional level;
+ Strengthened participation in decision making and in the
  evaluation of the intervention, thereby stimulating cooperation
  and learning;
+ Internal, project based orientation, thereby focusing on sub-state situations which have higher chances to succeed;
+ Introducing an external orientation, thereby aiming for increased competitiveness of the city in the context of economic globalization.

Although some strategic planning is regarded as a contemporary concept, it must however be clear that the discussion on strategic planning and its concepts and methods is not new (de Graaf 2005). As stated previously; strategic planning was developed in the eighties as a Neoliberal concept. It can be seen as a business sector instrument that emerged as a reaction to failing features of the modernist planning paradigm. Out of the business management world, the strategic planning concept has been applied to the public sector. The interest in strategic planning in the public sector started in the United States, it can be explained as a reaction to increasing difficulty in controlling a turbulent environment. This turbulence revealed itself as such things as an oil crises, demographic shifts, changing social values and morals, tax limits, tax indexing, tax cuts, reduction in federal grants and mandates, devolution of responsibilities, a volatile economy and so on (Bryson and Einsweiler 1988). In the nineties, Nutt and Backoff (1995) stated that governmental organizations need to apply entrepreneurial strategies to deal with the rapid changing environment. Entrepreneurial strategies entail that local governments need to form partnerships with private sector agencies and developers to accomplish results they would be unlikely to achieve if they worked on their own (Taylor 1998).

The same trend is described by Digaetano and Strom (2003), but from an industrial perspective on society. They state that Fordism prevailed from the 1930s to what he characterized as the international economic crisis of 1974 and took the form of standardized systems of mass production and distribution of goods and services, all managed through a mode of regulation based on the Keynesian welfare state’s fiscal and social consumption policies. Since the early 1970s, there has been a systematic dismantling of the Fordist mode of regulation. The political consequence of these structural changes in the world economy has been a triumph for Neoliberalism. In practical terms Digaetano and Strom (2003) assert that this has led to the formation of the Schumpeterian workfare state, which emphasizes the promotion of innovation in production and labour market flexibility, on one hand, and state restructuring that transfers political and administrative decision making upward to supranational organizations (e.g., European Union, NAFTA, World Bank, IMF) and downward to urban and regional governing systems (Jessop 1997), on other. Carrion (2003) has argued that the six stages
are essential to the development of a Strategic Plan, these are interpreted as followed:

+ Define urban concepts, tools and measures used;
+ Analyse the existing local institutional, administrative, geographic and demographic realities;
+ Construct local scenarios, aim at formulating possible local events, changes and evolutions;
+ Analyse the urban region in a global context, aim at identifying problems, risks, and threats;
+ Construct global scenarios, aim at formulating predictable extremes for the development of the region;
+ Presents the guidelines for the realization of the agreed vision, organised in terms of those activities to be carried out through government intervention, the private sector or civil society.

2.3 STRATEGIC PROJECTS

Strategic projects are emblematic and integrated structures which affect a considerable part of the city, the city as a whole or even a region. Beyond functional differences, essential features involved are the relationships established between public and private interventions and their economic, cultural, environmental and spatial impacts.

Lungo (2004)

It has been argued that to effectively react to new challenges cities have developed new instruments to steer their urban development, their attractiveness and competitiveness. The most important instruments are strategic planning and city marketing - these tools involve a pro-active, incentive based and development driven urban management (Joustra, 2005). Examples of high profile and emblematic strategic projects are found all over the world to promote a city or region. Promotion and development increasingly interconnect, aiming at creating added value to the community, doing so by presenting an image that defines a place.

Strategic projects change the image of cities and regions, producing spatial transformations through complex city- and project management procedures. Strategic projects have become a dominant feature in cities all over the world. This emphasizes the statement in the previous section, arguing that strategic plans are oriented towards development through results and are measured through objectives. In other words; planning through individual projects has become the main instrument
of strategic planning. The high profile emblematic projects assessed in this study aim to build up greater competitiveness of a city or region. This makes the relationship between strategic ambitions and spatial interventions crucial. Examples of (strategic) ambitions are: improvements of basic energy, transport and telecommunications infrastructure. Translating these ambitions into real life projects can result in plans to construct: new energy systems, motorways, multi-purpose transport terminals, container terminals, enlarged and modernized docks, airports, etc. As presented in chapter 1 this study will focus on high profile urban redevelopments that have a strategic significance to the overall strategic plan.

Strategic projects at the urban scale are often linked to image change. Interventions at the local scale have a strategic function in urban development. Emblematic projects are oriented towards improving image, tackling shortages, improving multifunctional activities or other objectives based on the existing dynamics of the city (Carmona 2009). The following section will make an effort to define the emblematic characteristics of strategic projects. Consequently, an attempt will be made to understand the added value of such strategic project. Finally, the concept of complexity will be presented as this constructs the argument in regards to the (in)ability of Development authorities to translate (strategic) ambitions into real life projects.

2.3.1 EMBLEMATIC PROJECTS

Churches were one of the first European symbols to mark a place. In modern times skyscrapers, futuristic pavilions and mega-projects have been active strategies used by cities to give incentives to their development and improve their image. Jencks (2005) argues that the – iconic – or emblematic project is here to stay because of the decline of religion, the decline of the monument, the rise of global capitalism, the rise of consumer society and celebrity culture, the rise of corporations and mayors and people who ask for them. It is however complicated to quantify a mental concept of “emblematic”.

The work of Lynch focuses on visual elements and cognitive concepts of the urban environment. In the book ‘Image of the City’ (1960) Lynch introduces the theory of urban form. An urban environment is a complex system of interactions between people (users) and various surrounding objects. Lynch defines a place as an environmental image that may be divided into three components: identity, structure and meaning. In addition he states “it is useful to abstract these for analysis, if it is remembered that in reality they always appear together”. This means users of
public space recognize or identify objects (identity), they see a recognizable pattern of relationships between objects (structure), and they draw emotional value about the objects and structure (meaning).

Identity and structure can be found in the five elements of Lynch that enhance a city’s imageability. These five elements are used by architects and urban planners to effectively create an emblematic strategic project. The five elements derived from the analysis of urban objects in Lynch’s theory are:

+ Paths. The channels along which the observer customarily, occasionally, or potentially moves;
+ Edges. The linear elements not used or considered as paths by the observer, they are the boundaries between two paths, linear breaks in continuity;
+ Districts. The medium-to-large sections of the city, conceived of as having two dimensional extents, which the observer mentally enters ‘inside of’;
+ Nodes. The strategic spots in a city into which an observer can enter, and which are the intensive foci to and from which the observer can travel;
+ Landmarks. Another type of point-reference, but in this case the observer does not enter within them, they are external, and they are usually a rather simply defined physical object used as radial references.

Rotterdam Central District, Bilbao Abandoibarra and Paris Rive Gauche are assessed in figure 7 according to the theory of Lynch

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rotterdam</th>
<th>Bilbao</th>
<th>Paris</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Path</td>
<td>Two major roads</td>
<td>Bridge and boulevard</td>
<td>Bridges and subway</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edge</td>
<td>Railroad</td>
<td>Riverfront</td>
<td>Riverfront</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>District</td>
<td>Central District</td>
<td>Abandoibarra</td>
<td>Rive Gauche</td>
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<tr>
<td>Node</td>
<td>Central Station square</td>
<td>Plaza Euskadi</td>
<td>Parque Bercy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmark</td>
<td>Transport terminal</td>
<td>Guggenheim Museum</td>
<td>FR National Library</td>
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*Figure 10: Lynch applied to this study*
Although Lynch recognized the importance of meaning, he argues one could not easily manipulate it through changes in urban form. Lynch argues that preference is highly variable across individuals. He asserts that meaning is impractical to study, and therefore focuses on form, identity and structure - separately from the notion of meaning. The meaning of a place may take a denotative or a connotative form. Denotative meanings are the same as identity; they refer to judgments of what the place is. Connotative meanings refer to inferences about the quality and character of the place or its users. People often think of such connotative meanings as a question of aesthetics (Images of Cities, 2010). This study avoids the term ‘aesthetics,’ because aesthetics are hard to quantify.

2.3.2 ADDED VALUE

The concept of creating an added value in the context of this study is to create a strategic project that is held to deserve; the importance, worth or effectiveness of “something” (derived from the Oxford dictionary). The vagueness of this definition gives a preliminary indication of the complexity of the matter. It is complicated to define “something”, thus the effects of the added value are hard to measure. Miles (2004) states that there is no straightforward answer to the question whether emblematic projects can make cities work? The impact of investment in strategic projects is highly site-specific. The meaning of the impact of an emblematic provision on place is in a sense intangible. An added value of a project is hard to identify and therefore even harder to quantify. Therefore this paragraph will try to elaborate in a holistic manner what can be acknowledged as added value in strategic projects. Claasen and Zaadnoordijk (2010) define several added values in their study on incubators in urban area developments. An incubator is, according to Hoogendoorn and Peeters (2005), a unique development that makes an area known to the public; the development determines an identity for the area and aims to attract a target group.

Strategic projects and their role in re-articulating the meaning of place is a much discussed subject in academics. Scholars argue about the added value of spatial interventions. It is suggested that an economically driven vision of strategic projects may serve to underestimate the diverse meanings of the local embedded values (Short 1989, Owen 1993, Broudehoux, 2004). It is in this context that Bianchini and Schwengel (1991, from Miles 2004) call for a genuine public debate about the re-imagining of cities, a debate that is not left to the marketing strategy and urban boosters, or which constructs an idealized middle class of what a city should be, but one that genuinely engages with the people
that make a city what it is. Consequently Miles (2004) suggests that the success of investment in emblematic projects depends above all upon people’s sense of belonging in a place and the degree to which spatial interventions can engage with that sense of belonging, whilst balancing achievements of the past with ambitions for the future.

For this study a holistic attempt will be made to explore the potential added value of a high profile strategic project. The following aspects are identified and will be successively be elaborated:

- Identity and image;
- Economic spin-off;
- Political decisiveness.

**Identity and image**
The identity of a place is not simply the product of the moment, but of the evolution and adaptability within time (Neill 2004). Therefore Neill argues that questions of identity should lay at the heart of the discussion the value of strategic projects. Hall (1996) argues that identification is constructed through common origin and shared characteristics with people and groups. Identity is therefore what a place means, subsequently a meaning cannot be created; identity evolves. According to Hayden et al. (1996) creating an identity is however not just about creating projects in the urban fabric, it is about restoring significant shared meanings for urban spaces. The ready-made identities assigned or implied through spatial interventions reduce several different visions of local culture into a single vision that reflects the aspirations of a powerful elite. It highlights the values, lifestyles, and expectations of potential investors and tourists (Broudehoux, 2004) Thus, a local embedded identity is often lost in the global ambitions and aspirations of a city.

Thus, creating identity is highly complicated and in the attempt to create an identity planners often do not take into account local values. An image however is the way a place is perceived by a public, which can be influenced to a great extent through, for instance, branding. Image is one of the main reasons people settle or visit an area. Dicks (2003) points out that the underlying rationale behind emblematic strategic projects is to generate new consumer demand by attracting new visitors and shoppers to the city. Thus, a negative image of a depreciated industrial area needs to be transformed into a positive image about an area where people want to live, work and visit. In the context of the realization of strategic projects, the question is how branding can compliment local needs and aspirations of a city. Strategic projects have a significant symbolic and material power. They make a powerful statement about a
place and that place’s intentions; it can therefore compliment strategic ambitions of a city.

Joustra (2005) argues that the quality of a place and the promotion of a place need to be connected to create added value. A strategic project can emanate identity and be a means to imaging. By investing in strategic projects, areas within a city can become a product for the promotion of a place. Liggett (1995) suggests that representational space is heavily loaded and deeply symbolic: calling upon shared experiences and interpretations at a profound level. From this point of view, strategic projects provide a key source of meaning. Hence, the purpose of the strategic project can be specifically to emanate the forming of identity and image (perception of the quality) of an area. However, the identity of a redeveloped area needs to grow organically and cannot be imposed. Strategic projects, creating an added value through a change in identity and image, holds a promise to modern-day cities, it however requires a high degree of local oriented analysis and a long term orientation.

**Economic spin-off**

Much of the debate around the significance of strategic projects concern whether or not such investment can effectively improve the economic conditions of the area (Hall 2005). According to McGuigan (1996) the problem with strategic projects is that they actually articulate the interests and tastes of the post-modern professional and managerial class without solving the problems of a diminishing production base. On the other hand it can be argued that in a global age strategic investment can provide a means of revitalizing communities by providing them with a new so-called post-industrial future that can help them readjust to the new economic conditions in which they find themselves.

The added value of strategic projects can be measured by analysing the increase in land values and building prices. This is one of the main arguments to justify investment of public means. The public interest in realizing strategic projects often results in the co-financing by the public sector. The aim is to attract additional private-sector investments for renovation of the surrounding area, thus strategic projects are regarded as engines of gentrification. Several cities aim to transform depreciated areas that hold an economic promise to the city. The principle of creating value is based on low real estate values in the beginning of the transformation process. Cities anticipate an increase of values in both existing and new real estate development. This can, in some cases, contribute to the business case of the entire redevelopment.

In Bilbao the development of the Abandoibarra area with the Guggen-
heim Museum has been an important factor for economic regeneration. It is a fact that tourism in Bilbao has increased sharply (Plöger 2007) after the opening of the museum. The Guggenheim Museum attracts an average of 1 million visitors per year (Plaza, 2007). Employment in the service sector has hugely increased but the direct effects of cultural tourism are not immediately evident. According to calculations around 1,000 jobs have been directly created in tourism-related parts of the economy as a result of the expansion of cultural tourism in Bilbao (Plaza, 2007). In addition the increase of tourism has created many smaller service outlets, bars, shops, cafes, small hotels, restaurants, guides, tourist mementos and so on. The indirect Spin-off effects in the city are however intangible.

A positive impact on the economy does however not come naturally. Miles (2005) states that it is essential to seek out the motivations and expectations people bring to their interaction with cities in order to understand the likelihood that significant investment in iconic projects will succeed in specific places.

**Political decisiveness**

Political stability, trust and decisiveness are important factors in a successful development of a city. This can be demonstrated by the successful development of a strategic project. Broudehoux (2004) elaborates on conditions in which city leaders imagine emblematic strategic projects as symbols to engineer consensus among city residents, foster local pride, and promote a shared sense of identity. In addition Broudehoux argues that urban beautification also has a depoliticising effect, and detracts attention from social and economic inequities by reducing the city to a surface assumed to be transparent and unproblematic. Confidence amongst investors, urban planners and citizens is of high importance for the impetus to develop a city. A positive atmosphere can stimulate change, but more importantly a lack of confidence can result in strong resistance.

Confidence amongst actors that interact in the developing process is of importance to create mutual trust among shareholders and stakeholders. Area development is a long term process that requires trust between the cooperating parties. Trust is difficult to measure and is developed over time through sustainable relationships. Political decisiveness and trust in the development authorities is crucial to the success of an area development (VROM, 2009). The lack of confidence is one reason why in practice area developments do not succeed. In some long term developments new ambitions are presented over and over again. Development plans are developed but failed and consequently lead to
less and less confidence in the area development at hand. Development authorities are often conceived of as volatile and a lack of confidence in local authorities is a problem in the development of a city, a successful development of a project can alter this view.

A change in the psyche of a city is described by Vegara (2001) in relation to the Basque city of Bilbao. He describes the greatest miracle that Bilbao is experiencing is a dramatic change in leadership style. The feelings of failure and pessimism brought about by prolonged economic crisis and political conflicts have given way to a collective optimism. The majority of the Basque community- the development authorities, the private sector, and the civil society- is now convinced that it is indeed possible to reinvent Bilbao and the Basque Country in the new post-industrial age. Strategic projects can thus contribute to the perception of political power, the long term orientation makes strategic projects however an unsuitable instrument for the more short term orientation of daily politics.

2.3.3 DEVELOPMENT COMPLEXITY

Complexity is defined as having diverse and autonomous but interrelated and interdependent components or parts linked through several interconnections. In the context of an organization, complexity is associated with (1) interrelationships of the individuals, (2) their effect on the organization, and (3) the organization’s interrelationships with its external environment

Business dictionary.

The previous paragraph has argued that strategic projects hold a promise to the development of a city. It does however not present the complexities that are involved when implementing a strategic project. The Business dictionary definition connects perfectly to the implementation difficulties that development authorities deal with. It proves however, to be interesting to further study the schools of thought in complexity theory. In the book: “Public management at the border of chaos and order”, Teisman (2005) distinguishes two tendencies within complexity theorists. He elaborates the differences between the two schools of complexity. For this study the work of Teisman is interpreted as two main paradigms on complexity. This study classifies them as (1) detailed complexity and (2) dynamic complexity. In the urban development realm complexity is about both forms, evident throughout the development process, and expressed through the behaviour of individuals.
Detailed complexity
Detailed complexity is used in situations in which there are high quantities of variables. Detailed complexity theorists search for simplifications of the intricate arrangement of variables. A type of simplification that is widely accepted and commonly in academics is the theoretical model. The master planning movement elaborated in paragraph 2.1, together with the Keynesian theory and modernism can be positioned in a similar line of thought as detailed complexity. Teisman (2005) argues that complexity theorists from this line of thought seek the big picture and an orderly alignment systems. In other words, complexity can be organized. Detailed complexity is defined as the intricate appearance of simple systems. By means of rational knowledge, clear organizational structure, rules and regulations, theorists attempt is to separate cause and effect, and distinguishing the main issues from the sub-issues.

In addition, Teisman describes two consequences on practice which are the result of this concept. The first is a desire to exercise power and the second is the desire to finding rationality. The desire for power is embodied by hierarchy and procedures and idealizing strong leadership. The desire to find rationality results in an understanding of mechanisms and recognition of cause and effect. Teisman also identifies pitfalls of the detailed complexity paradigm. In its search for order, too much of it can lead to inaction, tunnel vision and unsatisfying results. He even argues that order can increase complexity, for instance by excessive bureaucracy and over-regulation. On a strategic level it can be argued that the concept of detailed complexity can be regarded as inadequate, as was evident after the decline of the master planning movement. On a project level however high quantities of variables can be tackled by this structured line of thought. In addition, detailed complexity can be highly effective, for it is result driven. Finally, hierarchy and procedures can bring transparency and logic to a process that is otherwise chaos.

Dynamic complexity
Dynamic complexity is noticeable in situations where cause and effect are subtle, and where the effects of interventions are not obvious and difficult to predict. Theorists of this paradigm see complexity as dynamic systems in which chance, chaos and disorder are the key concepts. Simplifying reality in a theoretical model is impossible, since dynamics cannot be incorporated in a static model. The strategic planning movement presented in paragraph 2.2, together with Neoliberal theory and post-modernism can be positioned in a similar line of thought as dynamic complexity. Teisman (2005) describes dynamic complexity as a complex system built up out of subsystems which themselves are composed of subsystems. In this view all systems interfere with one another,
the result is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Thus, complexity cannot be organized and simplified since it is bigger than its core components. Teisman describes dynamic complexity as disordered systems within systems. In these systems processes are volatile since they develop through self-governance, emergence and internal conflicts. Dynamic systems are unpredictable and are arranged randomly. Patterns emerge and disappear, and grow new systems that are not explained by the systems from which they came from.

