Towards common imaginaries for a Shared Cyprus
European Postgraduate Masters in Urbanism
Strategies and Design for cities and territories

35°6'54"N 33°56'33"E Terra Incognita
Towards common imaginaries for a Shared Cyprus

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REFERENCES
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I would like to dedicate this work to the memory of my beloved father Vernis.
Cyprus_ In the crossroads of Europe, Asia and Africa

MAP 1_ Cyprus situation and area[map: by the author]
Focusing on the case of Cyprus, the thesis explores the relationship between urban space and group conflict and the relevance and importance of spatial planning and urban design practices in conflict resolution. Urban space is suggested as a prism through which to understand and address the challenges of the contested city. Famagusta, a city on the eastern coast of Cyprus, is used as a demonstration site for exploring ‘urban peacebuilding’ strategies seen through the lens of spatial practices. The Turkish invasion of 1974 resulted in the territorial division and occupation of 37% of the Island’s territory, while its two main communities, the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, have remained alienated ever since [MAP 2]. The partition and the presence of a violent buffer zone a ‘no man’s land’ along the islands’ east west axis, is the driving force behind a country of two systems and two cultures. Partition was to affect most dramatically the political geography of future development in Famagusta. On August 14th 1974, the whole of Famagusta was occupied by the Turkish army and Varosha, its southern suburb, was sealed off as a no-go area under the control of the Turkish Forces undermining the growth and development of the city. From April 2015, a new momentum in politics has given hope to the people of Cyprus for reunification, with Famagusta on the forefront of the negotiations. The research builds upon the potential of a ‘shared Famagusta’ to offer strategic motivations for a ‘shared future’ and a prototype of peaceful coexistence in a reunified Cyprus. How peace can be materialized in the urban environment and how the city could be transformed into an arena where common imaginaries and shared urban narratives are negotiated and developed is explored. Although this work addresses the specific context of the Cyprus case it provides insights to a much wider discussion of academic and societal relevance and draws attention to the complex connection between space, identity and politics.
Λένε πως ο άνθρωπος πρέπει την πατρίδα ν’ αγαπά

έτσι λέει κι ο πατέρας μου συχνά

Η δική μου η πατρίδα έχει μοιραστεί στα δύο
ποιο από τα δύο κομμάτια πρέπει ν’ αγαπώ;

"Η δική μου η πατρίδα έχει μοιραστεί στα δύο"

They say that a man should love his country,

My father often says this too...

My country has been divided in two

which of the two parts should I love?

‘My country has been divided in two’
Introduction

Partitioned/divided cities and countries often represent an ultimate form of segregation in which all the forms of Urban Livelihood are segregated [Kliot & Mansfeld, 1999:169]. In places all over the world, the social resilience of our cities is today questioned as sociospatial transformations generate new inequalities and dislocations that evolve around matters of ethnicity, religion and nationality [Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011]. One of the main arguments of this thesis is that since space is at the heart of such conflicts, planning and design as the main instruments for shaping [social] space they have a strong relevance and importance in conflict resolution processes. Starting by understanding the links between territory and identity and its significance in divided cities, urbanists are challenged to address both community cohesion and social inclusion problems and to knit urban regeneration and intercommunal reconciliation strategies.

The active participation of local communities in the recovery process is the central pillar for success. [Barakat, 2010:23] Planning and design have to find new methods to include the public in the actual process of city making. In the new context of state fragility and internal conflict, the Urbanist must adopt new approaches that are small scale, bottom up and community driven. His role has to be extended, beyond that of a conceiver and executer of blue print plans to ‘potential negotiator’ and ‘to go beyond the common notions of a place that is both physically grounded and socially fixed’ [Gaffikin, Mceldowney & Sterrett, 2010:497].
10.

MAP 2_Cyprus Partition 1974[map: by the author]

Turkish Occupied
Northern Cyprus Under
T/C administration

Republic of
Cyprus Under G/C
administration

UN buffer zone

Dekelia British
sovereign base
The summer of 1974 marked the territorial consolidation of a partitioned Cyprus. A short conflict in 1958-1959 and a longer civil war between 1962 and 1964, just right after Cyprus was declared as independent in 1960, resulted in establishing for the first time safe territorial enclaves for the island’s two communities the Turkish and the Greek Cypriot. In the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, the free movement of Greek Cypriots was restricted and these were economically blockaded by the Greek Cypriot Government; something which made Turkish Cypriots insistent on a separatist solution. This was a period of great anxiety and conflict between the British, the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot minority and Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus, was the center of this situation. The first physical division in Cyprus took place in 1958 in Nicosia, when the island was under British colonial rule and interethnic differences lead to interethnic violence. A demarcation line, known as ‘The Mason Dixon Line’, separated the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia. This barbed wire division along the Hermes Street, one of the most popular commercial streets at that time, preceded a UN supervised ‘Green Line’ dividing the two communities in Nicosia and elsewhere. The Green Line remained in place as a fearful division until 1967, and then became a permeable boundary as the relations between the two communities improved. However, a coup d’état in Nicosia, that was led in July 1974 by Greece’s ruling military junta and aimed at the unification of Cyprus with Greece, triggered Turkey’s reaction. With the Turkish invasion in August 1974 the
PHOTO 2_Varosha beach front [http://endlock.tumblr.com/post/4384555387/famagusta-ghost-town]
division was established at the heart of the city taking the form of a heavily armed dead zone, a no-man’s land expanding along Cyprus’ east west axis. The buffer zone signified a hard national boundary between the two sectors.

The Turkish invasion in 1974 resulted in the territorial division and occupation of 37% of the island’s territory while its two main communities, the Turkish and Greek Cypriots, remain alienated ever since then. After the division the North and South parts of the island, grew apart with a little co-operation between them and a dual, sprawling landscape emerged, in an attempt by the two communities to solve the many infrastructure problems resulted from the division. According to Demetriou[2003:242], in the case of the capital city Nicosia, ‘the presence of the Buffer Zone and the lack of interaction between the government controlled southern sector have significantly influenced the spatial structures of Nicosia as a whole’. Mainly, between 1973 and 1976 the population of the southern part of the island increased by 40%. This was due to the influx of refugees from the northern part and the government policy to house a great number of refugees in organized settlements in the suburbs and in particular on the south fringes of the city. Post 1974, the process of [sub]urbanization in the south became more rapid and by 1992, urban residents within Nicosia’s southern urban complex accounted for 68% of the total population of the Republic of Cyprus [RoC]. The city sprawled out to the south and west [Hocknell, 1999:303]. In the same fashion, north Nicosia witnessed suburban growth, however in a more consolidated form[SCHEME 1].

On the eastern coast of Cyprus, the establishment of the partition was to affect most dramatically the political geography of future development in the city of Famagusta. Most specifically, Famagusta’s southern suburb, called Varosha, was fenced off as a no go area and fell under the control of the Turkish Forces [PHOTO 2 & SCHEME 2]. The existence of a violent boundary/wall undermined the centrality of Varosha. The once new downtown and growth pole of Famagusta was turned it into a ‘boundary’ town an edge of isolation and division. Whereas from the mid-1950s to 1974, new developments were beginning to cluster on the southern part of the city ‘from 1974 the direction of Turkish Cypriot development turned 1800 [Hocknell, 1999:324]. Areas adjacent to Varosha’s fence failed to attract investment, particularly given the current territorial status and military presence as well as due to the psychological factor, which is associated with ‘border’ areas. Today Turkey keeps an occupying force in northern Cyprus of 30,000-40,000 troops, making the island one of the world’s most militarized areas. More than half the population of the north is from mainland Turkey and these inhabitants are part of a deliberate attempt of ‘Turkification’ of the north.
SCHEME 1: Nicosia urban growth 1930s-2016 [scheme: by the author]
SCHEME 2_ Famagusta urban growth 1910s-2016 [scheme: by the author]
PHOTO 4_Within the Ghost town of Varosha_ Famagusta

PHOTO 3_Within the UNBuffer Zone_ Nicosia

SCHEME 3_ Villages and Cities within the buffer zone [scheme: by the author]
According to scholars [Kliot & Mansfield, 1997] the lack of raison d’être and a constitutional structure that prevented its evolution were, together with external intervention, [British colonial powers—divide and rule] responsible for the failure of the newly established Republic of Cyprus to function as one society and one state. Scholars make a distinction between divided nations and partitioned states. Henderson and Lebow [1974:434], consider that Divided nations split along ideological lines [formerly divided Germany, currently divided Korea] while they define Partitioned countries as those with ‘division resulting from internal causes; by reason of ethnic, linguistic or religious conflict between or among groups formerly residing within one political unit; these divisions are most frequently associated with the backup of colonial empires [India, Ireland]. Cyprus is such a state, partitioned between Turkish and Greek entities.

Furthermore, the authors have argued that the ‘treatment’ of partitioned states is even more difficult than that of divided countries where divisions are often artificial. Often, in the case of partitioned states, the divide is internal and the schism between ethnic, religious and linguistic differences is too deep. As in the case of Cyprus, partition is rarely negotiated between equal partners but rather it is imposed by foreign powers that act as brokers and/or perpetrators [Hocknell, 1999:3]. Cyprus’ partition was effectively institutionalized during the 1959 constitutional ‘settlement’ talks that were held in Zurich between Greece, Turkey and Britain, while the partition of the island was to begin in December 1963 after bi-communal violence was erupted within the capital city, Nicosia. The spatial division was later consolidated by practice in August 1974 with the Turkish invasion.

‘Partition had developed from concept, to plan, to policy’ [Hocknell, 1999:153] [SCHEME 4]. As soon as 1956, segregation was to a large extent reflected in British proposals when the British suggested the self-determination of both communities. With partition as part of ‘divide and rule’, a north-south line west of Nicosia was proposed, with Greek Cypriot territory to its east. Even though this plan was rejected more plans suggesting possible ways of the island’s partition followed through the years. The ‘Macmillan Plan’ of 1958 set the territorial framework on which other such plans were based on as well as the violent partition of the island in 1974. Turkish Cypriots were to claim Northern Cyprus while the southern part was to be left on the Greek Cypriots. According to Greek Cypriot observers, the ‘symmetry’ and ‘symbiosis’ of the communities’ cultures, had become threatened only upon foreign intervention[!!]; while until before the 1960s in the economic sector, there was more or less complete unity and mutual dependence of the two communities [Hocknell, 1999:153]. Within this context, we understand partition not only as an attribute but also as a process...
Proposed Plans for the partition of Cyprus in time

Scheme 4: Proposed Plans for the partition of Cyprus in time

[Scheme: by the author]
Proposed Plans for the partition of Cyprus in time

Denktash proposal for a partitioned, Bilingual federation

Gunes proposal for the creation of six autonomous T/C cantons


GENEVA DECLARATION
DENKTASH AND GUNES PLANS FOR THE ‘REGIONAL AUTONOMY’ THE TURKISH CYPRiot POPULATION

ANNAN PLAN UN PROPOSAL FOR THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS A FEDERATION OF 2 STATES first referendum for reunification
PHOTO 5_ The leaders of the two Cypriot communities, Mr. Anastasiades [Greek-Cypriot leader] and Mr. Akinci [Turkish-Cypriot leader] delivering a message of hope and peace on December 24th_
As early as 1977 Rauf Denktash, President of the self-declared Turkish Federated State of Cyprus [TFSC] and Archbishop Makarios, President of the internationally-recognized Republic of Cyprus [RoC], agreed on a basis for future negotiations - the so-called ‘Four Guidelines’ - which envisioned the future state as a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation. Currently, there is great confidence amongst the civil society and political leaders that we are approaching a viable political solution of the Cyprus problem. A new ‘momentum’ in politics has given new hopes to the people of Cyprus for reunification. The city of Famagusta is now on the forefront as a bargaining chip and it is speculated that soon a part of it will be returned under the Greek-Cypriot administration.

Famagusta has always been highly fragmented with a number of ethnic and functional enclaves, where Greek and Turkish Cypriots lived largely separated [SCHEMES 5&6]. Like Nicosia, Famagusta’s Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities were ethnically segregated from 1963, while traditionally the historic walled city was a Turkish Cypriot enclave. By the 1960s, a new suburb called Varosha, to the city’s south, was to be made largely of Greek Cypriot residents and ‘represented the first substantial tourist development along Cyprus’ coastline’ [Hocknell, 1999:324]. After the independence of the island in 1960, the development of Famagusta came to signify a new era for the country, bridging modernity and history. In the early 1970s, Famagusta was a modern town and an important port in the pursuit of progress and wealth, an international entertainment and touristic center, attracting millionaires and Hollywood celebrities. On August 14th 1974 the whole of Famagusta was occupied by the Turkish army and Varosha was sealed off as a no go area. An urban area covering some 4 km by 1.5 km of coastal and once-agricultural land. Varosha, lined up with more than 100 luxurious hotels, exemplary architecture and the island’s most beautiful beaches has been ever since ‘kept like a petrified urban museum, enclosed, boarded up and frozen in time’ [Hislop, 2014]. After the Turkish invasion, as already mentioned, the city grew towards the North and from a pole of attraction for tourism development, was degraded to a simple regional center. However, during the Mid-1980s, the presence of the Eastern Mediterranean University [currently the largest and most popular university on the North] initiated new dynamics of growth and development.
SCHEME 5 _ The enclaves of Famagusta

Archaeological sites_ Ancient Engomi and Salamis

Central Administrative Area

The EMU[Eastern Mediterranean University] Campus

The Walled City

Neapolis Lake and Turkish [east] and UN[west] military camps

Varosha Ghost Town

Kato Varosha and Agricultural Hinterland

The Buffer Zone

The Port

The new City expansion

Limni Lake area

The Port
PHOTO 6. The Limassol-Dubai type marina, one of the most pre-eminent new developments in Cyprus.

PHOTO 7. In one of the many new 'villages' developers built on the North of the Island.
**The North and the south**

The partition and actual division have resulted in the fragmentation and consolidation of the spatial planning system in Cyprus. The intercommunal conflict about territorial sovereignty has resulted in the creation of two separate institutional networks. According to Lakkotrypis [2014:85] the main problem of the Cyprus planning framework is the absence of an integrated spatial development plan for the north and south parts of the island as well as for the island as a whole. This resulted from the uncertainty around the questions of occupation and sovereignty due to the prospect of change in case of a possible solution together with the ‘refusal of cooperation, which may be translated as an implicit acceptance of the de facto situation’ [Lakkotrypis, 2014:85]. Unfortunately, the two planning systems, unsustainable and obsolete, are unable to answer to the changing spatial and social conditions in Cyprus.

**The Crisis**

Furthermore, the ongoing economic crisis in Cyprus has resulted in convulsive, by the government, spatial investments/developments and further deregulation. The Troika Memorandum itself, implemented three years ago, has created the conditions for a vicious cycle where the driver for economic recovery is based on deregulation and in neo-liberal policies¹. The government has already implemented a series of measures such as permitting further tourist developments as well as facilitating the acquisition of a permanent residence permit in Cyprus² in an attempt to provide incentives to potential investors. Vast rural and natural lands - some protected under the Natura 2000³ - are sold to be transformed from productive/protected to consumption spaces turning the land and cities to the developers and speculative financiers. These investments might in fact lead to the phenomenon of social exclusion which can accentuate and further fragment the current governmental, urbanization processes. Instead, public land has the potential to be used very strategically as the public backbone in our cities...

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¹. The Cyprus’ bailout memorandum declares for example that condo hotel projects should be facilitated ‘with the aim of enhancing access to financing investment in hotel development, including the removal of any legal impediments [Q2-2013];’

². In order to provide more incentives to potential, foreign investors, the government introduced new regulations regarding the acquisition of the Cypriot nationality and of a permanent residence permit in the country with the purchase of a house, worth of at least 300 thousand euros and with a minimum of 30 thousand euros of deposit influxes in local banks.

³. For example, in February 2014, it was decided by the Council of Ministers that the construction of golf court [covering an area of 59 hectares] within the Natura 2000 area of Cavo Greco in Famagusta, should be allowed [Kathimerini, 26.02.2014].
For the last 40 years, the island is left with an unresolved political conflict and an open wound that is violently reflected in the built environment [Pyla and Phokaides, 2009:46][PHOTO 8]. The military invasion by Turkey in 1974, economically devastated the country as people from both communities were dislocated losing homes, property and their livelihood while the most productive tourist and industrial zones were left under the Turkish occupation. The invasion, while causing a humanitarian catastrophe, established the geographical division of the island with 37% under the Turkish occupation. For more than 50 years, the history of this island has lived through successive and varied conflictual relationships between its two main communities, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, which have dramatically altered its spatial configuration.

On the 21st of January 2016, the ‘Reuniting Cyprus’ roundtable took place at the annual World Economic Forum in Davos. There, the leaders of the two Cypriot communities, Mr. Anastasiades [Greek-Cypriot leader] and Mr. Akinci [Turkish-Cypriot leader] made a joint appeal for peace support. Over the past eight months, the two leaders are trying to sustain a political momentum. Politicians and diplomats close to the negotiations think that 2016 may be the breakthrough year for the Cyprus Dispute, while the Financial Times have indicated that Mustafa Akıncı and Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Anastasiades may be candidates for the Nobel Peace Prize. Therefore hopes for [re]unification are higher than ever as both leaders are committed to a deal. However, the solution to one of the world’s oldest and seemingly most insoluble conflicts will require more than just answers to political and legal issues. The process of creating a ‘shared future’ implies a shift from ‘managing to transforming urban conflict around diversity and sovereignty’ and towards more pluralist and inclusive places [Gaffikin, et al. 2010:497].

