RASMAR Final Report: Risk Analysis of Simultaneous Missed Approaches on Schiphol converging Runways I9R and 22

RASMAR Final Report: Risk Analysis of Simultaneous Missed Approaches on Schiphol converging Runways I9R and 22

Speijker, L.J.P.
Blom, H.A.P.
Bakker, G.J.
Karwal, A.K.
van baren, G.B.
Klompstra, M.B.
Kruijsen, E.A.C.

National Aerospace Laboratory NLR

2001-01-31

The increase in air traffic implies that for busy airports, such as Schiphol, new and advanced Air Traffic Management (ATM) procedures are being developed. For some proposed ATM procedures, ICAO regulations do not yet exist and a thorough safety assessment that incorporates the role of Air Traffic Control (ATC) and pilots is required. This study concerns a risk analysis of simultaneous missed approaches on Schiphol converging runways 19R and 22, where the Obstacle Clearance Altitude (OCA) of runway 22 is proposed to be reduced from 350 ft to values below 200 ft. This allows the use of runway 22 during actual CAT-1 weather conditions, which will support the optimisation of the arrival scheduling. Some guidelines for the adoption of a risk criteria framework to judge the acceptability of collission risk are given. Based on integration of three NLR facilities - Information System for Safety and Risk analysis (ISTaR), Traffic Organization and Perturbation AnalyZer (TOPAZ) and Flight Track and Aircraft Noise Monitoring System (FANOMOS) - an existing risk model is extended to enable determination of the collision risk related to the proposed ATM procedure. Numerical evaluations show that the collision risk may attain an unacceptably high level under certain conditions, especially when approaching aircraft on runways 19R and 22 both make a straight missed approach, and ATC does not intervene. For trying to maintain the collision risk at a low and acceptable level, some risk reducing measures are identified. In particular, ATC monitoring and instructing - turn right! or climb to! - to aircraft conducting a missed approach on runway 19R in case of a previous straight missed approach on runway 22 is required. Provided that the identified measures are applied, the proposed reduction of the OCA of runway 22 to values below 200 ft is risk neutral within a broad spectrum of missed approach procedural aspects, and may be judged adequately safe. This conclusion is also valid for the possible fixture situation, where the final missed approach altitude is raised from 2000 ft to 3000 ft and/or the wind criteria for the use of runway combination 19R / 22 is changed toward 20/7 knots.

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