POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PARTICIPATORY POLICY MAKING

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Preface

It has been a long journey, from the first job interview for the Phd-position, to finally finishing the book that is the result of years of study. Years of labouring, as well, of being fed up with the material, finding new energy, receiving help from all corners, in different shapes.

During that long journey I engaged with a lot of people, that all contributed, some just a bit, some considerably, to the book lying before you. As is rightfully common, I would like to thank them here.

First, I have to thank the Netherlands Centre for Underground Construction. It provided financing for four years of Phd-study. That my study took a little longer the Centre could not foresee. I would like to thank professor Horvat for the trust and great opportunities he offered in my early Phd-years, enabling me to get acquainted with the world of underground construction rapidly (and see quite a bit of the world while doing so).

In my years at Delft University of Technology I had many inspiring colleagues, who helped me along with their intelligent remarks and questions, but also simply made working in a young and vibrant environment fun. Among them my former ‘room mates’ Ad, Annet, Haiko, Jaap and Marijn take in a special place.

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The Dutch Centre for Political Participation I would like to thank for the priceless opportunity it gave by offering the possibility to partake in the research programme ‘Testing Grounds of Local Democracy’. Especially Eisse Kalk, Ingrid Horstik, Hetty Vlug and Pieter Sturm I would like to thank for their ability to be open to criticism that was sometimes a little coloured by youthful black and white thinking, perhaps. In the programme I worked together pleasantly with Jan Willem Duyvendak, Arthur Edwards, André Krouwel, Rob van de Peppel and Anchrit Wille. Among all scholars and would-be scholars I met over the years a special place is taken in by Jurian Edelenbos. Over the years we worked closely, pleasantly and productively together, a co-operation that was even extended, although in a much milder form, after I left the university. It has been a pleasure, all those years.

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Berend Tirion. Firstly, for the trust shown in appointing a young scientist, fresh out of the university world, as a consultant. And secondly, for racing me to the finish, by writing a thesis of his own. A turtle race, but nevertheless... he won.

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I would also like to thank my friends, who helped me carry on at the times when I was totally fed up with the development of this book.

Finally, a word to the three people most important to me, in Dutch.

Thomas, Matthijs en David: ik weet dat ik de afgelopen jaren niet altijd gemakkelijk was. Dat kwam grotendeels niet, maar soms wel een klein beetje, door dit boek. Maar al die jaren, en voor altijd, waren en zijn jullie veel belangrijker voor me dan dit blok papier. Zal ik nu maar eens het leuke boek gaan schrijven dat ik jullie al jaren beloofd had?

René Monnikhof
Leeuwarden, October 2006
CHAPTER 1

PROBLEMS TO DO WITH SPATIAL – AND INFRASTRUCTURAL PLANNING
1.1 DELVING FOR THE CENTRE FOR UNDERGROUND CONSTRUCTION IN A SPATIAL PLANNING MESS

The research from which the results are outlined in this thesis was sponsored by the Dutch Centre for Underground Construction. In the mid 1990’s the Centre became concerned about the fact that in decision-making on spatial issues, especially infrastructure, underground solutions seemed prospectless in the ‘chaos’ of the decision-making process, even in situations in which the Centre deemed them superior. This was attributed among other things to time-consuming decision-making processes, a lack of knowledge among decision-makers of available options, a lack of adequate weighing methodology, and so on (Enserink et al, 1997). I was supposed to develop an adequate policy analytical weighing methodology to support decision-making on spatial issues. After some consultation with decision makers in the field I decided to bend this assignment somewhat towards developing a set of guidelines for policy analysis. These seemed to be in greater demand than a full-fledged accounting tool doing the weighing for decision makers.

Such a set of guidelines had to help solve at least some of the problems in the field of land-use decision-making. I therefore took stock of the main problems in this field first. As a general guideline in distinguishing ‘main problems’ is chosen for distinguishing problems mentioned by most parties in the field, and/or the literature, as such. After mentioning a problem I will focus on the connection of policy analysis to this problem. Most policymaking concerning spatial and infrastructural issues in the Netherlands is supported by analysis. Projects of some size have to be supported by an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA), which for infrastructure projects is often coupled to a Trajectory study. This entails a great deal of research and analysis. But also projects without an obligatory EIA often have a lot of analysis carried out. Not only initiators and proponents of projects carry out analysis, but increasingly also opponents. The analyses carried out are partially an answer to the problems outlined below, certainly influenced by them, but also often contribute to them.
1.2.

GENERAL PROBLEMS OF SPATIAL
- AND INFRASTRUCTURAL
PLANNING AND THE ROLE OF
ANALYSIS

The main problems that plague decision-making in the Netherlands about spatial issues (including infrastructural decision making) are discussed below. Most of them will more elaborately be dealt with in chapter 5. There, also practical conclusions for policy analysis will be derived from them.

1.2.1 | COMPLEXITY

Spatial issues in the Netherlands are often complex. Projects have often to be carried out in or near a densely populated urban environment. Diverse, sometimes unproven technical possibilities play a role in the discussions. Spatial issues have links with congestion/infrastructural issues, environmental legislation, et cetera. Supplementary measures for other problems than the one specifically dealt with are usually the responsibility of other parties, implying other procedures with other initiators. Many (potential) stakeholders are involved. The complexity is also tied to uncertainty and ambiguity. There is usually uncertainty about technical possibilities, about political developments, development of related issues, and so on. There is ambiguity in that the different norms and values of parties involved lead to different interpretations of knowledge and facts (van der Moolen and Voogd, 1995; Teisman, 1992). Many decision-making systems are involved, and many systems of (complex) law. Nevertheless, the judicial system does not determine the process. There are many mutually dependent actors and many possibilities to turn resistance against a proposal into action that slows down or blocks the process (judicial or otherwise). Usually, many interlocking issues and problems influence and are influenced by each other. Some of these issues will be ‘technically complex’ and only understood by experts. Therefore, a lot of political decision-making is ‘implicit’, through technical choices. Knowledge of the many aspects involved will be scattered out among the many different parties (Teisman, 1992).

Handling complexity in analysis: analytical methods and issues

Often when decisions are made on spatial issues in the Netherlands no refined methodology is used to deal with the complexity of the situation at hand (Monnikhof and Bots, 2000). Lack of an undisputed methodology for analysing spatial and infrastructural development projects is common (de Jong, 1999). For calculations on partial aspects of the problem studied, like developments in traffic, sometimes advanced models are used, but not for the assessment and
screening of alternatives. Screening choices are usually made with the help of some kind of not very advanced multi-criteria analysis in several screening rounds (Monnikhof and Bots, 2000). On the plus side, there is a clear development in recent years in dealing with uncertainty. Whereas until recently uncertainty was usually dealt with by either ignoring it, or picking a mid-value from a range to work with, in recent studies uncertainty is more explicitly and sophisticatedly dealt with. But all in all, we can conclude that the analytical methodology used in decision making on spatial issues does not meet with the task of dealing with the complexities of the field.

1.2.2 CO-ORDINATION PROBLEMS

Co-ordination problems with respect to spatial issues are widespread in the Netherlands. Legislation and policy making is compartmentalised (WRR, 1994). Necessary formal decisions are dispersed over all kinds of different procedures, all with their own regulations for objections and appeal. Administrative responsibilities are concerned with a geographically marked out area (the province, municipality) or with a logical functional system border (a water-board covering the water-system). Through the strong spread and division of tasks, responsibilities and powers the effective organisation of integral policy is hindered. Design, decision-making and the execution of activities take place on different scale levels. Simultaneous operations in the same area are often poorly co-ordinated. When taking place, co-ordination between the different administrative layers leads to cumbersome and time-consuming iterations.

Supporting co-ordinated policy: the difficulty of achieving integral analysis

Difficulty with which an integral analysis of complexity can be achieved is common in land use planning in the Netherlands. More and more representatives of the relevant governments are involved in the analysis, but still often only on parts of the analysis. Also, an approach from diverse separated mono-disciplines leads to overlooking relevant aspects (CUR, 1998). Again, analysis does not seem up to the task of supporting the necessary co-ordination sufficiently.

1.2.3 PREMATURE CLOSURE

Decision-making on spatial issues, as on other complex policy issues, suffers from an often-found reflex to reduce complexity as soon as possible. The problem area is marked out and limited, conditions are formulated and the scope of directions for the solution is limited. This can lead to what is known as ‘premature closure’ (Janis, 1972). This means that people involved in decision preparation and choice narrow the problem aspects and/or field of options considered too much too soon, either because of group pressure, habit, or other motives. One motive specific to spatial planning is the necessary attention for the direction and control of the complex
formal structure of procedures. Another is the anticipation of the logic of the court that plays such a large part in land use planning, since the procedures concerning spatial planning give ample possibility for parties to go to court. This would make administrators unwilling to go into real debate on the content of plans, for which the procedures were meant in the first place, since things said in such a real debate could be used against them in court (Drexhage and Pen-Soetermeer, 1996).

**Premature closure in analysis: the type III-error**
Analysis knows its own type of premature closure, known as 'type III-error' (Miser and Quade, 1985). Within the selection of problems and options considered, already narrowed down by premature closure, this leads to the aspects and options that are considered being looked into only partially. Difficult, sensitive, unfamiliar et cetera aspects are (deliberately or not) overlooked. Next, only one or a few of the already limited amount of solution alternatives are elaborated. Moreover, these are regularly designed on only part of the problems defined. For instance, in many road projects lip service is paid to liveability, reducing noise pollution et cetera, while in the elaboration the focus is almost exclusively on lessening congestion. Concluding, type III-errors in policy analysis for spatial issues do at least in some cases contribute to the premature closure in decision making.

### 1.2.4 CONTROVERSIALITY AND RESISTANCE

Decision-making on spatial issues is often plagued by controversiality (de Jong, 1996; Huitema, 1995). Infrastructural planning has a special reputation in that respect (WRR, 1994; van der Moolen and Voogd, 1995). In the Netherlands, spatial and infrastructural planning has been meeting with growing resistance ever since the 1960s. Interest groups, different layers of government, neighbourhood committees and individual citizens object and protest to decisions that are either detrimental to their self-interest, or conflict with their values.

**A source of resistance: the questionable and questioned ‘objectivity’ of analyses**
There is a general tension in analysis on spatial and infrastructure problems in the Netherlands between the image of objectivity and rationality that the government authorities involved try to uphold, and the way their objectivity is doubted by other parties in the process. These doubts are based on a perception of government authorities as either neglecting specific interests, or stronger, being geared towards serving one specific interest, for example that of road construction in the case of Rijkswaterstaat (hereafter: RWS)\(^1\), which is responsible for analysis in the case of national road projects.

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\(^1\) The division of the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management that is among other things concerned with planning, building and maintaining national roads in the Netherlands. It is subdivided into several regional directorates
Subjectivity in analysis can express itself in problem definition. The natural focus of RWS will be on congestion problems, leading to downplaying the importance of other problems or effects. Another option is influencing the assumptions used in alternative design and effect analysis. Also, alternatives can be designed to enable their rejection. Although largely performed by engineers in the case of spatial and infrastructure planning, pledged to a 'rational' way of working, the process of alternative design is in general seen as highly subjective by other parties. Finally, the process of screening and selecting out alternatives, variants and elements during and after the design process is vulnerable to subjective choices. This is exacerbated since the methods used for this are usually not transparent.

One of the means by which lawmakers have tried to ensure objectivity in analysis is by prescribing certain procedures. But this carries the risk of 'ritual dance' by analysts: going through the procedures without belief in their usefulness or intention to use their outcomes. Related to ritualism is what one could call 'putting disturbance at a distance'. This stands for keeping developments that could possibly disturb the process of choosing the favoured alternative(s) and that can not be avoided or ignored unless at great (political) cost, at a distance from the core design, analysis and choice processes. This can for example be done by starting a separate 'open planning process' (see chapter 7), at arms length from the real designing and analytical process.

1.2.5 THE TIME-CONSUMING NATURE OF DECISION-MAKING

Decision-making on spatial issues, especially when it concerns infrastructure, knows a slow, tedious and often messy course. This is tied to the flood of research that is carried out to get to grips with its complexity and uncertainty. The large number of laws and procedures involved, the high number of stakeholders and controversial nature of issues (translated in legal appeals with their own cost in time) also contribute to this (Teisman, 1992; Wolsink, 1996; WRR, 1994). Decision-making turns out to be a more or less fluid process: discussions are intermingled, decisions made before are reconsidered, et cetera. This makes decision-making on spatial issues often unpredictable and hard to control (WRR, 1994).

Time for analysis: the time- and other resources consuming nature of analysis

The complexity and controversiality of decision making on spatial and infrastructure issues have led to a considerable growth in analysis performed for it, either to be able to incorporate 'all' relevant aspects and factors, or to be able to create a 'judge-proof' foundation of choices made. In addition, the diversity of interests involved led to pleas for, and every now and then execution of, a proliferation of effect studies conducted side by side on large projects, like Environmental
Impact Assessments, Safety Impact Assessments, Economic Impact Assessments, Gender Impact Assessments, and so forth. This proliferation of analysis has contributed considerably to the amount of means and time necessary for decision-making on spatial issues.

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The previous leads to a research goal with two aspects. First, there is the type of policy outcome I want to support, formulated here as alleviating the problems with policymaking on land use issues in the Netherlands outlined above. Secondly, I have outlined that many of these problems are related to the way policy analysis is performed in these processes. In light of my background and expertise as a policy analyst I therefore choose for improving the policy analysis performed for these processes as the route to alleviating the aforementioned problems, since I expect to make the largest contribution this way. Of course other elements will influence the extent to which the problems outlined above can be resolved as well, in some cases probably to a greater extent than the analysis performed. Others do study the possibilities of contributions from other angles (for example Edelenbos, 2000). Here the choice is explicitly made to contribute from a policy analytical standpoint, in addition to the other viewpoints already brought forward. In chapter 14 I will return briefly to other elements of influence, and the question as to what extent better analysis (alone) can help in alleviating the aforementioned problems.

This leads to the following research goal:
Developing a policy analytical approach for supporting policy-making on land use issues in the Netherlands, such that it enhances the possibility of making better decisions.

To achieve this goal I have to answer the following questions:
• what is meant by a 'good' result of a policy making process?
• which policy analytical approaches could be used in policy making on spatial issues in the Netherlands in light of the characteristics of that policy making and the policy analysis performed for it?
• by which criteria should the working of the policy analytical approach designed be evaluated?
• in how far does the policy analytical approach as designed meet these measures?

As stated, I take the route of improving policy analytical support of policy making on land use issues, to improve policy making and its outcomes. In this chapter I presented the main problems in policy-making on land use issues necessitating such an improvement of its policy analytical
support. In the next chapter I will give an overview of current problems with the way policy analysis is performed in general, to derive additional clues for the course my research should take. In chapter 3 I will found the research approach taken in ontology and epistemology, and present a more detailed overview of the set-up of the rest of the thesis.

In general this set-up will entail a short outline of the major developments in policy analysis to add to and refine the research questions posited in this chapter. In chapter 3 an epistemological background to the research is added. Then four blocks of theory are presented in the chapters 4 to 7 to derive design guidelines for policy analysis for policy making on land use.

These guidelines are brought together in chapter 8 in a coherent set under a number of intermediate factors.

In the chapters 9 to 11 the theoretical set of guidelines are used to check whether parts of the set of theoretical guidelines are applied in practice, if so, whether they work well, if not, whether their neglect or absence is a hindrance. Also, the cases are used to think up and add additional guidelines to the set, if they seem to provide evidence for the usefulness of these.

The improved set of guidelines is tested in a test case in chapter 12. From this test final conclusions are drawn on the set of design guidelines. In chapter 13 the case findings are used to draw conclusions on which guidelines seem to be supported sufficiently by the cases and which are not.

In chapter 14, the research questions are answered. Further, I reflect on methodological issues of the research carried out, and present some tentative findings on issues not covered by the guidelines that surfaced during the course of the research carried out.
2.1 THE RISE OF POLICY ANALYSIS

Policy analysis, defined broadly here as the collection, processing, and presentation of information on behalf of public decision making, has been around for thousands of years, ever since the advisors to the rulers in early Mesopotamia (Dunn, 1994). But it was the end of the Second World War that marked the beginning of the finest hours of what was to become policy analysis. During this war the technique of operations research had been successfully applied on military issues. After the war policy makers embraced operations research to be applied to all kinds of tactical and strategic issues, which had to be resolved because of the upsurge of many new weapon systems (Enserink, 1993). Operations research is focused on technical efficiency in the sense of maximising effect or minimising cost (Tijink, 1999). Later operations research was tied into the broader analytical perspective of systems analysis (Quade, 1989, p. 25). The analytic methods applied in systems analysis were meant to supply top-level managers with the means for centralised decision-making, in which system analysis should help replace political negotiations by ‘scientific analysis’ as the basis for policy making (Edelenbos et al, 2003).

In the course of time systems analysts in the public field paid more attention to the political dimension of the policy field, through which systems analysis transformed itself into policy analysis, a term surfacing for the first time towards the end of the 1950s. Policy analytical activities were mainly meant to be of assistance in the prioritising of governmental projects (van der Heijden and Thissen, 1996). Policy analysis reached a peak during the sixties and early seventies. I will outline the characteristics of this ‘classic’ policy analysis in the next section.

2.2 POLICY ANALYSIS AS THE SUPPORT OF RATIONAL CHOICES: THE INHERITANCE OF POSITIVISM

2.2.1 LOOKING INTO THE FOUNDATIONS: POSITIVIST ASSUMPTIONS AND RATIONALISM

Policy analysis at its ‘prime’, during the sixties and early seventies, was grounded in a ‘positivist’ view on science, analysis, and the world, and a choice of analytical tools and working-methods consistent with it. The assumption was that outside the researcher there was an objectively knowable reality\(^2\). Knowledge about that reality had to be separated from subjective human

\(^2\) See 3.3. for a somewhat more elaborated treatment of positivism
judgements, for which guarantees in procedures and methods were sought. Therefore ‘objective’ methods like regression analysis et cetera were employed.

Characteristic of positivistic policy analysis is the belief in the possibility to support policy development on the basis of scientific knowledge (Goemans, 1988). A policy problem is for an important part a result of a lack of knowledge or insight. The solution has to be sought in acquiring more knowledge and data on the basis of (policy analytical) research. The results of a policy analytical study are primarily cognitive: knowledge with respect to the relationships among problems, alternatives, consequences and actors (Twaalfhoven, 1999). On the grounds of this a rationally defendable policy for solving an eventually well-defined problem can be developed. When there is sufficient knowledge about goals, conditions, and effects of alternatives, the ‘best’ alternative can be determined in a relatively straightforward way.

The central concept in positivistic policy analysis is (instrumental) rationality. Policy analysis should support rational policy-making. Majone (1989, p. 12) gives the following description of the concept: ‘An actor's choices are considered rational if they can be explained as the choosing of the best means to achieve given objectives.’ It is assumed that it is possible to determine the ‘best means’ per case, also by others than the actor himself or herself. In the evaluation of policy criteria like effectiveness (goal achievement) and efficiency (the relationship between means and effects) play a major role.

### 2.2.2. Utility Theory as Another Important Source of Underlying Assumptions

In the first decades after World War II the science of economics became the main source of ideas and methodologies for public policy. Within the framework of their general theories, economists were successful in innovating quantitative techniques, such as cost-benefit analysis, that delimited alternative approaches to problems (Heineman et al., 1990). The dominance of economics and its background of utilitarianism and welfare theory in the early years of policy analysis led to most policy analyses being driven, explicitly or implicitly, by the framework of utility theory (Quade, 1989).

This theory occupies itself with the way in which individual persons weigh values against each other. The basic idea of the theory is that all values attached to matters by a person can be united in a mathematical function: the utility function. It is assumed that to every state of affairs a certain utility can be attributed. Every decision-maker has a well-defined utility function, and can attach a cardinal number as a measure of his or her appreciation for each set of events in the future. He or she can choose from a likewise well-defined, exhaustive set of alternatives. Furthermore, the decision-maker can attach a probability distribution to all future set of events. Finally, it is assumed that the decision-maker will choose the alternative, or strategy, that will
maximise the expected utility in terms of his utility function (Simon, 1983). This model is based on a number of underlying assumptions, that together form the ‘rational choice’ model. This model assumes that the decision-maker takes in everything that lies before him in one glance. He oversees and understands the whole series of alternative choices he has, not only at the moment they have to be made but also in their future effects. He understands the consequences of every one of the available choice strategies, at any rate insofar that he is able to attach a probability distribution to future states of the world. He has reconciled all his conflicting partial values and synthesised them in a single utility function that arranges all these future states of the world, by the preferences he attaches to them. Values in this model are considered fixed and all facts about the present and future states of the world are available (Simon, 1983). The subjective norms embodied in utility theory were ‘objectified’ in cost-benefit analyses, to be useful for making calculations and giving unambiguous answers on the questions asked. First, to enable calculations, only effects normally expressed in money were considered. Later, in what became known as ‘social cost-benefit analysis’, also the value of other effects normally not expressed in monetary terms, was converted into a money value (Heineman et al., 1990).

2.2.3 STAGE MODELS

Utility theory is a theory of individual decision-making. But it has directly inspired a theory of the policymaking process, called the rational-hierarchical model. In this a government is pictured also as a unitary decision-maker, but this time not with his or her personal utility at heart but with social welfare as the variable to be optimised. The assumption of omniscience is somewhat lessened, which means that the policymaker is supposed to go through a number of stages to find the correct answer to the problem, instead of grasping it in one moment of limitless wisdom. These policy-making stage models vary slightly, but roughly all abate to the following (derived from Twaalfhoven, 1999). First, policy problems appear on the agenda of government decision-makers. Then issues for action are formulated, after which legislation or other action follows. Implementation of the policy by administrators is the next step and finally the policy is evaluated. The stages model represents the process rationality assumptions about policy making underlying the classical model of policy analysis.
Figure 2.1: a stage heuristic of the policy making process, derived from Walker, 1994, p. 3

Policy analysis, supporting the unitary decision-maker, is also supposed to go through a stage model of its own. Characteristic for this heuristic stage model is the purposive acting and the (logical) sequence of a number of different activities. First problems have to be defined and goals and criteria determined. On this basis next an evaluation framework can be constructed, alternatives designed, their consequences estimated and choices between alternatives made (see for instance Dunn, 1994; Quade, 1989). It is usually indicated that iteration between these activities will be necessary because often the insight of the policy analyst will evolve (BraSkapwijk, 1999; Quade, 1989).

Often, the difference between the stage model of policy making and that of policy analysis is rather indistinct, and the stage model of analysis operates as a normative ideal for part of the

3 Remarkable in this model, as in others but not all, is the absence of the stage of creating alternatives. I will return to the topic of creating alternatives in chapter 7
policy making process as well. There is some consensus that the stage model of policy analysis is more limited in scope, with ‘agenda shaping’, choice, and implementation of measures chosen falling outside it, but within the stages model of policy making, but for activities like problem definition, analysis of alternatives and so on, both stages model are often used as if interchangeably.

Recently it has been acknowledged that descriptively the stage models do not provide a good picture of the actual policy process or policy analytical process. Nevertheless, normatively largely coinciding stage models for policy analysis as well as the policy making process are still widely endorsed in positivist policy analysis (Miser and Quade, 1985; compare Majone, 1989). Policy development should be, like policy analysis, an intellectual process on the basis of rational-analytical starting-points (Goemans, 1988; Mayer et al., 2004). Performing a good policy analysis in this view almost completely converges with good policy making. Sometimes it is explicitly stated that an important difference should be that ‘value tradeoffs’ fall outside the policy analysis and are the exclusive domain of the policy makers.

2.2.4. **THE UNITARY DECISION MAKER AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST**

The assumption of the unitary decision-maker entails that either the decision-maker is independent of others in seeing his decision through, or has sufficient control over others to achieve his goals. Normatively, the analyst accepts the goals of the decision-maker as the ones to support. Policy analytical efforts should be instrumental in achieving these goals, finding the appropriate means to accepted ends (Bras-Klapwijk, 1999).

This unquestioned acceptance of the goals of the decision-maker is defended by the assumption, deriving from welfare theory, that policy development derives from an attempt to serve the ‘public interest’. Policy makers are supposed to take decisions that are in the interest of society as a whole and to be able, aided by scientific support, to determine that interest ‘objectively’. This does not rule out, for instance, educating the client about conflicts between his values and helping him sort them out, but in the end the values of the decision-maker are accepted on face value. Policy makers are seen as entitled to decide in favour of this public interest by their democratic legitimacy: they have been elected to do so.

2.2.5. **THE IMPORTANCE OF OBJECTIVITY**

Crucial for achieving outcomes that serve the public interest is the assumption of objectivity. This means that knowledge can be gathered about reality as it is, that facts can be separated from our subjective and normative insights, theories and prejudices (the ‘fact-value dichotomy, Hawkesworth, 1988). It also means that political questions should be separated from scientific
ones. Policymakers should answer the first, and analysts should confine themselves to the second category (Bras-Klapwijk, 1999; Majone, 1989). Although recently it has been recognised that these two kinds of separation can never completely be achieved, this view of a detached, value-free and valuation-free observation and advice is considered an ideal. The (assumed) objectivity of the analyst and the verifiability of the methods used give weight to the information supplied. Quantitative methods are considered more objective than qualitative ones (Bras-Klapwijk, 1999). Objectivity would guarantee an unbiased policy analysis, designed to consider the entire problem and to give all factors and all sides of the question their proper weight (Quade, 1989). An objectively performed policy analysis guarantees that the outcomes also can be regarded as objective, and that decisions based on them serve the public interest.

2.3

BRUISED AND CONFUSED

"It is not clear what policy analysis is, or what it should be." (Dery, 1984, p. 110)

The high hopes of policy analysis of the 60s were dashed one by one in the late 70s and thereafter. During this period criticism grew on the way mainstream policy analysis was performed. Some of the criticisms were already voiced in the fifties, but grew steadily in strength and adherence, until they had grown into a serious threat to the credibility of the profession in the seventies and eighties. A number of main criticisms can be noted.

2.3.1 A BRUISED DISCIPLINE

The posture of value neutrality is impossible and misleading

A large variety of authors have brought forward objections against the positivistic base of traditional policy analysis and its stress on rationality and value neutrality (Durning, 1993; Hawkesworth, 1988). The background of this is a deeper lying epistemological 'war' between the positivistic paradigm and a number of more or less different attempts to establish a new, 'post-modern', paradigm (Mayer, 1997). In post-modern approaches the possibility of objectivity or value neutrality of the researcher is denied. Every observation is coloured by pre-existing ideas, theories of the observer, that influence what will be observed.

Policy analysts also were unmasked as not being value neutral (Brewer and deLeon, 1983; Nystrom, 1996) and influencing the outcomes of their research by overt or hidden assumptions and preferences of their own, often also hidden to themselves (Hawkesworth, 1988). The methods and tools they used incorporated hidden values, in the kind of information they could handle,
the way that information was required to be inserted into them and the way they transformed that information into analytic outcomes (Ligget, 1997; Robinson, 1992). Values also entered an inquiry through the nature of the problem selected for study or the evaluan to be evaluated, the choice of paradigm for carrying out the inquiry, the choice of analysis modes, the choice of interpretations to be made and conclusions to be drawn (Guba and Lincoln, 1990). As a response to the alleged impossibility of value neutrality some policy analysts became overtly advocative instead of value-neutral in the 1970s and 1980s (Hawkesworth, 1988). But most still clung (and cling) to the posture of value neutral ‘technician’ (Heineman et al, 1990).

**The assumptions on rationality are flawed**

Another objection against positivistic policy analysis is its optimistic stance on the rationality of individuals on the one hand, and the rationality of the policy process on the other.

On the individual level *economic man*, with his unbounded rationality and access to unlimited information, was unmasked as a fiction. In reality many data are not available, and when they are, are often ambiguous, incomplete, and so forth (Kingdon, 1995; Quade, 1989). Besides a limited availability of data, also an inability to deal with the information that is available undermined the ‘objective’ approach. The ability of decision-makers to digest information turned out to be limited. They therefore often limit themselves to alternatives that come close to what they already know (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Lindblom, 1959; Simon, 1959). Finally, the way in which information is dealt with is strongly influenced by the way in which decision-makers look upon the world, their ‘conceptual orientations’, ‘frames’, ‘worldviews’, and so on (Lindblom, 1990; Scarpino et al, 1983; Rein and Schön, 1996). This means that the way information will be perceived will always be ‘distorted’ by the standards of a hypothetical all-knowing and ‘objective’ observer.

On the level of the policy process public decision-makers were shown to be driven by other motivations besides (or even in stead of) the public interest, like re-election, status, power, et cetera (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Heineman et al., 1990). Political functionaries will “lie, dissemble, and suppress information whenever it is to their advantage to do so, constrained only by loose conventions of honesty and candor” (Lindblom, 1990, p. 81). Decisions themselves were shown usually not to be the privilege of one man or woman. Often, decisions are taken by groups, with all the irrationality and strife that goes with that (Allison, 1971; Janis, 1972). Also, often many other organisations, united with the public organisation the analyst works for in a so-called ‘issue-network’, ‘policy network’, ‘policy domain’ or ‘policy subsystem’ (Heclo, 1978; Marin and Mayntz, 1991; Nyland, 1995), take decisions that influence the one the analysis is concerned with. If not taking crucial decisions themselves, many of them
are able to influence, block or at least stall decisions of the public decision-maker if they so wish (Braybrooke, 1974; Kingdon, 1995). This in turn meant that in stead of cool-headed rational analysis suggesting what a decision-maker should do, organisational routines, trial-and-error, negotiation, cajoling, persuasion, rhetoric, threat, lobbying, et cetera determine the outcome of policy processes (Allison, 1971; Crozier and Thoenig, 1976; Pappi and Knoke, 1991). In reality policy processes often turn out to be unpredictable, non-linear processes without much structure, in which there is no clear beginning or end of a sequence of stages discernible (Braybrooke, 1974; Cohen et al., 1972; Kingdon, 1995; Kunreuther et al., 1982; Mintzberg et al., 1976).

**The way policy analysis is performed is anti-democratic**

The argument that traditional policy analysis would be antidemocratic stems from an aversion of ‘technocratic’ decision-making (Durning, 1993). The growing specialisation that came with increasing societal complexity led to the rise of a ‘caste’ of policy facilitators/supporters. This caste is not only made up of policy analysts, but also of civil servants, scientists from mono-disciplines, advisors and experts from different fields. Their involvement is used by decision-makers to point to the ‘objective’, ‘scientific’ research that would have been carried out, from which ‘facts’ have come forth that lead inevitably to the best (= adhered to by the concerned decision-maker) solution. Conflict and disagreement with the choice made or proposed is depicted as irrational and illegitimate (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Policy is made in an ‘iron triangle’ of civil servants and experts, administrators and interest groups that can not be evaded (Danziger, 1995; Heclo, 1978). In essence political choices in this way are taken out of the political context and for an important part are brought under the influence of non-elected technocrats, separating them from citizens and laymen (deLeon, 1992; Mayer, 1997; Mayer et al, 2004).

Neo-Marxists and Habermasians gave a more political twist to this argument. They considered scientists and public policy makers as part of the same technocracy by ideology and training. Both were focused to the interests of capital and denied citizens their right to participate. The Frankfurter Schule, Habermas, Foucault and other authors even sometimes considered policy analysts as merely ‘hired guns’ for those in power (Mayer, 1997).

**Policy analysis has little effect on policy making**

The next criticism is somewhat contradictory to the previous one: over the years it became clear that the impact of policy analysis on policy choices was disappointingly small. Policy analysts remained distant from the power centers where policy decisions were made (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Mayer, 1997). The limited use of policy analysis is blamed on the information overload of many decision-makers, which makes any separate piece of information less persuasive to them.
Other explanations are the political-strategic use of analytical findings and politicization of research, which means that every piece of analysis in an issue of some controversy and complexity is countered by studies carried out by opposing researchers, which makes people cynical about the usefulness of scientific findings. Further, most policy analysts lack an independent power base. Also, policy analysts give limited guidance on how specific policies should be implemented, which makes their recommendations sometimes impractical and unrealistic. Finally, policy analysts would be ignorant of the importance of values in the policy process (Heineman et al, 1990).

On the other hand, over a longer period of time policy analysis does have conceptual effects on policy makers – on their mind sets and the ideas they endorse – (Weiss, 1977), the so-called ‘enlightenment’ function of analysis. Nevertheless, from a perspective of direct instrumental use, the impact of most policy analyses is not very impressive.

*When it is heard, the policies don’t work*

When policy analysis is used, in the instrumental sense of the term, the effects of the resulting policies have often been less than satisfying (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Predictions have been known to be wrong, recommended measures did not work or not as well as expected (deLeon, 1988).

A number of possible explanations are brought forward for the inability of policy analysis to provide effective guidance in policy choices. Among these are the difficulty of predicting the future, a tendency of analysts to reason from elegant methods instead of an established cause and the many limited and contending frames that are used by policy analysts, each prone to missing policy effects falling outside the frame (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). The methodological limitations of social science and a lack of adequate theories and fundamental data have also been pinpointed as causes of the limited value to policy making of the rational-scientific approach to policy analysis (Brewer and deLeon, 1983; Hawkesworth, 1988). A lack of focus by analysts on implementation issues and the political nature of decision-making (and implementation) are seen as another explanation for the failure of recommended policies when adopted (Heineman et al, 1990). Finally, as stated above, a growing number of authors blame the positivistic framework on which traditional policy analysis leans. This is considered unfit for analytical tasks and therefore would render bad advice (Durning, 1993).

**2.3.2. A CONFUSED DISCIPLINE**

The mounting critique on policy analysis led to a discipline in growing state of confusion. Some changed their style from value-neutral technician to issue advocate. Some sophisticated their approach to take away points of critique by paying more attention to the political context, by
taking also non-quantitative factors into account (for instance by developing tools like multi
criteria analysis and scorecards), broadening their tool kit, et cetera.
Nevertheless, this could not prohibit several authors from concluding that policy analysis as a
field was divided and incoherent, without accepted paradigm, a well-developed body of theory, or
a set of methods to apply to specific policy problems. Many different conceptions and definitions
of the field abounded (Dery, 1984; Dryzek, 1982; Lawlor, 1996). Also, the field was marked by an
extraordinary variety of technical approaches, reflecting the variety of research traditions in
contemporary social science (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Mayer et al., 2004). The boundaries of
the field were ill-defined, with neither consensus about nor hegemony over the core intellectual
turf. Finally, the field was accused of not having kept pace with advances in relevant social
science (Lawlor, 1996).
Two things, however, remained virtually unchallenged amidst the confusion. First, that policy
analysis is above all a discipline that is committed to (the support of) “problem-solving in a
democratic polity” (Hawkesworth, 1988, p. 14). And, secondly, whatever shape policy analysis
was to take in the future, in principle “policy analysis remains an exceedingly important
approach to the policy process” (Heineman et al, 1990, p. 37).

2.4

A PARADIGM SHIFT: POLICY
ANALYSIS AS INTERACTION

Of course, the picture sketched in section 2.2 is a caricature, which one would be hard pressed
to find in reality, even during the high tide of the positivist approach to policy analysis during the
1960s and 1970s. Most analysts with some refinement were aware of limitations of the
positivistic approach, and consequently moderated the approach by the use of common sense,
or a further refinement of tools and methods they used (Mayer, 1997; White, 1994). More
attention was given to distributive aspects, interaction with the client, and so on.
Individual analysts took up positions that diverged from the ‘hard core’ outlined in 2.2,
advocating alterations or alternatives to it. They acknowledged for instance that stages in the
stage model could be recurring, instead of sequential and once-and-for-all (see for example
Dunn, 1994). Dror pointed out in the late 1960s that there was a need for a perspective broader
than that provided by the prevailing systems analysis approach. A policy analysis orientation
should include consideration of intangible cultural factors, political problems, and organizational
variables that would make studies more useful to policy makers (Heineman et al., 1990).
Wildavsky (1992) was also among the early ones to question the prevailing framework and
advocated for instance more interaction instead of analysis.
The refinement and alterations affixed to the positivistic model were not enough to silence the critique or end the confusion. Other avenues for policy analysis were being explored. These have slowly led to the emergence of what could become a new paradigm for policy analysis, the paradigm of 'policy analysis by interaction'. Of course, some measure of interaction in policy analysis has long been advocated and practiced, especially between analyst and client (see for instance Miser and Quade, 1985; Quade, 1989). But the interaction envisaged in the different 'schools' of the emerging paradigm has a different nature and goes considerably further than that envisaged in the positivistic model. The movement grew in strength during the 80s and took on full force during the 90s. It now seems to be the dominant force in the literature - which is something completely different from the practice of the practitioners -.

**Indications for a new paradigm**

The critique on policy analysis led to many suggestions for alternatives based on assumptions different from those of mainstream positivistic policy analysis. The alternatives are in general characterised by subjectivity and unknowability of ‘the’ reality as epistemological starting point, in contrast to positivism (Hawkesworth, 1988). Applied to the policy process this means among other things that it is acknowledged that participants to it might legitimately have different frames through which they see and value things (Schön and Rein, 1994).

Next it was a logical step to conclude that objectivity of the policy analyst or his analysis was also an illusion. The analytical process is loaded with explicit or implicit value choices, as is the policy process it is meant to support. Policy development as well as policy analysis are ‘contextual’ processes, which means that policy analysis (and policy development) are coloured by the perspectives of those that occupy themselves with it (Mayer, 1997). These should be dealt with explicitly, one way or another.

Also, adherents to the new paradigm acknowledge the lack of all-encompassing rationality in, and the network character and complexity of, the policy process in the real world and try to deal with that in their approach (Hawkesworth, 1988).

The critiques outlined in the section 2.3, and assumptions chosen in response to that, have all found their expression in one main basic cure for the ills of positivistic policy prescribed by the adherents of the new paradigm: participation. This 'modern' policy analysis is therefore sometimes called participatory policy analysis (Durning, 1993, Mayer, 1997). But beyond that single concept opinions diverge, for instance on who should participate in what and why? Several authors have tried to impose structure upon the emerging new paradigm for policy analysis. They distinguish between different forms of discourse or models within this new paradigm (see for instance Mayer, 1997 and White, 1994). These discourses or models differ in the emphasis they put upon participation of different groups, normative background, relative
emphasis on scientific consensus versus intersubjective agreement among laymen, amount of pragmatism and so on. But all these discourses or models assume that there is a plurality of values and arguments available for thinking about any policy issue. Analysis therefore has to take into account or directly include these different points of view. Discourse in participation provides the basis for selecting between options, since science (alone) is no longer believed to be able to provide ‘the’ correct answer (White, 1994).

I will delve deeper into the consequences of this new paradigm for the desired activities a policy analyst should perform in chapter 7. Here I will limit myself to the consequences this rising new paradigm has for the research questions developed in chapter 1.

2.5 Policy Analysis in the New Paradigm: Consequences for the Research Questions

The previous sections give rise to a specification and alteration of the research goal, and questions outlined in chapter 1. Firstly, I outlined the frame shift taking place from ‘classical’ policy analysis towards participatory policy analysis. This raises the question if a more participatory style of policy analysis could provide help in achieving the research goal outlined in this thesis, to develop a policy analytical approach for supporting policy-making on land use issues in the Netherlands, which supports the taking of better decisions.

But since participatory analysis suffers for the time being from a lack of methodical and empirical foundations (Geurts and Mayer, 1996; Mayer, 1997), we first have to provide some methodological foundation for this. In light of the early phase in which most participatory analytical methodology exists, I will satisfy myself with guidelines as a start in this respect.

Authors in the field of participatory policy analysis usually focus on participatory policy analysis as a separate process within the larger policy process. They look upon this partial process in relative isolation. I prefer to take the larger view of the whole policy process, which leads to a number of additional questions with regard to (the methodology of) participatory policy analysis. For one, it raises the question how well the participatory process fits in with the larger policy process. It might work perfectly when seen in isolation, but turn out to be an ineffective ‘fremdkörper’ in the larger policy process. The relation between analysis and the wider policy process is therefore included in the research questions.

Another aspect that arises in especially the larger, more time-consuming and complex policy processes, is the fact that in those processes often a considerable amount of traditional, non-

\(^4\) Since I consider policy analysis as a mean to improve the outcome of that policy process, not the analytical process as such
participatory policy analysis takes place, which raises the issue of the relationship between the two. Do they complement or overlap, and in the second case reinforce or weaken each other? Which one carries greater weight in the policy process? It is not unlikely that at least a part of the methodology of traditional policy analysis might have some value in the new paradigm as well. Its tools or methodology could be attuned to or even incorporated in the methodology of participatory policy analysis. Therefore, I am interested in the relationship between participatory forms of policy analysis, and the more ‘traditional’ forms.

The previous leaves the research goal developed in chapter 1 unaltered:

*Developing a policy analytical approach for supporting policy-making on land use issues in the Netherlands, such that it enhances the possibility of taking better decisions.*

But, in comparison to the previous chapter two research questions are added and one is altered, leading to the following set:

- what is meant by a ‘good’ result of a policy making process?
- which policy analytical approaches, *participatory or otherwise*, could be used in policy making on spatial issues in the Netherlands in light of the characteristics of that policy making and the policy analysis performed for it?
- *how can the relationship between participatory policy analysis and the more traditional forms of policy analysis employed in the policy process be improved?*
- *how can the fit of (results of), participatory or other, policy analytical efforts with the larger policy process be improved?*
- by which criteria should the working of the policy analytical approach designed be evaluated?
- in how far does the policy analytical approach as designed meet these measures?

To be able to answer the questions above, I will first specify more precisely to which aspects any form of policy analytical support should pay attention, by outlining four ‘corners of the policy analytical boxing ring’, within which policy analysis is performed.

### 2.6 A BOXING RING FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

The results of a scientific approach to policy analysis as subject of research should have some extent of generality. However, in the social realm, statements are usually valid only within certain
circumstances (contingencies) and/or for certain objects and/or a certain time frame. The capabilities ascribed to an approach depend heavily on the context of its intended use. Attention to context is vital in choosing, applying or designing a policy analytical approach (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Therefore, one has to aim for generality within a certain circumscribed area, what one could call intermediate or contingent generality. As Brewer and deLeon state (1983, p. 13) “Being contextual requires a comprehensive conceptual framework to direct one’s attention to possibly significant phenomena in a setting and to maintain a tentative, evolving appreciation of the whole.” This raises the question how to delineate this contingent conceptual realm for which the approach should be valid. Luckily, the literature provides some clues as to on which aspects at least choices should be made and where to draw boundaries - however vague and shifting. Four of those will be presented here as aspects on which choices are unavoidable to be able to steer the research outlined in this book. They could be seen as four corners of the policy analytical ‘boxing ring’ in which the approach to be developed should be able to have a fighting chance of success (see figure 2.2).

2.6.1 CORNER ONE: DELINEATING THE PROBLEM AREA

The first topic on which choices are unavoidable when creating a policy analytical approach is the problem field for which it claims validity. Relevance to the solving of practical problems is considered the raison d’être of policy analysis. Problem definition is subsequently considered the most crucial stage in policy analysis (Dery, 1984; Dunn, 1994; van de Riet, 2003; Wildavsky, 1992). Without a problem (situation), there is no (need for) policy analysis. Bobrow and Dryzek (1987) state that policy analysis should be ‘sensitive’ to the kinds of problems the policy analytical approach chosen can comprehend. Different problem fields require different analytical approaches, theories and methods (Brewer and deLeon, 1983). Therefore, to be able to outline a 'general' analytic approach, the limits of its generality with respect to the problem field it can claim to be fitting for, have to be outlined. In chapter 1 I already delineated the problem area for which to develop a policy analytical approach as that of land use planning in the Netherlands. I will go into more depth on the aspects of this problem area in chapter 5.

2.6.2 CORNER TWO: FITTING IN WITH THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

The effectiveness of an analysis carried out, or the way its results are presented, depends on the policy making process in and for which analyses are carried out (Miser and Quade, 1985). Policy processes vary among other things in the number of participants and degree of conflict (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Policy analysis can only contribute to the improvement of the quality of policy
decisions on the basis of an empirically supported picture of the course of policy-making processes, since only such a description provides points of application for changes or improvements (de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof, 1999). Otherwise, mismatches between policy analytical style and results on the one hand, and the policy process in which they are meant to play a part on the other, will result, with probably just another case of non-use of analysis as a result. If an approach has a mistaken image of the policy process, one should hesitate before employing it (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987).

Several authors see the choice here as one between assuming a rational, or rational-comprehensive policy process, or some kind of 'incremental' process. “The incremental-rationalist debate runs though major questions of choice of practical approach in policy analysis. Some approaches lend themselves well to rational analysis, some deny its possibility” (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987, p. 11, 12). In a not too distant past, sympathy usually lay with the rational process (see for instance Miser and Quade, 1985). Nevertheless, Brewer and deLeon saw a shift taking place of many policy analysts to the incremental model.

But the range of theoretical alternatives to the rational model goes by now far beyond the (original) incremental model, and for a defendable choice of assumed policy process at least the other major alternative theories should be considered. Also, instead of choosing on normative grounds - choosing the desired model - , a larger role should be given to the descriptive validity of a model, to avoid the earlier stated irrelevance of analytical results. That attention to descriptive validity is not a trivial prescription is underlined by de Bruijn and ten Heuvelhof (1999), who state that oversimplified ideas about the role of research in decision-making are fed by simple models of the course of the decision-making process.

In the end we can conclude with Heineman et al (1990) that knowledge of the policy process is important for the policy analyst, even if only to get the ‘best’ solution adopted and implemented by the relevant decision-makers and organisations other than the client (Quade, 1989).

Therefore, in chapter 6 attention will be paid to models of the decision making process.

2.6.3 | CORNER THREE: DETERMINING WHICH POLICY MAKING STYLE TO SUPPORT

The next corner, that of determining which policy-making approach to support, might at first be confused with the ‘knowledge of the decision process’ corner. However, this confusion can be largely attributed to a specific view on the policy making process, namely that of (older versions of) the stage model. When, implicitly or explicitly, it is assumed we have to do with a unitary decision-maker, that has access to all necessary information, means and power to carry out whichever solution recommended, the way in which this actor proceeds in his policy-making activities would seem to constitute the decision process.
But in reality many actors play a part in most decision-making processes dealing with spatial issues. In such a process a decision can come about in different ways, by different parties. Each party has its own policy style, by which I mean the repeating patterns of interaction between administrative and societal actors (Knill and Lenschow, 1998).

A policy style can differ per society, and within that society between different policy fields. Differences between policy styles are often made between an active and reactive policy style, and a more consensus oriented versus hierarchical policy style.

Also, different policy styles can co-exist within a policy field or country. Policy analysis has to fit the policy style of the party or parties for which it is meant, which has consequences for the instruments used for it, the way these are used, and so on.

Policy analytical approaches might also be fit for specific policy choices, and not for others. An approach might be for example useful for supporting choices pertaining to process rather than content or for strategic choices within the mission area of a single bureaucracy rather than within the overall scope of a government (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). I make a choice for a policy style to support in chapter 7, where I also develop the implications of this choice for policy analysis.

2.6.4 CORNER FOUR: DETERMINING THE EVALUATION NORM(S)

We can picture a problem area as the landscape in which policy analytical travels have to take place, the decision processes as the kinds of roads we can travel by, and the policy making style as the means of transport by which we want to travel them. Then the question arises: Whereto? If we want to support a decision making approach to achieve a ‘good’ or at least ‘better’ result in a given problem area than would be achieved without support, it becomes crucial to determine what ‘good’ or ‘better’ means in this respect. Knowledge about that is necessary to be able to determine what information is necessary, and how and to whom it should be presented.

Standards for ‘good’ decision-making are by definition normative. Therefore the question arises: What will be the normative framework, values, or evaluation norm(s) by which we will judge the desirability of results of decision making? Without answering this question, it is impossible to design a supporting policy analytical approach, since we wouldn’t know what the design was supposed to help achieve (better). It has been widely acknowledged in the literature that value questions are a critical and inevitable part of policy analysis. Every prescription or advice ultimately relies on normative premises and values affect analysis at all stages (Dery, 1984; Miser and Quade 1985; Rutgers and Mentzel, 1999). In answer to this, it has been pleaded that valuations should be faced and introduced as explicitly stated, specific, and sufficiently concretised value premises (Dunn, 1994).

In short, normative choices have to be made. But the question of which norms to support is a difficult and often debated one. There is an easy way out in this respect. Few analysts address
the normative aspects of their policy analytical efforts explicitly (Brewer and deLeon, 1983). Instead, they take the ‘technician’ posture, looking at the best way to achieve values stated by ‘the decision-maker’ that is the client of the analysis, without making value judgements themselves. But, looking more closely, this road is a dead end street. Most problems for which policy-makers appeal to the sciences are contested normatively (Edwards, 1999). Therefore, choosing the values of the ‘client’ to support means making a value choice in a normatively disputed situation. Since in public decision-making often a diversity of parties are involved, with diverging values and wishes (Quade, 1989), at the least the choice for the values of a specific client should be more generally founded.

The inevitability of normative choices brings along problems of its own. In concrete situations disagreement about standards is well-known. We therefore have to venture into a more general theoretical level, on which there is some agreement about the desirable characteristics of good decision making. I will therefore venture into a bit of political theory to develop a norm to work with. Using this theory I will set up a normative framework for judging decision outcomes as the fourth and final corner of the policy analytical ring. Since much depends on the values chosen, I will start off my theoretical exploration with this, in chapter 4.

2.6.5 Four corners of the policy analytical boxing ring

Concluding, the previous has left us with four theoretical corners I will delve into more deeply in this research as a basis to develop a sound policy analytical approach to supporting decision making on land use issues in the Netherlands. All four corners influence every policy analysis carried out, as well as their effects. They are depicted in figure 2.2.
Now I have outlined the theoretical corners within which the research should take place. But research can take place in many different ways, based on underlying assumptions on reality, the possibility of (objective) knowledge, and so on. Chapter 3 will present the epistemological framework in which this research will take place, and the research approach chosen based on that. After that the theoretical elements touched upon above will be treated in depth in the chapters 4 to 7.
CHAPTER 3

PHILOSOPHY AND RESEARCH APPROACH
3.1 A SCIENTIFIC WORLDVIEW: NATURALISM AND PRAGMATISM

Since Kuhn (1962) the notion that scientists work within a certain paradigm (“the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community”) is broadly accepted. However, not all scientists can be placed within the same paradigm. Paradigms differ between fields of science, but also within these fields, especially within the social sciences.

Everyone planning to do research within the social sciences will therefore first have to define clearly the paradigm within which he or she is planning to work. When doing this one can choose paradigms from other scientific fields, hybrids of these or a paradigm of one’s own making. A paradigm consists of three kinds of statements (Teisman, 1992):
1) ontological, about the nature of the studied object
2) epistemological, about the relationship between the researcher and his object of study
3) methodological, about the way in which the researcher has to work to generate knowledge about his object of study.

3.1.1 Ontology

An important element of a paradigm is the general worldview, or ontology, which the scientist refers to. What is at stake here are the assumptions about the nature of reality that a scientist upholds. The choice of such a worldview in the end is no more than a matter of taste. Every worldview has a number of basic assumptions that cannot be refuted within other worldviews. In the end a battle between worldviews mainly takes place on the basis of the functions and likelihood of such a worldview for its (possible) followers. Its likelihood can be enhanced by the logic of its structure and the extent to which its assumptions coincide with (daily) experience.

I choose a worldview that is known as (evolutionary) naturalism. As with all worldviews it is known under several names, the marking out of it is partially arbitrary and authors are (partially) seen or not seen as proponents of it at will. However, it can be discerned as a separate stream in scientific history and has been documented by Hutcheon (1996), among others. She distinguishes two basic premises of naturalism (Ibid, p. viii):
1. humans are an integral part of the ‘material’ of the universe, as natural as any other part. This implies that all our actions and relationships are as subject to causality as everything else. This conclusion justifies and demands the use of the scientific method in studies into human relations.
2. Humans are different from other animals by having developed a critical consciousness and culture. Firstly here the human role of knower is involved and secondly the human roles of creator and valuator.

A further filling in of the naturalistic ontology has, among other things, the following components (Ibid, p. ix): the idea of knowledge as humanly devised and verified and the belief that morality and creativity are grounded in, and restricted to, human experience.

### 3.1.2 Epistemology

Once an ontology has been chosen, somewhat stricter rules apply for choosing an epistemology: the set of assumptions regarding the relationship between the knower – researcher - and object to be known or researched. An epistemology has at the least to be consistent with the ontology chosen.

**Epistemologies based on a reality ‘out there’**

Several epistemologies are reconcilable with the naturalistic worldview. An epistemology for which this is *not* the case is that of (logical) positivism. In positivism the assumption is that outside the researcher there is an objectively knowable reality, which is characterised by unchangeable (natural) laws and mechanisms. Knowledge about that reality has to be cleansed of subjective human judgements, for which guarantees in procedures and methods can be sought. Objective knowledge can be achieved because in principle a researcher is able to get to know objects as such. Consequently theoretical knowledge can actually be tested against empirical observations. Important is the search for laws and the empirical testing of those. Means for this are induction and deduction, whereby induction concerns the build-up of theory on the basis of empirical observations, and deduction the testing of theory by testing hypotheses empirically (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987). Such a set of views is contrary to the naturalistic notion that knowledge in the end is always developed and verified by humans, and with that can never escape human subjectivity.

A sub-variant of positivism is the contingent approach. This approach assumes that (Teisman, 1992): (1) reality can not be fully known, (2) insight often does not come about by an external observation of the researcher, but by interaction between researcher and research object, (3) the researcher is never objective and therefore has to deliver research that can be criticised, (4) general patterns hardly ever occur in specific situations because too many disturbing variables are present and (5) important insights often come about in the context of discovery and not in the context of justification. Specific situations, contingencies, are decisive for the behaviour and outcomes of the research objects. Still standing are “the postulates that (1) reality exists independent from the researcher and as such can be approximated, (2) reality is driven by law-
like relations between factors that have to be discovered and (3) actors in similar situations will show predictable behaviour (Ibid, p. 112).” Such an approach can in principle be reconciled with naturalism, which does not exclude the existence of an external reality, explicitly takes causal relations as its starting point, but only denies the existence of objectively verifiable knowledge. Another epistemological variant assuming a reality outside the researcher is known as **pragmatism**. Largely concurring with the contingent approach, pragmatism assumes that knowledge is always provisional and only the half-time score in a continuous research process. The crucial test for judging knowledge is the extent to which it allows us to control the consequences that result from our acting on the basis of that knowledge. Within pragmatism the starting point is an indissoluble intertwining of knowing and – subjectively - valuing all aspects of experiences. Pragmatism also is compatible with naturalism.

Finally, Marxist inspired **critical theory** stems as well as the positivists from the assumption of the existence of a reality. But it assumes that that reality can be seen according to two different perspectives, namely the perspective of the ruling groups and that of the suppressed groups. The ruling class uses science to throw dust in the eyes of the weak, and doing this claims objectivity. Adherents of critical theory put opposite that their perspective of the weaker groups. Reliability of knowledge is tested against the chosen perspective of the weaker groups, with which an explicitly subjective starting point is chosen. In itself critical theory is also consistent with naturalism.

**Epistemologies denying a reality ‘out there’**

From speculations in the philosophy of science and knowledge-sociological research a number of epistemological persuasions sprang forth, that questioned the existence of a (objective) reality outside the consciousness of the researcher. The exact classification and labelling of such persuasions varies, but an often distinguished persuasion is that of **constructivism**. This takes as its starting-point the subjective nature of knowledge. Knowledge of reality is an individual or social construction, which is often equated with reality, with which the distinction between knowing and reality disappears. There are many realities, in the shape of mental constructions, which are based on social or empirical grounds, which are influenced by the context of the knowers, that are specific, and of which the form and content depend on the person that has or looks upon the knowledge (Guba and Lincoln, 1990). Reality is constructed on the basis of interaction between researcher and object through empirical research, or created by social interaction. A decisive test of constructions against an empirical object is fundamentally impossible, because no objective reality exists as reference. In itself, this school of thought is not impossible to reconcile with naturalism.

**Social-constructivism (or interactionism)** is a variant of constructivism in which constructivist starting points are supplemented with the notion that reality is a result of social interaction.
Individuals make constructions of the situation in which they find themselves and interact on the basis of those. Arenas and decision processes are the unforeseen result of interaction between actors acting strategically. Because actors can come to different behaviour in similar situations it makes no sense to predict the behaviour of actors in the future on the basis of observations in the past (Teisman, 1992). Things do not exist without a social context but are a reality agreed upon. Knowledge can hardly be tested and predictions are senseless. This ignoring or denying (the predictive working of) (subjectively assumed) causal relations makes this radical variant of constructivism hard to reconcile with naturalism.

Choosing between epistemologies
When in the end a choice has to be made positivism and interactionism/social-constructivism are dropped because of their irreconcilability with the naturalistic ontology chosen. Of the other four schools of thought critical theory is rejected because of the limitedness of the number of perspectives assumed (only two), and the deliberately chosen onesided subjectivity (instead of an attempt to take stock of more subjective perspectives) from which the researchers in that persuasion operate.
This leaves a choice between the contingent approach, pragmatism and constructivism, which all three can be reconciled with naturalism. All three approaches assume that objective knowledge, by the subjectivity of the researcher, is an illusion. In how far an 'objective' reality exists, or only a series of subjective realities, is then hardly relevant. The reality constructions that are constructed and used in science will in all cases be subject to a ‘consensual reality test’ (Holzner and Marx, 1979, p. 106): “Consensual reality tests assess the reality and reliability of knowledge or belief in terms of the criterion of consensual validation. Here what most people agree is real is taken as a validating criterion.” This reality test will, depending on the social setting in which it is applied, be supported by other reality tests. Among these are reality tests on the basis of empirical data, on the basis of the pragmatic criterion whether something works, or is workable, on the basis of the authority of the source of the reality construction, or the formal symbolic structure of the assertions and arguments (Holzner en Marx, 1979). Although most researchers in the tradition of naturalism assume the existence of a reality outside human consciousness (but which can never be known objectively), the cruciality of the consensual reality test in all cases means this is no decisive reason for a choice against constructivism.

Typical for the scientific method of theoretical reality construction is the principle of causal explanation. Causal explanation is typified by three elements (Visalberghi and Tomasello, 1998):
• antecedent and consequent events. Two events come together regularly in a consistent temporal sequence, ideally in spatial nearness of each other.
• an explanatory attitude. This entails that a hypothesis is formed about how the antecedent
causes the consequens. An important aspect of this is that an explanatory attitude means that a ‘web of possibilities’ exists from which the best explanation has to be sought.

- transferring forces. An explanation of why A leads to B contains a transference process or event that connects these two by the web of possibilities. These forces form the ‘how’ and ‘why’ of the predictable sequential relation between the antecedent and the consequens.

Although causal explanations can never be empirically proven (what can be empirically proven goes never further than ‘association’ of two observations, by repeatedly simultaneous or sequential appearance of the ‘alleged’ antecedens and consequens), without the mechanism of causal explanation science is hardly possible. Because of the philosophical impossibility to ‘prove’ a causal explanation empirically, causal explanation in the end boils down to making the causal hypothesis/ies which are concerned cover as many instances as possible. This means that as many instances as possible of the appearance of the antecedens-consequens can be explained by the causal explanation/hypothesis.

Causal explanation is central in naturalism. Within the contingent approach also the principle of causal explanation remains central. Within constructivism this plays a much less pre-eminent role. Because of the scientific importance of causal explanations that rise above the level of one case, constructivism also is dropped as a suitable epistemology.

This leaves pragmatism and the contingent approach as possibilities. Because of the fact that pragmatism is in fact a somewhat broader variant of the contingent approach, of which the broadness is not contrary to the ontology chosen or badly applicable on the research subject chosen, pragmatism is chosen here as the epistemology to work in.

3.2 RESEARCH APPROACH: GROUNDED THEORY

Standing on the (solid?) ground of his ontology, protected by the harness of the epistemology chosen, next the scientist has to choose his weapons: his methodology. This concerns the manner that a scientist chooses to gain knowledge about the object of study. The methodology chosen also should be consistent with the ontology and epistemology within which the researcher operates. Besides that, it is desirable for the methodology chosen to have a certain suitability, or applicability, for the issue to be investigated. For purposes of illustration: action research seems somewhat less suited for conducting historical research into events that took place in the 16th century.
Within the ontology and epistemology outlined in the last paragraph several research approaches are possible. A choice from these will depend, among other things, on time available, fitness of the research object and again matters like personal preference. For the design shaping part of this research an approach is chosen that is known as the “Grounded Theory”- research approach (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Strauss, 1987).

One of the reasons for that choice is the fact that the research object of this thesis is a complex, social phenomenon. To get more grip on that complexity ‘grounded theory’ is necessary. “This means conceptually dense theory that accounts for a great deal of variation in the phenomena studied (Strauss, 1987, p. 1).” The conceptual denseness of a theory is determined by the diversity of categories and attributes and their relationships.

To get a theoretical grip on the complexity of social reality a researcher in the grounded theory approach in essence does three things. First, interpretations and data collection are guided by successively evolving interpretations made during the course of the study. The second point is that a theory, to avoid simplistic rendering of the phenomena under study, must be conceptually dense, with many concepts, and many linkages among them. Finally, it is considered necessary to do detailed and intensive examination of the data in order to bring out the complexity of what lies in, behind and beyond them (Strauss, 1987).

The grounded theory approach is a way of conducting qualitative analysis characterised by a number of things, like theoretically driven collection of empirical material, and certain methodological directives, like making constant comparisons and the use of a coding paradigm, to achieve conceptual development and density. The goal is the development of many concepts and relationships between those to encapsulate a large part of the variation that characterises the central phenomena in every research project.

It is considered recommendable to make use of existing theory at the beginning of the investigation to serve as a spring-board for marking out potential lines of research, to direct in that way the collection of new data for discovering a new (more comprehensive) theory. This existing theory itself also should be grounded carefully in research. To fill in what is left outside the existing theory is a useful first step towards enlarging its span width. This leads to the development of additional categories, which in its turn leads to the generation of ideas about those categories. This leads again to hypotheses.

Next starts the process of “theoretical sampling”, theoretically driven data gathering, whereby the researcher decides on analytical grounds which data have to be collected in the coming period and where these should be sought. This process of data collection is driven by the developing theory.

The core of the ‘grounded theory’ approach is the emphasis on its process character. Research
does not take place in neat, marked out phases in which first on the basis of existing theory hypotheses are generated, next in a delimited new phase data are collected in an experimental setting, that lead in the following phase to testing, supplementation and/or rejection of existing theory. Within a grounded theory approach these activities take place many times in direct interaction during the research process. Although preferably the approach starts with existing theory and a number of hypotheses derived from that theory or about the possible filling in of gaps in it, theory-development is not stopped during the research process. This process is driven by three main activities: data collection, coding and the writing of memos.

*Data collection* takes place in general within case studies, in which for instance observation, interviews, study of (written) sources, but possibly also more quantitative methods such as surveys can play a part.

On the basis of the preliminary theory the data are coded in categories. The first version of the categories is derived from existing theory and hypotheses about supplementation/adaptation of those, but during the research process this set is regularly adapted to the new findings.

“Grounded theory is based on a concept-indicator model, which directs the conceptual coding of a set of empirical indicators. The latter are actual data, such as behavioral actions and events, observed or described in documents and in the words of interviewees and informants. These data are indicators of a concept the analyst derives from them, at first provisionally but later with more certainty (Strauss, 1987, p. 25).” The indicators are compared with each other to come to categorisation, these categories are then transformed in conceptual codes. The indicators are compared with the codes. On the basis of this the conceptual codes are sharpened, until the data do not lead to alterations any more.

Emanating from the process above theoretical ideas come up and are continuously registered, built up and connected through *theoretical memos*. During the process of data collection the theory gets revised and sharpened in many rounds. Based on new theoretical interpretations *between times* the process of data collection is driven and adjusted. Doing the work and doing the analysis are interwoven (Strauss, 1987).

The guided collection of data leads in the end to a sense of rounding off. Core- and supplementary categories come into existence. By data collection a ‘saturation’ of those categories occurs. Hypotheses on different levels of abstraction are developed. These are validated or qualified by guided data collection. Additional categories and hypotheses that come up later in the investigation are connected to the theory.

When in the end a theory is constructed that covers the data satisfactory enough to stop the process of data collection, it is recommended to look into the possibilities of connecting the developed theory with other theories, in so far as these are also ‘grounded’, not speculative, and
fit the data collected. In this specific study, much data was collected during the process by observation, surveys, document analysis and interviews. When the data was analysed during and after the process and gaps appeared in the understanding of what happened, additional document analysis and interviews took place until no new insights were gained and the scoring of the guidelines remained stable.

The grounded theory approach was explicitly developed for complex social phenomena, which makes the approach suitable for the study of (policy making on) complex spatial issues. Also, there is an awareness of the tentativeness and subjectivity of the theory build up through the approach, which fits seamlessly within the ontology and epistemology chosen. A starting point within the grounded theory approach is that “ideas become robust through getting kicked around by many people and “through” many contexts (the constant comparative analysis). Grounded theories are constantly being updated (Strauss, 1987, p. 304)”. Therefore there is an emphasis in grounded theory on publicly sharing and criticising data. Such ideas fit well within the ideas about the frame restriction of reality constructions and the limited durability of scientific theories that is assumed in naturalism.

**Two ways in which grounded theory is used in the research**

The grounded theory approach is, in fact, applied in two rounds in this research. The first of those concerns composing a theoretical framework on the basis of existing theory. Such an exercise also can take place in a grounded theory mode of work, a method recommended also by one of the two ‘fathers’ of the method (Strauss, 1987). The existing written sources of theory then form the data material with which is worked. From this theoretical material design guidelines for policy analysis are derived. And next I use the grounded theory in a relatively novel way: as a design methodology. The concept of designing is usually more tied to technical and ‘hard science’ designing of physical artefacts. But also in the social sciences designing is possible. Designing in that case is often focused on creating methods and instruments for actors to use in their activities to deal with problems. In design research in the social sciences insight into a situation is not the main purpose, but offering a solution for dealing with the situation. The descriptive and analytical parts remain of course important, but are instrumental in creating a design (Edelenbos, 2000).

A consequence of performing research aimed at creating a design is that systematic knowledge and/or insight in a complex study situation is not the (main) goal, but providing tools for dealing with that complexity. Knowledge and insight of course remain relevant, but only in so far that they contribute to providing those tools. Different sources can be used for design in the social sciences, including theoretical insights and knowledge as well as experience and intuition. Insights from empirical material are used to create a design.
In short, design-focused research has the goal of synthesizing insights from theory and empirical material into a design and, if possible, next test this in the practice of policymaking (Edelenbos, 2000). In the research I will synthesise insights from the theory with insights from empirical material to be derived from case studies. In developing a design from these insights I will follow a procedure largely analogous to the grounded theory approach. The design guidelines that are derived from the theory will be adapted during the process. To gather material about their workability, usefulness and necessity I will use a coding approach similar to that used in the grounded theory approach for the development of theory. Finally, the resulting design will be tested on a test-case.

How these activities will be performed in detail, including the selection and set-up of the case-studies, is a topic of chapter 8.

3.3 SET-UP OF THE THESIS

The chosen research approach leads to the following structure of this book. In the first chapter some main problems with policy making on land use were illustrated to derive a research goal and research questions. In the second chapter I outlined in short the major developments in policy analysis to add to and refine these research questions. After the addition of an epistemological background to the research in this chapter, the thesis is divided in four main parts. First, four main blocks of theory on the four essential corners of the policy analytical ring distinguished in chapter 2 are used to derive design guidelines for policy analysis for policy making on land use. In chapter 4 I develop a normative framework for judging policy outcomes. This should guide the development of guidelines (hence the broad grey stripe in the figure), as well as be an instrument to assess the policy outcomes of the case. In chapter 5 I delve deeper into the problem field of spatial planning. This is followed by an exploration in chapter 6 of the different theories of decision making processes that might be used to describe and understand that field. Chapter 7 concludes the theoretical part of this thesis by exploring the different policy styles used in Dutch decision-making on land use. In it a choice for supporting a participatory style of policy making is defended. From the chapters 5 to 7 design guidelines are derived, which are brought together in chapter 8 in a coherent set under a number of ‘intermediate factors’. These intermediate factors are aspects of the discussion- and decision process the guidelines are hypothesized to primarily contribute to.

Next, in part II the theoretical set of guidelines is used to analyse three ‘input generating’ cases, which in turn provide foundation for improving the set. The first case, a ‘baseline’ case of largely
'old style' decision making, deals with the proposed construction of a part of an urban ring-road around the city of The Hague, the Verlengde Landscheidingsweg. The second case deals with the participatory development of a so-called 'structure plan', a long-term spatial plan for the municipality of De Bilt. The third input generating case deals with the participatory development of a zoning plan in the municipality of Doetinchem. All three cases are used to check whether parts of the set of theoretical guidelines are applied in practice, if so, whether they work well, if not, whether their neglect or absence is a hindrance. Also, the cases are used to think up and add additional guidelines to the set, if they seem to provide evidence for the usefulness of these.

The improved set of guidelines is tested in a test case in part III. In this case the set of guidelines that resulted from the confrontation between the theoretical set and the first three cases is consciously applied in a quick-scan on the most desirable way of fitting in a projected High Speed Rail Line in the city of Ede. From this test final conclusions are drawn on the set of design guidelines.

In part IV, chapter 14, the research questions are answered. Further, I reflect on methodological issues of the research carried out, and present some tentative findings on issues not covered by the guidelines that surfaced during the course of the research carried out.
Figure 3.1: set-up of the thesis

Chapter 3: philosophy and research approach

Part I: four corners of the policy analytical ring

Chapter 1: problems with analysis for spatial and infrastructure planning

Chapter 2: policy analysis

Chapter 3: philosophy and research approach

Chapter 4: normative framework

Chapter 5: the problem field

Chapter 6: policy processes

Chapter 7: policy styles

Chapter 8: theoretical set of design guidelines and set-up of case-studies

Chapter 9: historical/hierarchical case: VLW

Chapter 10: participatory case 1: De Bilt

Chapter 11: participatory case 2: Doetinchem

Chapter 12: participatory test case: Ede

Chapter 13: comparing the cases

Chapter 14: conclusions

Part II: input generating cases

Part III: testing the design guidelines

Part IV: answers and findings
CHAPTER 4

PARETO OPTIMALITY WITH A REALITY CHECK
4.1 TRANSLATING VALUES INTO NORMS

As outlined in chapter 2, values inevitably creep into policy analysis, and choices between them not simply have to be made, but are always made, implicitly or explicitly. It seems better to consider those choices explicitly, so they can be made subject to (scientific) debate and possibly improvement. This is advocated by an increasing number of authors (Guba and Lincoln, 1990; Heineman et al, 1990; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). In practice only lip service is paid to considering values in policy analysis. This is rarely translated into discussion about how normative considerations are to be made part of the analysis. Analysts’ findings are still often described as “objective” (Heineman et al, 1990).

Although the picture of the value-neutral analyst as helping hand has crumbled in recent years, one aspect of it usually still stands: the outcomes of policy analyses are intermediate outcomes. They are (just) one of the inputs in a decision making process that yields the outcomes that are of real value: the decision outcomes. Since the raison d’être of policy analysis is defined in this book as supporting policy making processes, norms for policy analysis are considered to have no value in themselves. They are only of value when they contribute to achieving desirable outcomes of the decision process in which they are used. To be able to support the achievement of ‘desirable decision outcomes’, these have to be defined. That is the aim of this chapter.

The way in which values influence policy analysis and other influences on decision outcomes is through norms. These are defined here, following Brewer and deLeon (1983), as “rules governing behavior”. Inside the process analysts and designers use explicit and implicit norms to separate relevant from irrelevant information, ‘good’ and/or appropriate methods from ‘bad’ and/or inappropriate ones, et cetera. Decision-makers use norms to decide which steps to take, which (aspects of) alternatives to endorse, and so forth. From outside the process of decision making two kinds of norms used to judge that process can be discerned in the literature (de Jong, 1999):

• content norms: these are norms concerning the outcome of decision making: the (positive and negative) consequences that a decision has. These norms can operate on different levels of abstraction, from ‘operative’ norms to the most abstract norms of political philosophy, and many intermediary ones.

• process norms: these are norms concerning the way a decision comes about: the question is whether the way in which a decision was reached conforms to certain standards. Standards for the process of decision making can be derived from among others the policy sciences and psychological theories. In decision making often two types of processes are discerned: the
process of ‘will shaping’, or politics, on the one hand, and the process of ‘image construction’, ‘content shaping’, or analysis on the other (Kuypers, 1980, Edelenbos et al, 2000, 2003).

Here, as elsewhere (de Jong, 1999), content norms are considered leading. In the end, policy processes are seen as means to an end, or several ends. Therefore, first a norm or several norms for the desired ends should be uncovered, from which, if necessary, process or procedural norms could be derived in turn. Since we are developing or designing a policy analytical approach, it seems that more pragmatic content norms on a low level of abstraction might be most fitting to use. But this is not so, for two reasons. The first one is that in the policy area where this thesis focuses on (land use planning in the Netherlands) in the course of recent years many decisions have been taken that led to heavy resistance (see chapters 1 and 5). Obviously, there is no broad societal consensus on the norms with which those kinds of projects should be judged. Therefore, the norms of proponents and opponents of these decisions should be up for scrutinising, for which only a norm or several norms on a ‘higher’ level of abstraction seem(s) appropriate.

A more general reason is that my pursuit here is for a - or several - general norm(s) for judging the content of policy decisions. Policy content differs per decision, and therefore this/these general measure(s) should be fit for judging a diffuse content. Norms fit for that should lay at an abstraction level higher than the policy content of a separate decision. But when on separate policy fields content norms of intermediate abstraction are chosen to judge decisions - for instance the ‘sustainability’ of a decision with effects on the environment, effects on ‘competitiveness’ for a decision with economical effects, etc. - a stalemate arises in a multi-peaked landscape of content norms between which still a (relative) choice has to be made. We still have to find a more encompassing norm, or a few norms, to break this theoretical stalemate, even if it’s just a very pragmatic norm of ‘according to laid down views’ or ‘whatever the client prefers’. Here I will aim for a little better-founded normative framework.

There is another specific thing about the norm(s) to be developed here: it is or they are intended to judge the result of public decision making. As defined here, this differs from private (sector) policy making as well as from governmental decision making. Public decision making is defined here as the process of coming to decisions that affect a large number of individuals and groups with usually diverging interests and views. In this process no a priori hierarchy exists between the worth of the different perspectives held by those individuals and groups. It is decision-making that at least partially takes place in the public sphere (Edwards, 1999), and therefore has to cope with many critical eyes watching. It takes place in expanding and crowded policy environments in which everything depends on everything else. Almost always one or more governmental actors on different levels of government will be involved in this process of public

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4 Enhancing the working of democracy, for instance, can be such an end, as well as reducing congestion, improving welfare, et cetera

5 Apart from the rather often great difficulties in giving meaning to these slippery norms, and thereby their limited usefulness in assessing outcomes
decision making, but many other stakeholders (if only as potential beneficiaries or losers of a decision) as well. Power is disbursed and shared by many public and private actors. The consequences of public decisions are often far-ranging, stretch over considerable periods of time, and can carry many indirect or hidden costs. The term public is separated clearly from state or government, to make clear that serving the needs of state or government does not necessarily serve those of the public. The latter term is broader (compare Ventriss, 1997).

This focus on public decision making forces norms to take into account some conception of the ‘public interest’, or ‘common good’ of those involved in it or affected by it. It raises issues of legitimacy and with that even of the foundations for the existence of the player that is usually associated with taking care of the public interest, the government.

This leads to the following outline of this chapter: in section 2 I will motivate my choice for a contract view on government. Then three important views from political philosophy on the foundations of public institutions and action will be presented. These are utilitarianism, the conception of ‘justice as fairness’ of John Rawls and the ‘justice in holdings’ approach to political justice of Robert Nozick. The three views are reconciled with one another in section 4 in one normative framework for the outcomes of decision making, which basically combines a ‘soft’ utilitarian norm with two accompanying procedural norms. A content norm on the level of specific decisions is shown to be fully contingent, depending on the concrete circumstances of each case, and therefore can not be given on a generalised level.

4.2 THREE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES

A fertile way to judge the relationship between citizens and their government, is to see it as an (implicit) contract, in which the tasks that a government has to perform are embodied, as well as the powers and means that these gets transferred by its citizens for that. Within the metaphor of the ‘social contract’ the constitution can be seen as the contractual framework. The more detailed conditions of the contract change constantly, are laid down in laws, but are also partly unwritten. This *contract theory of government (or social contract theory)*, developed by Locke, Rousseau and Kant, entails that the interventions of government in the private sphere of the citizen should not go further than strictly necessary for achieving the goals intended by them. In contract theory mutual rights and obligations between state and citizens are derived from a chosen, mostly abstract starting-point. In general, “contract views, consist [..] of two parts: (1) an interpretation of the initial situation and of the problem of choice posed there, and (2) a set of
principles which, it is argued, would be agreed to (Rawls, 1972, p. 15).” There are many different contract theories, of which Rawls’ Justice as fairness is the most well-known. But there are also interpretations that lead to the classical as well as the average principle of utility (see for instance Harsanyi, 1953). The procedure of contract theories therefore provides a general analytic method from which different outcomes can be derived.

To be able to perform its tasks (‘contractual’ or not) governmental representatives regularly have to make decisions which make some better off at the cost of others. The question central to this chapter is: what norm(s) should guide those decisions (in the field of land use policy)? This is a question of political philosophy. To enable answering that question three important political philosophies will be dealt with next.

The oldest of these is the utilitarian body of thought, which will be outlined through its elaboration in the so-called ‘welfare theory’. An important guiding principle here is formed by the principle of efficiency, or welfare maximisation. “The two contemporary nonutilitarian classics in political philosophy” (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987, p. 217) will be presented after that. The first of these nonutilitarian classics is the work of Rawls, whose ideas of “Justice as fairness” make him the most important representative of the philosophical line of thought within liberalism that attaches a strong weight to the principles of justice and equality.

The second major modern day nonutilitarian political-philosophical work is a libertarian theory by Nozick, the theory of ‘Justice in Holdings’. Crucial in his body of thought is the principal inviolability of property that has been gained in a correct way.

These three theories can be considered the most important modern day normative political philosophies (Lehning, 1986). In the next section it will be shown that they in practice do not have to lead to contrary recommendations for decision making. The principles outlined in them can be combined to one normative framework for public decision making.

### 4.2.1 UTILITARIANISM

“During much of modern moral philosophy the predominant systematic theory has been some form of utilitarianism (Rawls, 1972, p. vii).” Today, utilitarianism is still a widely accepted philosophy (although often held only implicitly, even unknowingly) among academics and professionals to guide their efforts to view and solve problems and make decisions (Ventriss, 1997; Mullineux, 1999). As a ‘lived philosophy’ it is considered very strong in the Netherlands (Oversloot, 1995).

Lehning also discerns a fourth mainstream normative political philosophy, socialism. However, that philosophy has been somewhat discredited since then, and is here considered to form no serious contender to the other three philosophies any more, at least not in the more or less democratic part of the world. Possibly also communitarianism could be seen as an upcoming major political philosophy, but it is still considered premature to judge this body of thought as such.
Utilitarianism takes as its starting point that an action or institution has to be judged by the extent to which it contributes to the achievement of a collective utility that is as large as possible (Heineman et al, 1990). It finds its most explicit elaboration within the social sciences in ‘welfare theory’, the normative branch of economics that occupies itself with the question in how far the ‘utility of the community, or society’ is enlarged or diminished by undertaking a certain project or taking a certain decision. For this diverse human experiences like attending a concert or buying a new car are reduced to one denominator, the ‘utility’ or ‘disutility’ that is derived from them, through which they, in theory, can be compared.

Utility is a technical term that means welfare, or well-being, or satisfaction. It stands for the personally experienced value of a good for the one that ‘consumes’ it. The ‘measuring unit’ of welfare theory is therefore the human experience of diverse sensations. Crucial here is the concept of goods. These are in modern welfare theory in principle all objects or effects that can evoke a sensation of satisfaction or dissatisfaction, pleasure or displeasure, in a person (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). A person commands a larger welfare when his/her number of ‘pleasure’-goods rises, the number of ‘displeasure’-goods diminishes or the package of goods he or she commands changes in such a way that the utility of the total package grows.

Utilitarianism assumes that the welfare of a community is simply the added welfare of its different members. The objective of public policy should be to promote the welfare of society. Moreover, the welfare of society depends wholly on the welfare of individuals (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). It does not matter how the total sum of utility is distributed, but only how large this sum is or, more recently, how high the average utility per person involved. Whether those gaining are for instance rich or poor is in itself considered irrelevant, although it affects the determination of the amounts of utility involved.

Many governmental decisions will create a situation in which certain parties will gain according to their utility perception, and others will lose. To be able to judge whether a rise in total utility occurs, the subjective welfare loss of some will have to be compared with the subjective welfare gain of others. This is extremely difficult, and known as the problem of interpersonal utility comparison. There is no acknowledged correct procedure for making interpersonal comparisons of welfare or way to reach agreement as to how various distributions of welfare should be ranked. The greatest strength of welfare theory lies more in giving a conceptual framework to focus thoughts on an issue than in providing a concrete tool for decision making. As such it can be very valuable (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978).