The new territorial separation resulting from a federal solution might not lead to actual peace as in fact, intercommunal contact has been minimal after the tragic events of 1974. The ‘negative peace’ of the last 50 years, created by partition makes the effectiveness of any political solution difficult. As the dissimilarities between Greek and Turkish Cypriots still persist, the road towards the actual reunification of the island is to be considered a long and difficult process. In a new future for a reunified Famagusta, both community cohesion and social inclusion problems have to be addressed by strategies that link together urban regeneration and intercommunal reconciliation processes. At the same time, cautious and responsible decisions regarding future development should prevent the imposition of speculative trends in this process of rebuilding and rehabilitating parts of the city, which often tend to treat as’ Tabula Rasa’ the pre-existing structures, history and character of the urban fabric.

One of the main arguments of this thesis is that since competition over space is at
was established, and marked a shift in the highly centralized planning system of Cyprus. Nicosia master plan is an initiative that signified a new era of collaboration between the two communities at a planning level. Its success is a promise on what the two communities can achieve together.

The Nicosia master plan team - meeting at LEDRA PALACE[checkpoint]_ The Nicosia Master Plan is a valuable planning initiative as there is no other common planning document, tool or vision for the Nicosia Urban Area as a whole: the government controlled southern quarter and the Turkish occupied northern quarter. Along with the Nicosia Master Plan a permanent collaboration between the Town Planning and Housing Department of the government and the Nicosia Municipality

PHOTO 9_ [photo: Nicosia Master Plan]
the heart of the conflict, planning and design as the main instruments for shaping space they have a strong relevance and importance in conflict resolution processes [Gaffikin et al. 2010:494].

RESEARCH QUESTION

In the prospect of a political solution to the Cyprus Dispute, since Space is so central to the overall conflict, what is the potential contribution of [Urban] Planning and Design in creating spaces of opportunity for a shared future among Turkish and Greek Cypriots?

4. Shared Future implies ‘a significant increase in integrated living and working across the divide rooted in principles of inclusion respect of diversity, equity and interdependence’ [Gaffikin and Morrisey, 2011:261]
The North and the south

Three relevant spatial contexts

National
Planning in Cyprus needs to be updated and urban design practices to be evaluated in order to meet the changing conditions of the country. At the same time, how can planning, not just as a bureaucratic tool, can help in ‘breaking’ the divide as well as how planning and design can as political projects promote co-operation and interaction are critical questions need to be examined. An opportunity is presented for reconstituting and evaluating our cities’ development and the current governmental planning processes. Setting a new planning framework that can foster change in the island as a whole, Famagusta, the city which has become a potent symbol of the seeming intractability of the conflict will be used as a demonstration site for the testing of planning and design proposals. Identifying the problems that should be addressed by the current and future residents of the city, will open up potentials to ways in which intentions should be made. The potential of Famagusta, to become a new magnet of unity between north and south, Greek and Turkish Cypriots and a showcase for a new era of planning and design in [re]united Cyprus is to be explored through both research and design, visual and written investigations and proposals.

Aim of the study

UN Buffer zone

Local

Famagusta
The relevance of the issue can be traced both in the academic and societal fields. Understanding partition not only as an attribute but also as a process, the study will explore partition/division as an [extreme] form of social economic and political segregation in cities[Kliot & Mansfeld, 1999:168]. According to literature, social ethnic and racial segregation are still today important features of contemporary cities. As it is considered a problem that results from hierarchy of power and wealth as long as such hierarchy exist segregation will prevail. These social changes across the world are pronounced and leave their spatial imprints on places and communities. There is thus a strong link between space and group conflicts where planning and design as the main instruments for shaping space can be used in a process of ‘peace building’, towards pluralist and inclusive places/cities. Partitioned/ divided cities, an example of which is the city of Famagusta which will be investigated for the scope of this thesis, represent an outcome of contest and conflict on control of territory and resources within the context of segregation. Although the project needs to answer very carefully to the very specific local conditions of the place under investigation it can offer at the same time insights for a wider ongoing academic discussion. Kliot & Mansfeld [1999:169] argue that both partitioned/divided cities and cities where residential segregation for example prevails such as the black ghettos in North America and the apartheid segregated areas in South Africa, present similar features: ‘the principle of exclusion guides segregation between the various ethnic communities’. In both cases the Urbanist, not as the one and only master of knowledge production but as a civic entrepreneur, a negotiator who has a growing social role, is challenged on how to knit urban regeneration and intercommunal reconciliation strategies in the ‘search for non-violent responses to grievance and contest’ [Gaffikin & Morrissey, 2011].

The thesis builds upon three interwoven work packages a theoretical, an analytical and a [research by] Design package [SCHEME 8].

Theoretical context
i. Drawing upon the work of scholars such as Kliot & Mansfeld, Gaffikin et al, the relationship between Urban Segregation [spatial, social, and political] and its link to Group conflict is explored in the context of Cyprus in general and of Famagusta in particular. Investigating how the spatial is socially constructed and how the social is spatially constructed: linking the notions of the Edge-Border-Boundary [Richard Sennet, Atun and Doratli] and place-memory to urban design and spatial practices [Bakshi].

ii. Investigates alternative modes and tools of Planning and Design in Contested cities [Gaffikin et al, Bollens, Sutton]. The concept of collaborative planning [Healey] is examined in depth as it is
Theoretical Framework

Urban Segregation - Social + Sectarian and Group Conflict

EDGE-BORDER-BOUNDARY

Memory and identity and urban design

Analytical Framework

Cultural Context
i. Planning and Design culture
ii. Historical review

Case Studies

Planning and Design in Contested cities

Collaborative planning

Cyprus

Famagusta

Spatial Conditions

CONSTRAINS AND POTENTIALS

Research By Design
Testing

Strategic Design and Vision
suggested by scholars to be the most effective model of intervention in deeply fragmented environments.

In both cases comparative research is conducted and knowledge is drawn from international case studies such as Belfast, Berlin, Jerusalem, Nicosia [the capital of Cyprus where some important planning initiatives have been taking place since the early 1980s] in order to understand the 'whys' and the 'how's' of the islands spatial, political and social situation during the last 50 years. At the same time, evaluating the differences and commonalities of these cases can help us transfer relevant practices to the Case of Cyprus in general and the case of the City of Famagusta in particular. This exercise will hopefully provide new knowledge and insights to potential principles for planning and design for the specific context.

Analytical context_

Cultural context and Spatial conditions

i. Planning and design culture| The thesis explores the Planning tradition and design practices in both the South and North and their capacity to address the real urgencies of the island’s contested urban environments and deliver long-term socioeconomic benefits in a highly fragmented society.

ii. A Historical review of important events and spatial plans that have helped in consolidating the divide are documented in order to frame the Geopolitical conditions of the Conflict. Understanding the forces that have shaped the city in the past and the ones shaping the city now is important so as to identify the forces that would possibly shape the city’s future planning evolution and urban development. It is important to understand ‘what’ or ‘who’ influenced Famagusta’s current spatial conditions and identify distinct periods in which shifts in the urbanization forms of the city occurred.

iii. A comprehension of the past and current spatial conditions of Cyprus and of Famagusta in particular is important in constructing a different way to intervene to the city through the understanding of its historic and contemporary character and needs.

Design context and Deliverables_

Spatial planning and urban design have key roles to play in constructing a shared future for the two communities in Famagusta. The idea of acting and interacting in public realm is central in creating porous boundaries and borders, in dissolving the fear of ‘the other’ that feeds the conflict and separatism. A first idea would be that public realm both physical and procedural can become the medium towards peace. The city of Famagusta will be used as the demonstration site for proposals taking place within the public realm [physical and procedural space]| SPACE/PLACE MAKING AND PEACE BUILDING. Based on this, the
MAP 4_ Famagusta[by the author]
thesis will include:

i. A long term strategy for the whole of Famagusta. A number of strategic demonstration projects in key locations will be tested. A phased development should be considered amongst others [action in: physical space].

ii. A [critical] article to be published in local newspapers regarding Famagusta and the current debate on its future development [action in: procedural space].

iii. Guidelines or principles for reunification to be proposed.
Introduction

Divided/partitioned cities are generally linked with civil wars in which group identity is threatened [Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:1]. The end of World War II marked a shift in global warfare trends from inter-to intrastate conflict leaving many cities vulnerable. Between 1945 to 1988, 59 of 64 wars were intrastate [civil wars]. During the same period, 127 new sovereign states were created while 35 new international boundaries have been drawn since 1980[Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:1, Strand, Wilhelmsen and Gleditch, 2003]. This splintering trend peaked around 1990 with the height of what was called ‘the Third World War’ to describe the systematic and violent disintegration of weak states into statelets controlled by regional ethnic rivals[for example see Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war]. In 2007, 23 protracted non-state, civil conflicts were ongoing with approximately 80 per cent of these grounded around issues of contested group rights and threatened collective identity [SCHEME 9].
Comparative analysis_ CASE STUDIES

Mostar| Bosnia-Herzegovina
Beirut| Lebanon
Belfast| N.Ireland
Jerusalem| Israel
Berlin| Germany
Nicosia| Cyprus
The main proposition of this thesis, based on the work of Morrissay and Gaffikin, is that space is socially constructed, and has thus an impact on social relations and behaviors. The city is both a stage and an actor and according to Lefebvre[1991] it is shaped by ‘narratives and discourses that in turn are legible for references about the nature of wider society’ [Morrissay and Gaffikin, 2006:874]. Thus, the city cannot be reducible just to a given physical form as societal meanings are infused by spatial particularities and contingencies [Hastings, 1999, Markus and Cameron, 2002]. This proposition draws attention to the complex connections among space, identity and politics. The division/partition of cities takes place within specific political situations, and is the direct result of ethno-national conflicts as issues such as who owns or rules a particular space are in question. However, the city is by definition an open and inclusive system to all its residents and a laboratory for innovative spatial strategies; therefore the city has a leading role in conflict resolution, as a potential center for communication and reconciliation [Vockler, 2014:18]. Barakat[2010:22] argues that in the aftermath of war, the build environment assumes a complex role in forging identity and empowering or disempowering communities in driving the peace process and [social and physical] reconstruction. Urban planning and design as the tools for shaping [social] space, are pivotal in the resolution of political conflicts since these are able to anticipate a shared future that may put an end to partition [Vockler, 2014:19]. This raises the question of how planning and design practices can create shared spaces for a shared future among conflicted communities; where the concept of a shared future is defined by Morrissay and Gaffikin[2010:261] as ‘an increase in integrated living and collaborative working across the divide, rooted in principles of inclusion, respect for diversity, equity and interdependence’.

This part of the report, discusses ideas around contested spaces and social conflict and examines urban planning and design practices in such contexts. It then offers some empirical evidence on the nature of contested spaces using six different case studies – Nicosia, Belfast, Jerusalem, Mostar, Berlin and Beirut-[SCHEME 9]. Focusing on the permeability or impermeability of these divisions/partitions and their effect on cooperation and coordination of the partitioned/divided cities as a whole, particular spatial contexts are analyzed and recent approaches are assessed. Finally, a series of rules of engagement/action are proposed, based on relevant literature and findings from the selected case studies. The potential [new] role of the planning and design experts is also discussed.
Gaffkin and Morrissay [2010:58] argue that the inequalities of today’s world are embedded in a combination of disparities around differentials in class, religion, culture, gender, sexual preference and so on. Since all cities contain residents belonging to such groups, their social resilience is being tested as such containment generates intrinsic dispute about how to use and allocate land resources. In this respect, according to the authors, all cities are contested. Accordingly they distinguish between two main forms of urban contested space [Gaffkin and Morrissay. 2010:3]:

i. Where Dispute and antagonism relate to issues of pluralism, around imbalances in power, welfare and status among distinctive social groups- for example Chicago, a hyper-segregated city based on race.

ii. And around issues over sovereignty were similar pluralist disputes exist but these are ‘interwoven with an ethno-nationalist conflict about the legitimacy of the state itself’- for example the partitioned cities of Belfast, Nicosia or Famagusta.

In both forms of contested space, the territory is used as ethnic protector and exclusionary space [Boal, 1987, Gurr and King, 1987, Lustick, 1993]. However sovereignty disputes generate particular
sensitivities and complexity. For example, the concept of citizenship which can be often employed within a unifying process can be problematic if the environment under question is lacking shared sovereignty [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011: 260]. ‘Legitimations of common belonging, are displaced by a politics of dominance and resistance that promotes separate identity’ [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006: 874]. In the case of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots’ withdrawal from the state’s institutions in 1963, resulted in the formation of safe territorial enclaves by the Turkish Cypriot civilians and their stronger persistence on a separatist solution. When local ethnic antagonisms are intensified by macro nationalist disputes, as the once described, the city moves from being contested into being socially polarized which is manifested in space through the generation of safe territorial enclaves. Famagusta after the 1960s and its division into Turkish and Greek Cypriot enclaves was such an example. This critical distinction between a sovereignty and pluralist perspective on contested space should not be neglected. The reality of an existing deep diversity and disparity amongst the different groups in such cases should be confronted.
PHOTO 10_ Supporters wave flags, including an European flag, as they listen to the speech of newly elected Turkish Cypriot President of the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), Mustafa Akinci after he won the elections, on April 26, 2015 [Picture: Florian Choblet]

FROM ETHNIC TO A COMMON EUROPEAN CITIZENSHIP IN A FEDERAL CYPRUS?

SCHEME 12_ Cyprus as part of the EU family[scheme: by the author]
Polarization, partition and division represent outcomes and forms of contested spaces on control of territory and resources within the context of segregation. As discussed in the introduction, scholars make a distinction between divided nations and partitioned states. Henderson and Lebow [1974:434], consider that Divided nations split along ideological lines [formerly divided Germany, currently divided Korea] while they define Partitioned countries as those with 'division resulting from internal causes; by reason of ethnic, linguistic or religious conflict between or among groups formerly residing within one political unit; these divisions are most frequently associated with the backup of colonial empires [India, Ireland]. Cyprus is such a state, partitioned between Turkish and Greek entities. Understanding partition not only as an attribute but also as a process, the study will explore partition/division as an [extreme] form of social economic and political segregation in cities [Kliot & Mansfeld, 1999:168].

Following the models by Henderson and Lebow [1974] and Minghi [1976], we can identify six stages of partition in the case of Cyprus, as these are defined by Kliot and Mansfeld[1999] [SCHEME 12].

i. -1950s: Pre_partition state| includes all the times in which the two spatial entities functioned as one urban entity.

ii. 1958| 1963-1974: The actual Partitioning| the stage in which intercommunal conflicts and/ or total war occurred, in which superpowers or other states were involved, created and maintained the division/ partition [The 1974 Turkish Invasion and the establishment of a ceasefire Buffer zone by the UN peace keeping forces].

iii. 1974-1978: The initial Partition| is marked by mutual non-recognition and intense ideological or national ethnic antagonism between the two partitioned/ divided sides. The border is fortified and sealed, at least by one unit, and this stage is also characterized by military incidents.

iv. 2003- : Rapprochement| in this stage there is a certain degree of political cooperation concerning common problems and there is a marked increase in the movement of persons and of ideas across the partition [In 2004 the First checkpoints open, allowing access to the Turkish occupied north after 30years].

v. 2016[?]:Unification| is marked by physical eradication of the divide or partition, and the unification of the divided partitioned nations and states [an intensification in the negotiation processes between the leaders of the two communities sets new expectations and Hopes for solution after more than 40 years of Partition].

The model by Henderson and Lebow, can be applied both for cities and countries/ nations. It will be later on used as a tool to describe, analyze and compare the processes and context which led to the division or partition in the six case studies.
i. PRE-PARTITION STAGE

- MID 1950s

T/C → G/C

ii. THE ACTUAL DIVISION/PARTITION-ING

1958 | 1963-1974

T/C → G/C

THE MASON DIXON LINE DIVIDING NICOSIA'S QUARTERS was removed by the British after 8 weeks

'GREEN LINES' ARE ESTABLISHED BY THE BRITISH Dividing Nicosia and Legitimizing the separation of the two communities

cease fire line of Cypriot National Guard
ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND HEALTH PROVISIONS FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOT COMMUNITY

THE UN BUFFER ZONE IS ESTABLISHED as a permanent cease fire line of Turkish forces in the mid 1980s.

1968

1974

1978

2003

2015

3. INITIAL DIVISION
1978-2003

5. RAPPROCHEMENT
2003-

vi.

vi.

UNIFICATION

Contested Cities

Partition Process| Cyprus

SCHEME 12: Cyprus Partition Process (scheme: by the author)
‘Ne mutlu Türküm diyene’  A motto of the Republic of Turkey used by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in his speech delivered for the 10th Anniversary of the Republic of Turkey, on October 29, 1933

‘How happy is the one who says I am Turkish’
In cities marked by sectarian geographies the challenge is to go from ‘negative peace’ to ‘positive peace’. Recent violent events in Beirut and Jerusalem for example reveal how the history of cities can be a continuous vicious cycle of destruction and reconstruction. Reconstruction of war destroyed cities can in fact exacerbate physical or psychological borders left over from the occupying rule while new territorial divisions over pluralism issues may arise [Charlsworth, 2007:12] —for example phenomena of gentrification exist in physically reunified cities such as Beirut or Berlin. The cycle of conflict can repeat itself through the city’s rebuilding if both community cohesion and social inclusion problems are not addressed and multinational interests prevail over the common interest of local populations.

Contested cities, demonstrate a complex relationship between space, place and identity formation. Often referred to as ‘frontier cities’, these are ‘built on two or more mutually exclusive dreams’ [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006:875]. Space can be a ‘canvas’ manifesting the narratives of different communities that while these co-habit one city are in fact occupying two parallel universes. Space is manipulated into spheres of influence as the different populations compete over their separate vision for the city. For instance, the deliberate use of symbols such as flags, emblems, graffiti and wall murals produce an ethnified cityscape strengthening and legitimizing in a way the competing groups [Gaffikin et al, 2010:508]. Memory is territorialized and diffused within these ‘enthnoscapes’ and ethnic identity forms the main basis for power and resource allocation [Björkdahl, 2014]. In one of the simplest ways in defining and interpreting urban design is ‘...everything you can see out of the window...’ [Tibbalds, 1988:1] According to this, space becomes an ethnic marker with urban design as a barometer and a tool for provoking community rivals, sometimes to the point of violence. Such an example of the negative contributions of urban design is the deliberately enormous Turkish flag engraved on the southern side of the Kyrenian mountains in North Cyprus to be clearly seen from the windows of every Greek-Cypriot house in Nicosia [PHOTO 11].

