"LEGACY STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE OLYMPIC HOST CITIES"

OLYMPIC-LED REGENERATION PROJECTS

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“The Olympic regeneration in London can be seen as a marathon that was sprinting for nine years”
(Bill Hanway, 2012)
I. Preface

**Athens 2004:** My first Olympics. Great Games. Well-organised. Decent infrastructural improvements, but recent pictures show a decayed Olympic Park, metro line and venues.

**Torino 2006:** My first winter Olympics. Most venues were located in the mountains, little impact on the normal city life and urban structure.

**Beijing 2008:** Amazing Games. During one of my daily runs through the city it became clear that China only wanted to show the bright side of a booming new economic-hub (city/country). Slums were hidden behind large temporary walls with slogans as ‘one city, one dream’ on it.

**Vancouver 2010:** Well-thought Games. Sustainable venues as a result of decent after use planning with an improved transportation systems.

**London 2012:** Inspiring Games. Certainly in terms of legacy planning and delivery of the Games. Did London set a new standard?

Since the summer of 2004 I am fascinated by the catalytic effect created by hosting the Games. As the son of the vice-president of the Dutch Olympic Committee I had the privilege to visit three summer Olympics and two winter Olympics. As a student at the faculty of Architecture and later on graduate student Urban Area Development my attention was caught by the big contrast of the Games: on the one hand successful events on the other hand poor long-term planning.

After the Olympics in 2004 and 2008 I have read a lot about the problems that occurred during the preparations according to the after-use planning. “What could be more exciting than doing research about the impact of the Olympics and extract essential lessons from preceding Games?”

So in February 2012 I started with my graduation project in the Urban Area Development Lab of the Department of Real Estate and Housing at the Delft University of Technology.

I would like to use the opportunity to thank some persons for their assistance, advice and effort during my graduation. Especially, I would like to thank my mentors Erwin Heurken and Yawei Chen for their energy, help, input, and feedback. Thereby I would like to thank my coaches at Deloitte Real Estate Advisory, namely Sjors Berns and Martijn Nab. Next to them I would like to specially thank Heather Hancock for the opportunity to do research in London and get in touch with several key players and my father as a sparring partner.

I was in the fortunate position to combine my studies at the Delft University of Technology with playing sports as a professional field hockey player in the top league in Holland and Spain. This unique combination gave me lots of satisfaction and mutual stimulus to exercise both things on a qualitative way. It forced me to plan and prioritize to fulfil both roles as optimal as possible. Both disciplines were done in an environment were quitting was not an option and were the will to be successful was leading.

Pleasant reading,

Rogier Rombouts
Amsterdam, 2013
II. Abstract

Love it or loathe it, the Olympic Games. Hosting mega-events is a popular way to generate new investments and create urban improvements of which the city and its citizens can benefit. Unfortunately, most host cities face less positive outcomes than expected. Reasons for this can be the pressure of global stakeholders (IOC, media etc.), but it is mostly caused by weak commitment to strategies and planning. Cities have to comply with the requirements set by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Organising Committee for the Olympic Games.

Hosting cities try to incorporate the Olympic plan with local demands and existing (re)development plans. Due to lack of time and international pressure some objectives are cancelled or changed, which results in an insufficient Olympic development, which can lead to a negative legacy. In these times where private and public organisation have less financial means to invest in large-scale events and cannot bear the risks, it is even more crucial to create a decent legacy strategy. In this research the aim is to create some essential legacy strategies for future host cities to steer on an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens.

First of all, this thesis will provide us with some background on the topic, then a theoretical base is constructed to provide a framework in which the preceding Games and present case in London can be compared, evaluated and reflected upon. The two main chapters in this thesis consist of an intensive literature study of five preceding Summer Olympic Games (Barcelona 1992-Beijing 2008) and an in depth case analysis of the Olympic process of the London 2012 Olympic Games. The lessons extracted from all these cases will be converted into legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities.

Three models are used through the whole thesis to better understand the strategies, process and transitional period. These three models are established by knowledge from theory and after the analysis of the five preceding summer Games adapted to practises. After the in depth case study of the London Olympic process these models are again evaluated, modified and adapted.
III. Management summary

Legacy is something that is left or handed down by an ancestor or a predecessor (Oxford dictionary). Preuss (2006) states “legacy can be planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible. To further complicate the understanding of legacy, it is of an undetermined duration, which makes it nearly impossible to quantify. Finally, the same legacy may be positive for one industry (e.g. tourism) and negative for another (e.g. the environment).” Olympic legacy consists mainly of the (tangible) elements that were developed for the Olympic Games such as venues, facilities and infrastructure.

1. Introduction

The Olympic Games is the biggest sporting event in the world. Many city leaders in the past wanted to host this mega event to enhance the city’s global recognition, reputation and image. The Olympics can be used as a catalyst to generate investments and as a means to speed up existing urban plans. Tourism in preceding host cities increased enormously and thereby spatial improvements and new facilities were delivered.

Due to poor planning and pressure to deliver the event on time, by media and international stakeholders, legacy intentions are set aside. Legacy planning embodies a city’s vision to integrate local objectives for the benefit of the city and citizens into the Olympic plan, in which facilities and infrastructure for the event need to be delivered. However this is not always the case and many previous host cities were left with unnecessary venues, facilities and infrastructure and had to find use(rs) afterwards to prevent these amenities from falling into decay.

In times of economic recession cities have to steer more demand-driven developments to minimise waste and decrease unnecessary expenses. This research will extract interesting lessons out of recent summer Olympic Games, from Barcelona 1992 to Beijing 2008, and a present case, namely London 2012. Finally, some essential urban legacy strategies for future host cities will be given, which will help combining the integration of local demands and better after-use: the legacy planning.
Research design

Figure 0.2 shows the research design of this thesis. The research will be divided into three parts: concepts, practises and synthesis.

The first part -concepts- consists of three elements that form a sound base for further investigation. Concepts consist of a brief introduction to the topic and the research deliverables. Secondly theories are described, i.e. urban regeneration, legacy and strategy that are necessary to deliver substantiated findings in the end. After the theory the methodology is outlined.


In the last part -synthesis- the lessons and conclusions out of preceding Olympic processes are compared, evaluated and reflected upon. Conclusions will be made on: strategies, process and transitional period.
2. Theories

To understand the Olympics better first a short introduction to the Olympic process is given. This research will explicitly focus on the legacy, the after-use, of the Games and not on the delivery and organisation of the event. Therefore we always place the Olympics into the urban area development context. Regarding the Olympic process, there are many similarities in relation to urban area development projects. The main difference is the wide range of stakeholders, who are involved, public and private parties, local and national and important international bodies like the Organising Committee (OCOG) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) join the process. The involvement of the international sporting federations, the media and local community makes the Olympics to such a complex process, but challenging to research.

Figure 0.3 shows the strategic model by Daamen (2010) that forms the base of this research. This model is created by combining the four strategic activities of Mintzberg (1997) and divide them into eight distinct resources of urban area development. A division is made into allocative (tangible) and authoritative (intangible) aspects and deliberate and emergent activities. This model helps us to understand urban area development processes and thereby evaluate which activities are more important at a certain stage to make progress. All these activities and resources are important and integral in the process, only some can have a crucial role during a certain phase.
To illustrate how the different elements out of the strategic model by Daamen (2010) are integrated and play a role in the Olympic process figure 0.4 is developed. In this figure the Olympic process is been applied to theory in five steps.

Step 1 shows the Olympic process consisting of five phases and indicates the average time of each phase. Step 2 is a simplified representation of the Olympic logo and in step 3 all five phases are added to this logo. In step 4 the strategic model is applied to the five phases of the Olympic process. Step (5) illustrates the relation between each strategic activity and each phase.

**Learning** is divided between internal (within the process) and external (before and after).

**Visioning** forms the start point of each phase.

**Venturing** is the process of negotiations about what to deliver (property) and how things can be delivered (finance).

**Planning** runs through all the phases.
In figure 0.5 the relations between theory and practise are combined in one model. This model is called the ‘kite-model’, because of its shape and helps to understand the role of the four strategic activities in the Olympic process.

![Figure 0.5 Kite model: strategic activities in Olympic process](image)

The last element described in the chapter on theories is about urban dilemma. The different organisations involved have different interests. For organisations like the International Olympic Committee and the organising Committee (OCOG) delivering successful games is the priority. Other local and national governments are more interested in the legacy; venues, facilities and infrastructure that need to be used in the decades after the games. Paragraphs 2.5 and 2.6 describe the conflicts that occur and help to understand the process.
Figure 0.6 is created to understand these tensions. Highlighter below is the transitional period, just after the event period, which plays a crucial role in the success of the after-use of the Olympic park and the venues.

![Figure 0.6 Role and place of the transitional period including the different Olympic periods and phases.]

In level 1 three Olympic periods are illustrated and the position of the transitional period is integrated. In level 2 the transition of the process from a more local oriented perspective to a more global one is shown over the different periods. Level 3 indicates the five different phases of the process. After the case analysis of the past and after London a fourth level will be added to figure 0.6 to understand the role of the strategic activities in the different Olympic periods. In the end of this report a comparison of preceding Games and London will show that the transitional period is approached differently.

3. Methodology

To analyse the process of preceding Olympics the case study method is used. The case study of preceding Olympics (1992-2008) is conducted by an intensive literature study. Research on the impact of the Olympic Games and its processes have been undertaken (Gold & Gold, Smith, Preuss, Cashman, Chalkley & Essex and Brunet). There is no “correct” or absolute methodology for measuring the impact of an Olympic Games. Many different approaches and tools exist (Olympic Movement, 2006). To define successful elements some researchers or institutes divided the impact into the three spheres of (sustainable) urban area development, namely physical, economic and social, such as the Olympic Games Global Impact Studies Centre.

This research tries to assess all material into one framework, a strategic model (figure. 0.2). By framing all the preceding Olympic process into these four strategic activities and eight distinct resources it becomes clear which strategic activities are most crucial at a certain stage to make progress or to steer on a successful after-use. The intensive literature study can be found in Annex I. The outcomes of this analysis are described in chapter four by summarising the lessons learned from the past, being divided into the four strategic activities. The London process is analysed by an in depth case study and divided into the same framework used for the analysis of the preceding Olympic Games.

Knowledge is gathered by documentation through literature, impact studies, planning documents, interviews and personal observations. To ensure reliability of specific information the method ‘triangulation’ is used (Yin: 1984). Wherever possible, data from one source was checked with data from another source.
4. **Learning from the past (1992-2008)**

4.1 **Lessons**

In annex I the intensive literature study about the five summer Olympics of Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, Athens and Beijing can be found. By dividing these processes into the model of Daamen (2010) all elements are ranked into four strategic activities (Mintzberg, 1997) and the eight distinct resources of an urban area development project. It is interesting to see that several Olympic host cities had an almost equal vision, but the delivery of the event and after-use were totally different due to emergent (internal and external) forces. Out of all these Olympic process some generic lessons have been extracted that are useful for future Olympic host cities.

* Incorporate the Olympic plan into the existing urban plans
* For an optimal legacy; negotiate, tailor and steer on local demands
* Integrate sustainable developments, do not only mention it
* Make a decent legacy planning
* Try to create jobs for the unemployed people

* Own strategic land or control it
* Steer on strategic locations for the venues
* Make use of existing and temporary facilities
* Use a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic developments
* Steer on continuing investments

* Make use of changes in the urban context
* Make use of Public Private Partnerships
* Incorporate the legacy plan in an early phase
* Create Olympic regulations to speed up processes
* Be aware that several developments can lead to gentrification

* Steer on strong governmental control
* Use urban planners and architects for integration of the plan
* Establish legacy-oriented authorities
* Create a special authority to attract businesses and improve tourism
4.2 Strategies

Most important lessons can be found in the lower part of the model by Daamen (2010), namely visioning and learning. Some lessons are a result of positive experience from the past where others are a result of negative examples from the preceding Games.

Commitment

Many preceding Olympics such as Athens and Sydney have shown signs of weak legacy planning. Although cities had sustainable development as an important part of their bid, they were not able to deliver on the intended objectives accordingly. There was a lack of commitment regarding the after-use planning and therefore city governments were not in the position to give priority to long-term demands.

Property

Some preceding Games did not choose for a strategic location in relation to long-term planning, the sites were far outside the city centre (Sydney and Athens) or were located in a more developed part of the city (Beijing). The selection for these locations was sometimes a result of not being in the position to own the land in a strategic area or due to poor planning. The use of existing facilities or temporary venues was very limited.

Finance

Several preceding Olympics host cities used a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic developments, Barcelona being a case in point. Unfortunately, many of these five preceding host cities were not able to estimate the total costs of the Olympic property, which led to expanding budgets and subsequently low support by the public.

Time/Result

Almost all preceding host cities used the Olympics as a catalyst for urban change, especially when such cities undertook a change in the urban context. Several cities were faced with the de-industrialisation and had to develop special Olympic regulations to speed up the process. For example Barcelona had a change in the political climate after the reign of Franco and had to show a strong planning in terms of incorporating the long-term planning into the Olympic plans. Other cities tried to copy, but were not committed enough to integrate the legacy planning during the whole process.

Expertise

Almost all preceding Olympics were organised by public private partnerships (PPPs). Host cities in which the government had strong control during the process benefitted the most of the developments generated by the Games. Thereby the role of architects, urban planners and innovative bodies is crucial for the integration of the Olympic plan into the existing urban plans. Although none of all five preceding host cities established an organisation responsible for the after-use of the venues, facilities and infrastructure, already during the event the first steps towards legacy planning were delivered.
5. Learning from London (2012)

5.1 Lessons
This research was conducted during the end of the pre-event period, the event period and the beginning of the after-event period. The analysis of the Olympic process in London was done by gathering information from involved stakeholders, conducting interviews with key players and applying this information to theory. The process was divided into four strategic activities (Mintzberg, 1997) and eight distinct resources of an urban area development project. Better known as the strategy-as-force model of Daamen (2010). Some generic lessons have been extracted that are useful for future Olympic host cities:

* Integrate sustainable developments, not only mention it:
  * Make people responsible and organisations accountable for the legacy
  * Deliver strong commitment by government
  * Get the people and boroughs involved and give them influence
  * Stick to your vision

* Own strategic land or control it
  * Get early planning permissions
  * Realise early acquisition of the land
  * Make use of temporary and existing facilities
  * Choose a strategic location
  * Work with realistic cost estimations

* Create an outline-planning framework easily responding to changes in process and market
  * Incorporate the Olympic Plan into the existing urban plans
  * Use Olympic regulations to speed up the process
  * Decrease delays by using risk management in planning

* Steer on strong governmental control
  * Establish and develop an organisation responsible for legacy
  * Make use of existing expertise, put the right people on the right place
  * Share knowledge secondment
  * Monitor low political interference; trust the people to deliver
5.2 Strategies
By setting out the lessons against the strategic model it became clear that some activities had a more dominant role during some stages to make progress or to better steer on legacy planning. The most relevant activities and resources are discussed here.

Commitment
In the interviews with experts in London it was found that the most important resource for the success of legacy planning in the Olympic process was ‘commitment’. London did have a strong vision, but more important they really wanted it with the conviction of an Obama ‘Yes, we can!’ The city of London was extremely committed to deliver and to give priority to the after-use. In addition to delivering successful Games they wanted to kick-start the regeneration of East London. Although there was strong control by government and from the mayor - by special governmental bodies like LDA and later on OPLC and LLDC- the government trusted the organisations to deliver and did not interfere too much.

Property/Finance
Regeneration was necessary for East London and the city leaders and bodies involved were keen on giving priority to this large-scale transformation project. Many experts at the ULI congress about ‘Creating Legacy’ at Canary Wharf (May, 2012) stating ‘It was a major regeneration project with Games in it’. By selecting Lower Lea Valley as site for the Olympics, located only a few miles from the city centre, and by upgrading the infrastructure, London was sure that it would be a strategic location in terms of legacy planning. The city had a strong focus on delivering this legacy through establishing an organisation responsible for the legacy planning. The city wanted to minimise waste and reduce unnecessary expenses by investing in stadiums, infrastructure and facilities guaranteeing that these should have a clear function after the Olympics. The city was keen on delivering on time and therefore they started already before winning the bid by acquiring the land. Planning permissions were obtained in an early phase, which gave the organisation the power to deliver the developments on time. In comparison with preceding host cities London used to a greater extent already existing and temporary venues. Due to the world economic crisis investment by private parties was limited and established Public Private Partnership could not get funding, resulting in greater government involvement. All venues were delivered but the amount of investments by government was higher than estimated.

Instruments
London established some special Olympic regulations for acquiring the land and to speed up the regeneration of East London. The most essential planning instrument was the ‘outline-planning framework’ that was delivered just before the Games started in 2012. This framework, approved by local government, gave the responsible body for legacy planning, the London Legacy Development Corporation, the mandate to continue developments in the area after the event. This framework included the type and amount of future developments in the Olympic park.

Expertise
London really did a decent analysis of several preceding Olympics and has put the right people on the right positions. Many experts (event- or regeneration related) were involved in recent former regeneration projects or sport events in the UK. Knowledge from hosting the Olympics was transferred to UK companies by using secondments in the Organising Committee or legacy corporations. London is convinced that knowledge will be transferred by using the Olympics as a case study for other host cities and for future regeneration projects in the UK.
6. Conclusions

6.1 General

The analysis of preceding Olympic host cities have shown us that although cities opt to state a clear vision about integrating the legacy planning into the Olympic process, they fail to realise this ambition. This is mainly due to a lack of commitment and not having established and organisations especially responsible for controlling the legacy. Next to this time pressure pushed priority from legacy planning to deliver the event on time.

From good experiences and especially bad experiences from preceding Games valuable lessons were extracted, which are helpful for future host cities. It is interesting to see that these lessons were almost all integrated in the London process for the 2012 Olympics and the regeneration of East London. London showed the world a new definition of legacy.

Until the Olympics in London (2012) the term legacy had a negative load. It was seen as ‘something left behind by a predecessor and could be tangible, intangible, unplanned or planned.’ London showed that their legacy was planned to be left behind after the Games for the benefit of the city and citizens. London kept legacy at the core of their vision and through the process they made their legacy thoughts more realisable, deliverable and something that the people and city really wanted. In the words of some city planners the Olympics were only a short interruption of a long-term project of the regeneration of East London.

Although London did well in the delivery of the pre-legacy the city created an outline-planning framework that will give a special legacy corporation (LLDC) the mandate to continue with the developments in the former Olympic park. This study had to be finished half a year after the London Olympics. Only the future will reveal if their strong commitment to legacy has successfully continued after the event and if they use the momentum of the Games to continue the regeneration of East London successfully. Therefore we to have to review London’s legacy in one or two decades.

Although the costs for hosting the event need to be seen as investments in the city, it is clear that if a host city does not have a clear vision about the after-use of the park, venues and infrastructure they will be left with major unnecessary expenses. Therefore future host cities should always take into account what the local, regional and national demands are and should integrate these objectives into the Olympic plan.
6.2 Strategies

In figure 0.7 the legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities are summarised. The most important resources for decent legacy planning are commitment, property and expertise. Although all resources are necessary to make an urban development project come to life these three resources are seen as most instrumental for legacy planning. The most essential strategies for future host cities are highlighted in figure 0.7. All strategies are described in the thesis and thereby explained to understand how they should be implemented.

Figure 0.7 Urban legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities
6.3 Process

The differences in the process in preceding Games and in London is shown in figure 0.8. Both in preceding Games and in London venturing formed an important activity in the initiation of the process, but London decided to get all planning permissions, agreements and organisations approved before the event so they could continue the regeneration afterwards. Former host cities had to restart the venturing process after the Olympics. They had to establish an organisation responsible for the after-use of the venues, facilities and infrastructure. Some cities could not even find users for some venues and saw their Olympic park of stadiums turn into decayed objects, so called ‘white elephants’.

Learning formed an important activity during the process for all preceding Games, mainly internal learning, within the project. Although many London has expanded the learning process by analysing preceding Games and afterwards wrapping up knowledge from the process to transfer knowledge to future host cities or other regeneration project or companies in the UK.

Visioning is necessary in the beginning of the process to win the bid. Where preceding Games set aside their vision after the bid and had to re-vision after the event, London kept their vision through the process. The commitment to their vision was instrumental for the successful delivery of the legacy and event.

Figure 0.8 Role and position of the strategic activities during the process
6.4 Transitional period

Out of the intensive literature study of the five preceding summer Olympics it became clear that just after all of the event there was a period, which suffered from inadequate planning and unclear responsibilities. We call this period the transitional period. In the figure 0.9 and 0.10 the role and position of the transitional period in relation to the strategic activities is described. In former Olympics there was no clear plan for the post-event period. Due to lack of time cities were focussed on delivering the event and set aside the issues about the after-use of the stadiums.

To prevent the process from falling into such a transitional period, London established an outline-planning framework. It also established a legacy corporation, that was already during the pre-event period responsible for the after-use of the park, the venues and facilities. Thus, London placed the transitional period before the event-period and had approval by government about planning permissions, developments etc. London stated clearly, and communicated to the people, that there will be a period of one year in which some stadiums will be dismantled, transferred or downsized and in which infrastructural and physical adjustment are done, so called transformation period. After this transformation period the sites will be re-opened and all amenities will have a clear function and will be accessible for the citizens.
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A. Abbreviations

General
IOC International Olympic Committee
OCOG Organising Committee Olympic Games
NOC National Organising Committee
OC Organising Committee
NOC*NSF Nederlands Olympische Comité *
Nederlandse Sport Federaties
OGGI Olympic Games Global Impact Study
CC Coordination Commission

London
LDA London Development Agency
ODA Olympic Delivery Authority
LLDC London Legacy Development Corporation
OPLC Olympic park Legacy Corporation
GLA Greater London Authority
Dfl Design for London
MoL Mayor of London
Tfl Transport for London
HBU Host Boroughs Unit

Beijing
BOCOG Beijing Organising Committee Olympic Games

Athens
ATHOC Athens 2004 Organising Committee for the Olympic Games
HOC Hellenic Olympic Committee
NCOG National Committee for the Olympic Games

Sydney
SOCOG Sydney Organising Committee for the Olympic Games
OCA Olympic Co-ordination Authority
ORTA Olympic Roads and Transport Authority
SOPA Sydney Olympic Park Authority
GCOG Games Coordination Group and Operational Integration
NSW New South Wales; state in Australia

Atlanta
ACOG Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games
USOC United States Olympic Committee
ACOP Atlanta Centennial Olympic Properties
MAOGA Metropolitan Atlanta Olympic Games Authority
CODA Corporation for Olympic Development in Atlanta

Barcelona
COOB’92 Comité Organizador Olímpic Barcelona ’92
(Barcelona Olympic Organising Committee)
OCSA Olimpíada Cultural Societat Anònima
(Barcelona Cultural Activity Organising Committee)
COE Comité Organizador Español
(Spanish Olympic Committee)
I Research Framework
Chapter 1: Research Framework

1.1 Introduction

According to the Olympic history, the Olympic Games have always been a great success in which cities show their best qualities and skills to create a successful event and to enhance a city’s global recognition, image and reputation. Host cities have to meet all the IOC requirements and have to facilitate enormous amounts of athletes, professionals and spectators. To fulfil these emerging requirements cities have to upgrade existing facilities and construct new ones.