The first solution proposed for this problem was given by Pareto. His solution mostly boiled down to a circumvention of the problem. We speak of Pareto-optimality when a situation has been

7 The aesthetics of a landscape, for instance, is also covered by this definition
8 Despite this, welfare theory has come up with the widely used evaluation tool of Cost-Benefit-Analysis. Although its usefulness as a structuring device is undisputed here, the common use made of it for given quantified overviews of the advantages and disadvantages of alternative projects or measures is considered misleading here, certainly when it is presented as the possible sole base of decision making on such a project
achieved in which no one can be made better off without making at least one other person involved worse off. All situations in which gains in welfare could be obtained without hurting someone else, have been exhausted at that point (Boadway and Wildasin, 1984). Although reasonably undisputed, the pursuit of Pareto-optimality is of limited use. In most decisions there are one or more losers, consequently with the norm of Pareto-optimality no statements can be made (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978).

To enlarge the practical usefulness of welfare theory several other norms were developed. Well-known is the *Kaldor-Hicks-criterion*, stating that a situation has a potentially higher welfare than another situation when the winners in that situation could fully compensate the losers with respect to the other situation from their gains in welfare and then still have some gains left. According to this norm a decision is good when the total gain in welfare of the winners exceeds the loss of the losers (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978).

The Kaldor-Hicks-criterion enlarged the reach of welfare theory, but stumbled on the before-mentioned problem of interpersonal utility comparison. How does one know whether the gains of the winners will exceed the loss of the losers, when both are expressed in such subjective terms as personal experience of utility, and also can differ per person?

Originally also in this case the problem was circumvented, by limiting the effects considered to those that could be expressed in *money*, and in that way could be compared. But this in turn led to two problems: many effects can not be expressed in monetary terms, or only with great difficulty and strive (Heineman et al, 1990). This leads to a seriously limited assessment. Secondly, money is not a very reliable measure for the utility that parties attribute to effects. It does not have the same utility for everyone -100 euro to a millionaire is not the same as 100 euro to someone living on welfare– (see also Harsanyi, 1953; Michelman, 1967).

The first problem was tackled by also estimating the monetary value of effects normally not expressed in money terms, and taking these estimates into account in appraisals (Heineman et al, 1990). Partially induced by protests against this way of doing it was tried besides that to put monetary and non-monetary effects alongside each other and assess them against each other. This led to the return of the problem of interpersonal utility comparison, on top of the second, unsolved problem of the disputable ‘match’ between the monetary value of an effect and its underlying utility value. Nevertheless the Kaldor-Hicks norm is still (implicitly) dominant in many governmental decisions, including those on spatial issues.

Aside from the problems mentioned above, the Kaldor-Hicks norm is rarely sufficient to make a definitive choice when several alternatives are looked into. Often several efficient solutions are possible, with different distributions of gain and loss. The norm can not select between these, for this some other principle is necessary (Rawls, 1972).
Finally, the norm implicitly takes as a starting-point the inviolability of the current welfare distribution. It is conceivable to execute a project through which parties suffer damage, others experience a smaller rise in welfare and ‘society’ experiences this as desirable, for instance because the winners of such a project are poor. This brings us to questions of ‘justice’, which will be treated first by means of the Rawlsian approach to justice.

4.2.2 JOHN RAWLS: JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS

Partially out of discontent with the implicit acceptation of the status quo by utilitarianism several authors have applied themselves to the justice aspects of decision making. Oddly enough, the most influential relatively recent challenge to utilitarianism as a norm for decision making has come from someone who did not focus on a norm for decision making, but on developing a standard for judging the justice of the basic institutional structure of a society. This was the political philosopher John Rawls.

To develop his standard Rawls appealed to contract theory. He abstracts this contract theory to be able to make statements about principles of justice for judging the basic structure of a society. Also, he posits himself in the framework of rational choice theory. This leads to a point of departure in which rational individuals, focused on their self-interest, gather and choose the principles of a conception of justice that has to regulate all following criticism and reform of their institutions. The choice takes place under a veil of ignorance, which means that everyone when making this choice is unaware of his or her own place in society, status, possessions, capacities, et cetera. They are, however, accustomed with a number of general scientific insights, among which general knowledge concerning human psychology. He calls this position in which he places his subjects the ‘original position’. In this position these rational individuals, according to Rawls, will choose two principles of justice.

First Principle
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.

Second Principle
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both:
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity”
(Rawls, 1972, p. 302).

The first principle requires equality in the assignment of basic rights and duties, like for example the right to vote and freedom of speech. The right to hold (personal) property, and freedom from
arbitrary arrest and seizure also fall under this first principle. Underlying this principle is an assumption that (the preferences of) citizens are taken to be of equal value. The second principle holds that social and economic inequalities are just only if they result in compensating benefits for everyone, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society. It entails that the institutional structure has to be designed in such a way that the worst off group under this structure is at least as well off as the worst off group (not necessarily the same group) under every alternative institutional structure. This second principle Rawls calls the ‘difference principle’.

Rawls’ approach has often been identified with the second principle, the difference principle. Although Rawls himself only applied this principle to the basic structure of a society, it has, in often rather ‘loose’ form, also been applied to separate governmental decisions. Fairly, that possibility is also not wholly excluded by Rawls. With modifications the principles satisfactory for the basic structure could provide the key for some other questions of justice as well (Rawls, 1972, p. 8). However, those modifications are often not made (explicitly). It is simply stated that society is better off when an action or decision improves the welfare of the individuals that are worst off, the welfare of others is irrelevant.

A main problem with applying the difference principle, either to the basic structure or to concrete decisions, is that this leads to a societal welfare that is lower than possible. Decisions or structures that lead to a deterioration, however small, of the worst off groups can not be taken or instituted even when the gain for all others involved is large. There is no weighing of the welfare of the group ‘at the bottom’ against that of other groups in society.

4.2.3 ROBERT NOZICK: JUSTICE OF HOLDINGS

The principles of John Rawls as well as those of utilitarianism are endresult-principles or endstate-principles of distributive justice. Opposite to these stand historical principles of distributive justice, which take as their starting-point that actions or circumstances in the past create different claims. A well-known example of this is the theory of Robert Nozick (1974).

Nozick is the most prominent representative of libertarianism. This body of thought is built on the idea that liberty is the highest moral value. Liberty is foremost the absence of (government) intervention that impedes what one does or wants to do as long as it does not hurt the freedom of others. Justice in this view demands securing individual freedom, not a specific pattern of distribution or a specific distribution rule (Lehning, 1986).
Chapter 4

Pareto optimality with a reality check

Nozick builds upon John Lockes theory of the ‘natural state’. In this state people are protected by ‘laws of nature’, and can ask compensation from those hurting them by breaking these laws. Nozick’s starting-point is formed by the distribution of welfare as it exists at the moment of appraisal, and the way in which that distribution has come about in the course of time. As long as individuals have acquired their welfare according to a number of principles stated by him\(^9\), they have the (property)right to their possessions and no moral claim can be supported to change the existing welfare distribution without compensation. If each person’s holdings are just, then the total set (distribution) of holdings is just. When persons on the basis of luck or their larger talents manage to gain more welfare than others, this is justified on moral grounds. “Whether or not people’s natural assets are arbitrary from a moral point of view, they are entitled to them, and to what flows from them (Nozick, p. 226).” Nozick calls this the theory of ‘Justice in Holdings’.

Nozick strongly opposes the justification of afflicting damage to, or taking of property from, one or several persons by appealing to high-minded concepts like the ‘public interest’, or ‘justice’. He finds this use of abstractions covers up that things in the end always evolve around individual persons. The use of concepts like decisions taken for ‘the public good’, only covers up that some people are benefited at the expense of others. He denies government the entitlement to force this redistribution of welfare from some of its citizens to others, unless this is compensated. In Nozick’s view a change in welfare by governmental intervention should in principle therefore always be accompanied by compensation.

Nozick states a norm that is clear in principle: legitimately obtained property should not be affected without compensation. However, this principle only circumscribes which decisions should not be taken (those that harm existing property without compensation), but is not clear on which decisions should be taken.

4.3 PARETO OPTIMALITY WITH A REALITY CHECK

4.3.1 DRAWBACKS AND LEGITIMACY OF THE NORMS OF UTILITARIANISM, RAWLS AND NOZICK

All norms for judging governmental decisions expounded in the foregoing have problems. Rawls’ ‘difference principle’ would prevent many decisions that would lead to an enlargement of the total welfare of society. The utilitarian Kaldor-Hicks norm gets stuck on the issue of interpersonal utility comparison. Nozick’s principle of Justice in Holdings alone is not sufficient to determine which decisions should be taken.

\(^9\) The principles of ‘justice in acquisition’, ‘justice in transfer’ and ‘rectification of injustice’
But all three approaches also have considerable legitimacy. Utilitarianism has for centuries shown considerable appeal as a guideline to policy makers in their decisions and politicians, scientists and philosophers in their appraisal of decisions (see for instance Michelman, 1967). Rawls’ difference principle, which could be stated popularly as ‘protect the weak’, also is a strong influence on (democratic) decision making and has considerable support among philosophers as well as the general public. Nozicks plea for protecting the property of subjects against a powerful state is embedded deeply in philosophical thought as well as in legislation in many countries. Also, from all three norms valuable insights for a normative framework can be derived. Instead of choosing between them, I will therefore attempt to reconcile them.

4.3.2 A FIRST DEVIATION FROM RAWLS: DEVELOPING A NORM FOR SEPARATE DECISIONS

As Nozick wrote (1974), a present day political philosopher should work within Rawls’ A Theory of Justice, or otherwise explain why he does not do so (see also Lehning, 1986; Olsthoorn, 1996). Therefore I will first state here where I agree with Rawls, and where deviations from his theory are made.

As a reasoning tool I choose, like Rawls, the framework of contract theory, which has proven fertile for directing ideas concerning the relationship between citizen and state, as well as sufficiently flexible to be able to accommodate very diverse insights. As outlined in 4.2, the assumptions chosen when following this procedure are decisive for the outcomes. In that respect I will largely use the basic starting-point of Rawls: parties choose, ignorant about their own position in society, and in the possession of general knowledge about scientific insights, among which human psychology, (a) principle(s) of justice that match(es) their self-interest10.

An important difference with the starting-point of Rawls is that the norm developed here will not be chosen for judging an institutional basic structure of a society, but for judging public decisions within such a basic structure. This focus has many consequences for my relationship to Rawls’ two principles of justice.

Firstly, Rawls’ first principle could be seen as outlining certain basic conditions of a (democratic) society. Since my focus on separate decisions means I will largely take the existing institutional set-up of society for granted, I will not quarrel with this principle.

The focus on separate decisions also has consequences for Rawls’ second principle. Part b of that principle has bearing on the way openness of offices and positions to all is secured. For present purposes it is assumed that this aspect of the institutional structure could also be seen as a ceteris paribus assumption. This leaves us to cope only with part a of the second principle.

10 In reality, of course, it is the philosopher himself, using these fictitious ‘parties’, who chooses (a) principle(s), by moulding assumptions about these parties of stylised humans to fit his purposes. I just hope my creations are more convincing than Rawls’ ones
restated in its often-used ‘separate decision form’: decisions should be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.

Two final refinements are dictated by my more concrete focus. Firstly, the ‘least advantaged’ taken into account, would be the least advantaged group (possibly) involved in the decision, instead of the least advantaged group in society at large. Alternatively, one could take the meaning of society itself as flexible, meaning that for “some decision problems, society will be all the citizens of the country, for others the residents of a neighborhood” (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978, pp. 258, 259).

Secondly, Rawls has the difference principle only apply to primary goods, meaning ‘rights and liberties, powers and opportunities, income and wealth’ (Rawls, 1972, p. 62). As do those applying his principle to concrete decisions, I take ‘benefit’ in the above reformulation of the difference principle to apply to every conceivable form of good.

4.3.3 SECOND DEVIATION FROM RAWLS: GENERAL FACTS ABOUT HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY

Now the focus of possible (dis)agreement with Rawls has been narrowed, the question arises in how much we can share this decision-focused difference principle. Deviations from Rawls’ starting-points are important since they influence the expectations concerning the support that can be expected for a conception of justice. Arrangements that are thought up have to be observed. They have to have stability. “A concept of justice is stable when the public recognition of its realization by the social system tends to bring about the corresponding sense of justice” (Rawls, 1972, p. 177). The sense of justice evoked by the conception of justice should override disruptive inclinations. The persons in the original position are to assume the conceptions of justice they adopt will be complied with. To assure this, general facts of human psychology and the principles of moral learning have to be examined (Rawls, 1972).

All assumptions dealt with in the following arise from the discrepancy of Rawls’ assumption that parties posses general knowledge of scientific facts and knowledge about human psychology with the positioning of his theory in the ‘rational choice’ framework. Rawls choice for the rational choice framework meant he used assumptions that have been disproved convincingly. This weakens the usefulness of the difference principle he derived from those assumptions, at least for concrete decisions. I will therefore adapt or replace those assumptions by others more in line with empirical evidence.

A first major difference with Rawls arises on his embrace of the assumptions on rationality lying behind the rational choice framework. These have over and over again proven to be very far

11 The just savings principle means that a large amount of savings demanded from these least advantaged should be justified by the advantages installed on them by these savings later. Rephased this could be taken to mean that decisions with huge costs to the least advantaged should be justified by at least equivalent benefits to them later on. It therefore adds a time element to the second principle
removed from reality. People deal irrationally and biased in many ways with information that is presented to them (Sabatier, 1988), are ‘myopic’ and act strategically (Dawes, 1988). Therefore the rationality principles of the rational choice framework are not satisfactory for judging decisions when it is known these will be taken in an environment of only partially rational, biased individuals, including decision makers and analysts, ambiguity and so forth.

To compound this problem it has been shown that in most situations the full information that the rational choice approach presupposes is simply unavailable (Lindblom, 1990; Mintzberg et al, 1976). The information that is available is distorted in many ways. This should be taken into account when developing a normative framework for judging decisions.

These two deviations with regard to Rawls’ assumptions mean, for instance, that it can not be assumed that people will accept considerable disadvantages a decision inflicts upon them because over time advantages and disadvantages incurred by separate decisions will even out in the end (Michelman, 1967, see also Rawls, 1972; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). People will not be able to see this ‘greater picture’ when considering a specific decision, because they simply do not know whether they will regain their losses in future decisions. Also, sometimes losses incurred are so large that it is very doubtful whether the summation of other, past and future policy decisions would make them ‘whole’ (Rawls, 1972). It seems necessary to have a norm that makes a decision seem ‘just’ in itself to the parties involved in it at the time, without appeal to other offsetting decisions in the past or future.

Also, in contrast to the assumptions of the rational choice model, preferences are not only intransitive, often ill-defined, but also not stable, and often do not even exist on specific topics prior to them being deliberated (Lindblom, 1990; Wildavsky, 1992). This means that any norm developed has to be able to accommodate changing preferences, and therefore should not assume or stipulate preferences on specific content aspects of decisions.

Finally, I deviate from Rawls’ assumptions concerning basic human motives for behaviour. Rawls rejects the idea of positing a uniform all-covering goal - like for instance utility - as the basic drive behind human behaviour, because eventually the activities/objects to which this goal is tied have to be weighed against each other, and then a diversity of goals play a part. But what utilitarianism really does is not so much replacing all kinds of goals with utility maximisation, but offering utility as a measuring rod to compare those goals against each other. All these different societal goals - sustainability, gaining wealth, et cetera - are accompanied by a rise or decrease in welfare for parties concerned. Objective determination of this measuring unit by an objective outsider is impossible, as outlined above. But what is gained is a theoretical measuring unit and conceptual framework to focus thoughts.

For that reason, we follow here largely utilitarianism in stating that a basic drive behind human action or volition, could be conceived as a human strive to try to feel or become ‘better off’ than
before, where better off can mean everything experienced as such by those concerned. In the well-known language of economics: people are considered to strive for higher utility, either for themselves, in a narrow sense, or for a small circle of people dear to them. What is ‘good’, therefore, is left to individuals themselves to determine.

### 4.3.4 PARETO OPTIMALITY WITH A REALITY CHECK

Time has come to construct a framework from the foregoing. But first, I will sum up what the most fundamental assumptions are that underlie the following framework (most have been treated before):

1. *(The perceptions and values of) people are considered of equal worth and value (normative assumption)*
2. Perceptions and values are changeable and often formed only ‘on the spot’ *(empirical assumption)*
3. The basic drive behind human behaviour is a desire to become better off, in its broadest sense *(empirical assumption)*
4. People are irrational, by no means in possession of anything resembling ‘full information’ and largely driven by self-interest *(empirical assumption)*
5. Democracy is, foremost, a means of achieving desirable outcomes for its subjects (an instrumental view on democracy) *(normative assumption)*
6. Individual (human) welfare is all that ultimately should count in making policy choices *(normative assumption)*
7. There is no undisputed standard for making comparisons between people *(empirical assumption)*
8. There is no moral basis for a government for hurting some individuals on behalf of others *(normative assumption)*
9. All three philosophical bodies of thought outlined have proven their legitimacy in practice *(empirical assumption)*

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12 Although at times pleas are made to take into account the ‘intrinsic value of animals’, and rather often effects of decisions on ‘sustainability’ or ‘the economic climate’ or whatever are considered important, here these are considered nonsensical or impossible to heed. The well-being of animals has never been very convincingly argued by a chicken, but only takes place by intermediation of people (animal rights activists, for instance) that impute their own value pattern into a chicken, rabbit or whatsoever. We can take the preferences of animal rights activists into account, but not directly those of the animals. Analogous reasoning applies for the famous ‘future generations.’ Secondly, I’ve never met a ‘sustainability’ or something like that. In the end this concept could and should be translated into effects on individual humans, the only subjects that feel pain and pleasure, and are able to express it understandably (see also Heineman et al, 1990, p. 87; Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978, p. 262)
What would a norm(ative framework) for judging separate policy decisions based on the above assumptions look like? First, as with regard to the content of public decisions, in the light of our stated central drive behind human behaviour, there seems nowhere to go but back to utilitarianism. Thus, the central norm stated will be one with a strong utilitarian ‘twist’:

I: **Decision goal norm**: a decision is good when it improves the total welfare (in a broad sense) of all involved in it, or at least improves the welfare of some without decreasing the welfare of others.

This norm describes what is called a 'Pareto improvement' in the literature. Such an improvement does not demand to achieve ‘the’ optimal decision (in which no one could be made better off by any other conceivable decision), but only a decision that is good, and therefore meets certain minimal standards. It is a ‘satisficing’ criterion. It is akin to what is called ‘negative utilitarianism’ (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987, p. 108), in that the incremental nature of the norm is more geared towards improving upon agreed-upon ills than achieving some kind of ‘optimal’ grand design.

The norm is stricter than the Kaldor-Hicks criterion, which only demands that a decision could hypothetically make everyone better off, in the sense that the winners could compensate the losers and have something left. Kaldor-Hicks does not demand that this compensation really takes place, which allows decisions that hurt some and help others. Nozick's Justice in Holdings has inspired the strictness of the norm endorsed here, meaning that property legitimately acquired should not be affected without compensation.

The norm, as all utilitarian norms, does not make a once and for all statement on the preferred actual content of decisions, on whatever level of abstraction. It is not so much a norm on the content of a decision, but on the way those involved will perceive the effects of the decision. This is consistent with the fact that preferences are not only unknown, but also changeable. Even if, theoretically, it were possible to derive the preferences of the population on whichever issue concerned, the validity of that would only be short-lived. Preferences evolve in the social interaction of people (Lindblom, 1990). So, what constitutes welfare enhancement (or loss) for those concerned should be determined per situation.

There are two ways to go from here: the first is to stop at this ‘satisficing Pareto-norm’. This would make the norm largely irrelevant for everyday practice, since, as stated before, hardly any public decisions are made that harm no one. The second is to assume that compensation is actually paid, which would considerably enlarge the practical ‘reach’ of the norm. The possibility of compensating should be turned into actual compensation of the losers by the winners.

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13 If desired, the norm could be viewed as an intermediary norm, stating to which norm steps towards a Pareto optimum should live up to, without however ever assuming that such an optimum could ever really be achieved.

14 Like, the decision should be ‘environmentally sustainable’, lead to economic growth, or not destroy any houses.
(compare Michelman, 1967). When all potential losers are thus satisfied and the winners still want to carry on with the decision, it can be concluded that norm I has been met. So, this norm should be supplemented by a procedural norm:

**II) Compensation norm:** those expected to lose from a decision should be compensated for their losses by those expected to win.

However, here our deviations from Rawls on the human psychology come into play. Because, to determine who should be compensated, and by how much, someone should be able to do so. As I have tried to demonstrate, decision makers do not have all relevant information and do not always deal rationally (or unselfishly) with the information that is available. Those who possess the best information about the effects of a decision on their (changing) preferences are the (potential) winners and losers of the decision themselves (Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978). Actually, they are the only ones who can provide a reliable picture of the utility of a decision. Therefore, to be able to judge whether a decision is just in the sense of the two norms presented above, it seems necessary to involve those affected by a decision in the decision-making. Losers themselves should indicate the amounts of compensation needed. So, stakeholders themselves should indicate which positive or negative interest they have in a proposed decision, which makes for a second procedural norm:

**III) Participation norm:** those affected by a (proposed) decision should be allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision.

By stating the three norms above I have made a ‘weakened’ utilitarian norm the cornerstone of my normative framework, and incorporated Nozick's Justice in Holdings in it. However, there is still a need to deal with Rawls’ difference principle if we want to achieve the desired synthesis of the three bodies of thought. When all potential losers of a decision are compensated, this automatically entails compensating the weakest groups also. But this does not mean the difference principle is met: for this to happen, a decision would have to be more profitable for the weakest groups affected by it than any other possible decision for the weakest groups affected by that decision. However, the assumptions chosen, in which it is stated that information is scarce, entail that it is impossible to determine all possible alternatives. Therefore, the normative framework does not comply with the difference principle in its strong original form (which was never intended to judge separate decisions in the first place). It only complies with a ‘satisficing’ reformulation of it - often,

15 This could possibly be qualified following Nozick's three conditional principles for compensation, by screening whether property to be compensated has been acquired or transferred properly

16 An indirect justification for involving those affected in a decision could be found in the statement of Stokey and Zeckhauser (1978, p. 266) that it should be an “ethical principle that each person should be the judge of his own welfare”
explicitly or implicitly, applied in practice: one social state is better than another if it results in a
gain in welfare for the members of a society which are worst off (see for instance Dunn, 1994).
In this form, the principle is met by compensation of all losing groups involved in a decision.

4.3.5 | SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE FRAMEWORK

So, what we have is a normative framework consisting of three norms, which complies with
Nozick’s Justice in Holdings, and with weakened versions of utilitarianism and Rawls difference
principle. To put it otherwise, I have combined a norm for judging decision outcomes with two
norms for judging the procedure necessary in achieving the goal norm. I will build upon the
norms developed in trying to find some analytical procedural guidelines that might help in
achieving a ‘good decision’.

The combination of a ‘utilitarian-type’ norm with especially a procedural participation norm might
help overcome a dichotomy often posited. This is the dichotomy between serving a general
normative-analytic principle, considered to be achievable by technocratic means, on the one
hand, and an interactive -, political -, or bargaining process, where issues are considered to be
simply decided by fighting it out, without much explicit guidance of any principle whatsoever
(compare Stokey and Zeckhauser, 1978; Wildavsky, 1992). What the normative framework
presented tries to achieve is using a participatory/political procedure exactly for achieving a
general normative-analytical principle.

Neither the framework, nor its separate parts, are shockingly new. The norms comprising it all
can be - explicitly or implicitly - observed in practice. A rough sense of utilitarianism seems to
underlie much (official defenses of) government action, at least in the more or less democratic
part of the world. Care for the weak is a phrase that seems to get handed out to politicians when
they take office. And some stronger or weaker form of the protection of property against
wilfulness of the state is often embedded in legislation of democratic countries - for instance in
expropriation law -. This is only desirable, since the purpose of the framework is to provide some
foundation for a practical policy analytical approach. The more closely the framework is in
accordance with existing practices and norms, the better chances a policy analytical approach
developed on the basis of it has for being applicable in practice.

What is claimed to be new, is the combination of the three norms in one framework, backed by
explicit assumptions and reasoning. This explicitness will hopefully make normative conclusions
and recommendations derived from it accountable.

The resulting picture is still rather abstract. For instance, the crucial assumption that information
and cognitive capacities in reality are scarce has more consequences than are outlined above.
The most important one is that of what is called ‘transaction costs’ in the economic literature. These comprise of the costs of gaining information, of bargaining that is needed to find out the true position of parties when they have an incentive to withhold that true position, of making up contracts, monitoring whether these are enforced, enforcing them and so forth (Eggertson, 1990). Transaction costs limit the extent to which any ideal norm could be achieved. This aspect is dealt with by subsuming under the first norm an efficiency norm for the analysis carried out: means used in analysis are lost for other purposes enhancing welfare. This means that the efficiency of the analytical process is a correction factor in judging the welfare of the resulting outcomes. So, although the framework developed in this section is itself the result of replacing highly abstract assumptions with more realistic ones, the result still has to be qualified itself with respect to the day to day reality of decision making. This qualification of the normative framework will take place in developing a set of design guidelines for policy analysis.

In the everyday practice of decision-making a range of norms are explicitly or implicitly used to guide decision-making. This is not the place for an extensive comparison of the norms developed against all these norms in everyday use. I will use two examples to demonstrate, first, the generality of the framework developed, allowing it to encompass most of these everyday norms, and second, its ability to be discriminate between the desirability of other norms nevertheless. A norm often put forward in for example decision-making on environmental issues is that of ‘the polluter pays’. This norm is covered under the compensation norm developed here. When those expected to win should compensate those expecting to lose, this means a polluter, likely a winner from the polluting situation because otherwise the party has no incentive to do so, should pay those suffering from pollution. Another norm popular in (rhetoric in) everyday decision making is that of ‘having the broadest shoulders carry the heaviest burdens’. As long as this means gains from a decision are transferred as much as possible from those already well off to those less well off, this is not in contrast to the framework, and could be an addition to it. When those well off are put on an actual welfare loss by this norm, this is in conflict with the notion of Nozick underlying the framework that no state (or other authority) has a moral right to make some of its subjects better off at the expense of others.

A number of norms are not encompassed in the framework, because they were considered meaningless, nonsensical, just rhetoric or impossible to meet, like paying attention to the ‘intrinsic value of animals’, being ‘sustainable’, and so on. See further footnote 12.

The final question is, what does the normative framework developed in this chapter mean for policy analysis? I could outline one or more consequences of a norm, but these would in this stage be rather general. I will therefore not use the normative framework for direct derivation of design guidelines for policy analysis, but instead as a guideline for the next chapters, from which
I will derive more concrete guidelines for the design of a policy analytical approach for supporting land use planning in the Netherlands. The design guidelines presented in the following chapters are supposed to contribute to a *normatively desired* result as represented by the norms in this chapter. The norms therefore provide the normative background against which design guidelines are developed, as the theoretical findings in the following chapters provide the (hypothesised) empirical background. In chapter 8 the norms, along with the guidelines developed, will be made operational.
CHAPTER 4  Pareto optimality with a reality check
CHAPTER 5

SPATIAL - AND INFRASTRUCTURAL PLANNING
IN THE NETHERLANDS
This chapter deals with the problem situation of spatial and infrastructural planning in the Netherlands. To sketch this policy area, section 5.1 will start with a brief sketch of the characteristics of space in the Netherlands.

In 5.2 I outline the main characteristics of the spatial and infrastructural planning system in the Netherlands. Problems with this system heightened in the 1980s and early '90s. An exemplary case in this respect is the so-called ‘Betuwelijn’, a projected national railroad intended to connect the harbour or Rotterdam with the German hinterland. Because of the considerable influence this project had on (thinking on) spatial and infrastructural planning in the Netherlands, it will be treated in 5.3.

Two characteristics of decision-making on the use of space in the Netherlands stand out, complexity and conflict-proneness (see also chapter 1). Problems with spatial layout in the Netherlands all come forth from attempts to get control of those two aspects of spatial layout in the Netherlands. Problems resulting from the complexity of spatial layout are treated in 5.4, the conflict side will be treated in section 5.5.

Section 5.6 zooms in on the part of policy analysis in decision making on spatial issues, and problems that arise in that analysis. Throughout the chapter from the theory and findings presented, design guidelines for policy analysis in the field of land use planning are extracted. Section 5.7 sums up the design guidelines derived in this chapter.

5.1 SPACE IN A SMALL COUNTRY

The Netherlands is situated at the mouth of large rivers, which has determined its spatial lay-out for centuries. By virtue of its geographical location the Netherlands have since a long time been the port of North-West-Europe, which has led to a concentration of living and working around the harbours, along the rivers and the transport axes to the hinterland. But these are also the areas with vulnerable natural landscapes. From and to the harbour of Rotterdam and Schiphol airport all kinds of transport flows of persons and goods take place.

Economic growth, demographic developments, an increase in mobility and the wish to retain or improve the living environment and nature lead to different, often conflicting claims with regard to the available space, and to an increasing pressure on it. Especially in the densely populated west of the country, the pressure on space is considerable, and is expected to increase in the future. Here the demand for new houses and infrastructure will be largest. The spatial pressure leads in urban areas to adverse effects like noise and visual pollution, stench and safety problems. Where these areas are enlarged, nature and rural space are lost.

Because of the high population density the intensity of the use of space in the Netherlands is the
highest in Europe. Because all space in the Netherlands is allotted to one kind of use or another, there is no ‘free’ space available for new activities. Space in the Netherlands is constructed space. Whether we are talking about the build environment or the ‘natural’ environment, both are the result of centuries of human influence, planning and shaping. Therefore not spatial planning but spatial transformation of already laid-out and used space is the most important issue. This means every spatial decision has to cope with existing interests.

5.2

SPATIAL - AND INFRASTRUCTURAL PLANNING IN THE NETHERLANDS

5.2.1 | THE DUTCH SPATIAL PLANNING SYSTEM

Klaassen (1994) defines spatial planning as the search for and creation of the best conceivable mutual adaptation of space and society, on behalf of that society. To achieve that mutual adaptation a government uses spatial policy. Spatial policy is the way in which a government influences and leads spatial development through a motivated choice from the different possibilities. It is policy concerned with the spatial structure and the quality of the living environment of man.

Spatial planning is not a policy sector on its own, but focuses on a specific facet of the many policy sectors that together form the government task. This facet is composed of the spatial aspects and the spatial effects of the different policy decisions. Spatial planning is no ‘independent’ interest itself, but evolves around the weighing of interests.

In the period studied the Law on Spatial Planning\textsuperscript{17} formed the main foundation for spatial policy in the Netherlands, but a number of other laws influenced the spatial layout of the Netherlands as well. Spatially relevant policy areas are among others traffic- and transport policy, environmental policy, nature policy and water policy. Also general laws, like for instance the General Administrative Law\textsuperscript{18} are regularly applicable. The Law on Spatial Planning has no primacy above other relevant laws (Bemmel, 1996).

In the Law on Spatial Planning a hierarchical planning system on the three administrative levels (national, provincial, municipal) is outlined. On a national level plans are shaped through structure outlines and structure schemes\textsuperscript{19}. On a provincial level the regional plan is the central plan. The municipal administration can determine structure- and zoning plans. The concrete working-out of spatial policy takes place in the zoning plan, the only type of spatial plan that is

\textsuperscript{17} In Dutch: Wet Ruimtelijke Ordening, abbreviated to WRO\textsuperscript{18} In Dutch: Algemene wet bestuursrecht, abbreviated to Awb\textsuperscript{19} In Dutch: Planologische Kern Beslissingen, abbreviated to PKB’s
directly legally binding for citizens. Higher governments are also in principle bound by the zoning plan. To attune the planning on the diverse levels, co-operation between the three administrative levels is assumed. National spatial policy sets up the frameworks for other governments in the Netherlands. The translation of the national 'distribution' of space takes place on a provincial and municipal level. The main parties responsible for decisions about the spatial layout of areas are therefore provinces and municipalities.

The ambitions of the spatial planning system at present have gone much beyond arranging the use of land, and focus among other things on creating conditions for economic growth, contributing to a sustainable environment, et cetera.

An important element in structuring space in the Netherlands has always been the construction of (main) infrastructure. The Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (TPW) decides on the construction of new or extension of existing main infrastructure. The decision-making procedure is geared towards enabling this authority to base a decision on a careful assessment of the necessity of the intervention and its advantages and disadvantages, and of the environmental effects of alternative solutions.

Spatial policy is at times described as ‘dependent policy’. Governments are for realisation of their goals dependent on other governmental institutions on the same administrative level, lower and higher governments, market parties et cetera (Galle, 1995). Agreement of those parties with formulated policy therefore is of interest. Spatial policy is for that reason also consulting- and negotiating policy, allocating scarcity. However, that consultation and negotiation, at least until recently, was mostly confined to other public agencies/authorities. The (implicit) assumption is that these representative bodies, through their public interest focus, should be able to speak for all interests involved.

5.2.2 | POLITICAL CULTURE IN DUTCH POLICYMAKING ON LAND USE

Officially the Netherlands are a decentralised unitary state. In many aspects of the real relationship between central and local government, and certainly in the ideal view of many in central government, it would be more correct to speak of a centralist unitary state. In general there is considerable trust in Dutch public administration in the prospects of central government to steer local policy. Correspondingly, the dominant model in the science of public administration in the Netherlands has long been that of the unitary state, in which sub-national governments are placed in hierarchy below the national government. Administrators as well as scientists tended to see the administration as a rational actor, and took as a starting point that the public administration would be mono-rational, or at least should be. Problems inside public administration were defined in terms of lack of co-ordination, integration and information.
Solutions to these problems were sought in centralisation of the administration, because power would be more effective when it is more concentrated (Derksen, 1985). It is the picture of public administration as a pyramid with national government on top, directing the course of the lower levels of government (Toulmin, op cit in van Gunsteren and Ruyven, 1995).

This pyramid view on government was embedded in a political culture in which participation between (mostly economic and religious) elites and leaders of organised groups has a long history, in the typical Dutch corporatist system known as ‘pillarization’ or ‘pacification democracy’ (Lijphart, 1977). This elite participation was and is geared to depoliticise differences in views and thereby to work as a conflict prevention mechanism, and characterised by a large degree of paternalism. Open negotiation is seen more as a necessary evil than as an acceptable way to create situations in which everybody wins (but a considerable amount of ‘hidden’ negotiation takes place). Trading interests between central government and other government layers is soon seen as blackmail or bribery. In this sense we might typify the Dutch system as a ‘lukewarm’ negotiation model.

Although the pyramid view has been largely discredited in academic circles and replaced with paradigms like that of the network society (see chapter 6), in (national) administrative circles it is still very much alive. It is in contradiction with the large autonomy local governments have on the field of policy making on spatial issues. This leads to a tension between the pyramid view of government endorsed by national government and its in practice curbed powers to have its way.

**Resulting design guideline**

Spatial planning evolves around binding together and weighing many interests. But the Law on Spatial Planning has no primacy on other laws. This means that spatial policy touches upon a lot of topics spatial planners have no jurisdiction about, but have to take into account. For the analyses supporting them this leads to

5.1: map topics and parties from other fields relevant to a spatial decision.

### 5.3 THE BETUWELIJN AS A ‘SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM’

Central government in the Netherlands for a long time acted on the field of spatial policy as if it had sufficient central power to determine policy alone, especially when the construction of infrastructure of a national scale was the topic at hand. But this approach crashed into walls in

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20 A telling reflection of this happened when the minister of Transport and Waterworks entered into negotiations with regions, offering them funds for other investments in exchange for a willingness on their part to introduce toll roads. The chairman of the parliamentary commission on Transport and Waterworks accused her of prostituting with governmental money (Volkskrant, March 1st, 2000)
its efforts to make spatial and infrastructural policy in the 1980s and 1990s. Of considerable influence was the so-called Betuwelijn-project. During the 1980s Rotterdam harbour and the national railroad company, which wanted to revive its ailing goods transport branch, lobbied with the ministry of TPW for the construction of a railroad track from the harbour of Rotterdam to the German hinterland (Siddiqui, 1996; Teisman, 1995). This led to a decision of the minister in 1989 to construct a railroad dedicated to goods transport between Rotterdam and Germany before 1997.

Part of this railroad would pass through the Betuwe, an area of considerable natural beauty, roughly in the centre of the country. The resistance against the degradation of the landscape and the nuisance the project would cause, took forceful support from attacks against the foundations of the project in terms of economic payoff and benefits to the environment. Arguments brought forward for the project kept on shifting, from enhancing the competitiveness of Rotterdam Harbour, stimulating goods transport by rail, arguments of 'sustainability', to accelerating economic growth (Huigen et al, 1993). All arguments got demolished over the years, among others by economists and the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment, which finally led to the minister of TPW declaring the project was of importance because of its 'strategic' nature... (Pestman, 1998).

Vehement debate on the project went on for years, in which none of the arguments of central government managed to convince opponents of the project. But central government persisted in a classical ‘Decide-Announce-Defend’ strategy (Vlek, 1995), rejecting any ideas and alternatives brought forward by outside parties21. It saw statements from other government layers that they opposed the nuisance the project would cause as strategic behaviour, not as sincere opinions (Huigen et al, 1993; Teisman, 1995). Provincial and local government did everything in their power to slow down the project, action groups occupied buildings on the designated track nominated for destruction. Sometimes central government conceded, for instance in promising tunnels on contentious parts of the route. Cost estimates of the project rose from around 900 million euro in the early stages to 4,7 billion euro according to the latest estimates (estimate ministry of TPW December 2004). Many appeals on the judicial system were made, and some granted, slowing down and complicating the project. Nevertheless, in January 1996 the final decision to construct was taken.

The Betuwelijn project was in some respects a watershed (Pestman, 1998). It illuminated that national government lacked the power to bring projects like this smoothly to completion when local and regional governments resist it. Although its formal instruments give central government an edge on local government, in practice it hardly ever carries out sanctions when municipalities do not meet their obligations. A reason for this is that the formal arrangements do not reflect the

21 For instance, ideas were put forward on letting the canal shipping trade take care of any possible growth in the demand for goods transport to the German hinterland
real power balance between national and local government. Although central government, besides formal powers, also has an advantage in the fields of available finance and expert knowledge on most policy fields, local government is able to match this (at least partially) by a large edge in information on local circumstances. This makes it virtually impossible for central government to produce a local zoning plan, when municipalities refuse to do so or slow down the process as much as they can (Derksen, 1985).

The Betuwelijn experiences made national government ask the Scientific Council for Government Policy for an advice on how to improve the quality of decision making on large projects in the Netherlands. The report, entitled ‘Decision making on large projects’ (WRR, 1994) diagnosed that the problematic aspects of the Dutch system were mainly the long-lasting uncertainty, unpredictability and uncontrollability of the decision making process. These problems are considered to be partially a result of existing procedures and a focus on technical detail rather than political debate. On top of that it is stated that the different interests are not adequately weighed against each other and that the decision making on the mainlines of large projects and decision making on the execution and fitting in are mixed up.

The WRR concluded that the quality of decision-making on large infrastructural projects in the Netherlands needed improvement. A restructuring of decision processes should take place, aimed at an integral weighing of interests in decision-making.

**Resulting design guidelines**

It was shown that central government in the Netherlands, or its agencies, is dependent on the co-operation of local governments to be able to make spatial policy. This leads to

5.II: *when making plans on higher levels, tap the knowledge and use the co-operation of local governments on local circumstances and initiatives.*

The WRR stressed that in spatial and infrastructural policy making in the Netherlands interests are not adequately weighed against each other. Policy analysis could help in this respect

5.III: *provide a single overall framework for showing different interests.*
5.4.

SPATIAL PROBLEMS AS COMPLEX, UNSTRUCTURED PROBLEMS

5.4.1 THE NATURE OF SPATIAL PROBLEMS

Most spatial problems, at least in their initial stages, belong to the category of so-called ‘wicked’, complex or unstructured problems. These are characterised by many involved actors, including many decision makers, with many relations, dependencies, organisational backgrounds, power imbalances, imbalances in knowledge and information, differing values, differing problem perceptions and strategic behaviour. They are volatile over time and consist of a bundle of problems tied together without an unambiguous problem description. There are many possible alternatives with (partially) uncertain outcomes; vague and unclear, sometimes contrasting, objectives; many not quantifiable but important variables, ambiguities and uncertainties. Finally, an unstructured problem knows considerable uncertainty and conflict about the necessary knowledge, assumptions with regard to goals and means, as well as the values involved (Hisschemöller, 1993; Leemhuis, 1995; Miser and Quade, 1985).

Adding to the complexity is that problems are not ‘out there’ to be discovered. The person or persons that perceive them construct them in a process of social-political interaction (Dunn, 1994). In this process problem formulation becomes the subject of (implicit) negotiation and fine-tuning of the individual perceptions of the problems to each other. The problems ‘created’ in that way are unstable: the way problems are perceived changes over time (Majone, 1989).

Spatial problems often have to be dealt with in the public sector. Problems in the public sector, according to Dunn (1994) are difficult because they are characterised by many stakeholders with conflicting or competing values. The goals involved are of a collective nature, and specification of the ‘general interest’ often leads to conflicting criteria. Also, it's hard to determine the net benefits of public goods. This is because they are characterised by several legitimate stakeholders, which makes it hard to determine whose advantages should be sought and who should bear the burden of that. Also, it is difficult to determine the value of collective and quasi-collective goods and to compare income measures. Finally, social costs and advantages are sometimes hard to quantify and express in monetary terms.

Besides the fact that spatial problems in the Netherlands usually are plagued by most of the general characteristics of a complex, or unstructured, problem, they also have a number of specific complex aspects of their own:
the problem of scale. Problems on different levels (geographically, administrative, route choices versus implementation choices and so forth) are often intertwined and an increase of scale leads to an increase in complexity. Complexity is therefore tied in with the size of a problem as well as with the number of scale levels involved. Co-ordination between these scales is often weak (Bemmel, 1996, p. 788).

considerable ‘technical’ content: constructional, environmental, economical, judicial, and financial issues make the role of experts in solving these problems considerable. Often, the several different disciplines involved in these aspects design and engineer from their own expertise, which leads to a lack of integration in designs.

judicial/administrative complexity: many kinds of, varied and sometimes contrary, legislation applies, combined with an extensive planning system, which mostly means involvement of several governments at the same time. Also, the influence of the legal system on administrative relations has grown the past few years, which has increased the complexity of the spatial planning system (CUR, 1998; Drexhage en Pen-Soetermeer, 1996).

**Resulting design guidelines**

Spatial problems are social and political constructions that people have to agree upon through discussion in interaction. This discussion should be supported by policy analysis.

5.IV: provide problem descriptions in a format that makes them clearly and openly open to discussion.

Problems of land use and infrastructural planning in the Netherlands are on average complex. Furthermore, this complexity is changing over time. Therefore, all elements in an analysis should be open to adaptation when circumstances demand so, and not be carved in stone once their ‘phase’ has ended. Problem definition, alternative generation and so on should therefore in principle remain possible until a final decision is taken.

5.V: make analysis continuously adaptable to changing circumstances and new information.

Decision processes about spatial issues have a strong ‘technical’ component, requiring specific expertise. Therefore, much technical information of diverging nature could, should or does play a part in the decision-making process. This information has to be brought together in a format in which it can contribute directly to decision making.

5.VI: provide a policy analytical format in which diverging technical expertise can be integrated and used productively for decision making
A problem with spatial planning in the Netherlands is the lack of an integral approach over the several mono-disciplines involved in designing and engineering spatial objects and infrastructure. To cope with this problem we come with

5.VII: support integral design and engineering

With integral design and engineering I mean design and engineering that takes into account as many relevant aspects and effects of the design as possible. Therefore, it should not only be a technically 'optimal' design, social, environmental, administrative and so on aspects and effects should all be incorporated in the design.

5.4.2 | THE POWER INVOLVED IN PROBLEM DEFINITION

Problem definition is a very important activity, since it determines in large part the subsequent course of action in a policy process. Every problem formulation implies a notion about who are able to do something about it, who are competent to judge, who have a stake and who have a right to speak. Also, say about the problem implies say about the policy alternatives. Problem finding presupposes integrating diverging facts and values. The choice for a certain approach of a policy problem has far-reaching consequences for the solution methods to be used (Hisschemöller, 1993).

So, there is considerable power involved in the ability and authority to define a problem. In this respect, not only selecting elements to be taken into consideration in the problem definition is of importance. The ability to, explicitly or implicitly, leave out certain elements out of problem definition can be at least as important an agenda-setting effect as positively promoting an item (Kingdon, 1995; Mintzberg et al., 1976; Monnikhof et al, 2003).

Resulting design guideline

The ability to define a problem entails considerable power over the further (analytical) course of a decision process. To come to outcomes that properly represent all parties involved, the power to determine a problem definition should ideally be shared by all parties involved.

5.VIII: provide every affected party with power over the problem description.

5.4.3 | ‘WRONGLY’ DEFINING PROBLEMS: PREMATURE CLOSURE AND THE TYPE 3 ERROR

In chapter 1 I presented the related problems of premature closure and the type III-error. These problems derive from the fact that structuring problem situations is a difficult and time-
consuming process. Also, taking more factors and actors into account makes reaching achievement more difficult. Therefore, many analysts and politicians prefer to take into consideration problems that are thought to lend themselves to a structured approach, or even already belong to the category of ‘structured problems’. But in reality spatial problems, more often than not, are unstructured (Bobrow and Dryzek, 1987).

Besides the fact that problems and solutions taken into consideration are pre-selected at an early stage, also the ones that are taken into consideration are viewed more simply than justified. Governments often attempt to re-frame unstructured problems as more structured than they are. “This is an attempt to focus the discussion on technical evidence, in which the agency is fluent” (Renn et al, 1995, chapter 20, p. 357).

These forms of premature closure often happen early in the decision-making process, and are covered in untraceable ways with criteria that seem made up afterwards to rationalise pre-existing preferences (Monnikhof and Bots, 2000).

A crucial contribution to premature closure can come from a ‘type III-error’ in the analysis taking place (Miser and Quade, 1985). A type III-error means that the aspects and options that are considered are looked into only partially, and difficult, sensitive, unfamiliar et cetera aspects are (deliberately or not) overlooked. This is followed by working out only one or a few solution alternatives of the already limited set. Moreover, these are regularly designed on only part of the problems defined (for instance, in many road projects lip service is paid to liveability et cetera, while in the elaboration the focus is almost exclusively on lessening congestion).

Tied to this is the considerable amount of means necessary to analyse spatial and infrastructural issues, because of their complexity. This makes revisions of the problem definition, with all the demands on time and means that go along with that, usually out of the question. The ‘sunk costs’ of the process in terms of research time and – money, and political prestige, are in the way (Eijgenraam, 1995). The large investment of time and other means in analysis also makes it hard for new alternatives to enter halfway. These are on an almost unbridgeable arrears with respect to alternatives already (partially) elaborated. By this the process is closed for new inputs and possibilities.

An aspect of spatial and infrastructural planning leading to premature closure is the staged nature of analysis performed. First problems are defined, then alternatives created, often one or several screening rounds take place, effects are determined - sometimes going hand in hand with design -. Next on the basis of the effects the preferred alternative is recommended and selected. This staged set-up makes analytical choices made in one stage, for instance with respect to the demarcation of the problem area, very determining for the further set-up of the process, limiting possibilities throughout the whole further process.

Finally, there is the nature of the party conducting and/or ordering analysis. Usually in spatial
and infrastructural planning there is one initiator or main party responsible for carrying out or ordering most analysis. This means the views and focus of this party will be the starting-point for analysis, which can lead to a (relative) neglect of other aspects. Problem definition and the generation of alternatives in national infrastructural planning, despite experiments with open planning processes, remain largely the prerogative of RWS. Since RWS is traditionally dominated by engineers and has less say about, or expertise concerning, for instance public transport policy, some bias toward road solutions is to be expected. This leads to definition of the problem as a congestion problem + frill, and the accompanying focus on highway alternatives.

Decisions that are grounded in a type 3-error lead to situations in which certain problems are not solved, or worse, the solutions chosen cause new problems or worsen existing ones. The reduction of complexity achieved by this is only virtual, since actually important elements of a problem are set aside or downplayed that, in time, may figure prominently in realized outcomes (Brewer and deLeon, 1983). Bypassing these problem aspects leads to protest of the stakeholders connected to those problem aspects. This leads then to the use of hindrance power by the losers of the decisions taken (Renn et al, 1995).

**Resulting design guidelines**

‘Type III errors’ in analysis for land use policy occur by implicit technical choices in the everyday activities of engineers and other experts working directly or indirectly for the proponents of projects, mostly sheltered from outside eyes. To diminish ‘analytical’ or ‘design’ type III errors, and to have value choices be made or at least approved explicitly by those concerned, policy analysis should help open up this hidden process to outsiders.

5.IX: *open up the activities of experts, analysts and decision makers by providing information on them to those affected by them.*

5.5

**LULUS AND NIMBIES**

One core aspect of the extent of (un)structuredness of a problem, as outlined in the previous section, is the amount of conflict involved in it. In this section I present a core element in that conflictuous nature of spatial and infrastructural decision-making, the often large and clear imbalance in costs and benefits of spatial decisions. I will do this by outlining the concepts of LULUs and Nimbies.
The combination of scarce space and a large number of claims on that space in the Netherlands leads to collisions. An important part of those takes place between (a part of) the population and one or more governmental units, when the latter have plans that the former do not like. The objects of such plans have become known under the name of LULU: Locally Unwanted Land Use. It concerns facilities that are built for a general societal goal, like for instance waste disposal or transport, by which on a local level negative effects can occur. LULUs are from a spatial point of view unwanted objects and often from an environmental point of view unwanted activities (de Jong, 1996). Because of the scarcity of space in the Netherlands most complex spatial layout questions here can be seen as a LULU-issue. The most well-known examples of LULUs in the Netherlands on average are concerned with the construction of infrastructure.

A core point with LULU-issues is the uneven distribution of positive and negative effects. LULUs are mostly justified by the (claimed) welfare gain that could be achieved by it on a national or other high scale level (by a better accessibility, better possibilities for handling garbage, gains in travelling time, et cetera). Opposite these stand a broad range of locally concentrated negative effects, ranging from health consequences, decline in property values to a decline in the image of the community (Hunter and Leyden, 1995).

Opposition to LULUs has become known as the NIMBY (Not In My Backyard)-phenomenon. The NIMBY label refers to local citizen opposition to siting proposals or land-use activities with potential adverse impacts (Rosa, 1988). NIMBY-opposition can express itself in demonstrations, trying to induce local governments to oppose, seeking publicity, and so on. NIMBY behaviour is a response of those hurt locally to the imbalance between the claimed advantages on a regional, national or even above national scale level, and locally concentrated disadvantages. Those disapproving of it see people holding a NIMBY attitude as trying to pass the burden on: they want the benefits of technology, but do not want to pay the costs associated with a facility in their midst (Hunter and Leyden, 1995; Lober, 1995). Good citizen behaviour, in this view, would be to accept the facility for the ‘common good’.

Others see the worries of local proponents about the distributive imbalance as legitimate. Their opposition is seen as simply a rational response to the imbalance between the benefits that individuals perceive to receive from hosting a facility, and the costs they perceive they will bear. From that starting-point one can, and should, engage in negotiating about compensation for those hurt by the facility (see, for instance, O’Hare, 1977). Not surprisingly, in light of the normative framework developed in the previous chapter, I side with this view.

**Resulting design guidelines**

An uneven distribution of benefits and costs of proposals for land use is the cause of widespread ‘NIMBY’-opposition in spatial and infrastructural planning. This means that research into the
specific distribution on (groups of) humans of benefits and disadvantages of proposals, instead of leaving them ‘effects on the ecology’ or something like that, is needed. This leads to

5.X: award all effects of a decision taken into consideration to (groups of) human actors.

The fact that NIMBY-opposition is concerned with more than monetary issues also means that benefits and disadvantages should be taken in a broader sense than simply monetary, involving also (feelings of) unsafety, aesthetics, and so on. This leads to

5.XI: map all welfare effects from a decision considered relevant by parties affected by the (proposed) decision

5.6
THE PART OF RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS: BYE, BYE, OBJECTIVE FACTS

5.6.1 POLICY ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH ON BEHALF OF SPATIAL POLICYMAKING

Spatial issues, complex and controversial as they often are, form one of the areas of policymaking in the Netherlands where growing sums of money are spent on research and analysis. Spatial planning is by nature an activity hungry for information, occupied with bringing and fitting together a large number of societal data (Jolles, 1974). But in recent years the information stream is increasing rapidly. Partially this is the result of legislation in which in certain cases the gathering of particular kinds of information is prescribed (for instance in Environmental Impact Assessments). A more general example is article 3:2 of the General Administrative Law, in which government is put under the obligation to prepare decisions carefully, which means among other things a ‘gathering of the necessary knowledge concerning the relevant facts and the interests to be weighed.’

Analysis for infrastructural projects is usually carried out by employees of Rijkswaterstaat, who draft a first outline of the problem(s) and possible alternatives in a Notification of Intent. Whenever an EIA is necessary, the research required to make one is contracted out to consulting firms. Municipalities, when drafting their zoning plans, usually have some research performed as well. Most of this is carried out by civil servants, but often consultants are hired in for specific expertise. The same is true for provinces.
On a national level the ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and Environment performs more
general and long-term research into future developments, to ground long-term spatial plans.
For this largely the expertise of their own civil servants is used, but also at times committees are
established of outside experts. Other ministries, like that of Economics, occasionally also draw
up memoranda and plans with a spatial component.
Increasingly but still to a limited extent, other groups in society carry out their own analysis on
spatial developments, plans and projects. Sometimes they do so to show their own expertise on
the subject, in the hope of gaining contracts for (further) research or getting involved in financing
projects, sometimes to create counter-expertise when it concerns plans and projects they
disagree with.
In short, analysis for land use and infrastructural planning in the Netherlands is divided between
civil servants of implementing agencies like Rijkswaterstaat and more policy-oriented civil
servants at the ministries, and outside sources like universities and, mainly, consulting firms,
who perform a growing share (most of the EIAs, for instance). And then there is a limited amount
of counter-analysis of interest groups.

**Resulting design guideline**

Analysis is performed during every policy making process, by several parties of whom most can
have some or a major effect on the outcome of the policy process. This leads to

5.XII: **take stock of who performs which policy analytical activity in a policy process, and how
these separate activities might be best co-ordinated and distributed.**

5.6.2 | **THE POLITICISATION OF ANALYSIS AND RESEARCH**

Research and analysis in the Netherlands have become increasingly prey to politicisation of its
results. Administrators have to cope with an ever-increasing multitude of sources of knowledge.
Data, theories and institutions contradict each other. The extent to which they represent reality is
doubted increasingly. Administrators see the knowledge base they have to lean upon
increasingly as unreliable (Van Gunsteren and van Ruyven, 1995).
Although the amount of available knowledge has increased sharply compared to several decades
ago, this has not simplified governmental steering. Firstly, knowledge has become more
accessible, which means that the unreliability of existing knowledge can be exposed from many
sides: more people have knowledge, more people posses specific knowledge that invalidates
‘general’ knowledge and more people are listened to as a source of knowledge. Secondly,
knowledge about what is going on in society is used and in that way leads to a change of the
situation and therefore to its own obsolescence. In several areas the marginal use for steering of
an extension of knowledge seems to diminish or even become negative (Van Gunsteren and van Ruyven, 1995).

Research is used increasingly by all parties to legitimise pre-existing preferences, and to come to a ‘judge-proof’ motivation of those preferences in an administrative context (Drexhage and Pen-Soetermeer, 1996). There is the ‘arms-race’ effect, in which parties only feel themselves taken seriously in the policy arena when they bring along a considerable amount of firing power in the shape of research (Edelenbos et al., 2003).

The status and acceptance of information and research reports on spatial issues has deteriorated. Virtually every party involved in a decision-making process concerning spatial issues arms itself with a pile of ‘objective, scientific’ research as high as possible, with as a main goal, so it seems, to hit each other with it on the head. Besides the difficulty with agreeing on the desirability of certain starting-points and developments, it seems to a rising extent impossible to agree on the truth of them (Edelenbos et al., 2003).

Government itself has contributed to the increased controversial nature of analysis and research by showing a rather liberal attitude towards the truth at times. Examples of this can be found in the debates on expanding airport Schiphol and the Betuwelijn. In both cases dubious assumptions, figures and prognoses were presented, relevant alternatives ignored, unwelcome data put aside, and reports held back or antedated (see Siddiqui, 1998). Several respected institutions, like the advisory Council for Spatial Planning, Council of State (Raad van State, the highest judicial body in the Netherlands), the 'General Accounting Office', have castigated national government for its handling of information and research in these cases.

Opponent of spatial projects like the environmental organisations neither have a clean slate. They make calculating ‘errors’ concerning the possible environmental damage the sinking of an oil platform might cause. They exaggerate the possible danger of substances, deliberately smear experts of ‘the other side’ (Buijt, 2000) and so on.

**Resulting design guidelines**

Parties need analysis to be taken seriously in the political arena. Therefore, all relevant actors should have access to policy analytical resources, either on their own or in a pool.

5.XIII: provide all parties to a decision with analytical (counter)capacity.

Information in land use planning is usually politically loaded and controversial. It can never be assumed that analytical results ‘speak for themselves’, or will be accepted without questioning.

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22 Greenpeace in the controversy surrounding the possible sinking of the oil platform ‘Brent Spar’ by Shell in the North Sea, 1995
Their acceptance by all relevant parties should be a topic for discussion and explicit agreement. Policy analytical support has to devise ways to lessen the contentiousness of information, or adapt to it, by analytical and/or procedural provisions. This leads to

5.XIV: provide analytical and/or procedural provisions for reaching explicit agreement on and trust in the status of (those dealing with) research and information throughout the analytic process.

5.7
RESULTING DESIGN GUIDELINES

The design guidelines resulting from this chapter are:

5.I: map topics and parties relevant to a spatial decision from other fields.
5.II: when making plans on higher levels, tap the knowledge and use the co-operation of local governments on local circumstances and initiatives.
5.III: provide one overall framework for weighing different interests.
5.IV: provide problem descriptions in a format that makes them clearly and openly open to discussion.
5.V: make analysis continuously adaptable to changing circumstances and new information.
5.VI: provide a policy analytical format in which diverging technical expertise can be integrated and used productively for decision making
5.VII: support integral design and engineering
5.VIII: provide every affected party with power over the problem description.
5.IX: open up the activities of experts, analysts and decision makers by providing information on them to those affected by them.
5.X: award all effects of a decision taken into consideration to (groups of) human actors.
5.XI: map all welfare effects from a decision considered relevant by parties affected by the (proposed) decision
5.XII: take stock of who performs which policy analytical activity in a policy process, and how these separate activities might be best co-ordinated and distributed.
5.XIII: provide all parties to a decision with analytical (counter)capacity.
5.XIV: provide analytical and/or procedural provisions for reaching explicit agreement on and trust in the status of (those dealing with) research and information throughout the analytic process.
CHAPTER 6

MODELS OF DECISION MAKING
6.1 POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS

Policy analysis has been defined in chapter 2 as the collection, processing, and presentation of information on behalf of public decision-making. The decision making process therefore is the ‘mould’ into which policy analysis has to fit. In this light it is surprising how little policy analysts seem to take to heart recent insights concerning the course of those processes. The limited impact of analysis on policymaking and the criticism on the stages model have produced a new grasp of (the importance of) the setting or environment (many actors, diverging perspectives, (normative) ambiguity, and so on) of many policy analyses (Miser and Quade, 1985). At the same time complaints can be heard about the fact that a ‘rational’ analyst has to work in the political chaos ‘out there’ (Heineman et al, 1990). As most policy analysts have not yet embraced a convincing alternative model for the process aspect of policymaking (Abma, 1995), this leads to policy analyses being insufficiently attuned to the policy processes they are supposed to support (see Edelenbos et al, 2003). This in turn contributes to the often-mourned limited impact of policy analysis on policy making (see section 2.3). It seems recommendable, to increase the utility of policy analyses, to attune these more to the way in which decision processes in the public realm evolve in practice.

Policy analytical activities are based on two views of the policymaking process: a normative view and an empirical/descriptive view. At times these two views coincide; more often they diverge. Often it is not made explicit which model of the policymaking process is exactly used, and when it is, whether the model endorsed is normative, descriptive, or both (Heineman et al, 1990). To attune the style of policy analysis to the whims of the decision-making process it is necessary to know how decision processes take place. Increasing dissatisfaction with the stages model of policymaking has not resulted in the mainstream of policy analysis explicitly embracing an alternative model of the policy process. In 1993 it could still be concluded that “Policy researchers, practitioners, and teachers have broadly accepted a stages heuristic to public policy” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993, p. 1).

This clinging to an outdated model of the policy process cannot wholly be blamed on the policy analytical community. There simply is no convincing one alternative to the stages model. Instead, from the fifties on a series of alternative models were developed. Most of them have in common that they are considered to provide a (much) better empirical description of the ‘real world’ of policymaking. The picture they sketch is much more chaotic and unpredictable than that of the stage model. They assume that actors have limited ability to process information (Miller, 1956), are often irrational in their perceptions and decisions (Dawes, 23)

Policy process is here taken to mean “the course of acts and interactions between actors with respect to a policy” (Hoogerwerf, 1993, p. 225, my translation)
1988), and have perceptions that change over time (Lindblom, 1990). Actors are not ‘objective’, but influenced by the way in which they perceived the world, by ‘conceptual orientations’, ‘frames’, ‘perceptions’, ‘mental maps’ et cetera (Fischer and Forester, 1993; Rein and Schön, 1993). Decision makers do not strive to get ‘all’ the necessary information available and decide between all conceivable alternatives, but in reality only look for new alternatives until one is found that satisfies a certain minimum aspiration level (Simon, 1956). A set of alternative models based on this modified view on human decision making is outlined in this chapter.

The various models compete for attention and scientific hegemony; here some of the more important models will be presented as being largely complementary, rather than substitutes. The presentation of these models serves a specific purpose: to serve as an aid in determining a suitable policy analytical approach for supporting decision making about spatial issues. Of course, the number of possible models to use for this purpose is numerous. Three criteria were used to make a selection: (1) empirical relevance for the specific context, (2) whether the models treated elements of the policy process that were thought relevant for policy analytical support and (3) whether they were complementary in this respect.

The first criterion means that the models chosen are deemed to have some relevance for decision making in the Netherlands, preferably even decision making involving spatial issues. The extent to which this is the case is explored by examining whether the models have been applied to policymaking in the Netherlands, if possible on the topic of spatial or infrastructure planning, and whether they were found to have descriptive validity in that case.

The second criterion entails that all models have an element to contribute that is considered relevant when developing a policy analytical approach. These elements are all considered to be crucial, in the sense that not taking them into account is thought to cripple every possible approach. These crucial elements are (i) the social/political context in which processes take place, i.e. which actors play a part or how power is divided, (2) a description of the type of course they take, (3) an explanation of the driving forces behind this course and (4) a description of the part information and analysis play in these driving forces.

The last criterion means that the models chosen are thought to contribute one or several specific elements that are useful for determining possible policy analytical contributions. Each is thought to have something specific to offer that cannot be found in the others. This last criterion implies that the assumptions behind the models should not contradict, or with other words, that they are commensurable. This rules out, for instance, models that are based on the rational actor assumption - like public choice theories -, that is not shared by most newer models of the policy making process.

The specific contributions of the model chosen are considered to be the following: the network model presented in section 6.2 gives a broadly accepted metaphor for the context in which many
policy processes take place. The streams theory outlined in section 6.3 adds a picture of the kind of elements that form the 'working material' with which politics are made, i.e. problems, solutions and power, and an explanation of the way in which these are brought together. The rounds theory summarised in section 6.4 gives a handle to describe the way in which policy processes evolve over time, and criteria by which this process can be delineated in separate parts. The advocacy coalition framework outlined in section 6.5 focuses on the importance of coalitions formed on the basis of cognitive beliefs for policymaking, and related to that the importance of debate, learning and policy analysis. Most of these models also pay attention to aspects dealt with in the other models, but all of them have a distinct, different focus. Finally, all four models deal with the importance of interaction, of wheeling and dealing in the development of policy. From all models design guidelines are derived, which are enumerated in section 6.6.
A short scan of their relevance for the Dutch context will follow the treatment of each theory. This relevance will be determined by answering the questions whether theorists have applied (a variant of) the theory to Dutch policy processes - preferably on spatial issues - and whether it has proven a valid description of those processes. Finally, the guidelines resulting from this chapter are summarised in section 6.6.

6.2 NETWORK THEORIES

Network theories built upon the work of Lindblom (1959), who explored the consequences of limited availability of information, limited rationality and so on. This leads to incremental decision making, in which only a small number of policy alternatives are considered, and of these only a limited number of ‘important’ consequences is evaluated. Policy is the outcome of give and take between very many societal interest groups. Network theory builds upon these insights. Dominant early thinkers are Hanf and Scharpf (1978) and Heclo (1978). Heclo’s work will be taken as representative for much of the theoretical writing.

6.2.1 HECLO’S ISSUE NETWORKS

Heclo’s starting point is that government has to deal with ever more puzzling, unfamiliar and complex policy issues. Successfully enacted policies to deal with these issues unwittingly propagated hybrid interests. Activist policies of governments greatly increased the incentives for groups to form around the differential effects of these policies, each refusing to allow any other group to speak in its name. This led to the mobilisation of more and more fluid groups. These proliferating groups have claimed a stake and place in the policy process, by which they have
contributed to a diffusion of the focus of political and administrative leadership. This diffusion of power over many groups has led to the rise of what Heclo calls 'issue networks'. These are shared-knowledge groups having to do with some aspect - or, as defined by the network, some problem - of public policy. They comprise a large number of participants with variable degrees of mutual commitment or of dependence on others in their environment. They operate at many levels and tie together what would otherwise be the contradictory tendencies of, on the one hand, more widespread organisational participation in public policy and, on the other, more narrow technocratic specialisation in complex modern policies. The boundaries between a network and its environment are hard to draw. Participants move in and out of the networks constantly. At any given time only one part of a network may be active and through time the various connections may intensify or fade.

Heclo sees the prominence of these issue networks as increasing. “Increasingly, it is through networks of people who regard each other as knowledgeable, or at least as needing to be answered, that public policy issues tend to be refined, evidence debated, and alternative options worked out – though rarely in any controlled, well-organised way.” (Heclo, 1995, p. 276). This movement is strengthened because the reliance on issue networks is consistent with larger changes in society. Voters are less constrained by party identification and more attracted to an issue-based style of politics. The increasing tendency of government to intervene in more complex, specialised areas makes it useful to draw upon experts and policy specialists for the public management of these programs.

Heclo states that issue networks, through their sharing of policy knowledge, can provide a common framework for political debate and decision. However, the close identification of political administrators with the various specialised policy networks could lead to their alienation from the ordinary citizen. Only a small minority of citizens is likely to be mobilised in the various networks. Therefore, networks have a tendency to become a community of technocrats (see also Nyland, 1995). This closed circle of experts can lead to situations in which policies make excellent sense within the cloisters of the expert issue watchers and yet are nonsense seen from the viewpoint of the average citizen.

Although issue networks may provide a common framework for political debate and decision and enhance the amount of knowledge to be brought to bear upon an issue, this does not necessarily produce agreement. Issue networks may or may not be mobilised into a shared-action group by creating a coalition.

6.2.2 RELEVANCE FOR THE DUTCH CONTEXT

Network theory has found a considerable number of adherents in the Netherlands. The factors that Heclo considered leading to the rise of networks have also been extensively noted in the
Dutch context (Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998b; Duyvendak and Krouwel, 2001). More than that, it is claimed that networks are preceded by a long history of corporatism, 'pillarisation', consensus seeking and 'pacification' in the Netherlands (Lijphart, 1977). The network concept has been used to describe many areas of policymaking, including decision-making concerning spatial issues. It was found to be an accurate empirical description of the policy context in that field (de Bruijn en ten Heuvelhof, 1999a; Klijn, 1996; Klijn and Teisman, 1992; Klijn et al, 1993; Teisman, 1992).

**Resulting design guideline**

Not all relevant problems and solutions will be taken into account by the analysis/analyses of the dominant party/parties in a situation. Problems and solutions will be viewed differently by different parties. There will therefore be relevant problem definitions and possible solutions present with parties outside the decision arena, or even outside the policy network. These diverging views should be made visible, not integrated at all costs into one ‘right’ view.

*Design guideline 6.1: map the perceptions on the situation of stakeholders outside the decision arena, and use the knowledge of parties outside the network. Indicate differences in views.*

### 6.3 THE GARBAGE CAN/STREAMS THEORY

Within the rather broad framework of the network view on policymaking some specific theories were born or incorporated. One of those is the so-called 'streams theory' of Kingdon, which builds upon the garbage can model of Cohen et al.

#### 6.3.1 FROM THE GARBAGE CAN MODEL TO THE STREAMS MODEL

Cohen et al (1972) performed research into what they called ‘organized anarchies’. These are characterised by problematic preferences, unclear technology and fluid participation (properties considered prevalent in public organisations, for instance). They developed a chaotic and fluid “garbage can-model”, in which problems and solutions are dumped by participants in a 'garbage can' that symbolises the decision making process.

Organised anarchies make choices without consistent, shared goals. Decisions are outcomes or interpretations of four relatively independent streams within an organisation: problems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities. As properties of the decision processes in
garbage can situations they discern among other things decisions that solve no problems at all. Partially because of this there is a tendency of the same decision makers and problems to repeatedly meet again at new choice occasions. Furthermore, the decision process is often sharply interactive and there is a higher likeliness of solving problems that appear early in the process than of solving problems that appear later. Cohen et al conclude that this garbage can process does not resolve problems well.

Kingdon (1984) builds upon the garbage can-model. His model distinguishes not four but three streams that determine agendas and specify alternatives: a problem stream, a policy stream (or solution stream) and a political stream. These streams are largely independent and develop according to own dynamics and rules. On some points the streams are brought together and decisions are taken (compare Allison, 1971). This happens when a so-called ‘policy window’ opens. Two kinds of policy windows exist: problem windows and political windows. The first kind opens because a certain problem situation becomes so pressing (by the appearance of a disaster, alarming new figures, et cetera) that it ends up on top of the decision agenda. The second kind comes about by a change in political constellation, by for instance elections. As long as policy windows are open there are chances to connect the three streams in a decision.

The best chance of being chosen in such a situation have alternatives that were tied to the problem before the opening of the policy window. But also a choice between problems has to be made. Although a certain problem situation can lead to the opening of a policy window, the problem definition that is given to the situation can still vary widely. The best chances in such a situation have problem definitions that are already accompanied by a solution. The freedom in choice of problem is of course much larger when a political window opens, instead of a problem window. The problem definition chosen is therefore most of the time already tied to a solution alternative, or a certain kind of solution alternatives.

Crucial in bringing the streams together are the so-called ‘policy entrepreneurs’. They are defenders of certain alternatives, ideas or solutions, looking for problems to tie them to. To sell their goods (alternatives), entrepreneurs push for one kind of problem definition rather than another. The streams of problems, solutions and political events are continuously moving and a coupling usually does not last long, which is why timing and grabbing of temporary chances become more important than a rational foundation of the choice made.

Two kinds of participants can be discerned in these processes: a visible cluster and a more hidden cluster. The visible cluster exists of politicians and opinion leaders, who mostly determine the agenda of the problems to be taken into consideration, the hidden cluster exists of specialists below the top level, that mostly generate the alternative solutions. Interest groups move back and forth between the two clusters. But also the other participants can not be strictly tied to one stream. Some actors, for instance, are involved in agenda setting through problem
definition as well as in alternative generation.
The image presented here again strongly deviates from the phase model: “participants do not first identify problems and then seek solutions for them; indeed, advocacy of solutions often precedes the highlighting of problems to which they become attached. Agendas are not first set and then alternatives generated; instead, alternatives must be advocated for a long period before a short-run opportunity presents itself on an agenda” (Kingdon, 1984, p. 205).

6.3.2 | RELEVANCE FOR THE DUTCH CONTEXT

Within the larger context of network theories, the streams theory is one of the two theories of the policymaking process that currently dominate the Dutch policy scientific community (the other is the rounds model, which will be presented in the next section. See De Vries en Van den Heuvel, 1998). Teisman, for example, (1995) applies the rounds model along with the stages model and the streams model to decision making on a national railroad, and finds that it has valuable insights to offer. The streams model would be especially valuable when one wants to study the way in which organisations that favour specific policies are able to connect their solutions to dominant problem definitions. Also, it would be valuable when one is interested in why at some points decisions and changes can take place, and not on others. Pauly (2001) applies it to national policy making on PVC and finds it describes this field of environmental policymaking, which shares many characteristics with spatial policymaking, well.

The original structuring of Kingdon of the three streams was found to be more fruitful in the Dutch context when slightly altered, thereby partially returning to the garbage can model. Often, in the use by Dutch authors of the streams model, the third stream is not conceptualised as a stream of political events, but of participants or actors. I will follow this ‘Dutch adaptation’ here.

Figure 6.1: Example of a ‘Dutch’ process streams model (adapted from Koppenjan, 1993, p.25)
**Resulting design guidelines**
The important elements in every problem situation can be structured using the ‘Dutch adapted version’ of the three streams of Kingdon, and therefore be subdivided in problems, solutions and participants. This structure will also be conductive to a quick understanding of the situation by most relevant parties. This leads to

*Design guideline 6.1I: use the threefold structure of streams as structuring principle to provide an overview of the information relevant to actors.*

### 6.4 THE ROUNDS MODEL

The rounds model is a model for which early foundations can be traced in the work of Braybrooke (1974), but a first worked-out model was presented by Kunreuther et al (1982).

#### 6.4.1 THE ROUNDS MODEL

In *Traffic congestion goes through the issue-machine* (1974), Braybrooke (deriving his empirical material from policy making on traffic congestion problems) described the political process metaphorically as an ‘issue-machine’, processing issues through several stations and according to stable programs of reasons pro and con. The programs are institutionalised in networks of participating people and organisations. This processing of issues operates in rounds, closed off by an ‘authorative decision’. “Each round would begin with the circumscription of the current issue regarding the topic; there would follow the introduction of one or more particular proposals that fall within the terms of circumscription; then a sequence of reactions to these proposals, followed by reactions to these reactions, and so forth, may be supposed to ensue” (Braybrooke, 1974, p. 21). New rounds of discussion may begin with new actions; but they may also begin with the same actions with which the first rounds ended. In such cases the rounds will be not only consecutive but overlapping (Braybrooke, 1974).

Kunreuther et al (1982) develop a more sophisticated rounds model to describe the siting process of facilities. They see decision making as a sequential process, in which new issues emerge through the resolution of previous issues, changes in party preferences, and/or social norms. This sequential process can be separated into different rounds, which each involve different interested parties. They use the term round as “simply a convenient device to illustrate a change in the focus of discussions. This new focus or direction can be triggered by (1) a key decision taken (or a stalemate reached due to conflicts among parties), or (2) a change in the
context of the discussions due to an unanticipated event, the entrance of a new party or new
evidence brought to the debate” (Kunreuther et al, 1982, p. 285). Indications of a change in
round are a change in the set of alternatives, or a revised problem formulation (due to for
instance new legislation or constraints). Rounds, besides sequential, may also be overlapping.
The decision process in each round is characterised by a unique problem formulation. The
alternatives considered for discussion are bounded by specific constraints, including legislative
and legal mandates, resource constraints and pre-specified decision making procedures.
Decisions already taken will also influence the way the problem is formulated.
Interaction between parties during a round is represented by the main arguments each brings to
the debate in support of or in rejection of each of the alternatives at hand. “The outcome of the
political debate results, to a large extent, from some combination of the political power on the
part of the parties involved, the attention they give to the issues in light of their limited
resources and time, the way in which the problems on the political agenda are framed, and the
exogenous events that may change the problem and/or the parties. The interaction phase can be
thought of as the formal and informal communication among the parties influencing the decision
outcome” (Kunreuther et al, 1982, p. 286).
A round is concluded by a decision, a stalemate, a change in information that changes the focus
of the debate and hence initiates a new round, or an exogenous event. The interaction process
does not have to result in a clear decision. The outcome can also not have the appearance of a
decision but still conclude the round. If there is a feasible and agreed-upon solution or if no
solution is possible, the whole process ends. If on the other hand one or more parties is
unsatisfied with the situation, and has access to other channels, or if the round ends in a request
for further action, a new problem is formulated for the next round. The new round takes place
with another set of alternatives and interested parties (of which some or even all may be the
same as in the preceding round).
Kunreuther et al conclude that the sequential nature of the decision procedures limits the
possibilities for comprehensive analysis. The importance of analyses in such a process in general
will depend on the nature of the decision process, the interested interacting parties, and the type
of conflicts that they produce.

6.4.2 | THE ROUNDS MODEL AND ITS RELEVANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS

In the Netherlands Teisman (1992) has elaborated the rounds model and determined its empirical
relevance for decision making on spatial issues in the Netherlands. One of his elaborations
constitutes that rounds do not have to follow (logically) from preceding rounds. Also he
emphasises that not the ‘objective’ characteristics of the problems, solutions and policy makers
determine the course and outcome of decision processes, but rather the definition of reality by
involved actors. Decision-making is seen as a series of decisions taken by different actors. There is not one overarching decision towards which the process proceeds. Decision making takes place in one or more arenas\textsuperscript{24} that are formed during a round, and in which actors insert relevant information about means, possibilities to ‘score’ and selection criteria. Actors can perform varying roles and bring their own problems and goals into the process.

The best way of looking at the processes taking place during a round is to see it as a learning process. Through interaction actors develop initiatives, come to proposals for adaptation and select certain proposals. Teisman also stresses the importance of “binding” decisions to achieve progress in decision making. These binding decisions are decisions that are used by other actors as a reference point. They close off a round\textsuperscript{25}.

The case material Teisman used to develop his (version of the) model derives from decision making processes on seven cases of 'spatial investments'. For this area he concludes that the model accurately describes policy making in the Netherlands.

*Figure 6.2: Example of a decision-making rounds model (Teisman, 1995, p.44)*

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\textsuperscript{24} An arena is defined here as the “battleground on which actors fight over the formulation of problems, the choice of solutions and participation in the decision making” (Koppenjan, 1993, p. 32). It is “A meeting place for issues and feelings looking for decision situations in which they may be aired, solutions looking for issues to which they may be an answer, and participants looking for problems or pleasure” (Cook and Skogan, op cit, in: Koppenjan, 1993, p. 33)

\textsuperscript{25} Note the limitation in factors closing off a round when compared to Kunreuther et al
Resulting design guideline

Policy-making and the analytical activities that go along with it are not performed in a neat sequence during stages, but take place alongside each other, several times in several rounds. Problem formulations, solutions appraisals et cetera are iterated and changed from round to round, and during rounds. Policy analytical support for such a process should not be a linear activity geared to producing one product (like a report), but a ‘stand-by facility’ during the whole policy process, delivering inputs when deemed necessary and maintaining flexibility with regard to substantive outcomes as long and as much as possible. The planning of the policy process and this analytical ‘shadow’ process should be continuously mutually attuned, to avoid that the analytical process delivers the wrong products or delivers them at the wrong time. An important task of the policy analyst in such a set-up should be the management of information streams. In short, policy analysis should operate as an evolving, open process, in which information (for instance, on problems, solutions and effects considered) is always of temporary value and can easily be complemented, modified or deleted.

Design guideline 6.III: make policy analytical support a flexible ‘stand-by facility’ during the whole policy process, regularly delivering inputs when deemed necessary.

6.5
THE ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH

6.5.1 THE ADVOCACY COALITION APPROACH AND THE ROLE OF LEARNING THEREIN

The ‘advocacy coalition approach’ (Sabatier, 1988), builds among other things upon network theory. Since one of the principal goals of the framework is to integrate traditional views on policymaking as a power struggle determined by interests and resources with the role of knowledge and policy analysis, its relevance for the aims of this chapter seems obvious. Sabatier speaks of subsystems instead of networks. These consist of interest groups, administrative agencies, legislative committees, journalists, analysts, researchers, and others who contribute to the generation, dissemination, and evaluation of policy ideas, as well as actors at other government levels who play a role in policy formulation and implementation. Within the subsystems subsets of actors form ‘advocacy coalitions’. These consist of (groups of) people from a variety of positions (elected and agency officials, interest group leaders, etc.) who show a degree of co-ordinated activity over time (Sabatier, 1993). Some of these will be fairly stable members. Others will float in and out depending upon the particular policy dispute.
Not everyone in a policy subsystem will 'belong to' an advocacy coalition. Some researchers and others may participate because they have certain skills to offer, but are indifferent to the policy disputes. There will also usually be so-called ‘policy brokers’ (often elected officials, but also others) present, occupying themselves with keeping political conflict within limits and with reaching some ‘reasonable’ solution to the problem.

The aim of advocacy coalitions is to translate their beliefs into public policies (programs). Their ability to do so will depend upon their resources, including things as money, expertise, number of supporters, and legal authority. The direction in which they want to direct those governmental policies is determined by the shared belief system of a coalition.