According to Björkdahl [2014] ‘peacebuilding has rarely managed to grasp and address

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1. The concept of negative and positive peace was introduced by Norwegian sociologist Johan Galyung to describe the transition from a situation in which foreign military is needed to prevent a renewed outbreak of hostilities and violence to a situation in which groups or states have collaborative relationships and a society can deal with problems on its own.
the political and infrastructural ‘ethnification’ of urban space’. In the author’s view, urban peacebuilding is in fact about transforming ethnoscapes into ‘peacescapes’. She defines a ‘peacescape’ as an incubator of peace: a space that reflects the dynamic relationship between peace and place and a site where difference can be negotiated and transcended. The ‘peacescapes’ she refers to thus related to ‘cosmopolitan spaces of tolerance and civility and where a shared civic identity can be developed’. This typology of cityscapes promises spaces where common imaginaries could be developed amongst competing communities towards a shared future and shared urban dreams. The process of creating a ‘shared future’ implies a shift from ‘managing to transforming urban conflict around diversity and sovereignty’ and towards more pluralist and inclusive places [Gaffikin, et al. 2010:497]. Receptive approaches towards a cosmopolitan, open, culture, cultivate contact and engagement across the divide. In this respect the idea of acting and interacting in public space is central in creating porous boundaries and borders, in dissolving the fear of ‘the other’ that feeds the conflict and separatism.

Getting beyond the common notion of a place that is both physically grounded and socially fixed, according to Habermas, public space is any medium, occasion or event which prompts open communication between strangers. What very simply Sennet refers to as public realm to describe spaces of co-presence. Public realm, ‘holds the potential for chance encounters among people of diverse traditions, and in such serendipities rests the opportunity for exchange and learning that can help break barriers’.

Massey [2005: 9] highlights three main propositions:

i. space is the outcome of interrelations

ii. space is an arena of ‘coexisting heterogeneity and

iii. space is forever a work in progress, continuously being remade

Such understandings invite us to rethink the social use of space in contested cities though proactive interventions. The concepts of change, openness, mix, and relationality, which refer to spaces of greater pluralism of identities and belongings that emerge from collaborations across the divide, replace the conventional notions of space as associated with stasis, closure and representation, of spaces of distinctive and closed identity [Gaffikin et al, 2010:498].

Gaffikin and Morrissay [2010:262] argue that in order to share a common space and interact with ‘the others’ it is important to understand the city as a network of shared spaces and as a system of interconnected parts. And this should be pivotal to planning and design strategies. However in order to do so, the authors stress the importance of the involvement of civic authority in re-shaping the city rather than leaving it to the market, which often leads to the consequence creation of
disconnected microenvironments – as seen in Berlin, Belfast and Beirut. In Barcelona this ‘public’ alternative was the driver for the creation of new public spaces, parks, pedestrian routes, artwork and attractions to mark various focal points were people can interact and neighborhoods to be connected. Such deliberate interventions, rather than precisely designing and planning space, aimed in capturing ‘the spontaneity and messiness that characterize distinctive vibrant cityscapes’ [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2010:262].
The active participation of local communities in the recovery process is the central pillar for success [Barakat, 2010:23]. Vockler [2010:56] and other scholars argue about the necessity of developing processual, participatory and hence communication based types of plan. Such kind of planning according to the author would be a ‘flexible’ planning, fostering new ways of collaboration. The forces of civil society, which can act as an important corrective to the planning process, ensuring the transparency of the negotiations, should be encouraged to participate. Peace can be negotiated at the top table but durable reconciliation has to happen on the ground! The very process of collaboratively working towards common imaginaries and a shared future for an agreed planning and development agenda that works for the mutual benefit can motivate protagonists to perceive the cost of being in competition with each other.

Spatial planning gives geographical expression to the economic, social, cultural and ecological policies of society. It is at the same time a scientific discipline, an administrative technique and a policy developed as an interdisciplinary and comprehensive approach directed towards a balanced regional development and the physical organization of space according to an overall strategy [Council of Europe, 2003: 1]. According to Parker and Doak, ‘effective planning must be understood and engaged as a collective and shared aspiration for the future.’

It has been critically argued that planning and design proposals over cities, often fail to grasp the essence of the ‘place’ [Healey, 2002:1784]. Conceptions of the ‘city’, mobilized in urban policy, in such contexts, are not justified but rather rooted in nostalgic or trendy ‘city titles’ [‘competitive’ city, the ‘European city’ or the ‘EcoCity’] and narrowly focused understandings of cities [Healey, 2002:1784, 1777]. What often results are fragmented, unstable and short-lived images of the city that are externally imposed by local and international expert elites; As our society is progressing and evolving, in contrast to perceptions of the mid-20th century planners, ‘it is now widely understood that no one agency has the power to produce the city, materially or symbolically’ [Healey, 2002:1785]. Instead, the city has to be part of a shared imagination if its multiple meanings are to be mobilized into strategic resources for collective action. Urban governance
CREATING THE CITY AS A COLLECTIVE RESOURCE

discourses and planning and design practices have to be redefined in ways which have more connection to the social dynamics and time geographies of locals in order to unlock the full potentials of creating the 'City' as a collective resource [Healey, 2002:1784]; that is to mobilize collective effort, inspire individual initiatives, provide resources for identity formation processes and shared public spaces for interaction and contact between opposing groups in the framework of a coherent integrative narrative about the future [Healey, 2002:1789].

Collaborative Spatial Practices

The concept of collaborative planning advocated by Healey [1997, 2004] and others emphasizes the role of communication and collaboration in creating a more consensual and cohesive socio-spatial outcome. This concept has been suggested [Healey, 1997; Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011] as the most effectual model for intervention in deeply fragmented cities as standard approaches fail to prevail over the predicaments that confront democratic planning in such contexts [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011: 117]. Collaborative planning denotes public policy decision making that it is inclusive and based on dialogue among all stakeholders and implies an intentional shift from market over-determination of socio-spatial development. As an inclusive dialogic approach to shaping social space it embrace all forms of knowledge, including that from traditionally excluded stakeholders, treats cultural difference as an asset, and conflict as a creative tension to be channelled more productively [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006:877]. Based on the principles of solidarity and inclusion, the interaction among equals, results on what scholars [Innes and Booher, 1999] refer to as 'emanicipatory knowledge' [the result of knowledge sharing of tacit experimental knowledge of local communities and of formal knowledge of planning and design experts] which can reveal common interest.

This planning concept, marks a shift from a politics of antagonism to a politics of agonist, thus accepts the reality that outcomes of engagement may not be always consensual, totally inclusive or prone to stability [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011: 123]. The dialogic process is itself transformative for participant relations, and optimally such processes can help to create 'relational empathy' and some mutual meanings [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011: 124]. Agonistic planning, although does not abandon the pursuit of consensus, accepts the possibility of incompatibility of opinions having as its main aim the fostering of a multi-vocal and multidimensional discourse. '...engagement is less likely to end inhostility if the focus is on specific [common] needs [Dryzek, 2005:225]. In this respect, the process of city-making itself should be regarded as equally important to the final outcome; that is the collectively [re]imagined physical space.
Building Strategic Urban Governance

‘The city is brought to life through the mental work of imagining what it is and what could be’, ‘...it therefore matters which city images are called up and consolidated in public policy and how this is achieved’ [Healey, 2002: 1782]. In both conflict and post-conflict situations, traditional mechanisms of political and administrative organizations fail to provide the arenas where collective concerns can be identified and addressed [Healey, 1996:209-210]. Generating a discursive, collective public arena where ideas over the city are negotiated can become the basis for collective action to create, sustain and defend city qualities.

Collaborative city making processes are underpinned by the principle of subsidiarity and imply a shift of public power both downwards and upwards. In this respect, developing a multidimensional and multi-vocal discourse about the city becomes a key element in building strategic Urban...
COMMON URBAN IMAGINARIES AND COLLABORATIVE PRACTICES

Governance capacity by transforming urban political and policy cultures and reshaping state-citizen relations in contemporary society.

Building strategic Urban Governance capacity by challenging and changing established discourses and practices, can help to ‘disperse power, to empower and to destabilize discourses and practices which have got stuck in mono-vocal grooves or sectorally separated ‘silos’’ [Healey, 2004:1787]. In fact, literature on contemporary urban governance, suggests a shift to a more unstable context and towards more diffused power situations. According to Healey[2001: 1787], it is in such situations that more participative and deliberative governance forms may arise and it is in such contexts that institutional mechanisms for urban governance may succeed in developing social cohesion while addressing problems of social polarisation and inequality. However, the effective operation of such re-configuration, can be undermined by ‘institutional contexts which encourage fragmentation and competition’ [Healey, 2004: 1787, Gaffikin and Morrissay,2011: 135]. Designing collaborative local institutions is currently leaking away because the institutional context for initiatives does not provide the support for what people are inventing on the ground. What is most often lacking is an institutional context to sustain and spread the benefits of partnership and voluntary group initiatives for managing common collective concerns. This suggests the need for a shift from a culture of managerialism towards a culture of public entrepreneurialism and public local institutions that have the capacity to sustain and promote the strategic civic involvement at the local and regional level.

As scholars highlight [[Healey, Gaffikin and Morrissay] delivering such objectives is not an easy task! In any case, starting with an effort to encourage debates over the city’s future may provide the basis for mobilizing a plurality of actors while strengthening consciousness of a new urban public sphere where urban imaginaries can be envisioned. Such a collective effort could take place in all kinds of arenas of governance from the municipal councils, to strategic business alliances, citizen’s movement for change and ‘local strategic partnerships’. The key for initiating a public debate and participation lies in the assistance and involvement of local public media. Public campaigns can in this respect ‘stimulate participation and provide opportunities for people to get involved’.

Community Capacity

According to Gaffikin and Morrissay[2011: 271], such engaged forms of planning assume a seasoned civic literacy among well versed publics. In Belfast, although significant investment has been made in community development, there are evidences of limits in civic literacy and social capital together with claims that such
resources are unevenly distributed between the two communities [it is believed that Catholic areas have better community capacity than the Protestant ones] [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011:266]. Building community capacity, what can be understood as ‘imputing the knowledge and skills to enhance the ability of an individual/group in the community to participate in actions designed to advanced community well-being’, is an important instrument for local regeneration and collaborative planning [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011:268]. In this sense, it is both about creating a culture of debate and of a debate capacity amongst citizens. A set of skills and competencies are required for effective local strategic planning to take place within the context of urban conflict. These should include amongst others inclusive visioning, breakthrough thinking, brokerage, partnership working, leadership and negotiation [Gaffikin and Morrissay[2011:266].

As discussed, collective decision making over the city entails knowledge sharing of tacit experimental knowledge of local communities and of formal knowledge of planning and design experts. Such an exchange allows participants over time to become more ‘multilingual’ and to eventually reach a more sophisticated level of debate over city issues [Gaffikin and Morrissay[2011:272]. According to Healey[1997:309], collaborative processes require the facilitation of the ‘knowledge mediator, the broker’ to help reframe dilemmas and encourage negotiation problem definition and innovative thinking. Similarly, Barakat[2010:22] stresses the imperative for a new definition on the role of the planning and design experts beyond that of conceivers and executors of blueprint plants to potential negotiators of post conflict built environments. In this sense, the ‘space experts’ should have a central role in facilitating the building of community capacity. However, they have to operate without being over directive or prescriptive and to acknowledge the differential capacity for such discourse among the stakeholders.
Bollens [2006:68] argues that the foundations of inter-group conflict frequently lie in daily life and across local ethnic divides; that it is at this micro-level where meaningful and practical strategies can be more effective in ameliorating antagonisms. ‘Peace building in cities, seeks not the well-publicized handshakes of national political elites but rather the more mundane yet ultimately more meaningful handshakes and smiles of ethnically diverse urban neighbours as they confront each other in their daily interactions’[Bollens, 2007:1]. However planning for contested space must embrace a wider perspective of peace building [Gaffikkin and Morrissay, 2006:878]. Even though formal political agreements are ‘not solutions on content but proposed negotiation processes, will provide avenues for redefining relationships [Lederach, 2004: 46]. Of course civil society should not rely only on such formal agreements. In Cyprus, for the last 50 years the fade of the island was left on the hands of our politicians. The civil society is absent and only in the last few years it has started to rise with very few bridges being constructed between the two communities. Emphasis should be on an integrated approach to intervention.

Lederach[2004] advocates three separate levels of conflict resolution:

i. **Level 1**| the top leadership [political/military/religious.

ii. **Level 2**| Middle range leaders [social partners/opinion formers]

iii. **Level 3**| Grassroots leaders [community/NGOs]

Through a triangular model [SCHEME 13], he stresses the interdependence of all levels in order to achieve reconciliation while suggests that for each level of operation there is an appropriate kind of activity. Gaffikkin and Morrissay [2011:270] suggest that planning should have an interdisciplinary capacity and operate at the meso level as a critical interface, a mediator between micro and macro scale in order to influence policy and budget.
To conclude, the concept of public realm/space can be understood at two levels: the physical and the procedural [Iveson, 2007]. The thesis will manifest the idea that if post conflict Famagusta is to become a pilot project and an example of peaceful coexistence between two different ethnic communities, action needs to be taken within both overlapping spheres of public space [Gaffikin et al, 2010:496]: the physical-spaces of sociability in the city- and the procedural- spaces of collective discussions about common interests and issues [collaborative planning processes for example]. A first idea would be that public realm both physical and procedural can become the medium towards peace through an integrated, collaborative and multilevel approach to intervention.
PHOTO 14_ From the BiCommunal event Oranges in the Sand organized by the ‘Famagusta our Town’ initiative [15.03.2015]. It was an attempt from the Famagustian community to revive the ‘Orange Festival’ after 42 years. The festival was one of the shared city celebrations and used to attract Cypriots from all over Cyprus _ http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/f-me-apopsi-eponymes-gnomes/385/247700/ammochostos-i-polimas#sthash.06PNpc4r.dpuf[Photo1: ‘Famagusta our Town’]
How can a pluralist city for pluralist people be built? How can we attain an inclusive city that is at once diverse and cohesive? According to a number of scholars, for this to happen, a proactive strategy to counter ‘ethnic engineering’ should be based on ‘rules of engagement’ [Gaffikkin and Morrissay, 2011: 890]. From the work of five different scholars – Bollens, Vockler, Gaffikkin and Morrissay, Sennett, Charlsworth – such rules or strategies are selected and presented [SCHEME 14].
**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT**

**PROCEDURAL SPACE**

1. Engage in **equity planning**
2. Use planning processes and deliberations to empower marginal groups. Interweaving reconciliation and regeneration strategies

**PHYSICAL SPACE**

1. Intervene to city landscape with sensitivity to differences across sectarian geographies. Understanding the different spatial contexts of Urban Ethnic Homelands/Enclaves - Frontiers - Hard and Soft Interfaces

2. **Flexibility** and **Porosity** of urban form

3. Protect and promote the **Public Sphere** in both physical and institutional forms

4. Emphasize short term tactical physical interventions while articulating a peace promoting long rage vision

**S. A. Bollens**

1. Realistic **acknowledge of community division** by public authorities. Changing political mind sets!

2. **Prioritizing integrative** over potentially segregating projects

3. Establish an effective community spatial planning system - **Preference of the authors over Collaborative planning**

**F. Gaffikin et al**

1. Deliberate creation of shared space - Design and provision of a linked system of shared and accessible public spaces throughout the city

2. **Strategically locating key services** in order to bring local communities out of segregated enclaves into shared space. Relevant to the ideas of Sennett about edges-boundsaries-borders

4. **Challenging traditional sectional territorial claims**. Dispute over Ethnic ownership of parts of the city for example

7. **Reverse some of the negative contributions of Urban planning and Design**

- i. Rebranding the antagonistic public symbols in the two communities
K. Vockler

four strategies to counter the division of cities

1. **Plan across the divide**
   Planning as a way to anticipate and steer the future development of a divided city.

2. **Share space**
   Create common [‘neutral’] space for all residents within contested spaces is a first step to understand and overcome division.

3. **Share history**
   Cooperate and invest on architectural heritage with contemporary significance

4. **Create a thirdspace[other real-and-imagined places]**
   Spaces that adopt and alter the symbolism of contested spaces—Edward Soja.

E. Charlsworth

the three ‘P’ principles

1. **Political and Ethnic Collaboration** requires architects to consult with ‘non-spatial’ professionals - politicians, environmentalists, sociologists, psychiatrists, economists and community representatives. The formation of multi-ethnic and multidisciplinary teams

K. Vockler

four strategies to counter the division of cities

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   Spaces that adopt and alter the symbolism of contested spaces—Edward Soja.

R. Sennett

[the open city|an evolutionary system]

1. Planning for Unresolved narratives of Development
   Embracing non-linear forms of sequence look at conflicts and possibilities which each stage of the design process should open up| Discovery rather than clarity

1. **Creating Ambiguous edges**
   between parts of the city -edge- boundary - border

2. **Contriving incomplete urban forms**
   Flexibility/Transformability as the needs of habitation change
Comparative Analysis: Case Studies

Since the successful merging of theory with practice in the post-recovery field is often rare, a comparative analysis of the six forth mentioned case studies will allow an assessment and a final selection of principles that could be applied in the context of Cyprus in general and of the case of Famagusta in particular. The aim is to provide tools and insights into the possibilities for action in Famagusta.