The IOC wants cities to use the Olympics to upgrade their urban environment. The 1960 Olympics in Rome were the first one that really used the Games as a catalyst for non-Olympic developments. For many years the Barcelona 1992 Olympics, better known as ‘the Barcelona Model’, has been seen as the best example for Olympic-led regeneration. Barcelona used the event to speed-up urban developments and delivered the plan by a public private partnership. Due to a lack of time, international pressure and short-term strategies some organisations involved are only focussing on delivering a successful event and not on the post-use of the venues.

The scale of the event increases and simultaneously the investment costs rise. The Beijing 2008 Games was the most expensive sporting event ever organised, namely $40 billion (Zimbalist, 2010). The price cities have to pay (or more precisely: tax-payers) plays an essential role in the attempt to host the Games and to consider bidding. Almost all budgets of preceding Games were miscalculated. Interests of public and private parties are been combined to support the investments to create an optimal after-use, for the benefit of the city and citizens.

In these times, where cities have to deal with less public and private support for large urban developments, hosting the Olympics is becoming an even more delicate topic. Still there are many cities that bid for hosting the Games, mainly to re-image their city, to regenerate deprived areas and to generate economic benefits. In this prospect, it is interesting to look at the way London dealt with all the different interests, high investment costs and the after-use, while minimizing risks and decreasing unnecessary expenses, during times of recession.

Figure 1.1 An Olympic athlete jumping in the Olympic Stadium in Barcelona 1992
1.2 Problem statement

Olympic-led regeneration is a method to stimulate and speed-up urban development plans, but due to international pressure, different interests and an immovable deadline the desired outcomes for the host city are not always as successful as intended. In former Olympics, in which Barcelona (1992) for a long time played a pioneering role, a lot of new partnerships, planning instruments and strategies were developed. Although Olympic Games are location- and time specific a lot can be learned from former Olympics.

Still, former Olympic host cities lacked the ability to give priority to long-term objectives (legacy) and had to venture out after the event what to do with the newly constructed venues, facilities and infrastructure. Due to unclear future use of these amenities the Olympic park and venues elsewhere in the city were left abandoned. The involvement of some dominant international sport or event oriented organisations makes it hard for local government and other public parties involved to steer on long-term objectives for the benefit of the city and citizens.

1.3 Aim

The aim of this research is to provide future host cities, public leaders and commercial parties involved in large-scale sport or cultural events to better integrate long-term objectives into their bid procedure, called the legacy strategies. The research thereby gives an insight how these long-term objectives need to be managed and controlled to prevent the new facilities, venues and infrastructure from falling into decay. This research will provide future host cities with some instrumental lessons that derived from good and bad experience from six preceding Olympic host cities; Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, Athens, Beijing and London. Although these legacy strategies could be context-specific they derived from several preceding Games, which increase their generic applicability. Additionally, this research will help future planners to better organise and interact all the organisations involved and to give priority to the legacy.

This research will provide some essential legacy strategies derived from an analysis of the process, the stakeholder involvement and the role of the host city in several preceding Games. First of all five summer Olympics, Barcelona 1992 up to Beijing 2008, will be analysed by an intensive literature study followed by an in-depth case study about the London 2012 Olympics.

The Olympic Games are in one way unique, because they are location- and time-specific, on the other hand they are standardised due to rules, the period and governing bodies (Roche, 2000).

1.4 Research question

The main research question for this research is “What lessons can be learned from preceding Olympic Games to create legacy strategies for future host cities?”

This question is divided into:
“ What lessons can we learn from five preceding summer Olympic Games (1992-2008)? ” (ch. 4)
“ What lessons can we learn from the London case (2012)? ” (ch. 5)

Therefore title of this research is ‘Olympic-led regeneration’ and the subtitle of the research is “Urban legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities”.

### 1.5 Research design

The research consists of three parts, see figure 2.1.

**Concepts**

The first part embodies the base of the research and is divided into three parts. The **introduction**, chapter 1, starts with the problem statement, which results in an aim and research question. Then some general terms are explained to better understand the subject and a research design (figure 1.2) is established to guide the reader through the process.

To better understand the subject and to define the scope a **theoretical framework** is designed, chapter 2. In this theoretical part some background information is provided to better place the subject in its context and to better understand themes like legacy, urban regeneration and to explain how global and local stakeholders interact in the process. In this theoretical part the term strategy is described and placed into the urban area development context and later on into the Olympic context.

Although the base is set now, a clear **methodology** is needed to do a proper research. In this third part, chapter 3, the methods used for this research, the validity and resources are explained.

**Practices**

The second part of the research forms the heart of the thesis. In this part knowledge and information from preceding Games is gathered. This part can be divided into two chapters. In chapter four an intensive **literature study** is done by analysing the process of five preceding Olympics (1992-2008) and chapter five describes the process of the London 2012 Olympics by an **in-depth case study**. Both chapters use the strategic model by Daamen (2010) to make a clear division in terms of strategic activities and urban development resources used. At the end of
each chapter the knowledge is applied to theory. The outcomes are divided into three conclusions: (1) the lessons learned divided over the strategic activities, (2) a visualisation of the process and (3) the functioning of the transitional period.

**Synthesis**

In this part both the concepts and the practises are reflected and evaluated, which results in some end conclusions, the legacy strategies for future host cities, and will thereby answer the research question. Further on in this part a reflection, a summary and some recommendations for further research can be found.

1.6 Terminology

1.6.1 Strategy

The subtitle already indicates that this research will provide some legacy strategies in the end. In this paragraph the term and importance of strategy will be explained. In the next chapter the term strategy will be placed into the urban development context and subsequently in the Olympic context, see paragraph 2.5.

"There is no single, universally accepted definition of strategy (Mintzberg, 1992)."

A strategy embodies an integrated management approach and can be seen as a steering instrument to structure the process. To be able to deliver something effectively the formulation and implementation of a decent strategy is necessary.

Initially ‘strategos’ referred to a role (a general in command of an army). Later it came to mean ‘the art of the general’, which is to say the psychological and behavioural skills with which he occupied the role. By the time of Pericles (450 BC) it came to mean ‘managerial skill’ (administration, leadership, oration, power). And by Alexander’s time (330 BC) it referred to the skill of employing forces to overcome opposition and to create a unified system of global governance (Quinn, 1980).

Mintzberg (1992) focuses on various distinct definitions of strategy - as a plan, pattern, position and perspective. Strategies can form in an organisation without being consciously intended, that is, without being formulated. Quinn (1992) describes strategy as a pattern or plan that integrates an organization’s major goals, policies and action sequences into a cohesive whole. A well-formulated strategy helps to marshal and allocate the organisational resources into a unique and viable posture based on its relative internal competencies and shortcomings, anticipated changes in the environment and contingent moves by intelligent opponents.

The formulation and implementation of a strategy is so important, because it gives people or organisations direction and the possibility to better structure the process to get from a vision to a successful delivery. It is an instrument that helps to deliver and to prioritise.

In this research some terms will be frequently used and therefore explained here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Goals (or objectives)</td>
<td>‘State what is to be achieved and when results are to be accomplished, but they do not state how the results are to be achieved (Quinn, 1992).’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Programs</td>
<td>‘Specify the step-by-step sequence of actions necessary to achieve major objectives. They express how objectives will be achieved within the limits set by policy (Quinn, 1992).’</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Benefits

The Merriam-Webster online dictionary describes benefit as ‘to be useful or profitable to’. This immediately indicates that there is some positive outcome for a certain person, group or entity. This outcome can be ranked into several subjects, namely financial, physical, social, esthetical, environmental, ethical etc. The word ‘benefit’ clearly describes a useful or profitable outcome, but covers a wide range of factors subjects.

Success factors

There are no objective criteria that can be used to ensure or measure the success of an urban area development project. Choices have to be made on all these points before judgements can be made about success or failure (Hobma, 2010). Certain success factors can be ‘driven’ by powerful stakeholders in the urban area development project, while others cannot (Hobma, 2011).

Lessons

Under what circumstances and to what extent can a programme that is effective in one place transfer to another (Rose, 1991). In general, it refers to the fact that planners in different countries generally face the same problems, and one can learn from practices abroad (Heurkens, 2012).

Sustainable developments

Those improvements delivered on a physical (or social or economic) level, which have long-term duration. This includes intended or un-intended developments that are of benefit for the city or its citizens.

Figure 1.3 The Olympic torch arrives at the Olympic Stadium in London, 1948

1.6.2 Olympic Games

According to historical records, the first ancient Olympic Games can be traced back to 776 B.C. They were dedicated to the Olympian gods and were staged on the ancient plains of Olympia. The Olympic Games owed their purity and importance to religion (official IOC website, 2012). When the Olympic truth was declared soldiers had to stop fighting and put down their weapons during the Games. World piece is still an important theme for the Olympics, for this reason the Games of 1916, 1940 and 1944 were cancelled because of World War I and II.

The Olympics represent an international showcase, which can enhance a city’s global recognition, image and reputation (Essex & Chalkley, 1998).

The Olympic Charter (2011) defines the Olympic Games as ‘competitions between athletes in individual or team events and not between countries. They bring together the athletes selected by their respective NOCs, whose entries have been accepted by the IOC. They compete under the technical direction of the IFs concerned. The Olympic Games consist of Games of the Olympiad and the Olympic Winter Games. Only those sports, which are practised on snow or ice, are considered as winter sports. An Olympiad is a period of four consecutive calendar years.’
The Olympic symbol (see cover) expresses the activity of the Olympic Movement and represents the union of the five continents and the meeting of athletes from throughout the world at the Olympic Games (Olympic Charter, 2011). The five-ring symbol alone can be recognized by approximately 90 per cent of the world’s population (Chen & Spaans, 2009).

1.6.3 Olympic legacy

The Oxford dictionary describes legacy as ‘something left or handed down by an ancestor or a predecessor’. The IOC (2003) describes Olympic legacy as ‘multi-disciplinary and dynamic and is affected by a variety of local and global factors. Therefore it is a local and global concept, existing within cities, regions and nations, as well as internationally’. So, it is clear that legacy states something that is left behind after, in this case, the Olympic Games. Still the word ‘something’ has to be defined more clearly.

The IOC Charter, Rule 2, Article 14 states that the role of the IOC is “to promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries” (IOC, 2011). Legacy is being associated with impact on physical and non-physical levels (Gold & Gold, 2007).

Legacies can be planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible although most pre-event studies focus only on the planned, positive and tangible dimensions. To further complicate the understanding of legacy, it is of an undetermined duration, which makes it nearly impossible to quantify. Finally, the same legacy may be positive for one industry (e.g. tourism) and negative for another (e.g. the environment). The same legacy may be viewed positively or negatively, depending on who is making the assessment (Preuss, 2006). Preuss (2006) made an overview to determine what elements can be ranked as legacy:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>POSITIVE LEGACY</th>
<th>NEGATIVE LEGACY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>New event facilities</td>
<td>High construction costs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General infrastructure</td>
<td>Investments in non-needed structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban revival</td>
<td>Indebtedness of public sector</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Reputation</td>
<td>Temporary crowding problems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increased Tourism</td>
<td>Loss of permanent visitors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved public welfare</td>
<td>Property rental increases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional employment</td>
<td>Only temporary increases in employment and business activ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local business opportunities</td>
<td>Socially unjust displacement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporate relocation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Renewed community spirit</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inter-regional corporation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of ideas and cultural values</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Popular memory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education, experience and know-how</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1.1: Legacy, Preuss (2006)

In the early days, hosting the Olympics meant little more than assuming responsibility for providing the necessary venues and accommodation for competitors for Olympic-related activities. Even so, in these days the city was a stage, which perhaps attracted preliminary and post-Olympic events (van Prooye, 2010).

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to develop specific venues and buildings for the event, which resulted in several economic benefits, like a stimulus to the construction sector, increase in tourism and an employment boost. The advantage of this new strategy was
that host cities could generate enough profits to cover the investments for the construction of the sites.

The Barcelona Games of 1992 is probably the best example in which the Olympics act as a catalyst for urban change and renewal (Essex & Chalkley, 1998). Major urban improvement programmes were undertaken to underline the city’s claim for a place on the ‘global cities’ network (Sánchez, 1992). This new strategy in which a mega-event was used to stimulate urban regeneration became very popular also in other countries.

1.6.4 White Elephants
In several post-Olympic studies the term ‘white elephants’ is used for the venues (stadiums and buildings) that in the post-event period don’t fulfil any functional role and are mainly empty. In the past the size of the Olympic Games, spectators and athletes, were reasonable for building a stadium that could upgrade or replace the existing facilities. Nowadays the sizes of some stadiums do not correspond with local needs.

Robinson & Torvik (2004) define ‘white elephants’ as ‘investment projects with negative social surplus.’ They show that white elephants may be preferred to socially efficient projects if the political benefits are large compared to the surplus generated by efficient projects.

In 2002 the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, spoke out against Olympic ‘luxury’ projects that would become ‘white elephants’ after the Games preferring developments that would be sustainable after the Games and have some post-Games use. He gave an example by arguing the size of the Olympic Stadium in Sydney, 110,000 seats, by downsizing it afterwards to 80,000. He suggested this add up of 30,000 was an unnecessary expense (Cashman, 2002).

The enormous size of the latest Olympic Stadiums makes it even harder to use these buildings in the Post-Olympic period. There are some ways to decrease the possibility that stadiums turn into ‘white elephants’. By increasing the degree of adjustability of the buildings alternative occupancy is possible. Thereby related or surrounding commercial developments can stimulate the participation of the venues in the after-use. Also by making use of existing or temporary buildings the negative legacy of the Games can be decreased (Klee, 2012). This is an important aspect of the London 2012 approach for hosting the Olympics.

Concluding, more attention needs to be paid as to whether there can be some on-going return and community benefit from Olympic precincts and venues to prevent the occurrence of white elephants (Cashman, 2002).
1.6.5 Catalyst
A review of the historical record across the period of the modern Olympics reveals that the Games have had highly variable levels of impact on the host city’s built environment (Essex & Chalkley, 1998).

Since 1960 (Rome), it has become increasingly common for the Olympics to be used as a trigger for large-scale urban improvements and consequently they have had a much wider and more substantial impact on the host city’s built environment (Essex & Chalkley, 1998). The Olympics may be said to accelerate change rather than to initiate it. It is obviously difficult to judge the force of this argument; one can only speculate as to what might have happened without the Olympics (Essex & Chalkley, 1998).

1.6.6 Bid
The strength of several benefits (image, recognition and reputation) means that the Olympics have become widely viewed by city leaders as a highly desirable event to secure (Hiller, 1989). A decision to bid for the Olympics is therefore made by the city’s political authorities, backed by the national government and by business corporations (Cochrane et al., 1996).

Coubertin established the principle that the Olympics should be hosted in different locations every four years as a means of promoting and diffusing the Olympic Spirit of Freedom, progress and equality throughout the world (Grupe, 1991).

A bidding period can range from some years till a decade. For example, Beijing aimed to host the Olympics of 2000, due to a poor record on human rights the bid was rejected. After declining to bid for the 2004 Games, the Chinese government in 1998 again offered their candidacy for the 2008 games (Vogel, 1997). China’s desire to host the Games of 2008 began as early as the late 1980s (Ong, 2004). On April 7, 1999, the IOC accepted Beijing as host city.

1.6.7 Dutch Bid
Recently, the Netherlands was preparing itself for preparing a bid in 2018 for hosting the 2028 Olympics. A lot of research has been done already by the Ministries and some businesses (i.e. Deloitte) about the environmental impacts, investment possibilities, feasibility of the project, corporation strategies and social support. Although there were positive signs from the private site to invest in the Games on the 29th of October the new Dutch governmental agreement (in Dutch: het regeerakkoord) abruptly stopped all preparations:

“Although mega-sporting events can be of added value for the Dutch economy the hosting of such an event embodies large financial risks. Due to low public support from Dutch tax-payers and government during times of major national cutbacks we will not further invest in the Dutch Bid 2028 (Regeerakkoord, 2012).”
II Theories
Chapter 2: Theories

This research will explicitly focus on the legacy and legacy planning in previous Olympic processes and not on the delivery and organisation of the event. Therefore the Olympics need to be placed into the urban area development context. In paragraph §2.1 an introduction about urban area development projects is given and then related to Olympic urban area developments projects. Paragraph §2.2 highlights general topics such as legacy planning, urban regeneration and sustainability will be described. In paragraph §2.3 the role and involvement of different stakeholders in the process is explained and paragraph §2.4 the tension field is described. In paragraph §2.5 the theories are applied to the Olympic process and legacy planning and §2.6 helps to understand the role and position of the transitional period.

2.1 Urban Area Development

2.1.1 Urban Area Development projects

Urban area development projects (UAD-projects) are a common used instrument to upgrade the urban environment and to give a solution to existing urban problems (like a poor image, deprived areas, social conflicts etc.). UAD-projects consist of integral projects in which many stakeholders, public and private, are involved with many different interests. UAD-projects act on different governmental levels, namely local, regional or national. To deliver urban developments for the benefit of the city and its citizens urban strategies are designed as leading elements through the whole process. Franzen et al. (2011) state that the entire process of urban area development projects is divided into four recognisable phases:

- INITIATION
- PLANNING
- REALISATION
- MAINTENANCE

2.1.2 Olympic Urban Area Development projects

Organising large-scale urban events, like the Olympics, have become part of urban strategies by governments to improve the urban structure, to promote the city’s image in an international showcase and create economic growth. These major events generate attention, investments and potential for the organising city and thus act as a development engine. Many cities showed that even without actually hosting such a major event a city could already benefit from the catalytic-effect to speed up existing urban developments.

Table 2.1 gives a clear overview of the increasing number of urban investment generated by hosting the Olympics.

Table 2.1. History of urban investment by sector: Olympic Games 1892-2004, by Poynter & MacRury (2012)
Until the Olympics in Rome (1960) most investments made were related to sporting facilities and housing. From then on investments in transport, urban culture, the environment and telecommunications (which is assumed to be upgraded by every city) became part of the Olympic developments. The grey parts indicate upgrades to existing facilities and the black parts are new constructed facilities.

Time in an Olympic city can be divided into three periods (see table 2.2). There is the pre-Games period, which can last for a decade or even two: developing a successful bid plan and then organising the Games. Secondly, there is Games period with a duration of three weekends and two weeks – a mere 16 or 17 days – which pass for most in a twinkling of an eye. The post-Games period is by far the longest; it stretches for decades after the Games. However, it is clearly the least-planned period (Cashman, 1998).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympic Periods</th>
<th>Consists of</th>
<th>Duration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-Games period</td>
<td>develop a successful bid plan and then</td>
<td>between 7-15 years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>organising the Games themselves</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Games period</td>
<td>the event itself, matches, medal ceremonies etc.</td>
<td>three weekends and two weeks, 16-17 days</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-Games period</td>
<td>after-use of the venues</td>
<td>many decades</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.2: Cashman, 1998

In the beginning of the 20th century Olympic host cities only had to invest in upgrading existing (sporting) facilities and a few new venues. The amount of spectators, media and athletes was acceptable and applicable without large urban improvements. Nowadays, costs for infrastructural improvements rise and cities have to better plan the after-use of the Games to prevent new facilities from being left unused and the Olympic park from becoming abandoned.

In figure 2.2 the Olympic process is divided into five distinct phases. The intention to bid for the Olympics mostly starts from a public point of view by the local or national government or a public leader. Reasons for this initiation are diverse but are used by many cities: international prestige, promotion of national strength and unity, city beautification, re-development of deprived areas and improvement of the economy. If this intention finds support the National Olympic Committee (NOC) could submit the city to become an applicant city, see table 2.3. Applicant cities then have to deliver the applicant documents and if approved they are added to the candidate shortlist. The next step is to create a bid (book). Cities have less than a year then to establish a decent plan for hosting the Olympics, therefore they have to fulfil to an enormous list of requirements.

After cities delivered their bid books, the evaluation commission of the IOC makes some visits to the candidate cities to analyse if their bids are realistic and which one is most in favour of hosting the Games. More than half a year later the IOC announces the host city, which from then on has only seven years to deliver the event (and legacy). In the last year of this preparation period many facilities (stadiums) have to be finished already to do some testing, which makes the preparation phase even shorter. The Olympic Games are held in 17 days and after a short break the Paralympics starts (also 17 days). Then the longest period starts, sporting venues and facilities are transformed into public amenities and new tenants (sport clubs, offices, housing etc.) are moving in. In this after-Olympic period (legacy) the real impact of the Games becomes clear.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 16, 2011</td>
<td>NOC’s can submit names of applicant cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Until July 29, 2011</td>
<td>Applicant cities to inform IOC of alternate Games dates proposals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1, 2011</td>
<td>Deadline to confirm submission of applicant cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 15, 2012</td>
<td>Applicant file due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 2012</td>
<td>Announcement of candidate shortlist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2013</td>
<td>Candidate file ‘bid books’ due</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March – April 2013</td>
<td>IOC Evaluation Commission visits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 2013</td>
<td>Evaluation report published by IOC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 7, 2013</td>
<td>Winner announce at IOC session</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.3. Bidding phase for 2020

### 2.2 Legacy

#### 2.2.1 Outcomes of Urban Area Development projects

Urban area development projects are mainly led by public bodies to better control the integration and delivery of public demands. Although different interests conflict (public and private) the objectives stay clear during the process. During the process it is possible for some stakeholders involved to monitor the process and change if necessary for the benefit of the city and its citizens. In comparison with major event-led regeneration (or urban area development) projects the priority of staging the event, in this research the Olympics, makes it even harder to steer on long term objectives. Due to an immovable deadline and international pressure a city has to deliver the event on time, which results in changes to planning and strategies.