This concept of 'belief system' is crucial in the notion of advocacy coalitions. Advocacy coalitions form around shared beliefs concerning for instance a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions. These belief systems are normally highly, and reciprocally, correlated with self-interest. Belief systems exhibit a three-fold structure composed of a Deep Core of fundamental normative and ontological axioms, a Policy Core of basic policy choices and causal assumptions, and a set of Secondary (implementing) Aspects.

Public policies/programs incorporate (implicit) theories about how to achieve their objectives and thus can also be conceptualised as belief systems. They involve value priorities, perceptions of important causal relationships, world states (including the magnitude of the problem), the efficacy of policy instruments, et cetera. Advocacy coalitions try to match the belief system underlying a policy as much as possible to their own belief system.

Policy-oriented learning is an important aspect of policy change in the advocacy coalition approach. Policy-oriented learning refers to “relatively enduring alterations of thought or behavioral intentions which result from experience and which are concerned with the attainment (or revision) of policy objectives” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 133). It is an ongoing process of search and adaptation, motivated by the desire to realise core policy beliefs (see also Heineman et al, 1990). Coalition members seek to better understand the world to further their policy objectives.

Learning can be conductive to strengthening one's own belief system, learning about aspects important to competing belief systems and learning about challenges to one's belief system. The more abstract 'core' beliefs are very resistant to change. Although exogenous events or opponents’ activities may eventually force the re-examination of core beliefs, the pain of doing so means that most learning occurs in the secondary aspects of a belief system and/or governmental program. Changes in the core of a policy usually result of non-cognitive factors external to the subsystem, not of learning.

‘Learning within a belief system’ is relatively unproblematic: members of an advocacy coalition always seek to improve their understanding of aspects which are consistent with their Policy
Core. But when two cores conflict, and ‘learning across belief systems’ is called for, each coalition tends to talk past the other and a ‘dialogue of the deaf’ (Sabatier, 1995, p. 365) arises to persist until external conditions alter the power balance within the subsystem. Information suggesting that basic beliefs may be invalid and/or unattainable will be resisted, and formal policy analyses will be used primarily to buttress and elaborate those beliefs (or attack opponents). Only in rare cases research can so substantially alter actors’ perceptions of the nature of the problem that major changes result.

The way learning takes place in subsystems co-determines to an important extent the way policymaking and debate take place. Policy change is “a product of both (1) large scale social, economic, and political changes and (2) the strategic interaction of people within a policy community involving both competition for power and efforts to develop more knowledgeable means of addressing the policy problem” (Sabatier, 1995, p. 340). This strategic interaction is characterised by a number of key elements. These are “the importance of problem perception; shifts in elite and public opinion concerning the salience of various problems; periodic struggles over the proper locus of governmental authority; incomplete attainment of legally-prescribed goals; and an iterative process of policy formulation, problematic implementation, and struggles over reformulation” (Sabatier, 1995, p. 339).

Those who do not belong to the dominant coalition(s) in a subsystem and who feel aggrieved by the (proposed) policy can try to challenge the validity of the data concerning the seriousness of the problem. They can dispute causal assumptions concerning technical aspects or institutional arrangements which will provide the necessary changes in behaviour. They can attempt to mobilise opposition to proposals or policy by pointing to costs to themselves and others. The original group normally responds to these challenges, thus initiating a political and analytical debate. Therefore, much of the policy debate can be understood as disputes over the validity of causal theories and the adequacy of data. Policy brokers interested in keeping the conflict within acceptable limits usually mediate the process. Conflict will continue until all major interests find a given mix of policies to be acceptable.

On the basis of perceptions of the adequacy of governmental decisions and/or the resultant impacts, as well as new information arising from search processes and external dynamics, each advocacy coalition may revise its beliefs and/or alter its strategy.

The fact that core beliefs are hard to change means that information will be seen in the light of its possible threat to core values, and certainly not be ‘objectively’ taken into account. For learning to take place on more than the level of secondary aspects both sides must have the incentive to expend scarce resources to engage in analytical debate. For that, the level of conflict should be intermediate, meaning it should be a conflict between secondary aspects of one belief.
system and core elements of the other or between important secondary aspects of the two belief systems. Where two cores clash, defensive reactions would make learning unlikely, while conflict between unimportant aspects of each other’s belief systems does not lead to an allocation of sufficient resources to engage in informed technical debate.

Sabatier discerns four ways of viewing the role of policy analysis/information in the advocacy coalition framework. First, people expend resources on it to fend off (perceived) threats to their core values or interests. Secondly, information and (policy) analysis has a role in alerting people to the extent to which a given situation affects their interests/values. Third, analysis is primarily used by political actors that have developed a position on a policy issue to justify and elaborate their existing position (see also Heineman, 1990). And, finally, actors generally find it necessary to substantiate their positions in an analytical debate because it is seldom possible to get ones way through the exercise of power alone. This necessitates attempts to convince other actors of the soundness of their position.

Although the advocacy coalition framework was developed to improve understanding of policy-oriented learning and policy change over a period of decades, Jenkins-Smith (1988) demonstrated that it could also be usefully applied to understanding policy-oriented learning in relatively short time periods. This makes the framework conductive for the timeframe of the policy processes studied in this book.

6.5.2 RELEVANCE FOR THE DUTCH CONTEXT

Sabatier claims that his framework should be applicable to a variety of policy issues in most industrial societies (Sabatier, 1993). In the Netherlands, use of some of the concepts in the framework was made in analysing policy disputes concerning dike improvement and enlargement of an airport (van Eeten, 1999). Authors in Eberg et al (1996) applied Sabatier’s notions on learning to policymaking on the NIMBY-law, environmental policy and the evolution of ‘Area Focused Policy’ in which spatial and environmental planning are combined. The notions turn out to provide a satisfactorily theoretical ‘grip’ on these issues.

‘Wholesale’ use of Sabatier’s framework has not been attempted in the Netherlands. But similar frameworks, stemming from different backgrounds, have been developed and applied. One of these is the so-called configuration approach (Termeer and van Twist, 1991), in which reality is seen as an agreement between actors. Reality definitions are constantly constructed and reconstructed in interaction (Abma, 1995). Reality definitions determine which actors interact with other actors, which leads to social-cognitive configurations in which intensive interaction takes place. This approach, therefore, also couples cognitive and social dynamics. The approach
also pays attention to matters like interpretations and sets of beliefs. Termeer (1993) used this approach to study policy making in the Netherlands on the large ecological problems created by the huge production of manure by pigs and found the theory fitting. Hajer (1995) used the concept of *discourse coalitions*. Discourse is defined as “a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts, and categorizations that are produced, reproduced, and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to physical and social realities” (Hajer, 1995, p. 44). Coalitions form around these discourses, which structure behaviour and thinking of its adherents. They are formed and altered through social interaction and argumentation. Their separate parts are held together by a ‘story-line’, a “generative sort of narrative that allows actors to draw upon various discursive categories to give meaning to specific physical or social phenomena” (Hajer, 1995, p. 56). Hajer applied the perspective of discourse coalitions to policymaking on environmental issues in the Netherlands and the UK, and found it fruitful for describing this field in these countries.

The similarity between configuration theory, the theory of discourse coalitions and the advocacy coalition approach is considerable. Therefore, I will assume that ‘advocacy coalitions’–like approaches have proven fruitful for analysing policymaking in the Netherlands, on policy fields that are strongly related to policy making on spatial issues. The players, arguments and tactics used in these fields also often play a part in policymaking on spatial issues in the Netherlands. Therefore, it is hypothesised that this theory of advocacy coalitions can make a major contribution to the understanding and support of policymaking in this field.

**Resulting design guidelines**

Participants in advocacy coalitions use information instrumentally for achieving ends consistent with their belief systems. They consider information relevant only in so far actors believe its conclusion in the policy process can alter policy outcomes. There is therefore no need for ‘all’ facts about a matter to be surfaced. This can be translated into

*Design guideline 6.IV: gather no more information than needed for achieving (sufficient) agreement about (non-)action.*

In problem situations of some scale many (possible) actors will be involved, either inside or outside policy networks. In problems of some scale and complexity it is unfeasible to analytically support all persons (possibly) involved on an individual basis. Luckily, the advocacy coalition framework gives an analytically useful way of grouping the individuals: we can group actors by their shared interests and belief systems, as far as their possible stakes and expected actions in the process are concerned, which leads to

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26 Hajer himself acknowledges that there is “a major overlap between the two approaches” (Hajer, 1995, p. 69)
Design guideline 6.V: delineate (possible) groups or coalitions by their shared interests and belief systems and take this division into groups as the basis for structuring the information relevant to them.

The theory outlined has also shown that policy cores will be rather resistant to change through learning and information. Attempts at trying to alter them by ‘convincing with facts’ will usually lead to a hardening of positions and worsening of the general atmosphere.

Design guideline 6.VI: avoid as much as possible bringing core values into the analysis, or information that threatens core values. Look for possible syntheses on secondary aspects.

An interesting observation was that major changes in the cores of belief systems or transitions in policy rounds can come about by events external to the policy arena or even network.

Design guideline 6.VII: map processes and arenas with possible relevance for the arena and monitor them for developments with a possible impact on the arena.

Power is crucial in the explanation of policy outcomes. The interests of parties without some kind of power will be poorly represented in the final outcomes, unless they overlap with the interests of parties with power.

Design guideline 6.VIII: map which parties possess which kind of power in the situation. Map which parties with power (could) represent parties without power, or how parties without power could be involved in the (analytical) process.
6.6
RESULTING DESIGN GUIDELINES

The design guidelines resulting from this chapter are:

6.I: map the perceptions on the situation of stakeholders outside the decision arena, and use the knowledge of parties outside the network. Indicate differences in views.
6.II: use the threefold structure of streams as structuring principle to provide an overview of the information relevant to actors.
6.III: make policy analytical support a flexible ‘stand-by facility’ during the whole policy process, regularly delivering inputs when deemed necessary.
6.IV: gather no more information than needed for achieving (sufficient) agreement about (non-)action.
6.V: delineate (possible) groups or coalitions by their shared interests and belief systems and take this division into groups as the basis for structuring the information relevant to them.
6.VI: avoid as much as possible bringing core values into the analysis, or information that threatens core values. Look for possible syntheses on secondary aspects.
6.VII: map processes and arenas with possible relevance for the arena and monitor them for developments with a possible impact on the arena.
6.VIII: map which parties possess which kind of power in the situation. Possibly map which parties with power (could) represent parties without power, or how parties without power could be involved in the (analytical) process.
CHAPTER 7

POLICY STYLE
7.1 INTRODUCTION

As outlined in section 2.6, when it is determined - however vaguely - which problem situation should be handled, to which norm(s) solutions that might be endorsed should confirm, and in which type(s) of policy processes these solutions are supposed to come about, there is one remaining question. That is: how do we want to go forward from A to B, or differently, which policymaking style do we have to, or want to support?

Actually, the question above falls apart in two. The first part is empirical: which policy styles are used in the field of Dutch policymaking on land use? The second is a normative one: if just one approach is used, do we want to support that one (in the light of our normative framework)? Or, if more approaches are used, which of these do we want to support? Just one, several, all (when there are many), or maybe none? Or an alternative?

Then there is this other thing: to understand policy styles and their possibilities, we have to understand the institutional framework they are embedded in and at least to a certain extent determined by. What are the main characteristics of this culture? Are they constant, or changing? If they are changing, in what direction, and how should we take that into account?

I will point out in section 7.2 that policy making on land use issues in the Netherlands seems to have been in a transitional period for some time now. There are contradictory directions in that transition. These I will take stock of in 7.3. In that section I will legitimise the choice to support a participatory policy style. What this entails for policy analytical support will be touched upon in section 7.4. In sections 7.5 and 7.6 I will deal with two policy-making activities that could strengthen participatory policy making and in return be strengthened by it. Section 7.7, lastly, will be an enumeration of design guidelines for policy analytical support derived from the foregoing.

7.2 GROWING RESISTANCE AND A LEGITIMACY CRISIS OF THE DUTCH SPATIAL PLANNING SYSTEM

In chapters 2 and 5 it was outlined that the land use planning system in the Netherlands was running into its limits towards the end of the 20th century, illustrated most clearly by the Betuwelijn project.
Over the years resistance against policymaking on spatial issues in the Netherlands has come in waves. A first wave came forward in the 1960s, when a rising education level, increased wealth and the rise of radio and television led to administrators in the Netherlands losing their unassailable authority. Increased protests against land use decisions were one expression of this. To channel these protests an appeal procedure against spatial plans was created in the Law on Spatial Planning of 1965. Participation got the shape of the possibility to comment on plans in an advanced stage: a reactive form of participation that became known as *inspraak*. In the 1970s the pressure exerted by the increasing political force of the ecological movement led to enlargement of the possibilities for participation in decisions related to environmental quality and technological choices. Also ‘inspraak’ in the 1970s became increasingly established with municipalities and provinces. Its timing in the decision making process slowly shifted to the plan-preparation stage, rather than after determination of the plan, offering the possibility to voice comments on goals and starting-points too (Thurlings et al, 1980). An Environmental Impact Review process, which includes public review and comment, was included in law in 1986. But the most powerful means for interest groups to shape policy is litigation (Webler and Renn, 1995). The economic crisis in the 1980s led to a shift in emphasis from democratisation to enhancing the efficiency of decision-making. But two events led to a renewed attention for the participation of citizens in - among other things - land use decision making in the 1990s:
- a low turnout at local elections in 1990 led to a debate about a gap that would have grown between a self-absorbed and unrepresentative political system and the electorate. Instruments for influence like *inspraak* are branded as inflexible, empty instruments, which do not alter decisions (van den Heuvel and de Vries, 1995; Teisman, 1997). The number of appeals against zoning plan revisions grows steadily, indicating a growing dissatisfaction of citizens with the way government operates and the decisions it takes.
- on the national level the experiences with the Betuwelijn outlined in chapter 5 led to a recognition that the existing system of national government trying to push through infrastructure projects hierarchically has come to a dead end.

7.3** TWO POLICY STYLES COMPETING**

The Betuwelijn experience and the resulting WRR-report contributed to two contradictory developments in the ‘style’ of policy making on land use problems (de Lange, 1999). These can be seen as attempts to build on two cultural traditions in Dutch policymaking. The first is an extension, long-desired by central government, of the centralism so prominent in other policy fields to the field of spatial planning by enhancing (central) government control and
strengthening hierarchy in the system. The second tries to improve upon the existing political culture of deliberation between elites, by broadening participation and enhancing the influence of participants.

7.3.1 ENHANCING (CENTRAL) GOVERNMENT CONTROL THROUGH STRENGTHENING HIERARCHY

This approach is a reflection of what has been termed ‘scientism’, or a ‘technocratic’ view on governmental decision-making (Hawkesworth, 1988; Majone, 1989). Its adherents see problems as ‘technical’ in nature, meaning that policy decisions flow naturally from information delivered by technical and/or scientific experts. Participation of third parties is superfluous. Resistance against a governmental decision can impossibly be based on rational arguments. The slow pace of many governmental proposals and plans is seen as the result of a too complex system of laws and procedures, in which the legal protection and possibilities of opponents of proposals has gone too far. This view on spatial policymaking prevailed in government circles in the 1980s and well into the 1990s (Hisschemöller, 1993; WRR, 1994).

The approach is characterised by pleas for streamlining procedures, cutting back on participation and possibilities for objection of citizens, and giving central government more judicial ‘muscle’ to break resistance of local and regional government and by that speed up the pace of the decision making process. Solutions to the problems are sought in among others a drastic reduction of the number of plans, a reshuffling of responsibilities between administrative layers and more hierarchy between them. Decisions should be more clearly marked and binding (Drexhage and Pen-Soetermeer, 1996). This line of thought is mainly popular among administrators, builders, contractors and business, less so in the policy literature. It got embodied in for instance the Route Law (Tracéwet, 1993) and NIMBY Law (1993), laws intended to enlarge the possibilities for higher government to force municipalities to take up national projects in their zoning plans.

7.3.2 ACHIEVING AGREEMENT THROUGH ENHANCED PARTICIPATION

Adherents of the second view see the Decide-Announce-Defend strategy as a major cause of resistance, because people are inclined to resist things unilaterally imposed on them. They accept the current power distribution between the different government layers, as well as the growing political awareness of the average citizen and try to improve upon the already existing political culture of participation. This view is dominant on a local level, as well as in some national circles, for example in parts of Rijkswaterstaat.

Recommendations deriving from this assumption converge upon changing laws and procedures or decision processes within the existing judicial system, to enhance the participation of stakeholders in the decision making process, to make them more ‘fair’ and thereby enhance
support for their outcomes (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1996). Municipalities should get more involved in siting decisions. This would challenge higher governments to deliver quality to seduce the municipal council into co-operation (Bemmel, 1996, p. 792). A widespread recommendation is to enlarge participation of the larger public also to resolve siting disputes (Drexhage and Pen-Soetermeer, 1996; Lober, 1995). Governmental agencies or facility developers should address community concerns adequately through open meetings, than public concerns would dissipate (Hunter and Leyden, 1995). Local inspection- and advice committees have been suggested (Vlek, 1995).

The ‘new participation’ adds elements to the existing culture of elite participation, supplemented by ‘inspraak’. It is intended to be broader than the old corporatist participation, including for instance environmental groups, but also the ‘average citizen’. Next, it is supposed to take place sooner than in the older (inspraak) forms of participation, at a stage when plans have not crystallised yet. Further, participants should participate more actively, providing ideas, wishes, sometimes means, to help shape and/or implement policy proposals and plans, instead of criticising already finished proposals and plans. Parties should try to create a shared problem-ownership and a package of ‘win-win solutions’ together. The foregoing should lead to a more open process, in which the agenda, participating parties and topics to be dealt with can be broadened and/or otherwise altered by those partaking (Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999; van Schendelen, 1998). The new phenomenon is known under different names, like co-production, open planning processes, interactive policy-making, and so on.

In practice on a national level so-called benefit-and-necessity discussions were held concerning the extension of Schiphol Airport and the business area of the Harbour of Rotterdam. Rijkswaterstaat experimented with participatory planning concerning possible new roads or road extensions. But most experiments with participatory policymaking took place on a local level, mainly in the field of land use planning (van de Peppel, 2001). These experiments took on forms like client councils, city conferences, citizen forums, benefit-and necessity discussions, environmental conferences, scenario workshops, and so on (Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998; Mayer, 1997). Participation in these different types of projects can take on a large number of forms, ranging from prioritisation of screening criteria to active involvement in the structure and administration of the process with attendant veto power.

### 7.3.3 A CHOICE OF POLICY STYLE TO SUPPORT ANALYTICALLY

Both policy-making styles outlined above can be observed in practice. But the usefulness of enhancing procedural powers of higher government through legislation seems doubtful. The WRO already contained a possibility to force municipalities to adjust their zoning plan, similar to that offered by NIMBY-law and the Route Law. This power was hardly used over the
years, to avoid spoiling administrative relations. For the same reason the new NIMBY law is likely to be as dead an instrument as the old one. One way or the other, spatial planning in the Netherlands remains a game of mutual dependencies and negotiation (compare Oberholzer-Gee and Frey, 1995). It is no surprise, therefore, that great success with the new approach can not be reported yet. Finally, the hierarchical approach is in contradiction to the participation norm developed in chapter 4.

The second policy making style is in the process of development. The evidence of success of participatory policy making is mixed so far (Enserink and Monnikhof, 2003; Mayer et al, 2005; Monnikhof and Edelenbos, 2001). In the light of this inconclusiveness, decisively is that the participatory approach is in line with the normative position chosen in chapter 4. Pending more conclusive results, the choice made here is to focus on supporting a participatory style of policy making. In the next section I will go deeper into what this choice entails for policy analytical support.

7.4 SUPPORTING PARTICIPATORY POLICY MAKING

Three main motives are brought forward for enhancing public participation in policy making (Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998; Pelletier et al., 1999). These are (1) enhancing (the involvement of specific social groups in) democracy as a system, (2) increasing support for possibly controversial policy proposals, and (3) improving the quality and effectiveness of policy proposals.

I will focus on improving the quality of policy proposals. One reason is that the limited research conducted indicates that people mainly participate in participatory processes because of their interest in the outcomes. Their support for these outcomes depends on how they perceive quality in terms of their own preferences (Hartman, 1998; Monnikhof and Edelenbos, 2001). Therefore, (the expectation of) good quality outcomes seem(s) crucial for achieving participation of people at all, and the attendant enhancement in the working of democracy when so desired. Enhancing the quality of policy proposals through participation seems instrumental as well as crucial in achieving the other two motives.

A second reason for focusing on the quality of policy proposals derives from the policy analytical focus of this book. Since the task of policy analysis is to help in the design and choice of one or more ‘good’ policy alternatives, the stress on improving the quality of alternatives seems logical. This is also consistent with the normative framework outlined in chapter 4, which stresses the
extent to which policy outcomes satisfy preferences of those involved as the major measuring-rod for judging them, and sees participation and compensation as necessary, but instrumental, complements to that. The ways in which participatory policymaking is claimed to lead to better policy are dealt with in 7.4.2.

7.4.1. PARTICIPATORY POLICY MAKING AND PARTICIPATORY POLICY ANALYSIS

There is a clear link between participatory policymaking and participatory policy analysis. But, although there is considerable overlap, they are not the same. Policy analysis does not coincide with policy making. Policy analysis contributes to policy making by surfacing, processing and presenting information. Participatory policy analysis generates and processes that information with the help of participation of decision-makers, stakeholders and/or experts through the design and/or support of forums for participation and debate on the content of policy proposals (compare Mayer, 1997). But decision-making is more than processing information into decisions. For bringing about decisions power and means have to be brought together, agreement about (non-)action has to be reached, et cetera. For this also a process of ‘shaping consent’ is necessary (Edelenbos et al., 2003). Besides that in a policymaking process there are periods when in a ‘closed’ setting work needs to be done to process and structure information. For the latter ‘traditional’ or ‘expert’ policy analysis seems more fitting. Participatory policy analysis can therefore form an (important) part of participatory policymaking, but does not coincide with it. It therefore is important to attune participatory as well as more traditional policy analysis to participatory policymaking processes (White, 1994), which have their own specific analytical demands.

The way in which information is dealt with can contribute strongly to the success of participatory policy making. Information supply, support and making ‘homework’ can help to get a grip on the variety of perceptions and the multitude of data that are generated in a participatory process (de Keijzer, 1997a, 1997b; van Schendelen, 1998). But for that policy analysis has to fit in with the specific peculiarities of participatory policy making.

Within the different steps of a participatory policy making process numerous interactions take place, in which actors contribute and exchange information. Policy analytical support can offer information on behalf of (the management of) this interaction process and process its results. In practice a large number of ways or arrangements exist to organise interaction processes (see for instance Pröpper and Steenbeek, 1998). The amount and form of information that is necessary, and the analytical outcomes aimed at differ per arrangement, and with that also the support that policy analysis can and should contribute.
7.4.2  TWO TYPES OF INFORMATION NEEDS IN PARTICIPATORY POLICY MAKING

In general two needs can be identified with regard to analysis and information supply in the area of participatory policymaking (compare van der Most et al., 1998):

- the need for information on the content of problems, policies, stakeholders, perceptions and so forth, in many forms and on different levels of detail;
- the need for managing and processing the information streams in the process, besides the processing of information this also involves generating, storing, valuing, selecting, distributing and presenting information.

Satisfying the information and analysis needs in participatory processes

Information needs in participatory policy-making cannot be situated exactly within specific steps in the process. The various analytical activities - problem investigation, generating, elaborating and structuring of solutions - all know their own emphasis within a certain period of the process, but are or even can be in general not limited to that period. But of those activities themselves the information needs can be listed. Besides that the process of ‘meta decision making’, in which the process itself is set up and managed, also requires specific information.

The analytical information in the process can be derived from existing sources or obtained from experts, but one of the core ideas of participatory policymaking is that stakeholders too can contribute to better policy by giving analytical/informational contributions that would otherwise not be available. Those contributions could be (1) more and better information about their wishes and preferences, problems and fears; (2) information about the local situation; (3) professional expertise of participants; and (4) creativity, solution generating ability and design ability.

Because of this policy will be developed of a better quality, fitting better what people want (Beierle, 1999; Lopez Cerezo et al, 1996).

Often in pleas for participatory policy making the first two possible contributions are emphasised, which could be described as tapping the ‘lay knowledge’ of citizens (Lopez Cerezo et al., 1996), and the professional expertise and possible creative (designing) contributions of citizens are neglected. Policy analysis, participatory or not, could contribute to supporting and structuring all four forms of possible contributions of citizens.

Managing and processing the information streams in the process

The interaction between actors in participatory policy processes and the information streams produced in that interaction can be quite diverse as the circle of actors is concerned as well as the working methods used. In all processes an alternation between participatory and more closed moments in the process takes place. In the participatory moments an ‘information-explosion’ takes place (divergence); in the closed moments it is tried to get a grip on the
information-overload generated (convergence). In participatory processes information needs do not limit themselves to analytical information issues, but also apply to information activities like the processing of data (van der Most et al., 1998).

For all the activities mentioned above an important question is who will perform (which part of) which activity: will it be participants, civil servants, (independent) experts? An important policy analytical task for all activities can consist in providing methods and instruments for these activities. For participatory analysis various methods and techniques are available (see Rosenhead, 1989, 1996; Taylor et al, 1995; VanGundy, 1981, 1984). But also the information that is produced in the more ‘closed’ periods of the process by separate participants, by experts or the process management has to be processed. Non-participatory analytical methods and techniques can be used for that (see for instance the simple techniques in Patton and Sawicki, 1986), but they have to be adapted for use in a participatory process. Although more classical methods are not ruled out, it is believed that participation could lead to a more modest role for large-scale technical and quantitative methods of research (Hisschemöller, 1993)

Methods, tools and techniques, whether originally designed for participatory use or not, can provide structure to the information used in a participatory process (Monnikhof and Bots, 2000; Monnikhof and Edelenbos, 2001). However, the limited status of these methods as simply structuring devices, and possibly tools to experiment a bit with different valuations, but nothing more, should be crystal clear to avoid a case of methods making decisions.

**Resulting design guidelines**

For a participatory process to be able to take place, first it has to be determined which party would be relevant participants to it, leading to

7.I: **identify (the position of) – possibly – affected parties**

A participatory style of policy making demands the provision of useful information as well as management and processing of the many information streams in the process, which leads to

7.II: **provide and manage information necessary for supporting participatory policy-making**

The involvement of more functions, scale levels and parties in a participatory development of spatial changes means that data, information and knowledge are spread over different institutions and owners. An important policy analytical task in such a situation might simply be to find out where relevant information is to be found. Information from different sources as well
as on different topics should be brought together in one framework, or a central 'gate' should be available through which everybody can get to the information required.

7.III: provide a single framework that gives access to all relevant (sources of) information with regard to a decision.

Participatory policy-making has its own type of forums, participants and activities, different from those of a ‘regular’ policy process. This means there are also own specific demands on the information presented. Information presented by policy analysis should therefore be geared to these specific demands, and be usable in a participatory process in its form, extensiveness, and so on. This leads to

7.IV translate information in a format usable in participatory policymaking

7.4.3. SUPPORTING DIFFERENT CLIENTS

Enhancing participation also means that the potential user group is diverse in its composition. Information presented should be attuned to such a diverse user group. This means (expert) jargon and black box methods should be avoided as much as possible, uncertainties and assumptions should be exposed in terms clear to laymen. Policy analysts should translate different jargons etc. into a language understandable to all affected parties. This leads to

7.V: make information and methods transparent and understandable to all parties

Participatory policy making in itself is still a very broad concept. Within that form of policy-making, a number of specific activities can be performed. For enhancing two of those activities an increasing number of pleas are found in the literature (see for instance Vlek, 1995), and experiments conducted in Dutch policy making. These are an enhancement of the amount of learning taking place, and making more use of compensation in policy making, often coupled to negotiation. These two possible ‘supporting activities’ in participatory policy-making are dealt with in the next two sections.
7.5
ENHANCING THE LEARNING CAPACITY OF POLICY MAKERS

7.5.1 PLEAS FOR ENHANCING THE LEARNING CAPACITY OF POLICY MAKERS

A prominent line of recommendation in the literature starts from the assumption that the problem situation to be handled in land use planning is often unstructured, uncertain and ambiguous. In such a situation government does not have all the answers, or even knows what the problems are. To make the problem situation fit to be handled by policy a learning process should take place. Such a process is seen as especially fitting for avoiding type III errors, since these are often blamed on a failing learning ability of government. Therefore, the learning ability of government should be enhanced (Van Gunsteren, 1985, Majone, 1989).

Most authors in favour of enhancing the learning capabilities of government advocate ‘participatory learning’. This means that government should learn about problems and possible solutions by open discussions with as many as possible other parties (Hoppe, 1996). The generalist knowledge of non-specialists is of major importance because it connects diverse, usually separated areas of knowledge and in this way can lead to new information about problems (Wildavsky, 1992). Counter-expertise could also contribute to enhancing the possibilities of government for learning (Hisschemöller, 1993).

Through the confrontation and integration of the diverging insights, experiences and standpoints with regard to the problem, a situation can be achieved in which a better solvable problem comes about. For this those involved, including those that carry the political responsibility should be prepared to take part in the learning process (Hisschemöller, 1993). Analysts can contribute to this ‘social learning’ by facilitating a wide-ranging dialogue among advocates of different viewpoints to encourage a more sophisticated understanding of public policies than is possible from a single perspective (Majone, 1989).

7.5.2 A/I AND V/S LEARNING

Many typologies of learning abound in the literature. A productive distinction is that made by van Gunsteren (1985) between ‘A/I’ (analysis and instruction) and ‘V/S’ (variety and selection) learning27. A/I learning stands for the type of learning envisaged in ‘traditional’ policy analysis: learning takes place because an analysis of the situation is made, the different possibilities for action and their (dis)advantages are listed and next the best is chosen. This learning process can operate on an individual as well as on a collective level. Analysis is carried out by experts, after

27 The following draws heavily on van Gunsteren, 1985. Compare also the distinction van der Knaap (1997) makes between a rational and argumentative approach to learning. In the rational approach the ‘truth’ of the information is central, in the argumentative approach the persuasiveness within a social context.
which the presented rational solution is announced and enforced by centres of authority to the other members of the collective. Van Gunsteren sees analysis taking place everywhere among people, not just among scientists and technical experts. Opposite this type of learning Van Gunsteren posits V/S learning. In this process a variety of alternative policies is created and tried out. The most fitting is selected, without it being possible to analyse exactly why this works better than others. Survival indicates the presence of learning (compare Dery, 1984). This form of learning not only covers avoiding mistakes made before, but also the copying of successes. The selection environment is the policymaking system, and ‘testing’ of alternatives usually takes place in debate. V/S learning is a form of social or interactive learning.

Disadvantages of A/I processes can be blind spots in the theory and insufficient ability to observe a changing context and respond to it in time and flexibly. They can also cause too little appreciation of the problem solving ability present in traditions and in the behaviour of executioners of the instructions. They can lead to bureaucracy, blindness to societal developments, dependence on experts, mania for organisation, and inability to control and insure observance of all rules and instructions. V/S processes can be plagued by waste – many unused alternatives are created –, unjust selection criteria and sub-optimisation.

In light of the shortcomings of both approaches Van Gunsteren favours combining A/I and V/S learning. The pressure of competition in a V/S setting would make A/I analysis work out better. Firstly, because analysts who do not want to be the loser try extra hard. Secondly, because the total of analytical effort that is performed in a short time is large (no one wants to miss the boat). Finally, because there is a situation in which it is attractive to combine the strong points of the diverse analytical products. On the other hand, V/S processes usually work out more satisfactory, or at least achieve an acceptable result faster, when elements of A/I analysis have been included in them. Also, the variety that is necessary for V/S processes to work well is often produced through A/I analysis. And for available variety for which at first there is no place, regularly through A/I analysis a place is sought or even created.

Crucial for learning to take place is the creation of sufficient variety. When variety is limited too much, the functioning of V/S learning processes is prevented. Government should select from variety, because variety without any selection is wasteful. But besides that government should also (help) sustain a sufficiently large variety reservoir as insurance against an unknown future. What van Gunsteren sees as mostly lacking inside government in this respect, is not the creation of variety in itself, but adequate selection processes, in which the whole existing, and not only the officially recognised, variety is taken into account. Government could create these improved selection processes by for instance competition between governmental bodies, double work and overlap (compare Landau, 1969).
**Resulting design guidelines**

A larger role for participatory learning means that especially V/S learning should be promoted. But it was argued that V/S-learning is expected to work best when combined to A/I learning. Therefore, a combination of both should be supported.

7.VI: *support a combination of V/S learning and A/I learning.*

Crucial for learning is the creation of sufficient variety, which can be used to enrich the set of solutions considered. Analysis should support this. Additionally, it could for instance actively contribute to variety itself by bringing in for instance innovations in layout concepts.

7.VII: *support the creation of variety*

But all this variety is pointless if it is not used through adequate selection processes, in which the whole existing, and not only the officially recognised, variety is taken into account.

7.VIII: *support the use of all relevant variety in selection processes.*

### 7.5.3 SUPPORTING PARTICIPATORY LEARNING THROUGH POLICY ANALYSIS

Using participation to obtain information could in principle take place by means of a one-sided form of participation. In such a form people participate to give information concerning their situation, wishes, ideas, and so on to those who have to make the decisions, until these consider to have enough information to make the decision. Participation could take the form of interviewing different stakeholders, putting them in focus groups, holding surveys, or even just informing or educating the public (Beierle, 1999).

Aside from obtaining information and ideas, another main reason for using participatory learning is the existence of different frames, belief systems, ideologies, et cetera. No matter how much information is gathered, much of it will be contradictory, and differences will exist with regard to its weight and meaning. Agreement on ‘the facts’ can only be achieved by discussing them (Edelenbos et al, 2003). The values and interests of those taking part in them will shape these discussions. Participatory learning entails discussion and bargaining about facts, as well as about values and interests. “The truth, cogency, and relevance of knowledge claims” (Dunn, 1982, p. 306) has to be negotiated. Assumptions have to be exposed and the logical structure of arguments criticised (Dunn, 1982). This should stimulate critical self-reflection on the part of adherents of particular frames and lead to a ‘consensus zone’ (Edelenbos et al, 2003; Enserink
and Monnikhof, 2003) covering the data that agreement can be reached upon. For this negotiation process *two-sided* forms of interaction are needed, like workshops, citizen juries, consensus conferences, and such (Beierle, 1999).

One of the aspects of participatory learning has to do with the competence of participants. Assumptions underlying the plea for participatory learning are that *all* people are in principle capable to a well-argumented judgement. But it is unreasonable to expect all participants to be fully competent in all aspects of the subject at hand. Procedures, rules and support that promote competency are needed, to achieve a level of competence sufficient to make good decisions. Participants have to be provided with training and specific knowledge before or during a process, if necessary (Webler, 1995).

**Resulting design guideline**

7.IX: provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives to make participants competent and willing to participate

### 7.5.4 A CHOICE OF LEARNING TYPE TO SUPPORT

I will be specific on the type of learning aimed for. Policy analysis is meant to support decision-making by providing information to those taking decisions. People have to use the information provided to alter their perception, and their actions accordingly. I am not interested in learning that only alters perceptions. I do not aim for either knowledge to enlighten the participants on important societal issues in itself, or to give participants knowledge and skills that will make them a better citizen, although both are laudable aims.

The kind of learning I aim for is instrumental in achieving agreement on concerted action (or deliberate non-action). That action should be geared towards a multi-peaked efficacy, meaning that it should accommodate as much as possible of the interests of those affected by it. Its overall structure should be that of variation and selection through social interaction (V/S), in which analytical efforts (A/I) can be supportive in achieving that variation and selection. In short, the type of learning aimed for is given in figure 7.1.
Figure 7.1: supporting a combination of V/S learning and A/I learning

Supporting: learning by interaction
For action: learning by analysis

Resulting design guideline
The type of learning I want to support here entails that information provided is geared towards enabling action. Information that is not directly necessary for enabling that action should not be provided. This leads to

7.X: avoid providing information superfluous to enabling action

7.6
Enhancing support through negotiation and compensation

7.6.1 Negotiation and compensation in policy and literature
Another strand of experiments and recommendations focuses on diminishing resistance to land use proposals by compensating for negative effects. This strand of recommendations is tied to recommendations for enhancing negotiation in land use decision-making.

Compensation has played a role in Dutch policy making on land use for some time, but its importance is growing (Monnikhof, 1999). Arrangements for financial compensation exist for expropriation28 and for zoning plan alterations that cause damage or hindrance29. The issues compensated for are recently becoming broader, incorporating for example visual hindrance. The Law on the Environment30 knows a compensation principle since 1994, applicable to nature- and recreational values as well as to other environmental aspects like noise pollution. But before is proceeded to compensation first the possibilities of avoidance and mitigation of adverse effects have to be used. The authorities can order a project initiator to study compensating measures in an environmental impact assessment. Recently compensation gets increasingly

28 On grounds of the Expropriation law
29 On grounds of article 49 of the Law on Spatial Planning
30 In Dutch: Wet Milieubeheer
worked out concretely in EIAs and integrated in decision-making. Standard procedures for compensation projects have not been established yet.

In legislation as well as in policymaking there is a tendency to a more uniform compensation concept and – practice. The embedding of a general compensation principle in the General Law on Administration is imminent. This will put on governments a general duty by law to compensate.

Dutch policy literature pleads sometimes to use compensation more deliberately, voluntarily and actively as a policy instrument to lessen resistance (de Jong, 1996; van Zundert, 1996). Losers of proposals should be compensated for their losses earlier and more generously than so far. Compensation should play a part in the decision making process itself, not only be paid out reluctantly afterwards as ‘a mere palliative’. Compensation should be determined in negotiation between the parties involved, to create ‘win-win’ situations (Vlek, 1995).

7.6.2 THE NATURE OF COMPENSATION

Compensation is the reimbursement of damage to persons that experience that damage by an action. It can take the forms of financial reimbursement and of compensation in kind, in which a non-financial form of welfare loss is compensated by a non-financial form of welfare gain. When for example a forest is cut down to build a road this can be compensated by laying out a forest of similar quality on another location nearby. This compensation can also take place by dissimilar values (offering a playground for a disappearing forest). Financial compensation can take place by direct financial compensation, or by means of financial guarantees like a contingency fund for possible future losses or a guarantee for property values. Normatively, compensation should be determined on a level at least covering the damage suffered, but practice often deviates (Bacow and Milkey, 1987; Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996).

There are four basic arguments in favour of compensation in policy (Monnikhof, 1999). These are that compensation is just (see chapter 4), that by it resistance against decisions can be lessened, and that a compensation duty can lead to better proposals by forcing proponents to consider all relevant negative effects of a decision as ‘costs’ (Lake, 1987; O’Hare and Sanderson, 1987). Finally, a compensation duty can contribute to filtering out ‘bad’ projects: when compensation makes a decision no longer cost-effective for its proponent, that means that the decision was already not ‘cost-effective’ for society as a whole (Michelman, 1967).

But compensation also has its problems. The costs of determination and execution of compensation, including the costs arising from research to determine the appropriate amount of compensation, are high. Also, those eligible for compensation are not always willing to accept it, seeing it in

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31 Dutch law knows limitations to compensation which limit transaction costs. Firstly, the damage caused has to be disproportionate. And the decision taken has to cause damage that was not foreseeable earlier. Otherwise, this future damage is assumed to be discounted in the procurement price or cost calculations.
some cases as bribery, especially when it is financial compensation (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1996; Kunreuther and Easterling, 1996). Determining the correct amount of compensation is another problem. It is difficult to determine values that are normally not expressed in monetary terms - aesthetics, noise pollution and so forth -, to enable construction of an area with comparable value elsewhere. Methods developed for this (see for instance Bowers and Hopkinson, 1994) are disputed. Also, those involved are not always informed enough to provide useful information. A final problem is strategic behaviour. Determining the desired amount of compensation by stakeholders themselves opens the door to overestimating the (expected) damage, to receive as much compensation as possible. There exist clues that this problem is not very serious in practice (Rowe and Brookshire, 1980; Walsh et al., 1984), but these are based on relatively artificial situations32.

**Resulting design guideline**

To limit the possibility of strategic behaviour a check from a third (analytical) source on compensation claims is desirable. Policy analysis could use supporting techniques (like those for expressing nature values in money) and information from similar earlier cases to determine (the size of) the effects to be compensated as a check upon the claims of stakeholders. Mutual comparison of claims could also bring strongly diverging cases to light. Besides that one can look at similar cases in the past. This leads to

7.XI: provide third party estimates on parties' claims to compensation

### 7.6.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF NEGOTIATING COMPENSATION

Research shows that the less influence stakeholders can exert by participation in the decision-making on the amount and type of compensation given, the smaller the acceptance of compensating measures (Carnes et al., 1987; Lake, 1987a). Therefore, the correct amount of compensation should not be determined by experts, but by a negotiation process between parties (possibly) involved in a policy proposal (O'Hare, 1977). Negotiation is defined here as interaction between two or more parties in which one or more of them offer(s) something of

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32 However, the problem of strategic behaviour can be put into perspective on fundamental grounds. Awarding full compensation only leads to the receiving party neither losing nor gaining, whilst the paying party receives all (presumed) advantages of a proposed policy or project. An amount of compensation in between the minimal amount necessary to 'make the victim whole' and the maximum amount the party causing the damage can pay without becoming a loser itself is equally defensible (Nozick, 1974, p. 63). The exact amount of compensation then becomes a matter of negotiation power and skills. By allowing some 'overcompensation' a 'win-not lose' situation can change in a 'win-win' situation. Only when by strategic behaviour the total amount of compensation would rise above the gain in welfare that could be achieved by a project, the project would unjustly seem societally not cost-effective. Only then strategic behaviour baffles societally desirable projects.
value to the other party or parties, conditional on receiving something of value to the first party of parties in return.

By negotiation the necessary amount of compensation is determined through social interaction. Negotiation should be used to identify representatives of the interests affected by a policy decision and enable them to achieve a consensus on what policy should be. Successful negotiation will turn adversarial relationships into co-operative ones and reduce the chances of litigation (Fiorino, 1995). Negotiated compensation is especially useful in dealing with other issues than health and safety risk. Negotiation on these latter two issues is rather controversial and can therefore be counterproductive (Sandman, 1987).

Negotiation affects the information guidelines of the policy process. It allows people to directly state their preferences and provide information about their circumstances. Negotiation also avoids the precise, mutually exclusive definitions of value that are necessary to any synoptic procedure. It requires the redundancy of ambiguity or surplus meaning. This permits values to overlap the parties in dispute, thereby providing some common ground for agreement (Landau, 1969). People negotiating do not need to state their goals or criteria explicitly, and even would be very unwise to state exactly their demands, expected gains and losses. The overall success criterion is a negotiated agreement, which in itself does not have to be expressed in exact statements on consequences, as a policy analytical recommendation in a non-negotiating situation often does. Agreement is substituted for the demand for proof (Fiorino, 1995). With that negotiating at least partly takes away the necessity of explicit criteria/goals, and with that diminishes the need for information. Policy analysis should therefore focus on enabling (negotiation) settings by which the information need of the process is minimised, and next supply the remaining necessary information. In that remaining necessary information needs, problems and effects should be central.

**Resulting design guidelines**

It turns out to be important to supplement compensation with actual influence of stakeholders through negotiation on the form and amount of compensation. Problems with determining the height of compensation can also be lessened by using participation of (representatives of) those involved in negotiation processes. However, a first determination of which interests are at stake seems useful to start off talks and negotiations, leading to

7.XII: *identify the interests at stake of affected interested parties.*

The difficulty of determining the wishes and demands of others means that representing other parties is a tricky venture. Often it will be impossible to have all affected individuals or even
groups involved in the actual participatory process. This means great care should be paid to making sure those that are involved at least really represent the interests and views of those absent, instead of only claiming to do so, as is often the case. This leads to

7.XIII: map the representativeness of those partaking in the process for the views and interests of those absent with great care

Policy supporting negotiation on compensation could indicate what the possible effects of a LULU can be (because these determine what should be compensated), give a rough valuation of these or indicate how this could be done. It could point out which parties might benefit or suffer from what, where conflictuous issues lie. Policy analysis can help in identifying possible exchange arrangements, by determining the assets and wishes that parties have, and might be willing to exchange. Conversely, also strong blockades might be mapped, to avoid a waste of time and effort on trying to negotiate the non-negotiable. Policy analysis could indicate possibilities for financial compensation, compensation in kind, mitigation measures as well as providing suggestions for packages of these and a rough estimate of their costs. This leads to

7.XIV: map possibilities for negotiation, compensation and mitigation

7.7 RESULTING DESIGN GUIDELINES

The design guidelines resulting from this chapter are:

7.I: identify (the position of) – possibly – affected parties
7.II: provide and manage information necessary for supporting participatory policy-making
7.III: provide one framework that gives access to all relevant (sources of) information with regard to a decision
7.IV: translate information in a format usable in participatory policymaking
7.V: make information and methods transparent and understandable to all parties
7.VI: support a combination of V/S learning and A/I learning
7.VII: support the creation of variety
7.VIII: support use of all relevant variety in selection processes
7.IX: provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives to make participants competent and willing to participate
7.X: avoid providing information superfluous to enabling action
7.XI: provide third party estimates on parties’ claims to compensation
7.XII: identify the interests at stake of affected interested parties
7.XIII: map the representativeness of those partaking in the process for the views and interests of those absent with great care
7.XIV: map possibilities for negotiation, compensation and mitigation

The design guidelines of the last three chapters will be combined in chapter 8. In chapters 9, 10 and 11 it will be studied in how far these design guidelines are applied in practice, if so, whether they work out well or not. Also, it will be inferred in how far their application seems necessary to derive a good policy result in the sense of chapter 4, possibly resulting in removing one or more design guidelines from the list. Finally, new design guidelines may be added on the basis of the case results.
CHAPTER 8

RESEARCH SET-UP FOR CASE EVALUATION
In this chapter the normative framework and design guidelines from the previous chapters are combined into a framework for evaluating the cases. First, they were grouped and reformulated. Doing this it turned out 22 guidelines developed that way. Of course, many of these guidelines were not (entirely) new, but did exist more or less scattered through the literature. But some of them are new, to my knowledge, and their combination from the perspective and in the setting chosen certainly is. All seemed to contribute foremost to one of eight specific factors. These ‘intermediate factors’, derived inductively from the guidelines, are supposed to help achieve the norms of chapter 4. If application of the guidelines helps the intermediate factor come about, or be enhanced, this is supposed to contribute to achievement of the three norms. In this way inductively a hypothetical causal model emerges, that is presented in figure 8.1. In this model, the guidelines apply to the analysis performed in the cases. The intermediate factors these guidelines should help come about or enhance are either attributes of the policy making process supported by this analysis (its efficiency, the amount and success of negotiations during it, its flexibility, the comprehensiveness of (interim) decisions taken in it, the substantive enrichment created in and retained by it), of its participants (their representativeness and competence), or of the relationship between those participants (trust). The intermediate factors in turn are considered to contribute to achieving outcomes (and the process characteristic participation) meeting the norms developed in chapter 4.

The model has a number of functions. It is a hypothetical causal model, and analysing the cases will help in strengthening the case for, or on the contrary disconfirm, the hypothesised relations in the model. It is used to structure the guidelines in a framework and to operationalise them. Finally, the framework provides the ‘lens’ through which the case material is viewed. It determines which material is gathered, and which material not. The elements of the model I will use as an aid in classifying the case material.

Of course, the model, however complex in itself, is a simplification. Guidelines are grouped under the intermediate factor to which they are supposed to contribute the most. In practice guidelines will contribute to several factors, as well as influence each others’ working, or contribute directly to the norms, or through some other intermediating factor not included in the model. Also, intermediate factors like trust and comprehensiveness of decisions taken will be influenced by factors not covered by the guidelines, like political considerations, the history between parties involved, and so on. For reasons of overview and practicability (systematically researching all possible cross-links and possible non-analytical factors would be impossible) the model is not extended with these links and other influences. The model is a first hypothetical attempt to create some order, whether it is fit for doing that will be tested in the following chapters.

I will now discuss the different intermediate factors that came forward from grouping the guidelines, and outline by which indicators I will observe whether these intermediate factors have come about or were enhanced. Under each intermediate factor are subsumed the
Research set-up for case evaluation

Chapter 8

Figure 8.1: A hypothetical causal model for the effect of the guidelines on welfare

- have a broad scope
- integrate and structure

- avoid overlap in analytical activities
- provide no superfluous information
- focus on pragmatic aspects

- identify (the position of) relevant parties
- pay attention to representativeness

- provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives
- give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise
- provide sufficient information to enable participation
- translate information into a usable format

- have a stakeholder/interest focus
- map possibilities for negotiation

- make analysis a standby facility
- make analysis continuously adaptable

- be transparent
- have procedures for reaching agreement on status information
- let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space
- provide independent, trusted expertise

- connect V/S learning to A/I learning
- support variety creation
- support variety use

Comprehensiveness

Efficiency

Representativeness

Competence

Negotiation

Flexibility

Trust

Substantive enrichment

Norms:
- welfare increase
- compensation
- participation

= norms for judging the outcomes
= intermediate factors: attributes of the decision-making process
= guidelines
guidelines that are hypothesized to contribute to its achievement the most. Under each guideline I will also outline by which indicators I will observe the degree in which it was applied.

8.1

COMBINING AND OPERATIONALISING THE GUIDELINES IN ONE FRAMEWORK

Comprehensiveness
A number of guidelines are supposed to contribute to an intermediate factor I called comprehensiveness. This intermediate factor entails whether the processes analytically supported yielded ‘integral’ designs for solutions, and whether policy makers made ‘integral’ (interim) decisions on those designs. Empirically we should observe to what extent the solution(s) designed and decision(s) taken took into account ‘all’ relevant elements, views and welfare effects, also in relevant other arenas, or whether elements, views or welfare effects can be pinpointed that were neglected, or insufficiently taken into account. Protests of parties demonstrably missing their interests or points in a decision are a good indicator of this. In a strong form neglect of relevant aspects can lead to a type III error, meaning that the ‘wrong’ problem seems to have been tackled in the solutions designed and eventual decision(s) taken.

The guidelines contributing to this comprehensiveness deal with the extent to which ‘all’ relevant sources of information and analysis are used and ‘all’ relevant aspects and views taken into account, related to each other and structured. Firstly, there are guidelines that deal with the scope of policy analysis. There are two aspects to this. The first are the elements covered by analysis. They should cover all relevant welfare effects of a policy proposal, prevent a type III error, and create awareness of possible relevant developments in other policy fields.

Resuming, we have two levels of comprehensiveness here. One level is that of the comprehensiveness of designs and decisions resulting of a decision-making and design process. Those decisions and designs might be more or less comprehensive. Their comprehensiveness in turn is influenced by the comprehensiveness of the analysis conducted for the decision process. But the link is not necessarily one on one. A decision process supported by perfectly comprehensive analysis might for a variety of (for example political) reasons still result in a less then comprehensive decision. Conversely, a decision process supported by analysis not wholly comprehensive enough, might still yield comprehensive decisions by sheer luck, or because decision makers have other sources of information, for example.
Research set-up for case evaluation

The guidelines comprising this aspect are:

5.I: map topics and parties from other fields relevant to a spatial decision.

5.XI: map all welfare effects from a decision considered relevant by parties affected by the (proposed) decision.

6.VII: map processes and arenas with possible relevance for the arena and monitor them for developments with a possible impact on the arena.

The second aspect is scope of sources used, required to achieve the aforementioned scope of elements presented. This is covered by the guidelines:

5.II: when making plans on higher levels, tap the knowledge and use the co-operation of local governments on local circumstances and initiatives.

6.I: map the perceptions on the situation of stakeholders outside the decision arena, and use the knowledge of parties outside the network. Indicate differences in views.

The broad aspects mapped have to be integrated and structured to support integral policymaking as well as integral design and engineering. This means that ‘all’ relevant elements and ‘all’ relevant views should be included, or at least linked, and properly structured in one overview or framework. Guidelines dealing with this are:

5.III: provide a single overall framework for showing different interests.

5.VI: provide a policy analytical format in which diverging technical expertise can be integrated and used productively for decision making.

5.VII: support integral design and engineering.

6.II: use the threefold structure of streams (problems, solutions and choice opportunities) as structuring principle to provide an overview of the information relevant to actors.

7.III: provide a single framework that gives access to all relevant (sources of) information with regard to a decision.
I will aggregate the guidelines making up this theme to the following two main guidelines:

- **have a broad scope** (comprised of guidelines 5.I, 5.II, 5.XI, 6.I and 6.VII): with respect to empirical observation, this means we should observe whether all welfare effects of a decision are mapped, including non-quantifiable, emotional elements, concerns about ‘sustainability’ and effects on ‘next generations’, and so on; whether existing laws and regulations influencing the situation are mapped; whether processes and arenas with high possible relevance are mapped and monitored for major developments with a possible impact on the arena in question; whether the perspectives, values, problem definitions and ideas for solutions of all relevant parties, including stakeholders outside the decision arena are included; whether the knowledge and creativity of relevant parties, also those outside the network, is tapped.

- **integrate and structure** (guidelines 5.III, 5.VI, 5.VII, 6.II and 7.III): we should observe whether the core documents produced by those performing analysis achieve integration. Is the subject of the process connected to relevant other problems and plans? Is the knowledge of diverse mono-disciplines brought together in a coherent whole; are methods and tools used to make an integral weighing and negotiation of interests, values, costs and benefits possible? Is information structured according to a rough categorisation in problems/effects, solutions/ideas, and relevant parties? On the level of organisation and persons, are those performing analysis and in possession of relevant knowledge and skills brought together? Or, alternatively, are their efforts and products coordinated? Is a conceptual or structuring framework provided in which all kinds of knowledge and analysis are brought together?

### Efficiency

Another factor to which a group of guidelines primarily contributes is the efficiency of the decision-making process. An inefficient decision making process wastes resources (money, time, and so on) that could be used productively elsewhere, and by that diminishes the total welfare achieved by the process. The efficiency of the decision making process could be empirically measured by observing the time decision-making processes take, for example because decision-makers seem unable to decide for lack of (the right) information. Another indicator could be to what extent those making decisions seem to do the same things, or make the same decision, over and over again. Efficiency of the decision-making process also means not using more information in deciding than necessary. Whether this was the case can be indicated for example by the extent to which those participating in decision-making complained on receiving irrelevant or too much information, or digested a lot of information they evidently did not use in the decisions eventually made. Another indicator of an inefficient process would be the observation that policy cores clashed unnecessarily in the process, for example observable because conflict arises about issues on a higher abstraction level than the topic at hand, and not directly relevant to it.
Efficient analysis can contribute to an efficient decision making process. Guidelines dealing with that are:

5.XII: *take stock of who performs what policy analytical activity in a policy process, and how these separate activities might best be co-ordinated and distributed.*

6.IV: *gather no more information than needed for achieving (sufficient) agreement about (non-)action.*

6.VI: *avoid as much as possible bringing core values into the analysis, or information that threatens core values. Look for possible syntheses on secondary aspects.*

7.X: *avoid providing information superfluous to enabling action*

We can subsume these guidelines under three main headings:

- **Avoid overlap in analytical activities** (guideline 5.XII): empirical questions pertaining to this are in how far existing sources of information are checked first before new information is provided; to what extent stock is taken of who performs which policy analytical activity in the policy process, and in what measure these separate activities are co-ordinated and distributed.

- **Provide no superfluous information** (guidelines 6.IV and 7.X): the case studies should show in how far information gathering is geared to achieving (sufficient) agreement about action, and whether gathering of irrelevant facts is avoided; whether methodology and tools used are relevant to the situation, or could be described as ‘overkill’.

- **Focus on pragmatic aspects** (guideline 6.VI): are core values of any parties unnecessarily threatened by information gathered and presented and analysis performed? This can be observed by investigating in how far in documents, presentations and so on issues are brought forward that go beyond the issues that are central in the process, because they are more farreaching, abstract, or simply besides the issue. For example, in analysis on the size of a desired square, big issues like durability and liveability of society should be avoided if possible.

**Representativeness**

A third class of guidelines influence the representativeness for all interests of those partaking in analysis and decision-making. The questions here are to what extent the right parties are present, in the right proportion, and whether they have (opportunities for) equal influence on the analysis, or, alternatively, influence in line with their importance in the situation.

The representativeness of those involved could be observed in a possible difference in parties present in the analytical work, and parties protesting or objecting to its outcomes. Substantive themes unearthed analytically without a champion in the analytical arena could also be an
indication of insufficient representativeness. Also unequal weight of certain interests in the process, or its outcomes, could be an indicator of insufficient representativeness.

Relevant guidelines are:

6.VIII: *map which parties possess what kind of power in the situation. Map which parties with power (could) represent parties without power, or how parties without power could be involved in the (analytical) process.*

7.I: *identify (the position of) – possibly – affected parties*

7.XIII: *map the representativeness of those partaking in the process for the views and interests of those absent with great care*

Reformulated and grouped this results in:

- **identify (the position of) relevant parties** (guideline 7.I): are parties which might influence or be affected by a policy proposal left out of the analysis? Are positions in the situation clarified in the analysis (for example, are the parties decision-makers, (expected) proponents, opponents, expected gainers or losers, parties with relevant expertise, and so on)?

- **pay attention to representativeness** (guidelines 6.VIII and 7.XIII): is mapped which parties possess which kind of power in the situation, which parties with power (could) represent parties without it, or how parties without power could be involved in the analytical process; is mapped whether all interests are represented in the policy arena, directly or indirectly? Are all relevant parties invited to analytical activities? Are analytical means employed (like checks through surveys, for example) to check upon the representativeness of analytical results?

**Competence**

A fourth class of guidelines deal with the ability of participants to provide a meaningful substantive contribution to the analytical process in which they take part, their competence. A first element of this is what one could call their ‘basic competence’: the education level participants possess, the relevance of their background and knowledge to the topics treated in the process at hand, their experiences. A second element is what one could call ‘situation-specific competence’: in how far they are in possession of relevant substantive knowledge of the situation they are supposed to deal with analytically. But also, in how far they are aware of the (demands of the) policy process in which their contributions should play a part, how much they know of the specific analytical process they are supposed to play a part in, how much they know of and are prepared for what is expected of them in that process.
Relevant guidelines are:

5.XIII: provide all parties to a decision with analytical (counter)capacity.

7.II: provide and manage information necessary for supporting participatory policy-making

7.IV: translate information in a format usable in participatory policymaking

7.IX: provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives to make participants competent and willing to participate

None of these guidelines lent themselves for being grouped with one of the others. Reformulated and operationalised they become:

- **provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives** (guideline 7.IX): are participants trained, or do they receive specific knowledge before or during the process by means of lectures, for example? Do they receive monetary or other incentives for participation?

- **give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise** (guideline 5.XIII): have relevant actors access to policy analytical resources, either on their own or in a pool?

- **provide sufficient information to enable participation** (guideline 7.II): is sufficient information given to participants for them to be able to participate competently? This entails specific information pertinent to the issues at hand, not general knowledge and training to enlarge the capabilities of participants, as referred to above.

- **translate information into a usable format** (guideline 7.IV): is information presented in a way that makes it usable in a participatory process (when such a process takes place!); and is the way information and analysis is presented attuned to a diverse user group, with diverging interests and knowledge needs, and diverging backgrounds in available knowledge, education and cognitive skills?

**Negotiation**

Some guidelines first and foremost support the possible conduct of negotiations. Whether negotiation takes place in the process is to some extent relatively easy to observe. What is relevant is to what extent negotiation was successful. This is indicated, first, by the extent to which ‘all’ interest and elements relevant to those interests were mentioned and dealt with in negotiations, by the extent to which negotiation actually leads to deals, and also by the extent to which the participants to the negotiation are all relatively pleased with those deals.

The relevant guidelines deal with the way analysis should be conducted to support negotiation, among other things to reach agreement on compensation. These are:
5.X: *award all effects of a decision taken into consideration to (groups of) human actors.*

6.V: *delineate (possible) groups or coalitions by their shared interests and belief systems and take this division into groups as the basis for structuring the information relevant to them.*

7.XII: *identify the interests at stake of affected interested parties.*

7.XIV: *map possibilities for negotiation, compensation and mitigation*

These guidelines can be grouped to:
- **have a stakeholder/interest focus** (guidelines 5.X, 6.V and 7.XII): this entails delineating (possible) groups or coalitions by their shared interests and belief systems. This division into groups should be taken as the basis for structuring the information relevant to them, as well as for awarding all effects (in a broad sense) of a decision to these (groups of) human actors. Empirically this means we have to look whether effects in the cases are traced to (groups of) stakeholders and whether it is mapped who is expected to loose or win from the decision; and whether interest and value differences are identified and structured in such a way they could be discussed in a debate along with factual disputes.

- **map possibilities for negotiation** (guideline 7.XIV): once the groups have been identified, they should be allowed to bargain by presenting them with information on the relevant interests of all parties, their wishes, trading material, willingness to accept certain types of compensation. Empirically the question is to what extent this information is generated, surfaced and presented.

**Flexibility**

The flexibility and adaptability of the policy process is a sixth factor supported by a number of guidelines. In a policy process that is not linear, but a ‘garbage can’, decision makers should be able to deal with volatility and be flexible. To what extent flexibility in decision making was present and not hampered can be indicated by the extent and speed with which elements coming forward during the process were incorporated in discussions taking place and (interim) decisions made. Analysis has to be able to provide the material to feed these changing discussions and decisions during the process. Guidelines supporting this flexibility are:

5.V: *make analysis continuously adaptable to changing circumstances and new information.*

6.III: *make policy analytical support a flexible ‘stand-by facility’ during the whole policy process, regularly delivering inputs when deemed necessary.*
Reformulated, this leads to the following two guidelines under this heading:

- **make analysis a standby facility** (guideline 6.III): this entails that policy analytical support should be a flexible ‘stand-by facility’ during the whole policy process, delivering inputs when deemed necessary. Empirically, this means we should observe to what extent analytical input is given on a continuous, rapid and ‘when asked for’ basis instead of analytical inputs being just ‘one time events’, for instance culminating in one conclusive report without further ado.

- **make analysis continuously adaptable** (guideline 5.V): related to the standby nature of analysis is that it enables adaptation of analytical results. The different elements of an analysis should not be carved in stone, but open to alteration when new insights or information require so. To allow this, it also means the set-up of the analytical process might have to be altered during the policy process to provide new knowledge, tools and so on for the questions rising at that time. Empirically we can observe this by answering the question whether problem descriptions, inventories of solutions, effects etc. are regularly updated, and whether the setup of or the means used by the analytical process(es) are altered in response to the course of the policy process when this seems necessary. In general a question to guide observation is whether information is seen, treated and presented as of temporary value and open for complementation, modification or removal.

**Trust**

Another group of guidelines' primary focus is to contribute to the achievement of trust. At least two forms of trust play a part. The first is trust in those taking decisions, that they really have the best interests of all involved at heart, and actually try to and are able to further those interests in their decisions. This could be observed by the trust in the moral quality as well as competence of decision makers by all other parties, indicated in surveys, (written) statements or actions, like appealing to other parties, for example.

The second form is that of trust in those performing the analysis at the basis of decision made. This is turn also has at least two basic elements. The first is trust in the competence and quality of those performing analysis: are they seen as competent and knowledgeable? The second is trust in their independence: are they seen as performing analysis to the best of their abilities, and as objectively as possible, to try to contribute to good decisions? Or are they seen as siding with specific parties (for example their sponsor(s)), sacrificing facts for pleasing these parties? The amount of trust in experts and analysts can be observed in the extent to which their expertise is called upon, in the extent in which their independence, analysis and/or findings are openly questioned.

The second form of trust is of course most directly related to the guidelines, but these could also influence the first form. Therefore, both forms will be observed.
There are a number of guidelines that deal with the almost inevitable contentiousness of information in the context chosen, and provide attitudinal or procedural ways of dealing with this. These are the guidelines:

5.IV: provide problem descriptions in a format that makes them clearly and openly open to discussion.

5.VIII: provide every affected party with power over the problem description.

5.IX: open up the activities of experts, analysts and decision makers by providing information on them to those affected by them.

5.XIV: provide analytical and/or procedural provisions for reaching explicit agreement on and trust in the status of (those dealing with) research and information throughout the analytic process.

7.V: make information and methods transparent and understandable to all parties

7.XI: provide third party estimates on parties’ claims to compensation

Reformulated and partly grouped together this results in:
- **be transparent** (guidelines 5.IX and 7.V): this guideline deals with the importance of information provision on expert, analytical and decision activities to those affected by them, as well as the avoidance of black box methodology. Assumptions, methods used, activities performed and results produced should all be clear to and at least their general working understood by participants. They should therefore be explicated. The empirical question is to what extent the above indeed happened.
- **have procedures for reaching agreement on status of information** (guideline 5.XIV): to see whether this guideline was met I will observe whether analytical and/or procedural provisions for reaching explicit agreement on the status of (those dealing with) research and information throughout the analytic process are applied.
- **let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space** (guidelines 5.IV and 5.VIII): to what extent this guideline was met can be indicated by the openness of analytical activities and value choices taking place during those activities to stakeholders and decision makers. We can also look into who can influence the analytical activities taking place, how changeable the subject of the process is and which parties have most power over problem definition and solution choice.
- **provide independent, trusted expertise** (guideline 7.XI): provide independent third party expertise to check on claims of parties in the process. These third parties should be accepted and trusted by all participants to the process. This includes trust in the independence of their position as well as in the quality of their expertise. Relevant questions in this respect pertain to by whom analysts and experts are employed, supervised and paid (this can differ between the three aspects). We can also observe in which way the expertise of the analysts and experts is promoted and clarified.

**Substantive enrichment**

The final intermediate factor (possibly) resulting from a set of guidelines is that of substantive enrichment. By this I mean the extent to which the process led to more and better ideas, solutions, suggestions, that were also taken up in (interim) documents in the process, and in decisions. These new and hopefully better ideas could also be taken up in the minds of parties involved, meaning these learned. The other way around, learning by parties involved could contribute to new variety created.

Whether substantive enrichment took place is indicated by traceable changes in perception (for instance in documents) of involved parties, and eventually in their actions. It is indicated by an expansion of the number of solutions circulating in the process, by creative additions to existing solutions or ideas.

To achieve substantive enrichment, learning is essential. Differentiating between the two kinds of learning distinguished in chapter 7, I will of both kinds investigate in how far, and how, they contributed to progress in the policymaking processes of persuasion and negotiation. Relevant guidelines here are:

- **7.VI:** support a combination of V/S learning and A/I learning.
- **7.VII:** support the creation of variety
- **7.VIII:** support use of all relevant variety in selection processes.

Reformulated, this leads to the following:

- **connect V/S learning to A/I learning** (guideline 7.VI): to look into this guideline empirically first I have to establish whether both forms of learning take place. With respect to A/I learning this can be done by answering questions like: does analysis take place commissioned or undertaken by one or more parties? With respect to V/S learning we should observe whether discussion of alternatives in one or more forums by several parties takes place and whether
interaction is used as a tool for learning. With respect to their connection we should observe whether concrete traces (referrals, use of) of the findings of one form of learning can be found in the other form (for instance, are the results of A/I learning used in V/S debate? Are the outcomes of V/S interaction used to further analysis in A/I learning, for example by influencing criteria sets, adding to the set of solutions considered, and so on?).

- **Support variety creation** (guideline 7.VII): I will check to what extent this guideline was met by observing whether new sources of ideas, views, solutions and so on are brought into the process, or ideas are tapped of sources hitherto neglected. Are as many different relevant viewpoints and sources of knowledge in the process brought as possible? Are creativity stimulating methods used to generate creativity during the process?

- **Support variety use** (guideline 7.VIII): I will observe in how far this guideline was met by looking for structure offered in which variety created could be processed, by looking for application of explicit selection rules, and the use of tools to support selection, like scorecards, multi-criteria methods, and so on. Also, I will look to the extent to which (intermediate) results of the process are created in a form and on an abstraction level fit for use in the relevant selection environment(s).

The causal model in the above paragraph was developed inductively from the guidelines. However, the intermediate factors coming forward in this way are supported by mainstreams of theory on a range of relevant fields as well. For example, the link between (insufficient) comprehensiveness of factors taken into account in decisions and the quality of resulting decisions on the one hand has been long known in the literature (see for example Janis, 1972), as is the link between comprehensiveness of decisions taken and the analysis performed for them (CUR, 1998; Miser and Quade, 1985). The great hindrance distrust can form for parties involved in decision making (on spatial issues) in reaching good decisions is also supported by the literature (for example Huigen, 1996; Teisman, 1995). The not too surprising link between the efficiency of the decision process and efficiency of analysis is supported among many others by Teisman, 1992; Wolsink, 1996; WRR, 1994.

## 8.2 Research Strategy

To achieve the goals of this research a research strategy has been developed. A research strategy is a way to study an empirical topic by following a set of given prescriptions (Yin, 1989). For this study, the research strategy followed is that of case study. A case-study is an empirical investigation in which a present day phenomenon is intensively
analysed in its natural surroundings, using different 'sources of evidence'. Case studies are a preferred research strategy in situations in which the boundaries between context and phenomenon are not clearly evident, in which 'how' or 'why' questions are asked, when the researcher has little or no control over relevant behaviour and other events and when the focus is on contemporary phenomena in an everyday context (Yin, 1994).

Case studies are especially fit for understanding complex social phenomena. They enable a researcher to maintain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of everyday events. Also, they are suited for exploratory research. Since I am exploring which possible guidelines are used in everyday decision making on land use issues, and how effective they are, cases studies seem fitting. Another advantage is that the relationship between 'words and actions' can be investigated. What one says, does not always correspond to actual actions.

Other ways of making the set of guidelines more robust might have been to present them to an expert panel, or panel of all parties involved in spatial policy making, or using the Delphi method. But these methods have a few drawbacks. For one, they would rely on stated views of the parties consulted, while often actual behaviour is more telling. Also, the careful study of documents and observation give insight in the actual course of policy - and analytical processes, and the (possible) role of guidelines therein, in a way that views of those not directly involved could never replace. For those reasons also the labour-intensive method of case study is preferred.

**Choice of cases**

Three types of cases were sought. In the light of recent developments in land use planning towards a more 'participatory' planning (see chapter 7), I wanted a case in which the traditional style of policymaking was dominant to have a 'baseline case'. By this case the consequences this policymaking style has for policymaking support could be exemplified. A case of road development in the urban region of The Hague, the VLV-case, was selected, a truly 'extreme' case of traditional Dutch policymaking on spatial issues, spanning more than 60 years. This case is not a 'non-participatory' case. Since a long time decision-making on land use issues in the Netherlands has known participatory elements (see chapters 5 and 7). This was a participation of elites, in land use planning mostly confined to other public agencies/authorities and sometimes representatives of interest groups. This does provide the possibility to study in how far the more participation-focused guidelines were applied to support this 'old-style' participation. Also, since probably still considerably more than half of policy processes on land use issues in the Netherlands take place in this fashion, the findings of this case also provide insight in how far the guidelines might be useful for these more ‘limitedly participatory’ cases.

Next, I wanted to see in how far a more 'open', or 'new style participatory', planning process had consequences for policy analytical support, in light of the research aim to increase the fit between (results of), participatory or other, policy analytical exercises and the larger policy
process. The study of two local cases of participatory spatial planning was enabled by participation in a larger research project, the so-called 'Testing Grounds of Democracy' project, in which experiments by the Institute for Public and Politics (IPP) with participatory policymaking in several municipalities were studied. From this project I selected two cases, a case of participatory development of a so-called ‘structure plan’ (a long term plan for the spatial development of a municipality) in the municipality of De Bilt, and the case of participatory development of a zoning plan in the municipality of Doetinchem.

Finally, a third type of case was to be an experimental one, in which the ideas developed as a result of the first three cases were to be tested. For this ‘action research’ case (Yin, 1994), the choice fell on the development process of how to fit in a proposed high-speed train track in the municipality of Ede.

Although they had a different purpose, the cases had sufficient elements in common. Firstly, they were Dutch cases, to reduce the influence of cultural and judicial differences. Secondly, they had to have a main policy making focus on the same level or scale, to avoid disturbance by scale or level effects. Since most policymaking on spatial issues in the Netherlands takes place on a local level, I choose to focus on this level. In the De Bilt and Doetinchem cases, where the main policymaking actor is a municipality, this is clear. In Ede, where the municipality was one of our main clients, the cause of the issue dealt with was national, but the specific issue itself was local. In the VLW case, the main initiator of the project was a national organisation, Rijkswaterstaat, but the issue Rijkswaterstaat dealt with was congestion on a mainly local, and somewhat regional scale. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the cases dealt with a complex land use issue.

Table 8.1: overview of the cases
Aside from their common elements, the cases also have one specific interesting difference.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VLV-case</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Issue</td>
<td>Solving congestion</td>
<td>Developing a structure</td>
<td>Developing a zoning plan</td>
<td>Fitting in a high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>problems</td>
<td>plan</td>
<td></td>
<td>speed train track</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leading actor</td>
<td>Rijkswaterstaat,</td>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>IPP</td>
<td>TU Delft</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>later Sijtwende Ltd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy style</td>
<td>Dutch corporatism</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
<td>Participatory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of case</td>
<td>Baseline, design-feeding</td>
<td>Design-feeding</td>
<td>Design-feeding</td>
<td>Experiment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This concerns the different project- and/or process managing parties. In the VLW-case, Rijkswaterstaat was the leading actor. In the De Bilt and Doetinchem cases, it was IPP. In our own experiment, a team of scientists of Delft University of Technology took the lead. Whether this had consequences for the course of the case and especially the way analysis was conducted and used, was a question I will deal with mainly in the concluding chapter 14.

**Triangulation of research**

In case research, where much information is rather 'soft' and therefore vulnerable to criticism, the information gathered can be made more reliable by triangulation. The term stands for using different sources, evaluators, perspectives and/or methods to strengthen the reliability of the information collected and of the conclusions drawn on the basis of that information.

Triangulation can take the following shapes (Yin, 1994):

- data triangulation: getting information from several sources of data
- researchers triangulation: letting data be gathered and/or evaluated by different evaluators
- theory triangulation: applying several perspectives to the same set of data
- methodological triangulation: using several methods to obtain data.

**Data triangulation:** for conducting case research in principle six sources of information can be used (Yin, 1994). These are documents, archive material, interviews, direct observation, participatory observation and inspection of physical objects. In this research all sources are used, but (the emphasis on) their use differs between cases. In the first case, the VLW-case, which is to an important extent historical, documents, archive material, inspection of physical objects and interviews are used. In the second and third case, De Bilt and Doetinchem, all six sources are used, with the exception of participatory observation. In the fourth case, Ede, all six sources are used. Of course, also within a type of source variation was sought. Actors with different points of view are interviewed, documents from different sources studied, and so on.

It is a standard for 'good practice' in case research to present findings to actors involved, to give them an opportunity to reflect on them, point out errors or differences of opinion, and so on. Much of the findings in this thesis were in one form or another presented in reports or other publications, shortly after the cases were concluded. These were presented to key actors in the different cases and their comments were used. This thesis itself was not presented to actors involved in the cases, because the underlying reports or book chapters were already presented. Also, the long time period between the case period and the finishing of this thesis would make using the case actors' reflections less reliable.

**Researchers triangulation:** all cases were studied in co-operation with another PhD-student of Delft University of Technology. Additionally, the Ede case was conducted in co-operation with several colleagues in a project team. The De Bilt case was studied in direct co-operation with

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34 For my specific purposes I designate as leading actor the party that has most say on the use of analytical capacity in the process (which can also include providing it himself or herself)
researchers from the Free University of Amsterdam and Erasmus University of Rotterdam. The De Bilt and Doetinchem case were both subject to discussion in the larger framework of a research team of five universities carrying out the so-called Testing-Grounds project. In all these cases roughly the same data are used by several researchers (but in different ways and from different perspectives). By having the processing and interpretation of data checked by my colleague researchers these are tested for researchers' bias. At any rate 'factual' mistakes (names, dates, and so on) will in this way be exposed, and interpretations made are all cross-checked against those of at least one other researcher. But in the end all interpretations, evaluations and scores given in this study are my own, and my sole responsibility. They are fed as much as possible by the views of relevant others, as expressed in interviews, surveys, observation and so on. But in the end the verdicts given are mine.

Additional to the extensive researchers triangulation, many partial findings of the cases were presented in the reports to parties involved, in book chapters and so on. In these cases parties involved were given the opportunity to react, by which a considerable part of the material was more broadly validated. The combination of extensive researchers triangulation and piecemeal validation of much of the material is believed to compensate to a large extent for the lack of opportunity to present this book as a whole to parties involved before its completion. This turned out to be impossible because of the long time it took to finish the book, which made tracking down the many relevant parties in all four cases for comments impossible.

Theory triangulation: the idea behind this is to apply several rival theories to the same data material. When the theory to be tested can explain the data, and a rival theory can not, the persuasiveness of the first theory increases. However, the main aim of the research in this thesis is not the testing, elaboration or renewal of theory, but the creation of a design. Because of this, theory triangulation will not take place in the empirical research.

Methodological triangulation is related to data triangulation. Case study research allows the use of different research methods alongside each other. Research methods applied in this research in all cases include document analysis, physical inspection and interviews. In the De Bilt, Doetinchem and Ede case also surveys and (participatory) observation were used. The different methods have different strengths and weaknesses, and in this respect can supplement each other. With respect to the type of interview is chosen for collecting qualitative data by a combination of the semi-structured approach and the standardised open-ended interview. This entails that there is a list with items, which at any rate should be dealt with. Every item has a number of set and precisely formulated questions. On the basis of the answers given it is decided to ask additional questions or not. Document analysis provides a good way of acquiring background knowledge about the situation necessary for useful interviews. The use of documents also helps correct an 'interviewer effect', through which those interviewed give answers they think the interviewer desires. Documents can serve as a correction and
supplementation to the information gathered in the interviews. In this study document analysis also provides invaluable information on the development of policy content during the processes, and analytical activities employed and choices made in that development. Inspecting the spatial situation to which the case research applies helps in gaining insight in the concrete situation that forms the topic of much deliberating and analysis in the cases.

The different data sources and methods were used to extract information on the indicators defined in 8.1 as indicative for the extent in which the different intermediate factors were present and guidelines followed. For example, reactions to documents like the Environmental Impact Statement were studied to see in how far issues were raised in those that had been missed in the analysis leading to those documents, as an indicator of the broadness of scope of analysis. The decision taken on the basis of such documents was analysed to see in how far it took into account relevant issues, as an indicator of the comprehensiveness of decisions taken. And so for all (elements of the) intermediate factors and guidelines. Also, resulting decisions were studied for their welfare effects, and the different research methods employed to answer the question in how far there had been compensation and/or participation.

8.3 THE CASE DESCRIPTIONS

Yin (1994) discerns six alternative structures for the composition of a case study description: linear-analytic, comparative, chronological, theory-building, ‘suspense’ and unsequenced structures. Of these six the chronological structure seems useful in the light of the importance attached to process aspects for analytical activities and outcomes in this book. Also, a chronological structure can serve an important purpose in exploratory studies (like this one), because causal sequences occur linearly over time. Causal relationships will be easier to discern and analyse when events are depicted chronologically. Finally, a chronological structure usually offers one of the best means to get a first grip on the case for the uninitiated reader. Therefore, I will start the case descriptions with a chronological description.

For purposes of explanation and analysis a chronological structure in itself is insufficient. It has to be complemented by one or more other structures. Therefore, after the chronology I will evaluate the outcomes and degree of participation of the process, using the normative framework of chapter 4. This means that the following questions about the cases will be answered: - was the welfare of all parties involved served by its outcomes. If not, who won and who lost?
- were those expected to loose from decisions compensated for their losses?
- were all affected by (proposed) decisions allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision?

I will rate the extent to which the norms were met on a scale of either -, 0 or +, indicating that either the norm was not or hardly met, that it was to some extent met, or that it was well and thoroughly met. More specifically, a – on the norm welfare enhancement would mean total welfare of all involved probably deteriorated because of the (outcomes of) the process, a 0 that total welfare roughly stayed the same, and a + that total welfare in all likelihood increased. For the norm compensation a minus would mean no or hardly any compensation took place, a 0 would mean some, but not all parties got compensated, or not all parties got fully compensated, and a + would mean (nearly) all losing parties got (nearly) full compensation for their loses. Finally, a – for the norm participation indicates many relevant parties did not get to participate (properly) in the process to state their interests, a 0 indicates some participated, some didn’t, or participation did not go very far, and a + entails (nearly) all relevant parties got to state themselves the gains or losses they expected from the decision in a meaningful way in the process. This somewhat crude scale is considered to be the only one that can convincingly be supported by the heterogeneous empirical evidence. A more refined scale would give only a false impression of precision.

Next an evaluation will be given of the extent to which the intermediate factors of the causal model were present in the case, again using a three-point scale. Here - indicates that either the factor was not or hardly present, 0 that it was to some extent present, + that it was (almost) fully developed.

