Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Raja, A.A.; Grammatico, S.

doi:10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Title

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Author

Raja, A.A. (TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico)
Grammatico, S. (TU Delft Team DeSchutter; TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico)

Date

2022

Abstract

In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'

Subject

Control systems
Costs
Distributed Algorithms
Dynamic Games
Energy Systems
Game Theory
Games
Multi-agent systems
Network systems
Resource management
Stability criteria
Uncertainty