Some critics state that hosting the Olympics is not an ideal method to deliver an urban regeneration project, due to the high priority of delivering the event. Cities and city leaders are afraid of being left with amenities afterwards (i.e. venues and infrastructure), which were developed especially for the Games and are not necessary for the city. The IOC therefore promotes and supports sustainable developments and wants cities to better integrate their local demands and steer on these during the process (IOC Charter, 2011). This is called ‘legacy planning’. In this paragraph we will get into this topic.

#### 2.2.2 Legacy planning

In essence, the Olympics can be seen as a temporary invasion of Nomads on a new location every four years or like a circus that travels around the world. Their path (from city to city) and legacy (what they leave behind) is unclear. This role of this legacy embodies the most important aspects of Olympic-led regeneration. The Oxford dictionary describes legacy as ‘something left or handed down by an ancestor or a predecessor’.

The IOC (2003) describes Olympic legacy as ‘multi-disciplinary and dynamic and is affected by a variety of local and global factors. Therefore it is a local and global concept, existing within cities, regions and nations, as well as internationally’. So, it is clear that legacy indicates something that is left behind after, in this case the Olympic Games.

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Legacies can be planned and unplanned, positive and negative, intangible and tangible although most pre-event studies focus only on the planned, positive and tangible dimensions. To further complicate the understanding of legacy, it is of an undetermined duration, which makes it nearly
impossible to quantify. Finally, the same legacy may be positive for one industry (e.g. tourism) and negative for another (e.g. the environment). The same legacy may be viewed positively or negatively, depending on who is making the assessment (Preuss, 2006).

Since 2001 the importance of decent after-use planning has become an important element of the bid of candidate cities – since London 2012 better known as ‘legacy planning’.

2.2.3 Olympic-led regeneration

“The ultimate sports event in terms of place competition, profile and potential for urban regeneration is the global spectacle of the Olympic Games (Short & Kim 1999).”

Due to the increasing scale the Olympics are nowadays seen as a catalyst for urban change by creating investment and attracting attention to a specific area. Large-scale sporting events
Contribute to urban regeneration; act as vehicles for levering funds from regional, national and supra-national agencies; induce opportunities for funding wider regeneration programmes; generate publicity for host cities; and showcase opportunities in the city linking events and regeneration (Smith, 2007).

“Unless parallel initiatives are pursued, large-scale events should be regarded as branding, promotional tools or ways of leveraging, rather than as a genuine instrument for urban regeneration (Tallon, 2010).”

If a city wants to use the Olympic event as a catalyst for urban regeneration, a clear problem statement and plan of approach is necessary. In Table 2.4 the urban regeneration principles by Robert & Sykes (2000) are translated into the thoughts behind the regeneration in London (2012), with the Olympics as catalyst.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ten principles of Urban Regeneration:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Based upon a detailed analysis of the condition of an urban area;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>improving the lives and living conditions of the people in East London (deteriorated area needed an upgrade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Aimed at the simultaneous adaptation of the physical fabric, social structures, economic base and environmental condition of an urban area;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>redevelopment of the entire area in terms of sustainable developments (social, economic and physical)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Attempt to achieve this through the generation and implementation of a comprehensive and integrated strategy.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>the Olympic games as a catalyst for urban change and investment, the Olympic will generate the first investment that will speed up the regeneration and create a decent base for further developments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ensure a strategy and the resulting programmes of implementation are developed in accord with the aims of sustainable development;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staging the Games, integrating the Olympic Plan into the Regeneration plans of East London. Invest in sustainable developments, decrease unnecessary expenses by using existing facilities and creating temporary venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Set clear operational quantifiable objectives;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create affordable housing - Create a vibrant park for the neighbouring boroughs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Create new jobs - Get people involved in and enthusiastic about sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Improve the infrastructure - Clean up the soil, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Make the best possible use of natural, economic, human and other resources, including land and existing features.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- revitalizing the land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- special environmental programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- human involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Seek to ensure consensus through the fullest possible participation and co-operation of all stakeholders.;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>organizational structure with strong emphasis on legacy creation and integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Recognize the importance of measuring the progress of strategy towards the achievement of specified objectives and monitoring the changing nature of the internal and external forces which act upon the areas;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishment of the Government Olympic Executive (GOE) that monitors and evaluates the process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Accept the likelihood that initial programmes of implementation will need to be revised in-line with such changes as occur;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>changes due to time and budget occur in all Olympic initiations. The creation of an outline-planning framework that is flexible to changes in the market.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Recognize the reality that the various elements of a strategy are likely to make progress at different speeds.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This research will make use of the model of Daamen (2010). This model can identify the different elements (resources) of a strategy in the London case that are most important to make progress at a certain stage.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.4. Adjusted from Roberts & Sykes (2000)
2.2.4 Sustainability
Since 2002 (IOC), sustainable developments and minimising waste (unnecessary expenses) became an important aspect on the Olympic agenda. Sustainable development can be described as ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs’ (Tomlinson, 1987).

An example of the new policy formulation of the 1990s, which is evident both in general domain of politics and in urban policy, is the acceptance of the need to work in accord with the environmental objectives of sustainable development. This could be a final illustration of the way in which the inheritance of the past and the challenges of the present help to shape urban regeneration (Robert & Sykes, 2000).

Concluding, sustainability is incorporated in an Olympic initiation that is aiming for an efficient legacy. In this way the legacy can be seen as urban renewal for the benefit of the city and its citizens.
2.3 Organisational involvement
The reality is often more volatile than first imagined in the progression of successive phases, from initiation, planning, realisation to maintenance (see figure 2.1). This means that during the process ambitions may alter, due to political changes, involved parties may pull out and new ones can join which result in a restart of (parts of) the project. So during the process power- and influence levels of several stakeholders can dramatically change (Franzen et al, 2011).

In the Olympic process some parties (like the Organising Committee and the IOC) involved are only interested in delivering a successful event, where other more public parties are mainly interested in the long-term and local outcomes, the legacy.

The text below illustrates the difficult playing field during the Olympic process (in London):

“In relation to preceding examples London 2012 has perhaps the most complex governance structure involving several tiers of government, quasi-state agencies, national sport bodies, regional authorities and local boroughs (including the designated five Olympic boroughs). The unfolding of the Olympics project and its location within the wider Thames Gateway scheme, involve complex networks of institutions operating within tightly determined temporal and spatial conditions. Under such conditions it is not possible to fulfil the expectations of all stakeholders, nor is it possible to effectively integrate or embed these institutions in the local community. The achievement of ‘successful’ Games appears to rest upon the capacity to sustain the public rhetoric of partnership while local interests are increasingly dominated by national government supported by the city’s Mayor and the London Development Agency – an institution funded by central government but under the political guidance of the Mayor. Inevitably, a ‘state centred’ mode of governance defines the regeneration legacy. Weak local or civic voices may well result in a local legacy that primarily favours commercial viability rather than addressing the deep-seated and long term social, housing, employment and education issues facing East London (Poynter and MacRury, 2009: 309)”

The Olympic Games is the most popular sporting event in the world. Like Short (2008) states the Games are a global event that unfolds in a particular place. It can give international allure to a particular place in the world. This global-local context makes the Olympics such an interesting event to host. One of the disadvantages of such an enormous international oriented event is the conflicting interest during the organisation of such a widely discussed theme, see paragraph 2.4. Questions rise up like ‘should a city aspire such big international ambitions’ or ‘should local objectives makes place for international interests’.

These multiple organizations and stakeholders involved in hosting the Olympic Games each with their own mandate and tasks can lead to lack of accountability regarding the legacy strategies (Agha et al., 2011). Chen & Spaans (2009) describe the impact of the globally mediated television broadcasting and advances in communications technology on the unique feeling of being in a ‘global village’ and the ‘one world awareness’.

Almost all preceding Games had to deal with international pressure, lack of time, local and global conflicts, resistance of the residents and economic setbacks. Hereafter the most important stakeholders will be described by addressing their responsibilities and focus area (global or local, event or legacy) and their changing role in the transitional period. This transitional period can be seen as the period just after the event, when responsibilities were unclear in former Olympics. New agreements and organisations had to be established for the after-use of the park and venues, see paragraph 2.6.
“Most successful events are those that create effective synergies between stakeholders so that they can assist each other in achieving their objectives (Agha et al., 2011).”

When conducting a stakeholder analysis, the power, legitimacy and urgency of each stakeholder’s claims should be assessed (Mitchell et al., 1997; Hede, 2008) and one way of doing so includes developing a stakeholder map, see table 2.5.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GLOBAL</th>
<th>LOCAL (London)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IOC – International Olympic Committee</td>
<td>NOC – National Olympic Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>LOCOG – London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IFs – International Sports Federation</td>
<td>ODA – Olympic Delivery Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCOG – Organising Committee Olympic Games</td>
<td>LLDC – London Legacy Development Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Media (OBS – Olympic Broadcasting Services)</td>
<td>GLA - Greater London Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International sporting, cultural and leisure organisations</td>
<td>Mayor of London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Local government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Athletes</td>
<td>Local organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic tourists</td>
<td>Businesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transfer institutions like OGI and OGKM</td>
<td>Regeneration Agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Environmental organisations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Olympic Host Boroughs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.5. stakeholder overview

2.3.1 International Olympic Committee

This committee, established on 23 June 1894 by Pierre de Coubertin, is the supreme authority of the Olympic Movement and is in charge of organising the Olympic Games of the modern era (1st Athens 1896) as stated on the official Olympic website (2012).

“The goal of the Olympic Movement is to contribute to building a peaceful and better world by educating youth through sport practiced without discrimination or any kind, in a spirit of friendship, solidarity and fair play (olympic.org, 2012).”

The IOC is the leader of this Olympic Movement (OM) and thereby owns all the rights in and to the Olympic Games and Olympic properties with the potential to generate revenues for such purposes (Olympic Charter, 7th July 2011).

When looking to the event the IOC is the main body that sets the requirements, selects the host cities and then supervises the event. Regarding the legacy, the role of the IOC is mainly supporting (IOC Charter, 2011):

- To encourage and support a responsible concern for environmental issues, to promote sustainable development in sport and to require that the Olympic Games are held accordingly;
- To promote a positive legacy from the Olympic Games to the host cities and host countries;

Nowadays, one of the biggest struggles of the host city is the ‘hard’ requirements set by the IOC, like necessary seating, spectator flows and size of the stadiums, special Olympic Lanes for officials, security aspects, size of the Olympic park etc. Although the IOC aims for sustainable Olympics, due to these requirements unnecessary expenses will be made by the host city.
Role in the transitional period

Due to organisations like the Transfer of Knowledge (TOK) and the Olympic Games Impact (OGI) studies the IOC is willing to help hosting cities to more efficiently organize the event and provide information and expertise from preceding examples. Although the IOC integrated sustainable developments (legacy) as an important element of the bidding process (since 2001), they still lack the real ambition and expertise to really assist future host cities to organize the event in such a way that a decent legacy for the city and its citizens is created. Thereby the documents they deliver to host cities are nothing more than list of requirements, containing the elements that need to be delivered instead of an explanation how to deliver.

The IOC has several evaluation commissions, which analyse if host cities really deliver what they promised in their bid. The IOC has the ability to give a yellow or a red card, respectively a warning and a cancellation of the event, to the host city. Athens did not show any signs of progress directly after winning the bid. Athens threw away several years after winning the bid by re-writing their legacy plans, which resulted in extreme construction delays and no clear after-use planning. In the end they had to speed up the process, whereby delivering on time had the priority and legacy concerns and minimising waste and unnecessary expenses became less relevant. But no cards were given.

The IOC is in the fortunate position not to adapt their requirements to give future host cities more flexibility in ways how they could deliver the event and could better invest in necessary facilities and venues (in legacy). Although the president of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, frequently speaks about the importance of legacy integration, the IOC does not really have the ambition to fully incorporate legacy into their core-mentality. Therefore their role according to the transitional period is lacking in decisiveness. Their only focus is still on the delivery of the event and less on delivering all intended strategies, certainly according to legacy creation.

Figure 2.6. Olympic flag and flame
2.3.2 Organising Committee (OCOG)

After stated the intention to host the Olympics the city and the National Olympic Committee establish an Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (OCOG), which will be responsible for the organisation of the event. First, the OCOG will set out several possible scenarios to host the Olympics and will select one, in coordination with the National Olympic Committee.

The composition of an OCOG consists of some national NOC members, namely the president and secretary general, and one or more representing members of the host city. Next to these members the committee mostly consist of representatives of public authorities or secondees from commercial parties or other interesting figures (official website, 2012).

During the pre-Olympic period and during the event the OCOG needs to fulfil their tasks according to the Olympic Charter and the contracts with the IOC, NOC and the host city. OCOG has strong control in the preparation phase, because the event has to be delivered correctly, on time and without (too much) negative media attention. The official website (Olympic.org, 2012) states several tasks of the OCOG.

Role in the transitional period

Despite legacy’s inclusion as a vital part of an Olympic bid, there is little incentive for the OCOG to focus on creating legacy when their responsibility is to deliver the Games and the world press is busy critiquing the minutiae of their organizational strategies. Although legacy is required as an important part of an Olympic bid, it is the local community that gains or losses from an Olympic legacy, not the event organizers – especially as the OCOG disbands within a few months after the completion of the event (Agha et al., 2011).

OCOG is leading during the pre-event period and during the event it has total control. The harsh thing is that their control and involvement almost directly after the event stops. OCOG does not have any responsibility or liability according to the legacy and therefore has a free pass to only evaluate their own business and records; the organisation of the event.

In many preceding Olympics the IOC was seen as the main client of the OCOG’s. In figure 2.7 a general stakeholder overview is given in former Olympics. The dominance of event-oriented organisations becomes very clear.

![Organisational setup in preceding Olympics](image_url)

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*ISF* International Sporting Federations  
*IOC* International Olympic Committee  
*Government* National | Regional | Local  
*NOC* National Olympic Committee  
*OCOG* Organising Committee of the Olympic Games  
*CC* Construction Company  
*Sports projects*  
*Civic projects*  

*Event oriented*  
*Legacy oriented*
2.3.3 Legacy oriented companies

In former Olympic Games the role of the legacy oriented bodies was not very clear stated and organised, which has led to unsuccessful after-use of the park and venues. After-use was taken into account, but more seen as something that will just happen afterwards.

For the first time in the Olympic history London established a special legacy organisation, responsible for the after-use of the venues and the park. Barcelona, Sydney and Beijing made an attempt to establish such an organisation, but due to late involvement in the planning process the decisiveness of these legacy-oriented companies was not sufficient. London was the first city that integrated such an organisation already in the pre-Olympic period (see more in paragraph 5.2)

The role of this legacy corporation was stated as:

"To promote and deliver physical, social, economic and environmental regeneration in the Olympic Park and surrounding area, in particular by maximising the legacy of the Olympic and Paralympic Games, by securing high-quality sustainable development and investment, ensuring the long-term success of the facilities and assets within its direct control and supporting and promoting the aim of convergence (londonlegacy.co.uk)"

Role in the transitional period

Like stated before, the role of former legacy oriented companies was negligible during the pre-event period. Legacy oriented corporations were mostly established after the event or when facilities were already delivered, see cases Barcelona and Sydney in annex I.

Legacy oriented corporations are crucial in a city’s ambition to use the Olympics as a catalyst for (large-scale) urban developments. Therefore their commitment, control and involvement should be integrated from the beginning. But more important their mandate and possibilities to interact should be very powerful to interact with dominant (event-related) stakeholders like IOC and OCOG. In paragraph 5.2 the creation and process of such a legacy corporation is described.

2.3.4 Government (local-regional-national)

The involvement of governmental bodies in former Olympics was diverse. Cities like Barcelona 1992 and Beijing 2008 had strong governmental involvement and influence. Contrary, their involvement in Atlanta was limited.

For decent legacy planning local (and national) objectives need to be taken into account by governmental organisation. They should have the mandate to influence the Organising Committee’s programme and IOC’s requirements and could thereby steer on the integration of local demands into the Olympic plan.

In London, the Mayor had a dominant role in the Olympic initiation (Ken Livingstone) by spreading the word of the Legacy-Games that London wanted to host. His successor, Boris Johnson, subsequently was committed to give the legacy plan main priority above the event issues. He therefore even changed the mandate of the special Legacy organisation to be sure that the legacy will be delivered in a way that the city and its citizens will benefit in the end.
**Role in the transitional period**

The focus of governmental organisations is mainly on local scale. It could happen that a city integrates nationwide objectives into their local objectives and thereby want to upgrade their international image, trading position and want to increase tourism.

The focus of governmental authorities during the whole Olympic process is local oriented, with an aim to showcase the local qualities in an international context. They have to steer on decent legacy planning and therefore have to be dominant (involved) from beginning till end of the process. Especially in the years prior to the event governmental bodies should be dominantly involved in the process to secure that local objectives will be integrated in the plans.

2.3.5 Private parties

The private parties are represented by investors, multinationals, service providers and individuals. For example the Olympics in Los Angeles 1984 were initiated by private parties and thus almost entirely privately financed and organised. The Games of 1996 in Atlanta also showed a more private incentive.

IOC's opinion after the Olympics of 1996 was never to host a completely ‘private’ Olympiad anymore. The big problem was that the designed public-private-partnership could not work, because the municipal government was side-lined from the developments. Thereby the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was a private body, they could neglect the wishes of the society (Chalkley & Essex, 1999, Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

By stating this subsequent Games had to incorporate public bodies with local commitment. The role of the private parties did decrease in terms of control, but in terms of finance the private sector is still an important source of funding and in the end find long-term users for the venues and new facilities.

**Role in the transitional period**

Private parties are mainly interested in using the momentum of the Games, trying to connect their brand to the success of the Olympics, re-image as a sportive and generous sponsor, or by just showing they are willing to invest. For service providers the Olympics consists of an interesting case study for future projects. They can show their ability to deliver in such an enormous project, with so many stakeholders involved and with an immovable deadline.

During the period up to the event media attention rises enormously and in this period private parties can be part of positive promotion in an international showcase. Private parties, except from the ones that will be part of the legacy (as users) not always have the commitment to invest in the legacy for the citizens. Many investors are only interested in the pre-Olympic and event-period and lack the commitment to invest in the legacy afterwards.

It is hard to describe the role of the private parties in the transitional period due to the diversity in this group. Some parties can be locally rooted and aim for local objectives during the entire process, while others can be multinationals that just want to be part of the spectacle and grant their name to the Olympics.
2.4 Urban Dilemma: global ↔ local

2.4.1 Introducing the conflict
Organising large-scale international sporting events brings international exposure and attraction into a specific local place. The Olympics represent the largest international sporting event in a chosen city. Local organisations (public and private) have to manage, interact and deliver local developments with strong international surveillance, by the IOC and media. The organising city has the chance to aim for a better international position, physical improvements in the urban environment and a boost for the local economy by attracting businesses and tourism.

On the one hand, cities like Sydney and Beijing saw their international position as economic hub improve due to an increase in businesses and tourism. On the other hand, they were left with empty stadiums and an abandoned Olympic Park. Here we find an important conflict between what is good for the country and what is good for the local residents. So do Olympic cities want to show what they are capable of regardless to the price they have to pay to improve their international position (Beijing 2008)? Or does the ability to steer on local improvements (social, physical and economical) have a higher priority (Barcelona 1992 and London 2012)?

2.4.2 Theories
The formulation of an area development strategy is directly influenced by the way the particular locality views itself and the outside world and the way political and economic institutions function within the area development process (Chen, 2007). In her dissertation Chen (2007) describes the process of the redevelopment of Pudong area in Shanghai and analyses the motives and reasons why these developments occurred so rapidly and how global and local forces interacted. The rise of globalisation is a result of the increase in international competition due to new infrastructural technologies that fade out barriers. Chen (2007) states that globalisation generates and accelerates enormous fluctuations in cross-border economic processes, in the flow of capital, labour, goods, raw materials and travellers, and the resulting concentration and global dispersal of manufacturing, services and international business.

Globalisation is a contingent, non-uniform, temporal mesh of processes that do not lead to simple homogenisation; globalisation also initiates a myriad of local interpretations and transformations (Castells, 1996, p. 417)

Borja and Castells (1997) argued that a general awareness of global challenges led to the undertaking of large-scale projects of urban transformation, a phenomenon that has emerged in cities all around the world. Such projects involve a cooperative alliance between the public, private and civic interests and a shared desire for the city to progress, politically, economically, socially and culturally. All this has led to the emergence of large-scale urban transformation projects, so-called ‘Urban Mega Projects’ (UMPs), projects which are considered to be particularly significant to the remaking of a city because of their size or impact on part of the city, or on the city and its surrounding region as a whole (Carmona, 2003: 15). The Olympics are such an UMP.

Projects of this kind are good sources of material for discovering how ‘the local emerges in a globalising world’ (Appadurai, 1996: 18). Chen (2007) describes that although globalization could generate positive influence on various economic aspects of urban life, sometimes it is counterbalanced by the negative effects suffered by certain groups, i.e. fear of the loss of local
identity and culture, deterioration in social or environmental conditions and social confrontation caused by the increasing polarisation of winners and losers.

But what does all this really mean for the urban space? Knox (1996) states that when global and local forces interact urban space as a product is neither place-bounded, nor solely the result of capital, people, images, icons, signs and symbols. Borja and Castells (1997) state that the transformation of urban space is achieved by large-scale projects of urban development and redevelopment.