Theorists of dynamic complexity often compared it to organic processes. Since interactions affect one another, and small events may have significant effects, uncertainty is high. Consequently theorists using the paradigm of dynamic complexity need to deal with a constant lack of certainty. It is uncertain what impact their actions have and how it may affect the development. On a strategic level the concept of dynamic complexity connects to globalization processes and the rise network society, cause and effect cannot be distinguished in the maze of interrelated systems. The result is that risks are hard to predict, goals are difficult to set, and control cannot be exercised. This makes the steering within strategic planning highly difficult, perhaps even impossible.

2.4 STRATEGIC PROJECT REALISATION

The role of the public sector has changed over the last decades; this is evident in the shift from master planning to strategic planning. The public sector can play an active role in the provision of urban goods and services or adopt a more passive, modest role. A modest, reactive role resolves in public sector regulation of developments, placing restrictions on the private sector in order to achieve social and environmental objectives and to protect the common good. The public sector can also play a proactive role through public investments and the implementation of fiscal mechanisms (taxed, credit lines, subsidies, etc.), the creation of public corporations, including municipal and sectored institutions, and create the potential for urban intervention through zoning and regulation. The public sector can also act through the various vision and ambition documents. The city services agencies can aim to realize commonly-approved goals for urban regeneration, and facilitate private sector interventions and popular participation in land and strategic management (Carmona and Burges 2009).

Bruil et al (2004) discuss the role of development authorities and their (in)ability to steer the urban development process. They emphasize the need for a strategic approach in combination with goal oriented leadership. Each actor operates out of its own interests, progress can be made
when different interests are connected to common interests. This results in a temporary state of joint-interest. Wigmans (1998) describes circumstances in which: “... a temporary symbiosis (...) in which information, knowledge, position and preferences are exchanged which determines the final outcome of the development.” According to Bruil et al (2004) there are several challenges that the public sector encounters in contemporary urban development. The increase of complexity is linked to the following trends:

+ **Context.** The environment in which strategic projects are embedded changes. This is argued by Castells (1996) by proposing a new social order due to the rise of globalization, ICT and resulting in the creation of the network society.

+ **Process.** The evolution of the stakeholder interaction changes. Due to specialization there is an increase in stakeholders and the often conflicting interests at various levels. In addition, stakeholders such as social interest groups have become more involved.

+ **Organization.** The inability to control the development of strategic projects by the public sector. New steering mechanisms and inter-organizational networks, and organisational structures need to be reassessed as a result of the changing role.

The three tendencies will be incorporated in the steering model of de Leeuw, which is introduced in chapter 1 as research framework. As stated previously the model developed by de Leeuw derives from the Business Management domain. The connection to public administration is made since urban development processes share similar features. The model is a representation of steering mechanisms that are exercised to get to a result. The principles that are the basis of the model relate in far extent to the complexity that is described in the literature. De Leeuw first of all distinguishes three important dimensions in the management of a project; uncertainty, unpredictability and ambiguity. Secondly de Leeuw supports the contingency theory; de Leeuw (2002) states that: “There is no universally effective way of managing- the appropriate way to manage is dependent on the circumstances”.

The steering model makes a distinction between the context, the process (Controlled System) and in this case the development authorities (Controlling unit). The emphasis of this study into the realization of ambitions adds the fourth and final aspect of attainment of goals. The initial ambition will be regarded as input for the process and the plan definition is the goal or output. The translation from an abstract model into the practice of realizing a strategic project is suitable for this study.
Bear in mind however that the model is a simplification of practice, thus certain aspects might not be represented nor valued appropriately. The interpretation of the model provides the value of it. For this study the framework is therefore highly valuable to determining the conditions that should be taken into account when executing the empirical study.

This study focuses on the public leadership styles of the development authority in the process of converting a vision to its delivery. The aim of this study is to understand the leadership styles of the development authority that is responsible for realizing a strategic project. A sound study into understanding this leadership style requires an understanding on the conditions that influence the realization process. Therefore the remaining part of this literature survey will focus on the three additionally defined conditions that are relevant for understanding the development of strategic projects. Finally a theoretical model will be presented to conclude the literature study, the model defines the public leadership styles.

*Figure 11: De Leeuw steering model interpretation.*

*Figure 12: Factors that influence the realization of strategic projects*
2.4.1 CONTEXT

Defining the context is highly ambiguous because of its comprehensive character. In the following section, the term “context” is taken to mean “the set of circumstances that surround a situation or event”. Through the introduction of the PESTLE concept an effort is made to get grips on the circumstances that surround the realization of a strategic project.

PESTLE is an effective tool to scan the environment in strategic management, in this case applied to the realization process of a strategic project. A PESTLE analysis is often used as a generic ‘orientation’ tool, aiming to find out where a strategic project stands within the context of what is happening in its environment, and how that environment affects what is happening within the organization and the process (CIPD 2010). The context influences the public leadership style into far extent, since it provides boundary conditions and opportunities.

PESTLE analysis is in effect an audit of an organization’s environmental influences with the purpose of using this information to guide strategic decision-making. PESTLE stands for - Political, Economic, Sociological, Technological, Legal and Environmental. PESTLE is a part of the external analysis when conducting a strategic analysis or doing market research. The tool gives an overview of different contextual factors that the development authority needs to take into consideration. It is a useful strategic tool for understanding market growth or decline, stakeholders’ position, opportunities and direction for development. Ultimately the circumstances influence the urban leadership style.

Political dynamics
Political factors, encompass how and to what degree a government intervenes in the market. Specifically, political factors include areas such as tax policy, labour law, environmental law, trade restrictions, tariffs, and political stability. Political factors may also include goods and services which the government wants to provide or be provided (merit goods) and those that the government does not want to be provided with (demerit goods or merit bads). Furthermore, governments have great influence on the health, education, and infrastructure of a nation.

Economic dynamics
Economic factors include economic growth, interest rates, exchange rates and the inflation rate. These factors have major impacts on how organisations operate and make decisions. For example, interest rates affect a firm’s cost of capital and therefore to the extent a business grows
and expands. Exchange rates affect the costs of exporting goods and the supply and price of imported goods in an economy.

Social dynamics
Social factors include cultural aspects, health consciousness, population growth rate, age distribution, career attitudes and emphasis on safety. Trends in social factors affect the demand for a company’s products and how that company operates. For example, an aging population may imply a smaller and less-willing workforce (thus increasing the cost of labour). Furthermore, companies and development authorities may change various management strategies to adapt or cope with social trends.

Technical dynamics
Technological factors include technological aspects such as R&D activity, automation, technology incentives and the rate of technological change. They determine barriers to entry, minimum efficient production level and influence outsourcing decisions. Furthermore, technological shifts can affect costs, quality, and lead to innovation.

Legal dynamics
Legal factors include discrimination law, consumer law, antitrust law, employment law, and health and safety law. European regulations can affect the realization of strategic projects directly. Legal factors affects how a company operates, its costs, and the demand for its products.

Environmental dynamics
Environmental factors include ecological and environmental aspects such as weather, climate, and climate change. This can especially affect industries such as tourism, farming, and insurance. Furthermore, growing awareness of the potential impacts of climate change is affecting how companies operate and the products they offer, both creating new markets and diminishing or destroying existing ones.

It is important not to just list PESTLE factors because this does not in itself represent the urban context. The aim is to get an overview of the factors that are most likely to change and which ones will have the greatest impact on the development of a strategic project. Each strategic project must identify the key factors in their own environment. In other words, planners must decide on the relative importance of various factors. One way of doing this is to rank or score the likelihood of a change occurring and also rate the impact if it did. The higher the likelihood of a change occurring and the greater the impact of such change; the more significant this factor will be to the development of the strategic project.
When addressing the urban environment it is also important to consider the level at which the PESTLE analysis is applied. Whilst it may be useful to consider the whole city within its global competitive context, since it can highlight some important factors. When using it towards understanding the process of a strategic urban projects it is valuable to narrow the scope down. It is more useful because since the focus will be on the factors relevant to the specific project.

Applied to the empirical study the goal is to understand the contextual dynamics that lead to major shifts in the public leadership styles. Some might be more pressing or influential then others, and the dynamics are most certainly not linear, neither sequential during different phases or periods in the process. Every period has its own contextual PESTLE dynamics. However, the specific circumstances that lead to a new period are essential to understanding shift and changes in the public leadership style in the development a strategic project.

2.4.2 PROCESS

In the following section, the term “process” is taken to mean a particular course of action intended to achieve a result, in this case the plan definition of a strategic project. An interesting perspective on the process that corresponds with the argumentation in this study and elaborated the notion of process is the theory of transactive planning (Friedmann 1973) According to Friedmann, planning is a process of change. As he notes that planning is concerned with producing change and with maintaining organisational stability under conditions of change.

According to Friedmann (1973), planning is embedded in a broad societal context. It is more than just a step-by-step process. The planner cannot easily and rapidly change adapt to change because. This means that strategic projects should be guided towards a desired end-state, which can needs to be adapted over time due to changes in the context. Transactive planning translates knowledge and information into action through a continuous sequence of interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal dialogue and mutual learning are needed to realize goals. Because of the importance of the interpersonal relationships that are required to change society, Friedmann stresses the need for participation. Transactive planning therefore requires the planner to be an effective manager of interpersonal and social relationships. Dialogue and ‘face to face’ relationships encourage participants come to a joint solution.
The model of flows by Kingdon (1995) is based on research into the field of Public Administration. The process of strategic urban development shares features with Business Administrative decision making processes, adaptations to the terminology makes it applicable to strategic planning. The model is a representation of the ‘flows of power’ that influence the outcome, in this case a strategic project. To explain the Kingdon model some starting principles need to be elaborated. First of all Kingdon does not believe in a rational decision making process; subjectivity, coincidence and chance influence the process to high extent. Secondly, Kingdon argues that different processes run simultaneously; an abstract phasing in decision is not possible. In other words; Kingdon strongly opposes the incremental view on the process of decision making. Finally he strongly believes that a problem under discussion is always subjective, the sponsor or problem owner is bias.

Having determined the previous baselines Kingdon defines three flows that influence policy making; (1) the public domain; (2) the problem at hand; and (3) the solutions to the problem. The three flows move interdependent of each other which are presented in Figure 1. Kingdon furthermore defines the concept of an entrepreneur; this is a person, a group of people or an organization that can monitor and into some extent influence the direction of the flows. In this study the entrepreneur is regarded to be the development authority, this is the public organization that aims to implement the strategic project. Finally, Kingdon introduces the concept of a policy window. A policy window is a moment in time in which the three flows come together. When this moment is recognized by the entrepreneur the process can take a leap forward. In process evaluations these policy windows are often regarded as milestones that were needed for achieving the end result.
The reason for choosing the Kingdon model of flows is mainly to structure the evolutionary element of strategic planning. The realization of strategic plans is a long term process, spanning over several decades. The model is complimentary to strategic planning since it opposes a rational planning process and incorporated the evolutionary element. Consequently Kingdon incorporates the elements of: subjectivity, coincidence and chance. The concept of the entrepreneur relates to the role of the development authorities in realizing strategic projects. Kingdon defines entrepreneurial characteristics that result into assessable research principles. He states that an entrepreneur should have: (1) political influence; (2) authority through expertise; and (3) a long term perspective. Kingdon furthermore introduces important circumstances that increase the chance of successful implementation (policy window): (1) built consensus; (2) a clear problem definition; and (3) available solution. The Kingdon model should however be conceived as an inspiration and valuable concept to present the viewpoint of this study. The fundamental question addressed in this study is a managerial one – since the effect of public leadership is assessed.

Van Randeraat (2005) argues that the process of progress in the development of a strategic project is the result of interactions amongst actors. The process is, as in transactive planning theory, not linear. A leap forward can be taken when a moment of co-evolution brings the right parties together, this results into a leap forward into a next round. Every round defines its own problems and evolves solutions around them, and the duration of such a round is uncertain. During the search for consensus and common grounds a joint vision is created in which individual stakes are connected to the common interest.

The value of the Transactive model, Kingdon model and the Rounds model is that it incorporates a high level of uncertainty. In addition, individual interactions are the core of the process. Thus opportunities to express an attitude of leadership change, and the representation of the development authority and its behaviour in the collaborative process can also change. Applied to the empirical analysis the goal is to define the different rounds of the strategic project, and understand the public leadership styles of the development authority during a round.
2.4.3 AMBITIONS

The argument has been made that the process can be regarded as an accumulation of different rounds, and that a progression to the next round can be the result of contextual circumstances. A consequence of a new round and new circumstances can be a new ambition. In the following section, the term “ambition” is taken to mean “that which one wishes to attain”. The same meaning can be expressed by other words as well, such as “goal”, “aim”, “purpose”, “target” and “objective”.

The following section seeks to identify ambitions that are cited as possible ingredients within the process of realizing a strategic project. There are always goals - at least implicit ones - even if they are not clearly defined. They might exist only subconsciously, or the decision may be part of a hidden agenda. The ultimate formulation and choice of a set of ambitions should be based on an overall assessment of its PESTLE dynamics. However, many of the strategic projects existing today in different countries are not always based on a rational assessment of ambitions; the reason for this is the fact that urban ambitions are often the result of a political process. Therefore it is even more important to become more explicit about ambitions, and understand at what time and circumstances the ambitions were set. According to Virtanen and van ’t Verlaat (1999), it is of high importance to be very explicit about ambitions underlying urban plans. They make the following remarks regarding the significance of clear ambitions:

+ Clearly formulated goals can show what type of future one is aiming at;
+ The necessity to formulate goals clearly will force the political decision-makers to discuss more essential, long-term matters rather than to concentrate on short-term details;
+ Any political debate will sooner or later involve a discussion on what means are acceptable in a certain country. Such discussion will be meaningless without a set of clearly formulated goals as a starting point;
+ When faced with a choice between different options, an important criterion must be the relative consequence of each measure with regard to the goals that have been formulated;
+ Clearly formulated goals lower the risk of misunderstandings and of wrong decisions as a consequence thereof.

Once again, it must be underlined that the process of selecting and formulating ambitions for a strategic project is often a highly political one. Regarding the political aspect of ambitions, it needs to be underlined
that different nations have highly differencing processes. In this view, the emphasis needs to be made that a country cannot simply “import” development success factors which have proven to be fairly successful in another country. Nations differ in their political, social, economic, administrative, historic and legislative background. Such differences will automatically lead to diversity in their priorities for the strategic projects.

Applied to the empirical analysis the goal is to understand the ambitions that are the consequence of another round. The process of selecting and deciding on goals for a strategic project is not necessarily a unique event. It is possible to proceed by stages, which calls for intermediate goals. Likewise, if some goals that have been formulated and accepted turn out to be less appropriate at a later stage, it should always be possible to revise them. Every round has its own contextual ambitions, however the ambitions set in a successive round are essential to understanding a shift in the development authorities’ leadership style towards developing a strategic plan.

2.4.4 DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

In the following section, the term “development authority” stands for the establishments of federal, regional, and local government agencies that administer, oversee, and manage public programs and have executive, legislative, or judicial authority over the realization of a strategic development. The following section presents the “Typology of leadership roles in the new urban governance” (John and Cole 1999). Although the model focuses on leadership roles of individuals leaders in new urban governance – which makes it less applicable to this study - it does present a valuable starting point towards the development of a theoretical model for public leadership styles towards realising strategic projects.

Pol (2002) states that a strong, decisive leadership of governmental organizations is essential to initiate and implement adequate policies. Every organization or project needs a leading actor to initiate, continue and complete it. The assumption is that the leadership of key actors contributes substantially to the successful design, development and implementation of projects. Leadership is a necessity, whether relying on specific competencies (the position in the administrative hierarchy, financial capabilities, specific know-how or other powers) or on the charisma of public or private individuals who successfully “drive” the projects (van den Berg et al. 1997).
John and Cole (1999 in Pol 2002) use a relatively narrow notion of leadership; they focus on personal leadership. According to John and Cole, leadership is crucial to the new urban governance; since they argue that effective problem solving often rests on the ability of one person. They conclude that the politics of decentralization, networks, participation, partnerships, bureaucratic reform, rapid policy change and central intervention need powerful but creative people to steer the direction to local policy making. In a time on institutional fragmentation and complexity, leaders make the shifting framework of individuals and organizations work together. John and Cole (1999 in (Pol 2002)) present a typology of leadership according to two dimensions: (1) the continuum between responsive and proactive leaders; (2) the difference between leaders who generate capacity and those who are self-regarding. The latter continuum is captured by Stone’s (1989 in (Pol 2002)) distinction between Power over and Power to. The Power over focuses narrow exercise of power (a strong hierarchical leadership style); Power to is about exercising power by involving all relevant actors in the decision-making process (a cooperative, network leadership style). The following figure presents the Typology of leadership roles in the new urban governance by John and Cole (1999).

Personality, objectives and the conditions of the local context result in leaders that are likely to resemble one or a combination of the four roles in the grid. In their analysis, John and Cole identify the caretaker as the weak leader who is unable to manage the complex coalitions that have emerged in the local governance. The consensual facilitator, who is far more adaptable, has learnt about the importance of the partnerships
and networks and keeps abreast of national and local policy debates as they rapidly change. The consensual facilitator finds it hard to develop a coherent local strategy as local policy is driven by the demands of other powerful local actors, the need to please many people at once and to respond to the fashions of the moment. The city boss responds better to new urban opportunities, however this leader does not adapt very well to new urban governance since the city boss relies on management strategies that no longer work in changed conditions. The visionary combines elements of strong leadership with capacity generation and is able to establish more creative politics and effective coordination (John and Cole 1999 in (Pol 2002)).

The utility of this model to this study is the vertical axes. When the development authority behaves in a hierarchical manner in realizing its strategic project, it would fall in the category of Master Planning. When the development authority behaves more in a cooperative network manner in realizing its strategic project, it would fall in the category of Strategic Planning. The general framework of a more Proactive or more Responsive Public Instruction is valuable as well. However, the clear distinction that needs to be made is the normative statements that John and Cole make about the qualities of the various leaders. John and Cole clearly distinguish between positive and negative characteristics in a good urban leader. This study however argues from the perspective of de Leeuw, who supports the contingency theory. De Leeuw (2002) states: “There is no universally effective way of managing- the appropriate way to manage is dependent on the circumstances”. Thus the public leadership style in realising strategic projects will need to be more nuanced than the John and Cole model of typologies of leadership in modern urban governance.