Finally, using the framework developed in 8.1 I will describe which guidelines were followed in the cases. I will rate their use again on the same three-point scale as the norms and intermediate factors, but in this case - indicates that either the guideline was not or poorly followed, 0 that it was to some extent followed, and + that it was well and thoroughly met. The score per guideline is often built up of scores on separate elements of the guideline, awarded according to the same three-point scale. In coming to an overall score per guideline not all scores for the separate elements count equally. Some elements are considered to have a considerable weight in the more or less successful application of the guideline, because they stretched out over considerably more time than the other elements, affected more people or decisions, and so on. The scores of these sub-elements weigh heavier in awarding a total score per guideline. The case material considered to weigh more heavily is presented in bold. The reader can him- or herself check in how far his or her weights and with that total score for the guideline coincide with mine.
by appraising the empirical material presented. The case analysis might provide other examples or additional suggestions for guidelines for policy analysis, or suggested alterations in the guidelines.

This leads to the following structure for the case chapters:

1. Chronological description of the case
2. Normative evaluation of the outcomes and participation in the case
3. Evaluation of the intermediate factors
4. Evaluation of use of design guidelines in the case

An important issue remaining is the question of the unit of analysis: where do I draw its boundaries? Some indication of an answer is given by the research object: decision making on land use issues. But this is broad. Boundaries have to be drawn with respect to the time frame employed, the geographical boundaries, parties considered and so on.

As to the time frame, since a large weight is attached to problem definition in my theoretical framework, and this mostly starts very early in the process, the chronological description has to start early in the process. Ideally this should be at the time a problem is put on the political agenda for the first time. However, in practice decision making processes on land use issues can drag on forever (one case presented here could be said to have started in the 1930s). For reasons of practicality, I take as a starting point in time the most recent moment a topic had gained enough momentum to start off a political decision making process, or to revive a process that had got stuck for some time.

As the cut-off point in time I take the binding decision taken in the process, by whichever party, that caused most other parties and probably the party taking the decision itself to consider their policy making contribution to the specific topic of the process as finished. Of course some parties will stay involved in implementing decisions and other processes might get started up on working out specific aspects of a topic, but these will not be studied.

A problem might arise because different rounds are said to evolve around a different problem description, which means each round would have a specific topic and I would have to limit myself to describing only one round of the process. But these different problem descriptions in different rounds usually have some core elements in common, and for instance do play mostly on the same scale level. Usually one label can be attached to the topic of several rounds that would cover differing problem descriptions of the topic. For example, in the Verlengde Landscheidingsweg case new elements like possible establishment of the European patent agency surface in the course of time altering the problem definition to some extent, but this roughly remains ‘doing something about congestion problems in the area’. However, the exception here is also provided by the Verlengde Landscheidingsweg case. In this case there is
so much of a change in the central problem description between the period that Rijkswaterstaat had the lead in the analysis performed and the period Sijtwende Ltd had the lead, that those two periods will be evaluated separately, as two 'cases within the case'. Delineations with regard to geography as well as topics and parties considered will be regarded relevant when parties that are involved in the process, or try to be involved, consider these relevant. This is observed by different means in the different cases (see above), including interviews and document analysis. Topics and parties the researcher thinks relevant, but that have not been considered by any of the active parties, are an exception to this. Their inclusion will be substantiated.

Finally, a specific question with respect to scale applies to the application of the guidelines. Do I look only to whether guidelines were applied on the level of the process as a whole, or also at the level of specific arenas or forums of the process? The answer is 'both', since depending on the specific situation and the guideline itself, its application sometimes would give the best results when applied at the scale level of the process as a whole, sometimes at the scale level of parts of that process, and sometimes both.
CHAPTER 9

THE VERLENGDE LANDSCHEIDINGSWEG
On the 13th of January 1999 the minister of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (TPW) officially starts the project Northern Ring-road and Sijtwende. With this a decision making process of more then sixty years ends. I will analyse this probably most prolonged decision making process on infrastructure in the Netherlands and explore how the design guidelines derived in the preceding chapters were heeded in a largely ‘traditional’ policy process. I will focus on the period starting in the late 1970s, when new developments started that in the end led to final construction of the project. The period before that will be treated briefly in subsection 9.1.1.

*Figure 9.1: Northern Ring-road, Sijtwende Part highlighted, derived from COB, 2000*
9.1.1 | WHAT WENT BEFORE: 1938 - 1977

In the 1930’s it is discussed for the first time to construct a connection between what is then national highway 4 (now renamed to national highway 44) and the still to be constructed national highway 4a (now national highway 4). In 1938 the Commission for the Expansion Plans in South-Holland decides to construct such a connection. The plans are interrupted for years by World War II and its aftermath, but in 1952 the Director-General of Rijkswaterstaat (RWS) decides to include this national highway 14, or ‘Verlengde Landscheidingsweg’ (hereafter VLW), in the national highway plan. It is supposed to function as part of the so-called north-eastern Ring-road of The Hague. After a trajectory study is finished in 1956, the Minister of TPW decides on the route of the road. For the largest part this route lies in the northern part of Voorburg, a neighbouring municipality of the city of The Hague.

Since 1956 a strip of land is reserved for the road. But because of continuous disagreement between the municipalities involved, province South-Holland and RWS, construction does not come off the ground, although the pillars on which the elevated road should rest are already constructed. Voorburg is opposed to the road because of visual and noise hindrance and because it will present a major barrier on its territory.

Doubts in the Second Chamber of Parliament lead in 1975 to a ministerial proposal to put the road out to tender as an urban motorway. At the discussion of the budget, however, the money intended for the road is redirected to other purposes. Although national highway 14 remains included as a motorway in several national governmental plans, little happens with the road plans for several years.

9.1.2 | MANY ATTEMPTS AND FEW SUCCESSES: 1978 - 1993

Meanwhile, the densely populated region of The Hague keeps struggling with congestion and housing problems. The Hague, capital of the Netherlands, seat of the government bodies, is situated at the North Sea, limiting expansion possibilities at one side. The neighbouring municipalities Wassenaar, Wateringen, Monster Rijswijk, Voorburg and Leidschendam limit expansion possibilities on its landside. The built areas of the latter three border directly to the built-up area of The Hague. Added to this, the region suffers from little green areas. All this complicates road construction throughout the region.

In 1978 civil servants of The Hague issue a report with recommendations for completion of the ring-road system around The Hague, including construction of the VLW. This results in formation of a technical consultation group of civil servants from TPW, The Hague, the urban district35, the province, Voorburg and Leidschendam36. In this period a proposed building site, Leidschendam-Nootdorp (Leino37), situated in the east of the region, gives a new impetus to pleas for

35 This is a co-operative body of nine municipalities in the region of The Hague
36 Which neighbours the route designated for the VLW, see figure 9.1
37 Later renamed to Leidschenveen
construction of the Northern Ring-road. This, however, does not lead Voorburg to abandon its opposition to the plans. The differences of opinion between the different governmental actors involved again result in a stalemate for the process for several years.

**The reassessment study**
The new Court of M&A formed in The Hague in 1986 no longer favours construction of the VLW. RWS therefore carries out a ‘reassessment study’ on the VLW. This should look into the question whether there are reasons to revise the Route decision of 1956.

The study consists of five parts. The first part, by RWS, studies whether the route from 1956 still fulfils the intended functions, and whether there are alternative solutions and suitable routes. This study concludes that infrastructure expansion still seems unavoidable. The route from 1956 is confirmed as the most fitting one.

The study does not convince Voorburg and The Hague. Therefore, an administrative consultation framework is established, the ‘STUHA’38. Its task is to look into the traffic- and transport problems in the conurbation The Hague. Specific design choices for infra-structural provisions should be made through administrative consensus. Representatives of the province, the ministries of TPW and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (HSPE), the urban district and the municipalities in the region participate in STUHA. In the framework of STUHA a number of working groups operate, of which one develops proposals for the VLW. Voorburg participates in it without prior commitment to the results.

From 1987 till 1990 STUHA produces the reports that form the parts two till five of the reassessment study. The reassessment study results in the “Summarising Memorandum VLW”, issued by RWS South-Holland in February 1990. The overall conclusion is that in general there is agreement on construction of the road according to the plans of 1956. The road should become an urban ring-road with a maximum speed of 70 km per hour, to be constructed deepened or on ground level.

Voorburg still finds that the studies have not demonstrated the necessity of the road, and also considers the procedure followed up to that point inadequate. In 1986 the possibility of an EIA-procedure has been included in national legislation, which also contains the possibility to combine a trajectory procedure for infrastructure with the procedure for the EIA. Voorburg requests such a combined Trajectory/EIA-procedure.

During the STUHA-period the minister of TPW promises 450 million euros for a better accessibility of the region The Hague, on condition of - among other things - construction of the VLW. This turns The Hague into a proponent of the VLW again. The minister poses an ultimatum to Voorburg: if it has not by August 15th 1988 taken in a (positive) standpoint with regard to the

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38 Stuurgroep Verkeers- en Transportinfrastructuur in en om Den Haag: Steering Committee Traffic - and transport infrastructure in and around The Hague
VLW, she will ask the province to use article 37 of the Law on Spatial Planning (see section 5.2), to force Voorburg to co-operate. The ultimatum passes without either Voorburg agreeing to construction or the minister imposing sanctions, however.

Towards the end of 1988, still during the reassessment study, a covenant is established between national government, province, Leidschendam and the European Patent Agency (EPA) about its future establishment in Leidschendam, at a location just north of the designated route of the VLW. The future establishment of the EPA soon becomes the most important motive for the road brought forward by its proponents. When Voorburg remains unwilling to agree to construction of the VLW, the minister of TPW again threatens to use article 37. But this does not amount to anything, because shortly after the cabinet falls unexpectedly.

The Trajectory/EIA-procedure
The newly formed cabinet also has new ministers of TPW and HSPE. The article 37 procedure is called off. Voorburg urges again for a Trajectory/EIA-procedure. In February 1990 the ministries of TPW and HSPE jointly announce such a Trajectory/EIA-procedure, concerned with the different route sections of the VLW on the 1956 Trajectory. A steering committee with representatives of the four municipalities involved, the province and RWS (chairman) is installed. The EIA is carried out by a project organisation under responsibility of the Head Engineer-director of RWS South-Holland.

In August 1990 the municipalities involved reach agreement over the content of the Notification of Intent, which mentions five alternatives of highway 14:

- no additional measures to existing policy (alternative 0)
- construction of a 2x2 lane motorway on the trajectory of 1956 (alternative A, the intended activity of national government, with elevated and deepened variants)
- an alternative consisting of optimisation of existing infrastructure and public transport and a bridge over the river Vliet (alternative B, which also includes a local road with Vliet junction on the 1956 trajectory)
- maximisation of public transport (Alternative C)
- the legally obliged ‘Best Environmental Practice’ alternative (alternative D), at that point still unspecified.

Some alternatives have variants, consisting in among other things whether or not an express tram route is constructed along the road.

In October 1991, during the Trajectory/EIA-study, the European Patent agency announces not to establish itself in Leidschendam. When The Hague and the province enter the Trajectory/EIA-
study because their parts of the route turn out subject to obligatory EIA too, the joint project of (re)construction of the northern part of the Horseshoe of The Hague is renamed NORAH: Northern Ring-road Region of The Hague.

In October 1993 the Trajectory/EIA report is finished. In it there are some changes compared to the alternatives and variants announced in the Notification of Intent. With respect to alternative A an alternative is added during the study: an urban ring-road. With respect to the Best Environmental Practice alternative, not one alternative, as announced, but two are investigated. The first is D1, the construction of the motorway on the 1956 route with maximal provisions for the environment, among which a roofing over of the road. The other is D2, a public transport variant with supporting measures, among which realising a Vliet junction in Leidschendam. Finally, an added combination alternative (alternative E) combines alternatives B (the optimisation alternative) and C (the maximisation of public transport alternative).

The Trajectory/EIA report concludes that the best option is to construct the road on the old route through Voorburg (alternative A). In reaction to the report national government states a preliminary preference for constructing the road on ground level.

**Box 9.1: alternatives in the EIS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alternative</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alternative 0</td>
<td>no special measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative A</td>
<td>construction of the ring-road, three variants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- deepened construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- elevated construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- urban ring-road on ground level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative B</td>
<td>optimisation of public transport and the existing road system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including Vliet junction, two options)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative C</td>
<td>maximisation public transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative D</td>
<td>best environmental practice, two variants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- construction road with maximal environmental provisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(including roofing over of the road)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- no road construction, mix of public transport and car mobility reducing measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative E</td>
<td>combination of alternatives B and C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After issuance of the report, The Hague, Leidschendam, the urban district and Wassenaar all support construction in a cutting. Voorburg remains opposed to construction in any form. The province threatens Voorburg again with applying article 37 to force it to adapt its zoning plan, or
a border alignment with Leidschendam if Voorburg keeps saying no to all possibilities proposed in the EIA.

Also in October 1993 all kinds of action groups (some local, some regional or national) and neighbourhood committees opposed to the VLW form a ‘Platform against the VLW’. The platform pleads for improving public transport and enters into consultation with Voorburg. Voorburg continues its resistance against the road, uttering objections and suggestions for possible alternatives through the media.

In December the independent national EIA-commission concludes that the EIS offers sufficient basis for decision-making. Next the administration of the urban district concludes that the VLW should be constructed, only opposed by the representatives of Voorburg. The other municipalities all want the road to be constructed, but in a cutting. The advisory organ OVI\(^{39}\) issues its advice in April 1994. A majority of its members endorses a ring-road partially constructed in a cutting on the Voorburg part. The same month the minister of TPW establishes the co-ordinated Route decision on NORAH. NORAH will be realised as an urban ring-road. Influenced by the OVI-advice, the part in Voorburg will be partly constructed in a cutting.

In the following months different parties exert pressure on Voorburg. When an appeal of Voorburg is declared non-admissible, RWS formally requests Voorburg to co-operate to construction of NORAH. When Voorburg refuses the province threatens once again that it will force Voorburg to adapt its zoning plan by applying article 37 when the ministry of TPW will request so. Voorburg reacts by indicating that it would be open to discussing the VLW under the condition that it will be constructed wholly underground.


In 1994 the director of a real estate developing company in Voorburg gets the idea to build a ‘living area with a road underneath’ on the trajectory of the VLW. The real estate developing company together with a contractor forms the private consortium Sijtwende Ltd\(^{40}\). It informally presents a plan with the road in a tunnel to RWS and M&A of Voorburg. RWS passes the plan on to the minister, with the question whether she is prepared to put money into it. She likes the plan, but finds it too expensive. This triggers a looking for alternatives. Voorburg reacts positively. It sees the plan as a possibility to avoid the threat of article 37. Towards the end of 1994 Voorburg indicates to the minister of TPW to be willing to co-operate to construction subject to conditions. It presents the first worked-out version of the plan ‘Sijtwende’ of the real estate developing company. It entails a road constructed in a cutting and roofed over,

\(^{39}\) OVI stands for Overlegorgaan Verkeersinfrastructuur (Consultative Body Traffic Infrastructure), an advisory body of the minister of TPW at the time

\(^{40}\) The name “Sijtwende” refers to the historical border between the two polder boards in the area
with construction of houses, offices, recreational facilities and green areas. There will be level road-junctions with two local roads.

The total extra construction costs relative to the existing route decision to construct the road partially in a cutting would be around 68 million euros. The private initiators are prepared to contribute 27 million to this out of the incomes of housing construction they expect. Voorburg will try to lower costs by doctoring with technical and/or functional demands. The whole plan should be elaborated in a Public Private Co-operation agreement.

But the minister turns down the Sijtwende plan and requests the province to force Voorburg to adapt its zoning plan on the grounds of article 37.

But Voorburg from that moment on puts all its cards on Sijtwende. Sijtwende Ltd has an architects’ bureau adapt the plan. The road is no longer put wholly underground, but partially in a ‘hollow dike’, rising above ground level. This cuts back costs considerably.

In February the plan is confidentially presented to the council of Voorburg. Voorburg and Sijtwende Ltd also conclude a declaration of intent.

In March 1995 the province invokes article 37 to oblige Voorburg to make the zoning plan congruent with the route decision and financially feasible, before April first 1996. Voorburg has the Sijtwende plan elaborated further and sets out to prepare a zoning plan that will include it. At the same time, following the procedure of article 37, the original plan embedded in the Route decision to construct the road in a cutting without a roof and house-construction, is worked out in parallel by RWS and the province. During the elaboration of the Sijtwende plan, the support of RWS for the plan Sijtwende increases and its focus shifts towards structuring conditions for realisation.

In September the preliminary zoning plan is completed and adopted by the council of Voorburg. Next, Voorburg officially offers the plan to the province. Also, the ministry of HSPE indicates to be prepared to give the plan Sijtwende a serious look. But it demands certainty beforehand that the idea is financially feasible and construction starts on time.

In January 1996 Voorburg officially issues the Preliminary zoning plan Sijtwende. Although in its earlier directive the province had required Voorburg to include a public transport line along the route of the VLW, Voorburg has not done so, because this would limit possibilities for house construction. Leidschendam, Voorburg and the urban district agree to conduct a study into possibilities to fit in a public transport line in the plan.

TPW declares that it expects a considerable financial deficit on the plan. Voorburg officially has until April second to arrange the funding for this. On that date the Provincial Executive according
to the procedure of article 37 would have to come with a plan of its own. Despite remaining uncertainties on technical and financial aspects, the council of Voorburg approves the zoning plan with Sijtwende, but still without reservation for a public transport line, in March 1996.

After acceptance of the zoning plan negotiations and consultations with RWS continue. Aside from the money and the lack of a tram connection in the plan, some other weaknesses remain. The financial problems are in the end resolved by an extra financial contribution of all parties.

In July 1996 the provincial executive partially approves of the zoning plan of Voorburg including Sijtwende. The plan does not yet fully meet the demands of the article 37 statement of the Province. Approval of the remaining part is contingent on Voorburg mending the remaining weaknesses in the plan, like the lack of a public transport connection (a tram) and the safety problems with the junctions.

In the same month a declaration of intent is signed between national government, the urban district, Voorburg and Sijtwende Ltd. In it are covered the necessary adaptations of the zoning plan by Voorburg with respect to the junctions and the tram line. The same parties sign an agreement in September on construction of the new residential area Sijtwende together with the Northern Ring-road (the ‘four party agreement’). After this the article 37 procedure, and with that the separate development of a plan by the engineers of RWS and the province, is stopped.

After the four party agreement Sijtwende Ltd starts to develop two sub-projects: Houses and Road. In April 1997 the Preliminary design is submitted to RWS for assessment. It is approved and work starts on the Definitive Design.

When all relevant parties have approved the (partial revisions of) the zoning plans necessary to incorporate Sijtwende, the four-parties agreement of July 1996 is worked out further in June 1997 in a series of bilateral agreements between three of the four central stakeholders: Voorburg, RWS, and Sijtwende Ltd. The agreements on the project organisation are also supplemented.

The bilateral agreements mark the start of the pre-realisation phase of the planning process for Sijtwende. In this phase preparation of construction takes place. Parts of the preparation are, besides technical aspects, the conclusion of the zoning plan procedure and reaching agreement on land granting.

In October 1997 the Definitive Design is put to RWS for acceptation. The Definitive Urban Design for Sijtwende is finished in December 1997. However, it takes until October 1998 before finally the council committee of Voorburg approves it.
In November 1998 the realisation phase of the planning process Sijtwende starts. In January 1999 the minister of TPW officially starts the project Northern Ring-road and Sijtwende. In June 2000 the first pile for the house construction is put in the ground. The Sijtwende part of NORAH is opened in 2003.

Figure 9.2: the Sijtwende project

9.2 THE CASE JUDGED BY THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

First, I will analyse the outcomes of the process, using the normative framework of chapter 4 as a measuring-rod. Then I will present the characteristics of the case on the intermediate factors, in section 9.3. In section 9.4 I will analyse the contribution of policy analysis to these intermediate factors. Of course, there is an ‘unfair’ element in this judgement, since the framework is designed for participatory cases ‘new style’, not the ‘old-style’ process of elite participation presented in this chapter. But the comparison is not meant to condemn the policy analytical activities as they took place, but to conclude in how far the framework would be an improvement compared to analysis taking place in the more traditional policy processes.

The first question with respect to the outcomes of the long decision process concerning the VLW in the light of the normative framework derived should be: Was the welfare of all parties involved served by its outcomes. If not, who won and who lost?
The focus in this case is on the decision process on the VLW, projected on the territory of Voorburg. This decision process got embedded in a larger process concerning the construction of a ring-road for The Hague (NORAH). The VLW forms the core of this project: the broadening of the provincial part and the construction of the tunnel in The Hague are mainly necessitated by construction of the VLW. Occasionally I will therefore make excursions to other stretches of the route to illuminate or strengthen certain points.

NORAH results for Voorburg in the plan Sijtwende, which puts the road partially underground, partially in a hollow dike. This hollow dike is soundproof and is provided with planting. 700 houses are integrated on both sides of the road, as well as offices, green areas and recreational areas. The originally envisaged tramline constructed along the road was turned into an additional tunnel along part of the car tunnel for ‘public transport of high quality’, which at the moment means a bus, although the tunnel in principle would also be fit to have a tram go through it. Between the hollow dike parts there are two level junctions.

*Table 9.1: winners and losers of the process*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Winner/loser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leidschendam</td>
<td>reduction of congestion; Leidschendam opened up</td>
<td>visual barrier (the dike)</td>
<td>winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voorburg</td>
<td>popular living area; better accessibility to highway A4</td>
<td>visual barrier; loss of green</td>
<td>winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Platform</td>
<td>more facilities nearby for some members</td>
<td>facilitation of car traffic; loss of green; temporary nuisance of construction; visual barrier</td>
<td>loser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National and regional government</td>
<td>Leidschendam opened up; accessibility The Hague improved; new public transport connection</td>
<td>extremely high costs for the result, and high process costs because of the long duration</td>
<td>losers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sijtwende Ltd</td>
<td>profit; reputation as innovative party</td>
<td></td>
<td>winner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wassenaar</td>
<td>traffic nuisance reduced in some parts; better connection to A4</td>
<td>traffic nuisance increased in other parts; damage to nature and ecology</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Hague</td>
<td>liveability increased in some parts; Leidschendam opened up; dangerous goods transport re-routed; increased accessibility of north-western part of the city</td>
<td>liveability decreased in other parts; damage to landscape and ecology</td>
<td>winner</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
To assess the welfare effects of this result it first has to be decided to what the result should be compared. A range of plans has circulated for constructing the VLW. I could also compare the outcomes with the existing situation of a green and spacious piece of land, or a future situation without road but with for instance house construction. I choose to compare the welfare effects of the outcomes of the process with the welfare the parties involved might have derived from the situation as it is suspected to evolve without the activity proposed, what one could call the ‘dynamic’ status quo.

The welfare results for all parties in the process can roughly be pictured as in table 9.1

In explanation to this table: Voorburg resisted the VLW because the road would lead to increased nuisance and take away the possibilities to build houses on the route. The eventual solution takes away much of the nuisance, and allows construction of 700 houses. The final outcome is therefore an improvement for Voorburg compared to the status quo, a green area without houses.

The ministries of TPW and HSPE, the province, the urban district and RWS are as a group designated as losers based on the high costs of the Sijtwende plan and especially the whole NORAH project spawned by it. The addition of the urban ring-road as an alternative during the EIA is telling in this respect. It was added to the alternative set because the difference in effects between alternative B (the optimisation alternative) and the A-alternatives (construction of a highway) were considered not to justify the extra costs of the highway variants. The maximum cost difference between the cheapest variant of alternative B and the most expensive (deepened) variant of alternative A in the EIS was 194 million euro: 264 million for variant Amax deepened minus 70 million for variant B leizo. The added urban ring-road on ground level is estimated to cost 91 million and to have roughly the same effects as construction of a highway.

In the course of time the costs of NORAH, by Sijtwende and other factors, for RWS increased to roughly 410 million euro (Haagsche Courant, August 23rd 2003). Probably the costs of an optimisation variant would have increased as well in the course of time. When we increase these with the same 111% the costs of NORAH increased with, they would amount to 148 million.

The remaining cost difference in that case nevertheless would have increased to 262 million euro. This cost difference is larger than the cost difference RWS found unacceptable during the EIA in light of the limited difference of effects between alternatives A and B. The Sijtwende part alone costs national government roughly 82 million. A deepened construction would have only cost 36 million - although this would have been without the public transport line, with estimated costs of 14 million -. The choice for an optimisation variant would have enabled at least an equal amount of house construction on the trajectory.

All in all, whether the effects of construction of the Northern Ring-road itself, and with that of the road in the Sijtwende plan (among other things lower costs and time gain for road users) are

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The table is based on documents studied and interviews conducted.
worth the money of national government is doubtful. Leaving the situation as it was, or an alternative (for instance the optimising alternative) probably would have had a higher welfare score for the taxpayers represented by national and regional government than the decision taken (see also Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 2002).

The second basic question to be answered in the normative evaluation is: were those expected to loose from decisions compensated for their losses?

We designated in the foregoing as losers of the VLW construction the Platform and national and regional government. The question is: were they compensated by anyone?

Two of the winners, Leidschendam and The Hague, did not compensate anyone. Compensation had to come exclusively from national government. This means a party designated as loser already had to compensate other parties.

With respect to the losers united in the platform, especially the 'locals', compensation for damage caused by a non-foreseeable alteration of zoning plans was entrenched in the Law on Spatial Planning. Normally the municipality was responsible for compensation resulting from adaptation of zoning plans. In this case RWS had taken upon it to pay eventual compensation claims in the different municipalities. But in most cases the chances of successful compensation claims were considered minor. The possibility for a road had been included in several zoning plans, and the discussion on the road had been going on for decades. Thus the road construction was considered foreseeable for neighbours. This means compensation did not have to be paid (see section 7.6).

Compensation that was not prescribed by legislation or regulation was also given. In the cases of Wassenaar and The Hague it had been agreed that RWS would bear the costs of connecting the new road to the municipal road system. To Voorburg costs for connecting to the underlying road system were subsidised by the urban district (Hobma, 2000, p. 156). This arrangement might at least for Wassenaar and The Hague make the difference between them being winners or losers of the project.

Non-governmental actors had to do with the legally prescribed forms of compensation. Current neighbours, in Voorburg as well as Leidschendam, suffered temporary nuisance from the construction works. They did not get compensated for this.

The final basic question to be answered in the normative evaluation is: Were all affected by (proposed) decisions allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision?
Consultation and deliberation between administrative actors took place mostly unofficially, in a range of study groups or working groups (administrative consultation groups, STUHA, steering groups, project groups, and so on), in the forum of the urban district, bilaterally or in other, usually informal, settings. On an analytical level this consultation found its expression in cooperation of civil servants in working groups and sub-groups to feed these study groups and administrative consultation groups with reports and other information, and to come up with alternatives.

Non-governmental groups or individuals were restricted to using the official participation channels, write letters and so on. These channels were limited to reacting to worked out documents and designs. No provision for participating in their development was given. In the EIA-procedure participation was possible by giving a reaction after publication of the Notification of Intent, and after the EIA was finished. Although in these official participation procedures all affected could state the gains or losses they expected, they had no guarantee whatsoever that their views were taken into account, and the procedure made this unlikely as well.

The bilateral agreement of 1997 between RWS and Sijtwende Ltd stipulated that in contrast to the usual state of affairs, Sijtwende Ltd would be responsible for contacts with the social environment. In practice Sijtwende Ltd did this together with RWS and Voorburg. The interaction of Sijtwende Ltd with stakeholders mainly followed the well-known RWS-pattern: information was given to neighbours by means of hearings, newsletters, information packages, a call-centre, plan presentations and so on. Voorburg occasionally organised information evenings when it concerned an activity carried out by the municipality (like soil sanitation).

Sijtwende Ltd did consult all governmental actors: RWS, the urban district, Voorburg, Leidschendam, the polder board, the Chamber of Commerce of The Hague, and so forth.

**Table 9.2: normative evaluation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9.3 THE INTERMEDIATE FACTORS

Comprehensiveness
RWS period: In this period much evidence points towards a type III-error. The problem RWS tried to solve was almost exclusively a traffic problem, whereas several other pressing problems (of housing, for example) circulated in the area and were not connected to the choices to be made. At many moments during the process opportunities were missed to intertwine the process of deciding on the VLW with other developments relevant to this decision. In the preliminary decision taken on the basis of the EIS a road in a cutting was chosen, paying little attention to existing problems like housing, or expected problems like nuisance for neighbours. What also was not taken into account in decisions taken, was what is known in economics as the ‘opportunity costs’ of choices. It was not taken into account that houses that are not constructed in one place, will have to be constructed elsewhere, possibly necessitating construction of new infrastructure, clearing the land and so on, with their attendant costs (-).

Sijtwende period: The project that eventually developed out of the process, Sijtwende, is an integral project. It combines in its design road construction and construction of a living area, which, except by other private parties, before had only been looked upon separately. Added is also construction of a public transport tunnel. The combination of elements also led to a more integrated look upon (technical) problems. It helped ease congestion problems as well as a shortage of housing in the area, whilst preserving at least some green (+).

Score for the RWS period: -  
Score for the Sijtwende period: +

Efficiency
RWS period: Most parties stuck to a focus on problems amenable to action. Even the Platform, of which a part was involved out of ideological reasons, in practice operated pragmatically. It embraced the broad problem description in the Notification of Intent of RWS (enhancing accessibility and liveability), and attuned its argumentation to the problems enlisted by RWS, to enhance its political efficacy. So no inefficient debate on policy cores took place (+). Doubts can be harboured at the amount of information provided to decision-makers and the general public in the EIS. No trace can be found of the level of detail in this very voluminous and time-consuming report having played a role in decision making. The EIS in turn evoked a huge amount of (often similar) written comments, which all had to be processed and answered, again without having played any observable part in design or decision-making (-).
Sijtwende period: In this period the information gathered was directly used for developing the Sijtwende plan, and actual construction of the project. The development of the project was delayed. This was not caused by indecision, or decisions being revoked or remade (0).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

Representativeness
RWS Period: There are several signs of a limited representativeness in the process. Parties with a clear stake, like residents, were not directly represented in the process. They protested in great numbers to the EIS. In principle the different governments involved are supposed to represent their voters, but whether they do on such a specific issue can be questioned. The switches during the process from the Hague from proponent to opponent and back to proponent are unlikely to be caused by a great shift in preference of its population towards the road, and at least not caused by an investigation into those preferences (-).

Also, themes touched upon during the process, like a greater role for public transport, seemed to have been without a champion in the analytical arena. Because of the dominance of RWS, the interests of car drivers seemed to overweigh in the process compared to those of neighbours, lovers of nature, and so on (-).

Sijtwende period: Representativeness did not improve in this period. Differences of opinion between Voorburg and residents on the merits of the Sijtwende plan cast doubt on Voorburgs ability to represent properly in this period. Residents seem to regard Voorburg not as a proper champion of their nuisance theme. In general, there is no structured feedback between governments and their population in the Sijtwende period (-).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: -

Competence
RWS period: In the RWS-period the competence of the parties with good access to the analytical arena was guarded by providing them with sufficient support and information. Parties outside the core arena were not helped in their competence. This lack of (analytical) support hindered the Platform, for example. It would have liked to elaborate the D2 (public transport) alternative but refrained from this for insufficient time to do so. Time pressure also limited the Platform to a too limited role, during the production of the Notification of Intent. Not a lack of knowledge, but of analytical capacity made it incompetent for a full analytical contribution in these cases (0).
More ‘inside’ parties also did not always feel informed enough, for example, to give a meaningful contribution. For instance, after the EIS was finished, OVI felt incompetent at first to judge it because of lack of certain information on among other things alternative D2, the public transport aspects, the transport of dangerous goods, and some map material. After receiving supplementary information OVI did feel competent enough and gave its advice (0).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period RWS, Voorburg and Sijtwende Ltd each contributed their own competence. Sijtwende Ltd that of project development and building, RWS of road construction and traffic aspects, Voorburg with respect to local aspects, judicial aspects of zoning plans, and so on. The perceived competence in the parties behind Sijtwende Ltd was one of the reasons the consortium eventually received the trust of RWS. Opponents of the project were not competent enough in general to come up with alternatives (0).

Score for the RWS-period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende-period: 0

**Negotiation**

RWS period: The process is riddled with unsuccessful negotiations. All local parties continuously see and state their position as preparing for a negotiation process, and see themselves as being in such a process. For instance, in September 1988 the council of The Hague states openly to see the VLW as a topic for negotiations with Leidschendam over construction of Leizo. In 1995, HSPE declares that the construction of an extra Vliet junction is a hard condition for the construction of houses and businesses in the area.

During the whole process parties offer openings that are not picked up by others. Parties like Voorburg indicate possible ways in which they might be compensated, but these are not seriously gone into by the other side. Attempts at negotiation are undertaken sometimes, but are unsuccessful. There seems to be more preparedness to negotiate when the opponent is of more administrative weight. In this sense The Hague in the end of the 1980s is successfully negotiated into switching sides to the pro-VLW camp. On the other hand, Voorburg takes signs of V&W in the late 1980s that it is prepared to negotiate on for instance a deepened construction insufficiently seriously (-).

A recurring possible topic for negotiation was that of land swaps. Repeatedly parties suggested land swaps between Leidschendam and Voorburg. An actual land swap took place in the period of the STUHA-studies between Nootdorp 42 and Leidschendam, to get Leino wholly on the territory of Leidschendam (+).
Another topic for negotiation was that of 'shares' in the housing constructed in the area. The Hague and Voorburg for a long time had to cope with limited possibilities to expand their housing stock. They sometimes suggested getting a share in the housing of Leidschenveen or on other locations. The Hague got this share, Voorburg did not (o).

Non-governmental parties had no access to negotiations. Since direct substantive influence was denied to them, they tried to exercise their influence indirectly. The main actor in that respect was the Platform. But this was only formed in 1993, after issuance of the EIS. The main road open to the Platform to exercise influence was to object to municipal zoning plans with the courts. It also mobilised the population, experts and contact persons inside organisations that had influence on the decision making, like the municipalities or ministries. Its influence manifested itself mainly before the presentation of the plan Sijtwende, but was limited (-).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period also many negotiation efforts were undertaken, and with considerably more success than in the RWS-period. Throughout the development of the plan negotiations took place and were rounded off on demands put to the plan, regarding technique, safety, a public transport line, and so on. Partly related, negotiations were conducted on the extra cost. In the end this amounted in a result in which everybody ‘chipped in’ financially. Of the 205 million the tunnel eventually cost, Sijtwende Ltd covered around 25 million out of the earnings of its house construction. RWS paid the other 180 million to Sijtwende and is after construction responsible for the extra costs of control and maintenance of the tunnel. HSPE paid 20 million to RWS to cover part of this 180 million, and the urban district paid 30 million for the public transport line. Voorburg contributed land for free, with a value estimated in 1995 of roughly 20 million. It also carried the costs of public services for the new neighbourhood (lighting, opening it up by road, and the like). All parties involved in the end were pleased with the results they got out of the negotiations. Whether all relevant elements were included in the negotiations is uncertain, however, since not all interests were involved (+).

Finally, in the Sijtwende period there was a successful land swap between RWS and Voorburg around and on the route. The property of land on the strip was a patchwork of pieces of RWS and pieces of Voorburg, and RWS wanted to completely own the part on which the road would come. Voorburg obtained a piece of Leidschendam in order to have the living area Sijtwende fully on its territory (+).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: +
**Flexibility**

RWS period: Throughout the RWS period examples of considerable flexibility alternated with examples of very little flexibility. New arguments for constructing the road were rapidly incorporated in the decision process, like Leidschenveen and the European Patent Agency. New laws, like that on the EIA, were heeded before they even officially took effect. The analysis performed seems never to have been a hindrance for the decision makers in flexibly dealing with these matters. But the decision process in the STUHA and EIA periods turned out very inflexible in incorporating new alternatives. However, flexibility turned out possible during the EIA, when at the very last moment a new variant of alternative A was added (o).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period at first the article 37 procedure prevented national and provincial government from rapidly putting its cards on the new alternative. This only took place officially after the procedure had ended. Voorburg on the other hand was very flexible in its incorporation of Sijtwende in its zoning plan (o). Whereas Sijtwende Ltd wanted to realise the plans rapidly to generate income, the pace of the governmental parties was slower. Sijtwende Ltd suffered delay because other parties on which it depended for approval of its designs, like RWS and the urban district were regularly too late in their responses. Voorburg was slow in disowning a crucial part of land in the plan area. When the Definitive Urban Design for Sijtwende is finished in December 1997, it takes until October 1998 till the council committee of Voorburg approves it (-). During the more detailed design process of Sijtwende, Sijtwende Ltd had an open eye for the wishes of neighbours, because in the early stages of plan development support in the Council of Voorburg for the plan was feeble. In this respect, support among the population helped. Although the plan was altered on the basis of remarks and suggestions of citizens during the official procedures, these alterations were minor (+).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

**Trust**

RWS period: The lack of trust during most of the case was crucial. In the eyes of the proponents of the road (most strongly RWS and Leidschendam) Voorburg was stalling the process by all means without acknowledging the importance of the road to others or listening to arguments. Voorburg saw other parties, unwilling to listen to arguments, forcing it to accept a road meaning more harm than benefit to it, not solving the problems it was claimed to solve, without offering anything in return. The fact that Leidschendam for solving its problems mainly looked to the territory of Voorburg, whilst building upon the areas on its own territory where solutions
might have been possible, did not help to create trust either. The feeling of a conspiracy against Voorburg to enable the VLW led to the VLW-issue becoming an emotional and highly controversial topic in the local politics of Voorburg. This led to the statement ‘no VLW’ being included in most party programs and court programs in Voorburg. For a very long time discussing the road was taboo (-).

Mutual distrust also found its expression in the way parties looked upon analysis being carried out by or on behalf of the other party, and information brought forward. Respondents of the two main opponents Voorburg and the Platform expressed doubts about the objectivity of RWS. The effect and cost estimates of RWS would be influenced by what they found desirable. In the end reducing costs would always be more important than reducing externalities. In contrast, proponents of the road did not trust the motives of opponents in presenting information and alternatives. Trust in the 'objectivity' of research results was also lessened because in the same period regularly study results contradicted each other. This perception made all analysis carried out in the case controversial in advance. Information and analysis brought forward was attacked by opponents\(^4\). For example, opponents of the road objected to the EIS because some aspects were not studied at all. Results would have been influenced by the starting-points and assumptions and the choice in aspects of alternatives studied. Alternatives would be rejected on dubious grounds with shaky argumentation. Some findings and models used would be incorrect (-).

On the plus side, the competence of RWS with respect to road infrastructure in the sense of analytical and engineering craftsmanship is not questioned (+).

Sijtwende period: With the appearance of Sijtwende Ltd an independent party entered the stage. Sijtwende Ltd was not burdened by the distrust and personal frictions that troubled the relationship between the other parties. This eased acceptance of the initiative for all (+). But the reigning distrust also influenced the way most parties looked upon the plan Sijtwende in the beginning. At first RWS was convinced that it was a plan of Voorburg to delay construction of the VLW. When Voorburg and Sijtwende Ltd seemed serious, trust between RWS and Voorburg grew and co-operation arose. All involved had the will to have the plan succeed and kept consulting with each other to solve problems (0). Also, from the beginning many activities were employed to gain administrative support for the plan. This was successful in so far that the other members of the steering group declared to have no problems with the plan Sijtwende being investigated, as long as Voorburg was able to gain support of the minister and it did not lead to delay (+).

\(^4\) As well as by some advisory bodies, like the Inspector for the Public Health in South-Holland and the Commission for the EIA.
Even when the plan Sijtwende was adopted by the council of Voorburg it hung by a thread for a long time. The council remained of the opinion that no interests were served by construction of the road. In the text accompanying the zoning plan that incorporated Sijtwende Voorburg still stated that the necessity of the road had not been demonstrated and that it did not solve the problems it was supposed to solve (Zoning plan Sijtwende, 1996). Trust in those advocating the road and the analyses underlying those advocacy therefore never seems to have been obtained with the council of Voorburg (-).

Score for the RWS-period: -
Score for the Sijtwende-period: 0

Substantive enrichment
RWS period: During most of the process learning of the key players V&W/RWS, Voorburg and Leidschendam is limited. Their viewpoints on the desirability of the road, even on the preferred route, remain fixed. The preferred alternative in 1956 is still by and large the preferred alternative after the EIA in 1993. Only with respect to constructing it as a motorway instead as a highway, and possibly constructing it in a cutting, viewpoints show some ability to change (-).

During the decades the process took much variety was created, but mostly outside the core analytical arena. Several parties brought forward their own suggestions uninvited by RWS, among them municipalities like Wassenaar and especially Voorburg, the Platform, and neighbourhood groups. But especially commercial parties formed a source of creativity. Two private initiatives were presented in October 1988, of which one was similar to the Sijtwende plan presented years later. In June 1992 a plan to wrap the N44 in a kind of concrete box on which houses could be built, was presented to the council of Wassenaar. But all this variety was not let into the main analytical arena of RWS (-).

Sijtwende period: It is only the appearance of Sijtwende Ltd on the scene that forces the ‘usual suspects’ to learn about other possibilities. The eventual outcome of the process, Sijtwende, is innovative. Although the plan harbours no new techniques, its combination of existing techniques is innovative, at least for the Dutch context. But it was very late in coming. And not the full possible benefits of the plan were realised because of conservatism with RWS, which precluded for example the construction of houses on the road tunnel itself. Finally, it still is a road on the same route as pinpointed in 1956 (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: o
Table 9.3: overview of presence of the intermediate factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate factors</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWS period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the intermediate factor was (almost) fully developed in this case  
0 = the intermediate factor was to some extent present in this case  
- = the intermediate factor was not or hardly present in this case

9.4
THE DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

In this section I will look into the extent to which the design guidelines formulated in the chapters 5 to 7, and rearranged in 8, were met in this case. I will also try to identify other useful design guidelines that may be presented by the case.

9.4.1. GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS

*Have a broad scope*

RWS period: Not all politically relevant issues were part of the analytical process that was supposed to provide information for decision making. Other possibly relevant processes and arenas were not properly mapped and monitored by those most involved in analysis concerning the VLW. The housing problems in the area form an example. Whereas construction of Leidschenveen was mentioned as one of the main motives behind construction of the VLW, the housing problems of The Hague and Voorburg remained outside the studies performed into the VLW. That Voorburg would like to use the strip for house construction was only cursorily
mentioned from time to time. In the studies performed no assessment of alternative uses of the land designated to the route was made (-).

The motive for excluding some aspects was often procedural. An example was the most environmentally friendly variant D2 in the EIA-procedure. This was thought to lead to a decrease in liveability- and accessibility problems. In the directives an elaboration of the variant was requested, since a comparison with other alternatives could not take place otherwise. But this did not happen because some aspects of the variant were outside the scope of the EIA-procedure. Positive effects of the variant were therefore not included in the Outlines report. On request by OVI D2 got elaborated somewhat, but the information was only sent to OVI, not provided with the EIS, since this was already finished.

For other issues it was not clear why they had not been taken into account. In the EIS, for instance, the spatial fitting-in of the alternatives was not studied. The traffic generating effect of the road was underexposed according to the commission on the EIA. From the perspective of members of the Platform, the studies carried out were not broad enough in their focus in that they did not deal with questions like a change in modal split.

Finally, some missed attention to opportunity costs of choices. It is regretted that the fact is neglected that houses that are not constructed in one place, will have to be constructed elsewhere, possibly necessitating construction of new infrastructure, clearing the land and so on, with their attendant costs (-).

On the other hand, most aspects considered to be the core of the studies by RWS, accessibility- and liveability problems caused by traffic, were mapped, particularly in the EIS once this had become obligatory (+).

Sijtwende period: The design and building process for the plan Sijtwende carried a broad view in itself naturally, since it looked upon road construction and house construction in mutual coherence. Both subprojects therefore took into account relevant developments in and aspects of the other subproject (+).

Score for the RWS-period: -
Score for the Sijtwende-period: +

Integrate and structure
RWS period: In the RWS period at several times civil servants of different governments engaged in joint analysis of problems and options. Examples were the technical consultation group at the end of the 1970s and the STUHA working groups. Also during the EIA civil servants of different
municipalities, including Voorburg, co-operated to some extent with RWS. But these forms of co-operation in the end did not lead to a joint product. RWS was the maker of the EIS, commissioned most of the analytical work and carried responsibility for the end product (together with co-initiators The Hague and the province) (o).

The STUHA reports and later the EIS provided to some extent a core analytical framework. But not all stakeholders could contribute to them or were equally influential with respect to their content (o). Even parties that did have access to the analytical arena throughout the process continuously had their own studies performed, which were not linked to the integral platform of the STUHA-reports or EIS, but meant to influence the political games going on. Especially The Hague had several studies performed by 'independent' parties to back up its standpoints and interests at the time. Even within the STUHA-framework at some point two reports with contradictory assumptions were issued at the same time (-).

The qualitative overview in the Outlines report of the EIS did allow an integration of diverging information of a qualitative as well of a quantitative nature. All aspects were judged by awarding plusses and minuses, only costs were presented quantitatively (+).

Since not all parties performing analysis were linked to one informational platform, the platforms during the process (STUHA, EIA, etc.) did not serve as a central access point to all relevant information sources. To serve as a pointer to other information sources for interested parties did not seem to be an intention of those producing the STUHA-reports or EIS-report. No list of references or pointers to information sources used was given. There was even no reference in the main EIS report to the underlying aspect reports (-).

Sijtwende period: When later the project Sijtwende demanded its own analytical activities the core analytical party became Sijtwende Ltd. As director of the realisation process it had overview on developments in the process and the plan Sijtwende. On basis of that it organised the co-operation process. Sijtwende Ltd engaged in many consultations. The parties that were consulted were however mostly the same, namely Voorburg, the urban district, RWS and the contractor that was part of Sijtwende. The core parties in the process were three representatives of RWS, Voorburg and Sijtwende Ltd. Civil servants of Voorburg participated actively in the design process of the living area. Sijtwende Ltd also took part in consultations in the different project groups of civil servants of Voorburg, but RWS declined an invitation by Voorburg to partake in those.
In the elaboration of the Sijtwende plan, despite the fact that RWS elaborates its own plan together with the province, there is analytical co-operation between RWS and Sijtwende Ltd. In this co-operation RWS mainly plays the role of advisor and assessor of the plan, to indicate what is technically possible and what is not. The close co-operation with RWS also had its benefits for Sijtwende Ltd. When their economists overlooked technical aspects, RWS pointed these out to them (0).

Sijtwende Ltd was commissioner for design and execution and guaranteed execution according to the programme of guidelines. The fact that it was responsible for both the road construction and the living area made it easier to attune the development of both elements of the plan, for example by weekly consultation between the subproject Road, and the subproject Houses to guard integral development of the whole project (+).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period:+

9.4.2. GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO EFFICIENCY

Avoid overlap in analytical activities
RWS period: There was not much overlap in analytical activity between administrative parties and RWS. RWS as dominant analytic party carried out or commissions most research. Civil servants from the municipalities sometimes could contribute their own data and specific contributions. But especially The Hague also commissioned its own studies, dealing (partially) with the (un)desirability of the VLW, especially in the period that it was an opponent of the road. Nevertheless, in general, opponents of the road, even Voorburg, limited their analytical activity to attacking the arguments brought forward by the proponents. This meant analytical overlap was limited (+).

Over time there was a considerable overlap of analytical activities, with some studies being conducted over and over again. Studies into the desirability of the VLW, about how it should be fitted in, and so on, were conducted several times. Although to some extent this was desirable, since situations change over time, there was not much efficient use of studies conducted before. Many things studied during earlier technical consultations, in STUHA working groups and in internal RWS analysis, were again elaborated during the EIA (-).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende phase of the process analysis was subdivided. Sijtwende Ltd performed part of it, RWS performed studies or ordered these, and other parties studied relevant issues from their point of view. The ministry of HSPE, for example, studied what the
environmental consequences of tunnelling the road (transport of dangerous goods, discharge of exhaust fumes) would be for traffic (+).

Score for the RWS-period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende-period: +

**Provide no superfluous information**

RWS period: Before and during STUHA the information gathered was relatively to the point. This control in gathering information was broken when an EIS was prepared. This in the end consisted of separate reports on 8 different topics, a summarising report on the outlines, and a separate explanatory report on assumptions and procedures followed. All in all well over a thousand pages, detailed to the level of exactly which type of flowers were present at specific locations (o).

Sijtwende period: During the Sijtwende period information gathered was specifically focused to enabling construction of the tunnel and living area (+).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: +

**Focus on pragmatic aspects**

RWS – and Sijtwende period: In the RWS - as well as Sijtwende period most parties stuck to a focus on problems concrete enough to be amenable to action. Even the Platform, of which a part was involved out of ideological reasons, in practice operated pragmatically. It embraced the broad problem description in the Notification of Intent of RWS (enhancing accessibility and liveability), and attuned its argumentation to the problems enlisted by RWS, to enhance its political efficacy.

Score for the RWS-period: +
Score for the Sijtwende-period:+

9.4.3 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO REPRESENTATIVENESS

**Identify (the position of) relevant parties**

RWS – and Sijtwende period: There was in neither of both periods enumeration of which parties might be affected by the proposals circulating in the process. It was not mapped whether all those affected had power to represent their case in the proper arena's, or other parties with power representing them.
Score for the RWS-period: -
Score for the Sijtwende-period: -

**Pay attention to representativeness**
RWS – and Sijtwende period: There was in neither of both periods explicit mapping of the distribution of power and representation of interests in the relevant arena by any analytical party.

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: -

9.4.4 | GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPETENCE

**Provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives**
RWS period: The parties participating in the RWS-period did so as part of their job package, being civil servants from different governments or RWS. Bureaus were paid to do part of the studies, for example during the EIA. No parties were trained. Parties outside the core, like the Platform, were not trained since their participation was not an issue (-).

Sijtwende period: Participation of other than governmental parties in the Sijtwende period was also limited to hearings and official reactions to (draft) zoning plans. Those partaking in that were not trained, provided with specific knowledge or other means and incentives. The core parties were supposed to possess relevant knowledge already and again, to participate as part of their job package, so no incentives, lectures or training were given (-).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: -

**Give all access to analytical capacity and expertise**
RWS period: Access to analytical capacity was unevenly distributed. The party with most capacity in this respect clearly was RWS. RWS did provide some of its analytical capacity to other governmental parties at times (+).

RWS – and Sijtwende period: But throughout the RWS – as well as Sijtwende period the parties that had analytical capacity did not provide the non-governmental actors with it. Their lack of analytical capacity probably played a part in their inability to come up with alternatives (-).
Sijtwende period: RWS also took on an advisory role for the Sijtwende consortium during the period of the article 37 procedure. It even hired in outside analytical capacity to provide clarity on certain aspects of the Sijtwende plans (+).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

**Provide sufficient information to enable participation**

RWS period: The information non-governmental parties received was the 'usual stuff' like newsletters and information on hearings. The STUHA-reports were not spread to non-governmental parties. Participants had to grasp their general content from the newspapers. But later those interested could order the EIA-report. Non-governmental parties clearly only received sufficient information to enable them reactive participation in the formal participation procedures. (-).

Governmental parties, on the other hand, received sufficient information to perform their role in consultations, brainstorm meetings, and so on (+). When the advisory council OVI requested supplementary information to be able to judge the EIA, it was received within two weeks, but only partly (o).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende-period Sijtwende Ltd provides Voorburg and RWS with the information they need to make a zoning plan, and assess the designs, respectively. RWS provides Sijtwende Ltd with outcomes of studies it has ordered, and a programme of requirements to guide elaboration of the Sijtwende plan (+).

Non-governmental parties are, as in the RWS-period, informed through newsletters and hearings, and a website, which provided only general information (-)

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

**Translate information into a usable format**

RWS period: In the RWS period, since information was not meant to enable analytical participation of the broader public, it was usually in a form fit for expert use, but less so for others. But in the production of the EIS attention was paid to producing the information in a user-friendly format, through maps, table, a list of concepts, and so on (o).

Sijtwende period: Analytical information exchange in the Sijtwende period was mostly between professionals of Sijtwende Ltd, RWS and Voorburg. Translation of information in a shape more fit
for lay persons was unnecessary. At hearings and in newsletters information was made understandable for non-insiders, but not usable for own analysis by them (o).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

9.4.5. GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO NEGOTIATION

Have a stakeholder/interest focus
RWS period: RWS had no explicit group-focused analytical approach. In general effects were mapped 'in the abstract', as effects on liveability, nature, and so on, not as effects on specific interests or groups. Neither were problems or solutions explicitly linked to parties suffering from them or advocating them, respectively. In no analytical product during the process was the information structured according to the groups involved (-).

Sijtwende period: Sijtwende Ltd sold the plan by stressing among other things that it satisfied diverse interests, but did not map precisely whose interests were served or hurt by the plan, or presented the benefits or disadvantages of the plan per group. This was of course to be expected, since Sijtwende Ltd is a private party and it is not its task to do so (as it is of a governmental authority) (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

Map possibilities for negotiation
RWS period: Despite its political significance, in the RWS-period possibilities for land swaps, their practical consequences and effects on different stakeholders were never mapped. Also, no explicit search or mapping of housing possibilities that Voorburg (or in the late eighties, The Hague) might be inclined to accept as negotiation material took place (-).

RWS – and Sijtwende period: Another option not looked into during both periods was buying off those that would experience nuisance by the new road. According to some it would have been cheaper to buy off all neighbours (for instance, have them relocate) than constructing the expensive tunnels in the Sijtwende project and The Hague (-).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period other possibilities for negotiation were mapped, to enable agreement on finance, and to be able to negotiate on the way the project was shaped (+)
Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

9.4.6 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO FLEXIBILITY

Make analysis a standby facility
RWS period: Throughout most of the process analysis had a ‘classic’ nature. Preliminary problem definitions were formulated, research was commissioned or carried out by parties themselves, resulting in reports. There was no continuous standby-analytical capacity to carry out research quickly into burning questions, although the analytical capacity of RWS performed this function to some extent (0).

Sijtwende period: Problems with flexibility arose when Sijtwende Ltd took over the design lead. Whereas Sijtwende Ltd wanted to realise the plans rapidly to generate income, the pace of the governmental parties was slower. Progress of Sijtwende Ltd in the plan development was partially dependent on RWS assessing the designs Sijtwende Ltd made against the programme of guidelines. RWS was regularly too late in its responses, leading to delay. The urban district was late at times with its approval for the design for the tramline and tram stop. Questions asked by Sijtwende Ltd to the urban district were not answered, delaying the design process. Summarising, although it was there, the analytical capacity of the different governments showed flaws as a standby facility for Sijtwende Ltd (0).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

Make analysis continuously adaptable
RWS period: The classic nature of analysis performed in the case implied analysis was not adaptable. It was a one-time thing, resulting in reports that were next fixed. To some extent this was softened by the fact that was worked with partial reports in the STUHA period. This step-by-step approach allowed to some extent to take into account recent findings and changes. But in the EIA the separate reports were independent building blocks for the Outlines report, and were not produced in this step-by-step fashion (-).

The long time needed to elaborate an alternative provided an important limit to analytical flexibility. During the EIA the most preferred alternative was worked out more than others, because it otherwise would not be developed far enough when the formal decision for its construction was taken. This eased the task of RWS and the province during the two-track period, because many aspects of the plan worked out by them had already largely been detailed
on behalf of the Trajectory/EIA study. But it also made inclusion of a new variant in the latter stages of the EIA unlikely and difficult, since it would not be elaborated on a comparable level (which was even the case with some alternatives in the EIA, like D2, see below) (-). Nevertheless, analytical flexibility turned out possible during the EIA. At the last moment a variant of alternative A was added to be studied. This was an urban ring-road, constructed on ground level. When the first impact estimates of the different alternatives became known, those of the optimisation alternative B and the motorway variants A were not so far apart, whereas the costs of the motorway variants were considerably higher. This led to RWS wanting to have an ‘intermediate’ alternative included. This was the urban ring-road, which was considerably cheaper than the motorway variants (+).

Sijtwende period: Sijtwende Ltd proved more adaptable and flexible in its analytical approach. For example, it started with a ‘dream plan’, with a tunnel wholly below ground level. But when informal presentation of the plan to RWS made clear that the plan in that form was financially infeasible, Sijtwende Ltd had it adapted by incorporating the hollow dike. This considerably lowered the deficit on the plan (+). When during the further development of the plan difficulties arose Sijtwende Ltd had the plan adapted. An example was that when the junctions were deemed unsafe in the original design of the hollow dike plan, Sijtwende Ltd had these enlarged. This meant the number of houses projected in the plan had to be lowered from an original 1000 to 700, for which financial solutions were found (+).

Score for the RWS period: 0
Score for the Sijtwende period:+

9.4.7. GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO TRUST

Be transparent

RWS period: Since non-governmental parties were not involved in the design or analytical process, this process was a black box to them. The resulting reports were hardly provided to outsiders, let alone that assumptions or analytical procedures used were explained. Choices made in selecting alternatives were only cursorily explained (-). This changed to some extent with the EIA. With the EIS a separate explanatory report illuminating assumptions and analytical steps followed during the making of the 8 basic reports was provided. This was done relatively extensive, but not all specific calculation tools or methods used were mentioned. The way selections were made during the different study periods as well as the final selection was not really made explicit44 (0).

44 In the separate explanation report belonging to the Outlines report there was no explanation of goals and assessment aspects for alternatives
Many objections to the EIA were uttered, notably complaints that the basis of several conclusions remained unclear and complaints that vagueness reigned with respect to a number of issues, like how high the baffle boards would be. The Assessment of the commission on the EIA concluded that the EIS still left several questions open, which should be addressed in the decision-making. The commission indicated problems with the controllability of calculation results, the global nature of some data, different scores for the same variants in the main report and the appendices, and so on (-).

Sijtwende period: Sijtwende Ltd, being a private party, did have a certain reticence in revealing crucial business information. On the other hand, it allowed a third party hired by Voorburg and RWS to check upon its calculations of expected income of the sale of houses, and Voorburg to check upon the calculations of expected income from the land of Sijtwende Ltd. Other parties did not receive inside information, however (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

**Have procedures for reaching agreement on status information**

RWS period: The analysis taking place in the RWS-period devised no ways to deal with the political character and contentiousness of information. Proponents of the road explicitly or implicitly presented research carried out by them or on behalf of them as objective (-). Studies were usually carried out on behalf of one party or small group of parties, like RWS, or the different working groups through time, or the initiators of the EIA. Even when they were carried out on behalf of a small group, RWS usually paid for them (-).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period also studies were carried out only on behalf of the core parties around the Sijtwende plan. Even in this period studies were usually paid by RWS, although Sijtwende Ltd also regularly commissioned studies (-).

Only after all parties adopted the Sijtwende plan there was something of a procedure for reaching agreement on the status of information. It was agreed that RWS and the urban district had to approve of relevant studies performed for Sijtwende Ltd (+).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0
Let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space

RWS period: During this period, other governments had some influence on the problem definition. In the drawing up of the Notification of Intent they were involved in analysis of the problem to be solved, the solutions that would be investigated in the study, the method according to which the alternatives and variants would be compared and assessed and the decision making process. For the formulation of criteria for the problem analysis of the Trajectory/EIA-study the project manager of the EIA-study co-operated with civil servants of Voorburg, Leidschendam, Wassenaar, The Hague and the province. These could indicate for ‘their’ roads which amount of traffic would still be permissible before “a problem” would arise (+).

During the process proponents tried to narrow the solution space. In the early 1980s, the Memorandum of the technical consultation group proposed that also possibilities for travel via alternative means of transport as well as improving the underlying road system, and the consequences of not constructing the road should be investigated. This broad view was also largely applied during the reassessment study. But in the STUHA-report on design and fitting in of the VLW of June 1988 a range of alternatives got rejected. Although Voorburg especially did not support the rejection of one specific route, a ring-road north of Leidschendam, STUHA decided not to look further into this route (-).

This alternative and the other alternatives rejected by STUHA were also excluded from consideration in the Notification of Intent. In the EIA only the 1956 trajectory was considered. Further, a range of variants to alternatives were studied but left out of the final EIS, since “it was clear in advance, that the negative effects of those are too large in relation to their performance” (Rijkswaterstaat a.o, 1993b, translation RM) (-).

During the procedure, two alternatives were added to the set. During the official participation procedure the province brought forward a variant with continued construction in a cutting for its part. This variant was subject to obligatory EIA and therefore included. RWS itself brought forward the alternative of an urban ring-road. There was no opportunity created for including alternatives of other parties than the initiators of the study (-).

Opponents of the road mainly focused on either suggesting or endorsing other solutions than the road. For decades Voorburg proposed alternatives. Whereas there was considerable unwillingness as early as the early 1980s at TPW to take these into consideration, the hindrance power of Voorburg ensured that they were eventually taken into consideration in the STUHA studies, and some of them during the EIA (+).

When alternatives were included, this did not guarantee them all the same status. The only alternatives really studied in full were variants of the construction of NORAH on the existing route and variants of an improvement for the local Vliet junctions in Leidschendam and Voorburg. For example D2, the public transport alternative, is only cursorily studied. Since in
the directives for the EIA study of this alternative was demanded, some attention was paid to it. But this seemed largely lip-service. In the EIS D2 was described as completely infeasible. After the EIA the commission on the EIA as well as OVI and the inspector for the public health in South-Holland found the alternative had not been properly studied. When OVI was sent the requested additional information on the alternative this still was meagre, only 10 pages. Also, the information was accompanied by the statement that a number of measures from D2 would probably lead to insurmountable resistance. In light of the fact that even on the basis of the limited information given this alternative scored best on most effects this relative neglect seems questionable. Alternative C, maximising public transport, was also not studied in depth because its scale would differ too much from the other alternatives (-).

Non-governmental parties remained far from the analytical arena, limiting their participation to the alternatives chosen by the initiators. Besides that the participation allowed was reactive, allowing no other option than searching out the weak spots in the analysis conducted by analysts employed by RWS or endorsing existing alternatives for the road. Non-governmental parties could not contribute to the problem definition, determination of effects, or suggest alternatives (-).

Sijtwende period: In the Sijtwende period RWS and Voorburg were allowed considerable influence on the plan development of Sijtwende, and other governments like the urban district to a lesser extent. The influence of neighbours and others on the development of Sijtwende was however not explicitly solicited, and minor (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

Provide independent, trusted expertise
RWS period: Throughout most of the process analysis was either carried out or commissioned by RWS. It was the central party in the STUHA-studies as well as responsible for the EIA. During the EIA several engineering and consultant firms carried out studies into different separate aspects. These studies were commissioned by RWS, the province and The Hague. RWS saw itself as an independent governmental party, striving for the public good. It tried to keep up an image of objectivity. In the first NORAH Newsletter (October 1992), for example, the project manager of RWS stated to have no standpoint on whether national highway 14 should or should not be constructed. In light of the history of the project this is hard to believe (compare also Hobma, 2000 and Huberts, 1988) (-).
Other forums in the process too were not overflowing with independent expertise. For example, after the EIS appeared, the first hearing over it took place in The Hague supervised by an appeal commission filled by acknowledged proponents of the road (-).
Outside analysts, let alone independent ones, are only employed for partial analyses into specific aspects of the problems, requiring specific expertise. They are usually paid directly by RWS (-).

The expertise of RWS or the engineering firms, research agencies and consultant firms working for it was not really questioned during the case (+).

Sijtwende period: Sijtwende Ltd had the monopoly on crucial business information. When there were large uncertainties on the yields from house construction, RWS, as well as Voorburg, therefore took on a third party to check upon the claims of the Sijtwende consortium on expected income from the sale of houses. The calculations diverged slightly, but in the end agreement was reached. Civil servants of Voorburg checked the calculations of expected income from the land of Sijtwende Ltd (+).

The bilateral agreement between Sijtwende Ltd and RWS stipulated that in case of a dispute during the development and realisation phase of the plan the parties would consult a ‘Primacy’ of the directors and heads of the parties. When this Primacy was not able to reach a conclusion, the matter would be presented to a Council of Experts (+).

Nevertheless, all expertise hired by RWS or Voorburg was of course not independent in the eyes of the outsiders throughout the whole case, residents and interest groups in the region (-).

Score for the RWS period: -  
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

9.4.8 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO SUBSTANTIVE ENRICHMENT

Connect V/S learning to A/I learning

RWS period: During the RWS-period, political discussions and analysis going on were separated. In discussions and negotiations topics like land swaps and shares in housing plans were taken along, but these were not informed by or fed back into the analytical process (-).

Sijtwende period: In this period progress was mostly on an ‘analytical’ level. Where political discussions took place, for example on the desirability of a tram line in the plans, Sijtwende Ltd incorporated the results of this not always immediately in its plan making, but did so eventually.
V/S learning of involved decision-makers in turn was to some extent informed by information produced during the plan development of Sijtwende (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

**Support variety creation**

RWS period: The core analytical party in the process (RWS) was not the one with the most creativity, and it also did not stimulate that in others. RWS was dominated by civil engineers, with a preference for asphalt, concrete and constructions. It had an interest as well as history in coming up with road construction as the solution to congestion problems (o).

During most of the process RWS was, and clearly saw itself as, the core party in performing analysis, commissioning studies and designing alternatives. There was co-operation with civil servants of other governmental parties involved in technical working groups and so on, but RWS took up the bulk of analytical activity in the process. Variety was limited by the specific focus, expertise, experiences and preferences of RWS (o).

Sijtwende period: RWS did not design the Sijtwende plan but it did influence the process. In the further development of the plan a Programme of guidelines drawn up in co-operation between RWS and Sijtwende Ltd (but mostly deriving from RWS) played a crucial guiding role.

The guidelines were more global than the specifications RWS was used to work with, and left to Sijtwende Ltd some space to optimise (+).

The introduction of a 'third party' had its advantages for the learning abilities of RWS. During their co-operation in the development process of the tunnel in the Sijtwende plan Sijtwende Ltd pointed out to RWS absurdities in their usual technical conditions, which were sometimes adapted (+). RWS concentrated on the road. It was informed of other developments by Sijtwende Ltd, but did not try to influence these directly. Of course, choices made with respect to the road and its tunnel influenced the urban possibilities indirectly (o).

RWS took its new supervisory role seriously, and used it among other things to stop developments in the design process it considered undesirable, like house construction on the tunnel. Nevertheless, the lead for Sijtwende Ltd in designing did lead to a few innovative features, like lowering the tunnel at the junctions, as mentioned earlier. Also did the fact that Sijtwende Ltd was the initiator give the consortium the possibility to arrange the project in such a way that it became attractive to exploit (o).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0


Support variety use

RWS period: For a long time there was no framework in which plans coming from parties outside the arena of the administrative parties – for example neighbourhood groups or private parties - could be incorporated and for example be made more financially feasible (-).

In the problem definition in the Notification of Intent liveability was put alongside accessibility as one of the two core elements of the problem. In the EIS was stated on page 100 “Realising NORAH leads on balance to a worsening of the liveability situation.” (translation RM) But this worsening of liveability did not preclude the choice to construct the VLW, indicating that the openness to other problem aspects than congestion was not really optimal with RWS (-). Limiting on the incorporation of variety use in the RWS-period worked also that the ability to look towards non-standard solutions seemed less developed in the engineers of RWS. RWS and the firms working for it in producing the EIS also seemed unequipped to work out other than road alternatives, like public transport or other solutions (-).

Sijtwende period: Different from usual in the Sijtwende period is that RWS did not design itself. It formulated a programme of guidelines as basis for the contracts. Sijtwende Ltd took care of the design and the execution with the programme of guidelines as condition, within which it was allowed to optimise. Accompanying tasks, like tuning the design with the environment were also covered by Sijtwende Ltd. RWS assessed the designs and finished products of Sijtwende against the norms and demands in the programme of guidelines, and against legal rules and regulations. The urban district assessed the designs for the tramline and tram stop in the plans. Voorburg and the urban district had an advising role in the development process of Sijtwende and made their demands and wishes known to Sijtwende Ltd (+).

Conservatism with RWS limited the benefits of the creativity engendered with the plan Sijtwende. On an administrative level there was acceptance of it relatively rapidly, but sometimes people on a designing/executing level had more trouble accepting their new role. Also, it did take months to 'understand each others' worlds' (-).

Score for the RWS period: -
Score for the Sijtwende period: 0

Table 9.4 shows the extent to which the design guidelines were met in both periods.
Table 9.4: overview of application of the design guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design guideline</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWS period</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
<td>o</td>
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<tr>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
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<tr>
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<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
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<tr>
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<td>-</td>
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<td>let concerned parties influence</td>
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<tr>
<td>problem delineation and solution space</td>
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<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
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<tr>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
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<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>-</td>
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<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the design guideline was well met in this case
o = the design guideline was to some extent met in this case
- = the design guideline was poorly or not at all met in this case
A first remarkable outcome of the evaluation is the considerable difference between the performance in the RWS period and the Sijtwende period. This is not (completely) a difference in performance between RWS and Sijtwende Ltd. Although Sijtwende Ltd took over the part of analytical core party, this does not mean RWS played no part in the Sijtwende period. But part of the explanation for the difference will lay in the switch of core parties. The fact that Sijtwende Ltd is a market party might make it more inclined to (supporting) negotiation, since those funding have to be pleased, might make it more inclined towards innovation and the willingness to incorporate it. The need to make money might also explain the higher score on efficiency, since efficiency is a means of making money by saving it. The better score on (guidelines contributing to) trust might also be partly related to the fact Sijtwende Ltd needed to be trusted by its clients and funding parties. But it also had to do with the relatively unstained position of Sijtwende in a policy area where relations had been damaged by decades of conflict.

That Sijtwende Ltd is a private party does not explain the better score on (guidelines contributing to) comprehensiveness. This is probably due to the nature of the plan Sijtwende, which combined several aspects only looked upon separately before, and the declined scope of the problem definition to deal with: developing a project like Sijtwende, however complex in itself, is still easier to deal with comprehensively than all the problems and solutions (possibly) related to congestion and liveability problems in the area, as was the problem definition in the RWS period. Finally, both parties did not pay attention to identifying thoroughly which parties ought to be involved in analysis and decision-making, and whether those involved were representative. In the RWS period this had to do with the reigning culture of elite dealing among themselves, Sijtwende Ltd as a private party had no interest or expertise in stakeholder identification or involvement. Competence of the parties that did participate was reasonably safeguarded, but not that of outsiders.

Some of the weakness touched upon in the foregoing can be related to the neglect of (contributions of) possible stakeholders in the process. This created a climate of distrust in the analysis performed, limited broadness and integration of aspects mapped and limited the access to possible innovative solutions. In the following two chapters I will turn to two cases of spatial planning in which involvement of stakeholders is central, to see whether this involvement cures some of the ills of this case.
the case De Bilt:
MUCH ADO AMOUNTING TO NOTHING
10.1.1 | PROLOGUE

De Bilt is a woody municipality with 33,000 inhabitants in the centre of the Netherlands. It consists of two central villages, Bilthoven and De Bilt, which merge into each other. Bilthoven is cut in two by a railroad. There is a difference between the population of both villages: the affluent and elderly live mostly in the northern part of Bilthoven, north of the railroad.

Figure 10.1: municipality of De Bilt
After municipal elections in 1994 the new Court of Mayor and Aldermen (hereafter: M&A) agrees that within a year a plan on the spatial structure of the municipality (hereafter: structure plan) would be agreed upon. A 'memorandum on outlines' to precede this structure plan is made. But the parties forming the ruling coalition in the council are split on the desirability of a structure plan. The council commission on spatial planning rejects the memorandum. Since civil servants keep struggling with spatial (mainly infrastructural) problems, a new attempt is made towards the end of 1996. Two discussion meetings are held, first with M&A, then with the council, on spatial policy in De Bilt. The ideas and suggestions that come forward in those meetings are recorded and elaborated by outside experts into a brochure. Its main author is an urban planner who had been hired temporarily as an external advisor in the beginning of 1996. In the brochure the five most important spatial and infrastructure problems are singled out, and connected to each other. These are:

- the structure of the main roads
- what to do with the ecological corridor south of De Bilt
- the desired location of a business park
- problems in the shopping area Hessen road
- and several problems in the station area in the centre of Bilthoven.

A number of possible alternative solutions are sketched.

The council finds a first version of the brochure 'feeble'. Civil servants, the alderman of spatial planning and the Mayor fear that again the attempt will amount to nothing. It is decided to make the plan subject to an open planning process. The project is put in hands of the Mayor. A civil servant from Spatial Planning is appointed overall project manager. It is hoped that participation of inhabitants will break the stalemate. The brochure is rewritten to serve as kick off for a public discussion. The Institute for Public and Politics (IPP) is hired to help in designing and managing the participatory process.

### 10.1.2. Outline of the Participatory Process

IPP is an institute whose mission is to stimulate political and societal participation. In the second half of the 1990s it started to experiment with designing and managing interactive policy processes. IPP comes up with the process set-up outlined in figure 10.2. In the problem exploration phase, the intention is to surface the ‘agenda of the citizens’, to be put alongside the agenda of M&A presented in the brochure. At the end of this phase, both M&A and the council can add alternatives to the starting-points and solutions offered.

Workshops form the main instrument of the solution elaboration phase. In these workshops representatives of interest groups and unorganised citizens should generate solutions for the problems brought forward during the problem exploration phase. Two rounds of workshops are
to be separated by an interim presentation of preliminary results. After examination of the ideas offered using financial, technical and spatial criteria, the proposals would in the phase of preparation of decision-making be summarised in a 'note of decision points'. Next information should be gained on the support among the population for the alternatives mentioned in the brochure and those developed by the workshops. For this a written survey in the local paper as well as a public discussion should be held.

Figure 10.2: Planned phases of the interactive planning process in De Bilt

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 1 Exploration of the problem</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brochure ‘De Bilt in Motion’ (M&amp;As agenda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consultations with key-persons of De Bilt’s community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion poll among population and suggestion box (citizens’ agenda)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public start conference (stock-taking of problems, descriptions of problems to be elaborated on and indication of possible solutions)</td>
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</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 2 Elaboration of possible solutions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First round workshops (elaboration of ‘starting points’ and possible solutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasibility study of the various proposals and public presentation of interim results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second round workshops (making a list of decision-points)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final presentation of proposals (transference meeting)</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 3 Preparation of decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Summarise decision points based on the workshops’ results</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representative poll of public opinion on/support for these results among the population</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase 4 Decision-making</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M&amp;A present final proposal to Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public debate (informal Council meeting)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Decision(s) by Council</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

In the decision-making phase a council-proposal should be made. In this proposal M&As would specify the grounds for taking or leaving certain proposals from the workshops. Before final decision-making by the council a closing debate should take place in which the party groups should elucidate their views on the different solutions. At the same time the court would offer proposals for further elaboration of the plans and for the manner in which the citizens were to be included in the implementation of these.
10.1.3 | ORGANISATION OF THE PROCESS

The process is harnessed with an elaborate project organisation. The groups involved in the 'official' set-up of the interactive process are: core group, steering group, consultation group, working group, expert group+, and sounding-board group. Of these the core group, the steering group and the consultation group have mainly procedural tasks. Their functioning is outlined in Monnikhof et al., 2003, and will not be discussed here.

The working group should deliver substantive information (data, discussion papers, maps, memos and so on) on behalf of the discussions in the workshops and the public meetings. In it civil servants of all departments that should contribute material and/or manpower to the process partake. External advisors are invited when their contribution is desired. In the working group the progress and preparation of the next steps in the process are discussed. It should contribute to making the list of questions for the survey in the first phase and perform necessary additional research. Further, it should make a list of execution measures for the solutions that arise in the workshops, help in preparing the list of decision points and prepare proposals to M&A and the Council. Finally, it should be the conversation partner of IPP in the preparation of information- and training meetings for civil servants participating in or supporting the process. It is supposed to meet every four to six weeks.

The expert group+ is created to deal with substantive questions of rapport between the workshops. Herein, representatives of the various workshops, the chairmen of these workshops (IPP staff members), the project managers and outside experts are to exchange their views on attuning the different workshops.

In the phase of preparation of decision making the expert meeting+ will be expanded with four participants per workshop and turned into a sounding-board group. This group checks whether the workshop representatives can agree to the way the results of the workshop are brought together in one framework. It should contribute to the creation of a combined final document of all workshops in which the definitive alternatives are presented and motivated. It is intended to use the results of the support poll in the third phase in this.

An 'unofficial' group is the so-called traffic model group. Its goal is to map the traffic effects of the solutions suggested by the different workshops. In it representatives of the different workshops can ask traffic-related questions to an expert, who will run them through his traffic model. The participants then would report back the findings of this to their workshops.

The political/administrative responsibility for the project lies with the Mayor. For the 'internal' aspects of the project management (concerning the municipal apparatus) the overall project
manager and the urban planner who had authored the brochure are jointly responsible. The overall project manager is responsible for the external project management too.

10.1.4 | EXPLORATION OF THE PROBLEM, MAY 1997 - OCTOBER 1997

The first phase of the process is meant for problem-research and opinion polling, to derive a list of starting points. First the kick-off brochure is made available to the broader public. Next thematic meetings are held in May and June 1997 with roughly 30 ‘key-persons’ of the local community\textsuperscript{45}, to clarify whether there is enough interest in a participatory approach towards the spatial plan. The key persons are also asked what the starting-points for the process and the roles of the diverse parties should be. It is asked which points should be taken along in the process. Participants to a theme group 'societal issues' declare to miss 'people' in the brochure. Based on these consultations IPP prepares a plan of action (Kalk, 1997). After approval of this plan by M&A, the institute starts its preparations for the rest of the process.

In August two opinion polls (a written one in the local free door-to-door newspaper and another one by telephone) are held among citizens to find out which bottlenecks and starting-points citizens and their interest groups find important as a starting-point for the discussions (Felix and Berma, 1997). Politicians, civil servants and representatives of civil organisations administer the survey by phone. Response to both surveys is large, consisting of roughly 10% of the population of the municipality in total.

In September two consultation meetings take place on the centre area, one with entrepreneurs and one with other inhabitants of the centre area.

The exploration phase ends with a 'start conference' in October to kick-off the solution design phase. The conference serves several purposes:
• to discuss the problem inventory;
• to determine which topics should be elaborated further;
• to indicate directions in which to look for solutions,
• to offer a final opportunity to propose new topics for the agenda
• to translate all agendas into concrete topics for the workshops
• and to get people interested in participating in the workshops.
Roughly 450 citizens attend. The results of the surveys are presented and discussed. The different problem areas are explicated. Citizens could add topics and value their importance. At the end of the evening more than 150 people sign up for participation in the workshops.

\textsuperscript{45} Mostly representing different interest groups
10.1.5 | ELABORATION OF POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS, NOVEMBER 1997-MARCH 1998

In this phase two rounds of workshop meetings take place, as well as meetings of the consultation group, meetings of the expert group and of the traffic model group. Between the two workshop rounds there is a break in which research takes place. At the end of this break the interim results of the workshops are presented to the public.

The workshops should generate alternatives for the problems brought forward during the previous phase, using the starting points also resulting from this phase. For most workshops in total seven sessions take place, led by IPP process managers. A civil servant, the project leader within the civil service, supports them organisationally.

The assignment in the first round of workshop sessions is to develop possible alternatives, departing from the agenda that had been composed on the start conference. For this first a number of starting points has to be developed. Originally, six workshops are intended. Four cover a specific area of the municipality, two are concerned with generic topics. As the start conference confirms that ‘people’ are missed in the issues covered by the planned workshops, IPP and the municipality add another generic workshop, ‘People’.

The workshop Centre area: first round

I will focus here on the main ‘geographical’ workshop, dealing with the centre area of the municipality and the ‘hottest’ topic of the whole process, the unsafe railway crossing in the centre of Bilthoven, reputedly the most unsafe crossing in the country. A solution for the safety problems is deemed pressing. Tied to this are issues about noise pollution and plans about redeveloping the square in front of the station and changing the configuration of the shopping area adjacent to this square. The importance attached to this workshop is underlined by the fact that the director of IPP manages it. The overall project manager for the whole participatory project and several outside experts support him. Chief among the latter is the urban planner. Finally, next to the thematic workshop ‘Mobility’ it is the workshop with most substantive links to other workshops. For the workshop there are six meetings planned.

In the first round, three meetings take place. In the first the starting-points for the centre area are discussed and added to. Also is a delegation appointed for the consultation group and traffic model group. In the second meeting alternatives for the railway crossing are discussed and pre-selected. Also, participants think up questions for the private parties that will appear next time and think up interfaces with other workshops. The third meeting is dedicated to brainstorming on the development of the centre area. Wishes and demands with respect to this area should be mapped. Private parties also present their views on this development.

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46 Landscape Corridor/De Bilt-South, Station area/Bilthoven-Centre (Hereafter: Centre area), Business park/De Bilt-west and Hessen road
47 Mobility, traffic and transport, and Building, living and environment
The research break
In December ’97 and January 1998 civil servants and outside experts assess the solutions created on their spatial and technical feasibility. For Centre area this means the different options for the railway crossing are assessed. A separate study into the consequences of doubling the railway track in combination with a possible deepened construction for the track itself takes place. In this study three alternatives are looked into, respectively broadening on ground level, broadening in a deepened construction (roofed over or not), and construction of an extra bored tunnel, at which the existing track remains on ground level.