‘The government of the city faces a paradox. On the one hand, globalization enhances the role of local governments (the principle of proximity), and large, complex action programmes that are also highly localised require precisely institutions and political bodies that keep very closely to their territories. On the other hand, local governments have little or no international presence; they are subject to legislation, and depend for their resources on national governments (and sometimes regional governments too); they have a relatively weak position with respect to public or private economic groups; large-scale strategic action plans are not in their field of responsibility (or are only partially so); and furthermore they correspond to a metropolitan city that is fragmented in institutional terms’ (Borja and Castells, 1997, p. 174).

Of course, it does not all depends on the ability of a city to organize a UMP. A city should have the ability of decent national politics to respond to the external environment (Wang, 2004). It is not about ‘that’ a city delivers, it is about ‘how and what’ a city delivers.

Concluding, it is necessary that a hosting city should clearly describe the intentions and goals on local and global level and they should establish an organisational structure in which both forces are well coordinated. In this way the city (or local government) will be able to steer on local improvements and thereby give space to private investments, which could result in a successful delivery of a large-scale urban transformation project.
2.5 Applied theories

In paragraph 1.5 a short introduction to the term strategy was given. In this paragraph the term will first be placed into the urban area development (UAD) context and further explained. Later on it will be placed into the Olympic context.

In an UAD-project many forces (internal and/or external) emerge, which can result in unrealised strategies or unintended strategies (developments). Mintzberg is well known because of his research on strategic management and strategic spatial planning. To illustrate the process of strategy implementation he created figure 2.8. This figure shows how the process of an intended strategy changes due to external and internal forces. These forces can occur during the entire process, which results in a realised strategy that can be found between deliberate strategies and emergent strategies. This means that realized strategies can only be fully recognised in retrospect, as a ‘pattern’ understood as consistency in behaviour over time (Mintzberg, 1998).

![Figure 2.8 Deliberate and emergent strategies (Mintzberg, 1998: 12)](image)

According to Giddens (1984), our behaviour is the result of a constant consideration between what we are able to do (based on resources) and what we feel is allowed (based on formal and informal rules). Strategy, then, represents the capacity to act, but only in relationship to others. This means that strategy is understood as force: it is the force of actors to realize a particular goal according to their knowledge of what they can and cannot do in relation to others (Daamen, 2010).

This thesis will provide us with urban legacy strategies in the end, which means the term strategy has to be explained in an urban development context; the Urban development project. In the end of this paragraph the theory by Mintzberg (1992), Giddens (1984) and Daamen (2010) will be applied to establish a strategic model according to the Olympic process. This strategic model provides us with the opportunity to analyse and understand strategies in an Olympic Urban Development Project (O-UDP).
2.5.1 Effective strategies
Although each Olympiad is located in a different location, which makes the strategic situation unique, Mintzberg (1992) defines some common criteria that define a good strategy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common criteria to define a good strategy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clear, decisive objectives</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specific goals of subordinate units may change in the heat of campaigns or competition, but the overriding goals of the strategy for all units must remain clear enough to provide continuity and cohesion for tactical choices during the time horizon of strategy. During the Olympic process international pressure and forces can form a strong resistance, clear objectives need to be written down or numerically precise.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Maintaining the initiative</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategy should have an active course to enhance commitment, to increase the options available and decrease costs. The Olympic legacy strategies should give an active guidance through the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Concentration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A distinctive competency yields greater success with fewer resources and is the essential basis for higher gains (or profits) than competitors. The urban legacy strategies provided in the end of this thesis should be focusing on the superior power at the place and time likely to be decisive.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Flexibility</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The strategies should include reserve capabilities, planned manoeuvrability and repositioning to make adjustments possible during the process.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coordinated and committed leadership</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Successful strategies require commitment, not just acceptance. In the Olympic process, specific stakeholders need to be responsible (and accountable) to implement the strategies efficiently. Therefore urban legacy strategies need to be targeted to a specific body or person.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Surprise</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With surprise and correct timing, success can be achieved out of all proportion to the energy extracted and can decisively change strategic positions. Timing is crucial for the Olympic event. A clear date is set and all developments should be delivered on time. Due to this emergent character the Olympics can act as a catalyst for urban change and can speed up processes.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is important to take into account the level of security that is related within these strategies. Sudden external forces need be prevented or tackled by decent planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2.6 by Mintzberg (1992)

2.5.2 Formulation of Strategy
Mintzberg (1997) makes a division between the formulation and implementation of a strategy. The formulation consists of four steps how to formulate a corporate strategy. In this end of this research urban legacy strategies will be formulated, therefore we can find some similarities with the formulation of a corporate strategy.

The 1st step is to identify opportunities and threats and attach some estimates or risk to the discernible alternatives (Andrews in Mintzberg, 1992). The 2nd step is to determine the strengths and weaknesses and appraise them together with the resources on hand and available. The 3rd step for a corporate strategy is focusing on individual/personal values and aspirations. The 4th step indicates that some alternatives may seem to be more attractive than others when the public good or service to society is considered.

Concluding, the term strategy is described, thereby the method to define effective strategies was given and the formulation of a strategy was explained. The next step is to understand how a strategy can be implemented. The in-depth case study in London will help the reader to understand how strategies in London were delivered and will give insight in how future host cities should implement the legacy strategies.
2.5.3 Implementation of Strategy

The implementation of a strategy is comprised of a series of sub-activities, which are primarily administrative. The role of personal leadership is important and sometimes decisive in the accomplishment of strategy (Mintzberg, 1992). Mintzberg (1992) divides the implementation of strategy into three parts:

1. Organizational structure and relationship,
2. Organizational processes and behaviour,
3. Top leadership.

Again we have to relate these steps to the Olympic context, see figure 2.9.

Figure 2.9 Formulation UD-strategies

In practice, urban development projects are signified by concrete material interventions in a geographically bounded urbanized area. The strategies behind these projects essentially consist of decisions and actions, which are produced by actors who intend to realize buildings, infrastructure and public space (Daamen, 2010).

As mentioned before the Olympic Games can be seen as a catalyst for urban development projects. It thereby usually acts as an urban development projects itself, with sports in it. It therefore consists of material interventions – i.e. sporting venues, infrastructure, public amenities and housing – in a geographically bounded area, which after the event will be urbanized.

Following Giddens’ theory (1984), we assumed that the urban development force is created by mobilizing resources that consist of two types: allocative and authoritative. Allocative resources involve control over tangible products or means of production. These allow actors to persuade others to do things they would otherwise not do or choose to do differently. The four resources we propose to effect the realization of an urban development project are property, finance, instruments, and time/result (Daamen, 2010). In the table below the comparison of these resources is made within the Olympic context:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Resources that effect the realization of an UDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>property: venues, infrastructure, housing, facilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>finance: investments, sponsorships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>instruments: UD tools, authorities, regulations, legislation and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>time/result: clear deadline, list of requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Authoritative resources are much less tangible. These enable people to determine and coordinate the decisions and actions of others. In this category, we propose information, expertise, legitimacy, and dedication as four distinct urban development resources. Together, these eight resources are proposed to create the urban development force necessary to make projects come to life.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Four distinct urban development resources</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>information: communication, public involvement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>expertise: new organisational structures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>legitimacy: Olympic requirement and regulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dedication: …</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The second way Giddens’ theory has been specified is by categorizing the strategic decisions and actions by which certain resources are mobilized. Therefore Daamen (2010) employed a four-fold definition of strategy, as devised by Canadian management scientist Henry Mintzberg (2007). He argues that when people pursue a common intent in an organized way, four different strategic activities can be identified: planning, venturing, visioning and learning, see figure 2.10. In figure 2.11 the division by Giddens (1984), authoritative and allocative, and the division in strategies by Mintzberg (1998) in deliberate and emergent is integrated.

![Figure 2.10 four strategic activities by Mintzberg (2007)](image1)

![Figure 2.11 Strategic activities divided](image2)

To better understand the real strategies behind contemporary urban development projects Daamen (2010) provided a power interpretation of the things people actually do in order to realize an urban development project, figure 2.12. This interpretation is built around a fourfold definition of strategy – planning, venturing, learning and visioning – and connects it to eight distinct resources that actors involved need to mobilize in order to realize an urban development project: property, finance, information, expertise, legitimacy, commitment, instruments and time/result. With this model urban development project strategies can be comprehensively evaluated and reflected upon.
Planning -
In the Olympic process we can appoint all four strategic activities. In the initiation phase the host city has to deliver several documents to become a candidate city. It therefore has to plan how they are going to attend and deliver. The following steps are described in the planning documents. In these documents the city has to describe how they are going to deliver the event and the deliverables such as venues, facilities and infrastructure.

Visioning -
Mintzberg (2007) states ‘several organizations pursue a common goal’ for the Olympics this will be organising the Games. There are also some diverse goals, like legacy planning or making profit. In the initiation phase it is important that a certain vision is outlined, that the parties involved know how their common intent can be pursued. When a clear vision is set, further steps can be taken accordingly. The vision should guide the parties involved through the process.

Venturing -
This third strategic activity can be seen in the Olympic context as the playing field between parties involved with a common vision, but with different interests. They have to venture what and how they can deliver the developments. The city has to cooperate with private parties and Olympic organisations to deliver the intended objectives effectively. Thereby, all parties involved have to give and take some for the regret of the common intent.

Learning -
A fourth strategic activity can be found in the learning process. In the Olympic process public and private bodies have to collaborate and thereby use each others expertise and knowledge. Learning from other projects (UK or internationally) and learning from previous experience is instrumental for the efficiency and success of the delivery.
According to Mintzberg (2007), the strategic activities ‘planning and visioning’ cover the deliberate side of the process to realize its goals. ‘Venturing and learning’, however, concerns emergent decisions and actions that respond to unforeseen events and circumstances. These strategic decisions and actions are also responsive to what is enforced on the organization by the environment.

How can we apply this strategic model to the Olympic process. In figure 2.13 a five-step route is illustrated to get to an understanding of the strategic activities in the Olympic process. These steps and conclusions are a result of the literature study conducted for the five preceding Olympic Games. Step (1) shows that the Olympic process consists of five main phases. Step (2) and (3) convert these phases into the Olympic symbol. Step (4) is the strategic model by Daamen (2010). In step (5) the relation of the different strategic activities into the Olympic process is given.

To better understand step (5) we will describe the meaning of the illustration of each strategic activity. **Learning** can be seen in two ways, namely internal learning, which means all things learned during the process. Secondly, external learning, this includes the knowledge and expertise provided by preceding Games, projects, experts or secondees. **Visioning** is related to all phases and more functions as a strategic activity in the beginning of
each phase, as a sort of back bone. The vision (commitment and legitimacy) sets the direction. **Venturing** is the process of negotiating about what to deliver and how to deliver. Property in the project and finance have to be collected and appointed to start the next strategic activity, planning. **Planning** can be seen as the red line through the process. For each phase decent planning documents and strategies need to be established.

In this paragraph strategies of Urban Development projects were described by the Strategy-as-force model of Daamen (2010). All five Olympic phases do have a relation with one or more strategic activities of Mintzberg (2007). Now we have applied the theory to the Olympic process it is possible to establish an model in which both are combined, see figure 2.15. This model is called the ‘Kite Model’ due to its shape. On the x-axis the time is set out and on the y-as the impact (scale of the investments/outcomes). The different colours indicate the role of the strategic activities in the process, in which all four strategic activities are integrated.

In figure 2.14 the five Olympic phases are connected and together form the shape of a kite. The kite-line illustrates the process of considerations (venturing) in all phases, like global vs. local tensions, changes in commitment and support etc. Most phases start immediately after the preceding phase or even overlap (except for the event-phase). Due to strong regulations by the OCOG and IOC the host city has to deliver all venues a year before the start of the event,
because of security matters and tests. Shortly after the event there is a period in which the site is changing from a strong secured to an open area for the public, meanwhile some stadiums are dismantled or changed. The coloured lines in the figure illustrate the different strategic activities:

**Planning** - forms the leading thread running through the process and is thus involved in all Olympic phases. For every phase, *time and results* (‘when’ and ‘what’) need to be indicated and the (*how*) *instruments* need to be determined.

**Learning** - can be divided into ‘internal’ and ‘external.’ The inner circles represent the possible learning’s in each phase and the outer circle represents the learning before and after the event. It thereby uses knowledge from preceding Olympic processes (kites) or theory by collecting *information* and using *expertise*.

**Visioning** - forms the base of all five Olympic phases and embodies the vision that has to be expressed through the entire project. It does this by creating *commitment* and *legitimacy* in the beginning of each phase.

**Venturing** - can be seen as the process of negotiations and agreements during the entire process. It is a sort of iterative process in which the feasibility in terms of *property* and *finance* has to be calculated and (re)considered. Many former Olympic host cities suffered from major cost overruns. Therefore it is essential to do an effective and realistic assessment of the *property* and *finance* needed in an early phase.

Figure 2.14 only illustrates how the strategic activities could be seen in the Olympic process. This model is developed by knowledge and empirical research on former Olympic processes but can just be seen as a start-off. After chapter four, when the knowledge about five preceding Olympics is gathered, this model will be revised and the exact roles of each strategic activity will be illustrated. This will be done also after the analysis of the London Olympic process in chapter five. In the concluding chapter a comparison between ‘preceding Games’ and ‘London 2012’ will be made and constructed.
2.6 Transitional period

This research will provide you with a sound base to create and implement legacy strategies for future host cities. Preceding examples show that intended strategies are not always realised, which in several cases resulted in a legacy that did not fulfilled to local long-term demands. Examples are large stadiums left unused (white elephants), insufficient infrastructure and abandoned Olympic parks. Lot of information is written on planning of the intended legacy, but most research lacks the ability to provide future host cities with a decent organisational structure and planning for the most unclear period, namely the transitional period; the period just after the event, the start of the legacy.

In this transitional period there is a major shift from global to local. This research aims to provide future host cities with a better understanding of what actually happens. A spatial function change occurs; before, the area could be industrial land or a former housing district. After being awarded with hosting the Games it becomes a construction site for about seven years. During the event the area will function as a global space, where people from all over the world can meet and enjoy sports. After the event the site will be transformed into local functions for the city and its citizens.

In this paragraph the changes in this transitional period according to global and local focus and the changes in roles and responsibility of the different stakeholders will be described. After chapter four and five this model is been reflected upon and revised. Each period will be explained according to the strategic model by Daamen (2010).

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Figure 2.15 illustrates the role of the different strategic activities during the whole Olympic process. It is based on knowledge from preceding summer Olympics (1992-2008).

In figure 2.15 the three Olympic periods are described. The transitional period is located between the ‘event period’ and the ‘post-event period’, at least until the Olympics in London. Layer (1) illustrates the Olympic periods by Cashman (1998) in which the transitional period is integrated. Layer (2) illustrates the flow of local and global forces during the process. In the pre-event period the orientation starts locally (local initiative) and ends just before the event in a global peak (massive media attention and international stakeholders involved). After the event the orientation shifts back to local, but what happens in the transitional period is unclear. Layer (3) describes the relation of the phases (preparations, bid etc.) regarding the Olympic periods. In the end of chapter four and five a fourth layer will be added to explain the role and involvement of the strategic activities.

Although the intention starts locally and the Olympics are held in a city, most cities aimed to improve their international image, local pride and their international business role. From the beginning, the first plans have mainly a local focus, like improvement of a specific urban area in the city or the upgrade of existing sporting facilities. During the process more parties get involved, like the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Organising Committee (OCOG), International Sporting Federations (ISF) and national bodies (national or state government).
From that moment on the focus and attention is changing from local to more global. This shift continuous through the whole pre-Olympic period including the initiation-, bid- and preparation phase.

During the opening ceremony the whole world is watching how the organising city delivered. Spectators, media, international stakeholders and many others are waiting for this ultimate moment. During the event all parties involved are optimising the success of the event and are downsizing the chances of failure. “When the world comes to visit, a country’s greatest uncertainties are provoked (Clark, 2012).” Investing in decent security matters becomes more and more important these days, nowadays special security units are no superfluous luxury (like the Olympic Security Directorate (OSD) for London 2012).

Then after 17 days the Olympics are over and after a short transformation the Paralympics are held for 17 days as well. Media attention, spectators and athlete numbers decrease enormously after the Olympic period. The great momentum created up to the event makes place for a period that suffers from inadequate planning and unclear responsibilities. The Organising Committee wraps up (and several other parties involved), which include the demolition of all the security gates and fences and some event-related infrastructural improvements. Stadiums, facilities and infrastructure are left without any clear future use.

Thereby some desired tenants for the after-use of the stadiums are suddenly not that interested anymore. Organising cities in this transitional period have to deal with a change in urban atmosphere. Where the initiation, the winning of the bid and the preparations of the Olympics brought public participation and national pride, the uncertainty of future use of the Olympic venues then takes over the minds of most stakeholders and local residents. Thereby media is hungry for (negative) numbers about the total expenditures and start arguing the investment costs. Many cities (Barcelona, Sydney) had to re-organise their organisational set-up and had to establish special bodies for maintenance and finding tenants for the stadiums.

How can cities better structure this transitional period to prevent legacies from becoming unrealised or even worse being abandoned?

From 2001 legacy became an important point on the Olympic agenda (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). Cities tend to better plan their after-use but the first to really deliver is London. Therefore it is interesting to extract useful lessons about their process of legacy-planning and how they prevented the process from falling into such a transitional period, in which preceding host cities had to start over again. Paragraph 5.6.3 will give some very interesting insight in how London dealt with the pre-planning of this transitional period.
III Methodology
Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Research design

In this chapter the methods used will be described and the process of analysis is given. Lots of information about the impact of the games is available, but most of it lacks a decent structure in which the impact is categorized. The ones that are assessed properly make a division in tangible and intangible impact and thereby rank the outcomes into the three pillars of urban area development: environmental, social and economical. These three elements will help us to better understand ‘what’ is necessary for successful urban area development projects. In the end of this research not only the ‘what’ (the deliverables) of urban legacy strategies for future host cities will be given, also the ‘how’ (the delivery) will be described. To better understand the delivery a fourth pillar will be added, namely organisational. This pillar will give us more insight in the background, motives and instruments.

The division into environmental, social, economical and organisational is very useful for the analysis of preceding Olympics, 1992-2008, and will thereby provide the success factors from the past. To understand the process of the Olympics in Barcelona, Atlanta, Sydney, Athens and Beijing this research makes use of the theoretical model explained in paragraph 2.4. The analysis of London 2012 is an in-depth case, which means that is will be much more in detail than the analysis of the five preceding summer Games. It will thereby give more insight in how things were delivered (“how”) in relation to the five preceding cases.

Thus, the theoretical model running through both preceding Games and London 2012 is the strategic model by Daamen (2010) integrated with Mintzberg (1992) and Giddens (1984) theories on strategy (paragraph 2.5). In this way the strategies (‘what’) and the motives behind it (‘how’) will be assessed and will provide us with some necessary legacy strategies.

For the in-depth case of London the whole process will analysed by categorizing all elements into the eight distinct resources of urban development projects and the four involved strategic activities. Such detailed information will be gathered by interviews, documents, reviews, and presentations by involved key-players.

Parkinson (1996) states that a strategic approach to urban regeneration should have a clearly articulated vision and strategy and should specify how its chosen mechanisms and resources would help to achieve the long-term vision. It thereby has to integrate the different economic, social and environmental priorities of the regeneration strategy and thereby specify the role and contribution that the public, private and community partners would make to regeneration.
Figure 3.1 Research Framework

Figure 3.2 Deliverables in each chapter
3.2 Methodological Framework

In the figure 3.1 the methodological framework is illustrated. First, the conceptual aspects are described followed by the methods and techniques used.

![Methodological framework diagram]

3.3 Methods

3.3.1 Reliability

The goal of reliability is to minimize the errors and biases in a study (Yin, 1994). One of the hardest aspects in conducting a decent case analysis about preceding Olympics is avoiding subjectivity. As mentioned in the preface, the motive to conduct this research on Olympic-led regeneration derived from my visits to Athens, Torino, Beijing, Vancouver and recently London. Although my view of the Olympic process and delivery in Athens and Beijing is therefore slightly affected I strive to be objective by only using information out of reliable resources like books, publications and articles. To be certain if specific information is reliable the method ‘triangulation’ is used (Yin: 1984: 89-92).

"triangulation means that multiple sources of data (and research levels) were used when establishing events and their interconnections. Wherever possible, data from one source was checked against data from another source (Yin, 1984, pp. 89-92)."

Treatment of the information

Most information used for the analysis of preceding Olympics was collected out of books, documents and articles. There are some well-known researchers like Gold & Gold, Smith, Preuss, Cashman, Chalkley & Essex and Brunet, who already contributed a lot to ‘Olympic impact studies and analyses.’ We could rank these documents under the title ‘primary documents’. Articles and other documents will be categorized as ‘secondary’. The method ‘triangulation’ gives us the possibility to cross-compare these documents and make certain information more reliable.

For the in-depth case in London most information derived from documents by stakeholders like Olympic Delivery Authority, London Development Agency, London Legacy Development Corporation, London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games, International Olympic Committee, Department for Culture, Media and Sports and the Greater London Authority. Next to these documents information was checked by interviews with several key players involved. Not so much research was yet done on the impact of the Games for London, because the after-event period just started. To integrate the reliability in chapter five I will describe from with
source(s) the information is extracted and thereby make a division in what is intended and what is realised.

People that are involved in the Olympic process are mainly very passionate about things that happened and will emphasise more on the positive aspects than outline the negative ones. These people will not always give total openness about things that occurred during the process. Before conducting the interviews I made a division into three categories:

1. Informal questions: questions that will help me to better understand ‘what happened’ and ‘how’. The answers to these questions will not be directly related to findings, but will contribute to an overall understanding of the process;

2. Formal questions: these questions will confirm data from other sources (books, articles) that contribute to the extraction of new lessons or conclusions. Several documents seem to tell a different story, by verifying this information in the interviews errors can be taken out;

3. Open debate: during the interviews I always had my figures and visuals with me. I always tried not to show the interviewee what my conclusions were or how I compared the past experience and London, but I always asked them how they experienced it and what elements they think of as London-specific, that could be applicable for future host cities. By making such a division, a sort of hierarchy in types of reliability is established.

