Governance and power in the metropolitan regions of the Randstad

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Trends in decentralisation and globalisation are increasingly testing the capacity of regional economies to adapt and exploit their competitive advantages while also offering new opportunities for regional development. All levels of government are rethinking their strategies for building competitive, sustainable and inclusive urban territories (OECD, 2016). Effective relations between different levels of government, as well as greater participation by citizens, firms, education and research institutions, and other non-state actors, are required in order to improve the delivery and quality of public services (OECD, 2016).

In practice there has been a rapid development of consultation and coordination structures in response to growing spatial interaction and integration at the supra-local level, including metropolitan regions (as well as other types of regions). The private sector and voluntary actors are increasingly participating in the management of territories. Government itself has become a multi-actor system as policy sectors (the proverbial silos) have their own agendas while the range of semi-autonomous governmental agencies add to administrative complexity (e.g. airport and port authorities, public transport providers and their managing authorities).

This has resulted in the pursuit of new governance arrangements for metropolitan areas. The OECD (2015) distinguishes between four broad categories of metropolitan governance arrangements that can be found around the world. The first is informal or soft co-ordination and is often found in instances of polycentric urban development. Lightly institutionalised platforms for information sharing and consultation are relatively easy both to implement and to undo. They typically lack enforcement tools, and their relationship with citizens and other levels of government tends to remain rather minimal.

Inter-municipal authorities form the second category. There are two sub-categories. When established for a single purpose such as waste collection, such authorities seek to share costs and responsibilities across their members (in the Netherlands literally hundreds of these authorities can be found,
often with overlapping boundaries). The second sub-category is formed by multi-purpose authorities which embrace a defined range of key policies for urban development such as land use, transport and infrastructure.

The third category are supra-municipal authorities. The difference with the previous category is that this arrangement brings with it the creation of an additional layer of government above municipalities either by creating a directly elected metropolitan government, or with the upper governments (in the Netherlands that would be national government) establishing a non-elected metropolitan structure. The extent of municipal involvement and financial capacity often determine the effectiveness of a supra-municipal authority (OECD, 2015).

The fourth and final category is formed by so-called metropolitan cities with a special status. Cities that, for instance, exceed a legally defined population threshold can be upgraded by national government. Sometimes only capital cities acquire such a status which puts them on the same footing as the next upper level of government and gives them broader competencies.

According to the OECD these categories are not mutually exclusive: different arrangements may coexist in the same country, and even within the same metropolitan area (OECD, 2015). For example, a metropolitan area may adopt one arrangement for a specific public service but another arrangement for other services. According to the OECD more than half of the metropolitan governance bodies across the world rely on informal or soft coordination arrangements. The prime explanation is that they are relatively easy to create (and to dismantle), they do not break into a country’s administrative system and, for that reason, do not require any legal provision from upper levels of government.

As we will see, every category identified above appeared as an option in decades of discussions about the improvement of governance capacity in urban regions, especially in the Randstad area. This chapter concentrates on the nature and powers of governance arrangements in two Dutch metropolitan areas, both situated in the Randstad: the Metropolitan Region Amsterdam (Metropoolregio Amsterdam or MRA) and the Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The Hague (Metropoolregio Rotterdam Den Haag or MRDH). To do so, it draws on the work of Healey (2006) and Haran (2010). Both Healey and Haran identify a triad of similar (but differing) factors influencing the decision environment. Healey draws on the work of Giddens (1984) in her analysis of institutional adaptation and change, identifying three key flows which shape the materialities and identities of actors and create the structural forces that they experience: ‘material resources’, ‘authoritative resources’ and ‘ideas and frames of reference’. Meanwhile, Haran draws on the work of Lukes (1974) and distinguishes three dimensions to explain the way power is used to organise the relationships between the actors involved in regional governance: ‘resources’, ‘process’ and ‘meaning’. In this chapter, the powers derived from ‘resources’, ‘process’ and ‘meaning’ are used to structure the analysis and comparison of governance arrangements in the two Dutch metropolitan areas.
The power of resources has close ties to Healey’s dimension of ‘material resources’. For Healey, material resources refer to goods and assets, technologies, finance and labour power. Under the power of resources, Haran refers to information, knowledge and expertise, political access, control of money, rewards and sanctions, including the mechanisms for their distribution like laws and regulations. In this chapter, legal competences for different activities (e.g. spatial, transport and economic development) are also included under this form of power.

The power of process is related to Healey’s flow of authoritative resources, which includes regulatory power, and the power to regulate the behaviour of others through formal and informal norms, codes and laws (Healey, 2006). Haran (2010) refers to the power of process as the power of actors to prevent certain issues from reaching collective decision-making agendas. This chapter considers the power of process by analysing the actor network and relations.

The power of meaning is closely linked to Healey’s flow of ideas and frames of reference, the power to generate new imaginations and shape identities and values (Healey, 2006). According to Haran (2010), this power relates to the capacity to shape perceptions and beliefs. In spatial planning this is closely related to visioning, the creation of ‘images of the future’ (see also Shipley, 2002), which is often intrinsically linked to visualisation and map-making or ‘framing with images’ (Faludi, 1996; Zonneveld, 2005). This power is about how the structure of metropolitan regions is perceived.

The analysis presented is based on a mixture of primary and secondary sources, building on earlier related work by the authors (including Zonneveld and Spaans, 2014; Spaans and Zonneveld, 2015, 2016; Spaans and Stead, 2016). The chapter is divided into six main parts. It continues with an overview of recent international trends in metropolitan governance. It then presents a summary of trends in sub-national governance in the Netherlands. This is followed by analyses of power in the MRDH and MRA. It concludes with a reflection on the extent to which the powers of metropolitan governance in the two cases coincide and have experienced similar changes.