The interim public meeting
On 22 January 1998 the interim public meeting takes place, at which over 400 people show up. The meeting intends to inform a broad public and M&A in which direction is looked for solutions, give opportunity to react to the interim results, and have councillors give a first reaction to the course of the discussion. Representatives of the workshops present the solutions taken stock of up till then to councillors, the media, and the broader public.

The workshop Centre area: second round
The second round of meetings should work as a rapport - and end phase. Workshop members should discuss the consequences of proposed starting-points/measures, the dilemmas surfaced in this way (based on rapport questions and results of study) and assess the solutions by means of criteria on technical and spatial feasibility. Also, they should achieve rapport between the different workshops. The discussion points that will be presented to the council will be discussed. From this a ‘list of decision points’ should result for each workshop, to be discussed in the last workshop meeting.

The second round of meetings starts with a meeting in which the results of the two relevant studies in the research break are presented and discussed. Also options with respect to the development of the centre area are worked out and their advantages and disadvantages enumerated. Additional alternatives are presented. In the following meeting four plans developed for the area are discussed. An advisor of the shopkeepers, a representative of a mayor supermarket chain, and a representative of a project developer are interviewed on their views and these are discussed. In the final and sixth meeting a draft report of the outcomes of the workshop, drafted by the process manager, is discussed.

The transference meeting
In March local elections take place. After this a so-called ‘transference meeting’ takes place, in which a memo of the state of affairs so far, a ‘transference document’, is symbolically transferred
from the old to the new council. It is concluded that the planned opinion poll among De Bilt's
inhabitants has to show whether the proposals are broadly supported.

10.1.6 | PREPARATION OF DECISION MAKING, MARCH 1998 - SEPTEMBER 1998

In this phase the workshop results should be summarised into ‘decision points’ for the council.
The expert group+ is turned into a sounding-board group, to function as consultative structure
for this process. The support of the population for the alternatives formulated by the workshops
and those formulated earlier by M&A in the kick-off brochure should be assessed by means of a
survey, the support poll, in the local paper. Finally, a closing debate (originally planned in the
decision making phase), should close off this phase.
But at a meeting of the consultation group in April Mayor and councillors declare to cancel the
support poll, for a variety of reasons. This decision leads to the overall project manager in May
deciding to call in sick. He does not return for the remainder of the process.
After a period of weeks in which confusion abounds on how to proceed further, M&A suggest
presenting the results of the workshops and the contents of the concept Council-decision to the
larger public with an exhibition in September that would be opened at the national 'municipality
day'. At this day it will be possible for citizens to offer reactions on the plans. The other parties
accept this suggestion. IPP will further develop this proposal with the municipality, and make
other recommendations for finalising the open planning process.

Preparation of the final document
In April the urban planner receives an assignment to write a first version of the final document.
When this is finished the overall project manager, then still in function, finds this written too
much 'from his professional expertise'. It has to be adapted. After the project manager is
replaced by an interim project manager, the latter takes over responsibility for the final
document. After consulting M&A and helped by the town clerk he finishes it.

Two times, in June and August, the sounding-board group is convened to speak out on the
developing texts of the final document. They can comment on the correctness of the way in the
workshop results are processed, but not on a chapter presenting the standpoints of M&A.

Presentation of the results
On September 19th, municipality-day, the 'other' workshop participants, councillors and the
broader public get the opportunity to react to the final document. An exposition with the results
remains for inspection in the town hall for ten days. On the last day of the exposition a public
debate is held to close off the process.
10.1.7 DECISION MAKING, OCTOBER 1998 – DECEMBER 1998

After the public debate, the interim project manager and M&A rewrite the concept Council-decision into a definitive document. From the definitive document two main outlines for policy and 33 decision points are derived. For the Centre Area these decision points entail to keep on pleading with national government for bringing the railroad track underground by means of a bored tunnel, and starting a study into the possibilities to improve the traffic safety of slow traffic by means of a tunnel for slow traffic. No measures will be taken to improve congestion for car traffic at the railroad crossing for five years. A development plan will be made for the Centre area. The proposal with 33 decision-points is approved by the Council without any amendments on December 17th 1998.

10.2 THE CASE JUDGED BY THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Was the welfare of all parties involved served by its outcomes?

If not, who won and who lost?

The main outcome of the process was a council-proposal, determined by the council. This council-proposal was so vague its effects on welfare of anyone would be minor by any measure. Only in the process of concretely filling in the different development plans the real substantive value of the process, and its effect on welfare, could be determined. In a more general sense one could say the participants to the process were losers, since the costs of their efforts were not translated into specific substantive gains, because the end result of the process is so vague. But participation to the process in itself might bring benefits, for instance information on topics of interest (Mayer et al, 2002, 2005).

The vagueness of the council-proposal makes it hard to pinpoint losers of it. But spatial policy will be made in De Bilt in the coming years. New developments plans for the four areas of the four geographic workshops were already underway before the process started, and continued thereafter. That at least some parties feared welfare loss by these developments was outlined by an incident shortly after the process. When in December 1998 plans for the business area were discussed in an open meeting of one of the parties in the council, neighbours of the planned business area reacted shocked to the plans. They were taken by surprise by them, had totally missed the open planning process. They opposed the plans, since these would diminish their welfare. A green and spacious area nearby would be turned into a business area.

The original overall project manager regards the final product as so vague that it is unclear what the administration will do with the results of the workshops
**Were those expected to loose from decisions compensated for their losses?**

In nearly all workshops *possible* losers might be pinpointed from options discussed, because they would experience more traffic nuisance, be hindered in expansion possibilities, and so on. Compensation for these (possible) losers of the process was not discussed. But as outlined in 7.6, for some of the welfare loss regulations exist, that compensate damage to property values by changes of zoning plans. This did not cover all losses, however.

**Were all affected by (proposed) decisions allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision?**

Everyone could participate to the process. But participants were not supposed to explicitly defend, or even state, their interests, or the gains or losses they expect from suggestions, let alone negotiate on these. They should proceed from a public interest viewpoint. Nevertheless, some participants did express their interests explicitly. Most participants during the introduction round in the first meeting of the workshop Centre Area declared to be present 'on behalf of' some group or interest. Some were explicitly asked by their 'constituency' to represent them in the process. Some declared they would try to involve or at least inform that constituency during the process. But nothing was done during the process with the interest statements that were made.

**Table 10.1: normative evaluation of the case**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Normative measuring-rod</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>-</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
10.3
THE INTERMEDIATE FACTORS

Comprehensiveness

The process did deal with a broad spectre of topics, even broadened more after the start conference, when ‘People’ were added as a topic. But the topics dealt with were confined to De Bilt. Relevant topics in the neighbouring municipality Maartensdijk were insufficiently taken into account. Next, the process was still too much a ‘spatial planning project’, taking fields like environmental issues insufficiently into account. During the workshops and public meetings participants and councillors from time to time asked attention for specific aspects not taken into consideration. Finally, in some workshops the wealth of topics dealt with proved impossible to handle, meaning that inside the spectre some aspects were neglected (0).

During the process integration proved the big bottleneck. The kick-off brochure attempted to provide an integrated overview. Unfortunately it was the last integrated document for the whole field during the process. In the final document integration also was not achieved. Many involved missed coherence in the results. The decision-points decided upon by the council were all separate points. No decision on a comprehensive structure for the municipality (although the process should contribute to a structure plan) was taken (-).

Score: -

Efficiency

The process exceeded its budget with roughly 50% and its deadline with 9 months. This was caused among other things by an increase in the number of workshop sessions, much additional study and many more process management hours of IPP. The process cost civil servants a lot of time. Some succumbed to the pressure, called in ill during the process and did not return. After the process, they saw the added work pressure as the biggest disadvantage of the process. Participants also spent on average nine hours per month on ‘homework’ for the process, aside from attending the workshops and public meetings (0).

All this might be simply due to the unexpectedly high participation of almost 200 participants. The massive amounts of paper to be sent to everyone, organisational improvisation demanded and so on, meant that a small number of people had to work very hard. So the main explanation for the budget override as well as planning problems with the process might be just unwarranted optimism with IPP and the unexpectedly high participation.

But this is not all. Many participants doubted the point of activities in the final workshops. They got the feeling that towards the end of the process everything became diffuse and fuzzy, and steps were repeated. According to them a final document could have been created sooner.
So, analytical inefficiency seems to have been present as well (-).
But this was not due to an overflow of information provided, since only 6% of the participants surveyed found they received too much information prior to the separate workshops, and only 3% found they received too much information during the workshops (+).

Score: -

**Representativeness**
When before the workshops civil servants and IPP found those that had entered for participation not to represent all relevant interests, another 50 inhabitants of De Bilt were asked to participate. But despite this participation to the process was far from representative. Many participants had long-standing contacts with the municipality, either as member of an interest group, on a personal title or even as former councillor. Many had enjoyed college or academic education, and were elderly and affluent white males. Since higher and lower incomes were said to be often diametrically opposed towards each other in the municipality (and the results of the surveys before the process showed signs of this), this raises doubt about the representativeness of the outcomes of the process for the population as a whole. At the transference meeting participants of several workshops admitted that the outcomes might not be representative for the ideas of the population as a whole (-).

The lack of explicit acknowledgement of and attention paid to different interests by the process management led to some groups or interests being overrepresented. They dominated the course and outcomes of the workshops. Also, under the veil of ‘public interest’ hanging over the process, some participants saw an opportunity to further their interest. In Centre Area the residents’ association called Bithoven North performed an own multi-criteria analysis of the alternatives for the railway crossing, by which it tried to influence the course of discussions in the workshop. Its members were allowed to present their criteria first and the results of the analysis later in the workshop (-).

The support poll could have corrected imbalances of representation in the process. Its purpose was to gain more insight in how the broader population thought on the decision-points coming out of the workshops. But it was cancelled. The public meetings were another possibility to correct representation imbalances. But nearly all discussants on these evenings were also workshop participants. Finally, the council also could perform a role in correcting unbalances in the process’ representativeness. In the workshops a few councillors participated, and the council decided on the outcomes of the process. Participating councillors could bring forward the interests of those not, or not very well represented. But most councillors mainly listened during the workshops. Distorted representativeness in the process was even exemplified through the
councillors, since those lobbying with councillors outside the process were also usually the ones most active inside the process, like Bilthoven-North (-).

Important interests were also underrepresented, mainly the railroads and commercial parties without whom most developments discussed would be impossible. They appeared in the workshops, but only to give presentations and answer questions, not as ‘full’ participants (-).

Score: -

**Competence**

The participants seemed competent enough in a general sense. 75% of them had enjoyed college or academic education. Many possessed relevant expertise. Among them were consultants, university teachers, civil engineers (specialised in traffic), doctors, and so on. Many participants also perceived themselves or the organisations they belonged to as possessing relevant expertise, and saw their role as contributing expertise to achieve useful solutions. Some belonged to organisations specialised in contributing ideas to the municipality, like an unofficial traffic think-tank. Several outside experts acknowledged the high level of knowledge among participants. After the process, participants regretted no more use was made of the expertise of specific participants present.

During the process most participants showed competence in discussing, developing alternatives. Some even performed their own multi-criteria-analysis or drawing technical drawings or maps, occasionally (+).

Whether participants are able to play a competent role in the process also depends on whether they know enough of the specifics of the process. Their competence with respect to the specific process at hand was less clear, largely because they were in the dark on many aspects of this process. In interviews just before the start conference all parties suffered from a lack of clarity on the type of outcomes the process aimed for. Even within the process management there was no clear picture of what a ‘list of decision points’ exactly entailed. This remained unclear during the process. Participants also did not know whether constraints had been set to the process49. Participants (and civil servants and councillors) were in the dark before the process on the process set-up and intended process course. Most were unclear on the steps that would be gone through, the intended method of working50, how much time the process would cost, how much ‘homework’ it would take. Some participants to the workshops did not know the timing of the process and number of workshops planned, or what would happen in them. Halfway the process it was still insufficiently clear to 55% of those surveyed how the interactive process would proceed. Only 58% of participants was halfway the process aware that rules of the game had

49 In fact, no constraints had been put to any of the workshops
50 For instance, would there be subgroups, et cetera
been drafted for participants to the process. Despite all the information provided during the process, a lack of clarity on procedural/organisational issues remained. The analytical purpose of the different forums in the process was also unclear before the process to many. The intention of the talks with key persons was unclear beforehand. What for example the workshops were expected to do exactly was not clear to civil servants as well as participants. It was not clear to many what the intention or nature of specific meetings was. During the last meetings, sometimes an agenda was missing, by which it was unclear whether all topics to be dealt with were indeed discussed. Some participants were even unsure on matters like the reason for the interactive policy-process and who was actually steering it (-).

Score: 0

**Negotiation**

In the participatory process there was to be no negotiation. At its background, negotiations took place in secret between the municipality and private parties like the railroads and a large retailer. An example of this are the contacts between the overall project manager and the Head-Engineer Director of RWS on the budget RWS was prepared to fund for a solution for the railway crossing provide a clear example. In these talks the budget was raised from 35 to 50 million. Since the results of these negotiations in general were not reported back to participants to the workshop, it can not be assessed whether they would be pleased with them.

Score: -

**Flexibility**

The unexpectedly high interest in the process of the population necessitated several forms of flexibility. An important part of this was organisational. The unexpectedly high interest in the process was rapidly and effectively handled in booking extra and larger rooms and so on, but not for example translated in splitting up too sizable workshops, like Mobility (o). The process setup was adapted several times, but this was mostly not in response to developments external to the process, but in response to insufficient progress during it, necessitating extra workshops, for example (o). During the process in Centre Area participants are displeased they do not receive requested cost estimates, among other the costs of bringing the railroad track underground, the central topic in the workshop (-).

Score: 0
Trust
Trust was the weak spot in the process. During the process there was distrust with many participants that their contributions would be taken seriously. Throughout the whole process it was unclear to a majority of participants (and civil servants) what would happen to outcomes after the process. The interim presentation further damaged trust in this respect. Councillors were reluctant to speak out on what they think of the interim results, and what they would do with the final outcomes. Politicians and administrators were suspected of having a 'hidden agenda'. A major blow for trust was the cancellation of the support poll. Participants took this as a sign that the council did not appreciate the citizens' contribution and wanted to ignore it. Some civil servants believed the limited participation of the administration in the process was a sign that they wished to retain the right to deviate from its results. Distrust is persistent during the process. Halfway the process, 51% of the participants expects no or only a minor influence of the results from the process on decision making (-).

A sign of this distrust is the resistance the kick-off brochure evoked among participants as well as councillors. It was considered steering. It evoked the feeling that M&A already knew what they wanted, and choices had already been made. The wordings in the brochure, with sentences like 'the standpoint of M&A is', strengthened this feeling. Another sign is the fact that some participants found it questionable that the municipality itself, not IPP, supplied the questions for the survey held before the workshops. They found these questions amenable to manipulation (-).

The outside experts involved were attacked heavily sometimes, mainly because their independence was questioned. They were seen as siding with the municipality. Several participants even assumed the urban planner supporting Centre Area was a civil servant. Participants accused him at one point of being too subjective, of representing municipal standpoints, and even of manipulation and misleading. But not all shared this criticism (-).

Experts were also seen to side with their own 'pet solutions'. Participants explicitly noticed favouritism with experts from time to time (-).

Halfway the process, only 27% of the participants typified the performance of the experts as neutral. Nearly 20% saw them acting as representative of the municipality, 16% as speaking as a private person, 16% as defender of their own solutions, and 13% as representative of the interest of their own company. 40% found the experts steered the process to some extent, 31% found they did this fairly or strongly. Half of the participants found this steering objectionable.

Participants interviewed after the process nearly all found the contribution of the outside experts to the process steering. They found that the urban planner, in writing the final brochure, had approved his own plans to a large extent. The final document was said to contain other pleas than those proposed in the workshops (-).

Doubts about the neutrality of the experts involved even led to a counter multi-criteria analyses
performed by Bilthoven-North to challenge the analysis carried out by the experts. It also led to participants seeking outside expertise on their own. One participant, for instance, contacted the Centre for Underground construction, to check the arguments about putting the railway in a tunnel. Others got on a ‘field trip’ to sites where railroad tracks had been put underground, to study the project and obtain the figures they were looking for.

The professional quality of the expertise of the experts involved was also questioned. In how far this can be seen apart from their perceived position is doubtful. In workshops like Mobility and Centre area, the assumptions and findings of experts were questioned heavily and doubts and warnings about feasibility uttered by experts and civil servants in these workshops sometimes were simply brushed away. Participants and councillors also had a very critical attitude towards the methodologies and models used. Most parties doubted the professional qualities of the civil service of De Bilt stronger than that of the experts. Civil servants themselves did not think too highly of their colleagues.

Score: -

**Substantive enrichment**

In the end, no party involved found the results of the process impressive or innovative. Some were disappointed by the lack of concrete outcomes in the final document. The brochure made at the end of the process contained few concrete issues for decision. Of the 33 ‘decision-points’ presented after the process to the council in the council-proposal 19 were general statements on policy from which no concrete action would come forth directly, 7 were announcements of plans to be made, one the announcement of a new study and one point was a concrete action but already announced in the kick-off brochure of the process. Only five of the 33 points were points with some concreteness not in the original kick-off brochure, all in the fields of housing and the green corridor in the south of the municipality. Of these five three were statements that specific actions (like actively purchasing agricultural lands) would not be undertaken or tolerated. Two were statements that specific actions would be tolerated (like building on a specific terrain).

During the process, many participants had come up with a range of expert suggestions for alternatives. The most interesting example of this in the workshop Centre area was the so-called shopkeeper-variant for a railroad tunnel, which was considered feasible and interesting by the experts, and interesting enough by the railroads to be prepared to finance it. It also initially gained much support with other participants to the workshop. But most concrete proposals from the workshops had disappeared in the abstract final document. Innovative suggestions that came forward in the process did not make it into the final decision points. At the end of the

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51 Of the 7 prioritised activities in the brochure six entail the development of further plans for areas of themes of the structure plan.
process participants were promised these more detailed results would be used by civil servants in the elaboration of the plans for the separate areas. But for the time being these more detailed results seemed lost, and whether they will actually be used in the further elaboration depends on individual civil servants, to which the results in their fields were transferred. Participants were very sceptical in how far they expected more specific results to be used later. Although it was intended that towards the end of the process should be looked into follow-up procedures for further participation, that could have guarded this incorporation of more concrete suggestions, this did not happen (-).

Score: -

Table 10.2: overview of presence of the intermediate factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate factors</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the intermediate factor was (almost) fully developed in this case  
0 = the intermediate factor was to some extent present in this case  
- = the intermediate factor was not or hardly present in this case
10.4
THE DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

10.4.1 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS

Have a broad scope

In the preparation phase the project group performed or started exploratory studies. But some relevant aspects were not studied. For instance, the effects and costs of moving the railway track underground were not studied, although it was a foreseeable topic of interest. Now the study had to be performed during the process, and was not finished in time (o).

The addition of a workshop People, to map social aspects of the policy plans, broadened the process focus. In the solution elaboration phase this focus got narrower. Some found the topics too broad and attempted to narrow them, to disentangle the complex web of issues. In the workshop Centre Area civil servants persuaded the process manager to concentrate on the railway track. Some participants regretted that by this the development of the (shopping) area was hardly dealt with. The topic of the railway crossing itself was broadened in so far that also the effects of a possible doubling of the track were studied. On the other hand, consequences for traffic were not dealt with in Centre Area, but in the workshop Mobility (o).

Through the broad array of main topics in the process not all relevant subtopics within the broad problem definition could be dealt with. Also, the large amount of topics dealt with in the process meant that into some relevant topics no studies could be conducted before the process (-).

The process contained arenas at different levels. The meta-arena of the process as a whole dealt with a very broad range of topics in the municipality. Civil servants discussed possibly relevant developments in other arenas at the beginning of the process. For example, there were a number of reasons to take the neighbouring municipality Maartensdijk into account. There was discussion of splitting up this municipality, and its largest part would go to De Bilt. Also, an industrial estate in De Bilt-West was partly located on its territory and Maartensdijk lies in an ecological main structure, which could possibly be connected with De Bilt-South. But, because of the possible splitting up of Maartensdijk, this was politically sensitive and links with Maartensdijk were not taken into account during the workshops (o).

Mentioned also were the municipality of Zeist and the province, both relevant with respect to a green corridor South of De Bilt, topic of the workshop Corridor. Civil servants of Zeist were invited to partake in Corridor, but refused. The province was not contacted (o).
Inside the municipal apparatus other possibly relevant arenas were not taken into account. For example, the cluster environment involved citizens in achieving the local agenda 21, which was not taken into account in the process of making the structure plan (-).

The strong substantive links between most of the workshops were mostly not explored. Relevant discussions in other workshops were not taken into account. Discussion of links was relegated to forums like the expert meeting+. An exception was the workshop Mobility, which through its thematic nature had strong links with most other workshops, and explicitly dealt with for instance the discussion in Centre Area on bringing the railway underground (o).

Score: o

**Integrate and structure**

The kick off brochure provided an informational platform for all to base their efforts upon. It attempted to analyse the most important problems in an integral manner and offered a first attempt towards integral solutions. The exhibitions at the interim meeting in January and in September 1998 also functioned to some extent as integrative informational platforms (+). In the workshops, information was only provided in a scattered way, not tied to a specific document, for instance (-).

The process itself operated as a framework in which the diverging information needed to produce a structure plan (on ecology, traffic patterns, demand for housing, and so on) was brought together in another way than usual, and presented to the participants (+). That some workshops dealt with a geographical area, others with specific themes, combined with the broad range of topics, led to diverging input needs, as well as widely diverging (interim) results. Whereas some workshops came up with relatively detailed maps, others came up with separate alternatives, criteria, guidelines or general principles. In February and March 1998 a working group of outside experts made scenarios in an attempt to bring this diverging information together in one framework. But these were only made for three separate problem areas, not for the whole process, and turned down by M&A (-).

Most means of achieving substantive integration were organisational. The views, wishes and suggestions of participants were added to the normal information applying to the creation of a structure plan. The way in which municipal information was brought together also differed. One of the tasks of the working group of civil servants was to attune the activities of the different departments, services and outside experts. But it functioned poorly, because the project managers did not co-operate well with the overall project manager (-).
Halfway the process a weekly consultation of the project managers of the civil service was established. Here first contacts with respect to rapport between workshops should be made and 'signals picked up'. This consultation also did not function well (-).

The urban planner who co-authored the brochure was explicitly charged with guarding rapport. He co-managed the municipal side of the project. He was responsible for rapport between the different disciplines, advisors and workshops and supposed to function as a sounding-board for the project managers. He filled in his role by sometimes calling meetings of all experts involved, or of some experts on a specific issue (+).

**Workshop participants could formulate questions related to interfaces with other workshops.** These questions were dealt with in the expert meeting+. Outside experts could also signal questions of rapport. In the expert meeting+ also requests for study into these issues of interference between workshop themes could be put to civil servants and to participants of other workshops. In this way could be looked into which proposals should be attuned. In practice the large amount of time spent on updating each other, and large number of participants to the expert meeting that all wanted to have a say, left little time for rapport/integration. The varying abstraction level of the (interim) workshop results complicated integration. The intended analysis of rapport questions for dilemmas/points of conflict between the workshops did not happen (-).

The experts had other venues to achieve rapport. During the solution phase they met in the framework of studies undertaken. Meetings with the project managers of the civil service also took place, and bilateral contacts between experts and/or project managers (+).

The process did not have a central access point to relevant information sources. There was no overview of those sources, of studies carried out or planned, or a physical room where documents could be studied. The two exhibitions during the process were only temporary, presented only a selection of the (interim) results of the workshops, and did not provide access to relevant reports et cetera. During the process several studies were announced or referred to, but not provided to participants. Nor was mentioned where these could be obtained or inspected, or at which date studies were expected to be finished (-).

Information on problems, solutions and parties was not provided in one framework. Starting-points were not linked to specific parties. A list of participants was made, but not handed out to the participants themselves (-).

The traffic model group supported all workshops. The model used for this group calculated traffic effects for suggestions in the different workshops. But calculation of effects of suggestions in one workshop for traffic in another workshop did not take place (-).
Some integration of discussions in different workshops was achieved on a personal level. Since the meetings of the different workshops not all took place on the same evenings, some participants took part in two workshops. This was most common with respect to the workshops Mobility and Centre Area. It led for example to alternatives from one workshop being transplanted to or influenced by another workshop. In the third meeting of Centre Area one of the new solutions presented came from the workshop Mobility. And a ‘short, low’ tunnel presented in the fourth workshop of Centre area by a participant to both workshops, built upon the decrease in car mobility the workshop Mobility occupied itself with. Another example of the integrating working of this double membership happened when in Centre Area a member that was also a member of Mobility stated that the participants to Mobility would want the railway track to be put in a deepened construction. They asked the participants to Centre Area to express a clear preference for that solution (+).

There were also many personal cross-links on the level of experts, civil servants and participants between the supporting groups, contributing to some integration (+).

Score: -

10.4.2 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO EFFICIENCY

Avoid overlap in analytical activities

In the process several analytical activities overlapped either through time, or were carried out at several locations. For instance, starting-points were derived from the talks with key persons, the surveys before the process, consultation talks before the start conference, the start conference, and in the first session of the workshops (-).

The existence of thematic and geographical workshops, without a clear task division between them, resulted in overlap in the issues discussed and activities the workshops performed. This was especially evident between Mobility, Hessen Road and Centre Area (-).

The second workshop round was held to achieve rapport between the workshops and assess alternatives on feasibility. But IPP did not want to select solutions during the workshops (although a rather fuzzy selection takes place in the creation of the list of decision points at the end of the workshops). This meant that little was done with the assessments made. The intention of the last series of workshops to achieve rapport between the workshops was not achieved properly also, for one thing because the expert group+ functioned poorly (-).

Score: -
Provide no superfluous information
Only 6% of the participants surveyed found they received too much information prior to the separate workshops, and only 3% found they received too much information during the workshops. 82% of the participants found the information received useful. In other phases participants also did not complain of receiving too much or useless information (+). Doubt can be harboured at the presentations during the workshop meetings. Especially those of the experts regularly exceeded their time limit. This had the effect that there was at some workshops only a limited amount of time for own activity by the participants. Not the information itself was superfluous, but its presentation could have been more concise (-).

Score: 0

Focus on pragmatic aspects
A deviation from a pragmatic focus on results was the tendency of the process managers to keep the process ‘playful’ and ‘fun’. Artists present to draw and present cartoons were an example of this. But this was minor. On average discussions were to the point (+). An exception to this is the workshop People, which did not reach beyond very general discussions and recommendations. This could partly be blamed on its broad focus (-).

Score: 0

10.4.3 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO REPRESENTATIVENESS

Identify (the position of) relevant parties
Prior to the talks with key figures, consultation talks, the start conference and the workshops, attention was given to identifying the parties most relevant to the process. This was no explicit analysis of which parties would be affected, but more implicitly based on knowledge of the municipality with civil servants, experience with previous processes, and so on. No list of possible relevant parties was made. During the agenda-setting stage, the involvement of citizens and interest groups was not used to adapt the view on interests involved (o).

Score: 0

Pay attention to representativeness
Representativeness of participants was not explicitly mapped. But when before the workshops civil servants and IPP found those that have entered for participation not to represent all
relevant interests, extra consultations were implemented to make an inventory of people and representatives of organisations that could contribute the missing representation (o).

Workshops participants were not selected. Participants to forums like the consultation group, selected themselves. For example, at the last meeting of Centre Area a member of Bilthoven-North stated that the editorial commission to supervise the writing of the final conclusions should be composed of people with a constituency of some size and mentioned names. The proposed participants agreed. No check was made upon their real representativeness (-).
One of the things influencing this self-selection was the timing of meetings. The meetings of the expert meeting + and later of the sounding-board group, for instance, took place at the end of the afternoon, which meant working people had a hard time partaking (-).
Finally, there was no mapping of who quit the process halfway. It was agreed that no new participants would be allowed to participate after the interim public meeting (-).

The reliance on discussion meant participants less verbally gifted, or shyer, had less influence. This was partially remedied by supplying other means of exercising influence, like valuing discussion points by means of stickers, which happened for instance during the start conference. From time to time the process managers or project manager explicitly asked for the opinion of the more silent participants. But the unpredictable and changeable way the results of these exercises were used diminished this influence again (o).

Score: -

10.4.4 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPETENCE

Provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives
Participants were not trained or in any way educated before the process. But before as well as after the process no participant expressed a desire for such training. They had sufficient confidence in their own knowledge and capacities (o).
Early in the process civil servants attended a presentation by IPP on the outline of the process. But they were not trained in skills necessary for a participatory process (like presenting information). Neither were the outside experts (-).
Finally, no incentives for participation were provided to participants (-).

Score: -
Give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise

Much analytical capacity was provided to participants. Outside experts, most already hired to work on development plans for the separate problem areas, were notified their projects would be part of the process. Additional experts were engaged to support the process. Civil servants were present at every workshop. Most workshops had one or more outside experts present to support the sessions. Expertise is also broadly provided outside the workshops. All workshops could use the traffic model group to have calculations performed on traffic options. The results of this were next fed back into the workshops. Workshops also could have studies carried out by outside experts or request information from civil servants (+).

Civil servants in the process core, like the overall project manager and communication advisor, spend nearly all their time on the open planning process. Outside experts were hired, but only could perform part of the extra work, and their supervision also took up time. The urban planner was supposed to function as a sounding-board for the project managers, but was not used as such. Civil servants in the ‘second ring’ resisted the extra work. They were not keen on co-operating when something had to be sorted out, since this was at the expense of their regular duties. The project managers of the separate workshops were supposed to provide input on their workshops to the final document, but this did not amount to much (-).

The presence of analytical capacity does not necessarily mean it fulfils what is expected of it. Participants, when surveyed during the process, mainly would like civil servants to provide information (96%), answer questions (76%) and indicate the feasibility of proposals (55%). In practice civil servants seemed somewhat more reticent. In practice 76% found civil servants indeed performed the role of information provider, 63% saw them answering questions, and only 28% saw civil servants indicating the feasibility of proposals (0).

The outside experts were supposed to support civil servants as well as citizens. Experts should provide mainly substantive knowledge to participants, civil servants information on the project. Whereas no less than 98% of the participants surveyed found it a good thing that experts were present at the workshops, only 31% of the participants typified the way experts performed their task in the workshops as reasonable or good, against 69% mediocre or bad. Somewhat in contrast to this, 94% found the contribution of experts valuable nevertheless (0).

The private parties invited to the workshops were another source of outside expertise. Participants as well as councillors saw these parties as a possible check upon the feasibility of ideas. The real estate part of the railroads presented its views on the area. NS-RIB took part in the workshops to look into the technical feasibility of proposals, as well as among others the owner of the shopping centre in the area and a project developer. But they did not give away much information. After the process, participants declared to be disappointed by the limited
substantive contribution of the railroads and the project developers. They would have liked them to indicate for example what they considered the best solution. In general participants would have liked to see a more informative and open attitude of the market parties present (0).

Score: 0

**Provide sufficient information to enable participation**

The different groups involved in the process received much information. The broader public received information on the main developments in the local paper, through newsletters and the public meetings. The civil servants supposed to contribute actively to the process were informed in the working group meetings. The project managers were supposed to inform each other in the second half of the process in a weekly meeting. Councillors were invited to visit the public meetings and IPP explicated the coming process in a separate meeting before the process. Several councillors participated in the workshops, and therefore received the same information as other participants. The usual parties the municipality contacts in policy development on spatial and infrastructure issues were contacted to receive information from, or give information to in informal contacts with civil servants. Representatives were invited to partake and present their views in the process (+).

But the key persons received little information before their meetings. They got the brochure on the meeting. Between the start conference and the workshops information was send to those who had registered for a workshop. During the workshop phase participants received before the meetings substantive information as well as the agenda of the meetings. At the meetings presentations on substantive issues were given. Information on the process set-up, goal, agenda and intention of specific meetings was provided at the start of the evening. At the end of the evening information was provided on the process-steps in the next periods. Extensive procedural information was discussed with a sub-set of participants in the consultation group, and presented to other participants at the beginning and end of workshop sessions (0).

In the expert meeting + and the consultation group differences surfaced in information available to the different workshops. Whereas one workshop had ready-to-use memorandums available, other workshops experienced delay because of a lack of information. Through research questions they could supply the deficiency, but this did cost extra time (0).

Before the workshops civil servants knew the global set-up of start conference and workshops, but not what exactly would happen during them, or who would be allowed to partake. The structure of the process, with all its groups, was unclear to many of them. The information received was considered to be not very detailed on the process course (-).

Most participants were reasonably satisfied with the information they received in the early
phase of the process. The brochure was found clear (+).
The lack of clarity before the process on many issues led to diverging expectations about the process. IPP expected 'concrete results', which it did not specify. The citizens expected decisions on concrete issues, as did the aldermen and council. The Mayor and the outside experts seemed to expect mainly choices on outlines, which the latter should further elaborate. The civil servants expected differences in gradation between the workshops. For some more concrete, for some more global options were expected (-).

A bottleneck was the timeliness of information provided. 43% of participants surveyed and a majority of participants interviewed after the process were discontent about receiving information too late. The information provided to the workshop participants usually arrived just before, if not at or even after the meeting for which it was intended. Organisational problems at the town hall caused this. This led to regular complaints in the different process forums on information received too late, and preparation being hampered by this (-).

At several consultation group meetings an immediate reaction to information received very late or even handed out on the spot was asked. Members would have liked to see the information earlier to be able to study it carefully to formulate a well-founded opinion (-).
Also the party groups received their information late. For example, the information they were supposed to react to on the interim presentation of January 22d was received only a few days beforehand, as well as the questions formulated by the workshops for the councillors. Finally, also civil servants complained about receiving information late (-).

In contrast, the quality of the substantive information received was appreciated well. Nearly all former participants, as well as councillors, were (very) satisfied when interviewed after the process about the quality and usefulness of the substantive information received (+).

The great (time) pressure the process put on the project organisation meant sometimes errors were made in the information provided. For example, during the transference meeting it turned out the reports of several workshops were incomplete or outdated versions (-).

Score: 0

*Translate information into a usable format*

The information provided on the evenings was given in the form of presentations, pages handed out, and so on. Much of the information in the process was presented verbally at the beginning of the evenings. Sometimes copies of transparencies were handed out.

How to present information was left to the experts, and not checked upon beforehand.
This led at times to amateurish presentations, hard to follow and thereby hampering the process.
At several occasions the experts presented unreadable transparencies or pictures (-). 27% of respondents to the survey found the information provided on paper not understandable, 67% found it understandable at times and not at others, and only 3% found all information understandable without qualification (-)
Occasionally experts used jargon or abbreviations incomprehensible to the average participant, or kept a story on a too high abstraction level for non-experts. But the process manager was bend on checking whether participants knew and understood presentations given. Participants themselves also asked for explanation of jargon from time to time (+).

Score: -

10.4.5 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO NEGOTIATION

Have a stakeholder/interest focus
The process did not start from the acknowledgement of specific interests. Since IPP wanted to achieve a broad societal participation, and the municipality wanted support for proposals, IPP was bent on identifying and trying to involve a broad spectre of inhabitants of De Bilt. The municipality was bent on participation of all actors that might be useful or even necessary in achieving its goals, or might be a hindrance when not involved (o).

There was a lack of differentiation of information with respect to the different participant groups. The information given during the process was the same for all interests partaking. There was no attention to the possibility that different groups of participants might need different information. Similarly, it was not considered if different groups in the wider population might have been interested in different information (-).

Effects are not attributed to specific groups and there was no attention paid to interests that might be specifically hurt or benefited. Aside from a short statement of their reasons for partaking at the beginning of the first workshop, parties were also never asked to outline their specific interests or the way they might be affected by the plan (-).

Score: -

Map possibilities for negotiation
Possibilities for negotiation between workshop participants were not mapped. Negotiations between the municipality and private parties were also not supported by explicit analysis.

Score: -
10.4.6 | GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO FLEXIBILITY

Make analysis a standby facility
It was attempted during the process to have analytical capacity operate as a standby facility for participants. IPP aimed for studies into measures to be realised soon enough to meet the planning of the workshops (+).
It was tried to have questions participants asked during the workshops answered by civil servants on the basis of existing information, or outside experts by means of studies. There was a break halfway the workshops to perform studies (which was prolonged because more time turned out necessary). A specific forum in this respect was the traffic model group, which functioned well in providing traffic estimates on questions by participants (+).
The standby nature of analysis was not flawless. At several occasions information provided by civil servants took a long time, as did several studies. This meant answers found could not always be of use any more to participants, since they were provided too late. An example of this was the study into the alternatives for the railway crossing in Centre area, which was only finished after the process (-).

Score: 0

Make analysis continuously adaptable
The analytical results were on average not very adaptable. The process was based on a stage-model type set-up with four stages: assessing the (problem) situation first, then determining starting-points for the alternatives/plan to be developed, making the alternatives/plans and deciding on them. Once a stage was concluded, its products were fixed. Once the elements of the problem situation had been uncovered and valued, and starting-points determined, these were no longer up for discussion or alteration. This limited analytical flexibility. Studies were one-time events, of which results were presented. No feedback of participants was invited halfway studies to steer their further development, nor was worked with several versions of reports, to adapt them to growing insight or changing demands or circumstances (-).

In advance there was too much optimism on the activities that could be performed in the workshop sessions, so activities were spread out over more meetings during the process. In this sense the scheduling of analytical activity by the participants to the workshops was adaptable, but only by the process managers and civil servants, not by participants (o).

Score: -
10.4.7 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO TRUST

Be transparent

The process dealt with some topics for which the preparation of development plans had already started, and/or contacts existed with relevant private parties. This led to contacts outside the process between aldermen, civil servants and experts and these private parties. These mostly had to do with the topics of the 'geographical' workshops. Sometimes these contacts were made known. But requests to provide participants with a list of market parties with whom the municipality was talking were refused. In the kick-off brochure for the process there was no information on agreements and talks between the municipality and private parties, for example NS, or on what the plans of NS with the track and/or crossing were (o). Other contacts were hidden from participants, even though these at times were crucial for the possibilities in the workshops, since in those situations the market parties determined to a great extent the feasibility of proposed solutions. The contacts between the overall project manager and the Head-Engineer Director of RWS on the budget RWS was prepared to fund for a solution for the railway crossing provide a clear example. In these talks the budget was raised from 35 to 50 million, but this was not reported to the workshop (o).

In the workshops market parties were present, for example in the third session of the workshop Centre area. But they remained very vague on their exact intentions and interests, and did not mention concrete plans or figures (o).

Some information was held back from the municipal apparatus, at least temporarily, for participants. An example of this was a feasibility study for the business area in De Bilt West. This study was presented to the workshop only months after it was finished (o).

After the transference meeting development of the council-proposal took place out of sight of most former participants, with the exception of those in the sounding-board group. For months no information was send to other participants. They were updated on the meetings or exhibition in September 1998 but then could not exercise influence on the council-proposal any more. Thereafter the former participants were dependent on the normal public announcements for information on the course of the proposals (o).

During the process some of the experts tried to open up the black box of their expertise. The traffic expert involved with Mobility explained the workings of his traffic model, that was used in making the brochure 'De Bilt in Motion', and would also be used in the interactive process, on several occasions, for example during a meeting of the commission on spatial planning in September 1997 and the first meeting of the traffic model group. At these occasions he also made explicit the uncertainties in the model.
The urban planner among other things involved with Centre Area at several occasions went to great lengths in trying to be transparent on his assumptions, criteria and methodology used, and so on. He explained the information given and the kick off brochure. He put all plans and suggestions he presented up for questioning (+).

Score: 0

**Have procedures for reaching agreement on status of information**

There were no explicit procedures for reaching agreement on the status of information in the process. Information and ideas brought forward by experts, and information and ideas brought forward by participants were treated differently. Participants were allowed to present their views, ideas and alternatives to the other participants, but they were not supported by professional drawings. For instance during the second workshop, after a presentation of alternatives for the railway crossing by the urban planner, five participants were allowed to elucidate their alternatives. Most of the alternatives presented, except the one of the shopkeeper, did not reach beyond the idea stage. A participant remarked on the imbalance in the way of presentation of the 8 alternatives thought up earlier (on paper) and the alternatives brought forward by participants. Moreover, in general participants were awarded considerably less time to present their views than the experts present (-).

Another aspect related to the status of information was opposed to the previous. The civil servants involved in the process took a reserved stance during the workshops, hardly reacting to statements of participants. They did not actively react to matters that according to their opinion were nonsensical or had undesirable consequences (although the civil servant present in the workshop Centre Area did react occasionally). Consequently these statements go uncontested in the discussions (-).

The lack of clarity on the status of information brought forward in the workshops implied that it remained unclear in how far claims are contested, either within the workshop or by common knowledge. In the sixth workshop, for example, a participant tried to demonstrate the infeasibility of the railway tunnel by mentioning two examples of the costs of tunnels. Both times the numbers he mentioned were too high, in one case by a factor 10 (-).

The process manager usually cut short participants questioning the status of information, for example when participants sensed a certain positive inclination in the brochure as well as the inclination of the urban planner in the second workshop towards a specific variant (-).

Score: -
Let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space

Considerable attention was paid to creating a shared problem description in the beginning of the process. The agenda of the administration was put along that of ‘the citizens’, and integrated into a set of starting-points for the workshops. Instruments used in the problem exploration phase to poll the agenda of the populace were surveys, talks with key persons, a problem suggestion box and the start conference. At the beginning of the process two consultation meetings took place on the centre area, one with entrepreneurs and one with other inhabitants of the centre area, in which they could give their view on the problems of the centre and suggest solutions. In general participants had the opportunity to state their preferences, wishes, interests and values with regard to the problems to be dealt with, the solutions to be considered and the ‘starting points’ with which to do that (+).

To some extent this sounds better on paper than it was practised in reality. For example, although the key persons during their consultation had many comments on the ideas in the brochure, their contribution was limited to one remark per person present. This limited a serious contribution to the problem definition. Also not all key figures recognised their standpoint in the minutes made of the evenings. Finally, the fact that the consultations with key persons took place in separate groups dealing with five different themes (societal issues, traffic and environment, economy, building and living, and nature) meant the contribution of each key person was effectively limited to one of these themes (-).

The start conference in theory offered the opportunity to add to the problem definition. In practice this is difficult. All main problem areas were discussed and valued at separate tables, which meant that the contribution of those present is largely confined to one theme. It also meant that new points added at one table only hardly ever got sufficient points overall and disappeared again. Nevertheless, a main problem area (People) and a few other points were added to the problem definition at the start conference (0).

In the workshops also from time to time was worked with thematic subgroups, limiting the influence of participants to the theme of their subgroup (-).

The process started from a brochure in which outside experts had laid down the view of the council and M&A on the main spatial and infrastructure problems in the municipality. It also contained suggested solutions (sometimes one option, sometimes a few) under headings as 'Outlines of policy' or even 'preliminary choice'. The brochure met with resistance among participants as well as councillors and scepticism with some experts. It was considered steering. It evoked the feeling that M&A already knew what they wanted, and choices had already been made. The wordings in the brochure, with sentences like ‘the standpoint of M&A is’, strengthened this feeling. Participants also found that because of the brochure the discussion in the beginning was focused too much on the standpoints of M&A. They would have preferred to influence the problem definition more (-).
Several participants found that answering possibilities in the survey held before the workshops were too limited. Another regret is that it was not asked what should happen to the railroad crossing (-).

Despite the efforts to poll the agenda of the populace many participants see the agenda of the process as deriving in first instance from the municipality. Most participants largely agreed to the problems defined in the brochure. This was different with respect to the solutions suggested, that met with heavy resistance. Most participants therefore participated to ward off specific solutions or bring in their own, much less to alter the problem definition.

The process was very open with respect to solution development, although in this respect also the solutions in the brochure are seen to steer this process. Solutions suggested by participants were all taken into account, and taken along as long as participants themselves saw something in them. Participants could elucidate alternatives brought in by themselves at the workshop meetings. No definitive selection of solutions took place until the last workshop meeting (although something of a pre-selection of solutions took place in the second workshop), when the final conclusions and recommendations of the workshops were formulated (+).

Exhibitions at the interim public meeting and end of the process offered the broader public the possibility to write down reactions to the solutions presented. It was intended to use the comments made in the public discussions and the written comment in the exposition room in writing the final document. But few comments had been made at the exposition (+).

The final document should take together and summarise the outcomes of the different workshops, as well as the problem definition and solutions endorsed by M&A in the kick-off brochure. It outlined differences between the views of the workshops and M&A. It was made by a small and remarkable set of persons.

In April 1998, the urban planner received an assignment from the Mayor in person to write the final document. The Mayor consulted regularly with him, and delivered texts in person. When the final document is later adapted by the interim project manager, an employee of IPP is involved as a ‘guard’ of the view of the citizens, supposed to cover the whole breadth of topics dealt with. The interim project manager interviews M&A on the basis of the available texts. The town clerk concludes based on those interviews on which points differences of opinion remain between M&A. The interim project manager writes out those differences of opinion and a work conference of two days is held on them with M&A, the town clerk and the interim project manager. The outcomes are put in a memo.

The sounding-board group could comment on the part of the final document with the workshop
outcomes. Workshop representatives were told that when they wanted to seek feedback of their former workshop participants, they should contact the civil servant project manager. But this did not happen. The municipal project managers as well as the process managers of IPP could also comment on the concept proposal on paper (o).
The influence of the sounding-board group did not extent to the standpoints of M&A, which were not shown to the sounding-board group before the document was ready (-).

Score: 0

*Provide independent, trusted expertise*

IPP itself was the most important external party in the process. Most participants experienced IPP as truly independent. But this is not the same as neutral. Of those surveyed during the process 40% found their process manager not neutral as chairman, when summarising matters or giving overviews and 46% found him or her not neutral as discussion leader (o).

The foundation Agora supported IPP by surveying the population before the workshops. Many other outside experts were involved during the workshops, in the expert meeting +, carrying out studies, and so on. The expert involved in the workshop Mobility made his traffic model available for questions from the participants to other workshops in two meetings of a 'traffic model group'. The municipality established this traffic model group among other things to prevent suspicions of manipulation or withholding information (+).
The experts were supposed to keep a value-free story in the workshops. This conformed to what they saw as their ideal role, to bring independence to such a process, putting themselves in service of collecting information for the participants and providing value-free information on questions asked by those participants. They saw it as their task to provide participants with sufficient knowledge to be able to partake in the process (+).

Several of the experts had longer lasting ties with the municipality, for instance by their involvement in the development plans that had to be made for the four geographical topics. The urban planner that was the most central expert in the process had worked for over a year for the municipality when the first workshop started (-).

Some experts ‘wear several hats’. Several experts supporting the workshops had also been involved in developing the kick-off brochure. The most extreme example was the urban planner who supported the workshop Centre Area. He was supposed to steer the other experts to some extent in the project management, involved in writing the kick-off brochure as well as the final document, supported Centre Area, and performed studies. In the research break of the process he was one of the experts to assess options for doubling the railway track, among which the
options that he himself had developed in the kick-off brochure. Other experts assisting in this assessment were likewise involved in the kick-off brochure (-).

The urban planner in the workshop Centre area responded to the distrust by trying to bolster trust in his expertise, by explicitly outlining all expert participants to studies and by often leaning on studies performed in the past. However, the distrust was aimed at his position, seen as siding with the municipality (-).

The overall project manager found that the outside experts were not well protected by the process management or himself against attacks levelled at them (-).

Score: -

10.4.8 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO SUBSTANTIVE ENRICHMENT

Connect V/S learning to A/I learning

The workshops were the main forum for V/S learning during the process. Through debate and discussion in subgroups ideas and suggestions were tested to see which ones survived the selection environment of the workshops. This process of V/S learning was supposed to be fuelled by the results of A/I learning, mainly through studies carried out by outside experts. The results of several studies were not available in time. Interim results were presented. But at many occasions throughout the process participants and councillors complained of important information not being available in time in the workshops they participated in. This hampered V/S learning in the discussions (-).

The link between V/S and A/I learning was one-sided, there was no feedback from findings from the debates in the workshops into the studies carried out (-).

Of the supporting arenas in the process, the traffic model group worked well as it was able to help participants in making choices. For instance, in the workshop Hessen road a crucial debate about whether traffic should be one way or two way was decided when the model showed one way traffic would not provide many benefits (+).

Score: 0

Support variety creation

As to whether many new sources of ideas were present in the process, the evidence is mixed: only 10 percent of the participants in the workshops stated to have been politically active before (Krouwel, 1998), but participating councillors had the impression many participants did belong to the regular ‘participation-elite’ (0).
No methods/techniques were used in the process to stimulate creation of variety (-).

The degrees of freedom provided to participants in designing and discussions influenced creativity. The choice of the topic of the process, and the conditions put to it, play a part in this. This topic is broad, for the process as a whole and for most separate workshops. There are differences in the amount of creativity the different topics allow. Of the workshop Hessen road, for instance, the topic of redesigning a shopping area is said to allow only limited creativity. Drawing a new map for the Corridor area was considered more rewarding (+).

No conditions were put to the process. M&A, most councillors and IPP defended this choice by pointing out it would allow more creativity (o).

‘Time available’ also influenced the amount of creative suggestions. During the evenings much time was spent on presentations, leaving less time for discussion and coming up with starting-points or suggestions. The rest of the evening was usually used for plenary discussion or discussion in smaller groups on which problem aspects should be dealt with, and the pros and cons of circulating solutions. Alternatives were not designed during the evening, but had to be ‘home-made’, and next sent to the project management and/or presented during the meetings.

Some groups of participants created alternatives outside the workshops (-).

During the process was often pointed out that the time pressure threatened to diminish the quality of the results. This was felt especially severe in the second round of workshops, a phase in which the complex connections between problems should be dealt with (-).

Whereas originally IPP intended to limit participation to 20 participants per workshop, for the workshops Mobility and Centre area roughly double this number signed up. Since IPP was opposed to selection, a failed attempt was made to have participants withdraw voluntarily. Their large number made it hard for participants in these workshops to have a substantive contribution and affected the speed of progress and methods of working. It was tried to remedy this by working in subgroups at several occasions, but these also did not design solutions, but mostly debated on issues like starting-points (-).

Score: -

Support variety use

The lack of structure of the process and lack of clarity about its desired outcomes hampered use of the variety created. The emphasis lay too much on process, too little on content. Because there was no ‘dummy’ of the intended end product of the workshops, the 'lists of decision-points', no one (including several process managers!) knew exactly towards which result they were working. The ‘right’ level of abstraction to work towards to was never formulated. The civil
servants had no criteria in mind that they would use to filter the workshop proposals before presenting them to M&A, or for personally using the results. This made it harder to create solutions that would fit the desires of council and civil servants (-). The process therefore led to the workshops coming up with a variety of outcomes, differing in abstraction level, ranging from concrete policy-options and proposals to the 'well defined opinion of the workshop' or 'directional statements and starting-points'. Unluckily, most of the ideas in the process were on a more concrete level than the planning level the process was supposed to work on. The large differences in the level of abstraction of the outcomes of the workshops caused problems in translating them into a final document. Whereas at first civil servants tried to translate 'general' decision points, like 'we find important that...' into concrete actions, it was later decided to choose for 'strategic' statements as the level of abstraction at which M&A should react to the outcomes of the process. It was thought this choice could be defended by indicating more detailed results would be used in the further elaboration of the development plans to be made (-).

IPP opposed the use of constraints, and considered only recently taken council decisions as such. It also feared that indicating the limitations of a solution by experts too soon would hamper the desire of participants to be freely informed on effects and consequences to come to a judgement themselves. Some participants stated that constraints might inhibit creativity. Others declared that the fact that no constraints were formulated made it easier to dismiss of suggestions as 'unfeasible'. Several experts also regretted that costs were not dealt with in the workshops. During the process councillors pointed out in the consultation group the undesirability of determining the feasibility, financial and otherwise, of proposals too late. This could lead to disappointment (-).

IPP kept up a no-voting policy in the workshops. But in the final meeting nevertheless a selection of alternatives had to take place. This happened through IPP process managers making a final report with recommendations and a 'list of decision points' largely based on 'gut feeling'. These were, however, checked with the participants, first with an 'editing group', later by all workshop members on the final evening (o).

Score: -
Table 10.3: overview of application of the design guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design guideline</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do not overburden with tasks</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>translate information into a usable format</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map possibilities for negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be transparent</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on status information</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delineation and solution space</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the design guideline was well met in this case
0 = the design guideline was to some extent met in this case
- = the design guideline was poorly or not at all met in this case

A few things come forward as remarkable in the table above. For example, despite the scale of the process, the great number and diversity of participants, the amount of issues tackled, the comprehensiveness of decisions taken is meagre. This can at least partially be blamed on analytical failure in the process to take into account some relevant topics, and by a failure to integrate and structure the sea of information flowing through the process. Also remarkable is the poor result on trust. For an institute that sees as its main mission to
stimulate political and societal participation, one would expect IPP to pay considerable attention to creating and/or safeguarding trust between political elites, administration and participants. But in De Bilt, where already a low amount of trust between governors and governed reigned, they very limited attention to creating at least the analytical conditions for enhancing trust, aside from some attention to transparency. A certain naivety with IPP with respect to the importance of positions of for example experts might be an explanation. A general insufficient attention of IPP to safeguarding substantive influence of participants might be another. As noted by many in close contact with the institute, IPP saw the process as most important, not its content, which had far-reaching consequences, among other things on the absence of analytical safeguards for achieving trust. As a consequence of their absence, distrust towards the municipal apparatus as well as the experts hired by them poisoned at least parts of the process.

Finally, the Habermasian view on the process by IPP, of striving for a ‘power free dialogue’, in which the general interest should be the focus of all, had far-reaching consequences. It led to insufficient attention being paid to the representativeness of those participating to the process, but also within the process to the representativeness of those in specific forums like the consultation group for all participants. It meant no negotiation should take place, and therefore this was also not analytically supported. It also meant no decisions and selections were taken during the process, hampering the progress made and final absorption of results in decisions.

**New guideline**

One specific area in which there was a lack of clarity stands out as especially relevant for analytical purposes: all parties were unclear of their own expected role and tasks in the process, and that of other parties. The roles and tasks expected were discussed with civil servants, and to some extent with some participants in the consultation talks, but this seems to have been insufficient to provide clarity on them. Despite all the information provided during the process, a lack of clarity on role/task issues remained. Roles and tasks were not discussed with the outside experts before the process. The only agreement on roles with civil servants or outside experts IPP made was that they should be reticent. This led to diverging views on their role with councillors and civil servants, ranging from taking part in discussions to only listening, indicating feasibility or not, contributing data or leaving that to the outside experts, and so on. Citizens had no clear idea of what their role should be whatsoever. The analytical purpose of the different forums in the process was also unclear before the process to many. What for example the workshops were expected to do exactly was not clear to civil servants as well as participants. The above underlines the importance of specific attention to information provision on these aspects in participatory processes, which is why I derive a new guideline from it, contributing to competence: *give clarity about analytical tasks expected.*
CHAPTER 10
The case De Bilt: much ado amounting to nothing
TOWARDS AN ECOLOGICAL NIRVANA: THE CASE DOETINCHEN
11.1.1 PROLOGUE

Doetinchem is a municipality in the east of the Netherlands. Its population consists of roughly 47,000 in the year 2000, of which around 40,000 live in the town of Doetinchem.

In the 1990s, the municipality had carried out a planning process on a zoning plan for an area called ‘Dichteren’. Inhabitants of the area, feeling their wishes were insufficiently taken into account, had uttered many objections against the plan and used every procedural possibility to object. The process had been considerably slowed down and the relationship between the municipal apparatus and at least part of the population had been damaged.

The problems with Dichteren had left the municipality with a desire to improve its damaged image, and a willingness to try new things with respect to developing zoning plans. For some years ideas had been circulating inside the civil service on new ways of policy development. Thus, when during 1997 the development of a new zoning plan becomes an issue, this time for a future residential area called Wijnbergen, a participatory policy process for the development of this zoning plan is suggested by civil servants and adopted by M&A.

In the municipal structure plan of 1986 it had already been determined that the area Wijnbergen, situated at the south of Doetinchem and so far largely an agricultural area, would become a living area. An urban planning model would have to be determined for that in 1998/1999, to result in construction of roughly 1000 houses in 2004/2005. This number had been the outcome of an earlier study of external experts into the housing market of Doetinchem and was estimated to lead to a balanced budget for the plan.
Picture 11.1: Doetinchem (the area Wijnbergen is shaded)
11.1.2 | PREPARATION

The process for developing the zoning plan Wijnbergen starts within the department of Spatial Planning, towards the end of 1997. The head of the department is designated project manager. An urban planner of the department will also work on the plan. For the plan preparation a internal procedural plan already exists, which is fallen back on. This procedure will also form the basis for the phasing of the participatory process decided on later.

A broader municipal project group is established, which meets a few times. This group consists of civil servants from all relevant departments. The head of the department of Spatial Planning chairs it. Per substantive theme the project group looks into what information is available, which studies would be necessary and which parties should be involved. One of the topics on which a study is considered necessary is the power line running through the area, because it is thought this will surely be a topic in the process.

The department of Spatial Planning in conjunction with the Communication department suggests a participatory process to the administration. This is well received. Administratively, the project becomes a co-production between the Mayor, responsible for communication issues, and the Alderman of spatial planning, traffic and transport.

Figure 11.2: picture of the area Wijnbergen

1 = Kapperskolk
2 = former town nursery garden
3 = power line
4 = ABC
5 = community centre Gary Horse
6 = De Hoop
7 = business park Wijnbergen
M&A decide to involve IPP to take care of the set-up and management of the participatory process and provide the process management. The plan should be developed in consultation with the current and -if possible- future inhabitants of the area, with neighbourhood councils from neighbouring living areas and with representatives of societal organisations and political groups. Individual citizens interested in the new living area can also partake.

IPP also brings in the Foundation Agora, closely allied to IPP. It will perform a study into the existing cultural-historical qualities in the area, to find out what is worth keeping.

### 11.1.3 THE PROCESS SET-UP AND PLANNING

The participatory process ‘Living in Wijnbergen’ is intended to take place in three stages (see table 11.1). In the first stage the opportunities and bottlenecks for the development of the area will be mapped and valuable elements in the area will be prioritised. The existing problems and present and intended future qualities of the area are to be taken stock off and discussed as a basis for starting-points for the development of the plan.

In the second stage urban planning models should be developed. In the third stage, emphasis lies on discussing the layout of the area as a whole and the separate sub-sectors. No specific participatory activities are planned in this last stage before the process starts.

Table 11.1: process planning participatory policy process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1: consultation: May-August 1998</td>
<td>Discussion and valuation of the description of the plan area and the starting-points of the zoning plan. Process activities: information meetings, bicycle rides, interviews, public meeting (start conference).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2: model development: August-October 1998</td>
<td>Discussion of the programme of guidelines and the spatial main structure; translation of insights coming forward from this into one or several urban planning models. Process activities: workshops, public meeting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3: drafting zoning plan and urban development plan: November 1998 - March 1999</td>
<td>Discussion of the layout of the plan area and sub-sectors, realisation of the environmental goals, utilities, exploitation set-up of the plan area and the results of procedural consultations. No participatory process activities planned yet.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Groups supporting the participatory policy process

The more limited focus of the process leads to a somewhat simpler organisational set-up than the one IPP used in De Bilt. The groups involved in the 'official' set-up of the participatory process are: project group, core group, steering group, and consultation group. Since the steering group and consultation group have mainly procedural tasks I will not discuss their functioning here (those interested are referred to Edelenbos and Monnikhof, 1998, 2001).

The project group is the municipal group that was already established before the participatory process. It has the task of delivering substantive information (data, discussion papers and memos) on behalf of the discussions in the workshops and the public meetings. Also, it should provide answers to questions that arise in the workshops, the public meetings and the consultation group, and prepare proposals to M&A and the council.

The core group should deal with the process management and co-ordination of the daily course of events. It consists of the project manager, a communication advisor, an Agora employee, two members of the design team (see below), and the process managers of IPP.

General conditions and starting-points

Preceding the start of the participatory policy process M&A set one substantive and one procedural condition to the process:
1. 1000 houses should be constructed in the area Wijnbergen;
2. a rough zoning plan has to be ready at the latest on 1 May 1999.

11.1.4 The consultation stage, April - August 1998

The information evenings

In April two information meetings, one for residents and interested citizens and one for interest groups and those professionally interested, are held to explain the participatory process and give opportunity to ask questions. The two conditions put to the process are outlined. The set-up and time-schedule of the process are explained. Also the people present can bring up issues. Coming forward in this way are:
- the importance of the Kapperskolk, a watercourse, as an ecological object
- concern about the power line in the area
- and worries about the influence of a neighbouring industrial estate under construction.
**The bicycle rides**

Two bicycle rides take place in May. During these bicycle rides the participants can rate elements in the area (like buildings and elements of the landscape), which have been put on a form. Additional elements can be suggested. Participants can designate a top three of either most desired or least desired elements in the area. They can also indicate how existing impediments and other elements in the area should be dealt with. A discussion takes place after each bicycle ride, in which arguments on priorities can be exchanged.

In June the project group discusses what topics for further investigation could be related and relevant to the project. The outcomes of the Agora study into the cultural-historical qualities in the area are put alongside the outcomes of the bicycle rides and the insights of the project group itself, reviewed and put in a scheme. The elements are grouped in the categories Landscape/green/water, Buildings, Companies and Impediments, and inside those categories further subdivided by how highly they are valued.

**The meeting to prepare the start conference**

The scheme is presented on June 16th in a meeting to citizens who are to prepare the start conference. They are divided in five thematic working groups, to formulate concept-starting-points for the workshops that are to be held after the start conference. The meeting allows the list of points for discussion on the start conference to be shortened to 8 items. The earlier scheme is simplified.

**The start conference and determination of starting-points**

On the day of the start conference (July first), the core group discusses the set-up of the four modeling workshops of phase 2. The plan is to come to 3 or 4 urban planning models in the final workshop meeting. In the public meeting after the workshops these will be presented and discussed. A multidisciplinary ‘design team’ of civil servants from different sectors will be established to elaborate sketches between the workshops. A zoning plan should be derived from these urban planning models from November 1998 to March 1999.

Agreement is reached on how to visually support the participants to the workshops. In the beginning the project group will present some ‘discussion pictures’, to give the participants an impression how could be worked. A local artist and students he teaches at an art school will support the workshop meetings visually. The artist is present at most meetings of the core group and the design team since then.

The purpose of the *start conference* is to take stock of objectives and starting-points for the workshops, to have participants in the start conference sign up for them, and to determine the
assignment for the workshops. The results of the bicycle rides are presented, as well as the starting-points and discussion points. It turns out, among other things, that people strongly agree to the proposition to remove the power line.

The design team starts in July, to produce the discussion pictures for the first workshop. In August M&A ratify the starting-points and conditions for the process. They suggest looking into the possibilities to make the neighbourhood a so-called 'ecological neighbourhood'.

11.1.5 DEVELOPING URBAN DEVELOPMENT MODELS: AUGUST-OCTOBER 1998

Four workshops are planned for the second stage of the process, in which 45 participants that registered for them during the start conference should develop urban development models.

**Preparation of the workshops**

In August the core group and the project group\(^{52}\) prepare the workshops. Based on the discussions during the start conference and the additions of M&A after that, several starting-points are added to the set presented at the start conference. Among those are that the power line should preferably be moved, and that should be investigated whether Gary Horse, a community center in the area, has to be moved. The number of models to work with is determined on 'a few', respectively on 'two or three' for the second and third workshop.

**The first round of workshops**

In the first three workshops participants are split in five subgroups. In the first workshop they develop proposals for the area. These are next translated into two models for the area by the design team. In both models the area is divided in three sub-sectors, which remains this way for the rest of the process. These models form the basis for model development by the five subgroups in the second workshop. The resulting five models are after the workshop reduced to three by the design team again. The design team also produces a list of 'decision points' on which they need the participants to speak out to be able to further elaborate the models.

In the third workshop the five subgroups make a choice out of the three models, which results in a reduction to two. They also add to the models and speak out on the decision points. After the workshop the two models selected are elaborated further by the design team. In the fourth workshop a plenary discussion takes place about on which decision points (dis)agreement exists. A selection is made of 'discussion points' to be presented on the upcoming public meeting and in a poll to the population of Doetinchem. At the end of the fourth workshop two extra workshops in November to discuss the visual quality of the area are announced.

\(^{52}\) This is the last time the project group convenes
The ‘back and forth’ approach of having the design team take their own shot at the workshop results for each next workshop leads to conflict. The tendency to reduce the number of models elaborated by the design team, because of perceived limited differences between models and workability, leads to participants accusing them of going too fast, and taking too large steps.

Another bone of discontent is the number of houses needed for a balanced budget. During the process civil servants not directly involved in the process attempt to have the plan cover part of the deficit on another project (called Hamburgerbroek). This leads to cost calculations in which suddenly 1400 houses are needed in the area to play even. The cause for this is not explained to participants, and they revolt against these calculations. The problem is solved when threats ‘behind the scenes’ by the municipal project manager to the Alderman of Spatial Planning of giving back her assignment lead to cessation of the attempts to draw money from the project. Finally, the fate of the powerline leads to discontent. From the start, participants aim for the power line to disappear. But despite an explicit decision in the first workshop to elaborate at least one model with the power line gone, in both models the design team elaborates the power line remains where it is. This is again the case in the three models elaborated after the second workshop. Only in the two models elaborated after the third workshop it is assumed the power line will be removed. The future of the power line also is not a topic on the list of decision points. The reluctance of the civil servants towards bringing the power line underground has everything to do with the costs of this, towards the end of the workshop estimated at roughly 10% of the total budget for the plan.

**The public meeting**

At a public meeting in October the remaining two models are presented. A discussion on the plans is held, and the Alderman of Spatial Planning and the Mayor elucidate the pleas of M&A for an ecological neighbourhood.

A major discussion topic during the public meeting is the power line. In contrast to the models elaborated at the fourth workshop meeting it has been left undecided in the models of the municipality whether it will stay or be removed. Among those present moving the line seems unanimously supported. Finally, forms are handed out, to be filled out and taken in again, that will be part of the support poll that will be held among the population.

**11.1.6 DRAFTING A ZONING PLAN AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT PLAN:**
**OCTOBER-DECEMBER 1998**

After the public meeting two additional workshops are held to elaborate the urban development models to a layout plan for the area (a ‘visual quality plan’).
**The second round of workshops**

In the fifth workshop participants in three subgroups, each having to deal with one of the subsectors, ‘fill in the area’ in detail with houses and other types of buildings. All groups bring in high-rise blocks in their sub-sectors, and assume the power line will be removed. In between the fifth and sixth workshop M&A formally accept the two basic models and some thematic variants circulating at that point. M&A also agree to use the proposals of the workshop as the basis for the proposals that it will present to the council commission on spatial planning. Also, the planned support poll is held among the population of Doetinchem. The poll offers choices between several options on the seven main remaining topics on which differences of opinion persist between the models. On the basis of the poll outcomes some discussion points are transformed into decision points (points on which there is no large difference of opinion).

Two mixed groups of participants and civil servants are formed to save the workshop time, called Programme and Space. The first involves itself with the finances, among other things supplying variables for getting rid of the deficit of the power line to the working group Space. That group checks whether sufficient houses could be placed in the sub-sectors by drawing these in. Lack of time makes it impossible to do anything with the financial variables provided by Programme.

The design team and both working groups consult two times. The design team adjusts the visual quality plans for the sub-sectors based on the discussions in the fifth workshop. Despite the fact that M&A have agreed to two models and these two are presented in the poll, the only model the design team elaborates is the most ‘green’ model, because the core group has concluded that the participants prefer this model.

The outcomes of the working groups, the poll and the design team form input into the sixth and final workshop. In the workshop is discussed whether 1 or 2 models should remain and which decision points are still present. Per sub-sector a number of characterising quality concepts are determined. It is concluded that the second model should be elaborated too and play a part in the discussion again.

The labour of the working groups surfaces that norms embodied in a municipal housing market plan limit the amount of high-rise blocks in the area to no more than 5% of the houses. The limitation leads to more pressure on the green in the area, because money now has to be generated by building extra houses or by downsizing green strips. The civil servants refuse to go beyond it, which leads to discontent first with the participant members of the working group Programme and later in the final workshop with most participants.
The final public meeting

In December a final public meeting is held in which representatives of the party groups, the alderman of spatial planning and representatives of the workshops discuss the remaining decision points. Nearly all party groups support moving Gary Horse. Also almost the entire council favours a study into the possibilities for more than 5% high-rise blocks in the area. But M&A oppose this. With respect to the power line M&A favour keeping it above ground.

11.1.7 | AFTER THE WORKSHOPS

After the final public meeting a preliminary zoning plan is created inside the municipal apparatus based on the workshop results. A visual quality plan accompanies it. The plan has to be further elaborated into a definitive version by March 1999.

Following advice accompanying the plan M&A decide to bring the power line underground after all when they approve the plan on December 22nd. In January 1999 the committee on spatial planning approves of the preliminary zoning plan. Most committee members want a higher percentage of high-rise blocks in the area than 5%, or at least a study into the possibilities. But this request is warded of by the alderman of spatial planning. The committee members also want Gary Horse to be moved.

A festive closing evening for process participants is held in February. Next the plan is deposited for inspection and formal consultation with stakeholders takes place. Only a few reactions are submitted.

In April the elaborated version of the visual quality plan is issued. In April also the objections and letters submitted to the plan are discussed in a public meeting, intended to give a presentation of the reactions and the way in which the municipality proposes to incorporate these in the zoning plan. The meeting is also intended to solicit the suggestions of the visitors and assess the level of consensus among the participants on whether a point of objection should end up in the zoning plan. When the power line is touched upon, it turns out surprisingly that it is still not certain whether it will disappear, which evokes much discussion. Discussants also outline that more high-rise blocks should be enabled.

11.1.8 | BUSINESS AS USUAL AND A NEW OPEN PLANNING PROCESS AHEAD

From then on the preliminary zoning plan is processed according to the regular non-participatory procedure. It is enacted in April 1999 by M&A. The province officially approves (most of) the plan in July 2000. After this the plan will be elaborated piecemeal, also by means of open planning processes. These fall outside the scope of this study.
11.2

THE CASE JUDGED BY THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Was the welfare of all parties involved served by its outcomes? If not, who won and who lost?

The outcome of the process was a preliminary zoning plan, accompanied by a visual quality plan. Most participants, as well as the members of the Committee on Spatial Planning and M&A, were satisfied with both. The process also led to fewer judicial procedures afterwards than in non-participatory procedures. None of the existing inhabitants of the area officially objected53. Only three official objections were submitted to the preliminary zoning plan. Two letters were added that had come in before the concept-zoning plan was deposited for inspection. Two out of these five reactions (all mainly on the level of details) stemmed from participants to the earlier process. At the meeting of the commission on spatial planning in January 1999 there was only one commenter, which according to civil servants was much fewer than normal with similar plans and was interpreted as support for the plan. During the procedure leading to provincial approval only a few objections were issued against the plan. Only three reactions were submitted to the draft zoning plan.

The general satisfaction with the plan can be attributed largely to the preparedness of M&A and the council to bring their own preferences more in line with those of the participants in the participatory process. This was most visible with regard to the power line, which disappeared underground. The process seemed able to increase the match between policy and the preferences of at least a part of the citizens affected by that policy.

I will now look into the welfare effects for the different groups involved in the process, compared to the welfare they might have derived from keeping the situation as it was (or was suspected to evolve without the activity proposed).

Future inhabitants got the opportunity to live in a relatively green area, but paid for this by a high housing density. Nevertheless, they gained the opportunity to live in a new area, which they would not have had the process not taken place.

The current inhabitants of the Wijnbergen area will lose the advantages of living in a quiet and rural area.

The nature and ecology groups lost compared to the status quo: green will be sacrificed to houses, albeit probably less than without the open planning process. Telling is that the only two objecters to the preliminary zoning plan that had also partaken in the participatory process were

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53 This might be related to a promise to them they can also contribute in the actual designing phase
nature- and environmental organisations. The pain will be somewhat mitigated by the creation of an ecological neighbourhood and the disappearance of the power line underground.

Inhabitants of De Hoop lost. Those that used Gary Horse saw it moved to a location farther away. During an open planning process in that area in 2000 (unrelated to Wijnbergen), it became clear that inhabitants of De Hoop were not pleased with the transfer of Gary Horse to another location. They also saw a nearby green area turned into a living area.

The process succeeded in increasing the number of houses, and diminishing the resistance against the plans, which made the municipality a clear winner of the process. For this it had to endure somewhat higher costs for making the plan than usual.

All combined, it is hard to say whether the welfare gain by the process from the winners outnumbers the welfare loss of the losers.

Table 11.2: gainers and losers of the process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Gains</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Winner/loser</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Current inhabitants</td>
<td>New facilities nearby; power line underground</td>
<td>Living in a very green, quiet and spacious area</td>
<td>Losers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Future inhabitants</td>
<td>Living in a relatively green area; power line underground</td>
<td></td>
<td>Winners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nature lovers</td>
<td>Ecological neighbourhood; power line underground</td>
<td>Most green will be lost</td>
<td>Losers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipality</td>
<td>Little opposition to the plan; living area with 1000 houses created</td>
<td>Somewhat higher process costs</td>
<td>Winners</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inhabitants of De Hoop</td>
<td>Nearby green area disappears; Gary Horse moved</td>
<td></td>
<td>Losers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interesting is what the difference is of these outcomes with respect to welfare distribution with those that might have resulted from a regular, non-participatory process. Compared to a regular process probably roughly the same winners and losers with respect to the status quo would have resulted. The exception is the municipality, which clearly benefited from the process itself. For the rest it seems to be more a matter of degree in their winning and losing. The losers, except the inhabitants of De Hoop, were able to mitigate their loss somewhat. The future inhabitants might have gained even more welfare with a plan with a less high housing density, although this is difficult to say. It depends on the way the green in the area is perceived vis-à-vis the housing density.

The table is based on documents studied and interviews conducted
**Were those expected to loose from decisions compensated for their losses?**

There were no conscious attempts in the process so far to compensate losers, but I will look into how the process might have ‘naturally’ arranged for compensation for the losers. 

*Gary Horse* was compensated for loss of its location by awarding it another one. Its users were not offered any compensation.

As concerns *current inhabitants* of the Wijnbergen area, the plan did provide them with some facilities in the centre of the new neighbourhood. This might be seen as compensation for the loss of their green and spacious surroundings, but only partially.

The *nature lovers* seemed partially compensated for the loss of green by the establishment of an ecological neighbourhood, and the disappearance of the power line underground. But they did not regard this full compensation.

**Were all affected by (proposed) decisions allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision?**

Everyone could participate in the process. But little room was given to participants for explicitly defending, or even stating, interests, or the way they would be affected. Interests had to be defended through the 'bypass' of the public interest. Influence on gains and losses could be exercised, but only indirectly, inefficiently and imperfectly.

A partial exemption to this was the manager of *Gary Horse*, who was allowed to state the position and interests of *Gary Horse* several times. But the influence he exercised by this was minimal. This might be partially blamed on his outsider position. He did not participate in the workshops, and therefore was unable to shape the discussions taking place there. Also, his contributions were rather late, when he was present in the fifth workshop the discussion had, after four workshops, already shifted largely towards moving *Gary Horse*.

The final question is who had most opportunity to express their interests. Future and current inhabitants were underrepresented in the process, nature and ecology lovers over-represented. Only a few inhabitants of *De Hoop* participated. Thus, the influence that could be exercised was unequally distributed over the different interests.

In short, we can present the results of our normative evaluation as in table 11.6.

*Table 11.3: normative evaluation of the outcomes of the case Doetinchem*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
THE INTERMEDIATE FACTORS

Comprehensiveness

40% of participants surveyed during the process thought the municipality took relevant topics like facilities, infrastructure and architecture insufficiently into account. However, there seem to have been no important topics not covered in the approved zoning plan, and no reactions on it complained about it having missed important aspects (+).
On the other hand, there is a clear unwillingness during the process to reconsider earlier decisions, even when these have a clear bearing on the topic at hand. The clearest examples of these are the norm of a 1000 houses for the area, and the 5% norm for high-rise buildings. Also, the results of the poll under the population, although differing in some respects from the outcomes of the workshops, are not included in decision making (-).

Score: 0

Efficiency

Making the plan in a participatory fashion was estimated after the process by civil servants of Doetinchem to be roughly 10% more expensive than making it in a traditional fashion. Two extra workshops were added because progress was slower than planned. Despite this, some participants still felt hastened during the workshops and unable to properly go into some issues (-).
Participants and civil servants complained that the process was inefficient. Much of the debate during the process was about abstract matters like a sustainable society, not translatable in either design or decision making. These discussions evoked irritation with other participants and took up a lot of time. Also, several discussion topics returned time and again. For example, discussions on Gary Horse recurred until the sixth workshop, without ever becoming clear whether there was consensus on moving it or not (-).

Score: -

Representativeness

That interest were not mapped and taken into account made the process fragile to capture by special interests, masking as the 'general interest'. In practice the process was dominated by representatives of nature or environmental groups, by their number, vigilance and verbal abilities. This in turn led to ecology and sustainability dominating discussions, and rather ‘green’ outcomes of questionable representativeness.

Score: -
**Competence**

Three-quarters of the participants had enjoyed higher education, meaning a considerable source of knowledge in general was present. But 44% stated before the process to really have insufficient knowledge to partake. Nevertheless 81% desired no support. 13% did want support, but looked for this elsewhere, not with the municipality. During the process some participants complained to feel not to know enough for proper participation (o).

Many participants (as well as councillors and civil servants in the 'second ring') were unclear on how the process would take its course and what the intention or nature of specific meetings was. The set-up of the process and planning of the workshops were regularly changing, which made it unclear to several participants how far they had got at a certain point. Towards the end of the process 92% of respondents were clear on the time phasing of the process. But only 42% was clear on the organisational set-up of the process even then. On the other hand, 83% of the participants declared their own role in the workshops was sufficiently clear to them. But councillors during and after the process indicated to be unclear on their role (o). Also, confusion abounded on which conditions were present. In the survey at the end of the process, still 17% of the respondents were unaware that conditions had been put to the process. Those that did know of conditions, several times mentioned conditions that were not officially put to the process (-).

Score: o

**Negotiation**

It was not intended that negotiation should take place in the process. Some forms of negotiation took place between participants in their discussions, but these were not supported by the process management, or the results recorded.

Score: -

**Flexibility**

Decision-makers showed flexibility during the process, mostly by agreeing to remove the power line at the end of it. On the other hand, earlier agreed-upon policy turned out to be very inflexible, like for example the norm that no more than 5% of the buildings should be high-rising.

Score: o
Trust
There was a feeling among participants they were not always taken serious. The (outcomes of) the activities and suggestions of civil servants were also viewed with distrust from time to time, but this did not lead to a great open distrust against most claims in the process. The expertise of the civil servants supporting the workshops in general was not questioned (o).
From time to time disagreement arose on the firmness of the starting-points. Participants sometimes attacked them (-).

Score: 0

Substantive enrichment
Learning in general hardly seemed to take place in the process. Participants were surveyed and interviewed on whether their views on the most important topic of the process or the best solution for filling in the area had changed. They (as well as civil servants and councillors) all considered the same topics the most important and the same solution the best as they did at the beginning of the process. Neither A/I - nor V/S learning had changed these viewpoints (-).

The results of the process were seen as not very innovative. Many felt that the quality of the plan resulting from the process was reasonable, but that it was little different from what it would be if it would have been prepared by civil servants in a traditional way. But there was also broad consensus that the power line would not have been removed without the participatory process (o).

Some participants came up with many ideas during the process, but not all of these were new. Most of these ideas were on a more concrete level than the planning level the process was supposed to work on. Civil servants after the process declared they had seen new ideas, but on the level of house building, not on the level of area structure. Some of these more concrete ideas were retained in the ‘visual quality plan’, others disappeared. In the end, 92% of the participants saw their suggestions return in sufficient measure in the plan development, and three-quarters saw the municipality take their suggestions sufficiently into account in general (o).

Score: 0
Table 11.4: overview of presence of the intermediate factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate factors</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the intermediate factor was (almost) fully developed in this case
0 = the intermediate factor was to some extent present in this case
- = the intermediate factor was not or hardly present in this case

11.4

THE DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

11.4.1 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS

Have a broad scope
In the preparatory phase of the process the civil servants in the project group performed and started exploratory studies. A study into archaeological sites was performed by Agora (+). Some relevant aspects were not studied. No study was performed into the costs of moving the power line. During the workshops only estimates made by the power-company were obtained, increasing from two to five million. An announced study into the necessity of moving Gary Horse was not carried out (-).

Civil servants discussed possible relevant developments in other arenas at the beginning of the process. Matters that concerned the whole western part of Doetinchem, for instance, would be taken along. Although Hamburgerbroek was mentioned early in the preparation of the process, this topic was not considered to be relevant for Wijnbergen by either civil servants or M&A. Its relationship with Wijnbergen was not investigated (0).
In the early stages of the process the possible departure of ABC, a factory at the industrial estate neighbouring the area in the east, was a major topic with consequences for Wijnbergen. A study of these consequences took place, as well as a more general study into the environmental effects of the companies in the neighbouring business area on the new living area. Also, the core group made available information on the (possible environmental hindrance of the) new industrial estate Wijnbergen, planned in an earlier stage, south of the new to develop living area (+).