2.5 THEORETICAL MODEL

The model that will be used to analyse the leadership styles of the development authority towards realising Strategic Projects can be seen as a result of the previously explained literature in this study. The features of Master and Strategic planning are incorporated on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis is based on the public means to exercise power; the perspective chosen for this is the way a city deals with its land policy, more proactive or reactive. The following section will first elaborate on the vertical axis, the horizontal axis will be presented consequently.
2.5.1 DIRECTING AND INTERACTING

The decline of the Master Planning movement and the rise of Strategic Planning and the increase of complexity has led to a change in the way that the development authority can exercise influence on the development process. This literature study has however shown that on a local level a more nuanced approach towards the two movements is advisable. There are big differences between countries, and even among cities and regions within countries, with regard to the role of the public sector in planning. Some nations have, for instance, a great history of Master planning, which in contemporary planning might still be apparent. Within the process of realising a strategic project, paradigms and leadership styles might change, due to a change in the context or through a change in objectives, for example. Coping with the changes due to an increase of complexity is one of the main challenges for contemporary planners. In between these two opposites, there are many intermediate forms of public leadership. Each one has several elements from both Directing and more Interacting elements to realize strategic projects.

For this study, the use of a more Directing leadership style towards realizing strategic projects, and a more Interacting attitude towards realizing its strategic projects will be studied. A directing leadership style entails a focus on a more hierarchical organization of power, related to the complexity paradigm of Detailed complexity. In addition, the planning ambitions are realized through regulations, with more Keynesian ideals. The interacting leadership style entails a focus on a more cooperative organization of power, related to the complexity paradigm of Dynamic complexity. In addition, the planning ambitions are realized through collaboration and deregulation, according to Neoliberal principles.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directing</th>
<th>Interacting</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master Planning</td>
<td>Strategic Planning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Keynesian ideals</td>
<td>Neoliberal ideals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchy/ Institutionalism</td>
<td>Equality of actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blue print end state</td>
<td>Consensus based</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Control and zoning of land</td>
<td>Deregulation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order/ City as a machine</td>
<td>Complexity / Organic city</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5.2 REACTIVE AND PROACTIVE

As stated before there are big differences between countries, and even among cities and regions within countries, with regard to the role of
the public sector in planning. On the one hand, we see situations of so-called active land policy. In that case, the public sector is a very important landowner and takes the lead in land (re)development processes, the first step being the acquisition of the land by the public sector. On the other hand, we see situations where so-called passive land policy prevails. Under that policy, private actors are the most important landowners and take the initiative in land (re)development processes (Virtanen and van ’t Verlaat 1999). In between these two opposites, there are many intermediate forms of urban land policy. Each one has several elements from both active and passive land policy in different proportions.

For this study, the use of a more Reactive leadership style towards realizing strategic projects, and a more Proactive leadership style towards realising its strategic projects will be studied. The reason for not using the term passive is its implication of uncooperative behaviour. Reactive behaviour entails a focus on a more modest leadership style towards the realization of strategic projects, related to the humble dedication to the development of strategic projects in which public (financial)risks are avoided. In addition, the plans are initiated by the market, in which the government only coordinated plans on a more transcending scale. Proactive behaviour entails a focus on a more hands-on leadership style in the realization of strategic projects, related to a willingness to take up responsibilities and risks. In addition, the planning ambitions are initiated by the development authority though active investments in the development of the strategic project.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reactive</th>
<th>Proactive</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Demand driven</td>
<td>Supply driven</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market initiatives</td>
<td>Public Developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Avoiding risks</td>
<td>Actively investing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passive land policy</td>
<td>Proactive land policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transcending coordination</td>
<td>Joint ventures</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2.5.3 PUBLIC LEADERSHIP STYLES MODEL

In the following section, style, attitude, behaviour and role will be used to define a “mental position”, which results in a certain response of an individual or group to its environment. This definition includes the attitude and behaviour of an organization within its surroundings. In a narrow sense, leadership can be interpreted as directive behaviour, but this interpretation is avoided since it might introduce normative concepts to the contingent model. Therefore a broader notion of leadership is ap-
plied, thus focusing on a “mental position” of a development authority.

As a result of the two axes, four public leadership styles are defined. The four defined roles are namely the: Regulator, Implementer, Enabler and Collaborator. Each of the roles represents a certain style towards the realization of a strategic project. The roles will be briefly introduced and elaborated on, however the empirical study will make the comments more tangible. Figure 15 presents the model for public leadership styles, after which the separate roles will be presented.

![Figure 15: Public leadership styles model](image)

### Regulator
The regulator is a combination of a reactive and directive development authority. A development authority that represents the regulator role guides the realization of a strategic project through (legal) public instruments. Conditions for the development are set according to public ambitions and the market and community are required to adhere to the conditions. The development authority can be regarded modest, however it holds on to its public responsibilities.

### Implementer
The Implementer consists of a proactive and directive development authority. A development authority that represents the Implementer is actively involved in the realization of a strategic project through investing, acquiring land and setting development conditions. Public instruments are proactively used to accomplish public ambitions. A deterministic and decisive development authority realizes strategic projects through a resolute and pragmatic mind-set.
**Collaborator**
The collaborator is made up from an interactive and proactive development authority. Development authorities that resemble the collaborator are actively involved in the realization of strategic projects, investing and finding partnerships with market stakeholders. Public-Private partnerships and joint ventures are examples of collaborative development authorities that are willing to take risk in executing their public tasks. The development authority can be regarded as extravert and is prepared to divide responsibilities in the realization of a strategic project.

**Enabler**
The enabler entails a combination of a reactive and interactive development authority. The enabling development authority awaits market initiatives and then provides a public input. The enabler does have ideas for the development of a strategic project but does not carve them in stone. The concessions between market and public stakeholders form the basis for coming to a balanced strategic project. The development authority can be regarded as modest, but has an extravert mind-set and is therefore keen on facilitating market initiatives while guarding the public interest.
Experience without theory is blind, but theory without experience is mere intellectual play.

Immanuel Kant

The literature survey has concluded with a model that will be used to analyse the public leadership style of the development authority towards realising Strategic Projects. This chapter will use the model as a tool to assess the shifts in public leadership style. The Kingdon model (1995) and the rounds model of van Randeraat (2005) have argued that an urban area development process can be divided into several rounds. This chapter will describe the consecutive rounds and provide the main causes for possible shifts in public leadership style. The three case studies that have been selected for this study are: Rotterdam Central District, Bilbao Abandoibarra and Paris Rive Gauche. After the descriptive presentation of the consecutive rounds the whole process will be summarized and presented in the model for public leadership.

Prior to assessing the cases the contingency approach will be elaborated. The core concept in the contingency approach is that: “There is no ‘one best or one single way’ to carry out strategic spatial planning. The most appropriate approach depends to a large extent on the challenges faced, the particular context of a place and the values and attitudes of the main actors of the process” (Albrechts 2006 in Concilio 2010). The complexity of realizing strategic projects can be related to diverse causes and is often associated with implementation difficulties. Concilio (2010) identifies two causes being significant for implementation difficulties. The first cause is related to the belief that a necessary change can be translated into a defined end-state spatial strategy. It is already recognized that strategic planning cannot be conceived as oriented to an end-product but rather as a “complex governance processes, through which concepts of spatial organization are mobilized” (Healey 2007) by and for a “strategic enabling of means-based activity” (Tewdwr-Jones 2002 in Concilio 2010). The strategy, as an end-product, refers to a fixed form of the future. The second cause is related to the adoption of a pre-determined solution as an approach to strategic spatial planning (Hillier 2007 in Concilio 2010). Gunder and Hillier (2007) criticize the essence of strategic planning: the plan as a statement of what the city, the territory “ought to become”, or “what ought to happen”. An attempt to re-conceptualise strategy-making starts from considering modes for complex organisations to develop a strategy by using, producing and appropriating knowledge and practices while composing knowledge and practices in a coherent whole towards the needed change.
3.1 CASE A: ROTTERDAM CENTRAL DISTRICT

Settlement at the lower end of the river Rotte dates from at least 900 AD. Around 1150, large floods in the area ended development, leading to the construction of protective dikes and dam. The dam at the junction of the river Maas and lends the city its name. The port of Rotterdam grew slowly but steadily into a port of importance, becoming the seat of one of the six ‘chambers’ of the Dutch East India Company (VOC). To date, Rotterdam has grown into a major international commercial centre and the largest port in Europe. Rotterdam is located in the Province of South Holland and is part of the largest agglomeration of cities in The Netherlands, having a population of approximately 6.7 million. The municipality itself serves about 600,000 inhabitants, in an administrable context the metropolitan area of Rotterdam accounts for around 1.3 million people.

The City of Rotterdam was badly battered by the end of World War II. Shortly after the heavy bombardment of May 1940 the first urban redevelopment plans were made, exemplary for the cities’ hands-on mentality. Since then Rotterdam has recovered spectacularly. A new Central Business District was built and the pre-war transit-oriented Rhine Harbour was developed into the largest seaport of the world. Its strategic location in the largest estuary on the North Sea and at the heart of a massive rail, road, air and inland waterway distribution make the city the major gateway into Western-Europe. The latest addition to this impressive transpiration hub is the connection to the European High Speed Train network. The redevelopment of the Central District involved the optimization of the Rotterdam Central train station, strengthening the position of the city and the Randstad as a whole in the European urban network. The plan contemplates the radical restructuring of the area surrounding the station (Burges and Carmona 2009).

The empirical study has shown that the development of the Central District can be divided into three rounds. The three rounds will be elaborated in this section in a consecutive order, after which the gathered information will be summarized into Process, Context, Ambitions and public leadership style.

![Figure 16: Time line Rotterdam Central District](image)
3.1.1 ROUND 1: 1997 - 2001

The redevelopment of the Central District of Rotterdam was sparked in the 1997 proposition of redeveloping six “New Key Projects” (NSP) (Interview, van Boven). The Department of Regional Development and Environment (VROM) proposed a set of inner city redevelopments accommodating the new High Speed Network (HSL). The initiative of the six NSP’s is formally an addition to the Fourth Spatial Policy Extra report (Vinex - 1992). The First Spatial Policy Report dates back to 1960; the reports are issued by the National Department responsible for spatial development. Under the Planning Act, these reports set a framework of planning decisions regarding the spatial development of the Netherlands. Since 1960 all issues have had a different accent; van Boven (Interview) elaborates that the 4th edition is characterized by the aim to strengthen the economic infrastructure, with an emphasis on inner city areas. The HSL-development was projected as an engine for transforming diminished inner city station areas. Van Boven emphasizes that the aim has been to redevelop the station areas, not just the infrastructural hub. In 1997 the Department of Transportation and Water Security (V&W) and the Department of Regional Development and Environment (VROM) jointly reserved approximately 1 Billion Guilders for the development of the NSP’s.

Van Ameijden (Interview) elaborates the role of the local authorities; the authorities responsible for the urban planning in Rotterdam are Rotterdam Development Company (OBR), Urban Planning Department (dS+V) and Public Works (GW). In the ’90s the Rotterdam Development Company (OBR) was set up as an answer to the demand for coordinated market-oriented developments. Since that time, the OBR has been involved in transforming areas of the city by participating actively, setting up Public-Private Partnerships, investing and taking risks. Schrijn (Interview) – Director of dS+V at the time (1991-2001), and management Principal of the Central District in the period 1997-2001, states that the development of the Central District started off with a high level of idealism. The aim was to achieve a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) – aiming on a co-ownership of the central train station. Successful experiences with the Kop van Zuid development - a pilot PPP in the start of the ’90s – lead to the initial ambition to set up a Central District PPP in ’98. Van Ameijden illustrates the public leadership styles for the time; he states “the experience with the Laurenskwartier case in which the OBR took the initiative to generate urban change through investing and an active land policy was exemplary for the way of thinking at the time. The OBR acted in a proactive way by progressively investing in the Laurenskwartier area, this mind-set was evident in the Central District.”
Schrijnen argues that the Central District case differed from the Kop van Zuid case. One of the main differences was the ownership of the land. The Kop van Zuid development had the municipality as the main land owner - this was not the case with the Central District. This resulted in different relationships with the stakeholders. The management Principal for the Central District Schrijnen succeeded in realising a PPP in which project developers and investors took their share. The initial PPP was formed in June 1999 and consisted of: Municipality of Rotterdam, NS, Amvest and ING Real Estate. The Alsop design was funded by this joint venture and development coordination was high. Schrijnen however notes that the initial PPP was vulnerable; particularly because of a lack of a long-term vision - the private partners were more short-term oriented. Van Ameijden sustains this argument by stating that the PPP was not very stable nor long-term oriented.

On a National administrative level, Visser (Interview) states that the time before 2001 the Central District was characterized by a high degree of uncertainty concerning the HST connection to Rotterdam. At first there was a debate whether the HST would get a stop at Rotterdam at all; consequently there was discussion whether the station should be built at Rotterdam Airport or in the city centre. In addition, the track of the HST between Amsterdam and Rotterdam was subject to a strong national political debate. The uncertainties had a great impact on the private actor, and might have been the main cause of their short term orientation.

According to Pol (Interview), the uncertainties on a national level were fuelled because of the lack of alignment between the Departments of V&W and VROM. Van Boven (Interview) affirms that VROM had expertise in setting spatial ambitions and drafting them into strategic plans; V&W had the expertise and experience to execute large scale infrastructural developments such as the Delta works, which led to a discrepancy in the way ambitions were communicated. Van Boven points out that the main stakeholders: the Municipality, Railway Management (ProRail) and Railway Operators (NS) made propositions in which their wildest dreams came true, based on the expectation of national funding. In other words, during the first years of the process, the main stakeholders have been maximizing their own ambitions based on foreign funding. This eventually led to the ostentatious master plan for the Central District, designed by Alsop Architects. Schrijnen adds that the visualization of the real estate program amplified the projects’ ambitions and lead to the ostentatious interpretation of the project. The high quality infrastructure solutions constituted to most of the costs.
Van Amijden reaffirms that the long-term orientation of the municipal planners could not be met by the commercial parties. This became apparent after the design by Alsop Architects was made public, the design stretched the program of requirements to a megalomaniac master plan which was not in proportion to the market prospects. This resulted in a decline of confidence and willingness to participate by the commercial parties. Pol states that the combination of circumstances led to a misfit in the Alsop design of 2001 between the quality level and the investment means from a national level. The rise of the right wing Leefbaar party eventually took the credit for discharging the Alsop Design for the Central District. The popular opinion is still that Leefbaar was the main reason for discarding the plan, but the often forgotten other underlying circumstances provided the ammunition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambition</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Urban area redevelopment</td>
<td>- Uncertainties HSL</td>
<td>- Market actor’s short</td>
<td>- Pro-active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- High urban quality</td>
<td>- Lack alignment V&amp;W and VROM</td>
<td>term-oriented</td>
<td>- Initiating</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Set-up PPP</td>
<td>- Upcoming right wing Leefbaar</td>
<td>- High coordination</td>
<td>- Active participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Party</td>
<td></td>
<td>- Active land policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 17: Summary round 1 Rotterdam Central District

3.1.2 ROUND 2: 2001 - 2006

In 2001, the local authorities in Rotterdam decided on a strategy in which the project was divided into two developments (Pol Interview). He states: “The first years after discarding the Alsop plan there was a clear lack of confidence from the market, there was no faith in the capabilities of the development authority. The decision was made to separate the infrastructural from the Central District area development.” As a consequence of a high level of determination to complete the Central Station (HST hub), it is soon to be completed. However, the process can be regarded as controversial to some of the involved stakeholders. Between 2001 and 2006, the Public Works Department (GW) was coordinating the development; Mr. de Wijs became the management Principal of the Central Station.

Damink (Interview) declares that the 2001-2006 period, with a stringent focus on the development process of the Central Station, can be regarded as a black box combined with a pressure cooker, which was probably necessary for the time. After a long period of planning, results were needed through directive execution. There was less coordination of the
plan within a broader urban perspective, the focus was on technical aspects, financial feasibility and contributions of the involved stakeholders (VROM, V&W, ProRail, NS, Stadsregio Rotterdam and Municipality of Rotterdam). In this regard, van Boven describes a painstaking non-collaborative process of positional bargaining between the municipality and VROM / V&W. Van Boven (Interview) argues that the area development surrounding the central station was frustrated by the municipal authority that focused on executive infrastructural interests. The infrastructure development was the main concern and the ambition of VROM to redevelop the Central District area development was lost for a period of four years. Only after Visser (Dir. Rotterdam Development Company 2006–Present) was appointed did the development of the Central District Rotterdam have an upswing towards a comprehensive integrated development.

Visser argues that the focus on the Central Station had a negative impact on the development of the Central District as a whole. The initial focus was on a laborious public-public agreement for the Central Station, exemplary for this was the strict separation of the Public Transport Terminal into (1) National construction works (Spoorse deel) and (2) Municipal construction works (Stadse deel). This stringent separation increases complexity concerning the exploitation of the building; in addition, the underground parking, relocation of the tram station and bicycle facilities were publicly developed. Visser is convinced that private stakeholders will profit directly from these public investments. Visser argues these projects could have been integrated in public-private developments resulting in a joint investment and benefit sharing. A prerequisite for such a collaborative process is, however, a more integrated and collaborative oriented approach at the start of the process.

Meijer (Interview) declares that the development of the Central Station has perhaps not been complementary for the development of the Central District, but it has however been a success in itself. The decisive and sometimes stringent leadership was a direct result of the turbulence after discarding the Alsop plan. Pol adds that the Rotterdam Central Station will be the firstly completed HST station of the six key project developments in the Netherlands. The separation of the infrastructural hub has lead to controversy, but the result of the decisiveness performed by de Wijs has been indispensible to the overall success of the development of the Central District. Without the transportation hub, the added value to the urban area development would have been reduced.
3.1.3 ROUND 3: 2006 - PRESENT

After being appointed in February 2006, Visser succeeded in convincing De Wijs to allocate the municipal directorship for the Central District to the OBR. But the decisions that were made in the period before him were boundary conditions that needed to be dealt with. Visser asserts to value the achievements of De Wijs concerning the realization of the Central Station. In addition, he declares that under the circumstances a pragmatic leadership style towards the Central Station Development was necessary. On the other hand, he does stress that as a consequence of a directive focus, opportunities were missed. Visser argues that public interest could have been protected by a more collaborative process. He considers it to be a great loss that the underground parking, relocation of the tram station and bicycle facilities are solo public developments. Visser is convinced that private stakeholders will profit directly from these public investments. He argues these projects could have been integrated into joint ventures, resulting in a collective investment and benefit sharing. However, a prerequisite for such a collaborative process is a more integrated and collaborative oriented approach at the start of the process.

The change of leadership style that Visser initiated is underlined by an argument of Damink in which he affirms the need for change. According to Damink the focus shifted from an introvert to a more extravert mind-set: “How to get the right actors involved was the main concern at the time”. Meijer states that this lead to a new municipal leadership style; focusing on the role of the Central Station hub within the area development, and even the city. The shift was in line with the 2030 Rotterdam Urban Vision to increase urban cohesion and integral urban area development. Damink argues that the Central District development is a good example of the transition between traditional urban planning and a more collaborative approach to urban development. He states that, “The urban area development plan of 2005 was traditionally developed by the Urban Planning Department (dS+V); in this plan the whole area was drawn up

**Figure 18: Summary round 2 Rotterdam Central District**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ambition</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Attitude</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>- Central station redevelopment</td>
<td>- Lack of market confidence</td>
<td>- Clear divided responsibilities</td>
<td>- Introvert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Technical quality</td>
<td>- Pragmatic leefbaar party in power</td>
<td>- High determination</td>
<td>- Pro-active</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Directive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>- Executive focus</td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- Active investments</td>
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into high detail. The way the area should perform in social and economic terms was not sufficiently taken into account. The market criticized the plans for not being realistic – the first response of the dS+V was to focus on a more substantive communication strategy as a means to convince the market of their intentions.” Damink asserts that this is a typical reaction for an introverted plan-making development authority, which can be regarded as modernist ideals.