3.3.2 Collecting evidence

In fact documents must be carefully used and should not be accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken place. For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate (confirm) and augment evidence from other sources (Yin, 1994). Yin therefore created a table with the six sources of evidence, see figure 3.3. Green markers indicate which sources of evidence are used for this research.

3.3.3 Case analysis

Heurkens (2012) states that the case study methodology is mainly used to collect, analyse, compare, and draw lessons from research data. Case study methodology is a form of qualitative research; it enables us to create an understanding of complex issues. Case studies emphasize a detailed contextual analysis of a limited number of conditions and their relationship (Yin, 2003).

“The essence of a case study, the central tendency among all types of case study is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result (Schramm, 1971).”

In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when ‘how’- or ‘why-questions’ are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the focus is on a contemporary
phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 1994). The case study is not either a data collection tactic or merely a design feature alone, but a comprehensive research strategy (Stoecker, 1991).

Case studies have been done about decisions, about programs, about the implementation process, and about organisational change (Yin, 1994). These aspects will give very useful information and understanding in the analyses of past Olympic processes.

Yin (1994) describes five components of a research design, which are included in this research. First, the research design starts with study question(s), instead of propositions this exploratory research includes two main purposes: understanding of legacy planning and the functioning of the transition period. The definition of the unit (scope) of analysis is related to the way the initial research questions have been defined. The last two components consist of linking the data to purposes and criteria for interpreting the findings, which in this thesis can be seen as the lesson-drawing.

3.3.4 Selection of the cases
The case studies of preceding Games focuses on five summer Olympics, 1992-2008. As I have visited three summer Olympics (Athens, Beijing and London) and two winter Olympics (Torino and Vancouver) it became clear that the impact and investments for summer Olympics are much bigger than those for winter Olympics. Due to less participating athletes, lower spectator numbers and less media attention large infrastructural investments are not necessary. Most venues in Winter Olympics are located far outside the city centre (mountains), which results in less demand for legacy planning.

Barcelona 1992 is still seen as the best example in which a host city successfully integrated the Olympic plan into the existing urban plans, which resulted in the delivery of many desired objectives. London 2012 has huge ambitions according to legacy creation, which could put Barcelona of its throne. Unfortunately this research is written in a period (2012-2013) that the real impact and outcomes of the London 2012 Games and legacy cannot yet be measured.

3.3.5 Interviews
Conducting interviews is one of the most important sources of case study information (Yin, 1994). Yin gives a basic list of commonly required skills:
1. Ask good questions;
2. Be a good listener;
3. Be adaptive and flexible;
4. Have a firm grasp of the issues being studied;
5. Be unbiased by preconceived notions.

Next to these skills the role of the respondent (interviewee) is crucial for the success of a case study. The more that a respondent assists in this latter manner, the more that the role may be considered one of an ‘informant’ rather than a respondent. Key informants not only provide the case study investigator with insights into a matter but also can suggest sources of corroboratory evidence – and initiate the access to such sources (Yin, 1994). Yin also make a division in interviews, namely ones with an open-ended nature and ones more focussed. For this research several interviews in the exploratory phase were conducted with an open-ended nature to generate new insights for further inquiry, see page 144.
Gordon (1998) provides us with basic interviewing skills like asking relevant questions, listening, observing, evaluating, recording etc. Gordon created a Skill Life Cycle, see figure 3.4, which illustrates three phases, namely planning, doing and analysing. All phases include twelve skills and need to be repeated after each interview. The Skill Learning Cycle provides an initial, guided experience for the complete interview-learning process (Gordon, 1998).

The interviews conducted in London with key players involved in the Olympic process and with commitment to different organisations were divided into three parts:
- personal background: what was their role? how was their involvement?
- questions about the process, why and how did things happen,
- discussion about theoretical models that form a base for this thesis. Comparison of London and preceding Olympic processes.

3.3.6 Direct Observation (field research)

The third source of evidence in this research comes from doing direct observations. As mentioned before I have visited several preceding Olympic Games, which provides me with some valuable information to better understand the process and delivery. Some behaviours or environmental conditions will be available for observation, which serves as a valuable source of evidence in a case study. I thereby visited London and the Olympic site three times in 2012-2013.

3.3.7 Congress

After four months, the analysis of all five preceding summer Games was finished and I visited the congress “creating legacy” organised by the Urban Land Institute at Canary Wharf (May 2012). It was an ideal opportunity to understand the global process of the London 2012 Olympics and understand which and how organisations were involved. Some attending key-players even spoke about what lessons they have learned from the past (Olympics, development projects, expertise etc.) or already some new London-specific lessons.

3.3.8 Lessons-drawing

In general, it refers to the fact that planners in different countries generally face the same problems, and one can learn from practises abroad. The question then is “whether planners can learn from each other and whether there are policies which stimulate cross-national lesson-drawing in the field of planning” (Spaans & Louw, 2010; Heurkens, 2012).

Lesson-drawing forms an important element to get from the analysis of the preceding Olympics to the creation of legacy strategies. But how are we going to draw lessons. Lessons will derive from a specific element that was added or changed during an Olympic process, which could be of interest for future host cities. This could be two-fold: the lesson derives from a good example or from bad experience. In both situations the lesson should be adapted to fit into another context and i.e. political system or urban structure.

To make lessons more generic the lessons are an outcome of cross-case comparisons. An example is given for the lesson ‘choose a strategic location’ by describing some bad and good experiences from preceding Games:
**Bad:** The site for the Sydney Olympics in 2000, Homebush Bay, was far outside downtown. During the Games it was ideally located in terms of accessibility and routing for the enormous spectator flows, but afterwards the park was left abandoned and stadiums left unused. Athens, because of its history on land acquisition, was not in the position to acquire the land of some strategic locations due to poor planning (governance) and lacking financial means. Therefore they had to pick some dispersed locations in the city and connect them with a newly constructed metroline. Afterwards the stadiums and park were left unused and the metro fell into decay. Beijing’s Olympic park was located in the wealthier North region of the city, which made the gap between North and South even more strong in terms of attraction, reputation and economic viability.

**Good:** Barcelona did choose a strategic location and was able to use a part of the Olympic budget to improve the connection of the city with the sea and thereby improve some districts, which needed an physical upgrade.

So, the lesson “choose a strategic location” is a result of bad and good examples from the past and could therefore be generically applied to future host cities. But, future host cities should be aware of the fact that they have to figure out what is a ‘strategic location’ for them in Games-time and in Legacy. Lessons should not be copied by future host cities but tailored and adapted to the context and local governance. By doing so, the lessons (and strategies) could lead to successful legacy-planning.
IV. Learning from the past
Chapter 4:
Learning from the past

4.1 Impact of the Olympic Games
In this chapter five preceding summer Olympics will be analysed, starting with Barcelona '92 till Beijing '08. The analysis is done by conducting an intensive literature study. One of the major difficulties that arise when someone wants to analyse an Olympic process is how to measure the impact. This will be explained in this paragraph. In the second paragraph the method and structure of the case analysis is described.

Hosting the Olympic Games has a significant impact on the host city and its community. This impact ranges from tangible infrastructural improvements (new competition venues and upgraded infrastructure), to the evolution of the image of a host city. The event acts as a vehicle and catalyst for urban change, which leaves a lasting mark on the city, citizens and even the country. But there is also a potential downside, resulting from possible cost overruns, poor land use, inadequate planning, and underutilized facilities (Zimbalist, 2010).

Although many Olympiads have passed it is still hard to measure the impact of the Olympic Games on a host city, this due to measurable and non-measurable developments. Thereby some outcomes are directly related to Olympic developments and others could have occurred without hosting the event, the non-Olympic developments. There is no “correct” or absolute methodology for measuring the impact of the Olympic Games. Many different approaches and tools exist. The wealth of information emanating from previous Olympic impact studies, and conducted by organisations other than the IOC, attests to this fact (Olympic Movement, 2006).

Most literature studies or articles are describing the aims and objectives of all the host cities and highlight the positive effects of hosting the Olympics. Thereby lot of research describes probable outcomes and intended legacy strategies, which in reality (in a later stadium) are elaborated differently, due to undefined responsibility levels, conflicting interest, drop of investments costs etc.

"According to Olympic legacy, impacts – direct and indirect, planned and unplanned – continue to resonate in an Olympic city, years after the Games (Cashman, 2006)"

The literature distinguishes between motives for hosting the Games, strategies for implementing the various objectives and the impact of these strategies. The ways in which different cities use the Olympic Games and develop their own legacy can be understood by looking at their motives, the type of Olympic legacy that they anticipate and the implementation processes that connect the vision with the expected results (Chen & Spaans, 2009)

"Success depends on whether we have put in place the appropriate mechanisms and partnerships to deliver a legacy of wider economic benefits (Kornblatt, 2006)"

The strategic model by Daamen (2010) in chapter two can be used to comprehensively evaluate urban development project strategies and reflected upon. All preceding Games will be analysed by dividing the process into four strategic activities by Mintzberg (2007) and related eight distinct resources that actors involved need to mobilize in order to realize an urban development project.
4.2 Cases

Structure of case analysis

In figure 4.1 the geographical location and year of all five preceding Games is illustrated. In the end of this chapter we want to extract some valuable lessons from these five Olympic processes. This lesson drawing forms an essential part for creating legacy strategies in the end of this research. All five cases are divided into the four strategic activities by Mintzberg (chapter 2) and thereby after each subparagraph the relation to the model by Daamen (2010) is given by indicating (in italic grey style) one or more of the distinct resources in an urban area development process. In this way the strategic model forms a basis in which we can evaluate and understand each preceding Games process and afterwards are able to cross-case analyse what are the lessons to learn. These lessons are the result of positive and negative examples from two or more cases.

The size of the Olympic Games have emerged over the last decades. Professor Valentino Castellani (2012) explained that Winter Olympics are a total different category than the Summer Olympics in ways of size, investments costs, revenues and legacy. Due to these issues this research will only focus on the last five Summer Olympics, namely Barcelona 1992, Atlanta 1996, Sydney 2000, Athens 2004 and Beijing 2008.

Table 4.1 on the next page gives an indication of the size and range of these preceding Games. In this table some general facts immediately stand out. The city size of Beijing is more than five times bigger than most other cities and even twenty times bigger than Atlanta. You could say that the impact of the event should be bigger in Atlanta than in Beijing for example, but in reality it was not, which will become more clear in this chapter and after reading annex I.

Some researchers estimate the investment costs of Beijing on more than $40 billion (Zimbalist, 2010). Thereby most Olympics are mainly publicly funded and initiated by the local or central government. The amount of athletes did increase between Barcelona and Beijing with more than two thousand, with a peak in Sydney. Since Beijing, the IOC now has a maximum amount of 10,500 athletes.
The following paragraph (extremely) briefly describes the process of these five preceding Olympic host cities. To better understand were the lessons in paragraph 4.3 derived from it is recommended to read annex I.

>>>>

The entire case analyses can be found in Annex I. (±50 pages)

The analysis of five preceding summer Olympic Games, is conducted by dividing the Olympic process into the four strategic activities and eight distinct resources by Daamen (2010).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host city (year)</th>
<th>Inhabitants</th>
<th>Investment costs* (x millions)</th>
<th>Costs for O.G./ Infrastructure</th>
<th>Athletes</th>
<th>Initiative *</th>
<th>Finance (public-private)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beijing (2008)</td>
<td>19,612,368</td>
<td>40.000</td>
<td>2.038/13.608</td>
<td>10.500</td>
<td>Central government</td>
<td>75-25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.1 Source: Compiled by author; www.citypopulation.de & www.mapiworld.com & van Prooye, 2009

![Diagram](image-url)
4.2.1 Barcelona 1992

The 1992 Olympics in Barcelona are still seen as the best example to use the Olympics as a catalyst for urban regeneration (Kornblatt, 2006). The intention to bid for the 1992 Olympics was a reaction on the need to redevelop several parts in the city. After the reign of Franco the inhabitants had to re-unite and meet each other again on the streets. By hosting the Olympics the existing Plan General Metropolita could be speeded up and next to several physical improvements the city was connected to the sea (van Beek, 2007; Gold & Gold, 2007).

The Barcelona Olympics was the first host city that used a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic developments (Clusa, 1999; Coaffee, 2007). Thereby the role of the urban planners in the initiation phase has led to a successful integration of the Olympic Plan into the existing plans (Martorell et al., 1992; Ribas Pira, 1992). This led to a successful after-use, although some stadiums did not have a clear after use (Bakker, 2009).

The developments and event were delivered under a new organisational structure, the Public Private Partnership. In this partnership public and private interest are joined to steer on shared interests (Gold & gold, 2007; Clusa, 1996; Oriol Nel.lo, 1995; van Prooye, 2010). The Barcelona Model, event-led regeneration, became very popular in other countries.

> see annex I ‘Barcelona 1992’

4.2.2 Atlanta 1996

America entered a post-federal and global period in which the government was open for more private initiative and developments, which led to a perfect political climate for a private Olympic ambition (ACOG, 1997; Beaty; 2007; Andranovich, 2001).

The event started with major delays in traffic and communication infrastructure. Two persons were killed by a nail bomb, which overshadowed the event (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

The event and process were overly commercialised with very low governmental control (Minnaert, 2011). Long-term developments for the benefit of the city and citizens did not have a high priority on the Olympic agenda of Atlanta.

Atlanta did have a good after-use, due to low investments in non sporting developments. They only focussed on sporting facilities which were after the event handed over to universities and local sporting teams (Arbes, 1996; Engle, 1999; Simmons, 2000; Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Liao & Pitts, 2006).

The IOC decided that the Games should never again be given to a city that has no significant public sector commitment. (Richard Pound, IOC’s chief liaison with ACOG, in Rutheiser 1996).

> see annex I ‘Atlanta 1996’
4.2.3 Sydney 2000

Sydney has seen a rapid growth due to the gold rush and the industrialisation (Gold & Gold, 2007). Tourism became a major economical provider for Australia due to major recessions, increasing foreign debt, globalization effects and economic deregulation, a decrease of traditional employment has occurred (Hall, 1998). This led to the final Olympic ambitions in Sydney. The central government also incorporated this idea and wanted to use the Games to put the nation back on the map (Owen, 2001). In which they succeeded (Sassen, 1994; Gold & Gold, 2007; Clark, 2008; Matthewman et al., 2009).

Sydney’s decision to locate the Olympic park in Homebush Bay (15km outside downtown) was excellent during the Olympics and partly soil cleaning was delivered (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Liao & Pitts, 2006; Chan et al., 2006). After the Games the site was left almost abandoned. There were numerous spatial and environmental improvements, but the major stadiums turned into ‘white elephants’. There was no clear post-use strategy or organisation (Lockhead, 2005; Chen et al, 2010; Liao & Pitts, 2006; Chen, 2012).

We have to take into account that since 2001 legacy became an important topic on the Olympic agenda of the IOC. Sydney and Athens already initiated much earlier (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

> see annex I ‘Sydney 2000’

4.2.4 Athens 2004

Athens was a city developed by its citizens (property-by-property design) and not by government, which resulted in low public development participation and lead to very slow infrastructural developments (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007; Gold & Gold, 2007).

Athens could not fulfil the role as a dominant metropolis in Greece due to its isolated geographical location and lack of effective relation with neighbouring nations (Coecossis et al, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007).

Athens wanted to use the Olympics to enhance their International reputation and image and wanted to re-urbanise Athens (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007).

Due to bad planning and lack of expertise about establishing decent organisations the after-use of the venues was problematic, all venues on the Olympic Park turned into ‘white elephants’. The government did not own strategic land, which led to venues scattered across the city. Some infrastructure was only delivered for the event, like the metroline (Matthewman et al., 2009). Gold & Gold (2007).

> see annex I ‘Athens 2004’
4.2.5 Beijing 2008

The size of the Olympics in Beijing was enormous and it were the most expensive Games ever held, $40 billion. China process of candidature for the Olympic already started in the early nineties. Due to a poor record on human right and the environment they were not awarded.

Huge infrastructural improvement and beautification were made in the whole city (Liao & Pitts, 2006).

The 2008 Games put Beijing and thereby China on the international map and showed the world of what they are capable. It had a significant influence on Beijing’s economic development, environment. (Matthewman et al, 2009; Brunet & Xinwen, 2009).

The Government played a dominant role and was in control of the land, which led to fast developments (Gold & Gold, 2007). Beijing did incorporated the legacy thinking and many of the stadiums do have an after-use, only not all as desired.

> see annex I ‘Beijing 2008’

4.3 Lessons learned from the past

In annex I (±50 pages) five preceding Olympic processes were analysed and briefly described in paragraph 4.2. By knowing the context, the scale, the implementation and the execution of the different Games some conclusions can be extracted and converted into ‘lessons learned from the past’, which will be described in this chapter. Information was gathered by downsizing the enormous amount of studies on Olympic processes and impact. Thereby I visited the Urban Land Institute Congres about ‘Creating Legacy Conference at Canary Wharf in London, 30-31 May 2012, which gave me the possibility to oversee this bulk of information and filter the essential lessons. These lessons are the logic outcomes of a cross-case comparison and can therefore be referred to one or more other Olympic host cities. In this way these lessons can be seen as more generic as they can be used in different contexts, which means better applicable for future host cities.
4.3.1 **Visioning:** commitment & legitimacy

* Incorporate the Olympic Plan into the existing urban plans

Critics describe that the strongest element of the regeneration plan of Barcelona for the Olympics of 1992 was the fact that several existing programmes were integrated. These programmes were already proposed but due to the winning of the bid 1992, these programmes did not suffer on longer delays or even to be cancelled totally (Chalkey and Essex 1999; Marshall 2000; Monclús 2007, Coaffee 2007).

Barcelona succeeded to integrate the Olympic plan adequately into the existing plans for the ‘new Barcelona’. In this way the current demands for urban (re)development can be realized and speeded up thanks to the catalyst role of the Olympics. In the end, the use of existing plans gives the city more control to steer on an enduring legacy.

In Beijing the government was in strong control of the developments, they made sure the developments did fit adequately in the urban master plan of the city. Therefore the Olympics were used as a catalyst for indirectly related developments throughout the city (Gold & Gold, 2007; Van Prooye, 2009).

> **visioning + planning**

* For an optimal legacy; negotiate, tailor and steer on local demands

The Olympic Games turned into the biggest global event. It can be seen as a big world cup of football but than of many different sports at the same time. Logically, the focus of the event is global. Hosting cities have to deal with international pressure and interest, but in the end the international ‘convoy’ will leave the city short after the event.

Valentino Castellani (ULI, 2012) stated in his presentation that ‘The event should be tailored to the city, and should be part of an innovation process. The investments should be driven by legacy.’ Therefore cities need to ‘tailor’ the Olympic plan to demand-driven developments. Cities should negotiate with the IOC and OCOG about the necessary adjustments that need to be done to organise a successful event and afterwards benefit from the new realised or adjusted amenities and venues.

In 2002 the President of the IOC, Jacques Rogge, spoke out against Olympic ‘luxury’ projects that would become ‘white elephants’ after the Games preferring developments that would be sustainable after the Games and have some post-Games use. He gave an example by arguing the size of the Olympic Stadium in Sydney, 110.00 seats, by downsizing it afterwards to 80.000. He suggested this was an unnecessary expense (Cashman, 2002).

Some observers question whether a new stadium and arena were necessary since they seemed to duplicate existing facilities in downtown Sydney. Indeed, the Homebush stadium and arena have entered into bankruptcy, as has a rail link from downtown to Homebush (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).
In Athens the transportation and infrastructure did not play any role after the Olympics. For example some metro lines were constructed between the city centre and abandoned areas outside the city were some stadiums were located. One hundred years after the first modern Olympics the requirements of the IOC are of an enormous scale and size for Athens. Athens should have ‘tailored & negotiated’ more, but still a big applause to a small city, which delivered the construction of the sites just in time, but without a well thought legacy.

> commitment + legitimacy

* Try to create jobs for the unemployed people
Because of the international prestige and interest, cities don’t want to use unskilled or unemployed workers, they want the best people on this important showcase project.

Many Olympic contractors wanted people who were already employed, skilled and having “the right attitude” to work, while a lot of the long term unemployed and those from areas of high unemployment were not getting Olympic jobs (Lenskyj, 2000).

In Sydney the plans to decrease the unemployment rate were not targeted sufficiently to have a great effect on the long-term unemployed (Minnaert, 2011).

> commitment

* Make a decent legacy plan
The past shows that Olympic Games not always affects the people, who should benefit the most of hosting the event. To reach these groups better structured plans and programmes should be created. More public involvement and community power should be incorporated in the regeneration plans.

It has been argued by radical scholars, such as Lenskyj (2002), that some groups, such as the underclass, the homeless and low cost rental groups, are worse off as a result of an Olympic Games. She contended that Olympic ‘legacy benefits accrue to the already privileged sectors of the population’ while the disadvantaged bear a disproportionate share of the burden.

The case of the employment programme for the Sydney Olympics in particular clearly demonstrates that to achieve real change for socially excluded groups a targeted strategy is needed, as general programmes do not tend to reach those with multiple disadvantage (Minnaert, 2011).

> commitment

* Integrate sustainable developments, do not only mention it:
This lessons is more an overall lesson, it embodies the four previous lessons. In several preceding Games an aim for sustainable developments was intended, but in the end due to time pressure and shortage in budget the results were not always that ‘sustainable’ as mentioned before. It looks like the IOC created a trend of incorporating sustainable developments, but did not really steer on delivering one.

In Beijing for example there were some environmental improvements like a decrease of the air pollution and a purification of water quality, but some researchers argue the long-term benefits of these improvements (Brunet & Xinwen, 2009). Chen et al. (2006) thereby states that after the
Olympics, millions of cars will be back on the road, the city’s factories and power plants will once again be emitting fumes, and thousands of construction projects will start up again as Beijing gets back to its normal life.

Next to this Sydney aimed to pursue a tangible legacy, including spectacular Olympic venues, an upgraded infrastructure system and an impulse for its urban regeneration programme (Chen & Spaans, 2009). When the IOC wanted to adopt sustainable development to the Olympic movement, Sydney decided to integrate this and have the ambition to be the first ‘Green Olympics’. This last line already explains the real priority sustainability has for Sydney. Maybe it was more to be sure to win the bid by adding some ‘green’ pages.