Participants at times tried to broaden the spectre of topics outside the arena taken into account. At the third workshop a participant pointed out the importance of stench caused by a company situated directly outside the area. Neither civil servants nor process manager picked up this topic, partially because the stench nuisance was not above the legal norm (-).

There was also a relationship with topics in arenas on another scale level, or in another period. One participant, for instance, declared after the process he would have liked preferably to be already involved in vision development for Doetinchem as a whole, because now choices had already been made. Also, the creation of a zoning plan is a process with a long history. Many implicit or explicit conditions have been set in national legislation, regional planning and so forth. Although the condition of 1000 houses was explicitly derived from a structure plan, there was no thorough exploration or presentation of relevant legislation and policy (plans) (-).

Score: 0

**Integrate and structure**

After the start conference IPP outlined the structure of the two intended products of the process, draft urban planning models and a (rough) zoning plan, in a memo. This also outlined the central elements of a zoning plan. The goal for each of the four planned workshop sessions was given. Topics to be dealt with were awarded to the separate workshops. The substantive preparation necessary per workshop was indicated for the first two workshops, the agenda for the first three workshops, an explanation of the agenda for the second and third workshop, as well as an explanation of the ‘central questions’ for the fourth workshop (+).

The core group at the beginning of the process defined what the urban planning models to be developed should contain: the main structure of the area plus some characteristics, like the way the area is opened up, different types of sub-areas, a rough outline of utilities and functions (+).

The way in which contributions of participants were solicited is structured by the use of tables, multiple choice questions, rating on Likert scales, and so on. But the framing of the questions and statements making up these instruments was often ambiguous or unclear (o).
The production of a zoning plan usually integrates a diverse range of information, on ecology, traffic patterns, demand for housing, and so on. This diverse information was presented to the participants. The process itself operated as a framework in which diverging information was brought together. Not only the views, wishes, ideas and suggestions of the participants to the process were added to the normal information, also the way in which municipal information was brought together was much more integral than usual, to enable presentation of ‘the whole picture’ to participants to the process (+).

The timing of contributions was also different. Normally the spatial design is leading and financial consequences are looked into later (after which the design might have to be altered), now financial calculations were made at an earlier stage (+).

A lack of integration was most manifest during the fifth workshop meeting, when the three sub-sectors had to be filled in by three subgroups of participants, using blocks that represent houses. The blocks-exercise amounted to utter chaos, without any co-ordination among the subgroups with respect to how many and which types of houses were build at what site (-). Participants complained during the process about a lack of comparison between subgroups. Time was scheduled at the end of the evening for presentation of the results of the separate subgroups, but there usually was no time (scheduled) to compare results (-).

The information in the process was not tied to one specific platform (like a document), but scattered over bits and pieces of information, usually only handed out on the evenings themselves. Sometimes, with respect to presentations, nothing was handed out on paper (-). Those outside the process did not have the information participants had. The information given with the poll among the broader population, for example, was scarce (-).

During the process several studies were announced or referred to, but not provided to the participants. Neither specific points were mentioned where these could be obtained, nor the time mentioned at which studies were expected to be finished. The process did have a minor ‘project-library’ at the town hall, where all involved could consult additional information (o). There was no overview of (possible) sources of information, of studies carried out or planned when so desired. In one document, that presented the results of the bicycle rides, the preparatory meeting of June 16th, the results of the study group quality and the valuation of the project group in one table, sources of the information in the table were given. But this document was only presented to the project group, not to the process participants. In the version presented to the outside world the information sources had been removed (-).
Information on problems, solutions and parties was not provided in one framework. A list of participants was made, but not handed out to the participants. Problems and starting-points got full attention during the early stages of the process. But the workshops mainly dealt with creating solutions, in which the starting-points were only used loosely. They were not explicitly brought to bear on the solutions developed, or linked to specific parties55 (-).

Score: 0

11.4.2 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO EFFICIENCY

Avoid overlap in analytical activities
The process knew much repetition of analytical activities (overlap through time). Most participants and civil servants found that some steps were repeated too often (albeit sometimes in different forms) without generating added value. Little additional progress was made in the last two or even three workshops. Much of the detailed information the last two workshops aimed for had already been surfaced during the first four workshops (-).

The civil servants in the core group found that the agenda of the workshops was not attuned to the substantive needs of the designers. The description of the desired end product and necessary interim products was not clear and specific enough. There was a general planning of the products to come out of each of the originally planned four workshops. This planning already was not met in the first workshop, and never really replaced (-).

Several civil servants also found the course of the workshop sessions messy. The ‘substantive memory’ of the process was limited. During the workshops no explicit links were forged with earlier decisions, or with the starting-points derived in the first stage of the process. Deviation from starting-points happened casually. Participants mentioned them in discussions, but they were never explicitly put alongside the models made, or used for screening. Even on the last public meeting in December, no clear explicit decisions were reached on any aspects of the visual quality (-).

Score: -

Provide no superfluous information
Participants did not complain about receiving too much or superfluous information (+). But several civil servants thought that on the workshop meetings presentations took up (too) much time, by which too little time was available for discussion and own activity of participants. Presentations often exceeded their time limit. Of the participants 50% found there was insufficient room for discussion during the workshops. This suggests participants would have

55 M&A and Council towards the end of the process did receive an overview in how far the models met the starting-points and conditions. But also M&A and Council did not receive an overview in which relevant parties were tied to or put alongside problems and solutions.
liked to see more of the available time spend on discussion, instead of presentations (the main other activity) (-).

Of some presentations it was also doubted whether they were necessary, for example because the relation to the tasks expected of participants that evening was vague. But in general participants did regard the presentations as useful and necessary (+).

The large amount of presentations also led at times to them being conducted too hastily, sacrificing time for asking questions. This diminished their informational value (-).

Score: 0

Focus on pragmatic aspects

Many activities and discussions were concerned with aspects not strictly necessary for making a preliminary zoning plan⁵⁶, most prominent the recurrent presentations and discussions on a sustainable society, fuelled by members of nature and environmental groups (-).

The process managers also constantly attempted to keep the process ‘playful’. For example, in the fifth workshop a traffic light was used to signal presentation time for participants. A member of the process management team declared after the process the set-up of the process was too much geared towards ‘fun’, to little against the process being useful (-).

Score: -

11.4.3 Guidelines primarily contributing to representativeness

Identify (the position of) relevant parties

In the early stages of the process it was tried to have the most relevant parties identified. It was also tried to involve large stakeholding parties in the process, like the power-company and the water board. Some of those parties attended in the beginning, later no more. There was a lack of clarity over which parties could be relevant. In addition to the ‘normal’ identification of parties with relevant knowledge, means or authority, a focus on identification of relevant groups of citizens was added (0).

These attempts were not guided by an explicit analysis of which parties would be affected, but more implicitly based on knowledge of the area with civil servants, experience with previous planning processes, and so on. No explicit list of possible relevant parties was made. During the agenda-setting stage, the involvement of citizens and interest groups was not used to adapt the view on interests involved (-).

That a rather relevant party was missed became painfully clear after the process. One of the persons objecting in the official procedure to the preliminary zoning plan was a farmer in the

⁵⁶ The highlight in bringing up a rather unrelated topic was the suggestion of one of the ecologists to invite a rhabdomancer, to inaugurate the area
area, who had not participated in the process. He objected to the threatening expropriation of land from his farm. Shortly after the enactment of the preliminary zoning plan by M&A it turned out that this farmer, owning no less than two-thirds of the plan area, had been approached by a project developer, who offered him twice the price for his land the municipality was prepared to pay (-).

Score: -

Pay attention to representativeness
There was no mapping of what groups would have influence on the outcomes of the process, nor whether interests were represented properly within or outside the participatory process to influence the outcomes. Also, it was not mapped who quit or entered the process halfway (-).

By the support poll outsiders in theory could influence the analysis in the process. But it was only used for discussion points, not for decision points. The representativeness of those therefore was not put to the test. The response to the poll was small\(^57\). The form used for it was also handed out to those present at the public meeting in October. Many forms handed in came from people present on this evening. Of those roughly half were workshop participants. Important items like the moving of Gary Horse or the power line were no part of the poll (-).

Although the results from the poll deviated between participants to the workshops and 'outsiders'\(^58\), these results were not used in altering the design of the models. They were only put alongside the views of the workshop participants, the party groups and the Court at the final meeting in December (-).

Instead of correcting the overrepresentation of ecologists in the process, M&A in the beginning of the process added the idea of an ecological neighbourhood to the starting-points, thereby strengthening the position of the group already best represented in the process. Just as the other participants, they were not provided with an overview of which interests were (well) represented in the process, and which interests might be affected by the plan (-).

Score: -

11.4.4 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPETENCE

Provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives
A member of the process management team after the process declared she missed in the process’ set-up the opportunity for participants to gain relevant knowledge before the process, for example by training or presentations. Now people had insufficient knowledge (-).

\(^{57}\) Only 115 persons filled out the poll, of a total population of Doetinchem at that time of roughly 40.000

\(^{58}\) For example, of the respondents to the poll 46% was in favour of keeping the power line where it was, in contrast to nearly all participants to the workshop and nearly all party groups
To many participants it was unclear what the exact desired end-product of the process was. Only in the sixth workshop a presentation was given on what a zoning plan actually is. During the break of the fifth workshop there was an opportunity for the first time to look into an already existing zoning plan. Several participants stated it had not been sufficiently clarified that the process was about making a zoning plan, rather than a detailed layout of the area. This could be one of the factors in the large number of contributions of participants on a 'wrong' abstraction level (see under ‘support of variety creation’).

Civil servants could also need analytical support, expertise or training. A training session with civil servants was held, in which their role in the process was explained. But they got no training or structured tips from IPP during the process with respect to presenting information to lay people. They were not trained in dealing with possible sensitive points and objections. During the process some visibly struggled in how to deal with attacks of participants.

Providing participants with financial reimbursement for their time was no issue in the process. In an early stage a civil servant suggested to give participants precedence in the later assignment of houses. Nothing really happened with the idea.

Score: -

_Give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise_

As process manager IPP (with Agora) was the only outside expert engaged to support the process. Of the survey respondents 92% found it a good thing if external expertise would have been available to carry out studies, 83% would appreciate the presence of external expertise during the workshop meetings. Some participants felt that the municipality did not have enough knowledge of certain matters. A clear example of the effect of a lack of support for participants arose when one of the current inhabitants of the area made a plan of his own. He did not elaborate certain ideas, because that would cost too much time and energy.

Although it was tried to have outside parties with relevant expertise in the workshop, like the water-board or power-company, in general these were not present. Consultation with them took place outside the process. For instance a working group Water was created, in which civil servants, the fire department, water-company and District water board speak about water themes. The main results of these separate consultations are fed back into the workshops.

Civil servants, councillors and the alderman also possess relevant expertise and participants appreciated the presence and an active attitude of them. Members of the core group were always present in the workshops, other civil servants only when they desired. The members of the core
group were all busy with taking notes, presentations, and so on. When subgroups were formed, some civil servants present sat with one specific subgroup. This led to uneven availability of expertise per subgroup\(^{59}\), influencing the way people thought. Others walked around to be available to whomever desired so. But in that case few appeals were made to their expertise. IPP provided no guidance in the choice between these modes of support (-).

The accessibility of relevant knowledge was better guarded in the blocks exercise in the fifth workshop, when it was arranged that with each subgroup a member of the artist team was present who knew the meaning of the material (blocks, flags and so on) to be used (+).

Score: 0

**Provide sufficient information to enable participation**

Two-thirds of the survey respondents found the municipality provided all relevant information. But 58% found they received insufficient information on paper prior to the workshops. As information missed costs of diverse options and financial feasibility were most mentioned. An example were the costs of moving the power line, on which information was not provided during most of the process. In contrast, two-thirds of participants found they received enough information *during* the workshops (for instance through presentations or handouts) (o).

Participants and other parties were also provided with information on process -, procedural and organisational aspects. In the project plan a chapter was included on the organisation and consultation structure of the process. The organisational structure was presented to the consultation group in a meeting, but not to the other participants. Information on the process set-up and intention of specific meetings was provided to participants on paper before the first workshop. After that information on the goal and agenda of the evening was provided at its start. Usually at the end of the evening the process-steps in the next periods were outlined (o).

The timeliness of information provided was a problem. Aside from the first workshop, preliminary to which the participants received an information package\(^{60}\), the participants did not receive information preliminary to the workshops. One reason for this was that regularly the information was only ready on the day of the workshop. This lack of information in advance made it difficult for participants to prepare and have a meaningful contribution (-).

Much information to participants was conveyed by material handed out to them at the workshops themselves, or through presentations by civil servants on a wealth of relevant topics.

\(^{59}\) The effect of which was strengthened because for the answering of some questions asked during the plenary presentations was referred to the subgroups

\(^{60}\) This contained a list with starting-points, an explanation of the procedure to be followed, a statute with rules of the game, data and locations of the meetings and the report of the study group quality
Sometimes copies of transparencies were handed out. From time to time the expertise of participants themselves was also tapped, when they were allowed to give a presentation themselves, for example on smell contours or their own ideas for filling in the area (+).

The results of studies were regularly presented later than announced, if at all. Several studies were finished too late to be of use to the process. As a result participants did miss relevant research results during (a large part of) the workshop period. This was experienced as an impediment. For example, in the preparatory process stage the municipal project group attempted to have ‘all’ relevant studies available at the beginning of the process. But two deadlines for finishing the studies were not met, even though their priority was increased. A study into the cost of moving or bringing underground the power line, the most controversial topic of all, that should be ready before the workshops, was never conducted (-).

Participants were also informed by holding excursions to relevant living areas in other municipalities for those interested (+).

Score: 0

Translate information into a usable format

The information provided on the evenings was given in the form of presentations, readers handed out, drawings hung up on the wall, scale models put up, and so on. Most information was presented verbally at the beginning of the evenings.

Of the respondents to the survey two-thirds found the information provided understandable, one-third found it understandable at times, and not at others. Of those polled 83% found the information provided during the process usable (+).

The way of presenting information was left to the civil servants. This led sometimes to amateurish presentations, hard to follow and thereby hampering the process. Despite some preliminary consultation, some participants too gave hard to understand presentations (-).

Some information presented on paper was unclear. The discussion pictures provided in the reader at the first workshop were not supplied with an explanation or legend. With respect to the final products a tangle of terms was used (discussion pictures, spots plans, (preliminary) zoning plans, visual quality plans, et cetera). This created a lack of clarity with participants. On the other hand, much information was provided to participants before the process in the form of tables and maps, and these were understandable and usable (0).

Much of the information provided was visualised, starting with the starting-points in the discussion pictures. All respondents found the use of visualisation aids like drawings, scale models, photos and so on helped in understanding problems, 50% found they contributed to estimating the feasibility of solutions and 42% found they helped providing insight in solutions.
92% found the extent to which these aids were used was fine (+).
Some presentations suffered from expert jargon or incomprehensible abbreviations, or being too abstract for non-experts in the matter. For example, the presentations on financial aspects held by a civil servant of land matters were not clear to many present. Participants also used incomprehensible jargon at times. But the general opinion was that the extent to which this happened was no impediment to participation in the process. Also, the process managers regularly took care to explain jargon, or checked whether it was understood (0).

Score: +

Give clarity about analytical tasks expected
The participants (among which some councillors) and the civil servants were supposed to perform analytical tasks in the process. In the memo IPP produced at the beginning of the process a task division for civil servants was given. They should indicate the feasibility of ideas, in a policy - (conflict with existing policy), technical - and financial sense. Later the tasks of being a 'source of inspiration' and supplier of data and proposals were added. Project group members should partake to the workshops, among other things to answer questions pertaining to their field of expertise. In a consultation with councillors preliminary to the start conference their roles were dealt with (+).

The role of participants was not clearly outlined. What was presented at the start conference, was the ‘assignment for the workshops'. These should deal with the conditions brought in by M&A and Council, existing qualities that had to be respected and maintained, the qualities to aim for in the new living area and the impediments taken stock of. The information on many procedural aspects of the process was not very clear (0).
Some forums performed tasks they were not supposed to. The core group, for example, in practice also dealt extensively with substantive and analytical matters (-).

Score: 0

11.4.5  GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO NEGOTIATION

Have a stakeholder/interest focus
There was some attention to the effects of moving Gary Horse on its users, but these were not thoroughly explored. Other effects were not attributed to specific groups. There was no attention paid to interests that might be specifically hurt or benefited (-).
As in De Bilt, different information was provided to different parties. The information provided to participants was already dealt with under 'provide sufficient information to enable participation'. The broader public received information at the public meetings, and somewhat through press releases and the poll held in November (although the information accompanying the poll was very meagre). Civil servants were kept up to date through meetings of the project group prior to the start of the participatory process, and updated with specific information when a contribution was asked from them, usually through informal contact. The civil servants most involved informed each other in the meetings of the core group, and through informal contact. Councillors were invited to the public meetings, and also received an information package prior to the final public meeting to help them in making up their minds. Several councillors also participated in the workshops, and therefore received the same information as other participants. M&A received information in the steering group meetings, through memos before the decision to proceed with the process in November 1998, and before decision-making on the outcomes. The Mayor and the Alderman of spatial planning attended the public meetings. Finally, the usual parties the municipality contacts in zoning plan development, like the power-company and District water board, were contacted to receive information from, but also to give information to in informal contact and meetings with civil servants.

There was a lack of differentiation of information with respect to the different participant groups. There was no attention to the possibility that current inhabitants among the participants might be interested in different information than for instance the ecologists, or future inhabitants. Similarly, no attention was paid to providing different groups in the wider population with different information (-).

Score: -

Map possibilities for negotiation

Possibilities for negotiation were not mapped. That civil servants kept the power line outside discussions for as long as possible, made the achievement of package deals more difficult.

Score: -

11.4.6 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO FLEXIBILITY

Make analysis a standby facility:

It was tried to have the analytical capacity available operate as a standby facility for the participants. Participants asked questions during the workshops. The civil servants in the core group next tried to get these answered by colleagues of other departments. There were no
arrangements made about capacity made available for this. Also, during the process participants or councillors were invited to call upon civil servants for extra information when needed. For instance, in the third workshop the project manager indicated a separate meeting on stench contours was possible for those interested. Five people took up this offer (+).

Participants complained after the process that at times no answers were given to their questions. Several stated after the process that the process manager should have guarded better that 'homework' ordered by participants was carried out. Because this not always happened the process was hindered or delayed at times by a continuing lack of clarity on certain points. Some questions kept on resurfacing during the process, like whether there might be alternative ways to finance the removal of the power line (for example by subsidies) (-).

It was sometimes difficult for the core group to get information, especially figures, from civil servants in the 'second ring'. These seemed to some extent afraid to commit themselves to specific statements. Also, competence and wanting to stay clear of meddling played a part (-).

Score: 0

**Make analysis continuously adaptable**

In itself the process of developing models was characterised by analytical adaptability. Models in the shape of discussion pictures were provided in the beginning, altered and added to by participants, then merged and elaborated to some extent by the design group, altered and added to again, and so on. Also, participants several times had the opportunity to influence by their valuations which were the remaining discussion points of the process (+).

The process was based on a stage-model type set-up with three stages: assessing the (problem) situation first, then determining starting-points for the models to be made, making the models and deciding on them. There was no iteration between these stages. Once the elements of the area were identified and valued and starting-points determined, these were no longer up for discussion or alteration. This limited flexibility, but also for instance led to starting-points hardly being put alongside the models developed in the workshops (-).

There was flexibility with respect to the set-up of the activities performed during the workshops. For example, the set-up of the second workshop was altered after the first, in the sense that the layout was dealt with somewhat more in-depth than planned earlier. In advance there was too much optimism on the activities that could be performed in the separate meetings, so they were spread out over more meetings during the process. In this sense the scheduling of analytical activity by the participants to the workshops was to some extent adaptable, but only by the process managers and civil servants, not the participants (o).

Civil servants supporting the process also showed flexibility in dealing with all the elements making up the models. They juggled with lot sizes, building more luxury houses instead of social
housing and so on, when this was necessary for financial or other reasons. But this was limited by things like the 5% norm for high-rise blocks (+).

Score: 0

11.4.7 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO TRUST

Be transparent

For the most part of the process it was unclear to participants how the municipality would deal with the process outcomes. But at the end of the process three-quarters declared this was sufficiently clear to them (o).

The design team translated the results of the workshops into (new) models in between the workshops. The day after the workshops agreement was reached with IPP on the substantive main points. After that the design team made many choices on its own, out of sight of the participants to the process (-).

As only the sketches of the groups and notes taken by the design team during the workshops were available, the design team found it hard to determine how broadly specific remarks were supported. They incorporated elements on ‘gut feeling’. The design team had the impression their translation usually was reasonably accurate, but their translation of the results triggered several discussions in the workshops (-).

The correctness of the presentation could be checked in the next workshop, when the models were presented. From the first to the second workshop group composition was constant, but checking proper processing was made difficult by the reduction of the number of models from five to two. Only half of the survey respondents were satisfied with the way in which workshop results were processed into models. But only 8% was really dissatisfied. The rest was ‘neutral’ about this (o). Although regularly members of the design team tried to explicate the procedures and line of reasoning followed by them in making models, schemes, tables and so on, participants complained after the workshops about a lack of clarity on the way the municipality translated workshop results. Unfamiliarity with the usual course of events within the municipality and the precise purpose and analytical planning of the process added to this (-).

Before the sixth workshop some participants were allowed to partake in the working groups Programme and Space. But after the final public meeting in December the definitive plan was not shown to the former participants before it went to M&A or the council commission. No information about the further process course was sent to the participants for several months. Former participants could be updated on the meeting in April 1999 in which the objections to the plan were dealt with. After this they only received information on the course of the proposals through the normal public announcements (o).
Studies largely took place out of sight of the participants. Only one-third of the respondents knew which studies were carried out for the project and two-thirds found study results were not communicated to them. Also, two-thirds had no clear view on the course of the research being performed. There was no overview of which studies were performed at any given time, or when specific studies were scheduled to be ready. On the other hand, only one-third found this clear view really necessary (-).

The methodology used was in general not sophisticated or complicated. Much use was made of tables to structure and classify information. Sometimes subdivisions applied were debatable and hard to control, for instance in the scheme that processed the results of the bicycle rides and the cultural-historical study. In this scheme the cut-off criteria for subdividing elements in categories like "Very High", "High", "Low" and so on were not given

There were differences in the way elements were grouped/classified in the tables, and the way they were classified in enumerations of starting-points, or to classify the discussion pictures at the beginning of the workshops. This worked confusing. There was also inconsistency between the way discussion points were formulated and grouped on forms used by workshop participants, in the poll held among the population, and on a form given to councillors to prepare before the final meeting in December. Choices were rephrased or moved from under the heading of one topic to another, topics were removed or added, all by the core group (-). Valuation of elements and what should happen to them took place by debate, or by valuing elements on a five-point Likert scale, for instance by dots. This procedure was at times mixed with offering a choice between two or three options for some 'decision points'.

Score: -

**Have procedures for reaching agreement on status information**

There were no explicit procedures for reaching agreement on the status of information brought forward in the process. Information or ideas brought in by participants appeared to have a lower status than those of the civil service, without this differential status being clarified before or during the process. An example of this was a plan worked out by a current inhabitant of the area. The process management did not allow presentation of this to other participants. Only in the fifth workshop he was allowed to explain the general ideas behind the plan. The plan itself was never shown or handed out to participants. He could present it to the civil servants, who said they would 'take it along'. To his idea this did not occur (-).

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61 This led to disputable results. For instance, 51% of those filling out the forms valued the arable land at the back of the existing houses at the Wijnbergen road either with ++ or one +, and 37% found it worth maintaining against only 23% who agreed to or insisted on removing it. Nevertheless it was valued in the category 'low`

62 A Likert scale measures to which extent a person (dis)agrees with a question. A common scale is 1 to 5
Another aspect related to the lack of procedures for dealing with the status of information was more or less opposed to the previous. The civil servants directly involved in the process, members of the core group and/or design team, took a reserved position during the workshops, hardly reacting to statements of participants. In hindsight, according to members of the design team, this led to statements that were substantively nonsensical or had undesirable consequences to go sometimes uncontested in the discussions (-).

Score: -

**Let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space**

The process set-up paid considerable attention to creating a shared problem description in the beginning of the process. The agenda of the administration was put along that of 'the citizens', and integrated into a set of starting-points for the workshops (+).

When on one of the information evenings before the process a retired architect kept a speech on the importance of a broad, sustainable societal view this led to formation of a 'study group quality', to formulate a 'view on society' with regard to the neighbourhood. This group met three times and eventually produced a report with a 'sustainable vision' on the new living area, elaborated in a set of recommendations, among which that the power line should go. This subset of participants therefore had influence on the problem delineation (+).

Next to the starting-points M&A put only one official substantive condition to the process: the process should yield a zoning plan for a 1000 houses in the area specified. In the process the line between conditions and starting-points was blurred. The condition of a 1000 houses turned out instrumental to a starting-point that was in reality a much harder condition: a balanced budget. When this was endangered, the number of houses to be constructed turned out to be very flexible upwards. Some participants questioned the condition of 1000 houses. They found that for a good plan a lower number should be considered.

In the survey participants stated that there were too many conditions to make real choices and perceived a number of 'conditions not mentioned by the municipality'. Half of them did not agree to the conditions put63(-)

An example of such a ‘condition not mentioned (at first) by the municipality was the 5% norm mentioned earlier. This 5% norm was not even mentioned as a starting-point but turned out to be very determining for the planning possibilities. By allowing only a limited amount of high-rise blocks a larger land area for the same number of houses was necessary. Participants attacked the 5% norm. They doubted its underlying rationale. Although the exact

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63 It is not clear whether with this really conditions or (also) starting-points were meant. In light of the reigning confusing about the line between those two the latter is not unlikely
status of the norm never became clear during the process, the civil servants nevertheless
defended it equally vehemently. At the final meeting in December it turned out that almost the
entire council wanted a study into the possibilities for more than 5% high-rise blocks. Although
M&A was against this, in the end the regulations of the definitive zoning plan allowed the
percentage of high-rise blocks to be at most 10%, instead of 5% (0).

The start conference was the last moment starting-points could be altered or added to. But the
process management preferred to see additions limited to two per subgroup. From then on the
starting-points were immutable, and ‘implicit’ starting-points and conditions deriving from
municipal policy as well. Discussion was limited to the ‘discussion points’ (-).

Another factor that limited the substantive manoeuvring space of participants was created by
attempts to structure the process. Throughout the process participants were asked to make
choices with respect to ‘decision points’, given checklists of issues to pay attention to when
filling in areas, propositions to react to, and so on. IPP was consulted on them, but the
municipality made the choice of these points and their formulation, and it also gave the choice
options per point (however, based on discussions in the workshop). Sometimes these analytical
aids were rather steering but participants easily accepted this limitation of their choice space,
and hardly or not proposed alterations to these lists (0).

Nevertheless, the whole process was aimed at participants shaping the final product, the zoning
plan. After the process the municipality attempted to have the usual comment on the draft
zoning plan also translated into specific substantive suggestions. These were put in a table and
in a meeting presented per commenter. For each point the municipality indicated how it planned
to deal with it (+).

Score: 0

Provide independent, trusted expertise
IPP was officially concerned with the process, not with substantial knowledge. In practice its
(indirect) influence on substantive aspects was considerable, and substantively its neutral
position could be questioned. IPP showed a positive inclination towards the agenda of the
ecologists among the participants, giving them considerable leeway during the workshops (-).
IPP brought along its own outside expert on cultural-archeological history, Agora.
The municipality took care of the other substantive issues dealt with. Agora was used as simply
another input provider, not as a check upon claims of the municipality (0).
No other external experts were present during the process in the workshops, or hired in to check on claims. Several participants indicated afterwards they would find the availability of external experts for studies and during the workshops a good thing. These could for instance have verified some calculations the municipality made (-).

Score: -

11.4.8 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO SUBSTANTIVE ENRICHMENT

Connect V/S learning to A/I learning
The workshops were the main forum for V/S learning during the process. Through debate, discussion and brainstorming in subgroups ideas and suggestions were tested to see which ones survived the selection environment of the workshops. This process was supposed to be fuelled by the results of A/I learning, mainly through studies carried out by the municipal apparatus. Questions of participants could lead to studies, but this link between A/I learning and V/S learning was not without problems. Firstly, not all requests led to timely execution of a study. Secondly, several studies were not geared to the information needs of the participatory process. Sometimes their results simply weren't available in time. Thirdly, the link was one-sided. There was no feedback from findings from the debates in the workshops into studies carried out. Also, most studies were one-time events, usually not provided to participants. Participants could not supply questions for them. All in all, the attempt to integrate V/S and A/I learning was there, but proceeded not without problems in practice.

Score: 0

Support variety creation
Most participants had contacts with the municipality before the process, by taking part in advisory forums, neighbourhood councils and the like, or by having been in contact on specific problems. Therefore, the likelihood of hearing new ideas was not high, unless the new type of process would be able to extract ideas from these well-known participants the means of contact up till then had been unable to (o).

The municipality hired an artists group as an ‘engine of creativity’, to ‘loose up the brains’. By visualising things, and by providing unusual and extreme examples of ways living areas could be filled in, they stimulated the participants to creative thought (+).
Although all involved parties were pleased with the contribution of the artist team, a discrepancy
arose. The participants were supposed to create a rough zoning plan with a high level of abstraction. The mind-loosening contributions of the artist team were all on the level of filling in the living area with buildings. The main contribution of the stimulation of creativity by the artist team therefore lay in the creation of the visual quality plan, not the preliminary zoning plan (-).

IPP tried to stimulate creativity by the way in which it ‘puts participants to work’. When for example participants in the fifth workshop should fill in the area, a map of the area had been taped down on the ground. Participants were provided with a checklist, and blocks, flags and pictures that represent different kinds of buildings and visual quality (+).

The degree of freedom provided to participants in their designing and discussions also influenced the amount of creativity possible. The conditions put to the topic of the process played a role in this. For instance, in the sixth workshop a participant stated that the possibility of allowing more high-rise blocks would lead to a more creative plan. The checklists provided in the sub groups with the themes attention should be paid to also precluded to some extent paying attention to other elements. The discussion pictures64 presented in the first workshop to stimulate the thoughts of participants were meant to indicate possibilities, not to mark off the playing field, but the sub groups mainly took over elements of the discussion pictures, without coming up with many new ones (-).

The number of models worked with was also important in this respect. The project manager and the design team preferred to work towards one plan as outcome, but eventually did not object to elaborating two plans. But during the process the design team continuously limited the number of models as soon as possible, for reasons of workability. This limited the variety of the plans (-).

A member of the process management team found that the process of having civil servants elaborate models between the workshops killed creativity, since the civil servants worked along the line of old models. Too much would already be set (-).

The number of creative suggestions was limited by the time available. Participants, as well as a member of the process management team, complained there was insufficient time for discussion in the workshops. By this not everyone got a chance to participate. Civil servants suggested that with more time the results of the process might have been more innovative (-).

Score: 0

**Support variety use**

In the beginning the process was structured by providing forms for the bicycle rides with elements selected by the core group already indicated on them. Participants could supplement

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64 Presenting for example illustrations (on maps) of the starting-points of the process and possibilities in the area of landscape and green, traffic and house construction
new elements, but other participants could of course not rate these, which made it unlikely they would be added to the elements already pre-selected. The aforementioned checklists and discussion pictures provided also pre-structured the activities of participants. Still, in many ways, there was a lack of structure. There was constant confusion between IPP and the civil servants on what making a zoning plan exactly entailed. Because there was no ‘dummy’ of what it should be no one knew exactly towards which result they were working. This was never exactly formulated. There was much tug-of-war between IPP and the civil servants on what the result of the next workshop evening should be. IPP did not always have an agenda for the evening. Little consultation on content took place between IPP and the civil servants of the core group outside the workshops. All in all this led to a frequent lack of structure in which the results of the evening would fit, meaning results of the evenings were sometimes not very useful or easy to process for the design team that had to work with them. No structure was offered for retaining variety that was not directly useful (-).

What clearly worked out positively on the use of the variety created during the process in the final results was the participation of council members of the committee on spatial planning. They took part in the workshops and are on public meetings. Before the final public meeting they met in a separate meeting in which they received additional substantial information on what was going on in the process. By these forms of participation they were earlier and better than usual informed of the relevant issues and difficulties in the discussion and more committed to the plans created in the process (+).

Suggestions created in the process on the ‘wrong’ more concrete abstraction level were to some extent incorporated in the visual quality plan. The intention of this plan was to give more specific intentions and recommendations, by word and picture, for the layout and design of the area and thus to function as an assessment framework for concrete building plans. It was also intended to stimulate all parties in the process of plan development to think along on the quality of the built and rural environment in the area. It therefore had sufficient status to safeguard use of the variety incorporated in it (+). But the visual quality plan could not incorporate all suggestions on the ‘wrong’, more concrete level. Many of those ‘drowned' before they could be incorporated anywhere (-).

Score: 0

In table 11.5 we can see the extent to which the design guidelines were met in the case.
Table 11.5: overview of application of the design guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design guideline</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>translate information into a usable format</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give clarity about analytical tasks expected</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map possibilities for negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be transparent</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on status information</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the design guideline was well met in this case
o = the design guideline was to some extent met in this case
- = the design guideline was poorly or not at all met in this case

The above again gives rise to a few first conclusions. Again, the Habermasian perspective of IPP, as in De Bilt, leads to a neglect of representativeness and banning of negotiation.
Next, the focus of IPP foremost on participation per se and the process, and attending neglect of some substantive aspects, led to an inefficiently conducted process, delayed and by that also delaying decision-making.

**New guideline**
Some civil servants found there was too little time for discussion and for the subgroups to perform their tasks during the workshops. For instance, for the placement of the blocks in the
fifth workshop the thirty minutes scheduled turned out to be grossly insufficient. Too many tasks and topics were often crammed into too little time. An example of this was the debate on the public meeting closing off the process, in which ten topics were dealt with within an hour. Regularly too many topics were dealt with in a too limited time, which led to shallowness in dealing with issues, or inability to deal with some of them at all.

The above points to the importance of adding a new guideline, contributing mostly to efficiency: do not overburden with tasks.
12.1.1 A TEST CASE

The final case presented in this book is different by nature of the cases presented before. From the latter lessons were learned on how things 'go in the real world'. In the case presented in this chapter I deliberately tested the design guidelines outlined and sharpened in the previous chapters by incorporating them in the process design. The case was conducted as a joint assignment of the problem owner, the municipality of Ede, and the Centre for Underground Construction, by a team from the department of this author. I was a member of this team.

The case is mainly intended to test a 'quick scan' designed by the project manager (see Enserink, 2000). Aside from this, another member of the team tested his guidelines for process architecture and management of interactive policymaking (see Edelenbos, 2000). And I tested my guidelines for policy analytical support.

In subsection 12.1.3 I will outline how this context influenced the extent to which the guidelines could be incorporated in the case. First I will give a short introduction to the case.

12.1.2 INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE

The HSL-East

In 1994 the ministry of Transport, Public Works and Waterworks (TPW) decides to look into the possibilities of connecting Schiphol, Amsterdam and Utrecht through high speed rail with Germany: the HSL-East. The existing railroad track also is considered in need of improvement for domestic rail traffic. The plans for the railroad are coupled with the possible broadening of the A12 highway, which on large parts of the trajectory follows the existing railway closely.

Ede, a 100,000 inhabitant's park-town, is one of the municipalities along the proposed HSL-East track. The existing railway line Utrecht-Arnhem cuts the town in two. The new high-speed rail-line would follow the existing trajectory (see figure 12.1).

An open planning process

In the decision process on the HSL-East experiments take place with an open planning process. In the early stages of the process a so-called “Bestuurslijke Begeleidingsgroup (administrative coordination group)” or BBG is formed. This is an informal administrative co-ordination group and advisory council, aiming at realisation of the HSL-East. In it partake three provinces and four interregional co-operating communities representing the municipalities, representatives of Rijkwaterstaat (RWS) and the ministry of TPW, and the infrastructure maintenance part of the railroads (NS-RIB). The BBG should informally explore problems and possible solutions, preliminary to the official procedure, resulting in advice to the ministers of TPW and Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (HSPE) on which solutions to study or elaborate further in
the official procedure. Provincial and local authorities, water-boards and regional pressure groups are consulted informally by the BBG. The local authorities are held responsible for informing local pressure groups and citizens. In some instances the latter leads to the formation of local action committees and civil initiatives in the villages along the railway track that express their concerns and issues.

The BBG orders studies into the effects of additional railroad - and highway infrastructure on environment, spatial planning, nature and landscape in the area. The municipalities co-operate to this study. It results in a problem definition in May 1995.

Next the BBG orders a first study into the possibilities to fit in the expanded railroad and road. On the basis of this it screens possibilities for fitting in the railroad track to be further studied in the formal planning phase. The findings are described in an Exploratory memo, offered to the ministers of TPW and HSPE in September 1996. The screening reduces the options for Ede to either a railway expansion on ground level or a deepened construction.

**The Trajectory/EIA-procedure**

The minister of TPW decides the regional directorates of RWS will carry out a formal Trajectory/EIA-procedure in co-operation with NS-RIB. The Notification of Intent of the route part Utrecht-Arnhem appears in January 1997\(^{65}\). Shortly after appearance of the Directives in August

\(^{65}\) Broadening the track between Amsterdam and Utrecht has already been decided upon in another framework
1997 the study starts. The promising solutions from the Exploratory memo of the BBG are used in the EIA as basis for further elaboration. A project organisation is established. The BBG remains in existence to provide advice and judgement to the minister.

Ede requests the ministers of TPW and HSPE to also study possibilities for a tunnel. It is agreed Ede will elaborate these itself. Ede has consulting firms develop a tunnel variant, the 'Ede variant' (see 12.3). A 'Masterplan' for the urban structure of the municipality appears in April 1998 (DHV, 1998), in which the railroad tunnel is fitted in in the urban fabric.

*Figure 12.2 the tunnel construction in the Masterplan of Ede*

RWS en NS-RIB also supplement the EIA-procedure with an open planning process. They establish local sounding-board groups and ‘aspect counselling groups’ with experts of all kinds of organisations, who are involved in questions on methodology and validity of results.

In the EIA also a screening of alternatives takes place, which results in the end of 1998 in a screening document (NS-RIB et al, 1998), in which a tunnel for Ede is rejected. Ede makes clear to agree to expansion of the railroad only when this will take place in a deepened or tunnel construction. The minister says she will take it into consideration.

Towards the end of 1998 Ede consults with RWS and NS/RIB on the Ede variant. This results in a memo in which it is compared to the variants NS/RIB screened out in the EIA. Compared to the cost estimates made for Ede in its development of the Ede variant, different functional assumptions of NS-RIB lead to a considerable rise in the cost differences between the deepened and tunnel variant on the one hand, and the ground level variant on the other. The functional assumptions of NS-RIB are still a topic of dispute with Ede.

**Introduction of the quick scan**

In the summer of 1998 the Centre for Underground Construction (abbreviated in Dutch to COB) contacts Ede. COB had had a quick scan developed earlier by Delft University of Technology (DUT), intended to help in deciding between above ground, in ground and underground alternatives for infrastructure. COB offers this quick scan, awaiting a first 'in vivo' test, to Ede to look into the possibilities of fitting the HST-track in its urban fabric. Ede decides the quick scan test can take place in the spring of 1999. The exercise will be executed in co-operation between DUT and the municipality of Ede, which will provide organisational and administrative support.
Ede sees the exercise as another opportunity to bring its alternative ‘tunnel’-solution for passage of the HST-track through Ede under the attention of National Government, and possibly to get it incorporated in the EIS after all.

In January 1999 agreement is reached between the team of DUT and Ede on the problem definition to start from. Practical arrangements are made on dates, way of working, responsibilities, roles and tasks and the draft action plan, concept process design for the quick scan and the concept statute. The grounds for stakeholder selection are discussed and agreed upon. Agreements on mutual information provision are reached. After the meeting we start our preparations. Most of the guidelines for policy analysis, and the guidelines of my colleagues, are translated into a set-up for the (analytical) process.

12.1.3 | THE QUICK SCAN

In the case we test the design for a participatory ‘quick scan – approach’ described in Enserink (2000). The quick scan is an instrument for integral assessment of surface and sub-surface alternatives for infrastructure construction. It should help formulate a shared problem definition, generate alternatives, and screen and (pre-)select the most ‘promising’ alternatives for further elaboration. The quick scan combines an integrated approach to process design and substantive analysis. It is designed to take place early in the problem exploration phase and to actively involve stakeholders.

The quick scan starts with a given land-use problem. After the initial problem formulation by the problem owner and the analysts, an iterative process starts to evaluate, delineate and reformulate the problem and to explore the solution area. For this the team draws up three or four possible/plausible solutions for the initial (land-use) problem. These discussion-alternatives are discussed with stakeholders to explore the problem area and generate alternative solutions, or enrich the existing ones. The discussions also give insight in the objectives of stakeholders, which are translated into criteria. New issues, for instance related problems like congestion on underlying infrastructure, can be used to enrich the definition of the initial problem. Statements in the quick scan on feasibility and desirability of solutions are based on a scorecard in which the scores of the alternatives on the criteria coming forward in the process, and a monetary score derived from an accounting model, are presented.

For Ede the basic set-up of the quick scan is worked out in two half-day workshops in which the participants should reformulate the initial problem formulation, design new solutions, adapt discussion-solutions presented to them or add their favourite attributes to proposed solutions.
Figure 12.3 The set-up of the quick scan in Ede

**Living document 1**
- preliminary definition and context of problem
- discussion alternatives
- rules of the game

**Living document 2**
- new problem definition
- report of workshop 1
- preliminary criteria
- generated alternatives
- preliminary assessment

**Living document 3**
- report of workshop 2
- criteria for evaluation
- generated alternatives
- preliminary assessment

**Final Report**
- Living document 4
- description of process
- problem definition
- alternatives
- criteria for evaluation
- scorecard
- policy recommendation
Before these start, interviews are conducted with the problem owners (Ede and NS) and interested would-be participants. In a final meeting the resulting report is presented. A core team of two policy analysts and two policy scientists of DUT facilitates and manages the process, provides knowledge and edits a 'living document' (see below). Two teams of economists, engineers and designers belonging to a consulting firm and a research institute support the core team.

**Incorporating the design guidelines in the quick scan**

Some of 'my' guidelines are already incorporated in the basic design of the quick scan. Some are built into the set-up and support for the process. We also try to combine a number of guidelines by the use of a *living document* (van der Most et al, 1998). This is a document adapted after every workshop. The living document is meant for reporting of meetings and to help participants prepare for coming meetings. In total, four versions of the living document are planned. The fourth constitutes the final report.

Another way we incorporate guidelines into the process is to incorporate them into a set of rules of the game, brought together in a statute for the process.

Finally, other guidelines we try to follow simply by our way of working in the process, and the way we deal with and present information and analysis. The exact way the different guidelines were incorporated in the process will be outlined in 12.4.

### 12.1.4 THE WORKSHOPS

Those stakeholders that have shown interest in participation are sent the first version of the living document. It contains among other things a preliminary problem definition and the three publicly disputed alternatives.

**First workshop**

The intention of the *first workshop*, taking place on March 18th in the town hall, is to generate as much variety in problem perceptions, suggestions for solutions and criteria for judging solutions as possible. It has an afternoon and an evening session. Both sessions have a plenary and a working group part. Plenary introductions, presentations and summaries are given.

In the working groups the participants are asked to improve the problem statement, to discuss the three discussion-alternatives if so desired and to think up and actually sketch their preferred (new) solution(s) or partial solutions on a map.

In the afternoon session three sub-groups are formed. These groups all get the following assignment: 'Develop one or more alternatives for fitting in the HSL-East in or close to Ede.' The working groups are each presided by a member of the core team. After the working groups
sessions each group plenary presents their own alternative to the other participants, who are allowed to ask questions. Next the individual participants are given the assignment to provide each alternative with comments, by means of indicating their strengths, weaknesses and remaining questions using "post-it's".

In the evening session, since there are much fewer persons, only one working group is formed, which starts with a round to find out which issues are important to those present. Next participants are enabled to study the results of the afternoon groups and write down written comments on the post-it's.

The first workshop leads to eight variants in total. In them also attention is paid to the local traffic handling system, parking problems in the station area, and the connection to the 'chicken-line'. The latter in most plans should become a 'light-rail' track. Some alternatives change the location of the station from the east to the west of Ede. The alternatives are provided with an explanation and a first stock-taking of strengths and weaknesses, and remaining questions about them.

**Between the first and second workshop**

After the first workshop we elaborate the alternatives and their variants. Based on our elaboration the consulting firm draws detailed maps of the alternatives, and the research institute makes rough calculations on their costs and monetary estimates of some environmental effects.

*Table 12.1: the clusters of alternatives*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster</th>
<th>Main characteristics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prolonged tunnel, 3 alternatives</td>
<td>Tunnel is prolonged to the West compared to the ‘Ede variant’. Variants mainly differ in having the prolonged section either wholly below ground level or partially in a dike, and in moving or not moving the station from the East side to the West side of Ede</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic tunnel, 3 alternatives</td>
<td>Tunnel as in the ‘Ede variant’. Variants mainly differ in having the station were it is now, moving it to the West side of Ede, or moving it to the West side but retaining the old station in a reduced function</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open-closed variant, 2 alternatives</td>
<td>Parts of the trajectory to Ede in a closed tunnel, part only deepened. Variants differ mainly in moving the station to the West side and the centre of Ede, respectively</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Fridge’, 5 alternatives</td>
<td>Other alternatives, disposed off during first workshop, amongst which the ground level – and deepened alternative studied in the EIA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
We group the alternatives into three clusters with common characteristics: either the length of the underground stretches; the alternation of open and closed stretches; or explicit attention for other means of public transport. We also introduce a fourth category: the 'fridge' category in which we gather all 'wild' solutions which have been mentioned (and tracked by our assistants) but disposed off during the first workshop without much discussion.

We derive a 'package of wishes and demands' from the interviews prior to the workshops and the minutes of the subgroups as basis for evaluation criteria. We prepare a scorecard on which we present the alternatives developed in the first workshop, set off against the list of evaluation criteria.

We receive from RWS\textsuperscript{66} a list we requested for, of functional guidelines NS-RIB uses in its calculations. In the first workshop we had no scheme of which issues should always be found back in the design, and which demands on its form it should meet. This means the alternatives deriving from that workshop are somewhat hard to compare. Therefore, we use this list, as well as other sources, to derive a number of crucial functional assumptions for the railroad\textsuperscript{67}. We figure out what effect these different assumptions have on the effects and costs of the different alternatives. We will ask participants to make explicit choices with respect to assumptions in the second workshop to give direction to the design process. Assumptions should be translated into one or several alternatives.

\textit{Table 12.2 different cost estimates (costs in millions of guilders)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variants</th>
<th>Costs (research agency): calculated for core team</th>
<th>Costs (consulting firm): calculated for Ede</th>
<th>Costs (NS-RIB): calculated for RWS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ground level</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deepened</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>406</td>
<td>1250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunnel</td>
<td>625</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We produce a second version of the living document. In this version we leave out chapters that have remained unaltered with respect to the first version, and refer for these to this first version. The second living document contains a detailed set-up of the second workshop. We present the crucial functional assumptions we have identified, and the (cost) consequences of differences in choosing these assumptions. We outline the differences between the assumptions used by the railroad, the consulting firm in its development of the Ede variant and the research institute in performing its cost calculations\textsuperscript{68}.

\textsuperscript{66} Which in turn has received it from the railroads
\textsuperscript{67} An example of this is the maximum speed that the track should be able to accommodate
\textsuperscript{68} These differences pertain to construction, configuration of the rails and the station, the horizontal alignment and long-term reservations on behalf of future extension options
We present a number of topics we think attention should be paid to in elaborating the alternatives in this second workshop. An example of this is the location of the station. Minutes of the discussion in the different sub-groups of the last time are given. Maps, cost estimates (including some ‘monetised’ environmental costs) and a short explanation for the eight newly generated alternatives are presented per group from which they derive. For the alternatives derived in the afternoon session also the results of the strength- and weakness analysis and remaining questions of the first workshop are presented. We present the clusters, including the ‘fridge’ and the first draft of the list of criteria. In the foreword we invite participants again to comment on the contents. We ask them to fill in the scorecard provided separately with the document and to add any missing criteria to the preliminary list.

The participants receive the second living document a week before the workshop. A minority of them fills in the scorecard and some new criteria are suggested. In practice, this does not lead to changes in the preliminary list as the newly suggested criteria are very narrowly formulated and already included in the broader criteria formulated by the project-team.

A week before the second workshop we receive, from our contacts with the consulting firm, of which a branch not involved in our workshops is involved in developing the HSL-East, a letter the minister of TPW has send to all parties represented in the BBG, among which Ede. In it she announces among other things that she finds the Ede variant worthwhile to be elaborated further. Instead of incorporating it directly into the Route memorandum/EIA procedure, she proposes to elaborate this variant in parallel to the formal procedure. If it turns out possible to change its concept in such a way that its costs will diminish she will determine a standpoint on incorporation of the variant in the official procedure. We copy the relevant parts of the letter to hand out on the second workshop.

The second workshop
The second workshop takes place on April 29th. Its main objective is to improve, screen and elaborate some of the alternatives generated.

The participants are divided in four heterogeneous working groups. Each group is asked to work with a different cluster of alternatives. Three groups should design a privileged alternative using the main characteristics of the allotted cluster, and adding more detail on related topics than in the first workshop. The members of the ‘fridge’ group are free to pick whatever they like out of the fridge. They pick a glassine tube.
Afterwards the results are presented and explained. This time seven alternatives have been sketched. Two short rounds of commenting and evaluation follow: the first one using "post-it's" on which participants can comment on strengths, weaknesses and questions; the second one sticking green and red dots to measure approval and disapproval for an alternative. After evaluation of the results of the approval/disapproval round we split up again. This time participants can pick their winner to work on. Four groups of different size are formed and asked to perform five tasks. The first task is to use the comments to improve their favourite solution, by resolving the formulated issues, by enhancing its strengths and by resolving the weak spots. It is also requested to take stock of opportunities and threats with respect to the feasibility of the alternative. Their third task is to take stock of possibilities and guidelines to enlarge the opportunities or reduce the threats. They are also requested to point out winners and losers of the end result. Finally, their last task is to formulate remaining questions. Each group works out an alternative in further detail. Next the four elaborated alternatives are presented and after that the results are summarised by the process manager. The second and last workshop results in 7 alternatives. Four of them are elaborated in the second round of working groups, three are not. Each alternative is provided with an explanation and a first stock-taking of strengths and weaknesses, and questions it gave rise to. Finally, we have a first valuation of the alternatives by means of the dot stickers.

Between the second workshop and the presentation of final results
The alternatives derived from the second workshop are again redrawn and calculated by the supporting experts. For six out of the seven alternatives developed in the first round the research institute performs calculations (the seventh is excluded from this because of the extremely low support for it in the workshop, evidenced by its very negative ‘dot score’). We update the criteria list, translating the fire brigade concerns into the criteria internal and external safety.

We make a third version of the living document. This includes a full report of the plenary part and the discussions in the sub-groups in the second workshop. It also presents the alternatives worked out in the workshops, split in two categories. The first contains the alternatives that were chosen to be elaborated further in the second round during the second workshop, the second category contains the alternatives only elaborated in the first round of the second workshop. The results of the model calculations are also presented in the document, amounting to a preliminary monetary evaluation (cost-benefit analysis) of the alternatives. The document also presents a definitive list of criteria for evaluation. The participants are again asked to qualitatively judge the six alternatives with the new set of criteria. Participants can post or fax the scorecard provided for this to the core team.
On the basis of the report of the second workshop, the new results from the accounting model, the results of the scorecards and the concept evaluation of the alternatives developed in the third version of the living document a final, official report is written in which is indicated which of the solutions obtained should be considered promising or less promising. This final version of the living document combines, sometimes (slightly) altered chapters from the different previous versions. Additionally, it contains a description of the course of the workshops. The final list of criteria with their genesis and relevant stakeholder group behind them is presented. The alternatives elaborated in the second workshop are presented and their results on the calculating model compared.

In a final evaluation chapter both quantitative (monetary) and qualitative evaluations are combined in a scorecard. By logical consistent reasoning (dominance) some alternatives are marked as ‘less promising’ and others as ‘promising’ solutions that should be further detailed and evaluated in the EIS procedure. In this way the alternatives generated are reduced to four potentially worthwhile alternatives for further elaboration. The two alternatives imposed by the Minister (‘on the ground’ and ‘in a cutting’) are not among these four, since these are dominated by other alternatives.

The report concludes that one or more tunnel variants deserve attention in the decision making on the doubling of the track and should be detailed further. Additionally, the report concludes that moving the current station to the western part of town, as well as the idea of a ‘glassine tube on ground level’, also deserve serious attention.

Presentation of the final results

The final report ‘Broadening in Ede’ is presented on June 3, 1999 at the town hall to participants, representatives of the Ministry of TPW and the railroads, the alderman, council members and the local and regional press. Interviews take place with the alderman, a participant and the chief engineer-director of the regional directory of RWS to reflect upon the process and its outcomes.

12.1.5 | AFTERMATH

In February 2000 the quick scan results are one of the reasons for M&A of Ede to order an exploratory study by an external consulting firm into the desirability and feasibility of moving the train station to the west of Ede. The study concludes that maintaining the station on its current location is the best solution. It is offered to the minister of TPW in June 2000. Based on the study no attention is paid in the EIA to moving the station.

In the spring of 2000 Ede presents a new version of the Ede variant, a half-open tunnel, which is shorter and cheaper than the earlier variant and the deepened variant of NS. In this variant the track is only partially covered with plates at three crossings and the station. The municipality is
prepared to carry part of the costs. The minister of TPW includes the plan in the official Route memorandum/EIA procedure.

Meanwhile, surprising developments take place in the study on the HSL-East as a whole. Developing ideas on a more efficient use of the existing tracks, instead of doubling the number of tracks, turn out in the course of time to be cheaper and to solve the problems as well. This leads, despite resistance by Parliament, the BBG and most municipalities, including Ede, to a cabinet decision on 15 June 2001 to accommodate the HSL-East and the growth in rail traffic by a more efficient use of the existing track. The Route memorandum/EIA procedure is stopped. Measures on the existing track have to be elaborated in the framework of the normal spatial planning procedures. This development seems to be the end of plans to deepen the railroad track in Ede, since the extra costs for this in contrast to the whole costs for the utilisation variant seem excessive to the minister of TPW. But in the first half of 2003 the old plans of Ede make a comeback, when the minister of HSPE funds a new study by Ede into the cost and the effects on the environment and urban development of a deepened railroad and movement of the station (De Gelderlander, 19-02-2003). This new ‘masterplan’ is finished in 2005. At the presentation of the annual budget of national government, in September 2005, the minister of TPW puts aside 300 million euro for ‘municipalities with railroad problems’. Ede is on the list of possible recipients.

12.2

THE CASE JUDGED BY THE NORMATIVE ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK

Was the welfare of all parties involved served by its outcomes? If not, who won and who lost?

It seems logical, since we choose Ede and its surroundings as our geographical delineation, to choose parties concerned with the fitting in of the HSL through Ede as relevant for the welfare evaluation. With respect to the outcomes, there are on the one hand the outcomes of the quick scan itself, embedded in a report, and on the other hand the further effects of these on the municipal process of Ede and/or the HSL-procedure. Since I am in the end interested in welfare effects in the real world, I am mainly interested in the second type of outcomes. When we look to these effects of the outcomes on the wider policy process, they seem minor at the short term, but larger in the longer term. The Ede variant did get included in the EIA, but in an open-closed-open-closed version we screened out in the quick scan. Ede had a study performed
into the possibilities for moving the station, but the results of this were negative. But in the finishing stages of writing this thesis new life seems to be put into these plans. On the whole, the verdict on the longer-term welfare effects of the process is still out. Therefore, specific winners and losers are also hard to pinpoint.

Were those expected to loose from decisions compensated for their losses?
Since no definitive decisions were taken on the subject, it is impossible to say whether those suffering from those future decisions were (to be) compensated.

Were all affected by (proposed) decisions allowed to state themselves the gains or losses they expect from the decision?
Participants were in several ways and on several occasions enabled to state their own interests and preferences. Firstly, we asked a subset of the participants about their interests and preferences in the interviews by phone before the process. Secondly, interests and preferences could be forwarded in the discussions in the workshops, and were recorded by minute secretaries. Thirdly, they could score alternatives on effects (which include gains and losses to themselves) two times in the process. These scorecards formed an important input in the final dominance analysis we performed.

Table 12.3: normative evaluation of the outcomes of the case Ede

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Norms</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

12.3
THE INTERMEDIATE FACTORS

Comprehensiveness
No definitive decisions were taken on the basis of the quick scan. But we were able to broaden the field of topics taken into account. In the discussions in the working groups participants broadened the discussion from construction of the HST to issues of urban policy, traffic and transport policy and so on. Also, they touched upon issues like a broader notion of costs than looking strictly to the railroad, also including land made unusable for construction. After the process moving the station played a part in the discussions again, and this at least led to a new study (+).
On the minus side, looking back, it seems we narrowed the problem description too much, since we did not take into account the possibility the track might not be broadened after all. Allowing the possibility of keeping two tracks would have allowed us to deal with the question what to do with the passage through Ede in that case, something Ede has to deal with at this time (-).

Score: 0

**Efficiency**

The process is finished in the time frame given for it beforehand. Several of its results are rapidly translated by Ede into decisions. Firstly, the discussion on moving the station is translated into a decision to have this studied, which in turn delivers a report in a course of months. The negative outcome of this study is next translated into the decision by the minister of TPW no to study moving the station in the EIA.

Another piece of information rapidly translated into decisions is the half-open tunnel developed during the workshops. This is worked out further and within a year presented by Ede and included by the minister of TPW in the official Route memorandum/EIA procedure (+).

There were no discussions or conflicts on abstract issues in the workshops, detouring from the work and topics at hand. Neither conflict arose on abstract issues during the presentation evening. No participant complained about repetition of discussions in the process (+).

Only 15% of the participants found the information provided in the living document too much. It therefore seems we were largely successful in avoiding irrelevant and unnecessary information (+).

Score: +

**Representativeness**

Three-quarters of those surveyed found the composition of workshop participants not good. But they were divided on which parties were missed. No single party was missed by a majority of participants. Missed were among others public transport companies. Also mentioned were parties that were present, like environmental groups, councillors and civil servants of Ede and representatives of business. Maybe not enough representatives of these parties took part (-).

Although the group participating to the process was relatively broad, some relevant parties were missing, or only present as observers. It is clear that the refusal of parties like NS and RWS to partake as participants rather then as observers meant a blow to the representativeness of
participants. Neighbouring municipalities and the province did not come. Also, and probably partially because of this, inhabitants of Ede dominated the process, meaning that tunnel solutions were favoured, whereas a wider set of interests might have put more importance on cost aspects, for example (-).

Score: -

**Competence**

The substantive knowledge of participants seemed sufficient to participate. That many of our participants were pensioners might raise questions on the –up-to-date-ness of their knowledge. Most participants were relatively well informed on matters. This was probably also partially attributable to many of our participants also being a member of the sounding-board group of RWS. Participants seemed to regard the substantive information they received from us sufficient to be able to make rough designs. 69% of those surveyed found the information provided in the living document sufficient to participate competently in the process, only 15% found insufficient information was given. Two-thirds did not miss any specific information item in the living document. But the effectiveness of the information provided in bringing participants to a competent level might have been lessened by its late delivery. Several participants complained about receiving the living document too late and stated to need more time to read it and discuss the outcomes with their constituencies (0).

There did seem to be an effect of a relative difference in knowledge during the process. In the subgroups those with most relevant knowledge, mostly the civil servants of Ede, sometimes dominated (somewhat) (-).

92% of participants found their role and that of others in the quick scan clear. This did not prevent that participants still needed some time to get used to their new roles, which were more active then usual. Many participants in particular had difficulty or were hesitant to actually draw alternatives, rather than just discussing them (0). Also 92% of participants found the rules of the game and the process set-up of the quick scan completely or sufficiently clear (+).

Score: 0

**Negotiation**

Since crucial parties as RWS and the railroads only agreed to be present in the process as observers and for answering questions, real negotiations did not take place. Topics for negotiation were present though. For instance, just after the masterplan of Ede had appeared,
the municipality had offered to RWS extra income that would result from the plan for the municipality to cover part of the additional costs of the tunnel. But these issues did not come up in the workshop (-).

The topic of compensation (for example for a decrease in house values) was mentioned in discussions during the workshops among participants and the alderman. Some participants said to be prepared to pay extra real estate taxes to get the railway track underground, and claimed their neighbours would be prepared to do so too. Also possibilities were mentioned to extract money from other parties, of which the value of their property would increase, or who could avoid certain costs, when a tunnel would be constructed (+).

Score: 0

**Flexibility**

Developments external to the quick scan process, like the letter of the minister of TPW or the functional requirements provided by RWS, were immediately incorporated in the process. Participants also seemed to feel their progress was not hampered by insufficient analytical flexibility. However, we were not able to deal satisfactorily for participants with all matters and issues coming forward during the process. We simply lacked the time and/or capacity.

Score: 0

**Trust**

Trust was not really a problem in the quick scan process. With respect to decision-makers, no participants were distrustful of the municipality of Ede, and most participants were not hostile towards NS or RWS (+).

With respect to experts, our own independence/neutrality seemed largely unproblematic. 82% of the participants in the survey found the process manager did not meddle in substantive affairs, and 83% found the working group chairmen kept their substantive neutrality. 89% of participants found the behaviour of our supporting experts 'fairly neutral'. The experts were seen as open, to give reasonably neutral information and not to be steering. To some extent the information of the consulting firm was received with less suspicion than that of NS-RIB/RWS. 38% judged the observer role of RWS/NS-RIB positively, another 38% neutrally, and 25% negatively. 56% would have liked to see them in another role. Mentioned in this respect was among other things 'more objective' (o).

NS nor RWS made a problem of the involvement of the consulting firm that had helped develop the Ede variant. Maybe it helped that another branch of the firm was involved in helping develop
the HSL-East. One small incident did occur. During the presentation of the expert of the consulting firm of the three discussion alternatives in the afternoon of the first workshop, which was somewhat biased towards the tunnel alternative, the project manager of RWS interfered and explained the necessity of more elaborate functional guidelines (+).

No one uttered doubts about the impartiality of the accounting model from the research institute. But civil servants of Ede were sceptic about the model and multi-criteria analysis, because both would suggest an unwarranted hardness and objectivity of results and figures (o).

**No one questioned during the process the expertise of either the core team, supporting experts, civil servants or RWS and NS (+).**

No one objected to the statute or a specific rule. Aside from some small remarks by a few participants on the content of different versions of the living document, the status of information in the process also was unquestioned. Participants did not comment on the processing of results (+).

Score: +

*Substantive enrichment*

46% of the respondents to the survey gained new insights in the problem, 54% gained new insights in the possible solutions. 30% gained more insight in costs and other effects (+).

The quality and especially innovativeness of the alternatives resulting from the workshops was meagre. All participants clung to the pre-given delineation of the problem, geographically as well as otherwise. Some refinements were added on the basis of the discussions, like for instance the noise hindrance of an existing business estate in the West of Ede, which would diminish by baffle boards accompanying a broadening of the track. All variants eventually selected limited themselves to the existing route. Basically, only two main construction plans were pinpointed in the final report as promising. These were firstly three slightly different versions of the Ede variant. The other variant, the so-called ‘glassine tube’, had been considered before by the municipality. Most suggestions for ‘dressing up’ the variants were also far from new, but mentioned before in the Masterplan of Ede, or suggested earlier inside the municipal apparatus. Minutes and observation suggest that most creative ideas derived from civil servants. With respect to new ‘dressing up’ suggestions it was only found surprising that the moving of the station is put on the agenda again, since this never was brought forward in the normal procedure.

**Only one-third of participants surveyed thought the process delivered new substantive results.**

When asked what the process did deliver only 10% answered the process brought forth clearly new variants/alternatives. 40% found the process led to a dressing up of the variants/alternatives with related topics (-).
91% of participants found their ideas/interests back sufficiently in the living document. There was also an effect of the results of the quick scan on the wider policymaking process, at least on a municipal level, where our recommendation of studying a move of the station indeed led to a follow-up study, but this seemed largely ritual\(^69\). Nevertheless, it was again a topic in a later study (and again rejected) (+).

The quick scan was intended to lead to an ‘authorative’ screening of alternatives, which might strengthen their position. In this respect we can doubt our results somewhat. The grades we elicited for the alternatives at the presentation indicate that the glassine tube, which we considered promising, is considered otherwise by the participants. It played no role in municipal or other discussions thereafter (-).

Score: 0

Table 12.4: overview of presence of the intermediate factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate factors</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the intermediate factor was (almost) fully developed in this case
0 = the intermediate factor was to some extent present in this case
- = the intermediate factor was not or hardly present in this case

\(^{69}\) Its clients were M&A of Ede, avowed opponents of moving the station. At the presentation of the final results of the quick scan the Alderman had stated to see nothing in moving the station, and to find it a waste of time to study this. The bureau conducting the study had performed a study in the past opposing a moving of the station
12.4

THE DESIGN GUIDELINES FOR POLICY ANALYSIS

12.4.1 | GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO COMPREHENSIVENESS

**Have a broad scope**

In making the first living document, we used documents of the Route memorandum/EIA procedure, newsletters, documents sent to us by the municipality and by the consulting firm. We used interviews with civil servants of Ede, project managers of RWS and NS-RIB, and interviews by phone with stakeholders. From these sources we derived information on the different aspects of existing problems, views on new problems possibly caused by circulating solutions, ideas on solutions and criteria for judging those solutions. We for example surfaced consequences for Ede of doubling the track, but also traffic and other problems related to the existing track. We mapped existing municipal plans for the station area (+).

We looked for substantive developments and issues in other arenas that might affect choices made on fitting in the HSL-East in Ede. Many different issues and problems turned out to be interwoven with a possible doubling of the railroad track. Plans for a metropolitan transport system around Utrecht (RandstadRail) constitute just one example.

Many municipal choices in Ede, for instance with respect to a new main road structure, depended on the (way of) broadening the track. In the first living document we therefore included information on related and to our view relevant problems and topics inside as well as outside Ede, to enlarge the scope of the solution space available to participants, and to enhance the feasibility of alternatives developed in light of the context of the project.

We also mapped which political, policy making or decision-making activities are going on in these other arenas that might affect the process in 'our' arena.

To pick up relevant topics in other arenas we might have missed, and developments taking place during the process, we included a rule in the statute obliging participants involved in other relevant decision making processes (for instance on other stretches of the HSL-East) to inform other participants on relevant developments in these arenas (+).

In the survey only the urban and traffic structure of Ede was mentioned more than once as a topic to which insufficient attention was paid. Aside from this we seem to have been successful in covering the range of relevant topics. No one mentioned a relevant other arena we would have missed (+).
In the second workshop we used an explicit checklist of elements to pay attention to, which covered a broad range (+).

Score: +

**Integrate and structure**

Organisationally, the core team was to be the platform of integration. It was the focal point for questions on where specific information could be found, or which institutes or parties might have specific knowledge. The team had access to the information sources of participants, and was the assembly point for information (reports, calculation results, maps, and so on), parties wanted to make directly available to others or have included in the ‘living document’ (+).

The main route towards integrating and structuring diverging information in the process was the use of the living document. It was the main medium of communication between the team, participants, and possibly interest outsiders, and the informational platform on which design activities were based. It was supposed to be an informational platform for all interests. In it we presented content information as well as process/procedural information and reported substantial developments in the process. The living document turned out effective and useful as a tool in which to provide these types of information in one framework, and to bring together diverging types of content information. Of the respondents 70% were positive on working with the living document, 70% found it highly supportive and 54% found it structuring (+).

We used the living document also to inform the participants on the coherence between the different issues. We pointed out and visualised (see figure 12.4) their interconnectedness in the first living document and in the final report (+).

We tried to provide a central access point to information by the rule that all information and research used on behalf of the process or possibly relevant to it would in principle be accessible to the participants on a central point. But time constraints prevented our intention to have a central point in the town hall where relevant information would be available for participants. We took relevant documents with us to the workshops, where participants could and did look into them during breaks and so on (o).

We also lacked the time to provide participants with links to other information sources in the living document, aside from a literature list in the first living document, for those wanting more in-depth information. They did not seem to miss these links, however (o).
The core team was in charge of the analytical as well as process management side of the design process. This made it easy to attune the two. (+)

Score: +

12.4.2 | GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO EFFICIENCY

Avoid overlap in analytical activities

We used as much as possible existing reports and documents to make our living document, so we would not carry out already existing research ourselves unnecessarily (+).

Several participants were members of the sounding-board groups and in those groups had commented on the discussion alternatives before. But the activities we wanted participants to
perform did not overlap with those they performed in the sounding-board groups, since their
task in those groups was much more reactive, not design-focused. However, our attempts to
steer the activity from participants as much as possible from commenting and discussing to
negotiating and designing were not wholly successful (0).

Some discussions in the working groups between the different (rounds in the) workshops were
recurrent. Despite our relatively tight structuring of especially the subgroup sessions in the
second workshop, we were not able to avoid this (-).

Score: 0

*Provide no superfluous information*
Our aim was to create and screen alternatives for fitting in the HSL-East in Ede. We screened the
information we provided in the living document on relevance for the design - or screening
process of alternatives, trying to eliminate information that was irrelevant to this (+).

We produced roughly 250 pages of text and illustrations in the four versions of the living
document. But there was much overlap between the final document and earlier versions. The
'net number' was well below 200, of which many consisted of pictures and visualisations (+).

Score: +

*Focus on pragmatic aspects*
We kept the information we provided on a pragmatic level, directly geared to the goal of
designing and judging alternatives for fitting in the HSL-east in Ede, and tried to steer clear from
general discussions on for instance sustainability of rail transport and so on. We avoided
discussions on usefulness and necessity of the HSL. As a minor point in hindsight, it might not
have been necessary to give relatively detailed accounts of the discussions going on in the
subgroups in the living document.

Score: +

*Do not overburden with tasks*
Participants performed activities in the workshops, should comment on the processing of the
results of these in the living document, fill in a scorecard twice, and look at and possibly
supplement criteria developed. We tried to minimise their tasks by circumscribing precisely what
we expected from them, and geared their activities towards specific products.
In practice participants would have liked more time to comment on alternatives, and for the
dots sticking on alternatives. They seemed to have insufficient time to do more than only rough
sketching of alternatives. In the second workshop most groups could not complete all analytical
tasks, especially appointing winners and losers of the alternatives, possibilities to compensate
them and questions remaining with the alternatives (-).

Unfortunate in hindsight in this respect seems our decision to allow participants to choose
between different functional assumptions in the second workshop. In practice the influence of
participants as well as Ede on these choices would probably be nil, and it turned out that not
everyone was able to comprehend and therefore to make choices on the assumptions. Valuable
time was wasted that could have been productively used for other activities (-).

Score: -

12.4.3 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO REPRESENTATIVENESS

Identify (the position of) relevant parties

Before the process we identified relevant parties in consultation with civil servants of Ede.

We defined relevant actors as those either positively or negatively affected by the alternatives in
discussion, as well as parties that could provide means (like information, knowledge, authority,
money) for mapping the problems and finding and implementing solutions. We tried to achieve a
representation of interests and perspectives as varied and broadly as possible.

To map possible participants we used a cartographic map of Ede and its surroundings and the
'social map' of organisations in the municipal guide. The communication manager of the
municipality provided us with suggested participants based on lists of participants to the
sounding-board groups of RWS and the official participation procedures. We added some own
suggestions. We used interviews before the process with a first selection of stakeholders to find
out which actors, interests, values and perspectives could further be relevant.

All parties missed by participants were mapped and invited by us, but some relevant parties did
not want to participate or for another reason did not show up (province, public transport
companies, neighbouring municipalities), or only in small numbers (councillors). Strictly from an
analytical point of view we therefore can say identification of participants, their interests and
positions was relatively successful. Their mobilisation is another issue (+).

Score: +
Pay attention to representativeness

In identifying parties to participate we paid attention to mapping who had power in the situation, who were being represented by another party with power (possibly in another arena), and who was not or did not feel represented. Among other things we used the interviews with stakeholders before the process for this. In the selection of actors we tried to invite actors considered to truly speak for their constituencies. Parties that did not show up, could receive the living document and comment on it. Otherwise we did not provide for means of representing the absent interest. In the end 30 representatives from local business, the chamber of commerce, resident’s associations, environmental and tourist organisations, the municipality, the fire department and land-owners like the Ministry of Defence participated (0).

During the first workshop participants indicated to like an overview of participants, which was not given in the first version of the living document. We provided this overview in the second and third version, but without the background or affiliation of participants. In the final report we provided a list of participants with their background/affiliation (0).

Score: 0

12.4.4 | Guidelines primarily contributing to competence

Provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives

Although in the interviews with stakeholders before the process they were asked about their current knowledge, we lacked time to bring them up to date by a course or something like that. The living document seemed to do a good job in bringing the knowledge of participants on a sufficient level, taking away at least partially the necessity for an extra course before the process on content aspects (0).

This was different with respect to the process and analytical tasks of participants. In hindsight, it seems we underestimated the time and effort it takes for people largely unused to this kind of active contribution asked from them, to actually deliver it. An extra meeting before the process on the process and tasks expected of them might have been helpful (-).

We also lacked financial means to provide participants with reimbursement for their time. That we attracted largely pensioners, and not many working neighbours, might partially be blamed on an absence of monetary incentives for participation. Although the time (afternoons) at which the workshops are held is also a possible explanation for this (-).

Score: -
Give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise

We provided two forms of analytical capacity and expertise to the participants. The first of these was the ‘offline’ expertise and analytical capacity of the consulting firm and research institute supporting the core team. Both helped in ‘tidying up’ and elaborating alternatives created by participants to the workshops. The consulting firm provided us with map material to draw on and made professional drawings of the alternatives (+).

The research institute provided an existing accounting model that gave rough cost estimates of alternative infrastructure variants and their construction plans on the basis of index numbers and accounting rules. It also monetised a number of external effects (noise pollution, barrier effect, et cetera), normally not expressed in monetary terms. But our discussion alternatives were more elaborated than necessary for a quick scan, and therefore we also elaborated new variants more than strictly necessary for exploring the solution space. Since the accounting model was never meant for comparison of alternatives on a detailed level, it proved to be of limited use. The model had some specific technical shortcomings and lacunas, which were mended by ‘manual’ calculations, like the costs of moving the station. More important was that the costs of some variants and construction works discussed in the workshops could not be calculated in the model, like a hollow dike, half-deepened variants, light rail connections, a glassine tube and wildlife tunnels. The costs of these elements were not included in the total costs of the alternatives. Also, because of the focus of the model on construction plans rather than fitting in on a detailed level, the model could not distinguish between a number of alternatives developed by the participants. This seriously limited the identification of cost differences between alternatives. Partially for this reason we decided not to give an elaborate overview of the costs in the final report, because we did not want to give a fake impression of accuracy (-).

During the workshops experts of the consulting firm and of the research institute were present to answer questions of participants during their activities and indicate the consequences of ideas. An expert of the consulting firm gave a plenary presentation on the discussion alternatives at the first workshop. Not all participants were satisfied about the behaviour of the experts during the workshops. Although they were used to answer certain questions, 44% found their performance mediocre. They were seen as a supportive source of information by only 45%. Several participants would have liked more input from them. Only 20% indicated to have gained new insights because of the contribution of the experts present. On the positive side, 54% found the experts did provide help in structuring matters. Nevertheless, although they at certain points corrected incorrect remarks by participants, it seems the role performed by experts during the workshops was too 'shy' (-).
Project managers of NS-RIB and RWS fulfilled a similar expert role. 56% of those present would have liked to see them perform that role better. Mentioned in this respect were among other things ‘more informative’, and ‘better explaining’ (-).
Civil servants of Ede took part in the workshops and could be called upon as a source of knowledge and information by other participants. Some of the civil servants were indeed able to answer many questions of other participants (+).

In general participants missed no supporting methods or instruments (o).

Score: 0

**Provide sufficient information to enable participation**
Our main information tool was the living document. It provided participants throughout the process with information on substantial aspects, and updates on developments, like the alternatives and criteria resulting from the workshops. We also put process information in it. In the first version we outlined the cause, nature and goal of the quick scan, as well as of the living document itself. We described the process set-up and its organisational parts, the time planning of the process and a rough preliminary set-up of both workshops. The position of the quick scan within the wider policy development was given in an annex, as well as a statute of rules of the game. Other versions we used to present among other things maps for all suggested alternatives, descriptions of alternatives, and the strengths, weaknesses and questions brought forward by other groups (+). The living document proved successful in incorporating different types of information and new information brought forward during the process. It allowed us, for example, to inform the participants about all available information provided to us by stakeholders (+).

**But the amount of work and time this cost allowed us only to send the updates of the living document to the participants just one week in advance of the workshops and the presentation of the final report. Another factor in this was that we had to wait for the results of the supporting experts before finishing the next version of the living document (-).**

There were presentations at the workshops. The project manager among other things explained the purpose and programme of the meetings, the rules of the game, the problem definition, the process set-up and the expected final products of the workshops. An expert of the consulting firm explained the three discussion alternatives. In the second workshop the core team explained the clustered alternatives and the set of criteria derived so far (+).
Another channel for information was the opportunity given to participants to contact the core team in between the workshops. We also prepared large sheets of paper with the discussion alternatives, the statute and a schema of the process’ organisational structure, to hang up in the rooms where the first workshop was held. Finally, we gave a handout with the assignment and tasks for the subgroups to each participant in the first workshop (+).

We included a rule in the statute stating that information should not be for tactical reasons withheld. In the end no more than a moral appeal, it gave us some leverage to ask participants for specific information we considered relevant and knew they had (+).

That the core team carried responsibility for content as well as process made it easier to attune the information provision on both (+).

Score: +

**Translate information into a usable format**

In the living document we translated technical terms in lay terms, and put information as much as possible (also) in a graphical format. We visualised the connections between the different problem areas, the organisational structure of the process, the process design and the relationship between process steps and the different versions of the living document planned (see figures 12.4 and 12.5). Other means of visual support in the living document were a map of the relevant area, and drawings of all alternatives suggested during the process.

75% of those surveyed found the information in the living document clear, against 17% finding some parts unclear, and 8% found the whole unclear. 82% found all information in the living document completely usable. In general 69% found the way information was presented in the living document good, and 23% found its presentation sufficiently well. 91% found the mapping material useful to make the solution alternatives clear.

Score: +

**Give clarity about analytical tasks expected**

Before the process we consulted with Ede, NS and RWS on their roles and tasks (+).

The first living document described the intended end product of the workshops as a report in which the (characteristics of) the problem situation and the most promising (and/or least promising) alternatives for fitting in the HST-East in or close to Ede are included. The first living document contained the intended table of contents of the final report, to give a more specific
impression of the intended end products. We described the intended end product of the first workshop: an alternative for fitting in the track (with maybe some variants), coupled with a short explanation and an outline of its strengths and weaknesses (+).

We provided information in the living document and in the plenary presentations at the beginning of the workshops on the purpose and programme of the meetings, which roles and tasks were expected of participants (subject to their approval) and could be expected of the core team and supporting experts. At the beginning of the subgroup sessions the chairmen of the subgroups explained the roles and tasks expected of participants, and pointed out the assignment for the group and the end products aimed for (+).

We also made forms with detailed instructions for ourselves to use as chairmen of the subgroups. The minutes' secretaries received a form with instructions before the first workshop on which the desired concrete results of the first workshop were formulated and the tasks expected of them. They got a second form to be used for taking down notes, on which room was pre-structured for specific topics. We presented all group leaders and minutes' secretaries in the first round of the second workshop with a form stating the specific goal for their group in that session (different per group since alternatives treated per group differed). We also pre-structured a number of assumptions on which choices had to be made during the session on the form, as well as a number of topics with respect to 'dressing up' the alternatives, to which attention should be paid (+).

We provided participants in the second workshop with a 'task form' with the five tasks we wanted them to perform. To support them in performing the tasks they were provided with a form on which opportunities and threats with respect to the alternative could be written down and a form on which possibilities to enhance opportunities or reduce threats could be put. Finally, they were given a form on which winners of the alternative and their gains, losers of the alternative and their losses, and possibilities for compensation could be put (+).

Score: +

12.4.5 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO NEGOTIATION

Have a stakeholder/interest focus

In the first workshop we divided participants expected to have similar interests and views in four focus groups: (1) neighbours; (2) representatives of business; (3) nature, environmental and recreational groups; and (4) those belonging to the municipality of Ede. We provided minutes of the discussions in these separate subgroups in the second living document, which presented a view of the standpoint of the different stakeholder groups (+).
Time constraints prevented us from including an intended overview of stakeholding parties and their interests in the living document. For the same reason we were unable to differentiate in the information presented in the living document by stakeholder group (-).