Trends in regional and metropolitan governance in an international perspective

Trends in regional governance

Building on the work of Lidström (2007) and Fürst (2009), a number of closely interlinked contemporary trends in regional governance can be identified across Europe and beyond (Stead and Pálné Kovács, 2016). These trends can be summarised under five headings: (1) redefining of the role of the nation-state; (2) the strengthening of lower levels of self-government; (3) increasing diversity, variation and even asymmetry of governance; (4) increasing marketisation of the public domain and (5) shifting rationales for intervention.
The establishment and gradual expansion of the EU has changed the role of national borders and has contributed to the transfer of decision-making powers both upwards and downwards: to the supranational and sub-national levels. European regional policy, primarily through the Structural Funds and Cohesion Funds, has contributed to the establishment of new regional bodies (or the strengthening of existing bodies) to administer European regional policy resources. At the same time, territorial management and planning approaches in member states are being increasingly shaped by European policies and initiatives (e.g. structural fund rules, environmental management and nature protection directives). Meanwhile, the role of the nation-state has been challenged from inside in some cases where demands for separatism or self-government have been made, motivated by regional culture or identity arguments.

In many European countries, examples can be found where functions have been decentralised from central government to local and regional levels of government. In some, this has happened as a result of the reorganisation of sub-national government, either by amalgamating municipalities or regions or by creating new regional levels of self-government. Reforms in sub-national government have been enacted in various countries where comprehensive reforms of the whole structure of local and regional government have taken place, including amalgamations of municipalities and regions, and the transfer of functions between different levels of government (see for example Galland and Enemark, 2013). In some cases, however, reforms to government structures and competences have not always been accompanied by corresponding shifts in funding allocations for a variety of reasons, including the political difficulties or complexities of fiscal reforms (Maier, 1998; OECD, 2001).

This tendency towards diversity can be seen as the result of the empowerment of lower levels of government. Not only is the scope for variation between sub-national units greater, some units are also permitted to follow their own paths that may differ from the general national pattern. Various types of asymmetry can be distinguished: political, administrative and fiscal (Loughlin, 2007).2

The increased involvement of non-state actors (including the private sector) is one of the central dimensions of the shifts from government to governance (see for example Kooiman, 1993). Many functions that were seen as typical public responsibilities during the peak of the welfare state era when government rather than governance prevailed, have more recently either been privatised or are run jointly by public and private providers. Public organisations are increasingly taking an ‘enabling’ role where other actors are the providers of public services. In many countries, the welfare state has been reconfigured in ways that makes it less centralised and less redistributive, and more oriented to promoting the role of the market. Outsourcing is one of the ways in which non-state actors (including private and non-profit) are increasingly involved in delivering goods and/or services, a trend closely associated with the emergence of ‘new public management’. Governments can
outsource the delivery of services in two ways: providing technical support (e.g. consultancy or back-office functions for government); and/or delivering goods or services directly to the end user on behalf of the government (e.g. public transport or waste disposal services).

Territorial governance is being redefined in the light of important societal challenges, new powers and responsibilities and new attempts to increase the societal relevance of planning. Across Europe, territorial governance is being recast as a way of managing the increasing interdependencies of actors involved in territorial development (Stead and Meijers, 2009). Because the competition for various goods and services often extends well beyond national boundaries, the pressure to introduce governance reforms to respond to these challenges has increased. Moreover, the internationalisation of trade, education and communication is also contributing to shifts in the way in which territorial governance is practised and conceptualised.

Trends in metropolitan governance

Metropolitan governance bodies – bodies aiming at organising responsibilities among public authorities in metropolitan areas – are extremely common in most OECD countries. Very few countries have no metropolitan governance body at all, although rarely are all metropolitan areas in a country covered by a metropolitan governance body. Since the 1990s, there has been renewed momentum in the creation of metropolitan governance bodies (or in the reform of existing ones). According to the OECD Metropolitan Survey held in 2013 (Ahrend et al., 2014), more than two-thirds of OECD metropolitan areas currently have some kind of body or agency responsible for metropolitan governance (Figure 12.1). However, not all these bodies have many, or even any, legal powers.

A majority of metropolitan governance bodies work on regional development, spatial planning and transport. However, considerable diversity exists in their legal status, composition, power, budget and staff, and consequently in their impact on policy design and implementation. Within OECD countries, around 80% of metropolitan governance bodies work on regional development, over 70% on transport and over 60% on spatial planning. More than half of metropolitan governance bodies are active in these three fields at the same time (OECD, 2015).

Metropolitan-wide planning can be achieved by either formal and informal institutions or a mix thereof, depending on how sectoral competencies are divided. The effectiveness of either institutional approach depends to a large extent on the types of issues that a territory faces, the relationships among the actors, the resources at their disposal and, in general, the capacity to implement a common agenda. The policies of upper level governments, regional or national, have a major impact on the adoption of inter-municipal or metropolitan planning frameworks. (OECD, 2017) The majority of metropolitan governance bodies in the OECD tend to involve forms of informal
or soft co-ordination; less than a quarter of OECD metropolitan areas have governance bodies that impose regulations.

Links to political authority are directly tied to an entity’s capacity to raise funds independently and to establish binding regulation (the ‘power of resources’). Informal forms of metropolitan governance can struggle to implement a common agenda where major trade-offs are required and have weaker connections to the citizens they govern in terms of democratic legitimacy and accountability. Despite these drawbacks, there are many reasons why metropolitan areas have chosen to adopt more informal approaches to metropolitan collaboration, including the critical role they play in establishing a common metropolitan agenda (OECD, 2017).

Intergovernmental transfers are highly instrumental across OECD countries in establishing metropolitan forms of governance. In the Netherlands, however, such mechanisms are not currently employed. Here, the national government funds large projects of metropolitan importance directly in the domain of transport and infrastructure, rather than being funded by metropolitan regions as these regions lack taxation competences.

Searching for regional governance in the Netherlands

Many of the general trends discussed above are also visible in the Netherlands. Here too, the 1990s marked an important point in the search for new forms of metropolitan governance. Indeed, the quest to find regional and metropolitan governance structures had started a few decades earlier while becoming highly frenetic in the years after 1990. Quite typical for the Dutch
case is that more than one spatial scale was involved: the level of the entire Randstad as well as the level of its two constituting ‘wings’ and the urban regions within these wings.