Drawing upon the work of scholars such as Kliot & Mansfeld, Gaffikin et al, the relationship between Sectarian and Social Separation/Division and Integration within the context of segregation is explored and compared in all six cases. Sectarian Separation/Division and Integration is measured empirically, based on the consolidation of the divide - the existence of physical and/or invisible[psychological] boundaries - and the Social Separation/Division and Integration based on the permeability of the divide - the social interaction and exchange between the conflicting groups[SCHEME 16].
SCHEME 15_ six case studies-scale comparison[scheme: by the author]
CASE STUDY 1

Berlin | Germany

Antagonisms_ Western Forces Vs Soviet Forces, Communists Vs Fascists, West Vs East Germany

Names_ Berlin wall[German|Berliner Mauer], 'Anti-Fascist' Protective Wall, Wall of shame

Duration_ 1961-1989

Form Of contested space_ Divided

Reunified in 1989_
CASE STUDY 2

**Mostar** | Bosnia & Herzegovina

**Antagonisms** | Cristians Vs Muslims, Croatian Vs Bosniaks

**Names** | The Boulevard, or Bulevar Narodne Revolucije

**Duration** | 1992-1995

**Form Of contested space** | Partitioned

**Reunified in 1994**
**CASE STUDY 3**

**Belfast** | N. Ireland

**Antagonisms** | Catholics Vs Protestants, Republicans Vs Loyalists, Nationalists Vs Unionists

**Names** | Peaceline

**Duration** | 1969-

**Form Of contested space** | Partitioned

**Partitioned until today**

**Antagonisms** | Cristian Vs Muslim paramilitaries, Lebanese Front Vs Lebanese National Movement, Pro Government Vs rebel Factions

**Names** | Green Line, Damascus Road

**Duration** | 1975-1990

**Form Of contested space** | Partitioned

**Reunified in 1990**
CASE STUDY 5

Jerusalem | Israel

Antagonisms | Israelis Vs Palestinians, Jews Vs Arabs, Israel Vs Jordan, Israel Vs Jordam

Names | Green Line, Dayan-al-Tal Line, Armistice Line

Duration | 1948-1967

Form Of contested space | Partitioned

Reunified in 1967

CASE STUDY 6

Nicosia | Cyprus

Antagonisms | Turkey Vs Cyprus, Greek Cypriots Vs Turkish Cypriots

Names | UnBuffer Zone, No mans land, Attila Line, Green Line

Duration | 1958-

Form Of contested space | Partitioned

Partitioned until today
In June 1967, the Six Day War between Israel, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria resulted in the occupation of East Jerusalem by the Israeli forces. Immediately, the municipal areas of Jerusalem were incorporated within Israel. However, the de facto and de jure incorporation of East Jerusalem into Israel is not recognized by the international community or the Palestinians.

On November 29, 1947, the UN Resolution on the Partition of Palestine was announced. From that day on, Jerusalem was functionally and socially a divided city. However, even before the UN Resolution on Partition, the city had in effect been physically divided. Although Jerusalem was under siege and in a war situation for long periods of its history, and the Holy Places were always a matter for dispute amongst religious groups, it had never been partitioned until 1948. It have always constituted one urban entity.
Case study 1: Partition Process

JERUSALEM | ISRAEL

The ‘security fence’ dividing Israel from the West Bank, was constructed in order to protect civilians from suicide bombings and other terror attacks. The new partition of Jerusalem ['enveloping Jerusalem'] is dividing east and west parts of the city, Palestinian and Jewish population.

1967-2007


‘RAPPROCHEMENT’[?] 2011-
Case study 1: Conclusion

1. Infrastructure as a unifying element
2. Defensive architecture as a dividing element

Funded By: THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT
Top down practices resulting and partisan planning and the [re]division of Jerusalem
During the 1970s and 1980s hostility between the two 'Germanies' started to decline. Trade relations between the two sides improved, social contacts increased, and collaborations were established for joint infrastructure projects. However, the border mostly remained sealed.

The actual division of Berlin was imposed upon it by the Allied superpowers, as Berlin in particular and divided Germany in general, became the frontline for the escalating 'Cold War' between the USSR and the West. In 1961 the Berlin wall was constructed to separate East from West. In the next years both parts of the city turned their backs on the dividing line and the two Berlins developed separately.

During the 1970s and 1980s "Rapprochement" took place. Trade relations between the two sides improved, and collaborations were established for joint infrastructure projects.
Case study 2: Division Process

BERLIN | GERMANY

In November 1989 later all the border crossings to the Federal Republic of Germany and Berlin were opened. The Wall and other material barriers were removed. Post-war recovery was built upon the language and strategies of neoliberalism focusing on the construction of a new image for the new capital in the centre of the city. Although physical reunification is achieved inner divisions around economic and class lines still remain strong.

PHOTO 16 | 2013 | Colonel Chris Hadfield’s photograph of Berlin at night shows a divide between the whiter lights of former west Berlin and the yellower lights of the east [Photo: Nasa]
Case study 2: Conclusion

1. A new city centre and a new identity for the city

2. Speculative developments and the increase of public spaces

Reconstruction Funded By PRIVATE CORPORATIONS

Speculative developments and neoliberal strategies resulted in class phenomena, increased unemployment and gentrification in East Berlin. However, post unification developments have benefited the city and the Berliners in the sense that public spaces and their quality have increased
Mostar, until 1991, was one of the most cosmopolitan cities in Yugooslavia with a mixed and intermingled population of Croatian, Serbs, Bosniacs and Yugoslavs within its many mixed neighbourhoods.

In 1992, after Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognized by the EU and US as a sovereign nation state, Croatian and Serbian paramilitaries attempted the hostile annexation of Bosnian land marking the beginning of a civil war. Heavy fighting centred on the **Bulevard Narodne Revolucije**, which remains till now, the dividing line, which splits the city into a Muslim/Bosniac East and a Catholic/Croat West.

After three years of bloody civil conflict, the newly founded independent states of Croatia, BiH and Serbia eventually signed the Accords Dayton in 1995. BiH was declared a multinational state formed of three constituent people: Bosnian Muslim/Bosniac, Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Serb.

PRE-PARTITION STAGE | 1991

In 2004 the dissolution of the ethnically divided municipalities was achieved and Mostar was redefined as a single unified city. Even though many cultural buildings in Mostar’s historic core and the city’s most eminent symbol, the 16th century Stari-Most Bridge, have been restored, the city remains divided.

The city relied almost exclusively on foreign donations and expertise for the process of post conflict recovery. The EUAM, the European administrative organ in charge of Mostar, as a first step, re-organised the municipality into six sub-districts [three Bosniacs and three Croats] and a central - neutral – zone around the area of the former frontline. Each of these districts obtained a certain level of autonomy in decision-making.

After three years of bloody civil conflict, the newly founded independent states of Croatia, BiH and Serbia eventually signed the Peace Agreements and was declared a state formed of three people: Bosnian, Bosnian Croat and in Mostar, a long process of post-war reconstruction begun.

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PHOTO 18_ Stari-Most Historic Bridge
Reconstruction Funded By: THE EU AND INTERNATIONAL AGENCIES [WORLD BANK, THE WORLD MONUMENTS FUND AND AGA KHAN TRUST FOR CULTURE]. High profile projects, aiming in the reclamation and erasure of physical partition scars failed to deliver social benefits as the interventions were detached from long-term aspirations for social development.
During the civil war, Beirut became the stage and the emblem of the conflict among Maronites, Palestinians, Sunnis, Shiites, Druze and Greek Orthodox. After the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1975, a physical demarcation line was permanently activated in central Beirut.

Sectarian division increased and dual landscapes within the city emerged. In the next years, the city expanded away from the violent boundary of the green line and the city centre, the most mixed sector, became uninhabited and divided.

After the independence of Lebanon from the French rule in 1943, Martyrs Square and Damascus Street [the future Green Line] became the first territorial markers of homogenous neighbourhoods, between a Christian East Beirut and largely Muslim West Beirut. Israeli independence in 1948, sparked an influx of Palestinian refugees bringing immense pressure on the city through the polarisation of Maronites and Sunnis over the Palestinian cause.

**PRE-PARTITION STAGE** - **1975**

- 1943
- 1950s
- 1980s

**THE ACTUAL PARTITION**

**THE GREEN LINE**
During the civil war, Beirut became the stage and the emblem of the conflict among Maronites, Sunnis, Shiites, Druze and Greek Orthodox. After the outbreak of intercommunal violence in 1975, a physical demarcation line was permanently activated in central Beirut. Division increased and dual landscapes within the city. In the next years, the city expanded away from the violent boundary of the green line and the city centre, the most mixed sector, became uninhabited and divided.

In October 1989 Lebanese National Reconciliation agreements were approved, and power sharing concessions were agreed between Muslim and Christian parties. The reconstruction of Beirut after 1994 has focused primarily on the downtown and has been managed by a private development corporation called Solidere. No comprehensive strategy has yet developed for addressing everyday problems beyond Solidere project’s territorial boundaries.

Beirut is still fragmented, spatially and socially while ethnic boundaries have been replaced by economic ones.
Case study 4: Conclusion

1. *Tabula Rasa* approach and elite developments

**Reconstruction Funded By** | SOLIDERE, A PRIVATE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION  
The Beirut market driven investors’ model has been criticized for its *‘tabula rasa’* approach while the [supposed] benefits of such elite investments have not reached typical Beirutis. In fact, the city’s former historic core and public realm have been privatized
A short conflict in 1958-1959 and a longer civil war between 1962 and 1964, just right after Cyprus was declared as independent in 1960, resulted in the first physical division in Cyprus. The island was still under British colonial rule when interethnic differences lead to interethnic violence in 1958 in Nicosia. A demarcation line, known as 'The Mason Dixon Line', first separated the Greek and Turkish quarters of Nicosia.

Cyprus was invaded by Turkey in July - August 1974, resulting in the territorial division and occupation of 37% of the island's territory. The invasion established a division at the heart of the city taking the form of a heavily armed dead zone, a no-man's land that was expanded along Cyprus' east west axis. The buffer zone signified a hard national boundary between the two sectors.
The two sectors of Nicosia after the division grew apart with a little co-operation between them and a dual, sprawling landscape emerged, in an attempt by the two communities to solve the many infrastructure problems resulted from the division.

In the late 1970s, a close bi-communal cooperation was established in order to address the lack of infrastructures, and the centrifugal growth of the city, factors which have emerged after the establishment of the Buffer Zone. The joint initiative aimed in mobilizing development at a time where formal planning institutions are blocked due to the difficult and complex political circumstances in the divided city.
PHOTO 20_ Strategic Projects within the Buffer Zone: Home for Cooperation, an interface and a shared space for the two communities.
Rehabilitation Funded By THE EU AND UN[THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AGA KHAN TRUST FOR CULTURE] Nicosia and Cyprus, have not been reunified yet, however the historic city, has transformed into a prosperous place of coexistence of the two communities. Along with the Nicosia Master Plan a permanent collaboration between the Town Planning and Housing Department of the government and the Nicosia Municipality was established, and marked a shift in the highly centralized planning system of Cyprus. Its success is a promise of what the two communities can achieve together.
During the early 1990s, the centre regained its integrative role within the city. The focus on large scale commercial developments ensured its neutrality. In 1998, power sharing agreements [Good Friday Agreements] and the redevelopment of the city centre as a shared space gained momentum. It was seen as a key component in the social reconstruction of the city.

Segregation patterns were manifested by physical partitions, the ‘peace walls’, separating catholic and protestant quarters. The city became disarticulated into a series of poorly connected districts while the commercial heart of the city was undermined by ‘a ring of steel’, constructed for security reasons and restricted entrance to the city centre until the early 1990s.

Ethno-nationalist disputes [unionists vs nationalists]and a religion based segregation [Catholics vs Protestants] have been embedded in the urban fabric of Belfast since the original inception of the City in the early 17th century. Between 1969 and 1998, Northern Ireland, experienced a period of heightened conflict referred to as ‘the Troubles with the city of Belfast as the epicentre.

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In the following years, the neutralization of the commercial city centre through retail-led and culture-led regeneration strategies, played a central role in [re]branding Belfast as a ‘post conflict or shared city’. However, the prioritization of the centre has resulted in a ‘twin-speed’ city; the neutral and modern city centre contrasts the areas where peace walls still exist together with socially deprived working class communities.

Even though the number of peace walls has increased since 1998 and residential segregation prevails, at a more local scale attempts in reversing some of the negative contributions of the division have been successful. For example, in [re]branding antagonistic public art and display, aggressive wall murals have been replaced with more professional paintings promoting local history. Public art is used as a tool to unite rather than divide.
PHOTOS 21&22_ ‘peace walls’[left] and the[re] branding of antagonistic public art as a reconciliation tool[right]
Case study 6: Conclusion

1. A neutral - shared commercial city centre

2. Collaborative Planning

3. Reversing the negative effects of urban design

Rehabilitation Funded By: THE EU AND UN[THE UNITED STATES AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, AGA KHAN TRUST FOR CULTURE]
Policy and planning in Belfast

In the mid-1990s, urban policy in Belfast was marked by multidisciplinary dialogic consultations that openly acknowledged the spatial impacts of the ethno-nationalist conflict [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006: 882]. The imperative of linking regeneration into the peace process, the correspondence between deprivation and division, and the need to move towards common, unified goals and a ‘heal while renew’ approach were addressed in spatial strategies. A regional plan, known as Shaping Our Future, recognized the reality of community division and segregation and their implications for planning. It was the result of a process that included engagement with around 500 community and voluntary organizations, during which issues of sectarian division were addressed [Gaffikin et al, 2000]. Despite impediments in addressing controversial territorial issues, a consensual vision plan that projected a united and shared city was generated after a five-year visioning process sponsored by a broad-based cross-community partnership of leading politicians, business and community interests.

Several years later, the Good Relations Strategy 2010-2013, drafted by the City Council, marked a new paradigm of interventions within the city, that not only address the interfaces between social inclusion and social cohesion policies, but also the need to frame both within a broader agenda [like the competitive city] [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2011: 222].

Such alternatives to accepting the idea of a ‘fragmented city’ towards one shared city developed through integrated planning have yet to take firm root despite the best efforts. The city today is still scarred by almost 100 permanent walls of defensive architecture. Planning practices in Belfast, do not present a linear progression. For example, in the mid-2000s, the regeneration agenda entitled A Manifesto for City Development [also produced by the City Council], addressed the prospects of the city ‘as though it was a typical medium-sized European city, with no direct reference to the challenge of a contested city evident’ [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006: 883]. Such discontinuities according to Gaffikin and Morrissay may result from Weak institutional memory within government, when constantly changing personnel in urban planning and policy for example lead in an endless series of short-term programmes and pilot schemes rather than the continuation of the previous work [Gaffikin and Morrissay, 2006: 888].
_Spatial and Social segregation_

based on the consolidation of the divide _the existence_ of physical and/or invisible boundaries: geographic mixing of ethnic groups

Separation | partition/division
[Ethnic Homogeneity]

based on the permeability of the divide _the social interaction and exchange_ + ethnic diversity

Separation | partition/division

THE OPTIMUM[?] CONDITION
ACCORDING TO SPATIAL PRACTICES |
spatial and social integration

contested cities over issues of pluralism
Amsterdam

contested cities over issues of sovereignty
Berlin, Jerusalem, Belfast, Famagusta, Nicosia, Beirut, Mostar

**Introduction**

Effective and equitable spatial responses to urban partition are rare. The relationship between space, identity and politics is most often neglected and ethnic violence in contested cities is assumed to be the concern of other disciplines. Built environment practices however, ‘retain a significant and mostly unrealized potential to shape policy and assist in the broader process of coping with the negative impacts of sectarian division [Calame and Charlsworth, 2009:167].
An enormous gap still exists, between academic critiques of divided/partitioned cities and any visible improvement of their environment [Charlsworth, 2007:14]. Charlsworth [2007:14] advocates for the necessity of pilot projects as an alternative approach to reconstruct a city that can more easily incorporate the collaboration of local architects, planners, residents, students and policy makers in the development process. Urban theories need to be tested through practice in small architectural projects that can be implemented as part of a sequence of a long term urban vision. In Barcelona during the 1990s, reconstructing the city on the basis of a series of projects, understood as fragments of the city, made it possible to give continuity to the relative centralities within the urban fabric.

In Nicosia, the joint plan [NMP-Nicosia Master Plan] focusing on the historic walled city, offered for the first time an opportunity for intercommunal collaboration in planning and design. This bi-communal co-operation begun in 1978 when representatives of the two communities agreed to work together for the preparation of a common sewage system. Under the auspices of the UN, Turkish and Greek Cypriot planners and officials meet at irregular intervals, depending on the necessity, since 1981 at the Ledra Palace Hotel [which serves as headquarters of UNFICYP] to discuss technical issues, which interest both sides. The revitalization of the historic center was achieved through a series of small scale residential and conservation projects on both sides of the divide[twin projects] [PHOTOS 22&23]. The work was recognized as a collaborative and sustained effort and was found to be successful in reversing the city’s physical and economic decline, using restoration and re-use as the catalyst for improvement on both sides of the divided city. Unfortunately, due to the complex, political relations, Nicosia only after more than 30 years has finally seen the benefits of this commendable initiative. Today the historic city center has been transformed into a cultural hub by the locals, for locals. Small economies and local businesses are thriving while branding the area as a place of coexistence for the two communities, reflecting the original identity of the city has contributed significantly in its upgrading and success. However these interventions, despite their local success in the last few years do not contribute sufficiently to an overall regeneration outcome. A coherent vision for the future of the historic fabric, regarding its role, locally and within Cyprus as whole is lacking.
PHOTOS 23 & 24_ Nicosia Master Plan twin projects for the rehabilitation of key areas[Photo: Aga Khan Trust for Culture]
In Jerusalem, territorial governance has failed in transforming or even managing urban conflict while the UN and EU positions in conflict resolution have been ineffectual. According to Bollens [2001:183] urban policy has shaped a Jerusalem of inequality and subordination. Furthermore, he suggests that Israel partisan policy making stands as the biggest impediment to a shared and equitable peace to the holy city [2001:183]. Major development represents politically and strategically motivated planning. Equating demographic dominance with political control, Israeli planners have curtailed the growth of Palestinian neighbourhoods through the imposition of restrictions for development. Lacking a legitimate source of urban governance, the city’s Arab residents are a community being victimized, experiencing inequalities in public spending for roads, water, sewer and other urban infrastructure. Additionally, thirty four years after the fall of the Green Line of Jerusalem, the erection of a new wall marked the re-division of the city [PHOTO 15]. The Israeli government argues that the so called ‘security fence’ dividing Israel from the West Bank, was constructed in order to protect civilians from suicide bombings and other terror attacks. The ‘fence’ established a new barrier called ‘enveloping Jerusalem’ that divides the Israeli capital. This new divide, not only has undermined the peace process but has resulted in ‘the loss of approximately 14.5% of West Bank territory, formerly East of the green line, the displacement of approximately 875000 individuals and separation for thousands from relatives, jobs, schools and hospitals’ [Calame and Charlsworth, 2009:238].