> commitment
4.3.2 Venturing: property & finance

* Own strategic land or control it

In Barcelona the municipal government owned strategic land areas, which gave them the opportunity to implement the Olympic plan into the Plan General Metropolitá (PGM) (Gold & Gold, 2007). In this way the municipal government was in control to (re)develop deprived zones or areas with lower quality of life.

In Athens, the urban design has been a product of step-by-step development, due to low control of the government it has been confined to small-scaled, fragmentary and soft interventions (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). This unstructured urban design led to a ‘scattered model’, in which newly build Olympic venues and stadiums were dispersed in the city.

Beriatos & Gospodini (2004) state that there were declined areas in the city centre, but the Olympic (re)development projects were located all over the city without a focus. By owning strategic land the city government is in control to implement the Olympic plan in a sufficient way into the existing urban structure.

> property + finance

* Steer on strategic locations for the venues

Some preceding cities, like Athens, Sydney and Beijing, did not choose an ideal location for hosting the Olympics. In Athens the venues and stadiums were scattered all over the city, due to the fact that the government did not own enough land in the city centre. The Homebush Bay site in Sydney was far outside downtown, 15km (Liao & Pitts), which had its advantage during the Games, but afterwards the area and Olympic park were left abandoned by those who lived downtown and did not wanted to travel by metro to do their exercises. Not many offices were interested in moving to the Olympic site afterwards, not all soil contamination was cleaned up.

In Atlanta the low amount of investments in infrastructure resulted in traffic jams during the event. The international press corps and many spectators missed events due to traffic congestion and bus breakdowns.
Journalists were late filing copies because the computer systems failed to deliver results data from the competition sites (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). In Atlanta the after-use of the new sporting facilities was transferred to sporting clubs and universities. Due to low investments in non-Olympic developments the city did not benefit in the end. Private companies benefited mostly by creating surplus out of the Olympics.

Beijing did well by locating the venues according to a decentralised clustering model, see figure 4.2. Many venues were located near University campuses, so after-use was taken into account. Unfortunately, Beijing’s decision to locate the Olympic park in the more developed North (Liao & Pitts, 2006) was not that strategic in the end. It intensified the gap between north (wealthier) and south (poorer) Beijing and thereby missed the opportunity to address the gentrification process that the city was facing (Chen, 2012).

In Athens the main site was Athens Olympic Sport Complex (O.A.C.A.), located in the city’s north-eastern suburb nine kilometres from the Akropolis. The Olympic Village was even further located, namely 25 kilometres outside the city centre (Liao & Pitts, 2006). Transport facilities were only constructed for the Olympics and after the event left unused. They should have used the large investments in infrastructure for connecting the districts and people, not only the sporting venues.

* Make use of temporary and existing facilities

To create a decent legacy cities have to make use of existing facilities or temporary facilities, which can be moved or reduced after the event. For some cities a gigantic swimming stadium is not necessary for the future. The Olympic venues should be designed by keeping in mind what is needed afterwards.

Under the BOCOG plan, the Olympics would utilize 37 competition venues in China. Of the 32 venues in Beijing, 12 would be new and the others would be renovated pre-existing structures (Ong, 2004; Chen, 2012:24). The question that arises in the Beijing 2008 Olympics is that several bodies evaluate the after-use as well organised, but the scale of the venues could have been much lower. For example, The Bird Nest Stadium was only entirely occupied when Real Madrid played Inter Milan there in 2009.

Atlanta made a clear statement to limit the Olympic investment en let private parties invest mainly. The result was that the Games had little impact on non-sport development in the city (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). The investments made in sporting facilities were not comparable to that of the other cases, but the after-use of most stadiums and new facilities was well defined.

Figure 4.3. Spectacular views on the Sagrada Familia, Barcelona 1992
Use a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic developments

Many hosting cities used the idea to use a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic development, i.e. infrastructure, communications technology and facilities (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Clusa, 1999; Coaffee, 2007). Barcelona was one of the first cities that used a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic purposes. Clusa (1999) describes that although it is hard to quantify the exact amount of non-Olympic investments made, a mere 15 per cent of the total cost was used for strictly related event costs. Coaffee (2007) described that large parts of the Olympic budget were used for infrastructural purposes due to the growing population, high levels of unemployment and deprivation of certain neighbourhoods.

After Barcelona many other hosting cities used the same strategy, but were not all able to really use these investments in a proper way that the non-Olympic developments would suit for the after-Olympic period. Atlanta 1996 was not organised to create investments in non-sporting facilities. Liao & Pitts (2006) describe it as a pause in Olympic urban transformation as it concentrated on the development of essential sporting facilities. It missed the opportunity to upgrade the city or to speed up existing plans.

Although Beijing invested disproportionately, 60 percent of the non-BOCOG budget was devoted to environmental improvements, and the rest to infrastructure and transportation improvements (Hashmi et al, 2008). Other studies estimate the total costs to 44$ billion if related beautification, preservation and relocation projects were taken into account (Chen, 2012:26).

It is important that investments for non-Olympic developments are used in a proper way that the city and its citizens can benefit from it in the after-Olympic period. De Zeeuw (2012) spoke during the conference ‘slim vlottrekken’ about the importance of demand-driven construction. For the non-Olympic investments the coherence with demand-driven construction needs to be taken into account.

> finance

Steer on continuing investments

An important aspect of a successful Olympic legacy is use the momentum of the Games to attract new businesses, residents, facilities etc. After the event most venues become a tourist attraction, but to be sure that people keep on using the new or upgraded facilities continuous investments need to be done to create confidence and appreciation.

In Barcelona, for example, there was continued investment in infrastructure due to new urban projects like Poblenou district and Forum 2004. These after-Olympic events generate attraction and continue the Olympic spirit in a certain way (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

In Sydney, hosting the World Cup Rugby 2003 in the Olympic Park demonstrated the value of staging future mega-events in Olympic venues. The Rugby World Cup also enabled the Sydney public to reconnect with the park (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

During the pre-Olympic period Sydney organised the Olympic Arts Festival, a four-year cultural celebration starting in 1997. The festival helped to galvanise support from the non-sports sectors of the community by emphasising that the Games were to benefit the city as a whole (Clark, 2008).

> finance + commitment
4.3.3 Planning: time/result & instruments

* Incorporate the legacy plan in an early phase

Although the Olympics in Atlanta were delivered with a minimum of investments, which resulted in big traffic jams and communication technology failures, the legacy plan for the stadiums and venues was well structured. The venues and facilities were handed over to the local sports teams and universities, therefore municipal control was not necessary (Arbes, 1996; Engle, 1999; Simmons, 2000; Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

Certainly in the current economic situation the focus should be on demand-driven developments in terms of investing in regeneration plans. In Atlanta and Barcelona the after-Olympic period was already incorporated during the construction of the event.

Athens reviewed their bid programme after winning the bid to optimise their Olympic plan, after three years of small and slow developments Athens had to speed up to deliver the event on time. This resulted in rise in costs and poor after-use planning. The government established the Hellenic Olympic Properties (HOP) to exploit and manage the venues after the Games till new users were found (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Gold & Gold, 2007).

In Sydney such an organisation was also established, called the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA), which was responsible for creating a vibrant and active centre within the metropolitan Sydney and had to transform the park into a new location for cultural activities, sports and environmental educational programmes (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

BOCOG worked in multiple levels of government to divide ownership of the new facilities and responsibility for their construction. The biggest part of the venues lies under jurisdiction of the Beijing city government. Some universities will get some fees for modifications, but will remain under their management. Other venues were given a freedom to govern the construction or modification of facilities and to govern their after-games-usage (Ong, 2004). In the end of 2003 final decisions on most of the venues, based on design plans for post-Games use, and overall cost, were made (Ong, 2004).

Dimitriou et al (2004:11) pointed out that “early planning (3 years in the case of Athens 2004) is necessary for thoroughly examining all potential operational and planning aspects of the transportation system. The best urban legacies were gained by the cities that planned the longest and were able to take existing Master Plans “out of their pockets”.

> time / result
* Make use of changes in the urban context

Cities like Barcelona and Beijing were in a transition period when the desire to host the Olympic Games was pronounced. Spain, and thus Barcelona, was in the after-Franco period in which they faced some serious new challenges. There was a big economical crisis, a more left wing government and Barcelona had to adopt a new urban master plan. Barcelona exemplified the need facing many Western cities to re-invent themselves and to define new roles and new images appropriate to a post-Fordist world (Essex & Chalkley 1998).

Beijing had to change from a producer city to a city of consumption, of knowledge-based activities and with an enhanced international profile (IOC, 2001; Gold & Gold, 2007).

By hosting the Games Barcelona and Beijing hoped (and succeeded) to create and accelerate new investments to upgrade the urban structure and regenerate some areas. Barcelona’s strategy, the so-called Barcelona Model, was more effective in this way, due to the main focus on the urban redevelopments. Beijing’s main focus was to enhance the city and nationwide recognition, reputation and image.

* Make use of Public Private Partnerships

For a decent legacy creation a decent composition of the organisations is necessary (Bakker, 2009). During the pre-Olympic period many different interests, public and private, are involved in staging the Games. The IOC, OCOGs and NOC’s can be seen as bodies that are aiming for a successful organisation of the event and are less interested, and certainly not responsible, for the legacy.

In this pre-Olympic period it is essential that some authorities need to be established under a public-private partnership. In the ‘Barcelona Model’ the public-private partnership was seen as absolutely instrumental to the success of the whole operation (Clusa, 1996; Oriol Nel.lo, 1995).

In Athens they were unable to create a decent body in a public private partnership (PPP), due to historical background, political system and weak organisational knowledge. The public-private partnership should be mainly controlled by a governmental body that steers on an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens.

Barcelona did an attempt to tackle the after-use of the venues by creating a municipal organisation, which was responsible for the exploitation of the venues and facilities after the Games. The central Spanish government and Barcelona City Hall set up a joint venture, Barcelona Holding Olimpic, SA (HOLSA), to facilitate the investment process (Marshall, 1996; van Beck, 2007; Qu & Spaans, 2009).

Although the standard PPP is already replaced by new forms of public and private partnerships, the Games of 2008 showed that all 12 new constructed venues were financed by PPP’s; 26% local government, 11% national government, 50% private investors and 13% donations from Chinese national based overseas (Lin, 2009).

> instruments +expertise
Be aware that several developments can lead to gentrification

The Olympics generate a lot of attraction from outside to a specific area, the Olympic park. As stated before, the Olympic Games can act as a catalyst for urban developments, new investments and attraction. One of the things that can occur is gentrification.

The ground prices around the Olympic location will rise in the years before and just after the Games. This can lead to higher rents and the loss of affordable housing. In Barcelona and Beijing both cities aimed to create extra new affordable housing, but in the end did not succeed, due to falling revenues and increase of ground costs.

Gentrification has a very negative value, but should be seen as a catalyst of urban change and improvements. For example, in a deprived area there is need for new investments and a social mix. People with higher incomes can upgrade or re-image a deprived area by their expenses and presence. A part of the Olympic budget can be used for urban improvements and businesses and amenities can generate a higher quality of life.

By contrast, civic groups, community leaders and academic writers have focused upon the process of gentrification and the displacement of poorer, mainly black sections of the community, arguing that the Olympic legacy reproduced long term patterns of discrimination and impoverishment (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

Create Olympic regulations to speed up the process

Chen & Spaans (2009) describe that Sydney created a special Olympic legislation to accelerate development processes and to meet the deadlines for the Games with a level of certainty.

In Beijing the government was in strong control of the Olympic process. If changes had to be made to speed up the construction or to ignore current legislation the government was in the position to make quick changes.

Hosting the Olympic Games offered Beijing a legitimate reason to carry out some really ambitious environmental and infrastructural projects, which may have been planned for a long time, but would have been severely delayed or cancelled without the Games (Chen, 2012).
4.3.4 Learning: expertise & information

* Steer on strong governmental control

The analysis of the Olympic process in Beijing, Barcelona and Sydney and its organisational structure have shown that a dominant role of a public body (local, regional or national government) is very efficient in terms of delivering the event and shape it to public demands.

In Beijing the strong central planning exercised by the Chinese government allowed the leadership to make tough decisions and implement them quickly (Chan et al, 2006).

A big advantage to have dominant control by a public body is to decrease the chance of creating a “private-led-event” like the Games in Montreal 1976, Los Angeles 1984 and Atlanta 1996, and thereby not investing in the city and the community. All three host cities showed that private parties could be responsible for delivering the event and venues with Los Angeles as an example of a very profitable initiation. In the end these private-led-Olympics in Montreal and Atlanta left the government with high debts, due to maintenance costs of the empty stadiums. The IOC decided that the Olympic Games would never again be given to a city that, has no significant public sector commitment, either in the form of a financial contribution or, at the very least, a guarantee to meet the necessary costs of organising the Games (Richard Pound, the IOC’s chief liaison with ACOG, quoted in Rutheiser 1996).

In Atlanta, the designed public-private-partnership could not work, because the municipal government was side-lined from the developments. Thereby the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was a private body, they could neglect the wishes of the society (Chalkley & Essex, 1999, Poynter & MacRury, 2009). Andranovich et al. (2001) state that one of the problems for Atlanta was that the public role of government was not clear, which led to conflicts between public and private interest.

* Create a special authority to attract businesses and improve tourism

All preceding hosting cities have certainly some objectives in common “to promote the image of the city/country, to increase tourism and attract investments and businesses”. All cities used a different strategy for the execution, but in most cases the tourism did increase just before and after the Games. Barcelona, which became number six in world’s best tourist destination, and Sydney benefited the most (Clark, 2008; Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

In Sydney they created a special authority to increase the tourism industry, namely the Olympic Business Roundtable (OBRT) with representatives from government, Olympic sponsors, SOCOG and industry groups. OBRT launched a series of business promotion programmes which aimed to present a high-profile business image of Australia to provide a business matching service between Australian and overseas companies (Yu, 2004).

> expertise + information
* Use urban planners and architects for integration of the plan

For a good integration in the current urban structure the involvement of urban planners and architects is essential. In many previous cases the Olympic Park was created as a ‘stand-alone object’. The Olympic Parks of Beijing and Sydney were designed to fulfil an adequate role for the venues and the spectators during the Olympics. But in times of no events or matches citizens should be attracted by it and make use of the Olympic Park. To create such a multifunctional park it is important to use the knowledge of urban planners and architects to respond to this complex situation.

One of the main qualities of the Barcelona Olympics in 1992 is that the project was developed by a team of architects and planners led by Oriol Bohigas, one of Barcelona’s most influential planners (Martorell et al., 1992; Ribas Pira, 1992).

This planning team searched for creating good urban form (Marshall, 2004) that would be of added value in the after-Olympic period. Their plans were later on integrated into the Olympic plan to steer on a decent legacy.

> expertise

* Establish legacy-oriented authorities

The tension that remains unresolved within the Olympic process is that cities act more on a global rather than a local level and this requires much more careful attention in the future. The success in Sydney was more on satisfying the demands of global partners. This resulted in a feeling of pride and renewed confidence in the city and nation (Gold & Gold, 2007).

Many venues in Sydney turned into ‘white elephants’. This happened because the government and private parties did not create a post-Games organisation (Lockhead, 2005; Chen et al, 2010).

Since 2001 legacy is becoming more important and the IOC created the Olympic Games Global Impact-study to monitor the impact the Olympic Games in the host city over a period of eleven years (after the winning bid till some years after the event). The Olympic Games Knowledge Management centre helps transfer knowledge between host cities. Legacy becomes more and more important, due to the rise of the event and the increase in financial support from public and private parties.

In two summer Games after 2001, Athens and Beijing, some researchers and official documents state (van Prooye, 2009; BOCOG, 2001) that both cities focussed on an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens, but this legacy strategy did not really had the priority. It was still the 17 days of the event on which the main focus and attention was.

Almost like the Hellenic Olympic Properties (HOP) in Athens, nine months after the Games the SOPA was created by the government, which acted on a big-city level. Subsequently a public authority called the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) was established to be responsible for the realisation and management of an Olympic urban development project (Heurkens, 2008; Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

> expertise
4.4 Conclusion

4.4.1 Strategies

In the previous paragraphs of this chapter we have described several lessons out of preceding Olympics, which can be added into the strategic model described in chapter two, see figure 4.4. Although all four strategic activities play a role during the process, in certain phases some activity or activities can become strategically more important to make progress at that stage explained Daamen in an interview (2012). By dividing the lessons into the four strategic activities and over the eight distinct resources it is possible to take some conclusions regarding the dominance of each activity.

![Figure 4.4 Lessons from the past integrated with the strategic model of Daamen (2010)](image)

In figure 4.4 all the lessons are integrated in the strategic model. What becomes clear is that the most important lessons can be found in the lower part of the model by Daamen (2010). This means that most important lessons in preceding Olympic processes focus on less tangible aspects, and thus are more authorative. Visioning (9 lessons) and Learning (7 lessons) form the most important strategic activities in relation to the lessons learned from the past. Thereby Commitment (6 lessons) and Expertise (5 lessons) are the most valuable resources.
Commitment
Several cases (i.e. Athens and Sydney) in the literature study showed signs of weak legacy planning. Although cities had legacy planning as an important part of their bid, they were not able to deliver the intended objectives accordingly. There was a lack of commitment regarding this after-use planning. City governments were not in the position to give priority to long-term demands. Mostly the event-oriented organisations dominated which led to the achievement of short-term event goals. Although all preceding examples hosted successful Games several cities were left with unnecessary venues, facilities and infrastructure, like the Olympic Park in Athens, Beijing and Sydney.

Property
Some preceding Games did not choose a strategic location for the after-Olympic period. Some cities decided to locate the Olympic far outside the city centre (Sydney and Athens) or even hosted the Olympics in a more developed part of the city (Beijing). The decision for these locations was sometimes a result of not being in the position to own the land in a strategic area or poor planning (Athens). For many former Olympic host cities their future vision was unclear, which made it even harder to decide whether a stadium was necessary in the near future or not. Making use of existing facilities did provide them with a solution to this problem, but the amount of existing facilities and temporary venues was limited.

Finance
Several preceding Olympics host cities used a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic developments. Barcelona was once the first city to do so. Unfortunately, many of these five preceding host cities were not able to estimate the total costs of the Olympics, which led to expanding budgets (tax money) and low support by the public. Only a few of the preceding Olympic host cities did use the momentum of the Games by continuing investments before and after the event.

Time/Result
Almost all preceding host cities used the Olympics as a catalyst for urban change. Some cities even used the momentum of the Olympics to adapt the urban structure to changes in the urban context (de-industrialisation or political climate). Some cities even developed special Olympic regulations to speed up the processes. Only Barcelona showed a strong planning in terms of incorporating the long-term planning into the Olympic plans. Other cities tried to copy, but were not committed enough to integrate the legacy planning through all the critical periods.

Expertise
Almost all preceding Olympics were organised by public private partnerships (PPPs). In these PPPs the government mostly had the dominant role, except for the Olympics in Atlanta 1996, which were almost entirely privately organised and funded. The cities in which the government had strong control benefitted the most of the developments generated by the Games. Thereby the role of architects, urban planners and innovative bodies is crucial for the integration of the Olympic plan into the existing urban plans. Although none of all five preceding host cities established a legacy organisation responsible for the after-use of the venues, facilities and infrastructure, the first steps were already delivered. Cities like Barcelona, Sydney and Beijing all established such an organisation after the Games to find tenants and after-use for the venues. Lack of commitment, time and budget were the main reasons for not establishing such an organisation already earlier in the process.
4.4.2 Process

In chapter two we introduced the ‘Kite-Model’, this model illustrates how the four strategic activities are involved during an Olympic process. Figure 2.15 illustrates the role and positions of the four strategic activities in an Olympic development process. In this paragraph this ‘Kite-model’ will be applied to the knowledge out of the literature study of the five preceding Olympic Games, see figure 4.5.

![Kite model](image)

**Visioning**

In figure 2.15 in chapter 2 visioning was ideally seen as a starting point of each phase. During the research about five preceding summer Olympics it became clear that, although host cities intended to steer on legacy planning, during the process this vision did not had the priority. The vision was set in the initiation and bid phase and during the preparations was set aside when other interest became more dominant, like delivering on time and according to the IOC’s and OC’s standards. Preceding host cities therefore had to re-shape their vision after the event to better integrate the legacy and thereby find future users for the venues and facilities.
**Venturing**

The twisted line in figure 4.5 indicates the activity venturing during the Olympic process. In the initiation phase and at the beginning of the legacy phase the activity ‘venturing’ becomes strategically more important to make progress at those stages. In the initiation property and finance has to be investigated and plans about how and where to deliver have to be made to make the plan more realistic and deliverable. Like explained before, after the event the vision has to be re-designed. The park, venues and infrastructure suffer from unclear planning about their future use and occupancy. Therefore the venturing process has to start over again in the legacy phase.

**Planning**

Planning runs through the whole process in which the immovable deadline gives clear directions to the process. During the process new instruments are introduced or existing ones are modified.

**Learning**

Like in many other projects learning forms an integral process in each phase for the people involved. In the end of the entire process this knowledge can be gathered and transferred to subsequent projects in the country or other Olympics. One of the major problems of former Olympic Games is the lack of knowledge transfer, each Olympic host city starts over again and has to re-invent how they should deliver the event and legacy. The IOC only assists and monitors by sharing documents, which contain lists of requirements that need to be delivered, instead of helping how to deliver. So the amount of external learning is limited to those people that were involved in the process and will be involved in other projects or Olympics.
### 4.4.3 Transitional period

In figure 2.16 in chapter 2 the first three levels of the transitional period were introduced. In that paragraph it became clear what exactly happens during the process in relation with local and global forces. In this chapter we will relate these first three levels to the theory (strategic model) and the practise (literature study about five preceding Olympics). In figure 4.6 this is illustrated in the 4th level.

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![Figure 4.6 Transitional period applied to theory and practise from preceding Olympics (1992-2008)](image)

**Pre-event period**

In former Olympics the pre-event period starts with the formulation of a vision. ‘Planning’ comes directly after ‘visioning’. Cities only have seven years to deliver and start quickly with planning. The planning is being followed by ‘venturing’, in which the project is made more realisable and deliverable. The presence ‘learning’ is limited. Although they do learn from others, this process cannot be called efficient. Thereby it is interesting to mention that many cities just start building the venues, facilities and infrastructure, instead of first venturing what is really needed for the city and its citizens and thereby reduces unnecessary expenses.