First efforts to find ‘suitable’ regional governance arrangements

The present administrative structure of the Netherlands goes back to the 1848 constitution which defines two levels below the national level: provinces and municipalities. In those days there were 11 provinces and more than 1,200 municipalities. Today, by comparison, there are 12 provinces and 355 municipalities. Not surprisingly whether municipalities could effectively deal with spatial development became an issue in the following years. Discussions gained momentum during the first decades of the twentieth century as urbanisation started to become a regional phenomenon through suburbanisation and rapid urbanisation, in particular in industrial and mining areas and in the west of the country. From the 1910s onwards, strong pleas for regional spatial planning were made, in particular after 1924 when a large international conference on this subject took place in Amsterdam. At that stage there were still more than 1,000 municipalities. Planners called for giving planning competences to the provinces. However, national government regarded this as far too centralising (Faludi and Van der Valk, 1994) arguing instead that regional planning issues should be dealt with by (voluntary) cooperation between municipalities.

After the Second World War the Netherlands embarked on a long quest to find suitable governance arrangements, most specifically for metropolitan regions (Needham, 2014). For example, the national so-called Second Planning Report of 1966 proposed a fourth administrative layer in selected urban regions. This asymmetric solution (only applicable in a part of the country) was eight years later followed by a proposal to create a fourth level across the entire country through 44 districts (rayons) with planning and implementation competences. This idea was soon abandoned as in 1976 a new coalition government proposed continuation of the three levels of administration but to regionalise the middle – provincial – layer: from 11 to 26 provinces. In follow-up proposals the number went down to 24 and 17, respectively. Massive opposition from politicians, administrators, academics and civil society at large eventually led to the withdrawal of all legislative proposals in 1983. Regional governance had to be achieved through municipal cooperation and the capacity to do so had to come from the application of the so-called Joint Regulations Act (WGR: Wet Gemeenschappelijke Regelingen) of which a first version dates from 1950. This act opens up the possibility of cooperation between provinces, municipalities and water boards, but without directly elected councils: the watershed with a full-blown administrative layer. After the collapse of the plans to establish ‘new style’ provinces, a new WGR came into force on January 1, 1985. A principal objective was that all the present cooperation provisions had to be bundled and integrated to foster
effectiveness and transparency, with the provinces in a kind of supervisory role. This ‘conclusion’ (i.e. intermunicipal cooperation) would only hold for a few years.

Opening Pandora’s box once more

The economic recession of the 1980s particularly affected the four largest cities of the Randstad. In 1988 the government decided to install a heavy-weight advisory committee to evaluate policies with an effect on the socio-economic position of these cities, the so-called Montijn Committee. One area this committee specifically looked at was local governance. The main conclusion was that voluntary municipal cooperation based on the WGR was insufficient. The advice on what to do was twofold and essentially multi-scalar: (1) create four regional municipalities in the Randstad; and (2) create an Administrative Platform Randstad. How the second proposal was taken up we will discuss in the next section.

On the basis of this advice and a range of other studies and advisory reports, government decided in 1993 for the top-down creation of so-called city-provinces in seven regions, including Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague (the other regions were Utrecht, Arnhem-Nijmegen, Eindhoven and the Twente region in the east of the country). This would have to be achieved in a processual sort of way, instead of one single step. The route was laid down in the 1994 ‘Framework Law Administration in Change’ stipulating the establishment of mandatory municipal cooperation bodies in the seven regions in preparation of full-blown city-provinces. The temporary regional constructs acquired the rather unattractive name of ‘framework law areas’ (kaderwetgebieden).

The form of cooperation was clarified in a 1995 legislative proposal concerning the Rotterdam region: the new Rotterdam city-province would be formed by existing municipalities and the creation of new municipalities by splitting up Rotterdam. A similar trajectory was foreseen for Amsterdam. The idea that both Rotterdam and Amsterdam would ‘vanish’ led to a massive civil society opposition. Making use of local regulations a referendum was organised in both cities. The liquidation of the Rotterdam and Amsterdam municipalities was rejected by a vast majority (Lambregts et al., 2008). Initially government wanted to push through the idea of city-provinces but this idea had to be abandoned as parliamentary support in the end proved to be lacking, even in the government coalition.

In retrospect it did not come as a surprise that government changed to the trajectory of intermunicipal cooperation once more. By January 1, 2006, the Framework Law was withdrawn and a new Joint Regulations Act came into force. This version of the act provided additional competences in the field of spatial planning and public transport for the seven areas mentioned above plus one region in the south of the Limburg province. They acquired a highly bureaucratic, technical name: ‘WGR plus’ regions. The new competences for
the public bodies created by WGR plus included the making of mandatory regional structure plans (*structuurplannen*). However, this latter competence did not last very long. In 2008 a new Spatial Planning Act came into force which took away the plan-making competences of the WGR plus regions (Janssen-Jansen, 2011). Parliament considered the democratic legitimisation of WGR plus decision-making as rather poor.³

This story shows the vulnerable political basis of asymmetric solutions which sit somewhere between the standard, countrywide administrative layers, and it should not come as a surprise that just after eight years in existence all WGR plus regions were abolished in January 2015. A major reason for giving back competences to provinces and municipalities was the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy of the WGR plus regions (OECD, 2017) although this was not a dominant issue when they were created. Responsibilities for transport and related funding from national government were returned to the provinces, except for the provinces of South-Holland and North-Holland, where they had officially lost competences since the 2005 WGR plus Act. In South-Holland the areas of the two WGR plus regions were combined to form the Rotterdam–The Hague Transport Authority (see below). The Amsterdam WGR plus region, without any change in its boundaries, became the Transport Authority Amsterdam (TAA). Both transport authorities are mandatory forms of cooperation sharing the same legal basis. Both form the commissioning authority for public transport by bus, tram and underground railway (excluding the services of the national railway company). They also finance improvements to the regional infrastructure for goods vehicles, cars, bicycles and public transport, so investments in physical infrastructure. Both entities are strictly briefed to limit their activities to transport and in no way expand their actions to other areas. We explain below how issues outside (public) transport are addressed to network-type arrangements called metropolitan regions (Figure 12.2).