According to Pol, one of the first rigorous decisions that was taken in 2006 was to discard the existing urban plan for the Central District – which was developed in the 2001-2006 period. In addition, local stakeholders were involved in the initiative phase in which ambitions for the development were set. Meijer declares that the first sign of collaborative action was to schedule a set of bilateral meetings in which the main property owners located in the area were consulted (Corio, ING, LSI, Meurs, Unilever). The next step was to select an independent actor that would guide the development of a joint vision for the area development. Concire was hired to guide the cooperative process of developing a joint vision for the urban area development. Over the course of one week, the local stakeholders jointly developed the Glocal City District concept, which is still a valuable and much referred to document. That vision was signed by all involved stakeholders and was later translated into an urban plan. This led to a rapid upswing in the process.

In addition to a consensus-based approach, Visser adds that the increase in the pace of the process concerning the Central District development is also a result of better cooperation amongst individuals at the top of the organizations. Personal leadership excelled in an informal setting (VROM business trip) and a constructive mind-set have contributed to aligning the interests of the stakeholders. Visser makes his point by elaborating on a meeting that he had with the Minister of the Department of V&W (Eurlings) and the Mayor of Rotterdam (Opstelten). Visser asserts that crucial decisions were made during this particular meeting. As a result, the follow-up meeting with the involved (public) stakeholders (V&W, VROM, ProRail, VROM, Region of Rotterdam and Municipality of Rotterdam) resulted in the start of the construction works. In a gentleman’s agreement, the main (public) stakeholders committed themselves to the development, taking shared responsibilities for the (minor) challenges that still needed to be dealt with.
3.1.3 SUMMARY ROTTERDAM CENTRAL DISTRICT

The concluding remarks that can be made having analysed the Rotterdam case focus on the public leadership style of the municipal organization responsible for the development of the city: Urban Planning Department (dS+V), Public Works Department (GW), and Rotterdam Development Company (OBR). It is interesting to see that the management principal has shifted though the process, having great consequences for the public leadership style.

During the first round Mr. Schrijnen was in charge of the Central District development; having his origin in urban design and becoming Director of the Urban Planning Department (dS+V) in Rotterdam, his contributions to the process focused on a high quality urban area and spatial solution to the complexity of the infrastructural hub. In addition, his focus was predominantly on a collaborative approach with high profile market parties which resulted in a Public-Private Partnership. The popular paradigm of the Urban Planning Department at the time was to actively become involved. One of the aims was to get positioned in the area by obtaining land, and investing in infrastructure and public space. As a result of the proactive and participative approach, the development authority is regarded to have taken the role of Collaborator during the first round.

During the second round, Mr. de Wijs was appointed as management principal of the Rotterdam Central Station. A rational decision was made to set the urban area development of the Central District aside and focus on the Infrastructural hub (Central Station). Being the director of the Public Works Department (GW), his pragmatic leadership style and focus on technical aspects of the plan had far-reaching consequences for the development process. During a controversial non-collaborative period many technical aspects were dealt with and the responsibilities for the project were clearly divided. Besides the Central Station, additional public investments were made; an underground car park, bicycle stand, and

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<th>Attitude</th>
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| - Urban area redevelopement
- Consensus         | - 2030 Rotterdam
Urban Vision
- Financial crisis | - Involving local
stakeholders
- Joint vision (Concire) | - Extrovert
- Reactive
- Supportive
- Consensus based |
diverting trams can be regarded as municipal funding for the area. Because of the absence of market involvement and a controversial negotiation process for the transport terminal, the public leadership style shifted towards Directing. The unchanged proactive involvement and public investments in the area result in an Implementer role of the development authority during the second round.

During the third round, which is still underway, the management principal of the Central District has been Mr. Visser. As the Director of the Rotterdam Development Company (OBR), his focus has been predominantly on facilitating and enabling initiatives that came from the market. A process of active participation has been set up through a consensus-based joint vision for the Central District. Local stakeholders have been involved and are persuaded to take responsibility for the development of the project. In addition, the development authority has become more reluctant to actively invest in the area. However, this is not a direct consequence of the financial crisis, a reassessment of the intrinsic role of the public sector forms the basis for the contemporary development paradigm. The notion that the development authority should actively invest has been strengthened by the financial crisis, but is part of a more structural paradigm shift. The focus is on developing propositions through synergy of public and private interests, creating interdependence amongst actors’ trough consensual responsibility. Public-Private Partnerships might still be optional, but the focus is more on a modest public leadership style. The more reactive and participative leadership style of the development authority results in the Enabler role during the third round. This brings us to the following model; in this model the three rounds have been positioned within the theoretical model.

![Figure 20: Shifts in public leadership styles Central District](image)
3.2 CASE B: BILBAO ABANDOIBARRA

In 1300, the city of Bilbao was founded in an area that was previously part of Abando and Begoña. The city is located along the Ría estuary - the common mouth of the rivers Nervion, Ibaizabal and Cadagua. The City of Bilbao is situated in the north-central part of Spain, approximately 15 kilometres south of the Bay of Biscay. Its main urban core is surrounded by two small mountain ranges with an average elevation of 400 metres. The municipality of Bilbao accommodates about 40% of the total population of the Bilbao metropolitan area, and covers 8.3% of the land. The metropolitan area is made up of 35 municipalities that combined cover an area of approximately 500 km² with a population of 875,000 (Eustat 2008).

Bilbao is part of the Autonomic Community of the Basque Country. The Basque country has the status of historical region within Spain, of which the capital is Vitoria – Gastéiz. The Basque country is made up by three provinces, Bilbao located in the province of Bizkaia. Its close proximity to the rest of Europe gives the area a central role in Spain’s trade. As a result of its strategic geographical orientation Bilbao has been an important commercial hub for Spain, mainly thanks to its port activity based on the export of iron extracted from the Biscayan quarries. Throughout the nineteenth century and beginnings of the twentieth, Bilbao experienced heavy industrialization that made it the centre of the second industrialized region of Spain, behind Barcelona.

To date, Bilbao is a vibrant place that is experiencing an on-going social, economic, and aesthetic revitalization process. The emblematic Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, together with infrastructure investments have accommodated its fame. Currently the Abandoibarra area and Zorrozaurre are impressive examples of inner city redevelopments. The empirical study of the realization of Bilbao Abandoibarra has shown that two periods can be distinguished. A point in time in which the phases clearly shift is however difficult to determine, therefore the decision has been made to define a period of a “Spirit of Change” and a period of “Stabilization”. In both periods the features of directing and interacting public leadership styles will be assessed.

Figure 21: Time line Bilbao Abandoibarra
3.2.1 ROUND 1: SPIRIT OF CHANGE

The Metropolitan Bilbao area is the fifth most populous in Spain, behind Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Seville. Bilbao is one of Spain’s major ports and has been its entry point for heavy manufacturing for 100 years. Up to the 1970s Bilbao was still one of the wealthiest parts of the country. During the mid-70s to the late 1980s, Bilbao suffered intensely from the consequences of restructuring and industrial decline (Otaola Interview). Martinez Caerra (Interview) describes a paradigm shift during that period; from closed and protected conditions, Spain was exposed to the common European market in 1985. Companies were not fit to compete, which took a lot of reorganization and adaptation. Rodriguez (Interview) argues that the crisis of manufacturing hit the city’s labour base particularly hard, being vulnerable due to its specialization in traditional sectors and heavy industry. Between 1975 and 1996, Bilbao lost almost half of its manufacturing jobs. Most of the losses took place in the heavy industries such as steel, shipbuilding, machinery and electrical equipment, concentrated in large Fordist firms with a significant proportion of public ownership (Rodriguez and Martinez 2001). Alayo (Interview) asserts that the state owned industries were inefficiently run and could therefore not effectively react to the changing circumstances.

Valdivielso (Interview) emphasizes that the crisis could in turn lead to opportunities; there was a widespread sense of urgency which resulted in determination to redevelop the region. At the time there was a search to find an instrument to respond to the economic decline; the resolution for the time was to improve the urban performance. In the process, regulatory procedures gave way to more active and targeted forms of intervention. From the Neoliberal movement an entrepreneurial approach was adopted, this resulted in the emergence of business sector instruments into the realm of urban development. The transformation of the city was exercised through three main focal points, which reflects the entrepreneurial paradigm. The economic revitalization focused on the urban performance through: (1) a proactive approach to spatial planning, (2) the adoption of strategic planning, and (3) large-scale urban projects and infrastructure (Rodriguez and Martinez 2001).

Valdivielso notes that the last metropolitan plan for Bilbao dated from 1963; this plan was not revised only until 1989, when the new Bilbao Master Plan was launched. Matrinez Caerra states that Bilbao did not have the culture of Master planning; the political U-turn inspired change - there was a sentiment of starting on a blank page. Otaola affirms that the absolute rule of Franco had a major impact on the Spanish con-
cept of planning – he argues that the transition from master planning to strategic planning has not taken place in Spain. After Franco died in 1975, a process of democratization lead to the empowerment of local development authorities. These organizations adopted Neoliberal concepts during the ‘80s. Strategic plans for Madrid and Barcelona were drawn up in this period, after which Bilbao followed in the development of a strategic plan in 1987.

According to Alayo, the public administrations at the time were set up from scratch; the characteristic for the time was the absence of so called “career politicians” since Bilbao was in a transition towards democracy. The people that managed the public sector during the end of the 80s were predominantly entrepreneurs - successful businessmen that committed themselves to lift the region in which they grew up. These politicians were clear and pragmatic about the development of the city of Bilbao; this contributed to the entrepreneurial approach to planning the Metropolitan of Bilbao. The objectives of the strategic plan were (Rodriguez and Martinez 2001):

- Coherent set of short-and medium-term objectives that could provide a framework of consensus
- Co-ordination between development authorities
- Partnership with the private sector.

After an initial study, the comparative advantage of the Metropolitan area of Bilbao was identified. An urban vision was based on an analysis of inherent strengths and identified opportunities for social, economic, and urban growth. In 1989, Bilbao Metropoli-30 was formed as a public-private body; its aim was to prepare the Bilbao Metropolitan Revitalization Plan. After the first stage the organization focused on bringing together development authorities and private enterprises and succeeded in creating a basis of support for the strategic projects (Martinez Caerra Interview). Otaola argues that Metropoli-30 was set up at the start of the ‘90s as a forum for public-private initiatives. It was a great success at the start since it channelled the spirit of change for developing the city. Alayo asserts that the organization was basically set up to communicate the strategic vision to the market and to create a basis of support. According to him Metropoli-30 is one of the key success factors at the start of the process; he argues, “Many cities and regions have strategic plans, but the question is how many have been able to implement them and sustain them? In this case, it is amazing the amount of the key projects that have been undertaken and are to date underway or finished.” The Abandoibarra area can be regarded as the flagship redevelopment of the city.
According to Alayo (Interview), the Abandoibarra area can be seen as a key component of the Revitalization Plan for Metropolitan Bilbao. An advantage for planning the inner city harbour and railway area was the fact that the area was 95 percent publicly owned (RENFE, INI, Port Authority and Bilbao Council). Alayo (Interview) asserts that the urban regeneration, particularly in the Abandoibarra area, was identified early on in the process because of its strategic location in the heart of the city alongside the river. Abandoibarra aspires to become the nerve centre of the new Bilbao. After the development of the Guggenheim Museum (Ghery) and the completion of the new Subway line (Foster) the development began in 1998 along the lines of the Master Plan for the area drawn up by César Pelli, Diana Balmori and Eugenio Aguinaga. The urban plan includes leisure, business, culture, green spaces, housing and re-establishes the relation with the river.

One of the main success factors for the initiation of the urban redevelopment in Bilbao is the political alignment of ambitions and goals (Alayo, Otaola Interview). Otaola (Interview) asserts that Josep Borrell (Minister of Public Works, Transport and Environment) played an important role in setting up the development authority in the form of a Public-Public partnership named Bilbao Ría 2000, which was established in 1992. Borrell initiated the merger of the ministries of Public Works and Planning (Dirección General de Actuaciones Concertadas en las Ciudades). This new ministry established a directorate for cities, which initiated the Public-Public Partnership between the federal and regional authorities. Bilbao was the first in Spain. Within the Bilbao Ría 2000 organization, the federal state has a 50% share and the regional/local authorities have a 50% share. The equal representation in Ría 2000 subsequently stimulated collaborative political behaviour. Valdivielso adds that at that time the three Basque administrations were run by the same political party (PNV, Nationalist Basque Party), which complimented the local political consensus. The figure on the right presents the shareholder configuration of Bilbao Ría 2000.

Martinez Caerra declares that Bilbao Ría 2000 is the executive organization that is in charge of developing the public owned land. Otaola, however, argues that the success of the Ria2000 organization is more nuanced. The political leaders from different administrative levels come together five times a year to discuss the development of Bilbao, but the meetings also served as an informal political forum to discuss other issues in an informal manner. The result was that the main decisions makers were always present, which resulted in decisive and efficient decision making. On the other hand, it is an organization that is well-equipped for management of the city planning in Bilbao through
its efficient size. The management is based on coordinated, integrated, and focused actions to improve the flexibility and efficiency of strategic projects. Alayo affirms this and states that Bilbao Ría 2000 is well equipped to tackle all aspects of urban regeneration: urban design; infrastructure planning; landscaping; viability planning and the commissioning of projects and works. The small organization with high executive capabilities manages the whole process, and focuses on integral urban solutions. According to Rodriguez et al (2001), the following three critical factors explain the creation of Bilbao Ría 2000:

- Emerging consensus on the need to concentrate efforts and carry out coordinated actions for the revitalization of Bilbao. Cooperation, partnership, and collaborative advantage became synonyms of good governance.
- Recognition of extraordinary land management difficulties related to the landownership structure of derelict sites that required agreements amongst different agents involved.
- Extremely high costs of renewal operations and the imperative of financial self-sufficiency a condition for urban renovation initiatives – a factor that called for more entrepreneurial forms of management.

The significance of Ría 2000 lies in its considerable potential as a coordinating and executive agency and its capacity to act as a unified body in urban redevelopment schemes in the metropolitan Bilbao, thus vastly
improving the prospects of implementation. Moreover, the self-financing restrictions imposed on Ría 2000 may drastically limit its capacity to carry out other regeneration initiatives in derelict areas outside of central locations. In fact, the overwhelming concern with financial feasibility, as a guiding principle for intervention, may well prove this model to be inapplicable to sites other than central areas of high commercial potential. In this sense, the social and political legitimation of quasi-privatized planning, on the grounds of superior technical efficiency, may be jeopardized (Rodriguez and Martinez 2001).

All professionals that are interviewed (Alayo; Martinez Caerra; Otaola; Rodriguez; Valdivielso) argue that one of the main aspects of the success is the high and sustained level of investments in the urban revitalization of the city. In the transition to democracy, the Basque region has been granted several special rights. The Basque country can therefore be regarded as the most autonomous region in Spain – since the Basque collect their own taxes and are responsible for the police, health and education. Alayo asserts that the success of the development of Bilbao Metropolitan area is all about the sustained investment; approximately 10 Billion Euros have been invested in the region, without any governmental funds from the federal government. The public investment adds up to over 10,000 Euros tax money per capita.

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Figure 23: Summary round 1 Bilbao Abandoibarra

3.2.2 ROUND 2: DEVELOPMENT CONTINUATION

After a period of major achievements the development of the Abandoibarra area started to experience some challenges. The critique on the development can be categorized into three subdivisions: (1) Decline of political consensus; (2) Community mobilization; (3) Market conformity. There were no major changes in institutional structures. However, due to changes in contextual drivers the effectiveness of Metropoli-30 and Ría 2000 has declined over time (Alayo; Otaola Interview).
Alayo argues that when the initiation was underway a transition took place. From a period of analysis, visions and planning, the emphasis was put on the execution and implementation of the plans. The primary objective of Metropoli-30 was accomplished. Once the big picture was drawn up, each of the involved administrative authorities took responsibility for their own area of expertise. Otaola adds that the division of the management responsibilities (every project had its own autonomous project teams such as the museum, subway and congress development teams) has left no room for an overall public-private office. Bilbao Metropoli-30 created the “Spirit of Change” and consensus for the execution of the strategic projects. Martinez Caerra asserts that the organization has gradually been transforming into an urban development think-tank. To date there is an on-going debate on the role of the Bilbao Metropoli-30 organization, but the debate is highly sensitive because of the wide range of involved stakeholders.

The success of Ría 2000 lies in its ability to act as a forum to create political consensus on urban developments. As stated before, the political leaders from the first period can be regarded as entrepreneurs; after a decade the political game became more dominant in the decision-making process. The 2003 elections for the Biscay Province have resulted in a more local orientation, which has influenced the consensus-based decision making process of Bilbao Ría 2000. One of the major setbacks for the Abandoibarra development has been linked to this event. In 1998 the regional authority of the province of Biscay (Bizkaiko Foru Aldundia or Diputacion Foral de Bizkaia) announced its intention to sell its buildings scattered throughout the city of Bilbao and move its offices to the 150 meter tower in the heart of Abandoibarra. Shortly after the provincial elections of 2003 had taken place, the newly-elected leader of the authority of Biscay (Jose Luis Bilbao) decided to scrap the plans for the tower. The main argument concerned the high cost of the development. Great efforts were put into finding a new tenant for the building; a desperate search for a new tenant did not give Ría 2000 a good basis to negotiate. Eventually the Basque Iberdrola energy company became the new occupant. To date the 165 meter high Iberdrola’s headquarters is near completion. It is the tallest building in the Basque Country and the main commercial office development for the Abandoibarra project.

The second contextual shift that has influenced the work on Abandoibarra is the Community mobilization. Alayo argues that after the first decade, the citizens of Bilbao were highly content with the urban transformation. The citizens became more accustomed and comfortable with the increased quality of the urban environment. Community approval mechanisms and public exhibitions were in the hands of the municipal
planning body – not with Ría 2000. Over time, an opposition against urban renewal plans rose because of a lack of direct involvement in the decision making; residents were not actively involved during the regeneration process (Rodriguez Interview). The whole implementation process has been very top down with almost no local participation. Rodriguez suggest that the design of the new public spaces might appeal more to prosperous groups but fails to compliment the urban society as a whole. The first sign of a serious consideration of involving citizens came in 2004 when the Bilbao Town Council hosted a workshop entitled “Participation of Local People and Management Models in Programs to Regenerate Degraded Areas”. The aim was to explore ways of ensuring the effective participation of the local communities in regeneration projects. The workshop was attended by government officials and non-governmental stakeholder groups. The concluding remarks emphasized the need to “involve all related agents”, “achieve a sustainable participation” and “maximize the use of the energy of people” (LegCo 2007).