In such a troubled political and social context of corruption and inequality, ambitious projects such as the Jerusalem light rail line, destined to connect Jews and Arabs are difficult to succeed. The Jerusalem light rail, from a symbol of co-existence when first opened in 2011, ‘has become a magnet for insult, riot and death’ [Booth and Eglash, 2014]. Although Jerusalem is not physically divided since 1967, it is a city functionally and psychologically divided. A socially segregated city, where Arabs and Jewish live together separately. Such examples highlight the failure of traditional models of urban planning where the conventional top down approaches and strong hierarchies may lead to partisan planning with many negative effects. In this respect joint collaborations and civil society participation, should be regarded as important correctives to the planning process ensuring transparency and communication based plans.
In post conflict situations, strategies of rebuilding and rehabilitating parts of the city, despite all the good intentions, often disregard the realities of these cities and follow conventional capitalistic principles of property and market economies that dominate the global scene [Vockler, 2010:82]. When local government cannot provide a platform for professional intervention, exposure to market forces is usually seen as the alternative driver for post war reconstruction. Private investment will ensure the non-partisan and neutral involvement of experts as development will be guided by the ‘invisible hand of the market’ rather than a political agenda. However, the examples of the divided cities of Berlin and Beirut demonstrate how market driven interventions can result in new divides around economic classes.

In 1994, the core of Beirut’s central business district, almost totally destroyed by the war, was put for sail on the international market. A red line was drawn by the Lebanese Government defining the area to be sold. The reconstruction of Beirut has focused primarily on the downtown and has been managed by a private development corporation called Solidere [PHOTO 19]. Although in terms of physical rehabilitation the new central business district is considered a successful project, the red line defining the boundaries of the area, established separating economic classes. The original assumption of both Solidere corporation and of the Lebanese government that the project would on the long term have a positive effect on the wider metropolitan area is proven false; even neighbourhoods on the edge of the Solidere developments still await decent housing and infrastructure services while the privatization of public realm resulted in the exclusion of certain populations from the center. The Beirut market driven investors’ model has been criticized as the benefits of elite investments have not reached typical Beirutis. Design professionals involved in the private project argue that they have created an economically viable downtown, however no comprehensive strategy has yet develop for addressing everyday problems beyond its red line boundaries. Ethnic boundaries have been replaced by economic ones.

Vockler[2010:82] advocates the role of International NGOs as correctives in the political regulation of post conflict situations. He defines Non-governmental organizations as civil society organizations that do not represent the state and are financially independent from state and private businesses. These organizations should not pursue commercial nor wider political interests but rather the interests of community instead. In this respect, they can act as essential contributors in political decision making and an interface between international/local politics - global market and civil society. In recent decades, non-governmental players are increasingly involved in decision making and implementation processes in post conflict situations. This is associated with the fact, that ‘the hierarchic and centralistic state, no longer comprises...
the center of politics and controls development' when it comes to planning [2010:83]. The author suggests that, synergies and cooperation amongst micro and macro scales can be best developed under a new framework of territorial governance\(^2\) where NGOs formed by scientific, technical and political expertise play an important role. 'Not only do architects and planners bring their expertise to the table', but due to their ability to mobilize the public both at an international and local level, they frequently act as both initiator and mediator in order to reach the goals and interests formulated in cooperation with local civil society organizations [2010:86, 87].

The Nicosia Mater plan case can offer some interesting insights to this discussion. Generally, all the bi-communal projects, within the NMP framework, which were placed under the umbrella of the United Nations Development Programme are financed by The United States Agency for International Development and the European Union. Projects were planned and directed by bi-communal teams that worked together and were trained by international experts. The method of moving planning issues away from top level, political to informal, technical debate has been central to the successful completion of the joint plan and allowed

However, in a study made by Hazem Abu-Orf [2007], after interviewing key members, a mixed picture seems to emerge regarding the success and subjectivity of the technical discourses during the formal and informal meetings of the team. According to those interviewed, participants were free to discuss any of their concerns about the area schemes [Hazem Abu-Orf, 2007:47]. Even so, there was a dominant strong feeling among the members of the NMP that deliberations were not, entirely free since these were based on documents previously produced. At the same time, especially in the first meetings of the early 1980s, the attempt to move any discourse away from its political context resulted in the use of a clearly technical language which was incomprehensible for all participants but the planners and architects. The technical discourse whilst recognizing the central position held by local participants in the master plan, tended to increase the consultants power. After more than thirty

\(^2\) Governance is defined as the sum of all possible options within which public and private institutions and organizations are constantly regulating their affairs in order to coordinate their interests and facilitate cooperative action [Vockler, 2010:83]
years of successful activity, the NMP needs to move ahead, embracing new urban actors in less technical and more interdisciplinary discussions. As the relationships between the two communities, even though Cyprus is still divided, have been significantly improved, civil society and professionals are mature enough to be taken into consideration as active participants in the planning process.

Accordingly, while highlighting the importance of the international NGOs experts’ involvement in the planning and design processes, the structures and mechanisms operating in conflict/post conflict situations should be critically examined. This will allow the assessment and improvement of the current practices towards truly communicative and interdisciplinary methods for the creation of shared urban imaginaries that represent the interests of local civil societies. It is an imperative to reinforce the NGOs ‘neutral’ position as a critical interface between micro and macro scale. At the same time, as the main sponsors in such context [US and EU through UNDP in the case of Nicosia], they should allow and promote the involvement of civil society as the other corrective in peace building processes.
International intervention from agencies, such as the World Bank, the World Monuments Fund and Aga Khan Trust for Culture, has guided the character and scope of physical interventions in post war Mostar. Even though many cultural buildings in Mostar’s historic core and the city’s most eminent symbol, the 16th century Stari-Most Bridge [PHOTO 18], have been restored, the city remains divided. The general refusal for cooperation by the municipal authorities on both sides of the city, resulted in an almost total reliance on foreign donations and expertise to jumpstart the process of recovery [Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:189]. A number of rehabilitation projects addressed buildings of functional value such as schools, libraries, banks and office buildings; most foreign capital however was invested into highly emblematic and monumental structures. Intervention on historic sites dominated post war rehabilitation. International professionals aspired in both repairing physical destruction while providing ‘encouragement by replacing the structures that had been most inspiring’ prior war. High profile projects, aiming in the reclamation and erasure of physical partition scars failed to deliver social benefits and were detached from long-term aspirations for social development. For example, destroyed houses along the Boulevard [former dividing line] have not been rehabilitated yet.

While the disintegration and fragmentation of Urban Communities is accelerated by the purposeful destruction of spatial symbols, their reconstruction does not guarantee peace! [Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:195]. In the case of Mostar, the assumed symbolic performance of reconstructing the old bridge did not please the entire population and in fact became a much contested architectural project [Carabelli, 2014:20]. Ignoring the reality of the difficulty of social recovery processes leads to misguided metaphors of reconstruction in favor of positive public relations gestures [Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:192, 193]. In the words of one Belfast planner, ‘the urban scar of sharp ethnic division demands a serious response that must move significantly away from the surface “Band Aid” approach characterizing much of the image based planning in the City’ [Neill, 1995:224].
When Urban Planning and design are viewed as tools of social development, a new array of professional approaches to the contested city condition emerges. To embrace these alternatives, the notion that ethnic conflict can be resolved or eliminated must be discarded. The process of creating a 'shared future' implies a shift from 'managing to transforming urban conflict around diversity and sovereignty' and towards a more pluralist and inclusive city [Gaffikin, et al. 2010:497]. A revised professional mandate might then be centered on discovering and developing mechanisms and tools for creating collective shared spaces within contested cities and for coping with the everyday challenges of urban partition. [Calame and Charlesworth, 2009:200].

A conflict resolution process is proposed. Potential participating groups/institutions, levels of operation, their corresponding activities and spatial intervention scales are taken into consideration. The theoretical framework of this work, concludes with an array of potential Rules of Engagement towards a shared Famagusta. These will be tested in the physical context of the city as the first step towards a proposal for intervention within physical and procedural public spheres for a [re]unified Famagusta.
SCHEME 17. Proposed Conflict Resolution Process

conflict resolution groups

TOP LEADERSHIP
International Politics
Global market
National
Government

MIDDLE RANGE LEADERS
Local Government
International NGOs

GRASSROOTS LEADERSHIP
Community/NGO's

conflict resolution levels

MACRO

MESO

MICRO

interface

interface
PROPOSED Conflict resolution Process

LEVELS
GROUPS
ACTIVITIES

conflict resolution activities

international/national
negotiations

Political agreements and 'peace solutions'

Planning/

Collaborative
Planning

PHYSICAL + PROCEDURAL
PUBLIC SHHERE

Implementation of design
concepts/strategies

country
region
city
neighbourhood

conflict resolution spatial scales
3. *Thirdspaces* | other real and imagined places

[Edward Soja]_ *Thirdspaces* can be virtual or real, permanent or temporary; most essentially, they adopt and alter the symbolism of a contested space.

### LEARNING FROM THEORY

**Protect and promote the Public Sphere**

**PROCEDURAL SPACE_ Planning Processes**

**ESTABLISH AN EFFECTIVE COMMUNITY SPATIAL PLANNING SYSTEM**

**COLLABORATIVE PLANNING**

- establish multi-ethnic and multi-disciplinary collaborations
- combine reconciliation and regeneration strategies
- promote public participation

**CHALLENGE traditionale sectional territorial claims**

**Reverse the negative contributions of Urban Planning and Design**

**Cooperate for shared heritage**

**CREATE A **THIRDSPACE**

**PHYSICAL SPACE_ Implementation of design concepts/strategies**

**COMBINE SHORT TERM TACTICAL PHYSICAL INTERVENTIONS AND LONG RAGE VISION**

**PILOT PROJECTS**

- share 'neutral' space
- design Flexible/Transformable Urban Forms
- create ambiguous edges between the communities

**COMMON IMAGINARIES**

Shared Spaces for a Shared Future
SUMMARY Rules of Engagement towards a shared Famagusta

LEARNING FROM PRACTICE

i. Implementation of design concepts/strategies

ii. New 'peacescapes'

iii. Collaborative Planning

iv. A shared city centre and a new identity for the city

v. Public transit as a shared space + Linking spaces across the Divide

vi. Prioritize non-elite, non-segregating projects | Enhance public realm

vii. Rebrand the antagonistic public symbols

MULTISCALAR INTERVENTIONS

viii. Restoration of common historic architectural symbols

ix. Strategic/pilot projects

x. Rehabilitation of Historic city centre
This part of the research work, concludes with nine potential design *Rules of Engagement* towards a shared Famagusta [SCHEME 19]. The selected ‘rules’ are based on general planning and design principles in the context of contested cities. These have derived from the comparative and theoretical research presented in the previous chapters and have been filtered and concluded through the Famagusta context with an ‘apply and reflect’ approach of small design excersises. These are to be implemented in the micro and meso scale for guiding the design and implementation of interventions in the physical space of Famagusta.
PROPOSED Rules of Engagement towards a shared Famagusta

- Share space
- Link spaces across the divide
- Share history
- Rebrand the antagonistic public symbols
- Strategically keep ‘safe spaces’ for each community (at least during the first years of the reunification)
- Create instant public space
03 | ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: CULTURAL CONTEXT
Introduction

The partition and actual division of the island saw the fragmentation and consolidation of the spatial planning system in Cyprus. The intercommunal conflict about territorial sovereignty has resulted in the creation of two separate institutional networks. Currently, it is questionable whether the two planning systems are able to answer to the changing spatial and social conditions in Cyprus. In the wake of a re-unified Cyprus, an opportunity is presented for reconstituting and evaluating our cities’ development and the current governmental planning processes. Planning and design processes, seen as political projects, can promote co-operation and interaction if these are to be positioned within new organizational and operational frameworks of Urban Governance.

National Urban policies

According to Lakkotrypis [2014:85] the main problem of the Cyprus planning framework is the absence of an integrated spatial development plan for the north and south parts of the island as well as for the island as a whole which has exposed cities to serious physical and functional problems. This resulted from the uncertainty around the questions of occupation and sovereignty due to the prospect of change in case of a possible solution together with the ‘refusal of cooperation, which may be
of the de facto situation’ [Lakkotrypis, 2014:85]. Generally, the lack of adequate building regulations and the absence of effective legislation on urban planning [until 1990 in the case of the RoC and until 1989 in the case of the so called TRNC], allowed rapid and poorly controlled development to take place all over the island. In combination with a high demand for investment in real estate, and the use of land for purely speculative reasons have resulted in ‘an urban layout that lacks cohesion and identity, and an environment that does not respect the local aesthetic, social, cultural, and ecological character’ [Oktay, 2002]. As the main cities are expanding, agricultural land is consumed and dependence on the automobile is increasing in order to facilitate the ‘exodus’ towards the suburbs and areas with a more competitive edge; while the expansion of the city, as observed in the major urban centers, usually leaves behind a deteriorated and disintegrated historic urban core… [PHOTOS 25&26]

The two separate institutional frameworks of urban planning, of the recognizable Cyprus Republic in the south and the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Cyprus in the north, have evolved in a different way according to the social and spatial needs of each territorial entity. However both derive from a common context: the British framework implemented during the British rule until 1960 and the framework developed after the independence of Cyprus and until 1974 before the invasion [1960–1974]. An outbreak of typhoid during the translated as an implicit acceptance of 1940s, led the British colonial government in the island to act and in 1946 the ‘Streets and Buildings Regulation Law’ was introduced. During the same period, the Department of Town Planning and Housing was created, although its role at that time was consultative. The first ‘Planning Bill’ was introduced in 1957; however it was never enacted due to the political turmoil of those times. The legislative framework took form, only after the Cyprus independence. The ‘Town and Country Planning Act’ of 1972, provided for the first time, a comprehensive planning framework for the organization of settlements through the preparation and enforcement of a three-tier hierarchy of development plans:

i. the Island Plan| refers to the national territory and the regional distribution of resources and development opportunities through a long term strategy

ii. Local Plans| which cover the main urban areas [including the urban fringes] undergoing intensive pressures of population growth and expansion and

iii. the Area Schemes| which refer to areas of a smaller scale. These are more detailed and specifically project oriented proposals following the strategic guidelines and policies of the Local, or the Island Plan [No Area Schemes have been published until today in the RoC].

With the partition of the island, the preparation of an Island Plan was no longer feasible and thus it has never been applicable until today.
The institutional framework of urban planning in Cyprus before the partition

MINISTRY OF FINANCE
Under the ‘Town and Country Planning Act’

ISLAND PLAN

MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS

DEPARTMENT OF TOWN PLANNING AND HOUSING
Responsible for the implementation of the Planning act and ensuring and monitoring conformance to standards and regulations prescribed by the planning system

District Offices
Local Planning Authorities

DELEGATING RESPONSIBILITIES TO:

PLANNING BOARD
An independent body with an advisory role. Responsible for preparing all levels of Development Plans except the Island Plan

LOCAL PLANS

AREA SCHEMES

MUNICIPALITIES
Local policy making bodies. Currently, municipalities have no real power or interaction between them

Central Budget is redistributed to the local authorities
In the south, until 1990, when the Act eventually came into force, after 18 years [!], the ‘Streets and Buildings Regulation Law’\(^4\) was the basic control instrument for development and had already shaped the present framework of urban development: a sprawling landscape that lacked identity and cohesion with large urban voids in central areas and the mixing of incompatible uses[Oktay, 2005:25]. In order to provide a general policy framework and development guidelines in areas where neither a Local plan nor an Area Scheme is in force, an additional type of development plan, the ‘Policy Statement for the Countryside’ [PSC], was introduced to the planning system in 1982. This plan is legally binding and it specifies a framework of location policies. It basically defines land use zones[!] - rural settlements and communities, areas of special or exceptional natural or environmental value and so on - thus has limitations in terms of ‘responsiveness to specific local circumstances and characteristics’ [Local Perspectives Report, MOA, 2004]. Apart from the two main laws that frame and control the spatial development in the RoC, in 2005 the ‘Assessment of Environmental Impact Act’ was enacted for harmonization with the EU directives. However since the acquis communautaire is suspended in the areas not controlled by the RoC, EU legislation is not applicable in the north.

\(^4\) According to which applies ‘the control of buildings and construction in the publicly accessible areas in terms of the position of a building on a plot and conformity to public health regulations’ [Oktay, 2005:19].