**The emergence and downfall of Randstad cooperation bodies**

Since the Randstad concept was invented as a planning concept at the end of the 1950s it was national government that was responsible for spatial strategy in this area. However, in the early 1970s some sort of cooperation between the provinces of North-Holland, South-Holland and Utrecht started under an acronym which only civil servants can invent: Dripo (a Dutch acronym for ‘three provinces’). In 1975 the South-Holland executive took the initiative to broaden and deepen the cooperation by suggesting that also the four main Randstad cities should participate. However, the other two provinces feared that these cities would dominate. North-Holland was anxious that Amsterdam would reach out to the Green Heart (Quist, 1993). This proposal and ‘Dripo’ in general faded into oblivion shortly afterwards.

Amidst the economic recession of the 1980s cooperation between the three Randstad provinces picked up again in various domains from 1985
onwards, including spatial planning (Quist, 1993). The province of Flevoland started to participate as an observer as its main city, the new town Almere, played a key role for the northern part of the Randstad. In 1994 this province became a full member of Regio Randstad, since 1991 the official name for cooperation in the domain of planning (Lambregts and Zonneveld, 2004). As an expression of a desire to deepen relations, the Randstad provinces decided to base their cooperation under this banner. Cooperation in the Randstad seemed to intensify even more when as of September 2002 not only the four main Randstad cities but also the WGR plus city-regions around these cities joined Regio Randstad. The joint provisions arrangement was adapted and from that moment cooperation was not only multi-actor but also multi-level, involving 12 actors. Cooperation had a twin objective: (1) to strengthen the international competitive position of the Randstad and (2) to improve quality of life (Lambregts et al., 2008).

This expansion from 4 to 12 Regio Randstad actors could be regarded as a logical consequence of yet another Randstad organisation: the Administrative Committee for the Randstad (BCR: Bestuurlijke Commissie Randstad).

Figure 12.2 Location and perimeters of the two Randstad metropolitan regions and their transport authorities. Source: Own illustration.
This rather giant negotiation platform included the 12 Randstad authorities and no less than five ministries. It was created in 1997 to renew the covenants between national government, provinces, urban regions and municipalities on housing allocation and production (Dijkink et al., 2001). Later on, its tasks became much wider: not only the coordination of central government’s spatial investments in the Randstad but also to manage Randstad-input for the fifth national planning report to be published in 2001 (Lambregts and Zonneveld, 2004).

Changes in government coalitions, in nearly all cases preceded by national elections, played an important role in the changing perceptions of how to (re)organise regional governance as discussed above. Likewise, changing perceptions about the importance of the Randstad for the country as a whole and the boundaries and internal structure of the Randstad had similar repercussions. In mid-2002 a new coalition government took office which was less convinced of the need to put the level of the Randstad centre stage (Lambregts et al., 2008). The Randstad was divided into four programme areas, and concrete policies and investment strategies were coordinated with the authorities in each of these four regions (Amsterdam; Utrecht; Rotterdam; The Hague; and the Green Heart). However, a later coalition government again attached greater importance to the Randstad. Warned by ever-lower rankings of the Randstad in international comparisons, it established a high-level committee which was asked to advise on its administrative structure. The assumption was that administrative bustle (‘bestuurlijke drukte’) was seriously undermining all efforts to improve the competitive position of the Randstad. Early in 2007, the committee issued the daring advice to create one single metropolitan government for the entire Randstad that would take over a range of (mainly planning) competences of the provinces and the four WGR plus regions.

Another coalition than the one which established the Randstad advisory committee set aside this strongly formulated advice. Weary of governmental reform in general, support for this negative decision came from several research and advisory bodies. In 2006 the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research published an elaborate report showing that the Randstad is not a single, integrated urban region but on the whole is formed by two sub-regions (Ritsema van Eck et al., 2006). About a year later the OECD acknowledged that although the Randstad may represent a relevant scale in relation to certain issues, it did not consider the introduction of a Randstad authority a necessity and instead favoured the strengthening of the governance capacity of city-regions (OECD, 2007 as discussed by Lambregts et al., 2008). Moreover, at the request of parliament, the Netherlands Institute for Spatial Research (De Vries and Evers, 2008; see also Evers and De Vries, 2013) made a comparison between the organisation of governance within the Randstad and a (small) sample of other urban regions. The general assumption was that the situation in the Randstad was far worse when compared with examples abroad. The assessment agency concluded that this was
definitely not the case. In 2008 the government advisory council on spatial planning recommended that the creation of coalitions around strategic projects is far more effective than an overall restructuring of the administrative system (VROM-Raad, 2008).

By the time this latter advice was published the 12 partners of Region Randstad had already taken the decision to terminate their cooperation body by January 2008. Two dominant reasons are named in a frank letter by its chairman, the Crown’s Commissioner of the province of South-Holland (Franssen, 2007): (1) Randstad Region partners were becoming ever less prepared to prioritise the Randstad scale; and (2) the organisation was too heavy and too ‘administrative’ while the shared ambitions were too weak. The letter also points out that there was no match between how the Region Randstad works and how government organises programmes which seek to support the economy of the Randstad. Under the so-called Randstad Urgent Programme which started in 2007 all (35) projects became supervised by high-level administrative teams: one administrator from national government and one from local government, a sort of implicit reply to the VROM-Raad advice.

Since the disappearance of Region Randstad in 2008 there is no longer a cooperation body at this level. However, ‘Region Randstad’ is still used as a label for various joint lobbying and promotion activities by the four Randstad provinces in Brussels.4

Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The Hague

Introduction

In the early 2000s, the southern Randstad or South Wing became conceptualised as one of the urban networks in the Netherlands. This new national planning concept meant that groups of cities could form networks tied together by functional relations, physical infrastructure and connected government. When the director of the Department of Spatial Planning and Transport in the province of South-Holland assumed office in 2002, he set up the South Wing Studio (Atelier Zuidvleugel). His opinion was that the South Wing was suffering from an abundance of plans, strategies and fierce competition between local planning actors and municipalities and that an institution which would be independent from daily political routine and which would have time to reflect would help the province as well as other planning actors to develop a regional frame of reference for decision-making (Balz and Zonneveld, 2015: 877). The focus of this Studio was design-oriented and helpful in bringing relevant stakeholders informally together and introducing them to the level of scale of the southern Randstad.