The third aspect that was already built-in but which became more apparent over time is the market conformity of the plans. Alayo declares that developers have not been actively involved during the design process; the Abandoibarra program was based on market studies by the Ría 2000. Alayo continues his argument by stating that the planning system in Spain is in general highly deterministic. Urban designs are seen as a development blueprint at the start, and there are not too many adaptations over time. Before Pelli made his design for the Abandoibarra area, there was already a general design, an urban organization framework. In this traditional planning process the private developers come into the picture after the urban design has been made. The advantage for the Abandoibarra development is its central location, waterfront orientation and high urban quality. However, when the economic climate changes the projected real estate program can become redundant. A lack of flexibility can have far reaching consequence for the feasibility of the plan.

Exemplary for the public control and deterministic planning process is the fact that most of the investments in the Abandoibarra area were public. The UPV University building, Deusto library, Pedro Arrupe pedestrian bridge, Bank Park, Parque Campa de los Ingleses and the extension of Parque Doña Casilda were all public investments. The Iberdrola office tower and Zubiarate shopping centre are commercial developments which have been subject to some controversy. Alayo argues that the high-end housing in particular accounted for the greatest returns; the land uses and densities are specified in detail at the start of the development. It is part of the Spanish planning tradition, in which land uses are determined at an early stage. Developers were invited to submit their
bids through sealed envelopes. The public authority has directed and influenced the redevelopment of the Abandoibarra to a great extent; the involvement of the private sector during the plan making process was negligible (Alayo Interview).

Because of the financial crisis, the Ría 2000 has encountered challenges; the property development in the city as a whole has stagnated over the last 3 years (Alayo Interview). Ría 2000 has been cost neutral throughout the development process of Abandoibarra by selling land for development. During the crisis, it has become evident that its land-based business model is vulnerable. Land prices have declined as a result of a decrease in financing capacity by the market; consequently the plans become infeasible. According to Alayo, Ría 2000 has to revise its business model and become more diversified, not only focusing on the selling of land. He argues: “Maybe we should move on a bit, associate more with developers and jointly looking for opportunities”. However, the accomplishments in Abandoibarra should not be neglected.

Rodriguez states that the Abandoibarra area is the most emblematic of all the projects carried out by Bilbao Ría 2000 in its regeneration of the city of Bilbao. It is an impressive example of the creation of a new cultural and business district in the heart of the city with residential buildings, public facilities and open green spaces. The dynamics of urban revitalization in Bilbao are a result of a combination of series of initiatives (Bilbao Ría 2000, Metropoli-30) and strategies (Spatial Plan 1994, Strategic Plan 1992, Spatial plan 1994), and a high level of public investments and commitment. In less than one decade, over 10 Billion Euros of public tax money have provided the skeleton of the process of urban regeneration. The initial “Spirit of Change” has resulted in an impressive redevelopment of the Abandoibarra area. Specific contextual dynamics were, however, the driving factors for this success. The question remains whether this formula can be adapted towards future sustained development and economic revitalization.

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<td>- Market conformity</td>
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Figure 24: Summary round 2 Bilbao Abandoibarra
3.2.3 SUMMARY BILBAO ABANDOIBARRA

The lessons learnt from Bilbao offer valuable insights in strategic urban development. After the return to democracy and the re-installation of regional power, the Basque administrations were equipped with the power to decide on local and regional policies. A favourable timing and a number of intervention factors, such as joining the EU and the following economic boom in the ‘90s, have had a positive impact. The recovery of Bilbao has been facilitated by a combination of determined public sector leadership and an existing entrepreneurial culture. This enabled the design of interventions and special agencies such as Ría 2000 and Metropoli-30 to execute an impressive case of an inner city redevelopment.

It proves to be challenging to pinpoint important changes in the process, real paradigm shifts have not occurred until now. The model of public leadership styles that is developed in the literature study needs to be a more free interpretation. On the one hand, the development shows clear signs of a collaborative and strategic approach to realising strategic projects. On the other hand, the executive efforts that have been made are predominantly directive and show signs of a traditional development process. For the concluding remarks, the decision has been made to use the two main development agencies as exemplary subjects making this argument. However, the nuance needs to be made that each organization has several elements from both Directing and more Interacting elements in its efforts to realize strategic projects.

Bilbao Metropoli-30 contributed to the public-private consensus for the execution of the overall strategic plan. Particularly at the start of the process, the Metropoli-30 organization has been highly valuable to creating the movement of the “spirit of change”. This was done by involving market parties and later the citizens of Bilbao have gradually been transforming into an urban development think-tank. The primary objective of Metropoli-30 was accomplished. Once the big picture was drawn up, each of the involved administrative authorities took responsibility for their own area of expertise. Metropoli-30 can be seen as a research and development that was the key to the success at the start of the process. The leadership styles of Metropoli-30 is predominantly based on a proactive approach towards interaction; as a result, this entity within the development authority can be regarded as the Collaborator role.
The concluding remarks concerning Ría 2000 will be separated into two separate discussions. On the one hand, the organization as a political consensus-building forum, and on the other hand, the organization as an executive and coordinating authority. Aligning the public administrative levels has proven to be one of the key aspects of the successful Ría 2000 model — exemplified by the success of the Abandoibarra redevelopment. The delicate political arena in the north of Spain in particular could have resulted in a high level of opposition and a bureaucratic process. Creating an arena for stimulating administrative organization consensus has also given the development of Bilbao one face through one public company. It is intricate to prevent political strife and short-term “symbolic politics”, but a sustainable dialogue and a long term political orientation will eventually increase the effectiveness of public decision-making processes.

Bilbao Ría 2000 deservedly got the popular credit for the redevelopment of Abandoibarra. The results of the transformation of a run down, enclosed inner city harbour area into a mixed use high quality public space is admirable. The executive aspect of the organization is however backed by high quantities of public investments. Bilbao Ría 2000 is a self-financing company, which has proven itself by mobilizing high quantities of public investment. The coordination of the Abandoibarra development and extracting the value from a publicly-owned inner city area has been done in a highly professional manner. Whether this success can be sustained throughout the rest of the city is questionable, however. The business model has proven to be vulnerable during the financial crisis, and as a result of completed development there are fewer publicly-owned inner city areas that can be developed. The model has proved to be effective, but new instruments need to be sought for. The emphasis has predominantly been on the “Implementer”; real public private partnerships or joint ventures have not been set up.

This brings us to the model presented on the next page; in this model the two organizations have been positioned within the analytical model that was produced as a product of the literature survey. It shows the dualistic character of the development authority character in realising the Abandoibarra strategic project.
3.3 CASE C: PARIS RIVE GAUCHE

Paris was founded in the year 300 BC on a little island in the middle of the river Seine. A Celtic tribe called “Parisii” settles in the area. In 53 BC the Romans invaded the little village and renamed it “Lutèce Parisioru”, which literally means, “mud-place of the Pariisi” (Burges and Carmona 2009). This mud-place eventually evolved to become one of the world’s leading business and cultural centres, its influences in politics, education, entertainment, media, fashion, science, and the arts all contribute to its status as one of the world’s major global cities (GaWC 2008). The French capital is located in the region Île-de-France. The Île-de-France region (12,000 m²) consists of 8 districts and 1260 municipalities. The metropolitan area is characterized by the dominant position of the City of Paris. In an administrable context the City of Paris has been largely unchanged since 1860 and has an estimated population of 2.2 million (INSEE 2007). The Paris metropolitan area has a population of 12 million (INSEE 2007) and is one of the most populated metropolitan areas in Europe.

In 1983 the city of Paris decided to focus their redevelopment efforts on the East of Paris, resulting in more than 50 public development projects over the following 15 years. In the East the quality of the houses and environment was poor, whereas the west was relatively wealthy. It had for centuries accommodated the wealthiest classes. A number of areas were designated in which large public and private sector initialises constructed public buildings and infrastructure - mixed public and private sector housing and commercial projects were development. The city succeeded in the transformation of entire districts in the East of the city. To date a
significant number of these designated renewal areas have been redeveloped, including Bercy, Reuilly, Paris Rive Gauche and the Chevaleret Jeanne-d’Arc projects. The development put an emphasis on the sound integration of large-scale land uses within the city centre - creating high quality, liveable neighbourhoods. The design of urban form and spaces has therefore been significant in integrating the area into the surrounding built form and creating continuity between the development areas.

The empirical study has shown that the development process of Paris Rive Gauche can be subdivided into three rounds. The three rounds will be elaborated in this section in a consecutive order, after which the gathered information will be summarized into Process, Context, Ambitions and Public leadership styles.

3.3.1 ROUND 1: 1985 - 1997

The current urban appearance of Paris is the result of vast mid-19th century urban redevelopment. For centuries the city had been a labyrinth of narrow streets and half-timber houses, but during the industrialization entire quarters were redeveloped. These Second Empire plans are in many cases still applied today. As a result, the city of Paris has a tradition of imposing urban regulations such as laws that regulate building facades and height. This culture is reinforced by the fact that the building code has only been subject to modest changes since the mid-19th century. The city limits, strict building codes and lack of developable land have created a shortage of space in the inner city. As a consequence some institutions and economic infrastructure such as the financial business district (La Défense) and prominent universities (École Polytechnique, HEC, ESSEC, INSEAD, etc.) have moved to the Parisian suburbs (EFQM 2008).

Paris Rive Gauche is an extremely ambitious and challenging development, the only one of its size in the inner City of Paris. The challenge was to accommodate large scale uses within the existing boundaries of the city; the location along the Seine River is heavily constrained by infrastructure. De Mont-Marin (Interview) declares that there were already plans to connect both banks of the river Seine in the east of
Paris in 1973. During the 1980s the city considered several alternatives for the site; plans were made to allocate the area for the 1992 Olympic Games, and later for the ’89 world exhibition. After losing both bids to Barcelona and Seville, new plans were made which resulted in the ambition to develop a high profile business district, acting as an eastern counterbalance to La Défense which is located in the west of Paris. Due to bad market conditions at the end of the 80s, the plans were altered and a strategy towards mixed use was chosen. Martayan (Interview) asserts that APUR (Atelier Parisie d’Urbanisme, the city planning agency) played an important role with their proposition to mix the large office element with other functions such as housing and public space. The idea of the quarter was deployed to avoid political hostility. The plan proposed 520 000 m2 of housing and 900 000 m2 of offices (SEMAPA 1993 in (Coupland 1997)).

Paris Rive Gauche borders three Parisian districts: Austerlitz, Tolbiac and Masséna. Initially, an inner city railway station (Gare du Austerlitz), railway yard, tracks and some industrial buildings were located in the area. The development entailed an optimization of the use of the station and railway tracks. As a result, most of the tracks have been moved out. The small number of tracks that is still in use has been covered by a deck, establishing the relation between the existing Parisian districts and the river Seine. One of the first interventions was the development of the French National Library (BnF). De Mont-Marin (Interview) asserts that President Mitterrand initiated a plan to centralize and modernize the French library system in the 80s. In 1988, the decision was made to locate the new Library building at Paris Rive Gauche. The city council of Paris persuaded President Mitterrand to accept the site within the Paris Rive Gauche Project (Coupland 1997). Lecroart (Interview) argues that the decision was a political one between President Mitterrand and the Mayor of Paris Chirac. The benefits for the city’s plans were that the new library would bring a substantive element to start up activity in the area, secure new transport links and develop market confidence. Martayan (Interview) reaffirms: “It was a win-win situation, a new library in Paris which functioned as a cultural engine for the development, and Mitterrand got his desired presidential project.”

De Mont-Marin (Interview) asserts that the integration of the Library into the first 1991 ZAC (Zone d’Aménagement Concertée) can be regarded as the first breakthrough in the process. A ZAC is a development process type which is predominantly for major projects in France. The term ‘comprehensive development scheme’ captures some of the elements of what constitutes a ZAC since such schemes include mixed-use areas. However, it is more than a zoning plan; a ZAC is a structure for
cooperation and in turn provides an outline for negotiations (Ennis 2003). De Mont-Marin (Interview) explains that the ZAC is a development framework that integrates the project within a broader frame; a ZAC combines general rules and regulations for an area and puts them into perspective with the rest of the city.

Lecroart (Interview) argues that the advantage of the ZAC is that you have to have an envisioned end-product; a ZAC is binding when it gets approved by the city council. He continues that the main disadvantage of the ZAC is its poor flexibility. The inflexibility is caused by (1) the size and long term orientation of the operation and (2) the uniform technical concept to covering the rails in which there is no technical flexibility. A ZAC can be regarded as a master framework of the financial and technical development conditions. Lecroart underlines his argument with the following metaphor: “a ZAC is like a cruise ship, a powerful object once set in motion cannot be redirected easily.” In addition to the spatial regulatory framework, a ZAC organizes the financial aspects of the project. Lecroart (Interview) asserts that all ZAC’s must be financially balanced, some through open subsidy for certain programs, or by placing the interest of financial investments (debts) with the city of Paris. The public investments should be recovered by selling the land to the market; in practice however this does not always work out. There are several examples of subsidized ZAC developments. With regard to Paris Rive Gauche, Lecroart (Interview) makes his point by arguing that the office development in La Défense and other sites in the west of Paris made it difficult to initiate the commercial development in Paris Rive Gauche. In addition, the area was dealing with a bad image which made the private housing developers reluctant to invest in the area. Therefore the French National Library and social housing developments were the first developments in the area, both public investments.

In 1991, the City Council of Paris approved the first ZAC for the Rive Gauche area. In addition, an organization called `Société d’Économie Mixte et d’Aménagement de la Ville de Paris´ (SEMAPA) was commissioned to coordinate and manage the project. SEMAPA is a non-profit organization that operates in the private sector, though its shareholders are public. The organization has three main functions: to sell land to the private sector; to undertake research and analysis; and to deliver the scheme’s infrastructure. SEMAPA oversees a €3 billion budget; spending is divided between land development (47%), infrastructure works (30%) and development studies (20%) (Cabe2006). De Mont-Marin (Interview) elaborates that while SEMAPA was founded in 1985, the first administrative decisions were not taken until 1991. SEMAPA was initially established to conduct studies into the legal, technical and
financial feasibility of the project, and advising and reporting local politicians. In 1991, the mandate changed into a coordinating development agency.

The ambition in 1991 was to create a company that represented the interest of the city council and that could manage the development though ownership of the land. De Mont-Marin (Interview) elaborates on the responsibilities; “SEMAPA monitors the rules, regulations and program regarding the main orientation for urban design which are regulated in the ZAC.” He adds that SEMAPA has a high degree of independence; the organization is in charge of the development and coordination of the project – under the auspices of the City Council. Lecroart provides an additional argument for creating SEMAPA; he declares that the City of Paris felt very powerful during the ‘80s as a result of administrative decentralization. The main owner of the land was, however, the French National Railways Company (SNCF), thus a partnership with the SNCF was required.

An important aspect of the development is thus reaching an agreement on the land. The city of Paris has actively initiated the process; smaller land owners in the area were expropriated during the end of the ‘80s. De Mont-Marin argues that the key to success was the interdependence between the SNCF and the City of Paris, which is effectuated through SEMAPA. The City of Paris envisioned an inner city redevelopment of Paris Rive Gauche, and they were the only ones who could initiate such a complex and comprehensive plan. If the SNCF wanted to make a profit from their inner city railway yard, they needed the City of Paris to make development plans. The key negotiations between SEMAPA (acting on behalf of the City Council) and the SNCF started in 1990 (Ennis 2003). De Mont-Marin stresses the significance of the price agreement which was reached in 1991; “Every time we start a new phase we go back to that first contract - then we perform a price indexation on the land value. It is an honest, transparent relationship between the City Council and SNCF.” After 25 years new prices were negotiated as a result of that request by SNCF. This shows the constructive efforts of both parties to realize the development. De Mont-Marin adds, however; “I regard the initial agreement between the City of Paris and the SNCF as the wedding – it’s not always a perfect marriage - but we need each other.”

SEMAPA’s Executive Board includes Paris City Council as the main partner, the SNCF as the main landowner, the Régie Immobilière de la Ville de Paris (RIVP), French National Government, Regional Council of Ile-de-France and various private partners. Martayan (Interview) declares that the ultimate responsibility for the planning and delivery of
the project was with Paris City Council, the presidency of SEMAPA is
the mayor of the 13th district. Therefore the link between SEMAPA and
the city of Paris are much more important than any other stakeholder.
However, this does make the organization vulnerable for political shifts.

As presented before, SEMAPA has a large degree of autonomy in re-
lation to the City of Paris. The municipality does, however, have the
majority share in the SEMAPA capital, and thus keeps the legal and fi-
nancial responsibility in decision-making. The SEMAPA management
has a large degree of independence in day-to-day decisions; negotiat-
ing development rights and maintaining relationships with other involved
stakeholders (Ennis 2003). The SEMAPA team includes officers respon-
sible for managing the technical and legal aspects of the urban develop-
ment area, as well as maintaining contact with residents and local as-
sociations. SEMAPA oversees the construction of some of the facilities,
particularly in public areas, while coordinating the entire project. It
is also responsible for acquiring land within the ZAC for development.
The individual developer buys the building rights at a price indexed to
average selling prices. The developer then selects an architect to design
a building which conforms to the specifications set by SEMAPA and
the coordinating architect. SEMAPA has overall project management
responsibility, and aims to minimize the time between inception and
completion for each phase of development (Cabe 2006). As a conclud-
ing remark, we can state that SEMAPA was established as a vehicle to:
+ Conduct initial research prior to the in 1991 approved ZAC;
+ Create an arena for public-public agreements;
+ Take responsibility for the execution of the project.

**Figure 28: Summary round 1 Paris Rive Gauche**

### 3.3.2 ROUND 2: 1997 - 2007

After completing the French National Library and a public housing development of 450 units SEMAPA revised its public leadership style. As a result of a strong community mobilization, SEMAPA was forced to redress its collaborative process. The involvement of the citizens, associations and inhabitants was neglected during the first decade of the development. Only the minimal requirements for involvement of the local community were considered at the first stage. The growing intervention of citizens and associations had created a lot of problems in the continuation of the development, which eventually led to the development of an active process of communal participation in the decision making process. Community involvement did however come later in the process, first through litigation, and then through an on-going mechanism of participation (Ennis 2003).

One of the main public concerns was the top-down and imposed character of the French National Library development. The library was a late addition to the planning of the quarter, and was planned independently by advisors to President Mitterrand (Coupland 1997). Lecroart (Interview) argues that the public was not consulted at all about the building of the Library itself. The authorities considered the development of the library as a building permit, not placing it in a broader context of a ZAC. As a result, only the minimal legal standards were required – having a basic formal consultation on the library building permit. Lecroart states: “The building permit was given by the City of Paris, the community regarded it as a derogatory permit.” Apart from the procedural involvement of the community, the Library was perceived as rigid, introverted and an element out of proportion to the surrounding...
urban environment - which also gave rise to a negative public opinion. Lecroart (Interview) asserts that the building was built in a desert of railways in an old industrial area; it did not connect to the street network. The area changed over time but up until now, the Library still has urban design weaknesses with regard to its inactive edges (Cabe 2006).