**Transitional period**

In the previous paragraphs we already discussed what happened in this transitional period. Due to unclear after-use planning before the event preceding Olympic host cities have to establish new organisations and divide responsibilities about the after use of the facilities. This process consists of an iterative process, in which ‘venturing’ and ‘planning’ are following up each other.

**Post-event period**

In the post-event period the preceding Olympic host cities had to re-vision and start over again. Instead of directly starting with planning like in the pre-event period, they now first start venturing out what to do with the property (venues, facilities and infrastructure) and how to get finance, find tenants, sell off property and/or demolish it.
VI Learning from London
5.1 Introduction
First, this paragraph will describe the process in chronological order and explain how the different stakeholders were (or still are) involved. Second, an analysis will be done about the process of the London 2012 Olympics categorized into the four strategic activities of Mintzberg (2007) - the paragraphs- and the eight distinct resources of Daamen (2010) – underneath each subparagraph. By doing so, this chapter will provide us with some valuable information on the strategic implementations and decisions during the entire process, from initiation to legacy.

Like in chapter four the strategic model of Daamen provides us with the opportunity to evaluate and understand different aspects during the Olympic development project. As a result some lessons will be extracted in between the paragraphs and summarised in the end. The lessons are a combination of knowledge from literature and empirical data from my visits to London.

5.2 UK urban regeneration
Urban Regeneration, also called urban renewal, is frequently used in UK cities, in which the manufacturing sector played a dominant role in the past. After the deindustrialization the old factories became vacant. Due to this urban change cities like Manchester and Liverpool discovered decreases in population and even became a “shrinking city”. To attract people back into the decayed parts of the city, interventions to upgrade the physical environment were necessary.

In many cases the local government collaborated in this transformation process to facilitate by soil cleaning and investing in better infrastructure. In the UK urban regeneration is a common example to upgrade deprived areas.

East London, once a pioneering valley, where plastic and petrol were invented, became a deteriorated area used for wasteland for decades, see pictures on this page.

Although Stratford and Lower Lea Valley are only four miles from Central London, they were isolated due to poor access, bad image, the river and derelict land (Davis & Thornley, 2010).

Heurkens (2012) describes that in an international context, we encounter context-specific terms like urban regeneration, urban renewal, urban revitalization, urban redevelopment and urban renaissance amongst others. They all indicate a response to improving an existing urban situation (notice ‘re-’), with a specific approach in a specific period.
5.3 **London Case**

To better understand the London process the following paragraphs will describe the context, the general process and the role of the main involved stakeholder in a chronological order.

### 5.3.1 Context

East London, which was for long time a ‘rotten tooth’ that irritated the city centre, will be the epicentre of the Olympic Games 2012. The site and surrounding areas already experience physical improvements, which already form the pre-legacy of a total regeneration plan with Games in it.

Lower Lea Valley is the Southern part of the Lea Valley surrounded by the river Lea, which runs into the River Thames. A great part of this area is integrated in the master plan for the Olympic Games in 2012. It also falls under the LLV Regeneration Strategy, which will transform this rundown area into a vibrant, economic and social healthy district. The Lower Lea Valley covers four Boroughs, namely Hackney, Newham, Tower Hamlets and Waltham Forest, see figure 5.3.

Several public leaders in London stated that the Olympics embody a unique opportunity to generate attention, attraction, spatial improvements and investments for East London, which will lead to a large-scale regeneration, even without winning the bid. In figure 5.3 the location of the Olympic Park, a 250-hectare site, is marked in its surrounding boroughs. London was up for seven years of hard working and many struggles to transform this semi-derelict, post-industrial area into a home for the so-called “greatest sports show on earth.”

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**Figure 5.2** London is the capital city of the United Kingdom (UK) and inhabits more than 7.5 million people. London is seen as one of the four alpha-world cities next to Tokyo, Paris and New York city. London is located along the Thames river. **Figure 5.3** The surrounding boroughs (red) and Olympic Park (green), directory.londoncouncils.gov.uk

“without the Games, change would still happen, but it would be slower, more incremental and less ambitious (LOCOG, 2005: 23)”
Plastic (1856) and petrol were some of the important products invented in Lower Lea Valley. Paul Kelly made an interesting short movie called ‘What have you done today, Mervyn Day’, in which he shows the abandoned places in Lower Lea Valley just some weeks before the bulldozers and construction workers take over the site (you should watch it).

“The site consisted of derelict industrial land that had suffered from poor connectivity and was fragmented, polluted and divided by pylons and railways (ODA, 2012)”

Due to this heavy industry the soil in the Lower Lea Valley was decontaminated extensively. To wash, sift and clean the soil a special decontamination hospital was constructed on site. They injected oxygen to break down noxious substances.

5.3.2 Organisations
In this paragraph the most important organisations are described. Although Poynter and MacRury (2012) state that it is hard to determine an exact stakeholder-map for the London 2012 Olympics and regeneration, due to the scale and complexity of the city of London, there is a real need for high quality organisation to co-ordinate investment in the city. Figure 5.5 shows the most relevant and dominant parties involved during the Olympic process in London and their relations. The National Audit Office already emphasised in their first report that there is the need for strong governance (lesson) and delivery structures given the many organisations and groups involved in the Games (National Audit Office, 2012: 31).
past As Manchester and Birmingham already made some unsuccessful bids, the British Olympic Association (BOA) learnt from the IOC that the only British city that was likely to be successful was London. Unfortunately there was no citywide authority to compete in 1986, in 1997 the new national Labour government promised to restore a government for Greater London, the GLA. It therefore introduced the post of an elected mayor. From then on the BOA began a campaign for a London bid (Davis & Thornley, 2010).

2000 In 2000 the Olympic bid feasibility study was submitted to government.

2001 In 2001 the London Development Agency (LDA) received a commission from the former Mayor of Greater London Ken Livingstone: find a potential site for the Olympic Games in London. The mayor thereby indicated that East London would be his preferred option (RICS, 2012). Even if the bid was not assigned, the first (infrastructural) improvements should already be delivered (Vos, 2012). Four potential sites were appointed for the Games, all in East London (Deloitte, 2012).

In this pre-bid period the vision was set and some main organisations were set up to guide London through a successful bid period. In the first plans legacy was not that strongly embedded in the London plans and bid, but during the process London made sure that the Olympics were used as a catalyst for urban change in East London. So the London bid started from a public point of view with a core mentality on legacy. The Games were seen as part of a large regeneration programme. This resulted in the following stakeholders:

Mayor of London (Mayor) & Greater London Authority (GLA)
The Mayor of London and his Greater London Authority (GLA) are directly accountable for the contact with the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Their main focus was to stimulate and encourage developments, of which the city and its citizens will benefit.

During the whole Olympic process there was a Mayoral change. In 2008 Boris Johnson became the successor of Ken Livingstone (labour), the Mayor during the initiation of the bid, who was so passionate about having the Olympics in East London and about the regeneration. Contrary Johnson, as a conservative leader, was more committed to ensure that the city will host successful Games and will benefit from the legacy. All the Mayors of the Boroughs in East London are Labour. Johnson is very pragmatic, he understood that they wanted to achieve things for local people, not just him showing things on the London-wide level.

British Olympic Association (BOA)
BOA forms the National Olympic Committee of Great-Britain and North Ireland and is responsible for the selection, preparation and management of the athletes. They thereby informed the International Olympic Committee (IOC) about the submission of London to become an applicant city for the 2012 Olympics.

The Olympic Board (OB)
The Olympic board is responsible for the realisation of the Games and its legacy. It is a supervising board that has cross-party communication. This board consists of four chairmen: the Mayor of London, the State Secretary of the Department of Culture, Media and sports (DCMS), the chairman of the British Olympic Association (BOA) and the chairman of LOCOG are part of the board.
Department of Culture, Media & Sports (DCMS)

The DCMS is more a controlling body in relation to the event and legacy, their aims are:
- improve sporting participation
- economic increase
- improve social cohesion and participation
- Olympic Park as catalyst for regeneration of East London

Government Olympic Executive (GOE)

The Government Olympic Executive was set up as a sub-department of the Department of Culture, Media and Sports, the team has been led by specially recruited staff with a blend of commercial experience and expertise, and experience of the workings of government. Before the Games, the Government Olympic Executive’s legacy team coordinated legacy planning. (National Audit Office, 2012: 29).

The GOE had to make sure all things went well and would account back to the Prime Minister, they were responsible for all sport objectives and made several evaluation reports about if things were delivered.

International Olympic Committee (IOC)

This committee is the supreme authority of the Olympic movement and is in charge of organising the Olympic Games of the modern era as stated on the official Olympic website. The IOC is the main body that sets the requirements, selects the host cities and supervises the event. Regarding legacy, the role of the IOC is mainly supporting (Olympic Charter, 2001). Read more in paragraph 2.3.1.

Boroughs

During the bid period all candidate cities had to show some progress in relation to the intended developments. London clearly stated they wanted to upgrade the physical environment of Lower Lea Valley and wanted to improve the connection with the Boroughs. The Olympic site covered the boroughs of Newham (60%), Hackney (20%), Tower Hamlets (12%) and Waltham Forest (8%). These four boroughs got together and had agreed upon planning issues, called the Host Borough Unit (HBU). This HBU was established to give the boroughs a role in the regeneration plans.

To show some progress already during the bid phase, in 2002 the four boroughs started outlining their objectives for regeneration and infrastructural improvements.

Each Borough had chosen a specific theme on which they wanted to steer, i.e. Hackney Infrastructure & Culture, Newham planning, Tower Hamlets Skills and Greenwich Employment. During the bid- and preparation phases the Borough of Hackney benefitted from some major infrastructural improvements. Hackney became connected to the new Overground, which nowadays is frequently used and improved the connection of Hackney into the public transport system of London enormously.
2003 On the 15th of July 2003 nine cities submitted their application forms and became applicant cities for hosting the summer Olympics of 2012. Only five cities (London, Madrid, Moscow, Paris and New York) became candidate cities. For a long time Paris was seen as the front-runner in the Campaign, but thanks to skilful lobbying by London and an inspirational speech by Sebastian Coe, London was awarded the Games on the 6th of July in 2005. The strong emphasis on legacy planning in the London bid was the key element for the successful bid.

2004 The initial bid estimate of Games cost was to £ 4 billion, the London bid included many legacy promises.

2005 London was the first city in Olympic history to have planning permissions for acquisition of the land before the bid was awarded in 2005. The London Developments Agency (LDA) was appointed by the Mayor of London to find a potential site and thereby deliver a planning consent for the Olympics and one for the legacy. The LDA had to clearly state in this documents which site was needed and for which purpose (in legacy).

All candidate cities have to establish an Organising Committee (OC) to improve the communication between the IOC and the local government (in London the Mayor and GLA). The following stakeholders were dominantly involved in the bid period and continued their role during the preparation phase:

**London Development Agency (LDA)**

The GLA transferred the responsibility of spatial interventions and sustainable developments to the London Development Agency (LDA). The LDA was set up as a functional body of the Greater London Authority, its purpose was to drive sustainable economic growth within London. The LDA was responsible for acquisition and purchase of the land (see paragraph 6.3.2) and led the bid from 2003 -2005 explained James Graven in an interview (January 2013). He is a partner at Deloitte Driver Jonas and was seconded to LDA to advise since 2003 on planning issues and from 2005 with a particular focus on legacy planning.

The London Development Agency (LDA), an organisation apparently lower in the 2012 hierarchy compared to LOCOG, is formally the owner of the land that constitutes the Olympic Park and is, therefore, likely to play a key role in shaping the Games legacy for East London (Poynter & MacRury, 2009: 189).

Several experts who I interviewed in London (January 2013) stated that the legacy was always core to the London bid, but in the beginning it was more stated in general terms than it was in deliverable terms. During the process it had to go through some iterations to get to the point that it became deliverable, realisable and something the people wanted. To better integrate the legacy into the process the establishment of a special legacy organisation had to go through some iterations.
During the preparations for the London 2012 Games and legacy three organisations were mainly responsible for the Delivery: The Organising committee (organising the event), the Olympic Delivery Authority (construction of the venues and site) and the LDA, between 2005-2008 responsible for the legacy planning. The LDA was disbanded in the end of 2012.

The LDA had the task to assemble the land and was responsible for the relocation of all 198 businesses, 435 residents and 35 traveller families.

The Olympic budget was revised to £9.325 billion.

The DCMS action plan outlines the legacy ambitions including 9,000 new homes and 20,000 new jobs (Deloitte, 2012). Private sector funding fails for Athletes Village and Broadcast and Media Centres.

The plans for the site after the Games were revised and adjusted during the preparations to better steer on long-term development and to fulfil the requirements by IOC and LOCOG. In this way the general plans become more and more detailed and this all resulted in the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) published as a draft for consultation by the London Development Agency in 2009. Although this document contains a considerable amount of detail, its stated objective is to be illustrative of potential and to establish some key principles. It does, however, present a ‘preferred Legacy Framework’ for consultation with ‘legacy partners, stakeholders and the wider public’ (LDA, 2009a; LDA, 2009b, p. 4). It stresses that this framework needs to be flexible so that it can adapt to future uncertainties such as changes in the real estate market.

London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games (LOCOG)

LOCOG, an non-profit organisation set up in October 2005, whilst being responsible for preparing and staging the Games, has no independent source of funds beyond those allocated by the state and that secured from the IOC and official Olympic partners. In this sense, LOCOG’s capacity is largely confined to operational issues and the development of aspirational plans, which require a ‘socially responsible’ commercial partner to provide the funding to implement. LOCOG is one of the most dominant stakeholders during the pre-event and event period. Afterwards they wrap up and finalize their documents, which will be sent to the IOC.

LOCOG is a company limited by guarantee and established by a joint venture agreement between the Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport, the Mayor of London, and the British Olympic Association. LOCOG aims to be self-financing through sponsorship, ticketing, merchandising and contributions from the IOC, but the government has always been financially exposed should LOCOG fail to break even.

Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA)

The Olympic Delivery Authority was set up in 2006 and is mainly responsible for the delivery of the facilities (venues), infrastructure and transport. The ODA strongly worked together with LOCOG to deliver the venues and facilities, but had to take into account the demands by the LDA and later on the OPLC and LLDC.
Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC)

In 2009 London established the Olympic Park Legacy Company, which was for 50% owned by the city and for 50% owned by government (of which 50% Central/Local Government and 50% by the Department of Culture, Media and Sports). OPLC was never acting as an arm of government, it was a non-departmental public body, it could be seen as a Quango (see 5.2.2) said James Graven in an interview on the 14th of January 2013.

A Quango (quasi autonomous non-governmental organisation) consists largely of representatives from the local business community and little representation from the local resident community (Tallon, 2010).

They aimed to encourage the private sector back to run-down inner city areas through a market-oriented and property-led approach. They were given substantial powers to acquire, hold, manage, reclaim and dispose of land and other property (Imrie and Thomas 1999). Funding of the UDCs came from central government and by proceeds from the disposal of development land (Tallon, 2010). The most famous example of an urban regeneration project under UDC-control was the mega-regeneration of London’s Docklands.

2010 The OPLC published a revised vision for the Olympic Park to provide ‘the best of London all in one place’ with more family housing (Deloitte, 2012).

2011 Many agreements about the after use of the park, the venues and future developments were made. Athletes Village is pre-sold to Qatari Diar | Delancey (see paragraph 5.4.2) The long procedure of finding a future user for the Olympic Stadium (see paragraphs 5.5) looks to fall through to West Ham United as preferred tenant.

2012 The outline-planning framework is approved by the GLA.

As you can read on the previous pages, the plans for the Olympics and the legacy were revised several times. Legacy became a more and more crucial element, which ultimately led to the establishment of an outline-planning framework (see paragraph 5.4.3). This outline-planning framework provided (future) developers with a well-established framework. There is also a planning permission for this masterplan, which establishes the amount and type of developments. Although there were changes during the process, and these will occur, this outline-planning framework is adaptable and flexible in response to market changes stated Graham Goymour, strategic planner at Aecom in an interview on the 11th of January 2013). The Greater London Authority approved this outline-planning framework just before the Games, in May 2012.

London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC)

To be sure that the legacy intentions were delivered a special purpose vehicle on legacy had to be established. To get to such an organisation it had to go through some iterations (from LDA → OPLC → LLDC) to become the Mayors instrument, due to political realities.

To give the OPLC additional power to Compulsory Purchase Land and to give them power to make decisions it was transformed into the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) in 2012. This body was given total control (mandate) for the Olympic park area, so they did not have to refer everything to local government and its bureaucracy. The LLDC is a Mayoral Development Corporation 100% owned by the Mayor of London. It brought single focus under the Mayor from central- and local government.
The LLDC took over the tasks of the aforementioned OPLC and the London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC), formerly responsible for the regeneration of East London. The LLDC is responsible for ground lease issues (dutch: erfpachtuitgifte) to private parties, and maintain the Olympic venues and accommodate future tenants (Vos, 2012). The LLDC is responsible for the delivery of the outline-planning framework.

In the legacy process of the London 2012 Olympics the establishment of these legacy-oriented organisations was essential for the delivery and success of the legacy. The establishment of the LLDC finds its roots in the preceding regeneration projects. Sydney, Barcelona and Beijing did think about the after-use but did not create such an organisation responsible for the delivery of the legacy. Therefore they had to start over again after the Olympics by establishing organisations responsible for the maintenance and future use of the venues (like Barcelona Promocio and Concerned Management and Sydney Olympic Park Authority).

London was the first city to integrate such an organisation already during the pre-event period to prevent the Olympic process from falling into an after-event period (transitional period), in which nothing really happened and responsibilities are unclear (read more about the transitional period in paragraph 5.7.3).

"The key to success was the delivery. The focus of having three different organisations, one that builds the site (ODA), one that stages the Games (LOCOG) and one for the legacy (LLDC), which was set up three years before the Games to get everything in place for the Games and its post-Games regeneration mode (Altman @ ULI, 2012)."

Lesson: Establish and develop an organisation responsible for the legacy

The London 2012 Olympics were held from 27th July to 12th August.

2012 After the Olympics the site was closed again and stadiums will be dismantled, downsized or transported to other cities: the upper tier of the Olympic Stadium will be removed after the Olympics 80,000>58,000, both wings of the Aquatics Centre will be detached, 17,500>2,500), the Copper-Box (Basketball Arena) will be transported to Rio, all hockey pitches will be transported to other UK cities and the Beach Volleyball stadium and Horse riding venue in Greenwich will be dismantled (see more in table 5.1). Thereby the current infrastructure is changed, i.e. extra bridges and routes to better facilitate the enormous spectator flows are brought back to realistic sizes. Thereby the special screening gates and the fences around the park will be removed.

After the Olympics the Organising Committee (LOCOG) wraps up their work and does not have any responsibility towards the legacy. They sell of their assets like fences,
security gates and other facilities. Thanks to the outline-planning framework the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) is able to continue with the regeneration of East London and further developments are agreed upon.

Cabinet Office
Since the end of the Games responsibility in Government for coordinating and assuring delivery of the legacy has moved to the Cabinet office (National Audit Office, 2012: 21).

In its new role of leading delivery of the legacy, the Cabinet Office must make the most of the momentum created by the success of the Games and will need to provide strong leadership (lesson) and oversight of the progress made by the various organisations with legacy responsibilities (National Audit Office, 2012: 9). Coordination of this remains a challenge.

The program is managed by a cross-departmental unit in the Cabinet Office, which also supports Sebastian Coe in his role as Olympic Legacy Ambassador. Lord Coe has a part-time role in the Cabinet Office overseeing the Governments contribution working up the legacy.

Boroughs
The Host Boroughs have benefitted from the early integration in the process, their role and influence was limited, due to dominant international and event-oriented stakeholders.

In 2010, the boroughs of Barking & Dagenham and Greenwich joined the existing four Boroughs in the Host Borough Unit and formed the 6 Host Boroughs.

“This would not have happened without the Olympics. It could have happened without winning the bid, but not without bidding for the Games. London had to show progress in terms of infrastructural improvement and regeneration before being awarded the Games (Hackney, 2013).”

There were special plans for improvements of the borders (periphery) of the Park, called the ‘fringeplans’). To better connect with the Olympic park the main routes through the boroughs into the park were upgraded and spatially improved.

In an special edition update about skills and employment by the 6 Host Boroughs the outcomes were summarised (November, 2012):
- 15-20% of the Games time workforce were Host Borough residents
- 7-12% of the Games time workforce were previously workless
- the Games provided tens of thousands of opportunities for individuals to gain new skills and experience whilst working for world class employers.
- demonstrated to employers and public sector providers a successful model for diverse/local recruitment

Commercial parties

Next to all stakeholders mentioned on the previous pages, several architectural/planning firms were responsible for the master planning, of which AECOM was the strategic master planner for the Olympic Park. They have been involved since 2003 and first advised the LDA, then the ODA and now the LLDC. Deloitte LLP was the professional service provider for the Olympic Family, advising on how the above-mentioned organisations had to work together and deliver.

Thereby some investment funds, i.e. Qatari DIAR and Delancey, invested in parts of the Olympic park already before the Games started. Most property will be owned by the Greater London Authority and will be under responsibility of the London Legacy Development
Corporation. After the Olympics the LLDC will be in charge of selling of land and property to private investors and developers. Some national or local sporting organisations will become tenants for some of the venues: cycling arena, Olympic stadium, aquatics centre, BMX-track etc.

---------------------------------- Informal organisations ----------------------------------

Residents & Communities
The words “Get involved” were frequently used to show the world that all people can participate in the Olympics and that the public voice will be heard. Because the Olympics in 2012 were part of a major regeneration program for East London the project was about the hearts and the minds of the people. Getting involvement from the people, the communities and the boroughs was necessary for the success of the legacy.