**Administration of urban policy**

The Department of Town Planning and Housing is a government Department made up of three major Sections, those of Housing, Planning and Development Control and it is responsible for the implementation of the 1972 ‘Town and Country Planning Act’. Although the department is under the Ministry of Home Affairs, the Minister of Finance is designated as the planning authority for the Island Plan. Under the Act, certain responsibilities of the Minister of Home Affairs have been delegated to the larger Municipalities, the Department of Town Planning and Housing, as well as the Planning Board, an independent body with advisory power over large areas of planning policy. The Planning Board is responsible for preparing, approving, and updating all levels of Development Plans except from the Island plan. The municipalities are the local government authorities: Mayors act as executive authorities, while Municipal Councils function as the local policy-making bodies with responsibilities including street construction, maintenance and lighting, waste collection, along with additional activities in social services, education, the arts and sports. There are nine independent Local Planning Authorities[Five currently under the RoC] the District Offices, which are responsible amongst others for granting planning permissions, ensuring and monitoring conformance to standards and regulations prescribed by the planning system. As larger municipalities have been delegated as competent Planning Authorities both
Despite the presence of a comprehensive urban policy, the RoC planning authorities do not consider the planning system to be efficient. Several problematics are observed such as lack of effective legislation for creating public spaces and for protecting natural zones [PHOTO 27] and archaeological sites and the fact that even though the position of local government in the last few years is enforced, since the income comes predominantly from the central budget, the municipalities have no real power or interaction between them.

PHOTO 27_ ‘Hands Off Akamas’ Public Protest in December 2015 against further deregulation that endangers the Natura 2000 area of Akamas Peninsula in Paphos, Cyprus.
In the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Cyprus, since 1974, no comprehensive set of housing policies has been established; however, some institutions have introduced certain measures. Today the main legislative framework consists of the ‘Streets and Buildings Regulation Law’ – which applies where there is no planning instrument and the Town Planning Department has only an advisory role – and the ‘Town and Country Planning Law’. The ‘Streets and Buildings Regulation law’, first enacted in 1946, has a major impact on the physical development in Northern Cyprus in a similar fashion to the southern part: since any type of individual housing construction is permitted with the only restriction the building plot ratios, a development sprawl has dominate the image of the landscape and especially of the coastline in major tourism cities such as Famagusta and Kyrenia. The ‘Town and Country Planning Law’ was enacted in 1989 and was design based on the RoC model and the British law dating back to the 1970s. It authorizes the Town Planning Department as responsible to control development in areas where a planning instrument is in force. Unfortunately, only 40% of the self-proclaimed ‘TRNC’ has a statutory framework where planning control is in place. Since the existing legal framework is not strong, the different types of plans of the framework [National Physical Plan, Local Development Plans, Priority Area Plan, and Subject Plans] are not legally binding documents.

Additionally, one of the main determinants of the physical layout in Northern Cyprus, is the Social Housing Law [1978], developed for the provision of adequate health and living conditions. In order to cover the housing demand of the students, low and middle-income people, thousands of social housing units have been built by the government and housing corporations in the major urban centers since the 1980s. The UN Peace Plan [Annan Plan] of 2004 has also had a major impact on the property market in the North. It has directly led to a huge investment in real estate, driven partly by domestic and partly by foreign demand and a boom in all sub-sectors of construction and especially in tourism. After the construction boom, seven ‘development ordinances’ were enacted in order to control development in protected areas. However due to continuous economic pressures for development these are not effective enough. So far, policies of conservation have not been accepted as state policy.

5. Since 2010, there has been an ongoing process for generating a Spatial Development Strategy, the ‘National Physical Plan’, for the entire territory in the north [Mesutoglu 2012:10-11]

Administration of urban policy

The Town Planning Department is under the Ministry of Housing and is the responsible Planning Authority for planning legislation and preparing all types of planning documents both at national and local level. Since there is no integrated policy with regard to the administrative and financial
framework, the department is regarded as a
group of selected government and private
partners ‘who communicate with each other’
[Oktay, 2005:18]. The government partners
are the main actors in the urban planning
process whereas the private sector partners,
usually private landowners, influence
the development process. The Council Of
Ministers has the authority to approve
the National Physical Plan while for the
approval of other types of plans a ‘Joint
Board’ is comprised out of Municipalities,
District Offices and the Planning Authority
[the Planning Authority does not have the
right to vote in this context].

Some of the main problems of the
current planning framework include: the
fragmentation of the involved authorities,
the lack of citizen participation, the lack
of adequate local and external funding for
plan and policy implementation and the
limited number of professionals some of
whom have insufficient experience [Oktay,
regional development is prioritized
where the political support is greater
and findings coming from the EU sometimes
never reach the municipalities. In this
respect, the influence and role of the local
municipalities as main local, government
authorities is in fact very weak.

Although the 1972 Town and Country Planning
Law does not clearly promote active public
participation in the planning process it
specifies how the public may influence the
decision making over Local Plans or Area
Schemes.

i. Stakeholders are involved in a
consultative process during the plan-
making stage with the main objective of
informing the Minister on public opinions
and suggestions.

ii. At a later stage, any interested
body or individual may submit objections
against any of the plan’s provisions after
this is approved by the Planning Board and
published for the ‘public’s inspection’. Objections are examined by the Ministers
and taken into consideration for the
finalization of the Development Plan.

However, in the North, the policies
and plans are imposed from the central
authorities and the public is completely
excluded from the plan making processes.

6. Still most of the external financial aid comes from
Turkey[!]
Cyprus is currently experiencing its worst crisis since 1974 Turkish invasion. The financial crisis, which unfolded in spring 2013, has radically changed life in the island; Sharp rise in unemployment and mass poverty are an everyday living nightmare especially for the younger generation. A year after, unemployment had jumped from 12.7% in September 2012 to more than 17% – the steepest increase in the EU, according to Eurostat- with youth unemployment above 40 percent.

While many people across the island are casualties of the banking collapse and thousands of small and mid-size businesses are slowly dying, a new urbanity driven by the wave of globalization is introduced along with a whole new urban way of life and of new class phenomena. The ongoing economic crisis in Cyprus has resulted in convulsive, by the government, spatial investments/developments in public land and further deregulation [PHOTO 28-31]. The Troika Memorandum itself, implemented three years ago, has created the conditions for a vicious cycle where the driver for economic recovery is based on deregulation and in neo-liberal policies⁷. The government has already implemented a series of measures such as permitting further tourist developments as well as facilitating the acquisition of a permanent residence permit in Cyprus⁸ in an attempt to provide incentives to potential investors. Vast rural and natural lands - some protected under the Natura 2000⁹ - are sold to be transformed from productive/protected to consumption spaces turning the land and cities to the developers and speculative financiers. The majority of locals are excluded from the current real estate and
house markets [which mostly comprise of luxurious exclusive developments] since in the absence of liquidity and of the once easily given, low interest loans, properties are unaffordable. In the case of the Limassol Marina [PHOTO 30] on the west coast of the island, less than 15% of the new housing projects is estimated to end up in the hands of locals. These investments might eventually lead to the phenomenon of social exclusion which can accentuate and further fragment the current governmental, urbanization processes. Instead, public land has the potential to be used very strategically as the public backbone in our cities...

7. The Cyprus’ bailout memorandum declares for example that condo hotel projects should be facilitated ‘with the aim of enhancing access to financing investment in hotel development, including the removal of any legal impediments [Q2-2013];’

8. In order to provide more incentives to potential, foreign investors, the government introduced new regulations regarding the acquisition of the Cypriot nationality and of a permanent residence permit in the country with the purchase of a house, worth of at least 300 thousand euros and with a minimum of 30 thousand euros of deposit influxes in local banks.

9. For example, in February 2014, it was decided by the Council of Ministers that the construction of a golf court [covering an area of 59 hectares] within the Natura 2000 area of Cavo Greco in Famagusta, should be allowed [Kathimerini, 26.02.2014]. In the case of the Akamas Peninsula in the western coast of Cyprus, which in 2009 was declared part of the EU-designated Natura-2000 network, decades of inaction resulted in unregulated and unlicensed economic activity in the area. In January 2016, the Council of Ministers declared as a national Park only the state properties of this vast nature area and private land has been excluded from the protected areas [SigmaLive, 24.01.2016]
CURRENT ATTEMPTS TO ADDRESS THE RECONSTRUCTION AND
RESETTLEMENT PROCESSES IN A POST CONFLICT CYPRUS

In 2004, the Reconstruction and Resettlement Council was established [decision 36/2004]. The council is the responsible body for the implementation of a Strategy for Reconstruction and Resettlement in the areas that will be returned under the Greek Cypriot authority when a political agreement is achieved. This first government initiative by the RoC, took place at a time when hopes for the reunification of the island were high as the UN Peace plan of 2004 was ready to be put for vote.

The strategy aims in:

i. The rehabilitation of areas that will be retuned under the Greek Cypriot administration

ii. The resettlement of Greek Cypriot displaced people and their socioeconomic mobilization within the new spatial framework of a federal Cyprus

iii. Exploring different future scenarios and provisions for the different phasing, the actions need to be taken and the responsible actors; Timelines have to be prepared and funding sources to be found.

iv. Offering provisions for the protection of the environment

v. Informing communities and the public for aspects of the strategy while promoting public participation for its formulation

Reconstruction and Resettlement Council

The suburb of Varosha in Famagusta, is one of the areas of concern which have been most extensively studied by the council. According to one of the members of the council [Interview conducted in March 2016] two preliminary Urban Studies of the area, including the investigation over possible funding sources, over possible incentives for the rehabilitation of war destroyed buildings and an action plan for entering Varosha the day after a political agreement is reached, were completed three years ago; Since 2012 the team has not produced any new material and the proposals and studies completed strictly cover only the area of Varosha. According to the interviewee the state is indifferent to the topic, when in order for the council to progress ‘the state has to ‘spend’ for the completion of a comprehensive study’. Even though the council argues for the active involvement of Famagustians from both communities, besides informative events and some publications there has not been any other attempt for public engagement while the process has a strong hierarchical structure. The Council is not a bi- communal initiative and for the preparation and consultation of the strategy so far there was no involvement from the Turkish Cypriot side.
RECOMMENDATIONS

According to what has been discussed, in planning processes and design practices in post-conflict Famagusta, attention needs to be drawn

_in designing ‘peacescapes’ for communication and collaboration to take place

_in finding ways of conducting discussion and shifting decisional power as close as possible to those who will experience, and ‘live with’ the consequences of strategic choices

_in fostering styles of discussion which allow the different points of view of diverse stakeholders to be opened up and explored

_in ensuring the transparency of the negotiation processes

_in designing institutional mechanisms of urban governance rooted in the principle of subsidiarity

_in safeguarding an equal status between the ethnic communities as this is translated in physical space and the social and political structures of society

_in building community capacity where the ‘space experts’ should have a central role as brokers and ‘space educators’

_in providing measures for the protection of the environment

_in providing incentives for public participation in city making processes and economic incentives for DIY projects-revonnations, restorations etc

_implementation must be factored into the planning process. Major proposals must be accompanied with delivery agreements or delivery packages
In the last two years autonomously developed organisational forms that are characterized by local initiatives have arise and their action has been very significant in creating awareness over Famagusta and in building bridges across the divide between Famagustians from both communities. According to one of the members of the ‘Famagusta our Town Initiative’ [interview conducted in April 2016], even though the community’s work has been a great asset towards peace, unfortunately what is observed, especially now that Famagusta and more specifically Varosha has sparked the increasing international interest, is that they are not taken into consideration as active agents for envisioning a post conflict Famagusta.
The project proposes that new institutional mechanisms of urban governance rooted in the principle of subsidiarity and equality have to be design in order foster bicomunal collaborations and to shift decisional power as close as possible to those who will experience, and ‘live with’ the consequences of strategic choices. An independent entrepreneurial public body called [re]imagining Famagusta, would provide the main platform where debates about the city can be initiated, take place and be sustained between governmental, private and independent partners. As discussed, the ‘space experts’ will have a central role in facilitating the building of community capacity amongst the participants. It is also proposed that their work as ‘space educators’ should be complemented by public platforms, such as interactive websites, Facebook groups, informative events which will have an informative and educative character.

IMAGE 1_ A poster produced by the ‘Famagusta our Town Initiative’ one of the most active and popular bi-communal initiatives in Famagusta. It is comprised of more than 12000 members, local Famagustians and people who support their effort for the opening of the city to both communities. The initiative not only has an official website but it is also active in Facebook were its members can easily get informed over bi-communal events and celebrations organized by the team: http://www.amnoxwstos.com/en/
**ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK: HISTORICAL REVIEW**

**SPATIAL CONDITIONS**

Famagusta | Cyprus

**Antagonisms** | Turkey Vs Cyprus, Greek Cypriots Vs Turkish Cypriots

**Names** | Varosha Ghost town, Varosha closed city

**Duration** | 1974-

**Form Of contested space** | Partitioned/Occupied

Partitioned until today
MAP 4_ Famagusta [by the author]
1600 BC - 965 AD

1192 - 1489

BYZANTINE PERIOD_ 965 - 1192
After the destruction of Salamis by earthquakes and the Arab raids, the inhabitants gradually moved to the village of Arsinoe. It was later referred to as Ammokhostos in Greek, Famagusta in English and Magusa in Turkish

 Arsinoe_ Founded: 285-247 BC

 LUSIGNAN PERIOD_ 1192 - 1489

 Enkomi_ Salamis_ Ammokhostos_
Historical Review

VENETIAN PERIOD_ 1489-1571

With the surrender of Famagusta to the Turkish forces, only Turks were allowed to reside within the walled city. Consequently the Cypriot inhabitants established a new settlement south of the old city called Varosha. The Ottoman rule, marked the decline of this once prosperous city. The harbour as a consequence was left to decline and Larnaca took over as the principal port of the island.

DEFENSIVE ARCHITECTURE CHARACTERIZED MEDIEVAL FAMAGUSTA

VENETIAN PERIOD_ 1489-1571

 OTTOMAN PERIOD_ 1571-1878

OTMOMAN PERIOD_ 1571-1878

With the surrender of Famagusta to the Turkish forces, only Turks were allowed to reside within the walled city. Consequently the Cypriot inhabitants established a new settlement south of the old city called Varosha. The Ottoman rule, marked the decline of this once prosperous city. The harbour as a consequence was left to decline and Larnaca took over as the principal port of the island.
During this Period, the port of Famagusta was expanded and gained importance as a port. Expansion of the city outside the Walls towards the south, which started during the Ottoman period, was accelerated since the major economic activities were concentrated there. The Intention was to create a new city centre which would include mainly administrative and additional commercial activities.

As the area of Varosha was flourishing, the areas outside the Walls in the south-west, west and north-west of the Walled City where the Turkish Cypriots mainly lived, were neglected and fell behind in status. The City became an important centre for Trade and Tourism and it was particularly known for its citrus groves which had an important role in the economy of the City.
As the area of Varosha was flourishing, the Walled City and the areas outside the Walls, in the south-west, west and north-west of the Walled City where the Turkish Cypriots mainly lived, were neglected and fell behind in status. The City became an important centre for Trade and Tourism and it was particularly known for its citrus groves which had an important role in the economy of the City.

After Famagusta’s southern suburb, Varosha, was fenced off as a no-go area by the Turkish military Forces, the city was degraded to a simple regional center. However, during the Mid-1980s, the presence of the Eastern Mediterranean University, initiated new dynamics of growth and development towards the North. The walled city was left to decline along with the Ghost Town of Varosha.
Prior 1974: The walled city was considered the centre of the T/C part of the city while Varosha new downtown the centre of the G/C part of the city.

Currently: The walled city is now a week urban centre and Salamina Street and EMU Campus the new city core.
Past and [potential] Future Centralities

What would be the impact of the [re]unification of Famagusta on the centralities and future development of the city? After Famagusta’s southern suburb [Varosha] was fenced off as a no go area and fell under the control of the Turkish Forces, the centrality of the city was undermined. The once new down town and growth pole of Famagusta was turned it into a ‘boundary’ town an edge of isolation and division. Whereas from the mid-1950s to 1974, new developments were beginning to cluster on the southern part of the city ‘from 1974 the direction of the Turkish Cypriot development turned 180°’ [Hocknell, 1999:324]. During the Mid-1980s, the presence of the Eastern Mediterranean University [currently the largest and most popular university on the North] initiated new dynamics of growth and development towards the north. Areas adjacent to Varosha’s fence failed to attract investment, particularly given the current territorial status and military presence as well as due to the psychological factor, which is associated with ‘border’ areas. As seen in case studies such as Berlin, after the [re]unification, three different city centres existed within the city: a neutral[shared] one and two ethnic within each community’s enclave. Spatial segregation persisted even though the physical boundaries were removed.
In 1960, the administration of the city was separated into two municipalities, the Turkish one being dominant in the Walled City and the Greek one in all other districts.

TWO MUNICIPALITIES [PRIOR 1974]

In 1960, the administration of the city was separated into two municipalities, the Turkish one being dominant in the Walled City and the Greek one in all other districts.

Mapping the Divides

TERRITORIAL PERCEPTIONS OF THE CITY TODAY

PHOTO 32_ Walled City [photo: by the author] Turkish Cypriot perception_ WALLED CITY & NEWLY DEVELOPED AREAS [EMU CAMPUS] = FAMAGUSTA

PHOTO 33_ Varosha waterfront [photo: by the author] Greek Cypriot perception_ VAROSHA = FAMAGUSTA

SCHEMES 27&28_ Famagusta T/C and G/C territorial perceptions [schemes: by the author]
area to be returned under the Greek Cypriot administration
Mapping the Divides

PROPOSED PLANS FOR THE ‘RE-PARTITION’ OF FAMAGUSTA IN TIME


**Introduction**

Starting by understanding the links between territory and identity and its significance in divided cities, the project attempts to address both community cohesion and social inclusion problems and to knit urban regeneration and intercommunal reconciliation strategies. The main proposition is that in order to attain an inclusive, diverse and cohesive Famagusta the nine rules of engagement [SCHEME 19] are to be used as the foundation for formulating proactive strategies that counter ethnic engineering.

A long term project that combines regeneration and reconciliation goals, aims in redefining the coast as a unifying public spine that will bind together the fragmented Famagusta. Short-term interventions such as activating temporal 'peacescapes' through a series of events more explicitly address the social reconciliation processes.
141.

