Print Email Facebook Twitter Preventing Under-Reporting in Social Task Allocation Title Preventing Under-Reporting in Social Task Allocation Author De Weerdt, M.M. Zhang, Y. Faculty Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science Department Software Computer Technology Date 2010-12-31 Abstract In games where agents are asked to declare their available resources, they can also strategize over this declaration. Surprisingly, not in all such games a VCG payment can be applied to construct a truthful mechanism using an optimal algorithm, though such payments can prevent under-reporting of resources. We show this for the problem of allocating tasks in a social network (STAP). Since STAP is NP-hard, we introduce an approximation algorithm as well. However for such an approximation, a VCG payment cannot prevent under-reporting anymore. Therefore we introduce an alternative payment function that motivates agents to fully declare their resources. We also demonstrate by experiments that the approximation algorithm works well in different types of social networks. To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:39fcae97-c6fb-4fbb-b06a-2dbb63f03a22 Publisher Springer Source https://doi.org/doi:10.1007/978-3-642-15237-5_1 Source Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing, 44, 2010; authors version Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type book chapter Rights (c) 2010 SpringerThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.com Files PDF amec081.pdf 229.5 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:39fcae97-c6fb-4fbb-b06a-2dbb63f03a22/datastream/OBJ/view