Around the same time, in 1997, an informal multi-level government cooperation platform in the southern Randstad was set up (Dijkink et al., 2001). Members included the province, the two main cities, the two WGR plus
city-regions and three WGR regions. This Administrative Platform South Wing (Bestuurlijk Platform Zuidvleugel) covered the city-regions of Rotterdam and The Hague with extensions towards Leiden to the north and Dordrecht to the south with the task to improve the coordination of urban development in the area. Its aim was to undertake preparatory work for a new covenant between the regional and national governments regarding investments in infrastructure and other spatial projects in the southern Randstad (Dijkink et al., 2001). In 2000 the decision was taken to make the platform a permanent structure supported by a small secretariat located in the House of the Province of South-Holland in The Hague. It did not have decision-making or executive tasks, but formed the setting for negotiations with central government about investments in which the province had the strongest agenda-setting role (Spaans and Zonneveld, 2016).

The Metropolitan Region Rotterdam The Hague or MRDH was formed in 2010 when national government announced the abolition of the WGR plus city-regions. As the WGR plus city-regions were also the transport authorities for their territory and as such received considerable national budget for public transport, the announced abolition initiated a quest for these budgets and intensified the power play between municipalities and province. A new arrangement had to be set up to replace the city-regions. One option was that the infrastructure tasks would go to the province. The mayors of both Rotterdam and The Hague chose to block off this route as this meant that a large central government budget would find its way annually to the province. The metropolitan region placed itself at the forefront. In the law regarding the abolishment of the WGR plus regions, national government indicated that because of the complexity in the Randstad wings the new transport authority would cover the geographical area of the MRDH. But the exact elaboration was left to municipalities and provinces. This resulted in the metropolitan region becoming the transport authority and a formal arrangement: fixed boundaries and formal duties (which go hand in hand) but, like the city-regions before that, without an elected council. In December 2014 a joint provision was signed for the transport authority. On 1 January 2015, all eight Dutch city-regions were abolished and the MRDH was formally appointed by central government as the transport authority.

As MRDH gained in power, the informal cooperation for the larger area in the southern Randstad – the Administrative Platform South Wing – repositioned itself in 2016 as Network Southern Randstad focussing on strategic spatial-economic issues and cooperation with national government on national public investments in the field (Zuidvleugel, 2015).

As mentioned, the MRDH was formed by the integration of the two former WGR plus city-regions of Rotterdam and The Hague. The MRDH cuts a large chunk out of the territory of the province of South-Holland as it houses more than 60% of the population and 36% of the land area. The geographical area spans 23 municipalities which vary considerably in population size and
nature. It covers a metropolitan authority tasked with transport and economic development responsibilities for this territory. One of the core ambitions of the MRDH authority is to bring the economies of Rotterdam and The Hague closer together while generating growth and well-being (OECD, 2016).

**The power of resources**

The previous section explained that the MRDH emerged as a new metropolitan-scale institution with the ambition of becoming the transport authority but at the same time it also embraced additional ambitions. While emerging, the MRDH envisaged an even broader scope which was narrowed to a twofold focus: transport and economic development. The broader scope at the start covered three coherent strategies: (1) to exploit the potential of being a single daily urban system by improving internal connectivity; (2) to make better use of, and invest in the knowledge and innovation potential of the region; and (3) to fully exploit the wide diversity in amenities, services and landscape assets of the region (Meijers et al., 2013).

When we compare the two pillars of the MRDH, the Transport Authority (TA) is much more formalised and with a considerably higher budget than the economic development pillar. The MRDH’s budget is composed of public transport subsidies from national government and contributions from the participating municipalities for the economic development pillar. It is important to stress that MRDH has only limited possibilities to broaden its financial resources as it is not allowed to levy taxes or impose other fees or charges. In the Netherlands, most taxes are collected at the national level and then redistributed to the local and provincial levels. Municipalities collect approximately one-sixth of their budget by levying local taxes.

In 2019 the budget in the field of public transport was 0.74 billion euro (the budget is not indexed which means that its value is going down due to inflation), which is used both for the operation of public transport and investment in new infrastructure. The Transport Authority pillar employs 56 full-time staff in 2019. Legal competences and financial resources in the field of economic development are much more limited, which is also reflected in a more limited staffing: 12 full-time staff members in 2019. For this task the MRDH does not possess any ‘hard tools’ as its responsibilities are based on a voluntary agreement among member municipalities without any enforcement mechanisms. The annual budget of about 4.8 million euro (for 2019) comes primarily from the municipal authorities, in the form of a fixed amount per resident from each member municipality: 2.58 euro in 2019. According to the OECD (2016), such a funding arrangement for the economic pillar of the MRDH is common across the OECD, and its per capita budget is comparable to other informal metropolitan associations without regulatory powers. In terms of staffing, the MRDH has a smaller secretariat compared to other OECD metropolitan governance bodies that oversee a similar population size, but the MRDH has a more limited set of responsibilities.
The power of process

Shifts in leadership form an important underlying reason for the emergence of the MRDH. For a long time there have been tensions between the three major appointed administrators – the mayors of the two main cities of Rotterdam and The Hague and the Crown’s Commissioner of the province of South-Holland. This did not help the body to function as a cohesive policy network (Spaans and Zonneveld, 2015). When in 2008 in both Rotterdam and The Hague new mayors were appointed the politics changed drastically. Although they were from two different political parties they got on very well unlike their predecessors. It is because of them that the MRDH performs as a genuine politically approved informal governance arrangement (Spaans and Zonneveld, 2016). Although the MRDH and the province of South-Holland had a problematic relationship at the start, their cooperation has improved (OECD, 2016). As both governance bodies each have their own responsibilities in a partly overlapping geographical area they simply have to cooperate in economic and transport planning. After the abolition of the WGR plus city-regions in 2015, the Province of South-Holland and the MRDH signed a management agreement in 2016 and renewed and refined this in 2018, which focuses on the common fields of traffic and transport and economic business climate. The Network Southern Randstad complements this cooperation.