Share spaces across the divide

Create a third space

Rebrand the antagonistic public symbols

Strategically keep 'safe spaces' for each community [at least during the first years of the reunification]

Create instant public space

Be sensitive to differences across sectarian geographies

Design across scales

Break frontiers

Share space collaboratively work across the divide
Shifting conceptions of Famagusta as an inherently divided city will require a collaborative approach with new planning and design principles. In order to understand how deeply divided is the city and find potential spaces where peace can take place twelve spatial enclaves are identified and analyzed in the ‘Atlas of the Fragments of Famagusta’ [Stratis, 2016]. This work builds on the theoretical framework and categorizes each space into ‘ethnoscapes’, potential neutral spaces and ‘peacescapes’—shared and cosmopolitan spaces [Bjorkdahl, 2013; Gaffikin, et al., 2010, 2011, 2016] [MAP 5]. Each enclave’s degree of ‘ethnicity’ is indicated based on empirical evidence\(^\text{10}\) in order to conclude with the potential for spatial transformation. The project proposes a sensitive approach to differences across sectarian geographies where safe territorial enclaves coexist with, and contain spaces where communication, collaboration and interaction take place between the warring communities.

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\(^{10}\) Collected through historical investigation and observations from site fieldwork.
Spatial typologies relevant for contested cities as these are defined by Gaffikin and Morissay [2011] and Bjorkdahl [2014]:

**ETHNOSCAPES** spaces of distinctive and closed identity

**NEUTRAL SPACES** safe space, open to both main traditions for employment, shopping, leisure, and residence

**PEACESCAPES** open spaces of greater pluralism of identities and belongings that emerge from collaborations across the divide:

i. **shared space** | space that facilitates not just contact but also engagement across the divide, for example integrated schools and Universities, to become arenas for deliberated dialogue on difference

ii. **cosmopolitan space** | space that is international in character and has no specific reference in terms of the local division, establishing ‘new spaces’ and redefining ‘old spaces, for example, concerts, markets etc
ethnoscapes and peacescapes in Famagusta_PROPOSAL

MAP 5_[by the author]
1. Archaeological sites
Ancient Engomi and Salamis

2. The Delta
1. **BOUNDARIES:** PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES _fence_
   CONTROLLED ACCESS

2. **BOUNDARIES:** PHYSICAL URBANIZATION [south],
   THE RIVER COURSE [north], THE SEA [east] PUBLIC ACCESS
A NEUTRAL SPACE _ OPEN TO BOTH COMMUNITIES AS A SPACE OF A COMMON CYPRIOT HERITAGE _ TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO A NETWORK OF HERITAGE PARKS, PART OF A THICK PUBLIC WATERFRONT PROJECT

A NEUTRAL SPACE _ OPEN TO BOTH COMMUNITIES TO BE REDEFINED AS AN ECOLOGICAL AND PRODUCTIVE ENCLAVE AND ONE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A THICK PUBLIC WATERFRONT THAT CONNECTS THE NORTH AND SOUTH PARTS OF THE CITY
3. The EMU (Eastern Mediterranean University) Campus

4. Neapolis Lake and Turkish (east) and UN (west) military camps
**A SHARED SPACE**_ TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO AN INTEGRATED UNIVERSITY FACILITATING CONTACT AND ENGAGEMENT ACROSS THE DIVIDE

**A NEUTRAL SPACE**_ NEAPOLIS LAKE AND THE TURKISH MILITARY CAMP TOGETHER WITH THE DELTA TO BE TRANSFORMED INTO A PRODUCTIVE URBAN DELTA PARK AND TO BECOME ONE OF THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF A THICK PUBLIC WATERFRONT THAT CONNECTS THE NORTH AND SOUTH PARTS OF THE CITY_
5. The new City expansion

6. Limni Lake area
In the past and until 1958, Ayios Loukas neighbourhood was one of the mixed neighbourhoods where people from the two communities lived in peace.
Beyond the Divisions

CURRENT AND/OR PAST DEGREE OF ETHNIFICATION OF SPACES IN FAMAGUSTA

PROGRAMME [PROPOSED]

POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION OF SPACE AFTER REUNIFICATION

AYIOS LOUKAS NEIGHBOURHOOD TO BE TESTED AS A PILOT PROJECT OF LIVING TOGETHER AS ORIGINALLY IT WAS ONE OF THE MIXED NEIGHBOURHOODS IN FAMAGUSTA, A SHARED SPACE.

AN ETHNIC SPACE, THIS AREA CONSTITUTES A SAFE TERRITORY FOR THE TURKISH CYPRIOITS AS IT WAS DEVELOPED AFTER 1974. IN THE FIRST FEW YEARS AFTER THE REUNIFICATION IT SHOULD BE KEPT THIS WAY IN ORDER TO AVOID FEAR AND ANXIETY BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. HOWEVER, SEVERAL SMALL SCALE PEACESCAPES [COSMOPOLITAN SPACES THROUGH TEMPORAL EVENTS] HAVE TO BE CREATED IN SELECTED AREAS SO AS TO AVOID THE CONSOLIDATION OF AN ETHNIC ENCLAVE.

A NEUTRAL SPACE, TO BE ESTABLISHED AS AN INTERNATIONALLY VALUABLE NATURE AREA WITHIN THE CITY FABRIC, EMBRACED AND EXPERIENCED BY LOCALS AND VISITORS. CURRENTLY IT IS CONSIDERED A POTENTIAL NATURA 2000 AREA DUE TO ITS SPECIAL CHARACTER.
7. Central Administrative Area

8. The Walled City
7. **BOUNDARIES:** NO PHYSICAL BOUNDARIES

Zoning, administrative area| PUBLIC ACCESS

In the past and until 1974, the administrative centre used to be one of the 'neutral' spaces within the city where people from the two communities were working together.

8. **BOUNDARIES:** PHYSICAL Medieval City Walls| PUBLIC ACCESS

After the Ottoman rule and until 1958, the walled city was one of the mixed neighbourhoods within Famagusta, where people from the two communities lived in peace.
Beyond the Divisions

PROGRAMME [PROPOSED]

POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION OF SPACE AFTER REUNIFICATION

A NEUTRAL SPACE - OPEN TO BOTH COMMUNITIES AS A COMMON CITY ADMINISTRATIVE CENTRE WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT

A SHARED SPACE - OPEN TO BOTH COMMUNITIES AS THE MAIN 'INCUBATOR OF PEACE' - THE SPACE WHERE THE LOCAL INITIATIVES ARE HOSTED AND CHANCE ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE TWO COMMUNITIES MOST OFTEN TAKE PLACE

In the past and until 1974, the administrative centre used to be one of the 'neutral' spaces within the city where people from the two communities were working together.

After the Ottoman rule and until 1958, the walled city was one of the mixed neighbourhoods within Famagusta, where people from the two communities lived in peace.

CURRENT AND/OR PAST DEGREE OF ETHNIFICATION OF SPACES IN FAMAGUSTA...
9. Varosha Ghost Town

10. The Port
In the past and until 1974, the port used to be one of the 'neutral' spaces within the city where people from the two communities were working together.
Beyond the Divisions

PROGRAMME [PROPOSED]

POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION OF SPACE AFTER REUNIFICATION

VAROSHA COASTLINE TO BE REDEFINED AS A COSMOPOLITAN SPACE, A LOCAL AND A TRABSLOCAL ATTRACTOR THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE ECONOMIC AND LIVING QUALITY OF THE CITY

AN ETHIC SPACE, THIS AREA HISTORICALLY CONSTITUTES A SAFE TERRITORY FOR THE GREEK CYPRIOTS AS IT IS CONSIDERED AN ORIGINAL GREEK CYPRIOT SUBURB. IN THE FIRST FEW YEARS AFTER THE REUNIFICATION IT SHOULD BE KEPT THIS WAY IN ORDER TO AVOID FEAR AND ANXIETY BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES. HOWEVER, SEVERAL SMALL SCALE PEACESCAPES [COSMOPOLITAN SPACES THROUGH TEMPORAL EVENTS] HAVE TO BE CREATED IN SELECTED AREAS SO AS TO AVOID THE CONSOLIDATION OF AN ETHNIC ENCLAVE

A NEUTRAL SPACE, OPEN TO BOTH COMMUNITIES AS A SEASIDE LEISURE AND LOCAL TRADE CENTRE WITH EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES FOR EMPLOYMENT, TO BE DOWNGRADED.
11. Kato Varosha and Agricultural Hinterland

12. The Buffer Zone
11. **BOUNDARIES: No Physical Boundaries**
   Historically a very fertile area
   Agricultural production | PUBLIC ACCESS

12. **BOUNDARIES: Physical**
   Military-UN peacekeeping forces | RESTRICTED ACCESS

CURRENT AND/OR PAST DEGREE OF ETHNIFICATION OF SPACES IN FAMAGUSTA
POTENTIAL FOR TRANSFORMATION OF SPACE AFTER REUNIFICATION


A NEUTRAL SPACE THE BUFFER ZONE IS A NO MAN’S LAND UNTouched BY ANY HUMAN INTERVENTION FOR THE LAST 42 YEARS. IT HAS THE POTENTIAL TO BE REDEFINED AS AN INTERNATIONALLY VALUABLE NATURE AREA EMBRACED AND EXPERIENCED BY LOCALS AND VISITORS. IT CAN ALSO BE USED AS A LABORATORY FOR RESEARCH DUE TO ITS RICH BIODIVERSITY.
Beyond the Divisions

THREE KEY PROJECTS

Based on the information collected from the *Atlas*, a long term project, the *Thick Public Coastline*, is proposed for the whole of Famagusta as the unifying structure between the different fragments of the city. The project envisions the kilometre long coastline as the public backbone of a shared city and combines reunification and reconciliation strategies.

Two short term projects which more explicitly address the inter-communal reconciliation processes are also proposed: the *[RE]unification Celebration* and the *Social Encounter* project by creating what I refer to as ‘instant public space’ through temporal events in strategic spaces across Famagusta.

These three projects are to be implemented in different time spans and address different scales and purpose of intervention. The proposal thus refers to a *process towards peace.*
_view of the Famagusta 'Thick Public Coastline' [imaginary: by the author]
[RE]UNIFICATION CELEBRATION

The project proposes that the day after a political agreement is reached, the [RE] unification of the island and of Famagusta in particular will be jointly celebrated in a grand festivity within the city. The celebration will be organized by the two municipalities and the local initiatives. Events will take place in key points within the city and everyone is invited!
The ‘red bus’ will be running through the city during the night of the celebration with regular stops at the venues free of charge. The buses will also be used for transportation from Nicosia & Larnaca to Famagusta and vise versa.
Dear fellow citizen, you are invited in the celebration of the [RE]unification of Famagusta. Join us for a bi-communal celebration of peace and together to mark the beginning of a new start in a [RE]unified Cyprus.

Bi-communal events start at 18:00 and will take place in different spaces all over the city:

i. Pop Concert  21:00 | EMU CAMPUS SPORTS CENTRE

ii. Deryneia check point  18:00 | MUSIC FESTIVAL [area available for camping]

iii. Varosha waterfront  22:00 | BEACH PARTY

iv. Salamis Avenue  19:00 | Joint Dinner

A public bus will run through the city during the celebration with regular stops at the venues.

Entrance is free.
The first stop will be in Salamis Avenue. A joint dinner between people from the two communities will take place at 19:00 along the street’s length [!] and car circulation will be forbidden during the celebration time.
CURRENT SITUATION

SALAMIS AVENUE

[RE] unification DINNER

Current situation
Space during the celebration
The highlight of the celebration night will be at 22:00 at Varosha waterfront where a [re]unification beach party will take place. Temporal pavilions will be set up on the beach to sell drinks and food during the festivity.
VAROSHA WATERFRONT
[RE] unification PARTY
Space during the celebration/Bus stop
While it is acknowledged that safe spaces for the two communities have to be kept at least in the first years of the [re]unification, this implies the potential for polarization within space. Thus decisive steps have to be taken not only to prevent it but on the long-term to ‘open’ up these spaces to both communities. As mentioned, it is an imperative that each of the spatial entities identified has to acquire ‘temporal peacescapes’ that will allow the avoidance of [re]partioning/ [re]segregating the city into Greek and Turkish Cypriot enclaves.

The concept of ‘instant public space’ is introduced. The idea is that shared temporal events that take place within different parts of the city in different times activate potential peacescapes.

Twelve such spaces have been mapped, based on a historical investigation about shared events that used to take place in specific areas within the city and of course some new activities and spaces are proposed. A calendar with the potential activities and spaces is illustrated as a sample of how the idea could be implemented.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
<th>OLD PHOTOS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>i. bi communal beach volley tournament</td>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ii. international students spring festival</td>
<td>MAY</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iii. EMU celebrations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iv. fresh Vegetable market</td>
<td>WEDNESDAYS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>v. bi communal urban agriculture day</td>
<td>SATURDAYS</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>iv. fresh food market</td>
<td>SATURDAYS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>v. holy spirit Celebration Festival</td>
<td>JUNE</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Famagusta prior 1974 was known for its citrus cultivations. Every March the whole city would celebrate the ‘Orange Festival’ with parades and events in Varosha. In the last couple of years the bi-communal initiatives of the city have revived the festivity along the coastline of Famagusta. The proposal suggests the continuation of this joint celebration as an occasion for interaction and contact between the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots.
The Orange Festival, prior 1974 [Photo: Famagusta our Town Initiative]
A new event is proposed based on the tradition of Famagusta as a city where agriculture used to thrive and co-exist together with the everyday urban life. Every Saturday, the 'Urban Agriculture Day' will take place in Kato Varosha, traditionally the very fertile, rural area of the city. Selected greenhouses, fields and public buildings will be open to public
urban AGRICULTURE day
THICK PUBLIC COASTLINE

Re-reading Famagusta as an archipelago of different spatial entities is the starting point for formulating a long term strategy for a post conflict era. A Thick Public Coastline that is proposed as the backbone that binds together the different parts of the city. This unifying structure includes a public transit line, a promenade, horizontal connections towards the sea—what I refer to as ‘stitches’— and a strip of land along the coast.

The public transit line that will run through the city and connect locally and glocally Famagusta to other areas is considered as the first step towards a public network of ‘peacescapes’ and the improvement of the quality of life and space within the city. It is important to say that currently there is no efficient public transit network in the area despite the presence of the Eastern Mediterranean University. Life in Famagusta is highly car dependent even by students and elderly. First a bus line will be introduce and in subsequent years it will be upgraded into a tram line. Famagusta in this sense has been traditionally an innovative city since in 1905 it became the first city to acquire a railway and be connected to the capital Nicosia [for passengers and goods]. However after 46 years of operation it was dismantled in 1952 due to the competition by road transport. Subsequently, a part of the new road between Nicosia and Famagusta replaced the railway.
i. UNIFYING[PUBLIC] NETWORK

ii. PUBLIC[PROGRAMME] COASTLINE

iii. THE FRAGMENTS

iv. MOBILITY NETWORK AND CITY BOUNDARIES

_scheme: by the author}
the last train is greeted on its arrival in Famagusta on 31st of December 1951 [Photo: Public Information Office]
In the glocal context a regional public transit line will connect Famagusta to the capital Nicosia, the city of Larnaka, where the international airport is located, and the wider region of Famagusta which is well known for its natural beauties and its flourishing tourism industry.
Ali and Nicholas are both from Nicosia. However, Ali is Turkish Cypriot and Nicholas is Greek Cypriot. They met in 2014 at The Hague in a Dutch initiative called the Youth Peace Initiative. Ali was the first Turkish Cypriot Nicholas had met until that time. Ali is currently studying at the Eastern Mediterranean University in Famagusta[EMU] while the family of Nicholas originally comes from Famagusta. Both consider Famagusta their ‘home’ either this sense of belonging derives from physically experiencing the city, as in the case of Ali, or from stories of a place that Nicholas never had the opportunity to experience. They both share the dream of peace and reunification in Cyprus and since then they have become great friends often visiting each other on either side of the divide.
In the local context, introducing a public transit network is a key intervention that will contribute both in the efforts for urban regeneration and social reconciliation in Famagusta. The public transit will physically connect the different areas of the city while creating a network of well connected shared public spaces. Thus on the long term will contribute both in improving the quality of life and of space in Famagusta and in facilitating the access in the proposed shared public spaces.

At the same time the public transit as space, illustrates the idea that public realm is any medium, occasion or event that prompts contact between strangers: A public bus for example is by definition a space for chance encounters amongst different people, either these are the Turkish or the Greek Cypriots, the elderly and the youngsters, the locals and the international students who all share space in order to commute. In this sense, it is considered a temporal peacescape that it is activated when in use.
For the public transit network a phased development is considered. First, a temporal bus line will run through the city during the reunification celebration. Right after the reunification of the city, following the same routes, permanent Bus lines will be introduced. In subsequent years as investment will be stimulated, these will be upgraded to public transit of higher technology. This evolution will imply the gradual construction of the necessary infrastructure, a subsequent increase in pedestrian and cyclist movements and eventually the reduction of car use.
A THICK PUBLIC COASTLINE

Since the late 1960s what should be considered as the most public space of the city, its coastline, has been either privatized or fence off by the Turkish military forces. The project attempts to redefine the spaces and the programme along the coast and open up this area to the public.
In order to achieve the proposed strategy, which includes both longterm and short-term design proposals, it is proposed that transformation has to start from three key sites:

i. the Varosha historic core and coastline

ii. New city Centre and the Marshlands

iii. the Port and the Walled City area the

An imaginary for a shared Famagusta is constructed using these three sites as demonstration areas. At the same time, how the three projects work together in synergy is illustrated: how regeneration strategies are combined with intercommunal reconciliation strategies and how short-term projects complement and stimulate longterm regeneration projects and investment.
THICK PUBLIC COASTLINE
DEMOnSTRATION AREAS
a network of *ethnoscapes* and *peacescapes* linking the fragments

*ethnoscapes* and *peacescapes* in Famagusta_PROPOSAL

[map: by the author]
After a thorough analysis of the city prior and after the Turkish invasion of 1974, the project suggests that three main centralities will emerge after the reunification of the city: in the Varosha suburb [originally a Greek Cypriot enclave—currently a fenced area by the Turkish military] in the walled city [originally an ethnically mixed area and later a Turkish Cypriot enclave—currently in decline] and along Salamis Avenue, the new city centre since after 1974.