In the criteria set we distinguished in the location of accessibility and traffic nuisance effects between Ede West and Ede East. This was because moving the station played a part in the discussion, and the choice of its location entailed quite different effects for the inhabitants of Ede East (its current location) and the inhabitants of Ede West (its possible new location). Also, we indicated per criterion which groups of participants attached (much) weight to it. We presented this to the participants in living documents 2, 3 and 4. No objections were uttered against the importance we assumed groups did attach to specific criteria (+).

Score: 0

Map possibilities for negotiation

When we interviewed stakeholders before the process we asked them also about their stake in the situation, to prioritise topics of interest to them, to indicate which interests should not be tampered with, and which effects would be unacceptable. During the process we asked participants whether they were willing to accept compensation for certain effects, which interests of other parties they thought were untouchable, and which effects were unacceptable to them. In this way we tried to find out for which effects of variants compensation was unacceptable, and which therefore would have to be avoided or mitigated. We also recorded the suggestions for compensation arising in discussions in our minutes (+).

At the first workshop we let in an introduction round all participants introduce themselves, the organisation they represent (if they represent one), and their main concern and interest (+).

In the first living document we announced in a preliminary table of contents of the final document a chapter on stakeholders, benefits and disadvantages of the different alternatives per stakeholder group and possibilities for compensation and negotiation. But we lacked the time to fill this in.

In the second workshop we asked participants to point out losers and winners of their favourite alternative(s). But they too lacked time for this. So in the end we did not provide an explicit overview of interests involved and hurt by specific measures or alternatives (-).
In interviews after the process a few participants indicated to miss calculations on possibilities for compensation in the accounting model (-).

Score: 0

12.4.6 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO FLEXIBILITY

Make analysis a standby facility

Between both workshops and the presentation of the report we had six week periods to update the living document, execute research, add additional information provided by the stakeholders, sketch and elaborate generated alternatives, and make cost-calculations and impact assessments. What we had as standby facility were the computational tool of the research institute to perform calculations on alternatives, and some capacity with the consulting firm to elaborate and draw alternatives. We ourselves provided policy analytical expertise to the process, and used this among other things in setting-up the process and workshops, making the living document and performing analysis (+).

We planned to answer questions as much as possible during the workshops, otherwise, after research by the supporting research agency and consulting firm, in the living document. In practice we had insufficient time to answer most questions. The consulting firm, which we hoped would take care of some of the additional research needed, had its hands full on elaborating and drawing the alternatives made by the participants. We largely confined ourselves to listing the questions and topics for further study arising with participants in versions II and IV (the final report) of the living document (-).

Score: 0

Make analysis continuously adaptable

We retained flexibility in dealing with changing circumstances and new information by means of the living document. New information and new designs, criteria and results of assessments were made available through new versions of the living document.

The use of the living document allowed us to take up new information during the process (like the letter from the minister of Transport). Several participants brought in their own information. An example of this is a report on the urban infrastructure system brought forward during the first workshop by representatives of an environmental group, which evoked a new discussion on the location of the station. The essential elements of these contributions were incorporated in the living document or included as an annex (+).
The functional basic package of the railroads became a topic of discussion in the first workshop. It was asked whether this package existed on paper. Following a request by the core team RWS produced a memo with functional guidelines that was included as an annex in the second version of the living document. Moreover, this list of functions was used as reference in thinking up and elaborating the alternatives in the second workshop (+).

Participants were invited to suggest amendments to any part of the different versions of the living document either during the workshops, or by fax, (e-)mail, telephone or letter in between workshops. They could also make suggestions for another structure of the document itself, or specific chapters or even sections. Only a few participants reacted (+).

With respect to the set-up of the workshops we tried to maintain flexibility by keeping the definitive method of working and agenda for the second workshop open until after the first, so we could take into account developments in the first workshop (+).

Being responsible for content as well as process as a team (a responsibility subdivided in the team itself) allowed us to attune process set-up and planning of design activities rapidly. For example, when it turned out that the time allowed for production and processing of the feedback on the third version of the living document was short, we rescheduled the presentation of the Final Report to allow participants to react on the third version of the living document (+).

Score: +

12.4.7 GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO TRUST

Be transparent
We provided information on the wider procedural context of the process in the first version of the living document. Minimal information was provided on expert, analytical and decision activities by the rule that research is carried out by the expert-team. During the process we explained in the living document and presentations the analytical procedures we and our supporting experts followed. We outlined the procedure followed in deriving the list of criteria, and the choices made. We explained how the second version was made, including the activities of the consulting firm and research institute. We explained the clustering of the variants and the procedure followed in screening alternatives for domination (+).

The only complex methodology we used was the accounting model. Despite requests in the past, the research institute had not provided it with a clear, short description or made the parameters and assumptions behind the model more explicit. We learned of this relatively late, and were
only able to announce in the first living document that alternatives developed would be subject to calculations of an expert model on their costs and monetised effects. At the first workshop the project manager tried to explain its working to some extent. The accounting model turned out to be insufficiently transparent. Of the respondents to the survey 63% found the working of the model either insufficiently clear or even wholly unclear, among other things because it was insufficiently explained and its presentation too global. On the other hand, only 33% needed to know exactly how it worked. To half of the participants the built-up of the costs calculated through the model, which was explained in living document III, was wholly clear, to 25% partially, and to 25% wholly unclear (0).

To provide transparency on one of the most contentious issues in the discussions going on we outlined in lay terms the causes of the differences between the several circulating estimates of accounting costs of NS, Ede and our own accounting model. This explanation was based on information we received from the consulting firm and the memo on the consultation between the consulting firm, Ede, RWS and NS. At the first workshop an expert of the consulting firm explained the difference between 'main functions' and the functions national government would like to see the railroad perform. We also provided the most relevant technical assumptions behind our calculations and the uncertainties surrounding them (+).

Transparency on assumptions and starting-points of different parties was partially achieved by having parties contribute information to the process, like the package of functional guidelines of NS, which had not been available before. These guidelines, that were normally 'in the heads' of the people from NS, now were made explicit and it had to be explained to others why they were necessary. Other parties also contributed their own plans and information, thereby providing clarity on their starting-points (+).

We provided minutes of the subgroup discussions in the different versions of the living document, so participants to the groups could check if their deliberations were interpreted correctly. We indicated with each alternative which working group was its source, again to allow participants to trace in how far their efforts were translated correctly. We also provided the assumptions chosen by the participants behind alternatives developed by them and the 'dot score' they received during the workshops, to allow participants a check on this as well (+).

Only 18% of the respondents to the survey reported to have had sight on the course of research in the expert group, whereas no less than 81% found this necessary. We can conclude only that we failed in this respect (-).

Score: +
Have procedures for reaching agreement on status information

We included several rules relevant to this guideline. Firstly, participants could object to information and research that was used for or added to the process. All information in the living document, including the process set-up, statute, problem description, facts brought forward, criteria, and so on was subject to discussion.

Coupled with this was the assertion that the source of information and research was given on request and the assumption that when there were no objections this information or research was accepted. With that, the use of the living document itself formed an important procedure for determining the status of information: all information in the living document was, after it has been checked and not been objected to by participants, to have status in the process.

All information outside it had no status in this specific process.

Another rule was that questions for further study were formulated on the basis of a broadly shared request of the participants. Because of the impossibility of answering all questions within the time given, only questions would be investigated of which the majority of participants found their answering would be useful or necessary.

Also, participants had the right to bring in their own research results and information. These were also subject to possible objections. The rule that research results were discussed plenary in the workshops was another translation of this guideline. Finally, an explicit statement on the status of information was the rule that ideas, suggestions and plans of all participants would be treated as equally as possible in the process (+).

With respect to procedures for the transfer of information we stipulated that information intended for the living document should be handed over to the core team (+).

Score: +

Let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space

We had to make choices in presenting an initial problem statement to the participants, for example with respect to how restricted it should be. The main problem owners (Ede, RWS, NS-RIB) had no dispute on construction of the HST-East itself, the discussion limited itself to its passage through (or by) Ede. We therefore focused our preliminary problem definition on the question of fitting in the HST in Ede and decided not to question the necessity of the railroad expansion itself. We put the problem definition ‘how to fit in best the HST railway extension into the urban fabric of Ede?’ in the first version of the living document.

We elaborated the problem definition by providing relevant topics in and outside Ede in the living document. A sensitive topic for Ede as well as for RWS was that of connecting a railway line connecting Ede to the town of Amersfoort and the little town of Barneveld to the new four-track railway. We pointed out that during the workshops the line might probably play a part anyhow and
that we would not keep the topic out of the discussion. We included the question of what to do with this line in the descriptions given of the three discussion alternatives in the first living document. We used material from the interviews we held with some of the participants before the process as input in the analysis. But our problem definition was meant to be only the starting-point for the process. We made clear to Ede that during the process a shift in problem definition and set of alternatives considered could occur. During the process discussions in the working groups on alternatives and delineation of the problem were recorded by students of DUT acting as minutes’ secretaries to provide the basis for possible alterations in the problem definition or aspects of its elaboration. Participants indicated consequences of alternatives for the surroundings, but, although invited to, did not challenge the problem definition we presented in the first living document. Neither did the municipality, RWS or NS (+).

Since we chose to start with a problem focus on fitting in the HST-East in Ede, we had to look to alternatives for doing that. With respect to the passage through Ede RWS concentrated on two variants: construction on ground level or deepened construction. Ede had put its tunnel variant opposite this. We chose to use these three variants as discussion alternatives. We focused the whole process around alternative design, evaluation and adaptation, making these the central tasks in the workshops. The project manager invited participants at the beginning of the first workshop to come up with their own alternatives. We tried to enable modular choices by presenting them with different elements on which choices had to be made with respect to alternatives and their dressing up. With respect to the functional guidelines of the different parties we gave an indication of their costs, to take into consideration when deciding whether or not this functional guideline should be endorsed. The participants did indeed generate alternatives. We elaborated these alternatives between the workshops based on the maps drawn, comments given and the minutes of the discussions (+).

We positioned the three alternatives presented in the living document in the first workshop explicitly as 'discussion alternatives', meant mainly to get participants designing their own alternatives. Nevertheless, working with discussion alternatives probably narrowed the perceived solution space. But when asked about it, 80% of participants considered working with them (very) positively, 90% very supporting and 78% (very) structuring70. Although they also found working with discussion alternatives steering, 67% did not think the method of working with discussion alternatives needed to be altered. Some would even like more, others more concrete discussion alternatives to work with (+).

Screening of alternatives took place through a qualitative and quantitative evaluation, for which the core team derived criteria during the quick scan. For this a number of sources were used, namely the interviews by phone with participants before the workshops, document analysis71, and the discussions during the workshops, from which minutes’ secretaries made reports.

70 The remaining respondents all answered ‘neutral’ on these questions
71 Also of the written source material of the participants
A preliminary list of criteria was presented on a scorecard sent to the participants after the first workshop along with the second living document. They were asked to suggest supplementary criteria or adaptations to the list. This did not happen much, but in the second workshop a new participant, representative of the fire department, formulated new issues in a presentation: the safety of underground constructions and accessibility for emergency workers. These were added to the criteria list. In the end this led to a definite list of criteria for judging the alternatives. However, the eventual scorecards for which these criteria were used, were sent in by only 10 participants. We therefore cautioned against attaching too much weight to the scores, but did include them in the resulting overall scorecard (+).

We included a rule stating that the origin of constraints should be clear, if possible also their ‘hardness’. This rule should allow conditions and assumptions being brought up for discussion, if participants desired so. This did not happen, however (+).

More than 90% of participants found there were sufficient possibilities to bring in topics during the quick scan, and sufficient attention was paid to them. They also indicated to have had sufficient opportunity in the discussions to elucidate their view and standpoints (+).

We derived final conclusions from a dominance analysis we performed. We did not present conclusions in the third version of the living document, because we needed the scorecard evaluation of participants for that first. We did present them with the results of the calculations of the research institute, on which we received no comments (o). At the presentation evening we gave participants the opportunity to evaluate the same 8 alternatives we put on the scorecard for a last time, by means of grades. This provided a last check on the representativeness of our recommendations. But at that point participants could no longer alter the final report (o).

Score: +

**Provide independent, trusted expertise**

The most influential third party involved in the process were we ourselves, the members of the core team. Our independence as third party might be questioned for two reasons. Firstly, we were asked by Ede, a problem owner with a clear interest in a specific alternative, to perform the quick scan. We dealt with this by clearly positioning ourselves as an independent party, not as advocates for the Ede variant. This did not meet with resistance, since the municipality did not want to see itself too strictly as commissioner. They did not pay for our study, but only provided practical help, and had the status of just one of the participants. A letter
of Ede accompanied our invitation letter to participants, in which was indicated what the relationship between the municipality and DUT in the quick scan was (o).

Our independence might be questioned for another reason. In a process where the underground construction of a railroad is a topic of controversy, one would wish the supervisory team not to be sponsored by the Centre for Underground Construction. Practical aspects (money needed to conduct the study) played the most important role here. We can only say we were determined not to let the funding of our study influence its conclusions (−).

A research institute and a consulting firm supported the core team. The research institute had a reputation of independence. But its accounting model had been developed for COB, and this might lead to some doubts about the impartiality of its results. The consulting firm also had been an active participant in COB for years, but more seriously, it was largely responsible for the development of the Ede variant. This of course carried with it the risk that its contribution might be seen as biased, especially by RWS and NS-RIB. This was however mitigated because another part of the firm worked for NS-RIB in developing the HST-plans (o).

We tried to counter the possible biases of (the models of) our supporting experts by having also representatives of RWS and NS-RIB take part as experts in the workshop sessions, where they could be consulted by participants. By that we did not so much provide independent expertise as expertise from both sides, countering each other (+).

At several occasions NS or RWS in the workshops indicated difficulties or even impossibilities of certain suggestions. They for example declared in the second workshop, when asked, that bundling the railroad with the A12 would be impossible. Therefore this option was not worked out. When we checked this remark later with the consulting firm, they contradicted this. Civil servants also performed the role of experts in the discussions, besides having their own preferences. This sometimes intimidated other participants. Some of their remarks were also factually incorrect. Whether this was on purpose is hard to say (−).

In response to the interference during the presentation of the expert of the consulting firm in the first workshop by the RWS project manager we adapted the set-up for the evening session. We scheduled a comment of RWS after the presentation of the consulting firm expert (+).

We provided a third party check on the dispute between the municipality and NS-RIB on cost calculations of alternatives. We confirmed the finding of Ede and NS that the cost difference between deepened construction and wholly closed variants was relatively limited compared to the cost difference between construction on ground level and deepened construction (+).

Score: o
12.4.8 | GUIDELINES PRIMARILY CONTRIBUTING TO SUBSTANTIVE ENRICHMENT

Connect V/S learning to A/I learning

We provided participants with the results of studies carried out in the past in the first living document. During the process participants seemed to make ample use of these. We also provided them with access to the basic documents during the workshops, but only few of them studied those. Our aim to provide answers on questions asked during the workshops by means of rapid mini-studies, research and looking for existing information founndered, as stated before, on a lack of time (0).

We fed the outcomes of V/S learning in the workshops into the drawings of the alternatives by the consulting firm, the analysis performed by the core team itself, and the calculations of the accounting model. For this we had minutes secretaries write down the themes, concerns and issues brought up in the discussions, and gave participants the opportunity to write down comments, explanations and so on. With respect to the accounting model the workshop results proved hard to use sometimes. It could not incorporate all relevant information from the V/S activities. The other way around, the outcomes of the calculations seemed hardly to play a role in the deliberations and (design) choices of participants (0).

Of the participants gaining new insights in the problem, 44% attributed this to arguments by other participants, 33% to the living document, 11% to information received from the experts, and 11% to other sources. From those gaining new insight in the possible solutions 60% attributed this to arguments made by other participants, 20% stated they gained additional knowledge through the experts of the consulting firm and research institute present at the meetings, and 20% attributed this to other causes. Insight was also gained in the views and interests of the other stakeholders (+).

Score: 0

Support variety creation

We supported variety creation mainly by providing participants with sufficient information and opportunity to do so. We presented the existing alternatives as 'discussion alternatives'. We hoped that by providing additional information not only strictly ‘technical’ variants would be created, but that in them also attention would be paid to additional questions like what should happen to the surroundings of the track, traffic patterns, or to what use the roof of a possible tunnel could be put. We intended the experts present to help participants when they got stuck because of a lack of information, by answering their questions (+).
One of the ways we hoped to evoke creativity in participants was by defining the geographical area to deal with not to narrowly. The three discussion alternatives limited themselves to the urban area of Ede, but the project team found that the participants should also be enabled to look to a larger area. In that way they could, if so desired, also take into account alternative routes for the track. In the workshops therefore two types of maps were presented for use in designing: one with only the urban area of Ede on it, one with a larger area. In the first living document we outlined the consequences of different geographical scopes and left the choice for a scope with the participants (+).

During the process we supported the creation of varied results in several ways. We split up the participants in largely homogenous groups in the first workshop to create variance and broaden the scope of the problem definition and of the solution area between groups⁷². But this did not lead to more variance, possibly because discussion and confrontation of ideas, and with that the necessity to creatively bridge gaps, hardly took place. Therefore, we replaced the homogenous groups of the first workshop by heterogeneous groups in the second workshop. This also meant participants could take along ideas developed in their previous group to the new group, and therefore spread interesting ideas. We also decided to assign these groups in a first round to the four clusters we had distinguished, to have at least for the whole spectre of alternatives some amount of elaboration of alternatives. In a second round we allowed them to choose their own favourite solution to work on (0).

Another device to achieve a cross-over of ideas was to enable participants at the end of the first workshop to study and comment upon the alternatives of other groups. This led indeed to some suggestions crossing over from one alternative to another (+).

After the first workshop even all variants selected by the participants were different versions of the Ede variant. By forcing a group of participants during the first part of the second workshop session to deal with a ‘fridge’ of somewhat deviating alternatives that were lost during the first workshop, we hoped to stimulate participants to also consider other options, or interesting elements of those options. In the fridge were alternatives like a viaduct, circumvention, a monorail, a glassine tube⁷³, and a bored tunnel. The alternative developed by the fridge group in the first part of the second workshop, the glassine tube, was also taken up voluntarily by some participants in the second part of the session for further elaboration (+).

We did not provide participants with stimuli for creativity. During the process participants asked about example projects they could use for inspiration. But lack of time prevented their inclusion in the living document. We also did not identify and invite parties which might have helped in stimulating creativeness with others, or provide creative impulses themselves (-).

We invited participants in the subgroups to discuss other options than a tunnel, which did not amount to much. Some complained after the process about the working group chairmen

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⁷² Of course, variance inside a group was expected to be lower than with mixed groups
⁷³ Which entailed broadening the track on ground level, and constructing a transparent dome over the track
insufficiently stimulating creative discussions. Another element inhibiting creativity might be that the process manager in his introduction to the first workshop emphasised that the quick scan aimed to achieve consensus, without clearly explicating that this was meant to be at the end of the process, instead of in every separate subgroup session. This might have stimulated participants to achieve consensus, instead of creating diverging suggestions. Finally, some participants would have liked more stimulating input from the experts (−).

73% of those surveyed found there was sufficient time available for the meetings to create variety and 92% found there was (amply) sufficient room for discussion in the workshops (+).

Score: 0

Support variety use
We tried to fit our quick scan in with the formal EIA-process. For this the results of the quick scan would have to fit the stage of the variants elaborated in the official procedure, so that direct comparison of the quick scan results with the official variants is possible. This put specific demands to the outcomes of the model-calculations on the variants, for instance. In the final scorecard we put the alternatives developed in the second workshop next to the two ‘official’ alternatives from the Route/EIA procedure, so these can be directly compared in the same way and on the same level (+).

However, not all alternatives had ‘the same playing field’ during the process. Although we ‘forced’ participants in the second workshop to pay attention to alternatives from the fridge category, there were no worked out maps or cost calculations made for the alternatives in this category, which put the alternatives in it on a backlash (−).

To involve and possibly commit parties with formal power to increase the chances of the quick scan outcomes getting involved in the official procedures we invited councillors of Ede, as well as the Alderman of Spatial planning, to participate. We also invited NS-RIB and RWS. In practice hardly any councillors of Ede participated, but the participation of the Alderman in the first workshop and the presentation put some political weight behind the process. The railroads as well as RWS only wanted to partake as observer, without commitment to the results. The absence of political commitment of some relevant parties made us abstain from the idea to use the presentation of the final report to have participants speak out a commitment for the report as a whole, and agree on follow-up activities. 56% of respondents to the survey would have liked to see NS/RWS in another role. Mentioned in this respect were among other things ‘more involved’ and ‘as participant’ (−).

Variety might also be involved because of its inherent quality, or because results fit well with
existing preferences or demands. We used the memo on functions desired by NS to have participants make a number of choices on relevant functional assumptions and to think up and elaborate alternatives in the second workshop, to achieve a fit of the alternatives developed with those in the EIA procedure (+).

Score: 0

*Table 12.5: overview of application of the design guidelines*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Design guideline</th>
<th>Valuation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>do not overburden with tasks</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>translate information into a usable format</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give clarity about analytical tasks expected</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map possibilities for negotiation</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be transparent</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on status information</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

+ = the design guideline was well met in this case  
0 = the design guideline was to some extent met in this case  
- = the design guideline was poorly or not at all met in this case
The disappointing representativeness of participants can hardly be blamed on insufficient attention paid to it by the analytical team. This is a clear case where the influence of other factors presents itself. Lacking political cloud as a team is the best explanation we have for important actors like the railroads and RWS refusing to participate ‘fully’, rather than only as observers. The results of the case provide a sign that the factor representativeness, might more strongly than others be influenced by factors outside the control of analysts.

With respect to competence also the limits of what analysts might achieve were in sight. Although we paid considerable attention to supporting the competence of participants in several ways (although we lacked the time and means to train or pay them), they showed disappointing competence in creative thought or willingness to deviate from known alternatives. In the end competence and creativeness are to a considerable extent aspects of personalities and achieved over years. In this respect the importance of ‘having the right people present’, not only with respect to their representativeness, but also with respect to knowledge and creativeness, is highlighted. Once these are not present, in the time available there are limits to what analysts can do to increase competence of those that are.

Finally, the trust present in the case was remarkable. The analytical team was trusted by ‘both sides’ in the case, Ede and its inhabitants on the one hand, and RWS and the railroads on the other, despite our affiliation with the Centre for Underground Construction. Perhaps the fact that we worked for DUT, a bastion of engineers, gained us a ‘we engineers among each other’ bonus with especially RWS and the railroads. Our openness in procedure, on our position and so on, might also have helped. There was also little distrust between Ede and the participants on the one hand and RWS and the railroads on the other. This was probably also to some extent due to the mix of participants, probably even characteristics of the regional population. The case in this respect again points to humbleness in what analysis alone might do with respect to something as elusive as trust, but on the other hand also gives clear indication that heading the guidelines can help.
COMPARING THE CASES
Now the time has come to judge whether the guidelines developed in the course of this study are useful indeed. A useful guideline is one that contributes positively to an intermediate factor that in turn is assumed to contribute to achieving a ‘good’ outcome in the sense of the normative framework developed in chapter 4.

Of course, several notes of caution are in order. All inferences in this chapter are of a qualitative nature. Although use was made of questionnaires in three of the four cases, the sample size was too small to draw statistically significant conclusions. The material was only used to support the qualitative conclusions. The strength of those conclusions is dependent on the plausibility of the reasoning behind them, which is largely presented in the separate case chapters.

Secondly, the design guidelines presented here have been derived from combining a wealth of theory. Nevertheless, another researcher would probably derive a (perhaps only slightly) different set of guidelines even from the same exact set of theory, let alone from a different range of theories. The choice of another normative framework would very likely also lead to different conclusions.

Thirdly, the reasoning here is based on (non-statistical) correlation. Correlation is not the same as causation. Causation is a combination of correlation and a plausible mechanism (Visalberghi and Tomasello, 1998). Two sources provide a plausible mechanism between design guidelines and intermediate factors in this case: the theory underlying the guidelines, and the case material given in the case chapters. In this chapter the cases are put alongside each other to see whether correlation between (non-)application of the guidelines and appearance of the intermediate factors appears in several cases (multiple correlation), to strengthen the case for causation between each guideline and those intermediate factors, and eventually the normatively desirable outcomes as derived in chapter 4. For the latter I also look tentatively into the link between the intermediate factors and those norms.

In itself correlation in several cases is not enough. Hypothetically in five cases (viewing the RWS- and Sijtwende-period of the VLW case as separate cases, as I will do in this chapter) a guideline might be fully implemented, and the corresponding intermediate factor present in full glory. But this still does not prove one led to the other. Therefore, I will present for each guideline also an overview of the case material to see if the mechanism between application of the guideline and appearance of the intermediate factor was made (more) plausible by the cases. This also means that only ‘lukewarm’ correlation, where for example partial application of a guideline and partial presence of an intermediating factor are present, can gain significance if a clear mechanism between the two is shown in several cases.

The classification of the guidelines will be presented in 13.1. In section 13.2 I will compare the findings of 13.1 to those of two earlier, related studies of other authors, to see if their findings strengthen or contradict mine. In 13.3 from the above a distinction between ‘core’ and more optional guidelines is presented. Section 13.4 tries to establish relations between the
intermediate factors and eventual norms for judging (outcomes of) decision making processes
developed in chapter 4. Finally, 13.5 ties the foregoing together in an empirically refined version
of the causal model developed in chapter 8.

13.1
CLASSIFYING THE DESIGN
GUIDELINES

To say something about the usefulness of the design guidelines I put the results of the different
cases alongside each other in table 13.1. This is put together from the tables of intermediate
factor scores and scores with respect to the guidelines in the separate case chapters. The state
of the intermediating factors in the respective cases is put above those of the guidelines
hypothesized to contribute to them (in bold, and a bigger case).

To revive in memory, the classification given to the intermediate factors meant:
+ the factor was (almost) fully developed.
o the factor was to some extent present
- the factor was not or hardly present

With respect to the guidelines the scores given meant:
+ the guideline was applied or attention paid to it
o the guideline was partially applied/some attention was paid to it
- the guideline was not, hardly or wrongly applied or no attention paid to it

In principle this can lead to 9 different combinations. The most interesting outcomes are the
most extreme ones, 'without zero's':
+/+: the guideline is put into effect and the intermediate factor was fully present » the guideline
could be useful in contributing to the intermediate factor
+/−: the guideline is put into effect but the intermediate factor was not enhanced » the guide-
line does not seem useful, or even harmful, or at the least is not sufficient to bring the
intermediate factor about
−/+: the design guideline is not applied or paid attention to but the intermediate factor is not
negatively influenced » the guideline is not likely to be useful or at least does not seem
necessary
−/−: the design guideline is not applied or paid attention to and the intermediate factor is in
bad shape » this is a more complex case. The fact that absence of application of a
guideline coincides several times with a bad development of the intermediate factor does not prove that presence of its application would lead to a positive development of the intermediate factor. Therefore, in the case of this combination even more attention is paid to the causal mechanisms visible in the case. If the stories told in several cases clearly outline the negative effect of absence of application of the guideline on the intermediate factor, then the combination \(-/-\) in a number of cases is seen to provide evidence for its usefulness.

The strongest evidence for the usefulness of a guideline would be given in a situation where ‘opposite combinations’ appear in the row of cases. For example in one case a score \(+/-\) could appear, signifying that a guideline was applied and had a positive effect, and in another case \(-/-\) would appear, meaning that a guideline was not applied and this had negative effects. This suggests the guideline is not only useful, but also necessary, in the sense that its omission negatively affects the outcomes. Opposite this stand combinations of \(+/-\) and \(-/+\) in one row, which would put the usefulness of a guideline in doubt.

In practice it is unlikely that these extreme combinations will appear often. In the practice of everyday policy making and analysis some elements go well, some less so, also within the field covered by one intermediate factor or one guideline. The question therefore is what series of extreme and less extreme combinations are considered sufficient to deem a guideline useful (for the time being, as should always be the case in science). With other words, what should be the cut-off criterion?

I will use as cut-off criterion for calling a guideline useful the appearance of at least three \(+/-\) and/or \(-/+\) combinations in a row, or two \(+/-\) and/or \(-/+\) combinations when they are supported by the other three combinations in the row, and the mechanisms revealed by the case material. Being ‘supported’ by the other three combinations means that these point in the same direction as the strong combinations. For example, when for a guideline the combination is two times \(+/-\), meaning application of the guideline is correlated with enhancement of the intermediate factor, and three times \(0/+\), meaning that partial application also is correlated with enhancement of the intermediate factor, it seems warranted to conclude application of the guideline has a positive effect. A score of \(0/0\), combined with \(-/-\) and \(+/+\) suggest that non-application of the guideline has negative effects, partial application a partial positive effect, and full application a full positive effect. And so on.

I will use as cut-off criterion for calling a guideline not useful at least three \(+/-\) and/or \(-/+\) combinations, or two \(+/-\) and/or \(-/+\) when they are supported by the other three combinations in the row, and the mechanisms revealed by the case material. These strong negative scores
would be supported when for example contradictory outcomes would appear, for example when the score in one case would be – for a guideline and 0 for the corresponding intermediate factor, and in another + for the guideline and again 0 for the corresponding intermediate factor, suggesting that application of the guideline has no effect on the intermediate factor whatsoever. Negative +/- scores would also be supported by o/- scores, meaning that whether a guideline was fully or only partially applied, in all cases there was no effect on the intermediate factor. Conversely, negative -/+ scores would be supported by -/0 scores, meaning that the intermediate factor fared very or moderately well in all cases that the guideline was not or poorly applied. Guidelines with insufficient ‘strong combinations’ (less than two) or two or more contradictory outcomes I will call undecided upon with respect to usefulness, so far.

Some guidelines might be very dependent on the application of others. Some might not function if another guideline has not been at least partially applied first. Some might need to be applied in conjunction with one or several others at (roughly) the same time. For example, it is very conceivable that meeting the guidelines of ‘providing participants with sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives’, ‘providing access to analytical capacity or expertise for all parties’ and ‘provision of sufficient information’ would strengthen each other mutually. Also, some guidelines might be dependent on the application of another. For example, ‘maintaining a stakeholder focus in conducting analysis and providing information’ is a lot easier if the guideline of ‘identifying relevant parties’ is met.

Finally, in some cases not heeding to one guideline too well might ease the application of another. For example, taking the guideline of ‘supporting variety creation’ lightly, might result in limited variety in the process. This limited amount might be easier to make fit for incorporation in decision making than a more extensive set of creative ideas, therefore easing the possibilities for ‘supporting variety use’. However, the value of heeding to this last guideline is of course diminished when there is little variety available for use.

All these possible effects of interrelation between guidelines were not tested here. Researching respectively testing an extensive set of guidelines in a real life case with myriads of ‘disturbing’ causal effects on process outcomes outside those of the guidelines was considered complicated enough, not to exasperate matters by trying to establish correlation between the application of guidelines in bundle. Of course, this is an interesting, possibly even necessary, topic for further research.

Nevertheless, a tentative first attempt will be undertaken into an analysis of interaction effects and relative importance of all guidelines supposed to contribute primarily to an intermediate factor as a group.

In the following I will per intermediate factor deal with the extent in which the guidelines seem to
have contributed to its appearance. Those guidelines whose usefulness is found to be convincingly
demonstrated in this study (see for the analysis below the table) will be indicated in *italics*. Also,
a short but more or less impressionist excursion to possible interrelations between the different
guidelines subsumed under one factor will be made, where these came forward strongly.

**Guidelines primarily contributing to comprehensiveness**

*Table 13.1 Usefulness table Comprehensiveness*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>V LW</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RWS-period</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sijtwende-period</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have a broad scope</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrate and structure</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Have a broad scope:* In all cases it is attempted to apply a relatively broad scope on aspects
mapped. But in the RWS-period of the V LW case, De Bilt and Doetinchem relevant developments
in other arenas are sometimes insufficiently mapped. In the RWS-period also alternative options
for the preferred one are either not mapped at all, put aside at the first possibility, or not mapped
in the same way as the preferred alternative.

In De Bilt, although the process in itself had a very broad focus, this entailed that still more
issues were possibly linked to it and not taken into account. Also, the broad focus of the overall
process meant that aspects *within* a certain topic area could not all be mapped and properly
dealt with. The De Bilt case therefore provides caution that being too broad in the overall topic of
the process can lead to insufficient broadness in taking into account topics related to this broad
overall topic, and topics covered by or related to sub-topics within the process.

In Doetinchem also some aspect essential to the case, like the cost of moving the power line,
were not mapped (in time).

In Ede we took great pains not to miss any relevant aspects or sources of information. Despite
this, our problem definition kept us from exploring the possibility of not broadening the track,
which became the eventual outcome. The case therefore can be used as a caution that being
‘broad enough’ is not easy to achieve.

The positive exception is the Sijtwende period of the V LW case. Within the confines of the
narrower and therefore easier to handle problem situation of how to implement the solution
chosen (the road in a tunnel), Sijtwende took great care to take into account all relevant aspects.
This might have had something to do with its dependence as a market party on the funding and
permission from the different governmental parties involved, which it therefore needed to satisfy,
and therefore take the aspects important to them carefully into account.
The guideline meets the cut-off criterion for calling a guideline useful of three $+ / +$ and/or $- / -$ combinations in a row (two $- / -$ and one $+ / +$), and is on top of that also clearly supported by the mechanisms revealed by the case material. In all cases insufficient analytical broadness could be clearly traced to negative effects on the comprehensiveness of (interim) decisions taken. Aspects that were mapped, on the contrary, almost always also played a part in discussions and/or later decisions, or solution designs eventually implemented. All in all, the cases provide sufficient plausible connections between the broadness of aspects mapped and the comprehensiveness of decisions taken to call the guideline useful, for now.

**Integrate and structure:** In all cases to some extent attention was paid to integration and structuring. In the RWS-period of the VLW case organisational integration is present in the cooperation between civil servants of the different authorities involved and RWS. But this does not lead to joint products. These mainly remain the product of RWS. The only partial integration therefore leads to a minor 'report war', and insufficient integration of the different relevant aspects in the interim decisions taken.

In the Sijtwende period of the VLW-case the responsibility of Sijtwende Ltd for house – as well as road construction contributes to an integral approach to the plan development. Further integration is guarded by close co-operation with RWS and regular consultation with other relevant parties. The resulting Sijtwende project is innovative in its integration of housing, road construction, green, and a public transport connection.

Both IPP cases provide a natural setting (spatial plan development) for integrating diverse information from different sources. In De Bilt the kick-off brochure provides an integral informational platform, but after its issuance the participants to the process are only provided with scattered bits and pieces of information. No analytical framework or structure is provided to integrate the content of the process, and the organisational settings chosen to do so do not function well. No central access point to other information sources is given. All this leads to integration being one of the main bottlenecks in the process. The document resulting from the process is broadly found to lack coherence between the different topics of the workshop, and not to take into account links to for example developments in the neighbouring municipality Maartensdijk (later to become part of De Bilt, a development already underway at the time).

In Doetinchem the process does integrate a diverse range of information, and the desired results of the process and workshops are pre-structured to some extent. During the process information generated is not provided in an integrated fashion. The resulting preliminary zoning plan does incorporate the range of information integrated in the process. During the process decisions do not take into reconsideration earlier decisions taken, which were not mapped and presented in a structured way.
In Ede the living document turns out to be very valuable as a means of providing integration and structuring of information. Having the process management and analytical co-ordination in one hand also worked out positively on structuring both. Our linking of the different relevant topics like discussions revolving around the station with the topic of the HSL, did lead to incorporation of these topics when decisions were taken (if only to study them). But the effects of this on the final decisions are less clear. Here political considerations in the end weigh heavier than the quality of analysis provided. This guideline meets the second cut-off criterion for calling a guideline useful of two +/+, and/or -/- combinations (one +/+ and one -/- in this case), when they are supported by the other three combinations in the row and the mechanisms revealed by the case material. Overall the evidence is sufficiently convincing to also call this guideline useful. The evidence does suggest that broadness of aspects mapped is more crucial to the comprehensiveness of decisions taken than integration and structuring. This is not surprising, since aspects which have not been taken into account can never be decided upon, however well integrated and structured the elements that are taken into account were.

Relations between, and relative importance of guidelines: there is a logical connection between the two guidelines. Elements of analysis can only be integrated and structured, once they have been surfaced by the broad scope of the analysis. Therefore, without a broad scope, proper integration and structuring of all relevant elements is impossible. This logical primacy of a broad scope over integration and structuring might explain the slightly better ‘fit’ of the score for the guideline broad scope with the comprehensiveness of decisions taken than that of integration and structuring. The RWS-period of the VLW case and Ede show that once elements were missed in the analysis, a reasonable (VLW) or even good (Ede) structuring and integration of the elements that were unveiled can never result in a greater comprehensiveness of decisions taken than that allowed by the breadth of elements mapped. That would seem to make it obvious that the guideline to Have a broad scope is more important than the guideline to Integrate and structure. But this is not so. Once integration and structuring is absent, a greater scope in elements brought into the analysis might even lead to a smaller comprehensiveness of the decision taken, since decision makers are ‘overflooded’ and unable to incorporate the unstructured information presented to them. The case De Bilt shows the most clear signs of this. Concluding, both guidelines seem equally essential. Finally, the case De Bilt suggested an interesting paradox within the guideline to have a broad scope: being too broad in the overall topic of the process can lead to insufficient breadthness in taking into account topics related to this broad overall topic, and topics covered by or related to sub-topics within the process.
**Guidelines primarily contributing to Efficiency**

*Table 13.2 Usefulness table Efficiency*

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VLW</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
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<th>Ede</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWS-period</td>
<td>Sijtwende-period</td>
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<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
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<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>avoid overlap in</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>analytical activities</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide no superfluous</td>
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<tr>
<td>information</td>
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<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic</td>
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<td>aspects</td>
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<td>do not overburden</td>
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<tr>
<td>with tasks</td>
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<td>untested</td>
<td>untested</td>
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*Avoid overlap in analytical activities:* This guideline is met badly in the IPP-cases, and only partially in the Ede case and the RWS-period of the VLW case. Despite the occurrence of counter-studies, most analytical activities here take place by RWS. But there is a considerable overlap of analytical activity over time, with the EIS for a large part being a repetition of work already performed for the STUHA (or even earlier). This overlap in time leads to decision-makers having to confirm basically the same decision over and over again.

In De Bilt and Doetinchem overlap between analytical activities is the main problem with respect to analytical efficiency. In De Bilt this is among other things due to the large number of ways in which some analytical results are reached, and to overlap between thematic and geographical workshops. In De Bilt as well as in Doetinchem there is overlap through time, meaning some activities, topics and discussions keep on recurring in the process, especially in the workshops. This contributes to an explosive increase in project time and cost.

In Ede there is an overlap with discussions that take place elsewhere in the sounding-board groups. Also, discussions recur over time. This takes up valuable time that cannot be spent on creating outcomes with a higher average welfare level.

Only in the Sijtwende-period of the VLW-case overlap in analytical activities is largely avoided. Analysis is subdivided in consultation between Sijtwende, mainly RWS and other parties to some extent, thereby avoiding that several parties look into the same matters.

Overall, the results do not point clearly in one direction. Whereas in the Sijtwende-period of the VLW-case an analytical process largely without overlap leads to an only moderately efficient decision- and design process, in the Ede case an analytical process with some overlap does not
prohibit a largely efficient decision process. In De Bilt as well as Doetinchem an analytical process with much overlap does lead to an inefficient discussion-and decision process. The cases therefore do provide two negative ‘strong combinations’, but the evidence in the other cases is too diverse to make usefulness of this guideline plausible enough at this point.

**Provide no superfluous information:** All cases are at least to some extent successful in providing no superfluous information. In the RWS-period of the VLW case prior to the EIA information gathering and analysis is relatively efficiently geared towards decision making on concrete actions. But the EIA itself is from a substantive standpoint largely superfluous. Much relevant analysis has already been conducted. The EIA seems to serve mostly ritual/procedural purposes. The EIS is made ‘judge-proof’ by providing 11 detailed volumes. All this demands a large amount of largely superfluous efforts of those participants still hoping to influence the problem and solution space. In De Bilt and Doetinchem, participants do not find the information provided superfluous. But there is a crowding out of participant analytical activity by presentations during the workshop meetings. One could see this as support for sharpening the formulation of the design guideline to something like ‘do not let information provision go at the expense of analytical activity’.

We therefore took care in the Ede case to avoid long presentations, and focus the information provided as strictly as possible on the questions dealt with. We were to our own judgement as well as that of participants successful in that, and it helped contribute to an efficient decision-making process in which much of the information gathered in the workshops could be put to use. The Sijtwende period of the VLW-case once again provides another successful example of avoiding superfluous information. The clear focus of the process at that time (getting the project built) allowed information gathered to be specifically focused to this target.

Since only in Ede there is a strong correlation between the avoidance of superfluous information and an efficient decision process, the guideline does not meet either cut-off criterion for calling it useful. Its usefulness at this stage has simply not been demonstrated convincingly enough.

**Focus on pragmatic aspects:** In all cases except Doetinchem the groupings involved largely focus on analytically influencing the discussion going on in its own terms, and in a pragmatic way. In De Bilt only the workshop People fails to avoid irrelevant and abstract discussions. However, the link between that and the great excess in cost and time needed for the process is weak. But in Doetinchem the nature and ecological organisations dominating the process waste valuable analysis time on irrelevant discussions. This probably is one of the causes behind the extra number of workshops needed, since the efficiency of the process is diminished by it. Keeping up a focus on pragmatic aspects therefore seems to be useful in avoiding welfare loss by inefficiency.

Despite the only partial presence in three (sub-)cases of the intermediate factor Efficiency, in the
other two cases there was a strong correlation between the absence of a pragmatic focus and the inefficiency of the debate – and decision process (Doetinchem) and a strong pragmatic focus in analysis and an efficient discussion- and decision process (Ede), respectively. Combined with the evidence of the other cases, that means this guideline does meet the cut-off criterion for calling it useful.

*Do not over burden with tasks:* The case Doetinchem led to addition of the guideline not to overburden sessions and participants with analytical tasks. The reason for this addition is that in this case regularly too many topics are dealt with in a too limited time, which leads to shallowness in dealing with issues, or inability to deal with some of them at all. We are unable to prevent the same problem in the Ede case, where in the second workshop we overburden the participants with tasks. This leads to inability to pay attention to the winners and losers of the alternatives, and thereby limits the possibilities of accomplishing results without ‘net losers’. However, this hardly influences the efficiency of the discussion- and decision process negatively. Therefore, usefulness of this guideline clearly has not been proven (yet).

*Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines:* There is not a clear logical connection between the guidelines contributing to Efficiency as there was between those contributing to Comprehensiveness. No guideline can be pinpointed as prior to the others, either on logical grounds or on the basis of the case material.

What is clear, is that the link between application of every one of the guidelines and the intermediate factor is not very strong and direct. Even the one guideline that has been considered proven useful, to analytically Focus on pragmatic aspects, is alone clearly insufficient in the VLW case and De Bilt to lead to an efficient decision making process. It seems that the intermediate factor Efficiency is a factor that is rather strongly influenced by other factors outside the realm of analysis (like political developments), evidently more strongly so than Comprehensiveness.

**Guidelines primarily contributing to Representativeness**

*Table 13.3 Usefulness table Representativeness*

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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWS-period</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Representativeness</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
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<td>0</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
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</table>
Identify (the position of) affected parties: Identifying (the position of) affected parties is done insufficiently in the RWS-period of the VLW case, leading to creative solutions being missed and resistance among non-participants in the arena growing high. In the Sijtwende-period only parties necessary to contribute money or permits are clearly identified by Sijtwende Ltd. In the De Bilt and Doetinchem cases relevant parties are identified, but not very explicitly and thoroughly. In Ede we identify relevant parties rather thoroughly, but since we are unable to have them all partake the effects of this are unclear.

Although there are two strong ‘negative’ combinations in the RWS and Sijtwende period of the VLW-case, there are no signs of a positive effect of identification alone of affected parties on the representativeness of participants and outcomes. Despite some attention to identifying affected parties and their position in De Bilt and Doetinchem, and considerable attention given to it in the Ede case, the resulting representativeness in all these cases is meagre. The usefulness of the guideline is not demonstrated by the cases. It might be necessary, but alone is clearly not sufficient.

Pay attention to representativeness: In the RWS-period of the VLW case the absence of attention to representation issues leads to all kinds of parties feeling not represented in the analytical results reached in the process and countering these results with counter-analysis or objections to the analysis performed. In the Sijtwende-period Voorburg does feel represented in the developments going on, but interests of residents and non-governmental parties are more or less implicitly considered by Sijtwende Ltd to be covered by the governments involved. In De Bilt and Doetinchem this guideline was met poorly. The absence of proper mapping and guarding of representativeness in these processes leads to results of which it can be seriously doubted whether they represent the best welfare option for the whole relevant population. In Ede representativeness is to some extent mapped. The results themselves are so much one-sided (almost all tunnels) that it can be doubted seriously whether they represent a welfare-enhancing package for all stakeholders. Therefore, mapping (and next guarding) representativeness only to some extent does not seem to be enough. This guideline is backed up by no less than four strong (-/-) combinations, by which it meets the cut off criterion for calling it useful. Not paying attention to representativeness is demonstrated by the cases to have a negative effect on representativeness of the process results.

Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: a similar logical connection as between Broad scope and Integrate and structure seems present between the guidelines to Identify (the position of) affected parties and to Pay attention to representativeness. When affected parties and their positions have not been identified, it would be hard to achieve good representativeness in the analytical process(es).
However, the findings also show that identifying affected parties without subsequent attention paid to representativeness of the analysis process, in no case leads to representative outcomes of the process. Evidently, things do not ‘automatically work out well’ in this respect, once only the relevant parties have been identified, or at least partly, as in De Bilt and Doetinchem. Ede paints an even stronger picture. Whereas we took great pains to identify (the position of) affected parties, but somewhat less so to guard representativeness in the process, the resulting representativeness of outcomes is poor. This suggests, as with the efficiency of the decision making process, that the intermediate factor Representativeness is also heavily dependent on other than analytical factors. In the case of Ede this had to do with the political sensitiveness of the process, by which RWS and the railroads, for example, only wanted to take part as observers.

**Guidelines primarily contributing to Competence**

*Table 13.4 Usefulness table Competence*

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<td>give all access to useful</td>
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<td>ation to enable participation</td>
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<td>translate information into</td>
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*Provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives:* In none of the cases are participants, civil servants and experts before the process provided with extra knowledge on the topic dealt with, or training and other means and incentives. In all cases training or receiving extra knowledge was not really desired by participants, and no one seemed to regret the absence of incentives much. The absence of training of civil servants and experts was noticeable in the presentations held from time to time in the De Bilt and Doetinchem cases, but seems not to have had much adverse effects.
However, some participants in Doetinchem stated to limit their activities on behalf of the process outside the workshops because this would entail loss of income. In the Ede case the absence of training of participants in a more active, designing mode might have been one of the factors behind their difficulties and sometimes unwillingness in designing (new) alternatives. Also, the absence of incentives for participation might be a factor in the under-representation of lower income participants in all cases. But this remains speculative. The cases do not clearly pinpoint the guideline as useful.

*Give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise:* In neither period of the VLW case access is provided to analytical capacity or expertise to other than governmental parties, or Sijtwende Ltd. This leads to opponents of the road being unable to develop their own solutions, and limits them to opposing suggestions. In De Bilt (mainly outside) expertise is provided to participants, in Doetinchem mainly expertise of civil servants. Its presence is highly appreciated. In De Bilt it is found that the expertise present in the workshops is not sufficiently used. Finally, satisfaction about the way the outside experts present performed their job is less than total. They remain especially unclear about the feasibility of proposals. In Doetinchem outside expertise is missed to provide a fresh look and fill in gaps in the knowledge of civil servants. In both cases absence of market parties is regretted and thought to affect the feasibility of proposals.

In Ede the access to analytical capacity and expertise is flawed in some respects, as the experts present are found too reticent, and the accounting model does not work as well as it should to support the process. This hampers the creation of welfare enhancing results. Nevertheless, since there is not a case where the intermediate factor Competence is either very poorly or well present, correlation in no case is strong enough to back up this guideline as useful yet.

*Provide sufficient information to enable participation:* In both periods of the VLW case, much of the relevant information is only provided to the inside parties, namely the governmental parties (and, in the Sijtwende period, Sijtwende Ltd). Only legally obliged information like the EIS is provided to the broader public and possible non-governmental stakeholders. In De Bilt as well as in Doetinchem the substantive information received is generally well regarded. But the information on procedural/process aspects is clearly inadequate, leading to a great deal of confusion over the purpose of the process, over separate meetings, desired product, and so on. This damages the efficiency of the process. As least as damaging is the fact that a lot of information is provided too late or not at all, hampering substantive progress. In Ede participants are provided with sufficient information, and we see no appearance of the confusion on process aspects or slowing down of progress by absence of relevant information. Although in all cases there are hints as to the usefulness of this guideline, correlation with the competence of participants is not evident in any case conclusively enough to really make that statement.
Translate information into a usable format: In the RWS-period of the VLW-case information was usually in a form fit mostly for expert use. However, in the EIS attention was paid to producing the information in a user-friendly format. Since in the Sijtwende-period Analytical information exchange was mostly between professionals of Sijtwende Ltd, RWS and Voorburg, translation of information in a shape more fit for lay persons was unnecessary. At hearings and in newsletters information was made understandable for non-insiders, but not usable for own analysis.

In all participatory cases attention was paid to translating information into a usable format. In Doetinchem, it was one of the strong points of the process. The use of visualisation aids is found to help in understanding problems, estimating the feasibility of solutions and providing insight into solutions. The use of tables and maps is found to help in clarifying matters. In De Bilt especially the enormous size, complexity and time pressure of the process make it hard to always provide information in a clear and understandable format. Judging by the opinion of participants those responsible for providing information did a very poor job indeed in making it understandable. In Ede the information provided is considered clear and usable, but whether this has positive effects on the process remains unclear.

Again, as with the other guidelines primarily considered to contribute to Competence, in not one case is there a strong combination between guideline and intermediate factor, so this guideline has also not been considered demonstrated as useful yet.

Give clarity about analytical tasks expected: A specific aspect of information provision that came forward in the participatory cases is the necessity to provide clarity on the analytical tasks of all parties involved, and analytical purposes of meetings et cetera. In De Bilt and Doetinchem it was unclear to all parties involved what activities were expected from them, or to what specific purpose meetings were held. For participants the negative effects of this seem to have largely been minor, for civil servants it meant they chose a relatively reticent role. They sometimes deliberately did not intervene in indicating the feasibility of options or quality of arguments, thereby diminishing the possible competence of the participants as a group.

Opposite this stands Ede, where we were able to provide clarity on analytical tasks to all parties involved. This alone did not lead to hugely competent participants. As with other guidelines leading to competence, the absence of strong correlation in all cases makes it impossible so far to call this guideline useful.

Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: There is no clear logical order between the guidelines contributing to Competence.

What is clear, is that the provision of sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives before the process does not have to be fatal for the competence of participants. Also clear is that access of all participants to useful analytical capacity and expertise and the
provision of sufficient information to them are much more closely correlated with the competence of participants than the other three guidelines. Although none of the guidelines supposed to contribute to competence have been demonstrated useful in a convincing enough way, among them these two seem more important than the others, at least, for achieving competent participation.

**Guidelines primarily contributing to Negotiation**

Table 13.5 *Usefulness table Negotiation*

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<td><strong>RWS-period</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Negotiation</strong></td>
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<td>map possibilities for</td>
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*Have a stakeholder/interest focus:* This guideline is not met completely in any of the cases. In both periods of the VLW case participation of a broader array of stakeholders is not an issue, which limits the attention paid to gains and losses to specific groups or parties. However, in the Sijtwende period attention is paid to the interests of governmental stakeholders, contributing to successful negotiations in that period.

In De Bilt and Doetinchem an overarching public interest focus over the process precludes an explicit stakeholder focus. Effects are not awarded to groups and information is not structured to groups according to their interests. There is diversification of the information provided in the cases, but this is largely functional, deriving from the different tasks and positions of different parties in the cases, not their interests. Parties are not, or hardly, allowed to explicitly state and defend their interests in the process. This also limits the attention paid to gains and losses of groups and parties, and makes compensation and negotiation harder.

In Ede there was to some extent a stakeholder focus. But we were unable because of time constraints to provide fully stakeholder-diversified information. Whereas negotiation did not really take place during the quick scan period, compensation possibilities were discussed. The three strong negative combinations with respect to this guideline, combined with the results of the Sijtwende-period of the VLW case and Ede, which seem to suggest that partial attention to the guideline might already have positive effects, mean the guideline meets the cut-off criterion to call it useful.
Map possibilities for negotiation: Explicitly mapping possibilities for negotiation does not happen at all in the RWS-period of the VLW case, De Bilt and Doetinchem. In the RWS-period of the VLW case, this contributes to possibilities for negotiation and compensation being not optimally used. In the Doetinchem case, it means losers to the process are not compensated. In De Bilt, where the outcomes of the process and their effects on welfare are rather fuzzy, it is hard to determine the effects of this omission.

In the Sijtwende period of the VLW-case possibilities for negotiation between governmental parties were mapped to enable agreement on finance and to negotiate on the way the project should be shaped. In Ede, before and throughout the process we do give attention to mapping possibilities for compensation and negotiation, but we as well as participants lack time for really working this out. This means among other things no win-win packages are negotiated in ‘dressing-up’ the alternatives designed. But our attention to compensation in analysis does lead to it being a topic in discussions during the process.

The guideline is supported by three strong, albeit negative combinations, and the evidence in the other two cases supports the usefulness of this guideline. Therefore, it meets the cut-off criterion for calling it useful.

Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: there is a clear connection between the guideline to Have a stakeholder/interest focus, and a guideline subsumed under Representativeness, namely to Identify (the position of) affected parties. It would be hard to tailor information to specific groups and interests when these have not been identified.

The relationship between the two guidelines considered primarily to contribute to Negotiation is less clear cut, but present. If material for negotiation is not mapped, tailoring information to specific stakeholders is much less useful. The second guideline, to Map possibilities for negotiation, is not really necessary for a good application of the first, but strongly contributes to its usefulness. A strong link between the two guidelines is suggested by their identical scores in all cases, although this might also possibly be attributed to an underlying common factor, namely the attention (openly) paid and room given to negotiation by the parties involved.
Guidelines primarily contributing to Flexibility

Table 13.6 Usefulness table Flexibility

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VLW</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility RWS-period</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility Sijtwende-period</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Make analysis a standby facility: In the RWS-period of the VLW case RWS performed to some extent the role of standby analytical capacity to governments involved, as it did for Sijtwende Ltd in the Sijtwende period. But this capacity was not always flawless or rapid, and was not provided to ‘outsiders’.

An interesting finding that became evident in the cases is that a participatory process seems to call for making analytical capacity into a ‘standby’ facility. The participatory processes are comprised in a relatively short period of time. They frequently require new information to be brought in, and information produced by participants to be processed. This is only possible in the short time available by having analysis operate as a stand-by facility, providing information, answers to questions, and new designs rapidly and on request. Although it is attempted to have participants supported by a stand-by type of analytical capacity, all participatory cases provide evidence that this is not easy. Sometimes information that is requested is provided too late (for example because studies are not ready yet), or not at all. This hampers progress in the workshops, and especially in De Bilt sometimes leads to ‘negotiated nonsense’ (van de Riet, 2003). We can conclude that partial application of the guideline does not lead to miracles, but the guideline still awaits a ‘full’ application to test whether this does lead to positive effects. All in all, although in principle the characteristics of participatory policymaking seem to demand analysis as standby facility, the evidence at this point is insufficient to call the guideline useful.

Make analysis continuously adaptable: Until the EIA, analytical flexibility in the RWS-period of the VLW case was limited. When this came in handy, analytical flexibility was possible in the EIA. In the Sijtwende period Sijtwende from the start proved adaptable and flexible in its analytical and design approach. The De Bilt and Doetinchem cases did not provide progress in making analysis continuously adaptable compared to the VLW case. Whereas in the RWS-period of the VLW case is worked with interim reports that provide some opportunity for adapting analysis, this is not the case in De Bilt.
Doetinchem suffers as well as De Bilt and the VLW case from the rational phase pattern of analysis put upon it, which makes adaptation of analytical results from a previous phase hard. Nevertheless, to some extent adaptability is built into the process in Doetinchem by the continuous remaking of the models in between the workshops. This allows the model development to be closer attuned to the wishes of participants, as well as allowing a check on whether the model developers indeed have grasped those wishes. Therefore it is more likely that the final model is attuned to the welfare wishes of participants. In Ede the living document turns out to be very helpful in order to make analytical results open for adaptation. We also try to be flexible in our workshop set-up, by changing the set-up of the second workshop in accordance to our experiences during the first. The shared responsibility for content as well as process allows us considerable flexibility in attuning the two. Since there are no strong combinations between the application of this guideline and the flexibility of the decision making process in the cases, the evidence is insufficient to call the guideline useful.

Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: between the guidelines supposed to contribute to Flexibility, there is not so much a necessary, as a probable logical connection. That connection entails that it is probably easier to make analysis continuously adaptable when there is a standby analytical capacity around. Besides that, the case findings seem to indicate a closer connection between the guideline to Make analysis a standby facility and decision making flexibility, than between making analysis continuously adaptable and Flexibility. Although neither guideline has been convincingly proven useful so far, the guideline to Make analysis a standby facility seems a better candidate for this than to Make analysis continuously adaptable.

**Guidelines primarily contributing to Trust**

*Table 13.7 Usefulness table Trust*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RWS-period</th>
<th>Sijtwende-period</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Trust</strong></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>be transparent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on status information</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Be transparent:** In all cases the guideline of *transparency* is either only partly met, or even badly, as in the RWS period of the VLW case and the Doetinchem case. In the RWS-period of the VLW-case some effort is made to open the black box of the EIA-process by providing a separate sub-report with methodological explanations. But this is insufficient to open the design and analytical process during the EIA to non-participants, which leads to many doubts and attacks on steps taken and assumptions chosen. Earlier STUHA-studies did not bother about opening up the methodological black box at all. In Doetinchem there is a lack of clarity on the way and the criteria by which the results of the workshops are processed into models. These examples of a lack of transparency lead to participants questioning interim results.

In the Sijtwende period of the VLW case crucial business information was protected, but third parties were allowed to check the calculations Sijtwende Ltd made on expected income. In De Bilt it is attempted to open the black box of methodology. This is not sufficient to provide trust in either the methodology or the experts using it. In Ede, although we take great pains to explain our assumptions, choices, reasoning and also the model we use, especially the accounting model remains a black box. This does not damage trust in the process, however. Since the cases have not provided at least two strong combinations between application of the guideline and presence of the intermediate factor, the evidence is determined inconclusive. On top of that, results for the cases point in all kind of different directions. The usefulness of the guideline is not supported (but not disproven either) by the case material.

**Have procedures for reaching agreement on status information:** Procedures to reach agreement on the status of information are nonexistent in the RWS-period of the VLW case, and the De Bilt and the Doetinchem case. In the RWS-period of the VLW case the public interest profile of RWS and its supposed objectivity seem to be posed as sufficient to back up the analysis conducted and results presented. This turns out insufficient to breed trust. In De Bilt and Doetinchem the status of diverse forms of information is fuzzy, but unequal. Information presented by experts and civil servants is given more time and a more detailed elaboration. In De Bilt suggestions and plans by participants are included in the information set, but not all get elaborated and presented on the same level. In Doetinchem a plan by a participant is not shown to other participants at all.

In the Sijtwende period of the VLW case there was an approval procedure installed for studies carried out for Sijtwende Ltd. In Ede we did have clear procedures for determining the status of information, and this led to absence of questioning the information provided. The cases provide three strong combinations supporting usefulness of the guideline. What is more, two of the cases (the RWS-period of the VLW case and De Bilt) present negative correlations, and one (Ede) provides a positive correlation, making the support even stronger. In other words, in cases where the guideline is not applied trust is a problem, and in the case
where it is, trust abounds. The Doetinchem case provides evidence that its non-application does not have to be totally fatal for Trust, though. Nevertheless, the guideline clearly meets the cut-off criterion for being called useful.

Let concerned parties influence the problem delineation and solution space: Opening up the problem delineation and solution space to influence of participants is a weak spot in the RWS-period of the VLW case. Parties not in the arena have little influence on the problem definitions used throughout the process, but even governments talking directly to RWS and the minister of TPW do not have much influence on the problem definition. The solution space is more open to broadening, since alternatives suggested by local authorities are analysed, at least in the STUHA-framework. But whether this analysis goes beyond ritual analysis is open to dispute between the parties concerned. The same can be said of some alternatives analysed in the EIA. Other parties in the situation also make themselves guilty of trying to limit the set of solution alternatives in their favour. All this makes agreement on a so-called 'win-win-solution' harder, and also damages relationships and trust. In the Sijtwende period influence can mostly only still be applied on solutions. Influence is given to governmental parties, not to neighbours and others.

In De Bilt and Doetinchem IPP pays extensive attention to creation of a shared agenda for the process. But the limited analytical qualities of IPP make the actual execution flawed. In both cases steering by the municipalities remains strong. In De Bilt this leads to participants seeing the agenda to the process as mostly the agenda of M&A. Since this agenda is mostly agreed to by participants, they do not see this as a problem. In De Bilt the process is very open to suggestion of alternatives, in Doetinchem this is more cut off at the root by civil servants pointing to the limits put by existing policy and conditions. The limits this puts on solution development leads from time to time to heavy protest from participants. Therefore, in all cases we can see some to strong support for the contention that influence on problem delineation and solution space by participants is important for achieving trust in the process.

In Ede we allowed participants in principle a great deal of influence on problem definition and solutions design, although in both cases this influence is steered by the problem definition and discussion alternatives we provide them with.

The guideline is supported by two strong combinations, one of these -/- (RWS-period of the VLW case, and one +/+ (Ede), indicating that non-application has negative effects on trust, and full application helps in building trust. The other cases support this contention, where Doetinchem provides a warning that partial application might not (always) be sufficient in breeding trust. All in all, the evidence is sufficient to call the guideline useful.

Provide independent, trusted expertise: In the VLW case the provision of independent, trusted expertise is absent in the RWS-period, except from the commission on the EIA and OVI. That only
the independence of the experts performing analysis, not their expertise in itself, is questioned, does not suffice to create trust in the outcomes. The absence of independence makes the expertise of those performing analysis, more or less valueless with respect to creating progress in the process. In the Sijtwende period expertise independent to Sijtwende Ltd is hired, but not independent in the eyes of the outsiders in the process.

In De Bilt much outside expertise is used, but seen as siding with the municipality, clearly damaging the productivity of their contributions to the process. Also the quality of expertise of the experts is questioned (probably as a result of their perceived lack of independence).

In Doetinchem no independent expertise is present, which is missed to some extent. The expertise of the civil servants carrying out analysis is not seriously questioned, but their independence is. IPP itself guards its procedural independence, but seems substantially rather biased.

In the Ede case, where we work with ‘countervailing biases’ among the experts employed, this in some instances leads to utterances steering the efforts of participants away from possibly welfare-enhancing alternatives. This does not damage trust noticeably, however, probably because participants are unaware of the doubtful validity of some of the remarks.

Concluding, of the two components of this guideline, independence and a non-disputed expert status of the experts employed, especially the first seems to be a guideline that has to be wholly met to avoid damaging (the results of) the process. But De Bilt also provides evidence that absence of trust in expertise itself can damage the process. Since the guideline is supported by two strong negative combinations and sufficient supporting evidence in the other cases, it is determined useful here.

Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: There are relations between the guidelines contributing to Trust, but they are not as obvious or strong as for example that between the guidelines contributing to Comprehensiveness. For example, transparency contributes to the possibility to have parties influence the problems and solutions taken along. Black boxes are hard to influence. The VLW-case and Doetinchem show signs of this relation. The three guidelines deemed useful all correlate perfectly with the score on the intermediate factor in four out of five cases, which does not suggest a stronger connection or higher importance of one of them with Trust than the others. They seem roughly equally important.
Guidelines primarily contributing to Substantive enrichment

Table 13.8 Usefulness table Substantive enrichment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VLW</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>RWS-period</td>
<td>Sijtwende-period</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Connect V/S learning to A/I learning: The combination of V/S (variety and selection) learning, or leaning through debate, with A/I (analysis and instruction) learning, or learning through analysis, is a weak point in the RWS-period of the VLW case, where political negotiations and analysis operate largely separately, and the influence of topics discussed in the political sphere on the analytical sphere is minimal. There is some influence of analytical results on political developments, but this seems to be more caused by their simple appearing, than by their content. This separation limits possible enrichment of the analysis performed by politically relevant topics. That V/S decision making without heeding analytical results can lead to sub-optimal decisions could probably be seen as mirrored in the very expensive eventual outcome of the process, of which the wisdom of constructing it could be questioned. In the Sijtwende period of the case there was some connection between A/I- and V/S-learning, albeit sometimes delayed. This did influence the eventual outcomes of the process.

In De Bilt and Doetinchem the link between V/S learning and A/I learning is mainly classically one-sided: A/I learning provides input to V/S learning, not the other way around. But since the results of A/I learning are sometimes too late for the process of V/S learning, their contribution is limited, hampering progress in the workshops. Where they are in time and relevant, like the results of the traffic model group in De Bilt, they contribute much to the V/S process.

In Ede our attempts at having V/S learning provide direct input to A/I learning are successful in that the deliberations in the workshops provide the basis for the elaboration of alternatives by the experts. We are less successful in having questions answered by them.

Since in four out of the five (sub-)cases the guideline was applied only partially, only the RWS-period of the VLW case provides a strong supporting combination between guideline and intermediate factor. Therefore the cut-off criterion for calling the guideline useful is not met.
Support variety creation: This guideline seems helpful even when applied only partially. Whereas this support is weak to absent in the RWS-period of the VLW case as well as in De Bilt, in Doetinchem it is tried to support variety creation by means of a stimulating team of artists. Their contributions do indeed lead to creative ideas. In contrast, in Ede we did not provide participants with explicitly creativity stimulating methods. This led on the whole to not very creative outcomes. In the Sijtwende period of the VLW-case, lastly, it is mainly the room for maneuver given by RWS to Sijtwende Ltd that allows variety creation, more than explicitly stimulating it.

On the other hand, the lack of support for variety creation in De Bilt does not preclude participants from coming up with many suggestions there. The same is to some extent true for the RWS-period of the VLW case, where variety is created outside the arena without it being supported, but also the creation of variety (by for example the Platform) is hampered because it is not supported.

The two strong combinations in the RWS-period of the VLW case and the De Bilt case combined with the evidence of the other cases are sufficient to call the guideline useful, but the findings in the RWS-period and De Bilt also suggest it might not always be a necessary guideline to achieve variety.

Support variety use: Another guideline where all help seems welcome is that of supporting variety use. This is very weak in the RWS period of the VLW case, where it took years to finally have some ideas accepted. The guideline is also weak in De Bilt, where the variety created in the process is resolved in vague outcomes, and is only moderate in Doetinchem, where variety created on a 'wrong' level is lost, but the general grind of the content is retained in the outcomes. In the RWS-period of the VLW case this is mostly due to absence of an analytical framework open to incorporation of alternatives from 'outside'. In De Bilt and Doetinchem, there is also no clear analytical framework or structure in which the suggestions of citizens can be fitted in. Part of this is the lack of a clear product description of the desired outcomes of the process, meaning that a lot of effort is wasted on variety that is not incorporated in the final product. In De Bilt the outcomes are insufficiently tuned to the political process, and not tested on feasibility. In Doetinchem conditions are applied, and feasibility checks are provided by using the 'starting-point' of a balanced budget as a condition. In short, not heeding guidelines for supporting variety use leads to a large waste of variety created in the process, whereas heeding them to some extent diminishes this waste. Variety use in the Sijtwende period of the VLW case is helped by the guidelines provided by RWS, but hampered by the conservatism of RWS.

In the Ede case we are successful in supporting the use of variety created during the process in the direct outcomes of the process, but less so in having these outcomes influence the larger policy process. The effects of our efforts on policy making are therefore mixed and partially unclear. The guideline is supported by two strong negative combinations and the evidence in the other three cases, and is therefore deemed useful, also when not fully applied.
Relations between, and relative importance of, guidelines: the set of guidelines contributing to Substantive enrichment are strongly related. Most obvious is the link between variety creation and variety use: variety that is not created can not be used. But the link between their scores is less obvious. A process can score well on support of variety use even when scoring low on support of variety creation, when the variety that is created is to a good extent used. There is also a link between the extent to which V/S learning is connected to A/I learning on the one hand, and variety creation and – use on the other. When learning through selection in debate and discussion (V/S learning) is infused with the results of A/I learning (analysis and research), this would stimulate the creation of more variety in the discussion. The other way around, when A/I learning is closely attuned to the V/S learning process going on, the use of the variety resulting from the A/I learning processes is more likely to be actually used in decision making. The VLW case show a good example of these relations, when in the RWS-period these connections are poor with attendant negative effects, and in the Sijtwende period the three guidelines are heeded together, providing much better results.

13.2
INCREASING ROBUSTNESS BY COMPARISON TO TWO OTHER STUDIES

An additional source of increasing the robustness of design guidelines presented in this study is using the work of other researchers as additional grounding for their usefulness.

Roughly in the same period as the study discussed in this book, two other studies took place with considerable relevance to the one presented here. In the early stages of these studies as well as mine theoretical foundations for all three research projects were partially laid in co-operation (see for shared results Edelenbos et al, 2000, 2003). From that point on the research projects did take their own diverging courses, but similarities in assumptions used and guidelines/requirements developed remained. This allows for making comparisons of the findings on the remaining similar guidelines/requirements. Because of the similar foundations for research and use of guidelines respectively requirements by both authors comparison with their work is considered potentially very fruitful.

A question coming forward in this way might be in how far the normative focus of their research coincides with mine. Comparing (results on) guidelines meant to achieve quite different things might be misleading.
Both authors are moderately explicit on their normative framework. Edelenbos investigates which guidance of participatory policymaking would ‘enhance the quality of public policy’ (Edelenbos, 2000, p. xxv). He aims for ‘enriched policy’, which is achieved when the rich variation generated in the participatory process also influences the determination of policy (Edelenbos, 2000, p. 14). Van de Riet states that she sees the challenge of a policy analysis study in a multi-actor policy setting is to ‘produce useful knowledge, or knowledge that is scientifically valid and relevant to the policy debate’. With that knowledge ‘policy progress’ should be achieved (van de Riet, 2003, p. 34).

Both normative frameworks are less elaborate than the one presented in this thesis, but seem far from contradictory to it. Therefore, there seems no reason to reject comparison of guidelines beforehand on the basis of very divergent normative frameworks.

Edelenbos (2000) undertook research into three of the cases also presented in this book, De Bilt, Doetinchem and Ede. Whereas his focus was upon developing guidelines for process management of participatory policy making on land use issues, the partly shared foundation for both our research projects, as well as inevitable overlap between two connected research fields (since both are concerned with supporting participatory policy making on land use issues), have resulted in a limited overlap between guidelines developed and tested in his research and mine. The findings on those similar guidelines can therefore be compared, to check whether they strengthen or contradict each other. The gain of this is of course not the contribution of extra case material, since the material used is largely the same. What the comparison contributes is corroboration of my findings with respect to that material from an extra observant, an extended version of what was described in 8.2 as researchers triangulation.

One of the guidelines Edelenbos tested was “Information provision is organised as a process with couplings to the participatory policy process”, which is similar to my guideline to “connect V/S learning to A/I learning”. He concludes to a negative effect of not meeting this guideline in De Bilt and Doetinchem, and a positive effect of (partial) application of it in Ede. His guideline of ‘Active use of independent (external) content expert(s) in the interactive process’ is similar to my guideline to ‘provide independent, trusted expertise’. About De Bilt and Doetinchem he concludes that lack of either sufficient use of expertise, or of trust in the experts used, has negative effects on the process. With respect to Ede he concludes that the presence of this expertise is appreciated, but experts should have been more active.

Finally, his guideline of ‘Absorption of products from the interactive process in decision making’ is comparable to my guideline to ‘support variety use’. According to Edelenbos, in De Bilt ‘absorption’ (use) of variety generated in the process outcomes is insufficiently safeguarded, leading to negative effects on (the acceptance of) process outcomes. In contrast, in Doetinchem he finds that attention to absorption has positive effects. Finally, in Ede he finds that a high
degree of absorption in the interactive process also leads to some degree of absorption in the
‘official’ procedure.

Odette van de Riet (2003), similarly to my study, tested a set of requirements for performing
policy analysis in multi-actor policy settings. Although she actually presents two sets of
requirements, one for Single-actor complexity and one for Multi-actor complexity, she only puts
the second set to the test. Therefore this set is the one I will deal with here.

Her case material is derived from land use issues such as River Dike improvement, bundling of
several types of infrastructure between the cities of Amsterdam and Utrecht, and possible
construction of an additional sea sluice connecting Amsterdam to the North Sea. Some of the
(sub-)requirements tested by her are similar to guidelines used in this study74. In some cases my
guidelines group two or more of her subrequirements. Further, there are differences in emphasis
in the way her requirements and my guidelines are defined. And of course, although the two sets
of requirements and guidelines to some extent overlap, many differences remain. My set is
broader and more detailed, for instance. Nevertheless, points for a fruitful comparison abound.

Aside from an extra observant perspective, her work also contributes additional case material to
corroborate my findings.

For starters, the subrequirement she distinguishes of ‘Involving analysts who are trusted’ is
similar to my guideline to ‘provide independent, trusted expertise’. Enhancing trust in the
analysts involved by either independent experts, a consortium of experts covering the interests
of different parties and checks and balances on the experts by guidance groups or second
opinions in general seemed to contribute to trust in the outcomes. Therefore, her research
strengthens the case for my guideline ‘provide independent, trusted expertise’.

Another subrequirement, ‘Giving stakeholders a voice in the analysis’, is similar to my guideline
of ‘let concerned parties influence the problem delineation and solution space’. She finds that in
all three cases stakeholders were given a voice in the analysis, seemingly leading to an
enhancement of trust in the analysis. In the Sea Sluice case, where a stakeholder group
(‘ordinary citizens’) was left out of the analysis in the early stages, this bred discontent.

Concluding, her findings provide additional support to the guideline, ‘let concerned parties
influence the problem delineation and solution space’.

Van de Riet’s requirement of ‘Making the analysis accessible to all stakeholders’ roughly squares
with the guideline to ‘translate information into a usable format’. She concludes that this
requirement was in no case fully met, and in one case (Sea Sluice) really poorly. This had
observable negative effects on support for analytical outcomes. Her findings provide additional
support for my guideline ‘translate information into a usable format’.

Her subrequirements “Taking a broad scope and a multi-actor point of view in exploring policy
options”, “Covering all features relevant for any of the stakeholders” and “Applying multiplism if

74 In itself an indication of theoretical solidness of those requirements/guidelines, since these were reached
from two different perspectives and authors, although not wholly independently,
as explained before
there are diverging views on assumptions’, taken together, cover the field of my guideline “have a broad scope”\textsuperscript{75}. With respect to the first subrequirement she concludes this is met well in the Riverdike case, leading to support for the outcomes, whereas in the other two cases it was met at best partially, if not poorly, in both cases leading to a decrease in support for outcomes. These in themselves seemed suboptimal with respect to effectiveness and efficiency. With respect to the second subrequirement she concludes it is met reasonably well, but still only partially, in all three cases. The fact it is only partially met has negative effects on support for outcomes in all three cases. Finally, the third subrequirement was met poorly in all three cases, leading to negative effects on support for outcomes. In all, findings on all three of her subrequirements strengthen the case for the ‘have a broad scope’ guideline.

Finally, her (sub-)requirements ‘Maximizing the benefits and minimize the losses and identifying possibly irreconcilable differences among actors’ and ‘Giving insight into the distribution of gains and losses across the stakeholders’ taken together more or less form\textsuperscript{76} my guideline to ‘map possibilities for negotiation’. Not or only partly applied in the cases studied by her, this neglect is seen as having negative effects. Therefore her findings strengthen the classification of the guideline ‘map possibilities for negotiation’, reached on the basis of the findings in my study alone already, as a useful guideline.

To be concise, comparing the findings of these two other authors with my own yielded the following results:

• the guidelines ‘connect V/S to A/I learning’ and ‘support variety use’ received additional corroboration by the extra observer Edelenbos
• the guidelines ‘let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space’, ‘translate information into a usable format’, ‘have a broad scope’ and ‘map possibilities for negotiation’ received additional support by van de Riet
• the guideline ‘provide independent, trusted expertise’ received support from Edelenbos as well as van de Riet

What does this entail for the classification of guidelines? Firstly, five of the guidelines also dealt with under another name by Edelenbos and van de Riet, respectively, ‘have a broad scope’, ‘map possibilities for negotiation’, ‘let concerned parties influence the problem delineation and solution space’, ‘provide independent, trusted expertise’ and ‘support variety use’ were already branded core, useful guidelines by my own research. This label is confirmed by Edelenbos and van de Riet.

\textsuperscript{75} The larger number of requirements with respect to this topic by van de Riet reflects the larger emphasis on analytical ‘craftmanship’ in her research, whereas my focus is more, but not exclusively, upon the process of policy analysis and its connection to the political process

\textsuperscript{76} And actually derive directly from it, see pp. 30 and 32 of her thesis
Of the other guidelines, my own results for ‘connect V/S learning with A/I-learning’ already pointed to it being a useful guideline, but were just not strong enough. Although the observations of Edelenbos strengthen the case for usefulness of this guideline, since they are based on the same case material they are considered insufficient to tip the balance towards making it a core guideline.

Finally, the evidence of the guideline to ‘translate information into a usable format’ affecting the competence of participants from my own cases was not very strong throughout, meaning that the findings of van de Riet are considered insufficient extra support in this case. This guideline will remain an optional one.

13.3 Core and Optional Design Guidelines

The results above provide little guidance in shortening the list of design guidelines. No design guideline is clearly rejected by the cases (or the work of the other two authors). But it is possible to draw a provisional distinction between robust (convincingly supported by the empirical material) and more optional (‘just can’t tell’) design guidelines, as below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robust design guidelines</th>
<th>Optional design guidelines</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>do not overburden with tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>means and incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map possibilities for negotiation</td>
<td>translate information into a usable format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on the status of information</td>
<td>give clarity about analytical tasks expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem</td>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>delineation and solution space</td>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>be transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13.9 Robust and optional guidelines
This distinction translates in the recommendation that in every participatory process all robust design guidelines for policy analytical support should be heeded, and as much of the optional guidelines as possible. In cases of limited supplies of means (all cases, probably), priority should therefore be given to safeguarding at least the robust guidelines.

### 13.4

**The Relationship between the Intermediating Factors and the Norms**

*Table 13.10 Relation between intermediating factors and norms*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intermediate factor / Design guidelines</th>
<th>RWS-period</th>
<th>Sijtwende-period</th>
<th>De Bilt</th>
<th>Doetinchem</th>
<th>Ede</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Compensation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comprehensiveness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Efficiency</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representativeness</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Competence</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flexibility</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Substantive enrichment</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o</td>
<td>o</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

One thing that the cases made very clear, is that not many cases of decision making on land use planning in the Netherlands (fully) meet the norms developed in chapter 4. Another finding is that it is not easy to determine whether the norms were met, without in-dept study of that topic alone, for which time was insufficient. Especially whether welfare is enhanced by the outcome of a process or not is not easy to determine, as the De Bilt case and Ede show.

At first sight the findings seem very diverse, and drawing conclusions about the link between an intermediate factor and the norms difficult. I will review the findings of the case per intermediate factor to see whether for at least some of the intermediate factors a link between the factor and the norms can be made plausible. However, since especially results on the norms when
compared to the intermediate factors or guidelines are not very determinative, the links established in this way are considered more tentative than those between guidelines and intermediate factors unveiled in the foregoing. No ‘hard’ conclusions can be drawn.

**Comprehensiveness:** in the VLW case the end result is judged relatively mildly by the norms of chapter 4. This is almost exclusively due to the Sijtwende period of the case. In that period a comprehensive solution for a rather broad range of the problems in the case is found in the Sijtwende tunnel, combined with house construction, green areas and a public transport connection. The link between comprehensiveness and norm achievement in the other cases is not strong enough (mostly because of lack of clarity on norm achievement) to consider it even tentatively proven.

**Efficiency:** there is no clear link in the cases between the efficiency of the decision making process and norm achievement. At first sight this might seem strange, since an inefficient decision-making process uses up resources unnecessarily and thereby diminishes the overall welfare that could be gained by the proces. But the overall possible welfare gain or loss in decisions about land use issues is usually rather large, so the ‘process loss’ is relatively insignificant. The welfare of the resulting package is much more important, and no clear link between that and the efficiency of the decision making process proceeding it could be established.

**Representativeness:** the representativeness of those involved in the analytical work is a problem in all of the cases, and has clear effects on the extent to which the norms are achieved. Where there is doubt of good representation for all interests of those performing analysis, not all expected gains and losses are stated (see the VLW case, for example), compensation issues are missed (all cases, expect perhaps partly the Ede case), and the resulting welfare of outcomes is not as high as it might have been (De Bilt and the VLW case, for example). A link between this intermediating factor and the norms is considered to be made plausible by the cases.