The MRDH has been established in a formal joint arrangement under the Joint Regulations Act of 2016 (MRDH, 2018a). The voluntary bottom-up collaboration among municipalities is a positive, distinctive feature of the MRDH compared to other OECD metropolitan regions built around two large cities (OECD, 2016). The organisation mirrors how provinces and municipalities are organised: a General Board and an Executive Board which cover both pillars of the MRDH. The current organisation of the MRDH reflects the balance between the two major cities on the one hand and the smaller municipalities on the other. The Executive Board includes the mayors of Rotterdam and The Hague (who act as chair and vice-chair) and representatives from three other municipalities.

The mayors of the two major cities rotate every two years as the chair of the General Board which is the highest decision-making body of the MRDH. This body comprises 27 members and meets four or five times a year. Representatives in the General Board have a varying number of votes, depending on the population size of the municipality they represent. Decisions within the general management require an absolute majority of votes, but given the Dutch culture of political consensus, it is generally expected that most decisions will be taken unanimously. It is interesting that the two major cities together do not have the majority of votes although they represent more than half of the inhabitants of the MRDH (OECD, 2016). Some of the smaller municipalities hesitated to join the MRDH due to their fear of being overruled by the two cities but this was resolved by the sharing of votes.

Although the MRDH as a governance body is not directly elected, it has indirect legitimacy: bottom-up from the local level. Residents of the MRDH
are given the right to speak at MRDH meetings. Participation is possible if the resident has an interest in a topic that is on the agenda of the meeting.9

The power of meaning

The MRDH deliberately restricted itself to the policy fields of transport and economic development. Responsibilities of the Transport Authority MRDH relate to public transport in its territory, while the province has competences (and related budgets) for provincial infrastructure (roads and waterways). As OECD (2016: 125) puts it: economic development is a competency of the province but it is also a field of work of the MRDH. The responsibilities for spatial planning however have remained a function of the province. The initial sensitivities between the province and MRDH have probably had as a result that the MRDH does not develop any development visions on maps (rather than text and figures) for its territory that might fuel any antagonisms.

Publications on the website of the MRDH hardly include visualisations and those included refer to visual analyses in the MRDH Atlas (MRDH, 2014). Thus, meaning in the sense of ‘framing with images’ is not employed by MRDH. The aim of the MRDH to increase economic growth by fostering economic integration of the region needs spatial planning policies formulated by the province to contribute to this goal by providing sufficient space for the economy to grow (OECD, 2016). Achieving these ambitions requires that policy areas of both MRDH and province are well co-ordinated. Figure 12.3 shows an attempt by the MRDH to stress the importance of such integration by relating economic clusters to each other. But this type of visualisation is \textit{ad hoc} and is not used in external framing of the MRDH area.

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{Figure12_3.png}
\caption{An attempt to visualise the spatial structure of the MRDH as a system of axes, zones and clusters.}
\textbf{Source:} MRDH, 2014.
\end{figure}
Introduction

Cooperation in metropolitan regions is often multi-scalar as we have explained above. The Amsterdam region is an obvious example as there are two cooperation structures which cut different slices out of the wider area spatially connected to Amsterdam while they also have different ‘powers’. First, there is the region covered by the Transport Authority Amsterdam (TAA). Legally it is the successor of the WGR plus city-region Amsterdam, terminated on December 31, 2016. The new entity grounded on the Joint Regulations Act took over. The boundaries did not change: the area includes 15 municipalities, all within the province of North-Holland. The land area is 38% of the territory of this province and it houses roughly 54% of its population (about 1.5 million), percentages which are comparable with those of the MRDH.

The second, much larger entity is the Metropolitan Region Amsterdam or MRA. Having a population of about 2.5 million it is located in two provinces: North-Holland and Flevoland. Based on a covenant signed in March 2017, its membership includes 32 municipalities, the authorities of the two provinces, as well as, interestingly, the Transport Authority Amsterdam. The MRA covers a large area: 59% of the geographical area of North-Holland falls within the MRA and no less than 77% of its population. The figures for Flevoland are 42% (area) and 69% (population). As in the MRDH, the Transport Authority Amsterdam falls within the OECD category known as ‘inter-municipal authorities’ while the MRA is informal or soft co-ordination.

The MRA and even more the TAA has a track record in cooperation going back in time. The MRA cooperation started in the late 1990s under the banner of North Wing Consultation (Noordvleugeloverleg). After seven high-level conferences joined by administrators from the entire area, the structure was consolidated in its present elaborate form. The smaller-scale Informal Agglomeration Amsterdam Consultation (Informeel Agglomeratie Overleg Amsterdam) started about 30 years earlier in 1969 (Van der Lans, 2006). It went through successive periods of ever stronger cooperation, each phase indicated by a slightly different name, eventually leading to the present legally based stage of Transport Authority (see Lambregts et al., 2008; Haran, 2010; Janssen-Jansen, 2011; Levelt and Janssen-Jansen, 2013; OECD, 2016, 2017).

The power of resources

If we compare MRA with the TAA then obviously the first one is lighter in the sense of not having a statutory basis. In theory, the cooperation within MRA could also be based on the Joint Regulations Act, but politically this
was not acceptable to its membership (Stadsregio Amsterdam, 2016). In essence, the MRA is a network although one could argue like the OECD does (OECD, 2017: 153) that it is also a political body as it is based on a political agreement, discussed and accepted amongst all its members, meaning 32 municipalities and two provincial councils. Although ‘light’ the predecessor of the MRA, the North Wing Consultation was considerably lighter as there was no written agreement at all. Its main resource was based on process: meetings between administrators on a regular basis leading to several political agreements (we will come back to this below). The fact that this kind of cooperation has continued for nearly two decades and is politically formalised in a covenant means that although MRA lacks the ‘power to implement’ (OECD 2017: 157) it has created a valuable resource, namely trust.