The project proposes a sensitive approach across sectarian geographies where the two potential main ethnic enclaves of the city, Varosha [south] and the area along Salamis Avenue [north] do not lose their ethnic character, at least during the first years of the reunification. The idea is to strategically keep safe spaces for each community and to gradually open these to a greater pluralism of identities and belongings through the temporal appropriation of key public spaces by people from both communities [Social Encounter Project]. At the same time, the walled city is reimagined as a peace incubator, a shared place where contact and engagement across the divide is achieved. The walled city is a shared historic symbol of the city embraced by both communities and a space where Turkish and Greek Cypriots used to leave together in peace.

To achieve these objectives, strategic Projects [public transit line, etc] and a long term regeneration process are proposed in synergy to what I refer to as: the Social Encounter project.
From *Ethnoscapes* to *Peacescapes*

Historically, Greek-Cypriot enclaves and Turkish-Cypriot enclaves were separated by a buffer zone. The proposal involves creating neutral, shared, ethnic, and cosmopolitan spaces to introduce temporal peacescapes:

- **Social Encounter Project**

The diagram illustrates the proposed changes in the city center, varosha/old city centre, walled city, and new city centre.
Transforming Ethnoscapes into Peacescapes and ‘opening’ these safe territorial enclaves to a greater pluralism of identities and belongings.
DEMONSTRATION AREA I: VAROSHA HISTORIC CORE–VAROSHA COASTLINE

current situation
Beyond the Divisions

- Areas to be renaturalized
- Commercial centre regeneration
- Introduce sports and culture areas
- Pedestrianize area and introduce mixed uses
- Port area regeneration
- Tourism area regeneration

Conceptual scheme

Concept

Temporal events/peacescapes

Location: STIMULATING INVESTMENT
new spaces/ buildings

existing spaces/ buildings to be restored

important buildings to be kept
iii. Desnify ‘UNbuilt’ along Democratias Street: propose its transformation into a pedestrian commercial axis connecting coast and the centre of old Varosha [historically the first connection between the settlement and the sea] - Inside the ghost town of Varosha, as referred to by locals, many buildings have been taken over by nature while others are ramshackle. The proposal suggests reusing the existing wild nature as an asset to the overall quality of the space while acknowledging the need to restore when possible buildings of architectural and cultural importance [vernacular and modernism architecture] - DIY and Joint restoration/renovation projects.

ii Densify ‘built’ along Deryneia street. The main public transit line will pass through the street and on the longterm stimulate development and investment.

iii. establish a permanent peacescape where events can take place and restore the municipal library and stadium so as to be shared by both communities.

iv. add and/or extend public space along Varosha coast with floating platforms and interventions on buildings.

v. position the Tourism Businesses Faculty of the Eastern Mediterranean University in the area.
Many of the buildings along the coastline are of great architectural significance for Cyprus as these are were some of the most successful modernism examples from the 1960s that still survive. However since these occupy most of the beach, light ephemeral structures are proposed to be attached on them to increase the available public space.
[+] ADDING PUBLIC SPACE
STIMULATE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND DIY PROJECTS

Implement Intercommunal reconciliation strategies: INTRODUCE TEMPORAL EVENTS

Implement Urban Regeneration strategies: LONGTERM design PROJECTS
Space during Farmers' Market event
Beyond the Divisions

DENSIFYING GREEN OPEN SPACE

Final Imaginary
DEMONSTRATION AREA II: NEW CITY CENTRE–MARSHLANDS–COAST

current situation

- military camps

222.
Beyond the Divisions

Densify built new spaces/buildings areas to be renaturalized commercial centre regeneration introduce sports and culture areas pedestrianize area and introduce mixed uses port area regeneration tourism area regeneration

Pedestrianized street

Cosmopolitan spaces

Shared spaces

Public transit lines

Areas to be renaturalized
Commercial centre regeneration
Introduce sports and culture areas
Pedestrianize area and introduce mixed uses
Port area regeneration
Tourism area regeneration

Concept

Temporal events/peacescapes

Location: STIMULATING INVESTMENT

Conceptual scheme

Beyond the Divisions
new spaces/buildings

existing spaces/buildings to be restored

important buildings to be kept

[re]naturalize  add city parks  DIY restoration projects  new buildings/built spaces  densify built
DEMONSTRATION AREA II: NEW CITY CENTRE—MARSHLANDS—COAST

i. Densify ‘built’ along Salamis Avenue. The main public transit line will pass through the street and on the longterm stimulate development and investment. To do so, use or REuse efficiently spaces along Salamis avenue that have been already urbanized: Transform the urban voids by introducing new city parks and/or buildings.

ii. REuse some of the facilities of the former Turkish military camp and introduce a camping site with sports facilities.

iii. Invest in improving the facilities of the local community centre—Magem Community Centre

iv. RE naturalize the area of Neapolis lake and the marshlands of Karaolos area. Introduce an environmental centre and nature observatories within this area.

v. Transform the former UN military camp into a collective community garden.

vi. Propose a pedestrian commercial axis connecting coast and the new city centre along Salamis Avenue. Add commercial and leisure uses.
current situation
Implement Intercommunal reconciliation strategies: INTRODUCE PUBLIC TRANSIT LINES AND TEMPORAL EVENTS

STIMULATE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND DIY PROJECTS

Implement Urban Regeneration strategies: LONGTERM design PROJECTS
Space during the 'City Marathon' event
TRANSFORM AND/OR FILL URBAN VOIDS

Final Imaginary
DEMONSTRATION AREA III: PORT-WALLED CITY

current situation
Beyond the Divisions

**conceptual scheme**

- Renaturalize areas to be densified.
- New spaces/buildings.
- Commercial center regeneration.
- Pedestrianized area and introduction of mixed uses.
- Port area regeneration.
- Military camps.
- Tourism area regeneration.

**temporal events/peaceescapes**

- Pedestrianized street.
- Restored spaces/buildings.
- Add commercial and/or leisure uses.
- Densify built areas.
- New buildings/built spaces.
- Joint restoration projects.
- DIY restoration projects.
- Add city parks.
- Public transit lines.

**location:** Stimulating Investment
new spaces/buildings

existing spaces/buildings to be restored

important buildings to be kept

[re]naturalize  add city parks  DIY restoration projects  joint restoration projects
iii. consolidate the port and keep its current size and businesses in order to restore the historic relationship between the sea and the walled city and preserve the spatial and environmental qualities of the area. A leisure marina will coexist together with the new port.

ii. a public transit station is proposed outside the walls so as to create a new polarity and dynamics in the area. On the longterm such a strategic project will stimulate development and new investments in the areas right outside the city walls.

iii. new fragments of public beach space are re-introduced along the coast.

iv. a pilot project of mixed housing [Turkish and Greek Cypriots] to be tested within the city walls. The regeneration of the old city which is currently in decline to be initiated by DIY and Joint restoration/renovation projects.

v. along the main axis that connects city and sea to house some of the local initiatives. Local NGOs such as MAGEM and Famagusta walled city initiative [Mağusa Suriçi Derneği] are already housed there.

vi. a naval museum and a promenade are proposed along the coast as new landmarks and cosmopolitan attractors for the area.
RESTORING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE WALLED CITY AND THE SEA
ANNEX

PORTS FACILITIES
NATURE OBSERVATORIES
NATURE PATHS
LANDMARK
EDUCATIONAL BUILDINGS
NATIONAL TRANSIT LINE
BEACH
ENVIRONMENTAL CENTRE
HOTELS
CITY PARKS/PLAYGROUNDS
RESIDENTIAL AREA
REGIONAL TRANSIT LINE
Design Code

i. Provide incentives for DIY and Joint restoration/renovation projects.

ii. Provide an alternative to the current sprawling development trends that have resulted in the fragmentation of the city of Famagusta and to the absence of a centre. Consolidate urban development by filling and transforming urban voids around the city and especially along Salamis Avenue.

iii. The seafront has to be kept open to the public and only investments that will benefit the city and its natural environment are to be considered appropriate.

iv. Evaluate and Renaturalize areas of environmental importance and protect them from harmful developments.

v. Respect the different qualities of space—architectural, historical, cultural and environmental[see *The Atlas of the Fragments of Famagusta* pp. ] New developments should follow the existing space patterns: For example: new developments in Varosha historic core should not exceed the maximum height currently found in existing buildings of the area.

vi. Evaluate the role of the port for the future of the city and its relationship to the walled city.

vii. Redefine the relationship between the walled city and the rest of Famagusta. Use it as a valuable asset to stimulate investment in the city.

Urban regeneration strategies

- Commercial Centre regeneration
- Tourism area regeneration
- pedestrianize area and introduce mixed uses
- areas to be renaturalized
- introduce sports and culture areas
- port area regeneration
Beyond the Divisions

**Thick Public Coastline**

- New city centre-marshlands-coastline
- Port-walled city
- Varosha historic core - Varosha coastline

- Turkish Cypriots 'safe space'
- Greek Cypriots 'safe space'

*Intercommunal reconciliation strategies*
Twenty five research studies conducted by the Department of Phycology at the University of Cyprus from the period of 2006-2016, concluded that the evidences show a tendency for rapprochement between the two communities and a significant increase in intergroup contact [SCHEMES 30]. These findings, according to the research are particularly important if regarded as indications for the successful establishment and viability of any political solution. Allport [1954] suggested that contact between members of different groups is pivotal in improving social relations as it can reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict. Even in sub-optimal conditions, positive contact is associated with reduced psychological thread responses to outgroup members and in increasing perceptions of similarities [Everrett, 2013]. As discussed in the previous chapters, planning and design processes not only can assume a complex role in shaping space as a ‘canvas’, manifesting a shared narrative between different ethnic communities but also have a central role in facilitate positive interethnic contact which according to scholars is the key in breaking the divide.

2005  15% of the G/C had negative feelings towards the T/C community
2007  51% of the G/C had positive feelings towards the T/C community
2007  35% of the G/C had negative feelings towards the T/C community
2007  29% of the G/C had positive feelings towards the T/C community
SCHEMES 30_ Rapprochement between the two communities

[schemes: By the Author]

2007_ 68% of the T/C Were supporting a separatist solution to the Cyprus problem

2010_ 35% of the T/C Were supporting a separatist solution to the Cyprus problem

2007_ 51% of the G/C had positive feelings towards the T/C community

2007_ 29% of the G/C had positive feelings towards the T/C community

2015_ 15% of the G/C had negative feelings towards the T/C community

2007_ 35% of the G/C had negative feelings towards the T/C community
Members of the two communities from the local initiative ‘Famagusta our Town’, holding hands after a bi-communal event near the waterfront of Varosha [photo: ‘Famagusta our town initiative’]
A federal solution, as this has been negotiated since the mid-1960s, is in fact as illustrated in the many official documents, negotiating the [re]partition of the island and of Cypriot cities such as Famagusta with the consolidation of the divide in cities like Nicosia[SCHEMES 29]. Intercommunal contact has been minimal after the tragic events of 1974 while the ‘negative peace’ of the last 50 years, created by partition, makes the effectiveness of any political solution difficult. A dissimilarities between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots still persist and important issues such as the ‘properties issue’ remain unaddressed, the actual reunification of the island is to be considered a long and difficult process.

Since space is still at the heart of the contest, especially at the political level, we have to understand how any political agreement will have in turn spatial and social implications. Learning from the example of Northern Ireland, even if a political agreement is achieved, we should acknowledge i. the difficulties of peacebuilding between the people of the two communities in a violently polarized society. It will most probably be a painful and a lengthy process, and ii. the potential for polarization within space and take decisive steps to prevent it. Let alone if the city of Famagusta is divided by a constituent state boundary as it was proposed in the 2004 UN Peace Plan. Is an imperative then, to fully explore the potential of planning and design processes and practices for collectively building shared ‘peacescapes’ that facilitate contact and engagement across the divide.

The current planning traditions in Cyprus are not only inefficient and obsolete, but also inadequate in answering to the challenges that will arise with the [re]unification of the island. The planning system was inherited from the highly centralized British rule of the 1940s. Since [for the last 56 years [[!] we do not have the mechanisms of the British System, the current planning framework fails to be effective. In any case, a political solution in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation creates the imperative for developing new planning and design mechanisms and processes for coping with the everyday challenges of a shared city. At the same time, an opportunity is presented for reconstituting and evaluating our cities’ development and the current governmental planning processes by setting a new planning framework that can foster change in the island as a whole. In a reunified Cyprus, both community cohesion and social inclusion problems have to be addressed by strategies that link together urban regeneration and intercommunal reconciliation processes.

In troubled political and social contexts, such as the one of Cyprus, traditional models of conventional top down urban planning often fail and may lead to partisan planning and the further division of spatial and social structures in cities. Alternatively, joint collaborations and civil society should be regarded as potential
However, as Vockler [2010:84] argues the NGOs are highly dependent upon the financial support of governments, international governmental organizations [such as the EU] and their semi-public organizations. Therefore the reality of their role as neutral mediators in the peace process can be different: ‘NGOs are often forced to adapt their approaches, to accommodate the goals and programs set forth by their financial supporters’ while the fact that they often specialize in specific topics usually prevents them from understanding an overarching complex of problems[!] Yet another difficulty, observed in the exemplar collaborative context of the Nicosia master plan, is a new form of global domination, described by Kaldor[1996] as ‘the new divide’, of the ‘global citizens’ who work for the United Nations over the local experts [Vockler, 2010:86]. According to participants, they were indeed free to discuss any of their concerns about the Area Schemes; however the documents were produced in advanced by the international experts. Locals in this respect were not fully taken into consideration as active participants in the planning process…

From the comparative analysis, it is clear that in the majority of post conflict situations, national governments cannot provide a platform for professional intervention. Then, exposure to market forces through conventional capitalistic principles of properties and market economies, which often disregard the realities of these cities, and the involvement of international experts are seen as the two alternatives for jump starting the rehabilitation and reconstruction. In the previous chapters the potential role of international NGO’s as correctives in the political regulation of post conflict situations and their ability in initiating processes and mediating between micro and macro scales and interests was discussed. However, as Vockler [2010:84] argues the NGOs are highly dependent upon the financial support of governments, international governmental organizations [such as the EU] and their semi-public organizations. Therefore the reality of their role as neutral mediators in the peace process can be different: ‘NGOs are often forced to adapt their approaches, to accommodate the goals and programs set forth by their financial supporters’ while the fact that they often specialize in specific topics usually prevents them from understanding an overarching complex of problems[!] Yet another difficulty, observed in the exemplar collaborative context of the Nicosia master plan, is a new form of global domination, described by Kaldor[1996] as ‘the new divide’, of the ‘global citizens’ who work for the United Nations over the local experts [Vockler, 2010:86]. According to participants, they were indeed free to discuss any of their concerns about the Area Schemes; however the documents were produced in advanced by the international experts. Locals in this respect were not fully taken into consideration as active participants in the planning process…

But what if there was a third alternative? What if the Famagustians [Turkish and Greek Cypriot] where the ones to initiate a process of collectively reshaping/remaking the city? What if local institutions of Urban Governance would arise through autonomously developed organizational forms that are characterized by local initiatives, local partnership arrangements and goals that are both economic and social and benefit the entire community? In interviews with three native Greek Cypriot Famagustians and two Turkish Cypriots permanently residing in
the city [Interviews conducted in August 2015], they all expressed their desire for participating in the decision making over the future of Famagusta. In the last few years there has been a strong mobilization by native Famagustians from both communities and from individuals and groups with a special interest on the case of Famagusta. Through Facebook groups, bi-communal events, and appearances of representatives from the communities in the national television network and radio, often open discussions take place regarding the future of the city. One of local initiatives called ‘FAMAGUSTA OUR TOWN’, firstly envisaged by a small group of citizens, today has grown to reach 12,000 members [!] Undeniably, there is strong motivation and willingness from both communities for cooperation over the future of Famagusta in a post conflict era; collaboratively creating the city as a collective resource it is a realistic option in this respect. However, learning from the experience of Belfast, where extensive attempts have been made towards collaborative processes in planning and design, we have to acknowledge that there are two main challenges: on achieving a culture change in the mind sets of people—both planners and communities—from traditional to new practices [Building a culture of Debate and a capacity to Debate], while changes in approach is required both by governmental agencies and the private sector.
Conclusion

As suggested in this work, which I consider to be a small contribution into a wider and much complex discussion over space and group conflict, the active participation of local communities in the recovery process is the central pillar for success. Urban planning and design have to find new methods to include the public in the actual process of city making. In a context of state fragility and internal conflict the urbanist must adopt new approaches that are small scale, bottom up and community driven. His role has to be extended beyond that of a conceiver and executor of blue print plans to a potential ‘negotiator’ and ‘to go beyond the common notions of space that is both physically grounded and socially fixed’ [Gaffikin et al. 2010:497]. In this respect, urban planning and design as political projects can be strategically used for both promoting co-operation and interaction between conflicting groups and in constructing ‘peacescapes’ to physically bring people together across the divide.

In September 2014 a first publication, as a small manifesto written by me along with a group of young, Cypriot architects [Anatomy of the Wallpaper think tank] gave the first stimulation about the possibilities of this project. It was a fist attempt to initiate a discussion and campaign over the future of the city. Together with a series of collages, we published a short text entitled ‘Promised land’.

After the completion of this study the author is planning to have a second publication concluding with some of the new insights from this work

Anatomy of the wallpaper think tank was founded in February 2014. It’s a Rotterdam based dynamic research team that represented Cyprus in the 14th Venice Architecture biennale.

Image| Publication in Politis newspaper, Cyprus, September 2014. Collage: Intellectual Disaster Tourism in Varosha
Η πόλη μέσα μας
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References