Lecroart (Interview) declares that, as a result of the public activism, the project was almost abandoned in 1997. Public participation began to play a more important role in the preparation of the revised ZAC in 1995-1996. The public inquiry lead to active community pressure groups which were highly influential in local politics. TAMTAM and Les Frigos are some of the community pressure groups that managed to derail the process and even put the development on a hold. Lecroart and Mar­tau­yan (Interview) both declare that the pressure groups were often bi­ased during the start of the 90s, they were organized around individuals whom were indiscriminate about their objections to the plan. Martayan (Interview) states; “Some of the local activists can only exist because of opposition, if there was no opposition there was no reason to exist – this lead to a non-constructive debate.” The resolution to the dispute was to set up a permanent consultation committee. This resulted in a more constructive collaborative process. The committee consisted of several working groups, a budget and a permanent involvement in the evaluation of the project, including participation in the decision-making process of selling development rights (Ennis 2003). The committee was created in 1997 and is still active and influential (Cabe 2006). Martayan (Interview) reflects on the collaborative process by stating that public consultation is not embedded in the French tradition. According to Martayan, a good alternative would be to involve the public by organizing workshops, this declines the risks of non-constructive behaviour by politically-motivated stakeholders.

Coupland (1997) provides an interesting analysis of the proceedings at the time. Coupland (1997) notes that the opening of the library in 1997 provided the opportunity to make use of the development momentum. A social housing scheme of 350 subsidized flats was started in 1994, in which a total of 950 were planned. Local organizations were successful in delaying the project; they argued for more affordable housing and open space. At various moments, opposition groups representing local community interest put forward alternative proposals, but the significant change came about as a result of changes in local politics. Due to the active involvement of local left wing parties, the program for the university campus was dramatically increased from 60.000 m² to 130.000 m². This public investment had far reaching consequences for the development of the area, resulting in a boost in development activity; an
economic impulse; and demand for office space and student housing. Somekh and Leite (2008) later state that the direct confrontation with the local community resulted in the provision of an appropriate number of affordable housing units and the conservation of an old industrial mill. McCarthey (2011) asserts that, as a result of the objections from the local community groups, the project was modified to a mixed-use development with 50 percent affordable housing and 25 acres of green space.

De Mont-Marin (Interview) reaffirms that the political shift described by Coupland indeed had a major impact on the development process. The main adaptation was the result of the 2000 election of Bertrand Delanoë as Mayor of Paris. The program was modified and more public space and public housing were added. But the most significant was the high increase of academic facilities. De Mont-Marin (Interview) states; “In 1991 the plans envisioned a 60 000 m2 university campus, to date we are developing a program of 210 000 m2 of designated academic facilities. The public investments have been a great impulse to the development in terms of social cohesion, students’ accommodation demand and liveliness of the neighbourhood.” De Mont-Marin even makes a comparison to the French Latin Quarter; “with the library and the university both in the same the area it can become the new Latin Quarter of the 21st century” (The Parisian Latin quarter is famous for its academic heritage, dating back to the 14th century).

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<th>Ambition</th>
<th>Context</th>
<th>Process</th>
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<td>- Mixed use inner city redevelopment</td>
<td>- Community mobilisation</td>
<td>- Executing SEMAPA</td>
<td>- Deterministic</td>
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<td>- Social/communal responsibilities</td>
<td>- Political orientation to the left</td>
<td>- Public consultation committee</td>
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Figure 29: Summary round 2 Paris Rive Gauche

3.3.3 ROUND 3: 2007 - PRESENT

The latest shift in SEMAPA’s leadership style towards developing the Paris Rive Gauche area was the result of the 2007 financial crisis. The mechanisms to react to this, however, had already been in place since the beginning of the process, but have not become as apparent until now. De Mont-Marin (Interview) states that the business model of SEMAPA is to sell land with designated projects to private developers.
He argues that this is generally quite easy within the City of Paris because of the scarcity of land. Because of the high demand for offices and housing, land prices sell for thousands of Euros per square meter. The returns on the commercial development form the basis for the high quality public spaces, high level of public facilities and costly railroad covering deck. Due to the financial crisis, demand has declined and the construction costs have risen.

De Mont-Marin (Interview) declares that some of the early guidelines still provide a high level of stability in the development of Paris Rive Gauche. He states; “At the beginning of the project, we identified the DNA of the project; these points of departure have not changed throughout the process and form a basis for decision making.” He asserts: “The first aspect is mixed use of the land, no separation of functions. This may seem self-evident for modern urban practice, but at the time it was innovative. The second aspect is to cover the track over the railroad with a public deck. At the start the decision was made since this is the only opportunity to link the existing fabric to the river.” He emphasizes that selling more land was not a motive. De Mont-Marin (Interview) continues: “The third aspect is to continue the existing urban fabric of the City of Paris. A simple urban design framework of avenues, perpendicular streets and distribution streets.” De Mont-Marin concludes his argument by stating: “We strongly believe that a strong and idealistic basis makes it easier to incorporate flexibility into the project. When you have a long-term development process you need such principles as guidance.”

Because of the sheer size of the development, SEMAPA subdivided the area into nine development zones. All were assigned different land prices in 1991. The area starts at the periphery highway and advances towards the city centre where land prices go up. Adjacent to the strip are three historic quarters: Austerlitz, Tolbiac and Masséna. The reasoning for the divide is the continuation of the existing city, and different functional accents (de Mont-Marin Interview). De Mont-Marin (Interview) argues that it is important to connect each area to the its surroundings. He regards the ZAC as an overacting framework in which different districts can be assigned with different atmospheres, all incorporated within the same rules and regulation principles. De Mont-Marin (Interview) argues that a ZAC is a very powerful legal tool to start off the process, but it can be highly inflexible. SEMAPA tries to overcome this inflexibility by the subdivision of development zones.

Cabe (2006) reaffirm that a significant effort was made to ensure a diversity of architecture across the site. To achieve this, the nine sub-
development zones had different competitions to appoint an overall architect for each district. The appointed bureaus were required to prepare a sub-plan for each quarter, including details of building footprints, design of public spaces, design guidelines for each building, the relationship between buildings and some specific advice on materials. Individual developers for the development plots within the plan were then selected through another competitive process. De Mont-Marin (Interview) adds that SEMAPA was in charge of selecting the nine coordinating architects. These architects made an urban design, public spaces and links between the buildings. The coordinating architects in turn managed operating architects that were in charge of individual buildings. The system ensured diversity within the areas, which all had a different approach. The modest leadership style of SEMAPA gave it a powerful steering mechanism, the program could be adjusted over time and the project can be delivered in phases. De Mont-Marin (Interview) argues that, “It is possible to progressively integrate new ideas and insights.”

When dealing with an economic crisis, the development pace is altered and the production is downsized. De Mont-Marin declares, “No land is sold in a bad context; wait until the market is better in two years.” He continues, “When a project has strong guiding principles as the basis, it becomes easier to make adaptations to changes in the context.” The crucial element is that the design is made just prior to its realization; in this way you can keep track of market conditions. The advantage of this mechanism in times of crisis is that parts of the development can be postponed or terminated. When a part of the project is finished, the next phase starts – every project is an independent contribution to the whole. De Mont-Marin (Interview) argues that it does not make any sense to make a long term urban design for a project of this scale, he declares, “If the development takes more than a decade to complete, the one thing you can be sure of that the plans will change”. If the development can evolve gradually over time, termination becomes less of a problem – the completed parts work autonomously and connect to the rest of the city.

De Mont-Marin (Interview) adds that public relations becomes a more important responsibility for SEMAPA in times of crisis; in this way, an effort is made to attract market propositions. During informal events, SEMAPA interacts with market actors through setting up a stand and promoting Paris Rive Gauche to developers. Within SEMAPA, some people are in charge of this acquisition; their aim is to come into contact with the developers. However, it also works the other way round. Sometimes developers come to SEMAPA with a plan. When it has potential, SEMAPA will try to match it to the existing plans.
3.3.4 SUMMARY PARIS RIVE GAUCHE

The concluding remarks that can be made, having analysed the Paris case, focus on the leadership style of SEMAPA. It is interesting to see that the organization was established to align the interest of various public entities; in particular, those of the City of Paris and the SNCF. The leadership style predominantly focused on executing public initiatives from a directing perspective. Within the context of urban development in France, SEMAPA can be seen as an innovation towards more interacting behaviour. On the contrary, the regulatory frameworks of the ZAC and the various building laws are proof of a deterministic and directive culture. The fact that the public opinion was neglected in the first period provides extra evidence for the top-down leadership style. The crisis and competition with the La Défense office development resulted in public investments – resulting in the development of the French National Library and a social housing project of 450 units in 1997. Due to a lack of community involvement and the difficult nature of the negotiations with the SNCF regarding the selling of the land, the confusion can be drawn that Round 1 can be regarded as highly directing and proactive. Thus the development authority played the role of the Implementer.

After the community was mobilized SEMAPA was forced to develop a system of sustained public involvement. In the French context, the consultation committee can again be considered as an innovation towards more interacting behaviour. However, the French traditions still leave an important coordinating and managing role for SEMAPA. The development has predominantly been planned and coordinated from the perspective of the public interest, monitoring and regulating the development. The high increase of academic program, an increase in social housing and public space are considered as an increase in public efforts to develop Paris Rive Gauche. It is evident that the proactive public leadership style has been an engine for development throughout
the start of the 21st century. Although the development authority has still been directive and proactive, a change can be observed with regard to the first round. The leadership style changed more towards an interacting leadership style through the communal consultation committee. Round 2 can therefore be regarded as a change in accent of the public leadership style, not a shift into another role. Despite the incorporation of the communal opinion, the regulatory culture and the proactive development of a public program, this round is still regarded as an Implementer – with the nuance that a more collaborative approach was applied.

Finally, as a result of the crisis, an adjustment in SEMAPA’s leadership style took place. Because of bad market conditions, several initiatives needed to be put on a hold. The steering mechanism that SEMAPA has obtained through a system of coordinating architects has resulted in more phasing flexibility. Therefore a more patient and reactive approach can be taken towards the development of Paris Rive Gauche. While some small efforts are made to search for market initiatives, it cannot be regarded as a collaborative project development process. Still, the French regulatory frameworks and principles are in place; the directing leadership styles have been a constant factor throughout the process. However, it needs to be recognised that SEMAPA has made great efforts to successfully incorporate more flexibility throughout the development process. As a result, the leadership styles of the development authority in round three can be regarded as reactive leadership styles, combined with the French tradition of a directing role. Thus a shift took place from the Implementer role towards the regulator role.

Figure 31: Shifts in public leadership styles Paris Rive Gauche
Urban planning has become increasingly complex over the past decades. An increase of specialized actors (professionalisation), complex conditions (policy, law, economics, and environment), financing constraints and mixed interests (inter-organisational interests) result in a decrease of steering possibilities in the strategic planning profession. Healey (2007) confirms this as she asserts that it ‘is widely recognized that the development of urban areas [...] cannot be “planned” by government action in a linear way, from intention to plan, to action, to outcome as planned.’ Changing methods for achieving urban ambitions have resulted in a changing role for urban planners in the development of strategic projects. From a top-down approach towards implementing plans a more bottom-up method is required. Collaboration and participation with community and market stakeholders have become more important. It is therefore interesting to understand the role of the urban planner with regards to other involved stakeholders.

In a broad sense, the aim of this study is to gain a better understanding in how urban planners can transform ambitions into real life projects. In this study, this transformation will be referred to as the process of realizing strategic projects. This study focuses on the urban planning authority responsible for executing strategic projects, taking into account the increase of development complexity. The term urban planning authorities can be ambiguous since it regards a variety of administrative levels, therefore this study will refer to it as the development authority. The development authority is the public urban planning authority responsible for realizing strategic projects. In a narrower sense the leadership style – also referred to as attitude or role - of the development authority will be assessed. The aim is to get an understanding of how the public leadership style affects the realization of a strategic project.

The conclusions respond to the research questions as formulated in the first chapter of this study. The main research question was formulated as follows: How can public leadership affect the realization of strategic projects in urban development? Several supporting research questions have been formulated during the two phases of the study. The literature study described the dominant planning paradigms in contemporary urban development, analysed the utility of strategic projects and their drivers, and led to defining public leadership style. The latter was used and furthered in the empirical part of the study in three cases. After
reiterating the outcomes of the individual components we will draw the conclusions on the overall research question and reflect on them in order to formulate recommendations for further research.

4.1 CONCLUSIONS

The findings of this study will be addressed by assessing the sub-questions individually; the combined conclusions on the sub-questions will construct the conclusion on the main research question. The final question will focus on findings in the empirical study, since qualitative research is not equipped to give a generalized answer. Nevertheless, several modest remarks will be made concerning public leadership styles in realizing strategic projects.

Sub-question 1: What are the dominant planning paradigms in contemporary urban development?
The evolution of the urban planning practice is described along the lines of modernism and post-modernism. Assessing both schools of thought provides a frame of reference for assessing contemporary urban development. Both Keynesian and Neoliberal theories provide detailed and dynamic perspectives on complexity, and a perspective on the evolution from master planning to strategic planning. The modernist planning school is inspired by the concept of the city as a machine. Urban planners attempt to reassess historically evolved cities, transforming them into rational concepts of organized spatial models. A strong emphasis on end-state plans is expressed in the form of master plans. As a result of post-modernist ideals urban planning has created a more market and community oriented organic process. Post-modernist planners regard cities as ever-evolving engines for economic development. Holistic strategic plans - in which individual strategic projects make up the whole – have led to a more evolutionary and goal oriented approach to urban planning. Post-modern principles are dominant in urban planning. The shift from modernism to post-modernism provides a valuable frame of reference for assessing contemporary urban development. However, it needs to be stressed that remarks on such an abstract scale do not represent reality to the full. In present-day planning, elements of both schools of thought can be found.

Sub-question 2: What is the utility of strategic projects in contemporary urban development?
Planning based on individual projects has become the principal instrument of modern-day urban development. Strategic projects change the image of cities and regions, producing spatial transformations through complex city- and project management procedures. To effectively re-
spond to new challenges, urban planning councils developed new instruments to steer their urban development, their attractiveness and competitiveness. Strategic projects have become a dominant and much discussed feature in cities all over the world. As a result of the concept of a city as an economic engine, strategic projects are regarded as an instrument to contribute to the greater competitiveness of a city or region. This makes the relation between strategic and abstract ambitions and spatial projects essential. However, it is complex to qualify the added value of such projects, which makes it even harder to quantify it. In an attempt to assess the value of strategic projects, three aspects have been identified: (1) identity and image, (2) economic spin-off, and (3) political decisiveness. It needs, however, to be stressed that the quantification of the strategic projects’ added value is intricate.

Sub-question 3: What factors influence the realization of strategic projects?
Bruil et al (2004) discuss the role of development authorities and their (in)ability to steer the urban development process. She emphasizes the need for a strategic approach and a goal-oriented, collaborative leadership style of involved actors. Each actor operates out of its own interests; progress can be made when different interests are connected to common interests which results in a - possibly temporary - joint interest. A sound study into understanding this public leadership style requires an understanding of the conditions that can influence the realization of strategic projects. The steering model of de Leeuw (2002) provides a frame of reference with three elements that are taken into account in assessing the realization of strategic projects: (1) the context, (2) the process, and (3) the development authority. In addition, the emphasis on goal orientation provided by Build et al (2004) results in the fourth and final aspect of the assessment of the realization of strategic projects: (4) attainment of ambitions.

Sub-question 4: How can public leadership be defined?
The literature study has provided a theoretical model; the quadrant distinguishes two axes that provide elements of development authorities’ positioning. The two axes result into four development authority leadership styles in developing strategic developments: Regulator, Implementer, Collaborator, and Enabler. The model of public leadership styles present a typology of leadership roles according to two dimensions: (1) the continuum between reactive and proactive public institutions focusing on the public institutional willingness to invest and take risks and responsibilities; (2) the difference between public institutions that adopt more directive top-down methods and those who adopt more interactive bottom-up methods. When assessing the model it needs to
be stressed that there is not one best or one single way to carry out the realization of a strategic projects. As a result of the long term development process – stretching over several decades – paradigm shifts in public leadership styles can occur as the result of changing circumstances or new insights.

Sub-question 5 What is the public leadership style in three selected strategic urban development cases?

The joint municipal authorities of Rotterdam (dS+V, GW, OBR) are considered as the development authority in the Rotterdam Central District case. It is interesting to see that the management principal has shifted throughout the realization of the Central District, having great consequences for the development attitude. During the first round (1997 – 2001) the Urban Planning Department (dS+V) in Rotterdam focused on a high quality urban area. In addition, the focus was predominantly on a collaborative approach with grand players which resulted in a Public Private Partnership. During the second round (2001 - 2006), the Public Works Department (GW) chose a more pragmatic leadership styles with a highly technical focus. This had far reaching consequences for the development of the Central Station – neglecting the urban area component. During a controversial noncooperative period many technical aspects were dealt with and the responsibilities for the project were clearly divided. In the third round (2006 - present), which is still underway, the Rotterdam Development Company (OBR) focuses predominantly on facilitating and enabling initiatives that come from the market. They are drawing up a consensus-based vision for the area and actively involving

\[Figure 32: Public leadership styles model\]
local oriented market stakeholders. Public-Private Partnerships might still be optional, but the focus is more on a modest public leadership style.

Both Bilbao Ria2000 and Bilbao Metropoli-30 are considered the development authority in the Abandoibarra case. It proves to be challenging to pinpoint important shifts in the development of Abandoibarra; concrete paradigm shifts have not occurred until now. The model of public leadership styles which was developed during the literature survey is therefore more nuanced in this case study. On the one hand the development shows clear signs of a collaborative consensus-building role through Bilbao Metropoli-30. The proactive involvement of public entities in using urban development as an economic engine has been the basis of the planning of the city, consequently resulting in a strategic approach to realising strategic projects. On the other hand, the executive efforts that have been made through Bilbao Ria2000 are predominantly directive; a high amount of public investments within a deterministic planning fashion indicate a more traditional development process. Therefore the nuance needs to be made that each organization has several elements from both Directing and more Interacting elements in its efforts to realize strategic projects.

In the realization of Paris Rive Gauche, SEMAPA is regarded the development authority. SEMAPA has been established to align the interest of various public entities, in particular those of the City of Paris and the SNCF. The leadership styles were predominantly focusing on executing public initiatives from a directing perspective. The crisis at the end of the '80s and the competition for tenants with the La Défense office development resulted in public investments – resulting in the development of the French National Library and a social housing project of 450 units in 1997. Due to a lack of community involvement in the first period, SEMAPA was forced to develop a system of active public involvement. However, the French tradition of planning does still leave an important coordinating and managing role for SEMAPA. The highly increased academic program, additional social housing and additional public space are considered an enhancement to the development authorities’ efforts to develop Paris Rive Gauche. Despite the incorporation of the communal opinion, the regulatory culture and the proactive development of public programs have not caused a major shift in SEMAPA’s leadership styles. As a result of the global financial crisis (2008) a more patient and reactive approach was taken recently towards the development of Paris Rive Gauche. A shift in SEMAPA’s behaviour took place from proactive to reactive leadership styles as a result of the crisis.
Research question: How can public leadership affect the realization of strategic projects in urban development?