Having no power to implement means MRA cooperation is ‘cheap’ in financial terms. Organisationally the cooperation is based on annual contributions from its members. As specified in the 2017 covenant the municipal members contribute €1.5 per inhabitant. While in the MRDH this is 72% more, in the MRA also the provinces contribute. North-Holland pays the same as Amsterdam, and Flevoland the same as its biggest town, Almere. Both North-Holland and Amsterdam also contribute extra to one of the three ‘platforms’: Economy (see below). For 2019 this leads to a budget of about €8.25 million (MRA, 2018). About a quarter of this budget is needed for running the MRA bureau. The number of staff is small: about 12 fte (MRA, 2016, 2018). As the MRA is not a legal entity all staff members work on the basis of secondment from municipalities, especially Amsterdam. There is a strong multiplier effect in terms of staffing. According to a rough estimate (MRA, 2016), about 60 to 80 fte across all MRA members are working on the implementation of the so-called MRA agenda, plus the cooperation itself like the preparation of meetings.

The transport authorities in the Amsterdam region and the Rotterdam-The Hague region have similar competences, but the budgets vary. Annually the TAA receives about €390 million from national government, which is much less compared with the MRDH as the latter region has a far more complex urban structure. Every year there is about €4.5 million available for research while the TAA bureau (mainly staff) costs about €7.5 million (VA, 2018) which is about four times more compared with the MRA. This means that about 3% of the annual budget is not directly spent on (public) transport and infrastructure.

Both the MRA and the TAA spend some of their budget on research. The MRA focuses on the analysis of the housing market, the state and structure of the MRA economy and the energy transition. The TAA has a much larger research budget and the focus is primarily on accessibility studies. One particular project is about the modelling of (future) transport called VENOM: Traffic Model Metropolitan Region Amsterdam (VENOM, 2016). Interestingly the research area is not the TAA region but the MRA area. The spatial logic is obvious: the TAA area does not cover the functional urban area
Governance and power: two regions

Governance and power: two regions

of Amsterdam while the MRA area does to a much higher degree. This is reflected in the VENOM partnership which at the time of writing is in its third period (2017–2020). In addition, to the TAA, partners include the two provinces, the Ministry of Infrastructure and the municipality of Amsterdam plus ten other local, regional and national partners.

The power of process

This particular power or capacity is about how shared policy agendas come about and how the TAA, as well as the MRA, creates authoritative capacity within their constituencies as well as within their broader political context. As both entities are situated between constitutionally defined administrative levels with directly elected councils, a rather crucial issue concerns how legitimacy and accountability is organised, while at the same time dominance of Amsterdam is mitigated. The latter is a more sensitive issue compared with the MRDH as Amsterdam in terms of population and economy heavily dominates the MRA and even more the TAA.

In parallel with the MRDH, the TAA has a General Board (called Regional Council) as well as an Executive Board. The Regional Council has 51 members. Although the number of seats a municipality has is related to population size the Joint Provision uses a sliding scale. While more than half the population of the TAA lives in Amsterdam, the number of seats in the Council is less than a quarter. Members are appointed by the municipalities through their councils and the majority is recruited from these councils. The Council decides on the distribution of the financial funds across (four) programmes and projects. The Daily Board is rather small, with four members. The chair is an alderman of Amsterdam, holding a portfolio which includes transport and mobility.

The MRA has what the OECD calls a ‘flexible geometry’ (OECD, 2016: 177). Concrete activities and work processes rest on platforms. Of the three platforms, the Transport Platform works is exceptional: most MRA municipalities do not participate in this platform (but are represented by the provinces) and the membership is limited to those parties that participate in the TAA. The MRA Mobility Platform functions as a kind of interface between the MRA and the TAA. Some projects falling under this platform are not even limited to the boundaries of the MRA, in particular a project called MRA-E which seeks to stimulate electric transport in all municipalities not only in North-Holland and Flevoland, but also neighbouring Utrecht.

The Economy Platform focuses on employment and competitiveness. One of its main achievements it inherited from the period of the North Wing Conferences which preceded the MRA cooperation, namely the decision made at the fourth, 2005 North Wing conference to establish a platform to create a joint policy on the development of locations for offices and trade and industry: PLABEKA (Platform Bedrijven en Kantoren). As municipalities in the
Netherlands tend to compete with each other in this area (Needham, 2007: 74–75), this is no mean achievement. Connected to the Platform Economy albeit not a genuine MRA ‘institute’ is the Amsterdam Economic Board. The composition follows the classic triple helix formula. It has an advisory role both for the Amsterdam municipality as well as the MRA.

Most MRA municipalities are represented only indirectly in the Platform Economy as nearly all municipality members participate on behalf of one of the seven MRA sub-regions. This implies not only that MRA cooperation is characterised by a flexible geometry, but is also multi-scalar. Sub-regions play a crucial role in the Territory Platform which of all three platforms has the broadest focus. However, the platform does not call itself (in translation) Spatial Planning (see for this interpretation OECD, 2017: 149). The Dutch equivalent (ruimtelijke ordening) has the connotation of defining land-use through zoning plans. As this is a statutory competence this could not be dealt with by a network organisation such as the MRA. However, within the Territory Platform municipalities in MRA seek to coordinate house building programmes on the level of the sub-regions as well as on the level of the entire MRA. This is roughly the housing equivalent of PLABEKA. Both arrangements obviously have spatial implications, but the legally binding decisions on land-use are taken by the individual municipal councils according to the credo to be found on many MRA webpages and in published material: no competences are transferred from the participating authorities to the MRA.

There are connections between the three platforms. These are dealt with by four so-called portfolio consultations, their members are recruited from the ranks of municipal aldermen as well as the two provincial executives. The domains covered are sustainability; building and housing; landscape; and art, culture and heritage.

The power of meaning

What capacity do the TAA and the MRA have to shape perceptions and beliefs, both within the partnerships as well as the outside world? In its publicity material the TAA emphasises its functional relevance: ‘working for a region in which people can quickly and easily reach their destination’ (TAA, n.d.: 1). Interestingly, if one visits the website and clicks on ‘area’ the menu does not only show the municipal members but also the MRA which suggests that the TAA is not just active within the boundary of the area formed by its 15 municipal members but in a much wider area, forming an integrated mobility system.