**Competence:** competence is in all cases partially present, partially not. Competent parties show a clear ability to present their expected gains and losses (Bilthoven-North in De Bilt, for example, municipalities in the VLW case or the residents in Ede). In Ede the enhanced specific competence of participants resulted in enumeration of possibilities for compensation. In all cases competence of participants is related to more creation of variety, but this mostly is far from perfectly translated in welfare enhancing outcomes. All in all, the cases were yet unable to make the link between competence plausible enough.
Negotiation: negotiation takes place in all cases, but apart from the Sijtwende period of the VLW case far from flawlessly. This prolongs the decisionmaking process extremely in the RWS-period of the VLW case, eating up resources that diminish the resulting welfare of the process, and leads to outcomes in which compensation is only limited to legally obliged compensation in all cases. There is a clear link between the presence of succesfull negotiation in the cases and at least part of the norms.

Flexibility: decision making flexibility is partly present, and partly not, in all cases. This makes it hard to determine a clear link between it and norms that are also on average only partly met. There are indications that inflexibility in decision making especially during the process reduces the possible welfare of the outcomes of a process (Doetinchem, for example), but these are not strong enough yet.

Trust: Trust is a clear problem in the RWS-period of the VLW case and De Bilt. In both cases this means parties are either not heard when trying to express their expected gains and losses (VLW case) or play political games in trying to achieve the best results for themselves instead of clearly and openly stating these gains and losses (De Bilt). The lack of Trust makes compensation a non-issue in the RWS-period of the VLW case, thereby also hampering achievement of welfare enhancing outcomes. The presence of at least a basic trust in the Sijtwende period of the VLW case and in Doetinchem enables creation of reasonably welfare enhancing results in these cases, and compensation for Voorburg for its losses in the shape of extra green areas and houses in the eventual process result, Sijtwende. In Ede the presence of Trust leads to parties openly and unequivocally expressing their expected gains and losses. All in all, the evidence for a link between Trust and the norms is relatively strong.

Substantive enrichment: in the VLW case substantive enrichment is poor in the RWS-period, but present in the Sijtwende period. This allows for a final result, the Sijtwende plan, that is at least as good for welfare as the dominant solutions in the RWS-period (although perhaps not as welfare enhancing as some of the other solutions circulating in that period). In De Bilt the absence of substantive enrichment hinders creation of welfare enhancing results. Incorporation of the new solution for the railroad crossing developed by the shopkeepers, for example, might have enhanced welfare. In Doetinchem substantive enrichment is partly achieved by putting the power line underground, and incorporating ideas of participants to the process, and partly not by not incorporating ideas on the ‘wrong’ abstraction level or that were contradictory to existing policy (the norm for high-rise buildings). The extent to which substantive enrichment is
achieved/allowed almost directly correlates with the welfare resulting from the outcomes. All in all, evidence for a link between substantive enrichment and (part of) the norms of chapter 4 seems convincing for the time being.

13.5
THE CAUSAL MODEL

To conclude this chapter, we return to the causal model developed in chapter 8. In the previous paragraphs a number of guidelines were deemed useful in bringing about the intermediate factors to which they were supposed to contribute. Some of these intermediate factors in turn were considered to be demonstrated helpful in bringing about the norms of chapter 4. This means we can insert a little more confidence into the causal model than at its inception. Graphically, this is done by making arrows leading from ‘core’ guidelines to intermediate factors, and from intermediate factors branded helpful to the norms, thicker. These thicker arrows therefore indicate mechanisms I believe the research presented in this book has made convincingly plausible. Those performing analysis for participatory policy making should focus on at least the ‘thick’ mechanisms in the model, and as much of the others as possible. Since the link between guidelines and intermediate factors was much more thoroughly investigated than the link between intermediate factors and the norms, the arrows between intermediate factors and norms are dotted. This means that a thick arrow between an intermediate factor and the norms indicates a less certain relationship than a thick arrow between a set of guidelines and an intermediate factor.

With respect to some intermediary factors we see all contributing guidelines have been corroborated by the research, with respect to some only part of the set. In all cases the guidelines that were deemed useful were put in bold. This means also that the ‘thick’ arrows in cases where not all guidelines in the set were proven useful only stand for the relationship between the proven (bold) guidelines, and the corresponding factor.

What final conclusions can we draw with respect to the causal model? First of all, the link between intermediate factors and the norms was only considered to be made plausible for four factors: representativeness, negotiation, trust and substantive enrichment. For the other factors evidence on either the factor itself, or the factor and the norms, was considered to diffuse to provide a picture of its working generating enough confidence to call it plausible for now. In those cases more research will be needed (as in the other, but more strongly so for the four factors not linked yet).
Figure 13.1 A hypothetical causal model for the effect of the guidelines on welfare

- have a broad scope
- integrate and structure

- avoid overlap in analytical activities
- provide no superfluous information
- focus on pragmatic aspects
- do not overburden with tasks

- identify (the position of) relevant parties
- pay attention to representativeness

- provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives
- give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise
- provide sufficient information to enable participation
- translate information into a usable format
- give clarity about analytical tasks expected

- have a stakeholder/interest focus
- map possibilities for negotiation

- make analysis a standby facility
- make analysis continuously adaptable

- have procedures for reaching agreement on status information
- let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space
- provide independent, trusted expertise
- be transparent

- connect V/S learning to A/I learning
- support variety creation
- support variety use

Norms:
- welfare increase
- compensation
- participation

Comprehensiveness
Efficiency
Representativeness
Competence
Negotiation
Flexibility
Trust
Substantive enrichment

= norms for judging the outcomes
= intermediate factors: attributes of the decision-making process
= guidelines
= robust link
= supposed link
Secondly, for the four factors considered convincingly linked to the norms, also a convincing link was established with the set of guidelines considered to support their achievement. It was considered plausibly demonstrated that representativeness, negotiation, trust and substantive enrichment were supported by all guidelines considered foremost to contribute to them, with the exception of the guidelines to Be transparent in relation to Trust, and the connection of V/S-learning to A/I-learning in relation to Substantive enrichment. This strengthens the case for application of those guidelines. Not only have they been demonstrated to plausibly contribute to the four intermediating factors, those factors in turn are considered contributory in all plausibility to the norms used to judge decision making processes. So these guidelines probably contribute to the norms it’s all about.

The guidelines supposed to contribute to Comprehensiveness, and one guideline supposed to contribute to Efficiency are also deemed convincingly supporting those intermediate factors, but the link between these intermediate factors and the norms is not considered to be made plausible enough, yet. Nevertheless, application of these guidelines is also strongly recommendable, since they are strongly supported by theory, and most of them to some (but as yet insufficient to call them robust) extent by the empirical material presented in this book as well.

Finally, a plausible link between the guidelines supposed to contribute to Competence and Flexibility, respectively, and these intermediate factors, and between the factors and the norms, could not be demonstrated in this study. Further research might be able to achieve this, or demonstrate convincingly their lack of usefulness. Time might tell.

As outlined earlier, no explicit search for cross-links between guidelines and intermediate factors under which they were not subsumed in the first place took place. During the research some findings ‘popped up’ as a by-product, so to say, of the mainline of research, about links between guidelines subsumed under the same factor. These were touched upon in this chapter. Some links between guidelines were ‘logical’. A good integration and structuring presupposes that all relevant elements have been surfaced by a broad scope of the analysis. Similarly, having a stakeholder/interest focus would be hard without identifying (the position of) affected parties. These ‘logical’ relations are confirmed by the cases. The similarly logical connection between identifying (the position of) affected parties and being able to pay attention to representativeness is also clear in the cases, but also the great dependance of representative outcomes of other aspects than the guidelines.
A less directly logical, but interesting connection appears between the guideline to connect V/S-learning and A/I-learning, and variety use. Once these forms of learning are connected, variety use turns out to be much more likely. This is shown especially strong in the VLW case(s). More or less 'the other way around', the cases show that the provision of insufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives before the process does not have to be fatal for the competence of participants.
In this chapter I, first, return to the research questions guiding the research. Next, I reflect on the methodology followed and present some recommendations for further study. Finally, some findings are presented that came forward during the research, more or less ‘between the lines’, that could not directly be dealt with in the framework developed, but that I do consider interesting and worthy of further study.

14.1 ANSWERING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In chapter 2 a number of research questions were presented to guide the research of which results are presented in this book. Per question I will now summarise the answer(s) given to it in this study.

*What is meant by a 'good' result of a policy making process?*

This question was answered in chapter 4, where a threefold norm was developed. In short, a good result of a policy development process should lead to welfare enhancement for all involved, achieved among other things by compensation of all (envisaged) losers of the policy, after all involved have been allowed to state their expected gains and losses.

*Which policy analytical approaches, participatory or otherwise, could be used in policy making on spatial issues in the Netherlands in light of the characteristics of that policy making and the policy analysis performed for it?*

The answer to this question was divided over a set of guidelines developed in the course of chapters 5 to 8. Together they provide a picture in which elements of ‘old-fashioned’ analytical craftsmanship and elements of participatory analysis are combined. The approach emphasizes in the more traditional part elements like broadness, integration and structuring, because of the importance not to miss welfare effects for specific parties, and transparency and positional independence as means of creating trust, much more than expert ‘objectivity’. Also, attention is paid to efficiency, to waste as little welfare as possible in the process. With respect to the participatory aspects the emphasis is on giving all parties involved the means and opportunity to have a real and meaningful analytical contribution. This can be enhanced by first (but iteratively) determining all the parties that could be relevant, what their interests are and by actually getting them involved. Next by giving them knowledge, training, information (among other things about
items for negotiation), all in a format they can use, and giving them access to sufficient, flexible and adaptable analytical support. Finally, and perhaps most difficult, it is recommended to connect the deliberative processes with analytical activity. When this is succesful both can enrich and positively influence each other, to make participatory policy making the real combination the term stands for, instead of really two separate and badly connected processes called participation and policy making.

How can the relationship between participatory policy analysis and the more traditional forms of policy analysis employed in the policy process be improved?

The answer to this question lies largely in the relationship between ‘V/S-learning’ and ‘A/I-learning’. The two should be more attuned to each other. This means more concretely that the traditional forms of analysis should be willing to compromise depth for comprehensiveness, flexibility and speed, for example, when the participatory process demands so. It also means much more attention to creating constraints for trust, in a process where many parties with sometimes very conflicting interests are present (by means of procedures, transparency about methods followed and assumptions, and so on). It means paying attention to which analytical results are required from the traditional process to enable the analysis in the participatory process, and which form the analytical (interim) results of the participatory process should have to be useful in the traditional analytical process. This could be enhanced by making formats and clear instructions for those taking part in the participatory analysis, as well as those doing the traditional analysis.

How can the fit of (results of), participatory or other, policy analytical efforts with the larger policy process be improved?

This question was theoretically answered in the development of guidelines in chapter 6. The cases provide additional answers. For example, they point to the necessity to attune the timing and shape of (interim) results of the analytical process to the policy process. Also, the use of clearly outlined constraints put to results and set before the process comes forward. The case Ede especially made clear that results brought into an already running analytical process should be worked out on a level of detail and with attention paid to elements comparable with existing alternatives, to be able to be included in the running process.

By which measures should the working of the policy analytical approach designed be evaluated?
In the end the working of the policy analytical approach should be evaluated as to the extent to which it contributes to welfare enhancement for all involved, by contributing to a process in which all those with a stake are able to state their expected gains and losses, and those expected to lose are compensated for their expected losses. Fulfilment of these norms is supposed to be brought nearer by a decision process that is comprehensive, efficient, representative, competent and flexible, in which negotiation and substantive enrichment take place, and those involved trust one another. If the policy analytical approach contributes to these elements of the decision process, and through that to the final evaluation norms, it works well.

*In how far does the policy analytical approach as designed meet these measures?*

Based on an empirical analysis of 4 cases, a distinction was made between guidelines developed which were considered to convincingly contribute to the measures outlined, and guidelines that had not yet demonstrated convincingly enough to contribute. Roughly half the guidelines were considered supported convincingly enough by the case material.

## 14.2 A Methodological Reflection and Recommendations for Further Study

The research described in this thesis was carried out according to the methodology, and in the spirit of, grounded theory. This entailed concretely, first, the development of a ‘theory’ of a good working of policy analysis in land use decision making, based on existing literature. In this particular case the theory was turned into a special form, that of a set of design guidelines for a policy analytical approach to support participatory policy making on land use issues. Next, so-called ‘theoretical sampling’ took place. Guided by the set of guidelines developed (the theoretical framework to work with) empirical material was gathered and selected. This was done in the VLW case by means of document analysis and interviews. In the De Bilt and Doetinchem I proceeded among other things by what is described in anthropological research as ‘going native’: I was present at the deliberations of civil servants, process managers, participatory meetings. This especially turned out to be a very valuable research approach, delivering inside information and understanding that could have never be gathered by document analysis, interviews or surveys. Although the research method turned out to be very labour-intensive, other ways of gathering this type of ‘deep insight’ do not come to mind. The framework did turn out
useful for this gathering and categorising of empirical material. As normal in a grounded theory approach, the framework was adapted (albeit slightly) during the course of research, as a result of intermediate findings.

What came out of this was not, as usual in the grounded theory approach, a ‘grounded theory’, but a ‘grounded design’. This design was next supported more broadly by comparing my findings to those of two other authors, by this adding a new pool of empirical (although indirect) material to base the conclusions on.

In hindsight, the theory used turned out very useful in developing a set of guidelines that could be made operational to evaluate, and in the Ede case to structure, the policy analytical efforts applied in the cases. Also, the theory seems to cover most relevant ground. Not many new guidelines or aspects of guidelines were discovered in the cases, which suggests that no relevant (theoretical) aspects were left out of the theory used.

In the end, the case results provided two ‘types’ of design guidelines. Their classification as either core or optional design guidelines is relatively robust, but of course still sensitive to the cut off criterion chosen. Therefore, the previous results should be interpreted with caution, as only a first step towards determining empirically grounded policy analytical support of participatory policymaking.

Also, in the theoretical chapters assumptions and normative choices are made, which to a large extent predicate the application of the guidelines. The guidelines were developed to help achieve welfare-enhancing policy outcomes in the field of land use issues by means of participation and compensation. If someone strives for totally different goals, other guidelines might be more appropriate. Moreover, in another policy field they might work differently. This does not mean they could not be applicable, at least partially, to other policy fields (in fact, I expect them to be applicable to many possible fields, at least partially), but this is purely hypothetical so far. Also, the guidelines are supposed to support a participatory policy making style in a network environment. For a non-participatory policy making style some will be superfluous. Operating in a non-network environment others probably will be as well.

Another observation is that only half (12 of 24) of the list of design guidelines can be firmly classified useful on the basis of my case-research alone. This at first might seem disappointing, but on second thought is logical. The case material, although analysed in depth, only applies to four cases. Therefore, ‘firm’ criteria for drawing conclusions on it seem warranted and have been chosen here. Secondly, many ‘disturbing’ factors are at work, which warrants caution in drawing conclusions per case, which in turn affects the firmness with which overall conclusions can be drawn. ‘Ceteris paribus’ clauses do not apply to the real world.
Interesting is, that some at first sight ‘trivial’ relations between guidelines and intermediate factors are not confirmed by this study. Two guidelines stand out. Those are the guideline to Avoid overlap in analytical activities and the guideline to Provide no superfluous information. Their relation with the intermediate factor Efficiency would seem obvious, but is not confirmed convincingly in the cases. How can this be explained? The clue is that the intermediate factor Efficiency does not relate to the efficiency of the analytical process (that is comprised among other things by the four guidelines under this factor taken together), but to the efficiency of the decision making process that does or does not use, even only partially or wrongly, the outcomes of the analytical process. The efficiency of the decision-making process is influenced by other factors besides the efficiency of the analytical process giving input to it, for example politics. This is most clear in the VLW-case, where political factors (besides analytical shortcomings!) lead to a dramatically inefficient decision process. But also in the Ede case political developments hampered the efficiency of the decision process. We could conclude carefully, and tentatively, that this seems to be an intermediate factor relatively strongly influenced by other than analytical factors in comparison with some of the other intermediate factors.

This study did not venture into analysing cross-reference effects between guidelines and intermediate factors to which they may also contribute, but under which they were not subsumed. Interesting here especially are the guidelines that might work positively on one factor, but negatively on another. A guideline to Have a broad scope might work positively on the comprehensiveness of the decision making process, but possibly negatively on its efficiency. Support [of] variety creation might either ease negotiation processes, or make them harder. And so on. Going into these cross links would enhance understanding of the interrelations between the analytical process and the decision making process, and different aspects of the analytical process itself. For reasons of workability, it would seem recommendable to limit a more indepth study of these interrelations to only a subset of the guidelines and intermediate factors.

Broadening the case base in the future would gradually make design guidelines either shift from the right to the left column, since the foundation for that has become strong enough, or maybe remove them from the list all together, since the foundation for that has become strong enough. A first attempt towards that was taken in 13.2, where I compared my findings to that of two other authors. However, this did not change the classification of any single guideline, although it did strengthen the case for five guidelines already deemed robust. As it stands, the 12 core guidelines provide a basis for policy analysts supporting participatory policy-making, and the optional guidelines provide a probably well recommendable list of options of how to improve upon the work.
No scientific study is complete without recommendations for further study. A first obvious recommendation would be to broaden the case base for the list, meaning either researching ‘fresh’ cases for the (non-)application of the guidelines and determining the positive or negative effects of (non-)application, trying to apply (part of) the guidelines deliberately (as we did in the Ede case) and assessing the effects of that, or carrying out a secondary case analysis on other cases in the field of land use decision making, as I did in 13.2.

A second recommendation would be to look into which ‘packages’ of guidelines strengthen each other most (see 13.1), for example by applying parts of the whole set in different combinations in several cases. This would also allow study into the crossrelations between guidelines and different intermediate factors.

Yet another recommendation would be to look into preconditions for successful application of the guidelines. What circumstances seem vital or at least helpful to them to serve their purpose? Paragraph 14.3 provides some starting-points for this.

Finally, it would be interesting to start research into the more concrete level of methodologies and techniques, which could be used to ‘fill in’ the guidelines. Which methodologies and techniques work best to give shape to the guidelines? As it stands so far no methodologies seem ruled out beforehand by the guidelines, but their effectiveness would depend on the extent to which their specific application is tuned to the guidelines.

14.3
TENTATIVE FINDINGS
ADDITIONAL TO THE FRAMEWORK

In the case research a number of observations were made which could not directly be tied to one or more guidelines, but are relevant to their application. From these observations recommendations can be derived for policy analytical support of participatory policy making. For details reference is made to the separate case chapters.

_Neglecting interests to avoid conflict_

In all cases diverging interests are not openly acknowledged, let alone openly dealt with. The culture described in chapter 5, in which open conflict and negotiation are viewed with horror, where everyone should ‘chip in’ for the public interest, still seems very much alive. Conflict is
avoided by simply not explicitly surfacing the interests of parties involved. Openly stating interests jeopardised by a government proposal is branded as ‘Nimby’-behaviour, as for example happens to Voorburg and the Platform in the VLW case. In neither the VLW case, nor De Bilt or Doetinchem were the interests of parties involved ever explicitly mapped.

The implicit assumption often seems to be that public authorities ‘by definition’ act without their own preferences ‘in the public interest’ and that other parties should act that way. In the VLW case the assumption of the parties performing or commissioning most analysis in the process was that their expertise or position as defender of the public interest would guarantee objective and therefore unquestionable analysis being carried out. If it is acknowledged that different governments might represent different interests the assumption is that, since governments at all levels are involved, the interests of all possibly affected are represented by their chosen political representatives. These assumptions did not create trust in the results of analysis. The public interest focus meant RWS had no explicit group-focused analytical approach in the VLW case. This meant it did not map the interests at stake or tailor information to specific groups, which made successful negotiations harder.

Not acknowledging conflicting interests also leads to particular ways of dealing with negotiation and compensation. The practice of spatial planning in the Netherlands is one of bargaining, but this is not openly acknowledged. In the VLW case, for example, negotiating, if not flat-out bribery, was all around. For example, The Hague received money and later a tunnel for agreeing to the construction of the Northern Ring-Road. But open demands made by Voorburg for housing on the road, or a tunnel, or in some other way to be compensated, were not met, even ignored, until a private party through its plan created an excuse to do so.

When interests and compensation possibilities are not properly mapped and open negotiation is not welcomed, it takes a long time to reach a result that looks a lot like what could have been reached much sooner by such interest mapping and open negotiation in an early stage. The VLW case provides again a good example of this.

The new participatory processes spoil this ‘keep conflict under the blanket’ habit. By having different parties with real, conflicting interests partake in such processes and confronting each other in meetings, they bring conflicting interests into the open. However, in De Bilt and Doetinchem the actions of process manager IPP were pervaded with a Habermasian view of a power free dialogue, in which the common interest has to be discovered and served together. In both cases awareness of the importance of the different interests involved, and the influence these interests do or do not have on the outcome of the process, seemed to be missing. Aside from IPP, also often councillors, administrators and civil servants were unwilling to openly discuss interests. This led to participants shrouding a defence of their interests in the rhetoric of the public interest. Conflicts in interests between different groups were largely ignored. Since interests were not openly mapped in both cases, the parties with most skill or cloud won,
steering results away from possibly more welfare enhancing ones. The neglect of interests also led to a neglect of compensation. Interests that are ignored, do not have to be compensated when jeopardised.

Finally, the extent in which explicit attention was paid to interests guided the amount of and direction of innovations in the process. Attention to interests might focus innovation towards mitigating losses, and inspire specific innovations. An example of this was the tunnel solution developed by a group of shopkeepers in De Bilt, developed from their specific interests as well as those of some other groups of inhabitants, which during the process turned out to be an improvement upon existing solutions.

**Resulting recommendations:** policy makers in the Netherlands should openly acknowledge that conflicting interests are real and legitimate and should be dealt with openly and head on; that (possibilities for) conflict should be faced and resolved through bargaining. Aside from this ‘cultural’ aspect, policy instruments should be installed to reallocate the costs and benefits to achieve more harmony between groups. Examples are insurance schemes for potential victims of a project with dangerous sides, and compensation schemes to deal with opposition resulting from for instance losses in property values (see Kunreuther et al, 1982). To assure that all relevant interests would partake, aside from mapping them, it could be decided and made clear that non-participating actors will have less influence on the outcomes, and for example will not be eligible for non-legally obligated compensation. Participants could also be given a reimbursement for their participation.

**Neglecting power issues**

Also conspicuous in all cases was the denial of the element of *power*, especially in the IPP-cases. Participatory policymaking is all about a transfer of influence on policymaking, in other words, power, to parties less influential before. But the consequences of this were blissfully ignored by IPP.

In both IPP-cases, although participants were given influence on problem definition and solution development, the influence of other parties seemed larger, in the end. There were many situations in which parties other than participants placed a heavy stamp on the substantive developments. For example, the agenda of workshops, the topics dealt with and the way they would be dealt with were prepared in consultation between the process manager, the civil servant project manager and the outside expert supporting them. This gave these three parties considerable power over the course of the process. A lot of research was carried out by independent experts and sometimes civil servants, in which they made far-reaching substantive choices. The expert meeting plus was another forum exercising influence on the substantive developments. It among other things looked into which points for the agenda should be

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77 For a more in-depth treatment of this subject see Monnikhof et al, 2003
elaborated further. Forums officially only concerned with procedural aspects also exercised design power. Finally, process managers exercised considerable substantive influence. By wielding its power over process and procedures the process management exercised considerable influence over the distribution of design power over participants (see also Edelenbos, 2000). In De Bilt as well as Doetinchem two views on the ‘primacy of design’ in participatory processes seemed to clash, also because they were not expressed explicitly. The first was that of a participatory process being primarily a process of analysis, discussion and design (or at least part of these activities) by the participants, who are supported by experts in this. The second view saw participatory policy making as a process in which experts do most of the analysis and design, guided or steered by (opinions aired by) participants. The different focus in both views had many consequences for policy analysis, but was often not clearly indicated and thought through, leading to misunderstanding and conflict.

Whereas the power fight in De Bilt and Doetinchem was primarily over the definition of solutions, the VLW case showed the value of problem definition as a power tool. Throughout the years proponents of the road broadened the scope when this was favourable to their preferred solution, for instance, by bringing forward the construction of Leino and the moving of EPA as arguments. They narrowed the problem space when this came in handy, for example, during the EIA. Whereas in the Notification of Intent of RWS the problem definition was broad (concerned with accessibility and liveability), in the EIA the problem definition was narrowed to the problems for the users of the road and its neighbours.

*Resulting recommendations:* it should be recognised there is power not only in decision making, but also in analysis, design, and process management. Secondly, it should be decided and outlined before the process which parties will have which forms of power, and how this power might be controlled.

**The (possible) analytical contributions of participants are not taken seriously**

The cases also showed clear signs of unwillingness or inability to take the analytical contribution of participants seriously. The analytical part of the participation seemed in the De Bilt and Doetinchem cases to be at least partially symbolic. For experts, process managers, administrators and politicians it was more about hearing opinions, generating support, and generating participation for its own sake. There is an analogy between the symbolical use of participation in the case and the symbolical use of analysis so well documented in the literature. In the VLW case is tried to prevent criticism or render it powerless beforehand by going into enormous analytical detail in the EIS.
Those designing and managing the participatory process in the IPP cases did not always pay sufficient attention to the policy making aspects of the participation process. They were either idealistic process managers with more interest in participation per se than its results (IPP in De Bilt and Doetinchem), or the municipal department of communication (co-responsible in Doetinchem). Although in both cases the municipal departments of spatial planning were involved, they subjugated themselves with respect to the setup of the process and separate workshops to IPP. As a result of this, in Doetinchem several civil servants as well as participants of the workshop found that the emphasis lay too much on the process, and too little on the content. There was constant confusion between IPP and the civil servants as to what making a zoning plan exactly entailed. Because there was no prototype of what it should be nobody knew exactly what they were working towards. There was an atmosphere of tug-of-war between IPP and the civil servants on what the result of the next workshop evening should be. IPP did not always have an agenda for the evening.

(Common) standpoints were not fixated during the process, for instance by voting, in De Bilt as well as Doetinchem. This led to repetition of analytical steps. There was also a lack of clarity about what was expected of participants with respect to analysis and design.

The experts involved in the participatory processes in general also seemed to share a common belief that all this participating is nice, but that real analytical – or designing progress can only be expected from real experts78 (see also Enserink and Monnikhof, 2003). Participants were seen as fit to provide wishes and opinions, not expertise. Of course, fear for loss of position and standing with experts probably also played a part in this unwillingness to take contributions of ‘ordinary citizens’ seriously. In the VLW case it was a closed circle of experts that designed and analysed. In De Bilt and Doetinchem an underestimation of the possible analytical outcomes and demands of the participatory processes led to participants overflooding the process management and – support with hard to handle material. IPP also seemed to see the analytical contributions of participants as no more than a by-product. It sometimes put more effort into making the process ‘fun’, than properly supporting the analytical contributions of participants.

**Resulting recommendations:** The observed neglect of the policy making aspect of participatory policymaking could be translated in two recommendations. The first would be that policy makers not only vow to take contributions from other parties seriously, but also translate this in for example clarity on what will happen to those contributions once these meet certain constraints. But even more than procedural safeguards a change in ‘state of mind’ seems necessary here. The same necessary ‘state of mind change’ applies to experts. They should adapt to a new role, in which supporting others, giving advice, providing feedback and so on become more important than doing (all) the analytical and/or design work themselves.

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78 As with the policy makers, this does not apply to all experts involved, of course. But the tendency described does seem to be quite general
A lack of use of policy analytical supporting methods

The cases all showed insufficient policy analytical methodical support to help incorporate suggestions from outsiders and/or participants to the participatory process into the analytical process. In the VLW case there was no analytical framework open to incorporation of alternatives from 'outside'. Outsiders could suggest alternatives through ‘inspraak’, but in general not much was done with these suggestions. In De Bilt and Doetinchem, there was also not a clear analytical framework or structure in which the suggestions of citizens could be fitted in. Part of this was due to the lack of a clear product description of the desired outcomes of the process, meaning much effort was wasted on variety not incorporated in the final product. No structure was offered for retaining results that were not directly useful. The analytical steps in the process were, partly because of this lack of a clear description of the outcomes to work towards, also not well enough structured. The analytical understructuring of both processes in De Bilt and Doetinchem was mended somewhat by ideas and suggestions of civil servants.

In the VLW case analysis was for a long time officially assigned to RWS. In practice analysis and design also took place ‘diffusely’, by opponents of the road and private parties trying to come up with creative suggestions. The participatory process in De Bilt, though of a totally different nature, also showed a ‘diffusion of analysis’. Analysis and design did not take place in the workshops, but by experts and participants outside the workshops. Whether the results of this were incorporated in the content development in the process was in the case of participants up to individual process managers and civil servants. Clear procedures or methodical support for this were lacking. This lack of a framework or structure means that all the processes had a limited substantive ‘memory’. Suggestions that could not directly be fitted into the plan development, because they were on the ‘wrong’ level, or not suggested through the ‘proper channels’, disappeared out of sight of those performing the analysis.

In all cases except Doetinchem there was also little methodical support in creating variety. In Doetinchem a group of artists supported the process with provocative photo's, drawings and scale models, and this led to creative suggestions from participants.

One of the effects of the limited methodical support of processes was that analytical tasks in all processes were fulfilled inefficiently. Many activities were repeated again and again, or took place at several locations at the same time. This inefficiency might be one of the explanations behind the limited innovation of the results: inefficiency leads to a shortage of time, which in turn hampers possibilities for creativity. Analytical efficiency, and the grasp on the information explosion caused by participatory processes, might be enhanced by using explicit selection rules during the process. In De Bilt and Doetinchem these were not used, and especially in De Bilt the process more or less ‘drowned’ in the information it produced. In Ede we did use explicit (and explained) selection rules and methods, which made it possible to handle the content coming forward. A loss of information that might later be useful after all was prohibited by incorporating
all information in at least one version of the living document, and assigning alternatives selected out to a ‘fridge’.

Using analytical methods and tools to help structure the participatory analytical process will cost means. This raises the question as to whether some of these means might be transferred from more ‘traditional’ policy analysis. The policy analytical function (in contrast to political, or symbolical function, for example) of some policy analysis tools might be questioned. The EIS in the VLW case, for example, used up a considerable amount of time and other means, without really providing information to alter the already intended decision, a phenomenon not uncommon to EIA. Putting less effort in producing an EIS in a traditional way, and shifting some of those means to participatory analysis, for example, might be beneficial.

**Resulting recommendations:** use more supporting methodology. Most necessary seem not so much sophisticated tools in order to for example perform calculations, but relatively simple and transparent tools in order to provide an overview, that are able throughout the process to incorporate and bring together in one framework suggestions from different parties on different abstraction levels (see for possibilities Rosenhead, 1989, 1996). Such tools could enable the discovery of new linkages, or possibilities for compensating parties, by putting ‘all’ relevant problems, solutions and parties in one framework. Such a framework could also provide a better handle on the ‘information-explosion’ (see also van der Most et al., 1998) generated by participatory processes, and the often (also here) noted inability of those conducting the processes to deal with it.

**A dilemma concerning the use of constraints**
The participatory cases surfaced a possible dilemma between creating and assuring the use of variety. In the IPP philosophy and that of some civil servants participants should be allowed to speak as freely as possible. They should be burdened by as little constraints and restrictions as possible.

Although this enabled participants to ‘free their minds’, it also enabled politicians and civil servants to disregard the (interim) process results on the basis of being ‘unrealistic’, of being unchecked for costs, and so on. Constraints could prevent this. These constraints in themselves should be open to attack, so that they cannot inhibit the creation of good ideas. When good ideas arise constraints should be open to revision.

But there is also fear constraints would stifle creativity. In Doetinchem, although the only official constraint (aside from a time limit) put to the process was to create a plan with 1000 houses in it, the imperative to heed existing policy meant a range of other constraints ‘popped up’ during the process. This gave participants the feeling that their creativity and possibilities were inhibited.

Loosening up some of the ‘unofficial constraints’ to the process, and allowing participants more
time for debate and brainstorming, might have further enhanced the creation of variety. 

*Resulting recommendations:* The dilemma concerning the use of constraints might be resolved by working with explicit constraints, to enhance the credibility of process results. But these should be kept open to revision during the process when credible arguments for this are forwarded, and is outlined how the alternative constraint or situation without the constraint achieves the same or better results than the constraint is supposed to safeguard. Constraints as well as procedures for revising them could be outlined and agreed upon in the process setup.

**Combining planning levels**

The participatory processes highlighted the untenability of working in the stage mode (see 2.2.3), and moving from high to lower levels of abstraction. In De Bilt as well as Doetinchem many participants made during and after the process clear they would like to be engaged in a somewhat more detailed, concrete level than the plan development allows. They found the Chinese wall built between the planning level they were working on and the more concrete levels that should be worked on later artificial. Concrete choices in house construction influence the way ‘spots’ signifying living areas and so on can be divided over a map. In practice much of the creativity of participants in De Bilt as well as Doetinchem took place on another abstraction level than the product that resulted at the end of the process. The growing number of experiences with participatory processes might therefore in due course lead to pleas for a change in the way spatial plans are developed in Dutch (local) planning. This change could also be very well defended from a more traditional policy analytical point of view.

*Resulting recommendations:* tackle several abstraction levels of plan development at the same time, and have continuous iteration take place between the different levels, until at all levels a satisfying result is reached, instead of the traditional step by step approach from high levels of abstraction to high levels of detail.

**The pivotal importance of trust**

The cases clearly demonstrated the importance of trust as a basis for succesful and meaningful analytical efforts. They did this mainly by showing the problems when this trust was *not* present. In the VLW case, a deep-rooted distrust between Voorburg and most other parties was only very slowly eroded by interference of a so far unstained third party, Sijtwende Ltd. In De Bilt as well as Doetinchem, many participants when interviewed expressed a lack of confidence in the willingness of politicians and civil servants to act on the outcomes of the participatory process. Distrust in decision-making actors clearly was transferred to those performing analyis for them, however cautious transparent analysts tried to operate. This distrust was detrimental to the successful functioning of guidelines like procedures for
reaching agreement on the status of information or using independent, trusted expertise. In this respect it seemed to work two ways: these guidelines would help in promoting trust, but for their proper functioning need a minimum of trust to begin with.

A main point in creating trust was the willingness of the authorities to take over the outcomes of the process. This is a serious issue, since the disappointing use of results happens to be an Achilles heel of participatory processes (see Edelenbos and Monnikhof 1998, 2001, Mayer et al 2002, 2005). In Doetinchem the fact that the ideas of the participants, although not very innovative, were mostly incorporated in the plan, explains for the most part their satisfaction with the end result of the process. In De Bilt, in contrast, the vagueness of the end results led to disappointment among participants. In Ede the fact that we transparently used everything that participants produced was probably one of the factors enhancing their trust in us. Transparency in general seems necessary, but not sufficient, in building trust. In De Bilt considerable efforts were undertaken to make the analysis taking place in the process transparent to participants, but this was insufficient to generate trust. The perceived ‘tight fit’ between experts and municipality, and general distrust in administrators and politicians, was not overcome. In the VLW case the ongoing development towards more accountability in the way analysis is performed in the Netherlands was demonstrated in the EIA, to which a separate Explanatory sub-report was added. But this transparency was only partial. A lot of analytical choices made during the EIA remained not transparent. The impression that this was deliberate to cover up certain analytical choices, was present among many opponents of the road. However open analysis would have been, the distrust in the openness of those parties making decisions and those performing analysis for the decision makers probably would still have prevented trust.

**Resulting recommendations:** Of course, the part analysis can play in creating trust is clearly limited. Analysis can only contribute to some extent to the authorities taking over the outcomes of the process by making sure that the outcomes of the process have the proper usable form, and come about at the right time. It might also help to involve those taking decisions in the analytical process (see for this below). Achieving trust is probably the most successful by first meeting the constraints mentioned under acknowledging interests, of openly addressing and trying to deal with controversial matters instead of trying to brush them under the carpet, and by taking contributions of participants seriously. In general, a greater transparency on motives and problems policy makers deal with might help, as well. A clearly shown attitude of the client to take its results seriously would also help. The client could display this attitude by for example promises up-front, like use of results in EIA-directives, or using the results of the initial analysis in the choice of more in-depth research or something like that.
**Involvement and commitment of politicians**

All cases demonstrated the importance of involving politicians more closely in the (participatory) analysis process (see also for example Edelenbos, 2000; Klijn and Koppenjan, 1999). In the VLW case analysis and decision making were, as traditional, separated.

In De Bilt politicians and administrators were involved in the participatory process. Several participants as well as civil servants stressed the importance of councillors participating in the workshops. Through their participation they would gain a better sense of what the discussion issues were, which would enable them to take better decisions. But participating councillors seemed not to take the process very seriously as a policy making project (see above). They refused to make any concrete statements as to how they felt on the interim results, as well as with respect to the way they would treat them. That the outcomes in the process were insufficiently tuned to the political process, and not tested on feasibility, enabled this attitude. Another aspect influencing the use of results in decision-making was the extent to which the process was attuned to the existing representative system. Councillors pointed out before the process that according to them the open planning process and the regular decision-making by the city council and its subcommittees were insufficiently tuned.

Proposals discussed could be better attuned to the wishes and needs of politics. The political opinions of councillors should be put alongside expert opinions. But the council had never expressed which elements it would judge outcomes on and refused to speak out during the process. In Doetinchem, members of the council committee on spatial planning took part in the process. This enabled them to pick up the argumentation behind some of the analytical/design choices in the process.

Not only administrators and politicians are relevant decision makers that should be involved, the same goes for relevant agencies and so on. In Ede RWS and NS-RIB were an important factor in selecting alternatives and elements to be included in analysis. We planned to have RWS and NS-RIB at least comment on alternatives developed in the workshops included in the different versions of the living document. But they refused. In addition to this in the survey some participants suggested that the process would provide more results if it was given a formal status in the municipal consultations, or more commitment shown from administrators.

**Resulting recommendations:** Politicians should preferably be involved in and made to commit themselves to the participatory analytical process. And not only politicians, but other parties with power (agencies, for example) should be induced to commit themselves to the process through participating in it. At least some members of for example a committee on spatial planning should be present in workshops, to pick up the lines of reasoning behind choices. Politicians should be induced to speak out on feasibility of interim results of the process. Finally, the process itself, in
its timing and the shape of its results, should be attuned to the demands of the political process in which its results should play a part.

**A change of analytical ideal**
From this section also a tentative overall conclusion can be drawn. That conclusion is that participatory policy making seems to call for a move from the ideal of 'pure and untainted analysis' to 'smudged, political analysis'.
The acknowledgement already reached in 'traditional' policy analysis that stages in analysis can not be cleanly separated, but iteration should take place, is more pressing and stronger in participatory processes. Not only iteration seems a way to deal with linkages between different abstraction levels, solution development and problem definition, and so on, but actual consideration of these abstraction levels and analytical activities simultaneously, until on all levels a satisfying result is reached. No clear cut and clean separation, therefore, but mixing it all. Also, it is unwise to heed the traditional separation between analysts and decision makers in participatory policy making. Instead of analysts doing the analysis, and decision makers making decisions before or after that, participatory policy making calls for involving decision makers in the analysis process itself, to understand choices made in that process. Power is all around in these processes. Instead of, or perhaps in addition to, 'speaking truth to power', analysts should move on to 'speaking the truth about power'. Power aspects, also of analysts, designers and proces managers, should be explicitly recognized and dealt with, instead of aiming for an impossible feat like disinterested analysis. Finally, the cases make a clear point for acknowledging interests of different parties explicitly and openly, instead of doing analysis from a hypothetical 'general interest' standpoint. The meaningfullness of analysis for the actual policy process might be greatly enhanced by acknowledging that decisionmaking is all about wheeling and dealing, and that its greatest contribution might lie in giving the ammunition for this to all parties involved. Summarising, many still strong fictions about policy making, analysis and analysts should be abandoned. Analysts and experts are not disinterested, they have power. Also, separating policy making and analysis is not only impossible, but unwise as well. Instead of denying this 'tainting' of the analytical process, analysis should be changed to explicitly deal with these inevitable aspects.
POLICY ANALYSIS FOR PARTICIPATORY POLICY MAKING
The primary objective of the research on which this thesis reports was to develop a set of guidelines for improving policy analysis supporting policy making on spatial issues.

To be able to develop the set of guidelines I took stock of the main problems in the field of policy processes on spatial issues first, and the way analysis contributed to them or helped alleviate them. These main problems turned out to be: the complexity of issues and resulting policy making; co-ordination problems between the (policy making) actors involved; a tendency to focus too soon on a limited problem description and/or one solution or a limited set, known as premature closure; the controversiality of many spatial issues and resulting resistance; and the long length of time policy making processes take in the field.

Analytical practice is generally related to these problems. The problem of complexity is partially exacerbated by the inadequacy of the analytical methods to deal with it. The problems of achieving co-ordinated policy are linked to the problem of achieving truly integral analysis. The tendency of premature closure in policy-making is made worse by premature closure in analysis, the so-called ‘type-III error’, in which relevant problems, solutions and aspects are overlooked in the analysis. Controversiality of issues in spatial policy making is worsened by analysts posing as ‘objective’, and presenting the results of their analysis as such. Finally, the time-consuming nature of policy-making on spatial issues is partially caused by the increasing number and the extensiveness of studies being carried out.

To get a grip on possible analytical contributions to improve the situation the development of the field of policy analysis in general over the past decades was outlined next. This has been a development from an original focus on supporting an assumed unitary, rational decision maker with ‘objective’ analysis to what is becoming a new paradigm for policy analysis, what one could call ‘policy analysis by interaction’. Applied to the policy process this means among other things that the different perspectives of parties involved should be dealt with explicitly one way or another, for example by letting them partake in so-called participatory analysis. Also, adherents to the new paradigm try to deal with the lack of all-encompassing rationality in, and the network character and complexity of, policy processes in their approach.

Four aspects were distinguished on which every policy analytical approach should make choices. These were the problem area(s) to which it should/could be applied, the type(s) of policy process for which it is considered fitting, the policy-making style of one or more parties in those policy processes it intends to support, and the type of process outcomes the approach should help bring about.

From the problem analysis and outline of the state of policy analysis combined a number of research questions were derived:
• what is meant by a 'good' result of a policy making process?
• which policy analytical approaches, participatory or otherwise, could be used in policy making on spatial issues in the Netherlands in light of the characteristics of that policy making and the policy analysis performed for it?
• how can the relationship between participatory policy analysis and the more traditional forms of policy analysis employed in the policy process be improved?
• how can the fit of (results of), participatory or other, policy analytical efforts with the larger policy process be improved?
• by which criteria should the designed working of the policy analytical approach designed be evaluated?
• in how far does the designed policy analytical approach meet these measures?

To answer these research questions I chose a 'grounded theory' approach. This meant three things. First, interpretations and data collection were guided by successively evolving interpretations made during the course of the study. Secondly, the theory I used was conceptually dense, with many concepts, and many linkages among them. Finally, the data was examined intensively in detail and in order to bring out the complexity of what lies in, behind and beyond them.

The grounded theory approach was applied in two rounds. Firstly, to compose a theoretical framework on the basis of existing theory. Secondly I used the grounded theory in a relatively novel way: as a design methodology, to design a set of guidelines for policy analysis in land use policy making. These could be seen as the theoretical, but practically applicable, answers to the research questions. Of course, many of these guidelines were not (entirely) new, but did exist more or less scattered through the literature. But some of them are new, to my knowledge, and their combination from the perspective and in the setting chosen certainly is. Next, these guidelines were applied to four cases. In the first three of them I looked into how far guidelines, probably mostly unwittingly, were already applied, and if they were, in how far their theoretically assumed beneficial effect indeed seemed to materialize. In the fourth case the guidelines developed from the theory and adapted as a result of the first three cases were consciously applied and tested.

The first case, the 'VLW-case', was chosen as a 'baseline case', in which the traditional style of policy making was dominant, to exemplify the consequences this policymaking style had for policy making support.

To see in how far a more 'open', or 'new style participatory', policy process had consequences for policy analytical support two local cases of participatory spatial planning were studied. The first is a case of participatory development of a so-called 'structure plan' in the municipality of De Bilt, the second a case of participatory development of a zoning plan in the municipality of Doetinchem. Finally, in an experimental case the ideas about improved policy analysis that developed as a
result of the first three cases were tested. This case dealt with the question of how to fit in a proposed high-speed train track in the municipality of Ede.

The combination of theory and case study resulted in answers to the research questions. The answer to the first one, what is meant by a ‘good’ result of a policy process was however viewed as a normative issue, and therefore answered solely theoretically by delving into political philosophy. A utilitarian combination of Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’ and Nozicks ‘Justice of Holdings’ resulted in three norms for judging the results of policy making processes with a public nature. These are:

I: **Decision goal norm:** a decision is good when it improves the total welfare (in a broad sense) of all involved, or at least improves the welfare of some without decreasing the welfare of others.

II: **Compensation norm:** those expected to loose from a decision should be compensated for their losses by those expected to win.

III: **Participation norm:** those affected by a (proposed) decision should be allowed to state the gains or losses they themselves expect from the decision.

A good result of a policy making process should meet these norms. Fulfilment of these norms is supposed to be brought nearer by a policy making process that is comprehensive, efficient, representative, competent and flexible, in which negotiation and substantive enrichment take place, and those involved trust one another.

The policy analysis approach to help achieve these norms should take into account the characteristics of policy making on land issues in the Netherlands and the policy analysis performed on behalf of that policy making. Spatial and infrastructure planning in the Netherlands is characterised by different, often conflicting claims on only limitedly available space, and by an increasing pressure on this space. Every spatial decision has to cope with existing interests. Spatial planning evolves around the weighing of many different interests with respect to economy, nature, agriculture, and so on. For cultural and legal reasons spatial policy in the Netherlands is also consulting- and negotiating policy.

For years the decision-making culture on spatial planning was built on a view of public administration as a pyramid with national government on top, directing the course of the lower levels of government, with only elite participation, usually of other public agencies/authorities, in negotiation and consultation. During the 1990s the policy-making style in the Netherlands on land use decision making started a transition from this hierarchical style towards a more
participatory style. A broader group than the usual elite got invited to participate in policy making, in so-called ‘interactive policymaking’, or ‘open planning processes’. This type of policy making puts its own demands on policy analytical support, among other things a greater attention to the possibilities to combine learning through ‘traditional’ analysis, and learning through discussion and debate, all or not combined with participatory analysis. It also puts negotiation and compensation issues more to the forefront. Policy analytical approaches, participatory or otherwise, should take these characteristics and developments into account.

The policy analytical approach considered most fitting to support decision making on land issues in the Netherlands combines elements of ‘old-fashioned’ analytical craftsmanship and participatory analysis. With respect to the participatory parts the emphasis lies on giving all parties involved the means and opportunity to have a real and meaningful analytical contribution. The relationship between participatory policy analysis and more traditional forms of policy analysis can be improved by improving the relationship between learning processes taking place through debate and discussion (‘Variation and Selection, or V/S-learning’) and learning taking place through analysis and research (‘Analysis and Instruction, or A/I-learning’).

In policy making on spatial issues, as with all other issues, the effective linking of two types of processes is crucial. The first is the policy process, consisting of activities like debate, negotiation, cajoling, and so on, of which the main products are agreement and decisions. The second is the analysis process, consisting of research, analysis and design, of which the main products are knowledge and alternatives. Both know a participatory and non-participatory variant, to be discerned by the broadness of those partaking in the process. The fit of (results of), participatory or other, policy analytical efforts with the larger policy process can among others things be improved by not viewing the policy-making process, largely normatively, as a rational process in which a unitary actor in neat stages tries to come to a decision serving the public interest as well as possible. Instead the guidelines were designed to support a process in which only limitedly rational actors, serving their own interests, in sometimes chaotic processes without clear stages try to further their interests. The fit of (results of) policy analytical efforts with the larger policy process can also be improved by attuning the timing and shape of (interim) results of the process to the policy process, using clearly outlined constraints and working out results brought into a current process on a level of detail and with attention paid to elements comparable with existing alternatives.

In the end, of the 24 guidelines developed largely in the course of the theoretical chapters, and partly as a result of case findings, exactly half, 12, were found to be supported by the case findings convincing enough to be deemed ‘robust’. Of the other 12, no guideline was deemed
useless of even damaging by the case research, but their usefulness was not considered to be demonstrated convincing enough either by the material of the 4 cases. This resulted in the following dichotomy of guidelines.

Robust and optional guidelines

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robust design guidelines</th>
<th>Optional design guidelines</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>have a broad scope</td>
<td>avoid overlap in analytical activities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrate and structure</td>
<td>provide no superfluous information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus on pragmatic aspects</td>
<td>do not overburden with tasks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identify (the position of) relevant parties</td>
<td>provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pay attention to representativeness</td>
<td>give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have a stakeholder/interest focus</td>
<td>provide sufficient information to enable participation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>map possibilities for negotiation</td>
<td>translate information into a usable format</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>have procedures for reaching agreement on status of information</td>
<td>give clarity about analytical tasks expected</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space</td>
<td>make analysis a standby facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>provide independent, trusted expertise</td>
<td>make analysis continuously adaptable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety creation</td>
<td>be transparent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support variety use</td>
<td>connect V/S learning to A/I learning</td>
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It is recommended that in every participatory policy process all robust design guidelines for policy analytical support should be heeded, and as much of the optional guidelines as possible.

The guidelines resulting from the research can be combined and bundled according to beneficial elements of the decision-making process they are most supposed to support, like trust or flexibility. In total they were bundled under 8 of these so-called ‘intermediate factors’. These factors themselves in turn are believed to contribute to the three norms for judging the results of decision-making processes with a public nature. From this emerges a causal model (see next page). In this model the ‘thick’ lines indicate a causal effect that is considered to be demonstrated convincingly in the research, a ‘thin’ line a so far only theoretically supposed link. Since the research was focused mainly on the guidelines, the links between them and the intermediate factors (grey in the model) are considered much better supported by the research than the links between intermediate factors and the decision norms. Hence the normal arrows between guidelines and intermediate factors, and dotted arrows between intermediate factors and norms. See for a thorough explanation of the model chapters 8 and 13.
Norms:
- welfare increase
- compensation
- participation

Intermediate factors: attributes of the decision-making process

Guidelines

Robust link

Supposed link

A hypothetical causal model for the effect of the guidelines on welfare

- have a broad scope
- integrate and structure

- avoid overlap in analytical activities
- provide no superfluous information
- focus on pragmatic aspects
- do not overburden with tasks

- identify (the position of) relevant parties
- pay attention to representativeness

- provide sufficient knowledge, training and other means and incentives
- give all access to useful analytical capacity and expertise
- provide sufficient information to enable participation
- translate information into a usable format
- give clarity about analytical tasks expected

- have a stakeholder/interest focus
- map possibilities for negotiation

- make analysis a standby facility
- make analysis continuously adaptable

- have procedures for reaching agreement on status information
- let concerned parties influence problem delineation and solution space
- provide independent, trusted expertise
- be transparent

- connect V/S learning to A/I learning
- support variety creation
- support variety use

Comprehensiveness

Efficiency

Representativeness

Competence

Negotiation

Flexibility

Trust

Substantive enrichment

Norms:
- welfare increase
- compensation
- participation

= norms for judging the outcomes
= intermediate factors: attributes of the decision-making process
= guidelines
= robust link
= supposed link
As the model shows, exactly half the guidelines developed were considered to convincingly contribute to the intermediate factors (indicated by bold in the model). Of these intermediate factors, elements of the policy process as representativeness, negotiation, trust and substantive enrichment emerge from the case material as convincing enough to contribute to the final norms.

More or less as a byproduct of the main analysis, some interesting findings came forward from the cases. Firstly, a lack of open acknowledgment of diverging interests in favour of a ‘public interest myth’ is still very much alive in Dutch policy-making. This prolonged processes and led to a neglect of possibilities for compensation.

Conspicuous in the first three cases was the denial of the element of power, especially in the cases where process management of the participatory process was in the hands of an external process manager, the Dutch Centre of Political Participation (abbreviated in Dutch to IPP). This led to power aspects and games determining the course of processes to a considerable extent, without this being acknowledged or openly dealt with.

Next, the (possible) analytical contributions of participants were not taken very seriously on many occasions in the first three cases. In the IPP-cases, the policy making character of participatory policy making was not taken seriously enough. This affected the process setup, and by that the possibilities for creating enriched content.

Probably related to the former point, all cases showed insufficient policy analytical methodical support to help incorporate suggestions from outsiders and/or participants to the participatory process into the non-participatory part of the analytical process. One of the effects of the limited methodical support of processes was that analytical tasks in all processes were fulfilled inefficiently. Many activities were repeated over time, or took place at several locations at the same time. Remedying this inefficiency might be crucial in maintaining support for participatory policymaking in the future, especially with experts, civil servants and administrators. Also, it might be one of the explanations behind the limited innovation of the results: inefficiency leads to a shortage of time, which in turn hampers possibilities for creativity. Analytical efficiency, and the grasp on the information explosion caused by participatory processes, might be enhanced by using explicit selection rules during the process.

The cases unearthed a dilemma concerning the use of constraints. Where on the one hand it is feared constraints would stifle creativity, on the other hand not using them enabled politicians and civil servants to disregard the (interim) process results on the basis of being ‘unrealistic’, of being unchecked for costs, and so on. This dilemma might be resolved by working with explicit
constraints, to enhance the credibility of process results. But these should be kept open to revision during the process when credible arguments for this are forwarded, and it is outlined how the alternative constraint or situation without the constraint achieves the same or better results than the constraint is supposed to safeguard.

The new participatory processes also highlighted the untenability of working in stages and moving from high to lower levels of abstraction. Participants to them ‘naturally’ ignore boundaries put to the topics dealt with or abstraction level on which is worked. They also return to previous activities like problem definition at any time when this seems necessary, also in much ‘later’ stages. Therefore, these processes provide a rationale for tackling several abstraction levels of plan development at the same time, and having continuous iteration take place between the different levels, until at all levels a satisfying result is reached, instead of the traditional step by step approach from high levels of abstraction to high levels of detail. They also provide a rationale for seeing different analytical activities like problem definition, solutions development, solution comparison and so on not as stages to follow one another, but as activities to be performed largely at the same time, although in the course of the analytical process a shift in emphasis from problem definition to outlining and comparing effects, for example, would be likely.

The cases clearly demonstrated the pivotal importance of trust as a basis for successful and meaningful analytical efforts. Distrust in decision-making actors was transferred to those performing analysis. This distrust was detrimental to the successful functioning of guidelines like procedures for reaching agreement on the status of information or using independent, trusted expertise. A main success factor in creating trust was the willingness of the authorities to take over the outcome of the process, preferably expressed prior to the process.

All cases demonstrated the importance of involving politicians more closely than usual in the (participatory) analysis process. Through their participation councillors get a better sense of what the discussion issues are, ‘what’s going on’, which enables them to take better decisions. The commitment of other parties with power besides politicians (agencies, for example) seems also vital. Finally, the participatory process itself, its timing and the shape of its results, should be attuned to the demands of the political process in which its results should play a part.

A final, tentative overall conclusion can be drawn. That conclusion is that many still strong fictions about policy making, analysis and analysts should be abandoned. Participatory policy making calls for a move from the ideal of ‘pure and untainted analysis’ to ‘smudged, political analysis’. Different analytical activities at different abstraction levels should be performed...
simultaneously, until at all levels a satisfying result is reached, instead of performing them in neat but inadequate stages. Participatory policy making calls for involving decision makers in the analysis process itself, to understand choices made in that process. Power aspects, also of analysts, designers and proces managers, should be explicitly recognized and dealt with, instead of aiming for an impossible feat like disinterested analysis. Also, the cases make a clear point for acknowledging interests of different parties explicitly and openly, instead of doing analysis from a hypothetical ‘general interest’ standpoint. Instead of warding off all these forms of ‘tainting’ of an outdated ideal of the analytical process, analysis should be changed to explicitly deal with these inevitable aspects.
SAMENVATTING

BELEIDSANALYSE VOOR PARTICIPATIEVE BELEIDSONTWIKKELING
Het voornaamste oogmerk van het onderzoek waarvan dit proefschrift een neerslag is was het ontwikkelen van richtlijnen voor het verbeteren van beleidsanalyse ter ondersteuning van beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke onderwerpen.

Om de richtlijnen te kunnen ontwikkelen inventariseerde ik de voornaamste problemen op het veld van beleidsprocessen over ruimtelijke onderwerpen, en de manier waarop analyse aan die problemen bijdraagt danwel deze helpt verlichten. De voornaamste problemen bleken te zijn: de complexiteit van kwesties en resulterende beleidsontwikkeling; coördinatieproblemen tussen de (beleidsmakende) betrokken actoren; een neiging om te snel te focussen op een (te) beperkte probleembeschrijving en/of oplossing of een beperkte set, bekend als ‘voortijdige sluiting’ (premature closure); de controversialiteit van veel ruimtelijke kwesties en resulterende weerstand; en de lange duur van veel beleidsontwikkelingsprocessen in het veld.

De analytische praktijk is over het algemeen verbonden met deze problemen. Het probleem van complexiteit wordt gedeeltelijk verergerd door de inadequaatheid van de analytische methoden om daarmee om te gaan. De moeilijkheid om gecoördineerd beleid te bereiken is gerelateerd aan de moeilijkheid om echt integrale analyse te bereiken. De neiging tot voortijdige sluiting in beleidsontwikkeling wordt verergerd door voortijdige sluiting in analyse, de zogenoemde ‘type-III fout’, waarin relevante problemen, oplossingen en aspecten in de analyse over het hoofd worden gezien. De controversialiteit van ruimtelijke kwesties wordt verergerd door analisten die zichzelf en de resultaten van hun analyse presenteren als ‘objectief’. Tenslotte wordt de tijdrovende aard van beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke onderwerpen gedeeltelijk veroorzaakt door het toenemende aantal en de toenemende uitgebreidheid van uitgevoerde onderzoeken.

Om grip te krijgen op mogelijke analytische bijdragen aan het verbeteren van de situatie wordt vervolgens de ontwikkeling van beleidsanalyse in het algemeen in de afgelopen decennia geschatst. Dit is een ontwikkeling geweest van een oorspronkelijke focus op het ondersteunen van één veronderstelde, rationele besluitvormer met ‘objectieve’ analyse naar wat een nieuw paradigma voor beleidsanalyse aan het worden is, wat men zou kunnen noemen ‘beleidsanalyse door interactie’. Toegepast op het beleidsproces betekent dit onder andere dat de verschillende perspectieven van betrokken partijen op een of andere wijze expliciet een rol zouden moeten spelen, bijvoorbeeld door hen te laten deelnemen in zogenoemde participatieve beleidsanalyse. Aanhangers van het nieuwe paradigma trachten ook in hun aanpak een wijze van omgang te vinden met het gebrek aan alomvattende rationaliteit in, en het netwerk karakter en de complexiteit van, beleidsprocessen.

Vier aspecten werden onderscheiden met betrekking tot welke elke beleidsanalytische aanpak keuzes zou moeten maken. Dit waren het probleemgebied of de probleemgebieden waarvoor de aanpak geschikt wordt geacht, het type of de typen beleidsproces waarvoor het geschikt wordt
geacht, de stijl(en) van beleidsontwikkeling van een of meer partijen in die beleidsprocessen die de aanpak wenst te ondersteunen, en het soort procesuitkomsten die de aanpak wenst te helpen tot stand te brengen.

Van de gecombineerde probleemanalyse en schets van de stand van zaken van beleidsanalyse als vakgebied werden een aantal onderzoeksvragen gedistilleerd:
- wat wordt bedoeld met een 'goed' resultaat van een beleidsproces?
- welke beleidsanalytische aanpakken, participatief of anderszins, kunnen worden gebruikt in beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke onderwerpen in Nederland in het licht van de kenmerken van die beleidsontwikkeling en de beleidsanalyse die ten behoeve ervan wordt uitgevoerd?
- hoe kan de relatie tussen participatieve beleidsanalyse en de meer traditionele vormen van beleidsanalyse toegepast in het beleidsproces worden verbeterd?
- hoe kan de aansluiting van (resultaten van), participatieve of anderszins, beleidsanalytische inspanningen op het bredere beleidsproces worden verbeterd?
- op welkecriteria moet de werking van de ontworpen beleidsanalytische benadering worden beoordeeld?
- in hoeverre voldoet de ontworpen beleidsanalytische aanpak aan deze maatstaven?

Om deze onderzoeksvragen te beantwoorden koos ik voor een 'grounded theory' benadering. Dit betekende drie dingen. Ten eerste, interpretaties en gegevensverzameling werden gestuurd door opeenvolgende zich ontwikkelende interpretaties gedurende het verloop van het onderzoek. Ten tweede, de theorie die ik gebruikte was 'conceptueel dicht', met veel concepten, en veel verbanden tussen deze. Tenslotte werden de gegevens intensief en gedetailleerd bestudeerd om de complexiteit van wat in, achter en voorbij de gegevens lag naar voren te brengen.

De grounded theory benadering werd in twee rondes toegepast. Ten eerste om een theoretisch raamwerk te maken op basis van bestaande theorie. Ten tweede gebruikte ik de grounded theory aanpak op een relatief nieuwe manier: als een ontwerpmethodologie, om een set richtlijnen voor beleidsanalyse ten behoeve van beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke kwesties te ontwerpen. De richtlijnen kunnen worden gezien als de theoretische, maar praktisch toepasbare, antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen. Vervolgens werden deze richtlijnen getoetst aan vier cases. In de eerste drie cases keek ik in hoeverre de richtlijnen, waarschijnlijk meestentijds onbewust, al werden toegepast, en als dat zo was, in hoeverre hun theoretisch veronderstelde positieve effect inderdaad leek op te treden. In de vierde case werden de uit de theorie ontwikkelde en naar aanleiding van de eerste drie cases aangepaste richtlijnen bewust toegepast en getest. De eerste case, de 'VLW-case', werd gekozen als een basiscase, waarin de traditionele stijl van beleidsontwikkeling dominant was, om de consequenties van deze stijl voor beleidsanalytische ondersteuning te illustreren.
Om te zien in hoeverre een 'opener', of 'nieuwe participatieve stijl', beleidsproces consequenties had voor beleidsanalytische ondersteuning werden twee lokale cases van participatieve ruimtelijke planning bestudeerd. De eerste is een case van participatiever ontwikkeling van een structuurplan in de gemeente De Bilt, de tweede een case van participatieve ontwikkeling van een bestemmingsplan in de gemeente Doetinchem.

Tenslotte werden in een experimentele case de ideeën over verbeterde beleidsanalyse die resulteerden van de eerste drie cases getest. Deze case draaide om de vraag hoe om te gaan met het inpassen van een voorgenomen hoge snelheidslijn in de gemeente Ede.

De combinatie van theorie en casestudie resulteerde in antwoorden op de onderzoeksvragen. Het antwoord op de eerste vraag, wat bedoeld wordt met een 'goed' resultaat van een beleidsproces zag ik echter als een normatieve kwestie. Die vraag werd daarom zuiver theoretisch beantwoord door gebruik te maken van politieke filosofie. Een utilitaristische combinatie van Rawls’ ‘Justice as Fairness’ en Nozicks ‘Justice of Holdings’ resulteerde in drie normen voor het beoordelen van de resultaten van beleidsontwikkelingsprocessen met een publiek karakter. Dit zijn:

I: **Besluitvormingsdoel norm:** een besluit is goed als het de totale welvaart (in een brede betekenis) van alle betrokkenen verbetert, of tenminste de welvaart van sommigen verbeterd zonder de welvaart van anderen te verlagen.

II: **Compensatienorm:** zij die verwacht worden te verliezen door een besluit zouden gecompenseerd moeten worden voor hun verliezen door degenen die verwacht worden te winnen.

III: **Participatienorm:** degenen die de effecten van een (voorgesteld) besluit zullen gaan ondervinden zouden in staat gesteld moeten worden om de winsten of verliezen die ze verwachten zelf naar voren te brengen.

Een goed resultaat van een beleidsontwikkelingsproces zou aan deze normen moeten voldoen. Voldoen aan de normen wordt verondersteld dichterbij te worden gebracht bij een beleidsontwikkelingsproces dat integraal is, efficiënt, representatief, competent en flexibel, waarin onderhandeling en inhoudelijke verrijking plaatsvinden, en waarin de betrokkenen elkaar vertrouwen.

De beleidsanalytische benadering om deze normen te helpen bereiken zou rekening moeten houden met de kenmerken van beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke onderwerpen in Nederland en van de beleidsanalyse uitgevoerd ten behoeve van die beleidsontwikkeling. Ruimtelijke en
infrastructuur planning in Nederland wordt gekenmerkt door uiteenlopende, vaak conflicterende claims op slechts beperkt beschikbare ruimte, en door een toenemende druk op die ruimte. Elk ruimtelijk besluit moet omgaan met bestaande belangen. Ruimtelijke planning draait om het wegen van veel verschillende belangen met betrekking tot economie, natuur, landbouw, enzovoorts. Vanwege culturele en juridische oorzaken is ruimtelijk beleid in Nederland ook consultatie- en onderhandelingsbeleid.

Jarenlang was de besluitvormingscultuur met betrekking tot ruimtelijke planning gebaseerd op een visie op publiek bestuur als een piramide met de rijksoverheid aan de top, het handelen van de lagere overheden sturend, met slechts elite participatie in onderhandeling en consultatie, over het algemeen van andere publieke instanties/autoriteiten. Gedurende de negentiger jaren begon een hernieuwde transformatie (na een doodgelopen golf in de zeventiger jaren) van de stijl van beleidsontwikkeling in Nederland over ruimtegebruik van deze hiërarchische stijl naar een meer participatieve stijl. Een bredere groep dan de gebruikelijke elite werd uitgenodigd om te participeren in beleidsontwikkeling, in zogenoemde ‘interactieve beleidsvorming’, of ‘open planprocessen’. Dit type beleidsontwikkeling stelt zijn eigen eisen aan beleidsanalytische ondersteuning, waaronder onder meer een grotere aandacht voor de mogelijkheden om leren door ‘traditionele’ analyse en leren door discussie en debat (al of niet gecombineerd met participatieve analyse) te combineren. Het brengt ook onderhandelings- en compensatiekwesties meer op de voorgrond. Beleidsanalytische benaderingen, participatief of anderszins, zouden met deze kenmerken en ontwikkelingen rekening moeten houden.

De beleidsanalytische benadering die als meest geschikt wordt beschouwd om besluitvorming over ruimtelijke kwesties in Nederland te ondersteunen combineert elementen van ‘ouderwets’ analytisch vakmanschap en participatieve analyse. Met betrekking tot de participatieve gedeelten ligt de nadruk op alle betrokken partijen de middelen en gelegenheid geven om een reële en betekenisvolle analytische bijdrage te geven. De relatie tussen participatieve beleidsanalyse en meer traditionele vormen van beleidsanalyse kan worden verbeterd door het verbeteren van de relatie tussen leerprocessen door debat en discussie (‘Variatie en Selectie, of V/S-leren’) en leerprocessen door analyse en onderzoek (‘Analyse en Instructie, of A/I-leren’).

In beleidsontwikkeling over ruimtelijke onderwerpen, als bij alle andere onderwerpen, is het effectieve verbinden van twee typen processen cruciaal. Het eerste is het beleidsproces, bestaande uit activiteiten als debat, onderhandeling, cajoling, enzovoorts, waarvan de hoofdproducten overeenstemming en beslissingen zijn. Het tweede is het analytische proces, bestaande uit onderzoek, analyse en ontwerp, waarvan de hoofdproducten kennis en alternatieven zijn. Beide kennen een participatieve en niet-participatieve variant, te onderscheiden door de breedte van het deelnemersveld in het proces.
De aansluiting van (resultaten van), participatieve of andere, beleidsanalytische inspanningen met het bredere beleidsproces kan onder andere worden verbeterd door het beleidsontwikkelingsproces niet, grotendeels normatief, te zien als een rationeel proces waarin één actor in keurige fasen poogt te komen tot een besluit dat het algemeen belang zo goed als mogelijk dient. In plaats daarvan zijn de richtlijnen ontworpen om een proces te ondersteunen waarin slechts beperkt rationele actoren in soms chaotische processen zonder duidelijke fasen hun eigen belangen trachten te bevorderen. De aansluiting van (resultaten van) beleidsanalytische inspanningen op het bredere beleidsproces kan ook worden verbeterd door het afstemmen van de timing en vorm van (interim) resultaten van het analytisch proces op het beleidsproces, het gebruik van helder gedefinieerde randvoorwaarden en het uitwerken van de resultaten ingebracht in een lopend proces naar een detailniveau en met aandacht voor elementen vergelijkbaar met (dat van) bestaande alternatieven.

Uiteindelijk werden van de 24 grotendeels in de loop van de theoretische hoofdstukken, en deels als resultaat van de casebevindingen, ontwikkelde richtlijnen, exact de helft, 12, overtuigend genoeg ondersteund door het case materiaal om als ‘robuust’ te worden betiteld. Van de andere 12 werd geen enkele richtlijn als nutteloos of zelfs schadelijk geclassificeerd, maar hun nut werd als nog niet voldoende overtuigend bewezen in de cases beoordeeld. Dit resulteerde in de volgende tweedeling van richtlijnen.

Robuuste en optionele richtlijnen

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Robuuste ontwerprichtlijnen</th>
<th>Optionele ontwerprichtlijnen</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>heb een brede scope</td>
<td>vermijd overlap in analytische activiteiten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integreer en structureer</td>
<td>verschaf geen overbodige informatie</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>focus op pragmatische aspecten</td>
<td>overbelast niet met taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identificeer (de positie van) relevante partijen</td>
<td>verschaf voldoende kennis, training en andere middelen en prikkels</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>besteed aandacht aan representativiteit</td>
<td>geef allen toegang tot nuttige analytische capaciteit en expertise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heb een stakeholder/belangen focus</td>
<td>verschaf voldoende informatie om participatie mogelijk te maken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breng mogelijkheden voor onderhandeling in kaart</td>
<td>vertaal informatie in een bruikbare vorm</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>heb procedures voor het bereiken van overeenstemming over status van informatie</td>
<td>geef helderheid over verwachte analytische taken</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laat betrokken partijen probleemdefinitie en oplossingsruimte beïnvloed</td>
<td>maak van analyse een standby faciliteit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>voorzie in onafhankelijke en vertrouwde expertise</td>
<td>maak analyse continue aanpasbaar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ondersteun variëteitscreatie</td>
<td>wees transparant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ondersteun variëteitsgebruik</td>
<td>verbind V/S leren met A/I leren</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Het wordt aanbevolen dat in elk participatief beleidsproces alle robuuste ontwerprichtlijnen voor beleidsanalytische ondersteuning worden toegepast, en zoveel mogelijk van de optionele richtlijnen als mogelijk.

De richtlijnen resulterend uit het onderzoek kunnen worden gecombineerd en gebundeld naar gunstige elementen van het besluitvormingsproces waar ze verondersteld worden de sterkste bijdrage aan te leveren, zoals vertrouwen of flexibiliteit. In totaal werden ze gebundeld onder 8 van deze ‘intermediaire factoren’. Deze factoren worden op hun beurt zelf verondersteld bij te dragen aan de drie normen voor het beoordelen van de resultaten van besluitvormingsprocessen met een publiek karakter. Hieruit resulteert een causaal model (zie de volgende pagina). In dit model geven de ‘dikke’ lijnen een causaal effect aan dat beschouwd wordt als overtuigend aangetoond in het onderzoek, een ‘dunne’ lijn een tot dusverre slechts theoretische verondersteld verband. Aangezien het onderzoek voornamelijk was gericht op de richtlijnen, worden de verbanden tussen deze en de intermediaire factoren (grijs in het model) geacht veel beter ondersteund te worden door het onderzoek dan de verbanden tussen intermediaire factoren en de besluitvormingsnormen. Vandaar dat de pijlen tussen richtlijnen en intermediaire factoren ononderbroken zijn, en de pijlen tussen intermediaire factoren en normen gestippeld. Zie voor een uitgebreide toelichting op het model hoofdstukken 8 en 13.
Samenvatting

- heb een brede scope
- integreer en structureer

- vermijd overlap in analytische activiteiten
- verschaf geen overbodige informatie
- focus op pragmatische aspecten
- overbelast niet met taken

- bepaal (de positie van) relevante partijen
- besteed aandacht aan representativiteit

- verschaf voldoende kennis, training en andere middelen en prikkels
- geef allen toegang tot nuttige analytische capaciteit en expertise
- verschaf voldoende informatie om participatie mogelijk te maken
- vertaal informatie in een bruikbare vorm
- wees helder over verwachte analysetaken

- heb een stakeholder/belangen focus
- breng onderhandelingsmogelijkheden in kaart

- maak van analyse een standby faciliteit
- maak analyse continue aanpasbaar

- heb procedures voor het bereiken van overeenstemming over status van informatie
- laat betrokken partijen probleemdefinitie en oplossingsruimte beïnvloeden
- verschaf onafhankelijke en vertrouwde expertise
- wees transparant

- verbind V/S leren met A/I leren
- ondersteun variëteitscreatie
- ondersteun variëteitsgebruik

Een hypothetisch causaal model voor het effect van de richtlijnen op de normen

Normen:
- welvaartstoename
- compensatie
- participatie

Omvattendheid
Efficiëntie
Representativiteit
Competentie
Onderhandeling
Flexibiliteit
Vertrouwen
Inhoudelijke verrijking

= normen voor beoordelen uitkomsten
= intermediaire factoren: attributen van het besluitvormingsproces
= richtlijnen
= robuust verband
= verondersteld verband
Zoals het model laat zien, werd exact de helft van de ontwikkelde richtlijnen beschouwd overtuigend bij te dragen tot de intermediaire factoren (aangegeven middels vet in het model). Van deze intermediaire factoren komen elementen van het beleidsproces als representativiteit, onderhandeling, vertrouwen en inhoudelijke verrijking naar boven uit het case materiaal als overtuigend bijdragend tot de uiteindelijke normen.

Meer of minder als een bijproduct van de hoofdanalyse kwamen sommige interessant bevindingen naar voren uit de cases. Ten eerste, een gebrek aan open erkenning van uiteenlopende belangen ten gunste van een ‘publiek belang mythe’ is nog steeds erg aanwezig in Nederlandse beleidsontwikkeling. Dit verlengde processen en leidde tot een verwaarlozing van mogelijkheden tot compensatie.

Opvallend in de eerste drie cases was de ontkennin van het element van macht, vooral in de cases waar het procesmanagement van het participatieve proces in handen was van een externe procesmanager, het Nederlandse Instituut voor Politieke Participatie (IPP). Dit leidde ertoe dat machtsaspecten en -spelletjes het verloop van processen in aanzienlijke mate bepaalden, zonder dat dit werd erkend of openlijk geconfronteerd.

Bij veel gelegenheden in de eerste drie cases werden de (mogelijke) analytische bijdragen van participanten niet erg serieus genomen. In de IPP-cases werd het beleidsontwikkelende karakter van participatieve beleidsvorming niet serieus genoeg genomen. Dit beïnvloedde de opzet van het proces, en daarmee de mogelijkheden voor het creëren van verrijkte inhoud.

Waarschijnlijk gerelateerd aan het vorige punt, alle cases vertoonden onvoldoende beleidsanalytische methodische ondersteuning bij het incorporeren van suggesties van buitenstaanders en/of deelnemers aan het participatieve proces in het niet-participatieve gedeelte van het analytische proces. Een van de effecten van de beperkte methodische ondersteuning van processen was dat analytische taken in alle processen inefficiënt werden vervuld. Veel activiteiten werden herhaald, of vonden plaats op meerdere locaties op dezelfde tijd. Deze inefficiëntie verhelpen zou wel eens cruciaal kunnen zijn in het behouden van steun voor participatieve beleidsontwikkeling in de toekomst, vooral bij experts, ambtenaren en bestuurders. It zou ook een van de verklaring kunnen zijn voor de beperkte innovatie van de resultaten: inefficiëntie leidt tot een tekort aan tijd, wat weer de mogelijkheden voor creativiteit beperkt. Analytische efficiëntie, en grip op de informatie-explosie veroorzaakt door participatieve processen, kunnen wellicht worden vergroot door het gebruik van expliciete selectieregels gedurende het proces.
De cases legden een dilemma bloot met betrekking tot het gebruik van randvoorwaarden. Waar aan de ene kant wordt gevreesd dat randvoorwaarden creativiteit zouden verstikken, stelde aan de andere kant het niet gebruiken van randvoorwaarden politici en ambtenaren in staat om de (interim) proces resultaten terzijde te leggen op basis van het feit dat ze ‘onrealistisch’ zouden zijn, dat hun kosten niet in kaart waren gebracht, enzovoorts. Dit dilemma zou kunnen worden opgelost door te werken met expliciete randvoorwaarden, om de geloofwaardigheid van de procesresultaten te verhogen. Maar deze zouden open moeten blijven voor herziening gedurende het proces wanneer overtuigende argumenten hiervoor naar voren worden gebracht, en wordt uiteengezet hoe de alternatieve randvoorwaarde of situatie zonder de randvoorwaarde dezelfde of betere resultaten bereikt dan de randvoorwaarde verondersteld wordt veilig te stellen.

De nieuwe participatieve processen bracht ook de onhoudbaarheid van het werken in fasen en het werken van hoge naar lagere abstractieniveaus naar voren. Participanten in de processen negeren ‘van nature’ de grenzen die gesteld zijn aan de behandelde onderwerpen of het abstractieniveau waarop gewerkt wordt. Ze keren ook terug naar eerdere activiteiten als probleemdefinitie op elk tijdstip dat dit nodig lijkt, ook in veel ‘latere’ fasen. Daarom verschaffen deze processen een argument voor het aanpakken van meerdere abstractieniveaus van planontwikkeling tegelijk, en het hebben van continue iteratie tussen de verschillende niveaus, tot op alle niveaus een bevredigend resultaat is bereikt, in plaats van de traditionele stap voor stap benadering van hoge abstractieniveaus naar hoge detailniveaus. Ze verschaffen ook een argument voor het zien van verschillende analytische activiteiten als probleemdefinitie, ontwikkeling van oplossingen, vergelijken van oplossingen enzovoorts niet als fasen die elkaar opvolgen, maar als activiteiten grotendeels tegelijk uit te voeren, alhoewel in de loop van het analytische proces een verschuiving in nadruk van probleemdefinitie naar het schetsen en vergelijken van effecten, bijvoorbeeld, waarschijnlijk is.

De cases demonstreren duidelijk het grote belang van vertrouwen als basis voor succesvolle en betekenisvolle analytische inspanningen. Wantrouwen in besluitvormers werd overgedragen naar degenen die analyses uitvoerden. Dit wantrouwen was nadelig voor het functioneren van richtlijnen als procedures voor het bereiken van overeenstemming over de status of informatie of het gebruiken van onafhankelijke, vertrouwde expertise. Een belangrijke succesfactor in het creëren van vertrouwen was de bereidheid van de autoriteiten om de uitkomsten van het proces over te nemen, bij voorkeur aangegeven voorafgaande aan het proces.

Alle cases toonden het belang aan van het nauwer betrekken van politici in het (participatieve) analyseproces dan gebruikelijk. Door hun deelname krijgen politici een beter gevoel voor wat de discussieonderwerpen zijn, ‘wat er aan de hand is’, wat hen in staat stelt om betere besluiten te
nemen. De betrokkenheid van andere partijen met macht naast politici (instanties, bijvoorbeeld) lijkt ook cruciaal. Tenslotte zou het participatieve proces zelf, de timing ervan en de vorm van de resultaten ervan, moeten worden afgestemd op de eisen van het politieke proces waarin de resultaten een rol zouden moeten spelen.

Een finale, tentatieve algemene conclusie kan worden getrokken. Die conclusie is dat vele nog steeds sterke ficties over beleidsontwikkeling, analyse en analisten zouden moeten worden verlaten. Participatieve beleidsontwikkeling vraagt om een move van het ideaal van ‘pure en onbesmeurde analyse’ naar ‘besmeurde, politieke analyse’. Verschillende analytische activiteiten op verschillende abstractieniveaus zouden tegelijk uitgevoerd moeten worden, tot op alle niveaus een bevredigend resultaat is bereikt, in plaats van ze uit te voeren in keurige maar inadequate fasen. Participatieve beleidsontwikkeling vraagt om het betrekken van besluitvormers in het analyseproces zelf, om de keuzes gemaakt in dat proces te kunnen begrijpen. Machtsaspecten, ook van analisten, ontwerpers en procesmanagers, zouden expliciet moeten worden onderkend en geconfronteerd, in plaats van te streven naar een onmogelijk fenomeen als belangeloze analyse. De cases verschaffen ook heldere argumenten voor het expliciet en openlijk erkennen van de belangen van verschillende partijen, in plaats van analyse uitvoeren vanuit een hypothetisch ‘algemeen belang’ standpunt. In plaats van al deze vormen van het ‘besmeuren’ van een verouderd ideaal van het analytisch proces af te weren, zou analyse veranderd moeten worden om expliciet om te gaan met deze onvermijdelijke aspecten.
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