The public leadership style of the city of Rotterdam in realizing the Central District development has affected the project in every consecutive round. The extent to which different rounds have complimented one another is arguable; the second round has been a direct consequence of the first round. From a visionary and ambitious project, the development was brought down to earth with a high dose of pragmatism. The third round, with a more collaborative behaviour, can be regarded as a logical consequence of a period of a deterministic mind-set, the consecutive rounds are therefore part of the evolving process and need each other. A direct link between the responsible development authority and the leadership style seems to exist. But a “higher power” that has decided on these changes appears nonexistent. The organisational culture can therefore be regarded as an important intrinsic driver in the public leadership.

The public leadership style of the city of Bilbao in realizing the Abandoibarza project seems to have affected the development. However, the evidence is less strong then in the Rotterdam case. The cause of the decline of the effectiveness can be related to changing circumstances. During the first period, impressive progress is made in the redevelopment of the location, but over time the effectiveness seems to have declined as a result of a decline in the sense of urgency. The direct effects of the public leadership style can therefore be questioned. On the other hand, the argument can be made that the City of Bilbao has succeeded in realizing its desired strategic project, and the alignment of the complex administrative layers through Ria2000 has clearly complemented this. A widespread and shared sense of urgency can therefore be regarded as an important precondition for a successful realization of a strategic project.

The public leadership style of the City of Paris in realizing Rive Gauche has affected the project. After a period of deterministic planning, the French national Library was completed, but due to a lack of community involvement the project got criticism from community action groups. The establishment of a permanent community consultation committee secured the public interests in the process. The consecutive phase is characterized by a high quantity of public program. After its completion the global financial crisis changed the market conditions. The development principles result in a degree of public flexibility in realising Paris Rive Gauche. Perhaps this is the best example of a development authority altering its behaviour – although it can still be seen as a response to a changing market environment. An outline structure of principles incorporated with a degree of flexibility through phasing can therefore be regarded as an important condition for a successful realization of a strategic project.
As a result of this study, the following general remarks can be made concerning public leadership styles in realizing strategic projects. The Paris Rive Gauche case provides an interesting insight concerning the contextual circumstances; an initial frame of reference resulting in realization principles results in a degree of flexibility. Developing a strategic project through separate autonomous projects provides the means to react to changes in contextual circumstances. The Bilbao Abandoibarra case offers an understanding in the participation process; a widespread and shared sense of urgency is an important precondition for a successful realization of a strategic project. Joint problem-ownership unites and speeds up the process of finding consensus for development. The Rotterdam Central District case provides an interesting consideration regarding the organisational culture of the development authority. Organizations interacting with one another bring their own expertise, experience and school of thought to the table. Thus it is commendable to assess the organisational culture of the development authority since it plays an important role in the realization of strategic projects. The advice is: know your own organization before interacting with others.

4.2 APPLICATION TO PRACTICE

This study has produced an assessment of leadership styles that are adopted by development authorities in realizing their goals through strategic projects. A theoretical model for public institutional attitude has been developed and three cases studied. The following section will elaborate further on the application of this study. The aim is to translate the theoretical findings into information that can be applied in practice. This holistic attempt aspires to structure and embed the findings of this study into the day to day work sphere of urban professionals. Development authorities have a variety of instruments to regulate, shape, stimulate and activate the realization of strategic projects. These instruments will be assessed and connected to the public leadership styles model. It is important, however, to bear in mind that the application of this study into practice needs to be further researched. This section addresses the question of how the four public leadership styles can be effectuated through (public) instruments, ultimately aiming at connecting the public leadership styles model to practice.

The work of Adams and Tiesdell (2010): “Planners as market actors” challenges the dichotomous distinction between planning and the market. Their arguments connect to the findings of this study to a large extent and provide an interesting departure point for the application of this study from theory to practice. They argue that markets should be
seen as socially constructed, and not as a given framework. This is in line with the dynamic complexity school of thought. Albrechts (2006 in (Adams and Tiesdell 2010)) points out that in the end “Strategic spatial planning relates to action, to implementation—things must get done!” He calls for effective connections between political authorities and implementation actors (within which category he includes developers) seeing spatial planning not as a form of directional control but rather one of mutual learning. This connects to the contingency approach which is one of the fundamental perspectives of this study. They argue for a more interactive relationship with the private sector, pointing out that it is particularly important in areas of significant urban change, such as strategic projects. If development authorities thus become more conscious regarding their adopted public leadership style, the role towards the market can become more tangible. The acknowledgements of the importance to create consciousness regarding the relationships with other stakeholders might not sound groundbreaking – Faludi (2000 in (Adams and Tiesdell 2010)) however suggests that many planners inherently like to see themselves at the centre of the action, controlling or reining other actors - it thus might require a fundamental change in the public authorities’ mind-set.

Besides the overlapping conception of planning, Adams and Tiesdell (2010) provide the first step towards the effectuation of the four public leadership styles through (public) instruments. Individual leadership styles can be related to a particular set of public instruments that help steer the realization of a strategic project. They define three types of instruments that can be adopted by urban planners and argue that impact operates through three types of policy instrument, intended respectively to shape, regulate and stimulate markets.

**Market-shaping instruments**
These are development, regulatory and indicative plans that set the context for market actions and transactions. These instruments provide information based on policy objectives of the development authority, and focus on potential investments and spatial interventions. They can be seen as a “political position statement”. The disadvantage of these instruments is that the development authority thus aspires to influence the development with a vision, thereby taking responsibility and becoming a problem owner. This can have a negative effect on the collaborative and consensus developing process.

**Market regulating instruments**
This occurs when legal frameworks govern the development of an area. Control and restrictive covenants attached to land transfers, restrict the
parameters of market actions and transactions. A regulatory structure informs the market primarily what is allowed in an area, it thus discourages undesired initiatives. The disadvantage of these instruments is that the development authority might restrict innovation. In addition high and sustained levels of investment are required to effectuate these instruments.

**Market stimulating instruments.**

Development subsidies and compulsory purchase lubricate market actions and transactions can provide profitable market conditions for initiatives and increase the chances for a feasible business case. The disadvantage of these instruments is that the development authority loses its influence on the development outcome. In addition it requires a mature market that is willing to take up the responsibility for the development.

As with the four leadership styles, the three categories are conceptual, and will rarely be found as explicitly in planning documents. Nevertheless, they can often be discerned through careful analysis of such documents. The following figure applies the findings of Adams and Tiesdell (2010) to the public leadership style model. The three types of instruments cannot be allocated to particular leadership styles – a cocktail of instruments is required for any of the styles to become the most effective. Still the various leadership styles have a natural tendency towards the types of policy instrument.

*Figure 33: Adams and Tiesdell in Public leadership styles model*
The next step in this application to practice will incorporate an empirical study that has been conducted in the Dutch context. There is however a high level of overlap with the work of Adams and Tiesdell, which can be considered more abstract.

The work of Braun et al. (2011) provides a valuable assessment of steering mechanisms for development authorities in their quest to realize urban development – the application of their work to this research is highly complementary. It helps making the abstract model applicable to practice. The provision needs to be made that this application of the model only refers to the Dutch context – as a result of varying cultures, regulations and traditions steering instruments differ highly between Spain, France and The Netherlands. Still the application of the public leadership styles model to the Dutch context might prove valuable in making the same step in another system. First of all Braun et al. (2011) confirm that the “role” – in this study referred to leadership style - of development authorities requires a dynamic perspective. It is argued that as a result of changing circumstances a shift in leadership style is required. Secondly the scholars appeal for more awareness by professionals involved in the development of the urban environment, they argue that recognition of the four steering mechanisms results in more integrated resolutions. Again it needs to be emphasized that many intermediate forms of public leadership exist. The model should not be regarded as a static structure. It merely provides an analytical and theoretical framework. Each development authority has several elements from all four leadership styles, thus the same applies to steering mechanisms.

**Regulator:** Market Regulatory instruments (zoning plans, building codes and permits) are examples of legal frameworks governing the development of an area. A regulatory structure informs the market primarily what is allowed in an area, it thus discourages undesired initiatives. The development authority needs a system in which market initiatives are provoked.

**Implementer:** Market-shaping instruments (municipal visions, plans and notes) provide information based on policy objectives of the development authority, focus on potential investments and spatial interventions. This way the development authority can provide stability and demonstrate decisiveness. Development authorities can impose power through expropriation of land.

**Enabler:** Market activating instruments (creating and aligning internal and external affairs) focus on reducing risk and ensuring trust and commitment. Development authorities aim on an increase in the accessibil-
ity and reliability of information. Transparency amongst actors results in an awareness of interests and resolves in combined efforts to realizing common objectives.

Collaborator: Market stimulating instruments (subsidies or direct stimulations) can provide profitable market conditions for initiatives and increase the chances to a feasible business case. Public investments in socio-economic and/or physical space create an added value. Actively exploring Joint ventures and public-private partnerships opportunities articulate public commitment.

It remains a question how urban professionals can take the public leadership styles model into account while coping with the day to day challenges. Can the public leadership model change the way in which development authority’s act and interact in their quest in realising strategic projects? Maybe not but increasing awareness of the impact of leadership roles in development planning could be very productive. Adams and Tiesdell (2010) suggest that planners already serve as market actors, shaping, regulating, and stimulating market activity. But, crucially, planners do not necessarily see themselves playing this role, and are neither aware of their leadership style. The result is that their influence and effectiveness might not be applied to the fullest. The change that is required is not for planners to become urban leaders, but rather to realise that their behaviour can facilitate the development of strategic projects.

4.3 SIGNIFICANCE, CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

It is complicated to generalize from the findings of the three analysed cases, since direct cause and effect of the public leadership in realization strategic projects are not always clear cut. It is uncertain what would have happened if a shift had not occurred. It is difficult to identify the consequences of a different shift in public leadership style. However, there is strong evidence that the leadership style does affect the process to a large extent. The degree of success is also difficult to determine; in the following section, the realization of plans (results) are regarded as success. The degree of community involvement and market participation has had far-reaching consequences for the realization of a strategic project. In the case of Paris Rive Gauche, the project was close to collapse due to a lack of community involvement. The deterministic, proactive and directive leadership style of SEMAPA can be accounted for the lack of community involvement. When this leadership style shifted towards a more collaborative behaviour, the realization of the strategic project evolved with success. In the case of the Rotterdam Central DIS-
district, responsibilities shifted from different public entities within the same development authority. As a result of changing circumstances, different principals were appointed. The different organization cultures are likely to be the cause of the shifts in public leadership style towards the realization of the Rotterdam Central District. On the other hand, the effect of the Ria2000 leadership style has been relatively constant over the course of the development process. However, its effectiveness has declined as a result of changing circumstances in relation to other actors. The effect of the public leadership style is therefore also dependent on the context in which it is applied. This supports the contingency approach; there is not one best solution for public leadership style in realizing a strategic project. Each strategic project, and every consecutive round requires a new assessment of the public leadership styles.

The conclusion can be drawn that the contingency approach as a basis for the theoretical model has been supported through the empirical studies. Different environments and circumstances call for diverse leadership styles. In addition, the various cultures and traditions have a severe impact on the means and baseline position of the development authority. The extent to which generalizations can be made in relating the various strategic projects is questionable. The practice of urban development is interlinked with a high diversity of factors and dynamics. Local differences in political traditions, market conditions, socioeconomic culture, physical constraints, legal setting and environmental issues make every country, region and city different. Also, projects within a city may require different approaches. Because of the sheer size of the analysed projects, locations within a project might involve a nuanced process. This supports the local orientation and bottom-up assessment of strategic projects – since the key to success is differs for each case.

The public leadership style can be regarded as a management approach towards getting a result. To elaborate on this further, the following management metaphor will be presented. In this metaphor the distinction will be made between a manager in charge of a production team and a manager in charge of a team of educated knowledge workers. A manager in charge of leading a production team can – in general terms - have a leadership style with a more directive leadership styles, because the subjects being managed can be steered and evaluated based on measurable results. The direct cause and effect can be determined and standards of work can be set. As a result of the above discussed complexity the supervision of a strategic project relates more towards the management of educated knowledge workers. Cause and effect are less clear and separate aspects of the working process are harder to distinguish. A more individual and personalized management style
is required, employees need to be stimulated and the intrinsic labour ethos is the essence of results. Every staff member can therefore be approached in a different ways; some need more structure and others recognition. In some situations, a more directive style is needed and in others a more stimulating and interactive position will lead to results. The value of this metaphor is that it presents several parallels – circumstances change, every case is different and directive and supportive leadership can alternate. The metaphor however also provides a basis to present a major difference – can a manager change; can development authorities rationally adjust their leadership style?

As a result of the contingency approach, the argument can be made that every problem requires an independent consideration and perhaps a change in leadership style, just as a manager of a knowledge worker would do. The principle difference however is the difference in scale between the individual manager and the development authority in realizing a strategic project. The development authority can be seen as a legal person, but not as one individual making rational decision. The shifts in leadership styles of the development authority are therefore seldom intrinsically motivated, but more a result of changes in the circumstances. In addition, the realization of a strategic project is long term oriented; goals, views and ways of thinking change over the course of several decades as a result of a combination of experience and changing external conditions. The empirical study has provided evidence of development authorities shifting in their behaviour as a result of contextual changes and process changes. To what extent the shifts in behaviour are based on a rational decision within the development authority is questionable. In most of the analysed cases, the shifts are the result of an evolving non-rational process, therefore the argument can be made that the theoretical model might not be an effective operational tool to deliberately alter the public leadership style.

The added value of this theoretical model is its analytical application in understanding the efforts and measures taken by development authorities when coping with changing circumstances. The empirical studies have supplied information regarding the three analysed cases. It would have been good to incorporate more cases into the analytical framework. Cross national cases might prove to be of value since different urban concepts might be applicable elsewhere. The abstract nature of the theoretical model might be less valuable within strategic projects in one nation since the variations in public leadership styles will decrease and the contextual circumstances will become more alike. This hypothesis however needs to be based on empirical evidence which is not provided in this research.
4.4 ORGANISATIONAL CONSEQUENCES

This study calls for contingent and adaptive leadership by public development authorities in realizing strategic projects. This is put in a broader perspective by the Boston Consulting Group. Their publication on adaptive advantage argues that historically, success in the world of traditional strategy relied on scale, efficiency, and first order capabilities. However, we now live in a world with increased turbulence: leadership is less durable, industry boundaries are blurring, and organisations are less able to predict even their own success. In this new world, we must supplement traditional, static strategy with a dynamic, adaptive strategy (BCG 2010). This has direct consequences for the organisational layout of the development authority.

To date, as a result of the global financial crisis, municipal development authorities in The Netherlands are dealing with fundamental issues, such as; “What are our public responsibilities?”, “What risks can we take?” and “How can private actors be stimulated to take up their responsibilities?“. Historically, prescribing authorities have stimulated passive and reactive market attitudes. As a result of the decline of financial means, depletion of land positions and a impassive housing and office market, development authorities are challenged to become more consensus driven and collaborative. Accepting a loss of direct influence and steering mechanisms along the way. This study calls for more adaptive and dynamic leadership through which authorities can exercise future influence. How this will affect the organisation, and how historically evolved values, structures and cultures will change to facilitate new dynamic urban leadership remains the question.

Development authorities are thus assessing their role within the process of realizing public responsibilities and achieving societal goals. In the case of Rotterdam this is a highly pregnant issue, since the three development authorities; Public Works Department (GW); Urban Planning Department (dS+V) and Rotterdam Development Company (OBR) are in the midst of a reorganisation. The three departments will eventually merge into one public authority. Since this study argues that a contingent leadership style in the realization of strategic projects holds great potential, the follow-up question is how to design the organisational structure of the future development authority of Rotterdam, so that it can apply adaptive urban leadership.

Four additional meetings have been scheduled with urban professionals. These meetings discussed the public leadership styles model and its the operational consequences, in particular the design of the organisa-
tion in becoming able to apply adaptive urban leadership. Mr. Westhoff (Director Urban Area Development, OBR) and Mr. Middelkoop (Management Urban Area Development, OBR) are both directly involved with the operation and reorganisation of the Rotterdam Development Authority. Mr. Van Randeraat (Co-founder of Site Urban Development) and Mr. Van der Toorn-Vrijthof (Associate Professor at Delft University of Technology) provide a more distant expert view on the issue. The aim is to formulate the findings concise and practical. This short assessment will provide a holistic view of the issue, it therefore needs to be emphasised that further research is required.

All four experts show a high degree of interest and recognize the findings of this study as concise, realistic and topical. The contingency approach is supported and the four leadership styles are recognized to be represented in practice. Both Middelkoop and van Randeraat assert that when public authorities are in the position to exercising public influence through directive public instruments, it is not always necessary to put them into effect. The public authorities should assess each project and oversee the consequences. Middelkoop states: “The objectives need to provide the means, not the other way round.” Thus supporting the contingency approach. Another common remark is that - as a result of the global financial crisis - most municipal development authorities in The Netherlands are currently assessing for their core values. The main question is: “What are public sector responsibilities, and what are private sector responsibilities”, thus validating the topicality of the issue. Some of the constructive remarks concern the interpretation of the model, regarding it as a frame of reference and not a fixed truth. In addition, Middelkoop comments that the scale level of the public leadership styles model needs to be distinguished. He defines an inter-organisational level of application, organisational level of application and individual level of application. The three levels form the basic structure of this section.

**Inter-organisational level**

In an abstract sense cities are constantly and gradually shifting their leadership paradigm, caused by changing circumstances and innovation. In a general sense the remark can be made that cities have a natural tendency towards one of the leadership styles, as a result of historic evolution of organisational culture and local conditions. Van Randeraat asserts that the development authority of Amsterdam (OGA) has a strong socialist tradition, and has historically been highly involved in steering the urban development of the city. Through the implementation of public instruments a high level of authority is exercised. Over the past three decades Rotterdam has evolved towards a more collabo-
rative, participatory culture. As a result of the global financial crisis development authorities are reassessing their core responsibilities; consequently development authorities are shifting from proactive towards more reactive leadership styles. Rotterdam’s has re-evaluated its public leadership style in 2010, resulting in the current reorganization of the development authorities. Van Randeraat states that Amsterdam is in the midst of such a reassessment, and expects a shift from proactive to reactive public leadership. Whether they will become more collaborative or stay directive remains unclear.

Figure 34: Abstract application of public leadership styles

Remarks on this strategic and abstract level provide an identification of holistic shifts in public leadership perspectives. Shifts on an inter-organisational level are the result of multi-disciplinary decision making, overlapping systems and processes and in particular, unique and locally bound circumstances and traditions. Although it is interesting to recognize the changes, a direct use is difficult to identify and even more complex to implement. As Adams and Tiesdell (2010) suggest it is more important to be aware of the position of public authorities within the market. The added value is the creation of a framework of reference for urban professionals to be aware of - rather than to apply it as a static structure of rules to give direction.