As the TAA is a mandatory form of cooperation, there is less need to work on its profile and relevance. In contrast, the MRA is a voluntary partnership with a much wider focus and a much bigger area compared with the TAA. There is, therefore, much more need to show relevance, particularly to keep its membership together. In such a context, framing becomes particularly important: creating perspectives on how to understand or perceive a particular,
complex situation (Rein and Schön, 1993), in this case a territory. This can be done through words and images.

In its use of language, two particular concepts are important. First, there is a particular emphasis on the Metropolitan Region as a *daily urban system*, a space forming a coherent area for its inhabitants. This obviously suggests it is only ‘natural’ to regard this area as a logical object of policy cooperation. Second, the area is no longer conceived as the North Wing of the Randstad but as Metropolitan Region Amsterdam. At the 7th North Wing Conference, December 2007 the decision for the name change was taken, only two months after the decision to abolish the Randstad Region. Both events were connected to each other. North Wing obviously is linked to Randstad as the concept originates from a discussion about its structure and morphology. Doing away with the Randstad paved the way for another much more attractive ‘label’ due to the connotation of the area being a metropolis: a world-class regional city based on Amsterdam. Also, images played a role in the perception of the MRA. In early 2008, after a year of intense debates, conferences and design studios, a 138 pages vision document was published (MRA, 2008). Its key image served as a kind of logo for the following years (Förster et al., 2016) (see Figure 12.4).

In 2016 a new policy map was created. This time it is not called a development vision but an action map (*actiekaart*). It is part of a glossy publication of 60 pages bearing the names of dozens of authors, under the auspices of the Platform Territory (MRA, 2016). It is not a replacement of the development vision but an addition, showing all the projects that are carried out in the region over a period of four years (2016–2020), demonstrating that the MRA cooperation has drive, momentum and practical relevance.

![Figure 12.4 Image of spatial integration in the MRA area and the direction of main external relations.](source: MRA, 2008.)
Conclusions

The Netherlands is obviously no exception when it comes to the rescaling of governance. What is striking is the duration of the ‘quest’ and the many turns that have been taken over the course of time. The four broad categories of metropolitan governance arrangements as identified by the OECD have all been discussed at some stage. A fifth model was also considered: a new fourth layer of administration across the entire country, including elected councils. The fourth model involving special status of metropolitan cities (the proposal to create city-provinces) finally seemed to become the trajectory for seven regions, but resistance from civil society and eventually parliament led to the option of inter-municipal authorities (the WGR plus regions).

Government and parliament has changed its mind time and time again: the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy was the insurmountable stumble block. Since 2010, just two metropolitan regions exist in the country, both situated in the Randstad. In these two regions, there is currently a supra-local authority in the domain of (public) transport with some measures to safeguard a form of legitimacy by giving elected members of local councils an advisory role. The two authorities are almost exclusively dependent upon government funding as municipalities (and provinces) have a very slim tax base. Clearly, the abolition of the multi-purpose city-regions in the Netherlands runs counter to trends in metropolitan governance as observed by the OECD.

For a large-scale Randstad authority, governance complexity simply proved to be too great while the level of functional integration between the various parts of the Randstad as expressed, for example, by commuting patterns, is lacking. Alongside the two statutory Randstad transport authorities soft-coordination takes place under the banner of ‘metropolitan regions’. The MRDH is more focused on economic development while the area is the same as that of the transport authority. The MRA is much more comprehensive in its ambitions and is ‘working’ for an area almost twice as big compared with the Transport Authority.

Looking at the MRDH and MRA in more detail, we arrive at the following conclusions in relation to the three categories of power on which our analysis is based. When it comes to the power of resources both regions are almost exclusively dependent on national government funding, at least in the transport domain as already stated. Outside this domain there are (very) limited resources for staff and projects, although especially in the MRA there seems to be a large multiplier effect in relation to staff due to the comprehensiveness and multi-scalarity of the cooperation.

From the perspective of the power of process we conclude that the two metropolitan regions seem to slowly converge in the way in which they are organised. Both have, for example, a daily board and a supervisory board, the latter mostly recruited from municipal councils. Nevertheless, they also show two major differences: the province (i.e. North-Holland and Flevoland) is a prominent participant in the MRA and joined at the beginning. At the phase
of emergence of the MRDH, the province was even foreclosed. Currently, the province participates in some of the MRDH committees.

The second major difference is geographical in nature: even though there might surely still be discussion about the precise external borders, it is the intention of the MRA to be inclusive and cover the whole daily urban system of Amsterdam in its metropolitan governance arrangement. In the MRDH two urban agglomerations (Leiden and Dordrecht) which are functionally part of the daily urban system are not represented in the metropolitan governance arrangement. From this perspective there seems to be a fundamental flaw in the arrangement. This may have an impact on the degree to which policy integration in the focus policy areas can be reached.

With respect to the power of meaning we observe a major difference in the fact that the MRA is actively using visions, maps and spatial images as a way of bringing coherence in the issues at the table between the actors involved and, in the projects, and programmes at stake in the region. Accessibility, economy and spatial planning seemed to be much more aligned than in the MRDH where spatial images are almost non-existent and spatial planning is not a policy field with which it wants to relate. Rather, economic development is the integrating frame here.

Notes

1 In the Netherlands the steering bodies are usually recruited from the ranks of municipal aldermen or (elected) municipal councillors.
2 The ‘special’ and ‘ordinary’ regions in Italy provide one example of political asymmetry and diversity within a state. Different forms of territorial administration within the UK provide one example of administrative and fiscal asymmetries, where the three territorial offices representing Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have distinct relations and arrangements with London. Meanwhile, in Spain, the Basque Country and Navarre have more financial (and legal) autonomy than the rest of the country, and exhibit fiscal asymmetry.
5 Largely based on the Broad goal-oriented grant for transport (BDU or Brede Doeluitkering in Dutch) which is a financing programme for regional traffic and transport projects funded by central government.
7 Mayors and Crown’s Commissioners are appointed by national government and not elected.
8 Each representative of Rotterdam has 15 votes, each representative of The Hague has 13 votes, the representatives of Delft, Zoetermeer and Westland have 9 votes and so on, up to the smallest municipalities, whose representatives have 2 votes each (OECD, 2016: 145).
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