Organisational level
This study argues that the field of urban development is a good example of a complex business environment, subject to changing political, economic, social, technical, legal and environmental circumstances. The environment of urban development is expected to remain turbulent and unpredictable and therefore calls for new approaches to strategy,
organization, and, consequently, leadership. The most effective way to chart a course through uncertainty and constant change is to become more adaptive. Adaptive leaders create the conditions that enable dynamic networks of actors to achieve common goals. Adaptive organizations can be distinguished from more traditional organizations. Adaptive organisations navigate the environment by embracing uncertainty. The following aspects need to be taken into consideration when development authorities aspire to apply adaptive leadership.

+ Situational leadership, let the circumstances decide, emerge from the given context;
+ Scene setting leadership, create and manage the arena in which actors interact;
+ Cooperative leadership, cultivate and embrace a diversity of perspectives;
+ Anticipative leadership, question the world around and forecast future.

However, the challenge with adaptive leadership in regards to public development authorities is the paradox between traditional institutionalized, hierarchic organisations and the contemporary need for operational flexibility. Van der Toorn-Vrijthof argues that hierarchy can restrain innovation. He asserts that management does not necessarily have to be a problem, as long as there is room for debate. One of the main characteristics of self-regulating and adaptive organizations are internal feedback loops – which are independent from the organizational hierarchy. Van der Toorn-Vrijthof however declares that it is easier said then done, public authorities are historically evolved towards the structures that are now in place. Therefore the adoption of adaptive leadership might require a renaissance within development authorities, breaking with the traditional organisational structure.

Both Westhoff and Van Randeraat argue that small, knowledge intensive organizations create optimal conditions to implement situational management. Westhoff both presents the London Development Agency (LDA) as a benchmark. Westhoff describes the London Development Agency as: “A small organisation of 45 professionals that facilitates the development of an area greater than the metropol of Rotterdam”. He continues by stating that: “It is only feasible because London Development Agency knows what their responsibilities are, and perhaps more important; which are not.” Westhoff does make the provision that British Thatcherism has created better circumstances for a small government. The “LDA Investment Strategy 2010-2013” presents their perspective on the role of public authorities in urban development:
In late 2008 the Board reviewed their role. It was done in the light of the tough economic issues facing London, the role and possible functions of a Regional Development Agency, emerging political priorities and the effectiveness of project interventions in tackling market failure. The review concluded that their role should encompass international promotion, business support, climate change, sustained employment, spatial and physical regeneration and deriving the greatest benefit from the 2012 Games. Concentrating on getting the very best value for investments; for this a set of principles shows where to invest, resulting in greater opportunities and benefits. Investments are made where there is a clear market failure, focusing on a measurable impact and where the LDA’s involvement can lead to sustainability when the funding ends. We fund large-scale, flexible projects and get the best value for money.

Middelkoop however asserts that the concept applied in London might be ideal in Dutch theory, but argues that it is not realistic in the Dutch context. Middelkoop argues: “The United Kingdom has a policy framework that is fit for a small role for public offices.” In addition, he argues that the British private sector is more familiar with taking up an initiating role. Middelkoop continues by stating that the development process in the Netherlands is highly dependent on the public expertise of local processes. He argues that the Dutch development authorities provide an indispensable added value through a high and unprecedented level of local knowledge. The challenge is however to create a synergy between public sector and the private sector qualities.

Middelkoop elaborates his view on the organisational layout by sketching the outline of an adaptive public development authority, comprising of experts and networkers. Experts are versatile professionals, adapting to a variety of circumstances and taking a high level of responsibility for the quality of deliverables. Networks are all-rounder’s and connectors of expertise which have holistic knowledge of all sectors. Experience with the rules of political decision making is a prerequisite. Middelkoop continues by arguing that every development requires a unique set of competencies, thus every project team should be different. This requires an organization that is fit for such level of flexibility, and a requires a high level of independence by its professionals.

The figure on the following page presents an abstract representation of a project based organisations, focusing on the synergy between experts and networkers. Whether all experts need to be employed by the development authority is subject to debate. The question addressed here is
Figure 35: Network organisation

not whether a small or larger organization is needed to realize strategic projects. Whether the development authority is “lean and mean” consisting of only networkers or whether it is a large institution combining networkers with sector expertise - the aim is to realize public responsibilities and achieve societal goals.

In an environment in which circumstances are ever changing, flexible and autonomous project-based development is most effective to incorporate a variety of view-points, stakes and interests. Westhoff argues that it requires optimal organisational alignment to integrate knowledge both within and outside the company. Miller and Turner (2003) incorporate uncertainty and complexity in their definition of project-based development:

A project is a temporary organization to which resources are assigned to undertake a unique, novel and transient endeavour that involves managing the inherent uncertainty and need for integration in order to deliver beneficial objectives of change.


Project-based development has direct consequences for the management and the organisational layout of public development authorities. The comments made by the four experts, complimented by the Boston Consulting Group (2010) reports on “adaptive advantage” will form the basis of the following recommendations. There are several requirements for an adaptive, project based organization to be successful. The following comments concerning the organization layout of public development authorities can be made:

- Modular, slim project-based project teams provide flexibility in a changing environment.
+ A limited number of guiding principles need to replace detailed standard operating procedures.
+ Promote adaptive values and encourage individual flexibility and responsibility.
+ Cooperative and horizontal management result in context shaping decision making and stimulate innovation.
+ A focus on individual competencies, and the possibility to create mixed – integrated project teams.

Although the organisational layout provides the dimensions for professionals to become successful, all four experts meetings comment on the fact that the main difference is made by individuals that are involved with the realization of a project. The organization needs to facilitate the individuals to achieving results.

**Individual level**

One of the major challenges of the increase in urban complexity is its effect on professionals involved in urban development. Knowledge of skills, expertise, and core competence are embedded in individuals. A significant increase in the number of professionals spend most of their time perceiving, creating, thinking, and acting on data, information, and knowledge as a means of coping with the increase complexity (Bennett 2002). Urban professionals should learn how to apply their knowledge in collaboration with others, while simultaneously recognizing the range of information and knowledge required to resolve complex problems and situations. To be successful, they must also be able to manage different sources of information in the sense of recognizing, creating, finding, and communication data.

Information integration is highly necessary for successful project management, thus a focus on collaboration by individuals inside and outside a company is required. For this to be successful, it becomes essential to define the organisational boundaries, thus returning to the initial role discussion; “what are their public responsibilities and what are not.” Facilitating the integration of expertise puts pressure on development authorities to reflect on their structure and take action to undergo a transformation that will permit them to work more effectively within the urban development process. Bear however in mind that no evidence has been found that an increase or de-crease in the level of interaction corresponds to respectively an increase or de-crease in performance. Research has shown there is no guarantee that high degrees of interaction lead to improved performance (de Graaf 2005). There are many other factors that influence performance of an development authority; interaction is just one of them and has only limited influence.
Nevertheless, the development process can become more efficient if a synergy is created between individuals within and outside the development authority. For this to occur, the organization must be able to sustain a dynamic balance wherein professionals continuously adapt to each other through cultural and organisational expectations, flexibility, and empathy. In this the aspect of culture will be highlighted, with culture it is meant the set of beliefs of employees about how the work should be done and what behaviour is expected. There are things that the professionals can individually learn, know and do. The stimulation of professional development will significantly impact organisational learning and performance. At the same time, there are many things the organization can do to support and help their professionals to perform more effectively. Both parties will benefit from continuous collaboration and support. As the environment becomes turbulent, nonlinear, and complex this relationship between knowledge workers and their organization takes on even more importance (Bennett 2002). The synergy between organisation and individual is thus essential for development authorities to become able to effectively apply adaptive leadership.

It is arguments that the individuals make a difference in the realization of strategic projects. The final remarks will therefore focus on what could be done to build the operational capacity of planners as professional public leaders. In addition, the remark is made it is necessary for development authorities to change their organisational layout as a starting point for the implementation of their new role. As a prerequisite, urban professionals need to be encouraged to break free from traditional mind-sets that see planning separate from the market. This thinking constrains the potential influence in the realization of strategic projects. An adaptive organisation alone will not turn planners into more effective public leaders. We emphasise that it is more important for individual urban professional to be aware of their position in regards to other actors.

4.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

The research conducted in this thesis has led to an assessment of the role of public authorities in realising their goals through strategic projects. A theoretical model for public leadership styles was developed and three cases have been studied. The recommendations for further research will present uncovered areas that require additional study. This section is structured in three categories, which run parallel to the categories that formed the basis of this study; Context, Process and the Development authority. The recommendations focus on both development of theoretical know-how and its implications to practice.
Context
Although this study has provided information on how circumstances influence the realization process of strategic projects, there is still debate how context influences performance or outcomes. In this research several context factors have been identified. The contingency approach that strategies and programs, like stakeholder interaction programs, are developed based on the specific characteristics of the environment. However, this research is still in an explorative stage of theory development. Hence, there are probably more and other influencing factors from the context that influence the realization process of strategic projects. Thus more research needs to be done to study the influencing factors from the context.

In addition, more research is required to connect circumstances to leadership styles. Particularly in its application to practice it is important to understand what conditions call for a particular leadership style. When this connection is made it should become possible monitor and to make predictions of changing circumstances. Scenario planning will then help development authorities to become more anticipative and proactive in their quest to realise strategic projects. It thus requires more research to become more aware of the surroundings in which development authorities act and interact.

Process
This research has defined public leadership styles from the perspective of public development authorities. It has been pointed out that the development authorities should be regarded as one of a number of market actors. It is suggested that planners already serve as market actors, shaping, regulating, and stimulating market activity. The process of realising strategic projects is thus interlinked through mutual dependence between involved actors. The process of progress is the result of interactions amongst the three defined stakeholder categories (public, private, community). Therefore leadership styles of market and community actors require additional research.

Furthermore, additional examination is needed considering the application of policy instruments. What instruments fit best with what styles?; What new instruments should be developed?; Which combinations are effective to create a desired outcome?; And which instruments can be effective in an individual application, but work contra productive in combination with others? The assessment of instruments cannot be done in a generic manner; varying national policy frameworks, and in some cases differing local policy frameworks, give different implications to practice.
Development authority
It has been argued that a new role for development authorities is necessary, as a result of an increased turbulence: leadership is less durable, industry boundaries are blurring, and development authorities are less able to predict the outcomes of their interventions. This means a shift in the planner’s role from being a technical expert towards a manager of interpersonal relationships, a negotiator and a networker. But how can the traditionally evolved culture of hierarchy be converted to adaptive leadership. Therefore organisational repositioning needs to be taken into account and further researched to facilitate the envisioned role of development authorities.

To conclude, it needs to be emphasized that as a result of the explorative nature of this study, more research is necessary to test, extent and verify the findings of this study and to further develop theory. It is of high importance to focus on research strategies that pay explicit attention to the context in which urban development takes place, because it has been found that context has substantive influence.

4.6 EVALUATION

The process of this research can be divided into two periods. The first period consists of the initial study and the second period can be regarded the primary and final study.

During the first months, the search for a research topic focused on city marketing and the role of iconic buildings. Iconic buildings as a means to market a place let to discussion on the implementation difficulties of projects. The difficulties of realizing a strategic project introduced me to the efforts that public authorities take to influence the urban development. From there on the main focus became strategic planning and the means of development authorities to realize strategic interventions. The shift from strategic projects towards strategic urban area developments was gradual; after studying the added value of strategic projects it became clear that such a building cannot function as a standalone intervention. The role of iconic buildings thus lost their importance in this study.

After demarcating the focus of the study through the theoretical models of De Leeuw and Kingdon, the initial aim was to define success factors for strategic urban developments. The perspective chosen was the development authority and the two other elements that were defined in these theories are the context and the process. During this period, two hypotheses were formulated, the first focusing on dealing with
the contextual dynamics and the second referring to the process. The hypothesis was that anticipation and participation were the two main ingredients to deal with strategic developments. The empirical study resulted in conflicting findings. The literature focused predominantly on a development authority that was subject to a high level of complexity. Dealing with this complexity could indeed be by anticipation and participation, but it left out the more dominant and traditional development paradigms.

This insight led to the primary study. After readjusting the research there was a secondary focus on more detailed theory. This resulted in a theoretical model which was sufficient to incorporate the more traditional planning methods. The new focus narrowed down the research question. Most of the initial empirical data could be used but in some cases more detailed data needed to be gathered. As a result of the second period the final conclusions were drawn up, which have been presented in this report. I consider the whole process a very valuable one for my professional and personal development.

Figure 36: Representation of academic process
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APPENDIX I INTERVIEWEES

ROTTERDAM

Mr. Teun van Ameijden
Management Director Inner City, Rotterdam Development Company

Mr. Cees van Boven
Managing Director, MAB Development

Mr. Dennis Damink
Management Director Rotterdam North, Rotterdam Development Company

Mr. Fons Meijer
Management Director Central District, Rotterdam Development Company

Mr. Peter Pol
Strategist, Rotterdam Development Company

Mr. Joost Schrijnen
Chair of Spatial Planning and Strategy, Delft University of Technology

Mr. Adriaan Visser
General Director, Rotterdam Development Company

BILBAO

Mr. Alfonso Martínez Cearra
General Director, Bilbao Metrópoli-30

Mr. Pablo Otaola
Management Director Zorrozaurre, Bilbao Ría 2000

Mr. Juan Alayo Azcarate
Director of Development Planning, Bilbao Ría 2000

Mr. Mauro Valdivielso Unda
Director of Urbanism and Environment, Bilbao City Council

Ms. Arantxa Rodríguez
Associate Professor, University of the Basque Country
PARIS

Mr. Gilles de Mont-Marin
Managing Director, SEMAPA

Mr. Paul Lecroart
Senior urban planner, Institute of Paris Ile-de-France

Ms. Elsa Martayan
Assistant Commissioner, Paris City Council

ADDITIONAL MEETINGS

Mr. Koen Westhoff
Director Urban Area Development, Rotterdam Development Company

Mr. Geurt van Randeraat
Co-founder, Site Urban Development

Mr. Wout vd Toorn-Vrijthof
Associate Professor, Delft University of Technology

Mr. Lennert Middelkoop
Management Urban Area Developmen, Rotterdam Development Company
APPENDIX II GLOSSARY

**Added value**
The regard that something is held to deserve; the importance, worth, or usefulness of something. (Oxford dictionary)

**Attitude**
A mental position, which results into a certain response of an individual or group to its environment. This definition includes the behaviour of an organisation within its surroundings. (Webster dictionary)

**Complexity**
Having diverse and autonomous but interrelated and interdependent components or parts linked through several interconnections. In the context of an organization, complexity is associated with (1) interrelationships of the individuals, (2) their effect on the organization, and (3) the organization’s interrelationships with its external environment (Business dictionary).

**Directing**
To cause (someone or something) to turn, move, or point in a particular way, command with authority. This definition refers to the public leadership style in realizing strategic developments. (Webster dictionary)

**Interacting**
To come together and have an effect on each other, to work together on a common enterprise of project. This definition refers to the public leadership style in realizing strategic developments. (Webster dictionary)

**Leadership (individual)**
The art of moving a group of people to act towards achieving a common goal.

**Public leadership**
The process of organisational influence in which the aim is to enlist the aid and support of stakeholders, focussing on the successful integration of available resources within the internal and external environment for the attainment of societal goals.

**Master planning**
A comprehensive, long-term general plan for the physical development of a community, embodies information, judgement, and objectives collected and formulated by experts to serve as both a guiding and predictive force (Haar 1955)
Modernism
In its broadest definition, is modern thought, character, or practice. More specifically, the term describes both a set of cultural tendencies and an array of associated cultural movements, originally arising from wide-scale and far-reaching changes to Western society in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. (Wikipedia)

Post-modernism
A movement away from the viewpoint of modernism. More specifically it is a tendency in contemporary culture characterized by the problem of objective truth and inherent suspicion towards global cultural narrative or meta-narrative. (Wikipedia)

Policy
The way, as accepted by decision-makers, to attain one or more given goals. This definition includes the need for a formulation or specification of one or more goals, and a description of the way, mainly by applying different instruments, in which such goals might be attained. (Virtanen and ´t Verlaat 1999)

Private sector
Part of the economy which is both run for private profit and is not controlled by the state. Also referred to as market and business sector. (Webster dictionary)

Process management
Processes are defined as having inputs (holistic goals and objectives), outputs (unique goals and objectives) and the energy required to transform inputs to outputs. In regards to management it is the ability to accomplish the mentioned transformation. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Processmanagement

Project management
A project is defined as a temporary endeavour, having a defined beginning and end, undertaken to meet unique goals and objectives. In regards to management it is the ability to accomplish the mentioned temporary endeavour. Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Project-management

Public administration
Establishments of federal, regional, and local government agencies that administer, oversee, and manage public programs and have executive, legislative, or judicial authority over other institutions within a given area. (Webster dictionary)
Development authority
The establishments of national, regional, and local government agencies that administer, oversee, and manage public programs and have executive, legislative, or judicial authority over the realization of a strategic development.

Stakeholder
A person, group or organization who can have an influence on or will be influenced by the project or its outcomes. (HRSDC)

Strategic planning
A framework consisting of proposals for medium and long-term action accompanied by a mechanism for short-term micro planning (Burges and Carmona 2009). Strategic Planning consists of a number of concrete urban projects, strategically chosen, which once completed could act as generator loci in the urban fabric and infuse it with a new modernity (Bohigas 2003).

Strategic projects
Strategic projects are emblematic and integrated structures which affect a considerable part of the city, the city as a whole or even a region. Beyond functional differences, essential features involved are the relations established between public and private interventions and their economic, cultural, environmental and spatial impacts (Lungo 2004)

Urban
Anything to do with human settlements (large cities as well as small villages) with the exception of purely “rural” activities or interests (agriculture, forestry, countryside recreation and military activities, countryside conservation, etc.). (Virtanen and ‘t Verlaat 1999)

Context
The set of facts or circumstances that surround a situation or event. (Oxford dictionary)

PROVISION
Great efforts have been made to define the terms and concepts used in this study in a comprehensible manner. The possibility however exits that interviewees use the terms differently or have their own interpretations and meaning.
The following writing by the UN Habitat World Urban Campaign inspires me to make a difference, and pursue a career as urban professional.

The next two decades of the 21st century will be an unprecedented momentum in human history. The global population will move from 50 percent urban to 70 percent. This transition to a predominantly urban world is irreversible and it brings with it equally irreversible changes in the way we use land, water, energy and other natural resources.

This transition also places cities at the centre of the climate change agenda. With just over half of humanity living in urban areas, cities already consume 80 percent of global energy output, generate more than 70 percent of all waste, and contribute directly to more than 60 percent of greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, cities are primary victims of climate change. Many of the world’s major metropolises are coastal cities that are prone to flooding and erosion; many other cities are located in drought-prone areas and are already suffering from water-stress.