A key driving force behind these successful outcomes in the 6 Host Boroughs has been the well-coordinated partnership model. This partnership consisting of LOCOG’s Employment & Skills team, 6 Boroughs brokerages, Job Centre Plus, HBU, colleges and other community organisations helped to secure 14,013 conditional job offers for Host Borough Residents (6 Host Boroughs evaluation, 2012). Monthly or quarterly meetings were organised to get everyone involved and to communicate about the process. In this partnership model some formal and informal stakeholders agreed upon issues regarding spatial improvements, job opportunities, social commitment etc. Although the involvement of residents and the communities was an important objective for the main parties involved in the Olympic process (LOCOG, LDA), their involvement and influence was limited.

Just after the Games the focus of the six Host Boroughs, recently named the 6 Growth Boroughs, turns its focus towards legacy and how to harness the momentum of the Games in order to address convergence (6 Host Boroughs evaluation, 2012).

Mayor of Newham: “without the Games Newham should have never been developed like it happened now (ULI, 2012).”
5.3.3 UK specific organisation

The term Urban regeneration comes from the UK, in which the first organisational structures to structure an urban regeneration project were established. The UK is well known because of its property-led regeneration, examples are London Docklands, Canary Wharf and King’s Cross. A commonly used organisation in the UK responsible for urban regeneration is called the Urban Development Corporation (UDC, see figure below).

This development corporation was formed the flagship of the Conservative government’s urban regeneration programme in the 1980s and 1990s in terms of the amounts of money invested, the political and media attention received, and the extent to which they embodied the ideologies of the New Right (Anderson, 1990 & Robert & Sykes, 2010).

Their primary objective was to secure the regeneration of an area by bringing land and buildings into effective use, encouraging the development of existing and new industry and commerce, creating an attractive environment, and ensuring that housing and social facilities were available to encourage people to live and work in the area (Oc and Tiesdell, 1992; Imrie and Thomas, 1999).

Tallon (2010) describes that the Development Corporations were mainly focused on local and regional scale and especially at those cities, scattered across the UK, where there were particularly local urban problems of severe de-industrialisation, economic restructuring, environmental degradation, but also of economic potential. East London.

London Docklands formed an important source of expertise and information on how to deliver the regeneration of East London. Some transferable advantages of the LDDC for the LLDC are:

* The LDDC had powers to acquire land by agreement or compulsory purchase.
* The LDDC took over from the London Boroughs their planning (but not their plan making) powers.
* The LDDC had powers and the resources to provide new (or refurbish existing) infrastructure.
* Apart from planning all other public services (housing, education, health etc.) remained firmly in the hands of the Boroughs and other public agencies although they did provide funds for their development and improvement (lddc-history.org.uk).

The Olympic site, like London Docklands, also covers several boroughs and above-mentioned elements can be easily translated into the tasks of the London Legacy Development Corporation. We should take into account that the Urban Development Corporation was established under the Conservative government’s urban regeneration programme and during the initiation of the London 2012 bid Greater London had a Mayor of the Labour party. When Boris Johnson
became Mayor of Greater London the LDA and later on the OPLC was changed into such a Urban Development Corporation, the LLDC.

Some drawbacks of the LDDC were that some people felt that the LDDC should do more to revitalise the public services for the benefit for local people. Thereby the LDDC has generated a wide range of economic, environmental and social benefits. Prominent amongst these are over 24,000 housing units and over 80,000 gross jobs within the Urban Development Area (UDA). These enormous amount of permanent jobs will be much more difficult to realise for the LLDC because many jobs will only be temporary and will not continue after the event. Thereby it took the LDDC some more years than intended to deliver the projects.

Figure 5.6 Canary Wharf, in the middle of London Docklands

“Rose, a citizen who attended every citizen’s meeting once said: ‘I’m proud of living in Stratford. I just wish I had more to be proud about.”
5.4 Strategies
In the first paragraphs of chapter five the context, process and the stakeholder involvement were described. This has given a decent base to go into further details about which strategic activities occurred during the process and which resources were used to make progress at a certain stage. This paragraph will describe the process from a more detailed view and thereby helps us to extract some valuable lessons for future Olympic host cities, marked in grey colour.

5.4.1 Visioning: Commitment & Legitimacy

One of the core elements in London’s 2012 vision is that it was about the regeneration of East London and that the Games were used as a driver for urban change and investments. London anticipated on the need to go more East and more important responded to three existing large-scale regeneration plans in Lea Valley (Vos, 2012), namely:

Lea Valley Regional Park Plan
In 2000 a plan was designed to improve the nature, leisure and recreation and appointed some specific locations for nature redevelopment by Lea Valley Regional Park. L.VRP, after the Olympics, became owner of four Olympic venues, namely Lee Valley White Water Centre, Lee Valley Velopark, Lee Valley Tennis Centre and Lee Valley Hockey Centre and thereby owns one-third of the Olympic Park area and has to collaborate with the London Legacy Development Corporation to create a lively, multifunctional, loved and sustainable park (leevalleypark.org.uk).

Stratford International Railway Station
Stratford International clearly indicates the high expectation to become an international railway station just after the Olympics. London still hopes that Eurostar with its international railway network soon will connect to Stratford. This decision will be revised after the Olympics, this still remains unclear (April 2013). The development of Stratford International was accelerated by the need to have a high-speed train to St. Pancras to transport 10% of the Olympic Park visitors. Next to these improvements the Stratford Regional (Metro) was upgraded and better connected (Vos, 2012).
To help finance the rail link, the Consortium was given ownership of the land around the stations at St. Pancras, Stratford and Ebbsfleet, in order to attract developers to build major projects (Davis & Thornley, 2010). Stratford International was already in place and developed before the bid was awarded to London.

The upgrade to the Stratford underground was already planned, but it happened more quickly to meet the 2012 deadline. The International stations had been built before 2005.

**Westfield Stratford City Shopping Centre**

Near Stratford -or better said all over Stratford station- Westfield, a large retail investor, invested in a 460,000 m² asset including offices, housing and community facilities and a large retail centre called Westfield shopping centre. Planning permission for the project was granted in 2004 and building started in 2007. It was planned before the Olympics and would ensure the regeneration of Lower Lee Valley regardless of the addition of the Olympic development (Davis & Thornley, 2010).

Westfield group took the opportunity to develop a large scale shopping centre near Stratford International Railway station and near the Olympic Park. Four million people can access this shopping centre in 45 minutes (Vos, 2012). Westfield Group thereby invested in the infrastructure nearby.

Westfield was an entirely commercial project that commenced after the bid was won. The shopping centre had a planning consent before the bid was won (in 2004) but this was by a different developer. Westfield took control of the developments in about 2006/2007. It was the only large development project that Westfield carried on during the crisis in Europe. This development most likely would not have happened without the Games, or would have taken a much longer period said James Graven in an interview (2013).

In its mission statement the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) has reiterated the need to integrate the Olympic site into the surrounding community, however it has also placed emphasis on attracting private investment. By 2011, the Olympic Games have been thoroughly integrated into the London Plan's 2011 version following revisions to the 2004 and 2008 plans (Greater London Authority, 2011).

**Lesson:**

Incorporate the Olympic Plan into the existing urban plans

Already some preceding Olympic processes have shown the importance of integrating the Olympic plan into existing plans. Future host cities should incorporate the Olympic deliverables such as venues, facilities and infrastructure, into existing urban plans to increase the success of
the legacy. By integrating the Olympic developments into existing urban demands the chance of venues, facilities and infrastructure falling into decay decreases. Cities should always see the Olympic plan as complementary to existing plans.

Nigel Hugill, Executive Chair Urban & Civic states that ‘if you look to the success of developments in London in the past they were all driven by the strength of public transport connections, if we can get the international trains to stop in Stratford it can become as equally strong as Canary Wharf and West London (ULI, May 2012).’

The Olympics in London were always seen as part of a large regeneration program for East London. Besides enhancing London’s global position the Olympics will act as a catalyst to generate investments and to speed up the regeneration. When Londoners were talking about the Olympic 2012 plan they always mentioned the Legacy 2030 plan. Several experts during the Urban Land Institute congress (May, 2012) and also during the interviews referred to figure 5.9.

The Olympic plan was always seen in parallel with the Legacy plan. In this way, developments necessary for the Olympics were individually reviewed about their future use and decisions were made about temporary or permanent venues. During the whole process, London was keen on grasping back to their vision in which the Games were seen as part of a large regeneration process.

Lesson: Stick to your vision

One of the success factors of the London 2012 Olympics was that the vision did not change during the process. Despite all the political change, through three Prime Ministers and four Mayoral elections, the vision did not change. In each stage of the process it was clear that the Olympics were seen as part of a large regeneration project. The government and other legacy-oriented parties were very committed to stick to their vision.
In the figure above the site is shown in 2003. At that time the site consisted of mainly derelict land, 198 businesses, 435 resident and 35 traveller families. The figure left on the next page shows the plan during the 2012 Olympics in London. The site consists mainly of venues and sport facilities with infrastructure to provide decent access for the spectators, officials and athletes. The figure on the right shows the situation in 2030. It consists of a functional mix of residential, offices, retail in and around a new park for London, called the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park.
London promised to do something in sports that has not happened with any deal of consistency in the past: ‘reach all communities and segments of the population…and leave a lasting legacy of equality..’ (ODA, 2007:3). As London realised only investing in sporting quality alone would not be sufficient for winning the bid they also placed a strong emphasis on legacy and regeneration (Davis & Thornley, 2010).

During the process some intended goals seem to be too hard to fulfil. In 2010 the government, led by the Department of Culture, Media and Sports, established the four pillars of its legacy promise: sport, economic growth, regenerating East London, and people (including volunteering). On sports participation, in March 2012 the Committee of Public Accounts reported poor value for money for 450 million pounds on increasing sports participation, with only 109,000 additional people participating in sports three times a week against the original target of one million by 2013 (Committee of Public Accounts, March 2012). Sport England now uses the number of people taking part in sport once a week as its main measure, and stated that to April 2012 there had been an increase of around 1.3 million since 2005-2006. In paragraph 5.5 more criticism on the London 2012 are summarised.

Sebastian Coe (May 2006, quoted in NEF, 2008): ‘Legacy is absolutely epicentral to the plans for 2012. Legacy is probably 9/10 of what this process is about, not just the 16 days of Olympic sport’.

At the Urban Land Institute Conference on ‘creating a legacy’ Neale Coleman (2012) of the London Government and Director of London 2012 explained that ‘building trust and relationships is key, and placing boroughs into a strong leadership role will help to make the Games work.’

One of the hardest parts was a practical issue, regeneration is about ‘the hearts and minds’, people and businesses had to be convinced and later on should support and be involved. “If legacy was not a key part the UK people would not have backed the Games said Chris Lewis of Deloitte, who is involved in the iCity tender, in an interview in 2013.”

Lesson: Get the people and boroughs involved and give them influence

This lesson is an outcome of the process in London in which the communities and people were involved from the early days in the process. Because the regeneration is about the ‘hearts and the minds’ and ‘the people need to back the games’ it is necessary to find support from these informal groups (see 5.1.2). London decided to invest time in getting people involved in the process (the Olympics and the regeneration). This was done by organising monthly or quarterly meetings, in which the plans were communicated to the people and there was some room for discussion. Although London did a great job by listening to and the integration of the public voice, due to time pressure and dominant international stakeholders the public demands were not always delivered and therefore thus limited. To be sure that the city and citizens are benefitting from the Olympic-led regeneration, they should be given a certain ‘mandate’ or legal power to be heard.
The IOC spoke out that the role of the government should be overall strategic direction, the budget (provide the money), security and legacy. But to be clear the government is not obliged to build the projects or run the Games. It took many years to get a legal undertaking from the national government as the limitless financial guarantor (Davis & Thornley, 2010).

- legitimacy/ commitment

“During the critical crisis years in 2008 and 2009, the Olympics had to move on, due to an immovable deadline, the investment was almost guaranteed by government. Contrary some of the Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) that were developed could not get funding, so the public bodies had to take greater responsibility in terms of delivery. That did affect some of the ways we made decisions (Hanway @ ULI, 2012).” - commitment/finance

“It was mainly the public sector giving all the commitment. That is a generic pattern for any big regeneration project, you need the public commitment to put all the up-front coordination and commitment and investment into getting at a point of take-off. The private sector would never been able to do this. Too much financial risks are at stake (Deloitte, 2013).”

Valentino Castellani (ULI, 2012) advises other cities to require strong commitment from sport institutions regarding management of the venues after the event to create long-term usage.

- commitment

Regeneration and Renewal (January 2013) wrote: “Capital spending is expected to be 154 million pounds in the current financial year, this will rise by to 267 million pounds in 2013/2014, before dropping to 117 million then 83 million pounds in the following two years. These increases reflect the mayor’s commitment to securing the legacy from the outstandingly successful Olympic and Paralympic Games in 2012.” - commitment

>>read more about the role of the government in paragraph 5.2

| Lesson: | Deliver strong commitment by government |

The National Audit Office already emphasised in their first report that there is the need for strong governance and delivery structures given the many organisations and groups involved in the Games (National Audit Office, 2012: 31). This lesson is a result of the role local or national governments played in preceding Olympics. From the beginning the London bid was led by the Greater London Authority and the Mayor. Later on in the process the responsibility related to the legacy was transferred to the London Development Agency and the London Legacy Development Corporation. In this way legacy was always strongly integrated in the process.

The LDA’s website reports that a major advantage of negotiation is that solutions can be ‘found to the satisfaction of all parties’ (London Development Agency, 2004). Davis & Thornley (2010) describe that the process of negotiation implies the distribution of decision-making powers amongst all those involved.

Brian Field (ULI, 2012) describes the early success of the London 2012 to ‘the ability of people from different political persuasion coming together to form a coalition and deliver a complex project. Thereby he thinks it is admirable how central Government, the Mayor, the Boroughs,
have worked together in the delivery.’

There was cross-party political commitment between central and regional government. In many levels there was an attitude to work together and get things done. “The ones working on the Olympic stadium were sharing knowledge with the ones working on the Aquatics centre to deliver the project in a good shape on budget and in time said Heather Hancock, lead partner for the London 2012 in an interview in August 2012.

It became clear that London has put a lot of effort in bringing all the parties together and thanks to a decent organisational structure (which was revised several times) parties could work more efficient. Clear communications is instrumental for the delivery of the event and legacy.

“\nThe London games are different than its precedings, because at its core (as base proposition) it is about regeneration (Altman @ ULI, 2012; Deloitte, 2013).”

……

London took a brave decision not to follow the plans of Athens and Beijing, they even clearly stated that “London will not compete with Beijing 2008”. Hosting the Olympics was rather a threat than an opportunity. Although both Games (2004-2008) were held successfully, both cities were left with large empty stadiums with no clear after-use, big governmental debts and high maintenance costs due to the absence of tenants.

Sydney tried to organize the first ‘green’ Games, but failed due to unclear strategies. Beijing aimed for a better living environment for its citizens by decreasing the air pollution; unfortunately it was just temporary, because after the games the factories reopened. The IOC wanted that 2012 should become green Games, says LOCOG director James Bulley (RICS, 2012).

In 2001 the IOC started to promote and support sustainable games and wanted cities to better plan their after-use. Beijing already started much earlier and tried to adapt their bid. For Athens it was too late. London was the first city that could deliver a bid with a decent long-term vision, which they did, and that is why they were awarded, probably.

Lesson: Integrate sustainable developments, not only mention it

This lesson is more an overall lesson; it embodies the previous lessons in visioning. London kept its intended vision always in mind and was committed to deliver. Despite all the political change, through three Prime Ministers and four Mayoral elections, the vision did not change. It gave people clear focus and improved the support. Although legacy was in the bid from the beginning, it had to go through some iterations to become realisable, deliverable and something the people wanted. Just before the event the legacy was secured in the outline-planning framework.
Many experts involved mentioned that the Olympics of 2012 had legacy at its core. Graham Goymour of Aecom stated in an interview (January, 2013) that ‘minimizing waste or rather protecting investment was important.’

Therefore the city decided what developments and venues had temporary need (2012) and what permanent (2030) and was committed to lead this vision through the whole process. Only four new venues were constructed. London emphasised to make the city the client and not the IOC, which was seen as the client with high demands in preceding Olympics. The event was of temporary importance, although it was a highly stressful and risky undertaking.

"We were only building permanent venues where we had a solid business case for their use after the Games (RICS, 2012; Bidbook, 2004)"

Some examples: the upper tier in the Olympic Stadium will be removed after the event to downsize the capacity from 80,000 seats to 25,000. Therefore all amenities are located outside the stadium like toilets and food & beverage shops (in paragraphs 5.6 for more about the stadium). The real architectural quality of the Aquatics centre, by Zaha Hadid, will be exposed after the event when the attached wings will be removed. These temporary wings provided a total of 15,000 extra seats, next to 2,500 permanent seats, which could fulfil a role as smaller swimming events. After the Olympics the Aquatics centre will be open for Londoners for the same price as swimming pools elsewhere in the city (LOCOG, 2012). The Basketball arena will be removed and built up again in Rio for the Games of 2016. The field hockey pitches will be transported to clubs in other parts of the UK and the stands will be dismantled (see table 5.1).

We have to take into account that it was just a financial decision to only invest in four newly built permanent venues, in fact a temporary venue is certainly not cheap. More expansive materials need to be used that can be dismantled afterwards and re-used. The ODA planning committee regularly asked: “what happens in legacy?”, which ensured that the promoter and the local planning authority made the long term integral to everything we did (Regen.net, 10th August, 2012).

**Lesson:** Make use of temporary and existing facilities

Never before did an Olympic host city committed itself so strongly to the use of temporary and existing facilities as London did. Thereby new stadiums were only built when there was a demand for such a facility after the event and if there is a feasible business case. London always kept the desired situation of 2030 (legacy) in mind by investing in temporary of permanent venues.

In table 5.1 an overview is given of the Olympic venues, their previous role and in legacy. On the
next page some spectacular views are shown; Horse Guards Parade (figure 5.7) and Greenwich, Horse riding (figure 5.8). Hyde park was used for the medal ceremonies and people could watch sports on a big screen, see figure 5.9.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Olympic venue</th>
<th>Previous role</th>
<th>in Legacy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beachvolleybal</td>
<td>Horse Guards parade</td>
<td>EXISTING Historical location (dismantled)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Horse Riding</td>
<td>Greenwich Park</td>
<td>EXISTING Historical location (stands dismantled + upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modern Pentathlon</td>
<td>Greenwich Park</td>
<td>EXISTING Historical location (stands dismantled + upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shooting</td>
<td>Royal Archery Fields</td>
<td>EXISTING Historical location (stands dismantled + upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Archery</td>
<td>Lord's Cricket Grounds</td>
<td>EXISTING Existing location</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennis</td>
<td>Wimbledon</td>
<td>EXISTING Wimbledon (little adjustments)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Football</td>
<td>Wembley Stadium and other football stadiums</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling</td>
<td>City centre roads</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball</td>
<td>North Greenwich Arena</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnastics</td>
<td>North Greenwich Arena</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sailing/Rowing</td>
<td>Outside London</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Badminton</td>
<td>Wembley Arena</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gymnastics</td>
<td>Wembley Arena</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhythmic</td>
<td>Wembley Arena</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Volleyball</td>
<td>Earls Court</td>
<td>EXISTING Existing location (upgraded)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triathlon</td>
<td>Hyde Park</td>
<td>EXISTING Event-related improvements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boxing/Judo</td>
<td>ExCel</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fencing</td>
<td>ExCel</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taekwondo</td>
<td>ExCel</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Table Tennis</td>
<td>ExCel</td>
<td>EXISTING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hockey Arena</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>TEMPORARY Temporary: stands dismantled and pitches transported to other UK cities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basketball Arena</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>TEMPORARY Temporary: will be transported to Rio afterwards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velopark (BMX)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NEW Temporary: downsized to local dimensions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycling Track</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NEW Permanent: tenant: local cycling federation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aquatics Centre</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NEW Permanent: side wings will be detached and downsized (17,500&gt;2,500 spectators) and will become a swimming centre for local residents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Stadium</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NEW West Ham United until the year 2115 and is available for other events: World Cup Athletics 2017. Upper tier will be removed 80,000&gt;58,000 spectators.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Broadcasting centre</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>NEW Permanently: unclear after-use, iCity-tendering</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1. Olympic venues in London 2012

"You can bring the sports into the heart of the city to exploit the iconic nature of a city. You get fantastic TV views, which shows a city in its best light, which helps to leave a sort of a tourism-perception legacy (James Graven, interview, January 2013)"

Figure 5.10 Spectacular views at the historical Horse Guards Parade, London 2012
To be able to regenerate the entire area and to deliver a highly secured event the Greater London Authority (GLA) gave the London Development Agency (LDA) a tough task: all 198 businesses, 435 residents and 35 traveller families had to be re-accommodated. They did accomplish and in July 2007 the site was handed over to the ODA, nowadays (2013) negotiations about the compensation for relocation are still been worked on.

When the Olympic consent (bid book and application form) was submitted the government required also a planning consent for what comes after the Games. “Actually the Olympic consent
was done well, but the one according legacy was too general. But, there was a starting point, no other preceding host city had ever done” said Clive Payne working for the LDA in an interview in 2013.

From that moment on the vision was made more realistic, deliverable and financeable and something that the people wanted. As Payne explained lots of financial modelling was done. “We sort of boiled everything down into something people want and something that we thought developers could build and something we thought the government would support.”

Then a business plan was established containing the key elements that needed to be delivered in the early phases and financial applications to government to deliver and to mitigate risks. From then the real planning started.

Normally it would have taken many decades to deliver these planning applications, but due to the immovable deadline of the event it had to be delivered much quicker. The final legacy planning permission was obtained a few months before the Olympic event, so in 2012. It was a real consent, something deliverable, so when the Games will finish there was a planning permission that could deliver a conventional regeneration stated Payne.

In granting planning permission for the Olympic Park, an obligation was set in the ‘section 106 agreement’ for the timely submission of an outline masterplan application for these sites in legacy mode. Section 106 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 allows a local planning authority to enter into a legally-binding agreement or planning obligation with a land developer over a related issue. The obligation is commonly referred to as a 'Section 106 Agreement' (pas.gov.uk).

Lesson: Get early planning permissions

Getting early planning permissions was crucial, not only for winning the bid, but mainly to create an impetus for the regeneration of East London. By having planning permissions in an early stage London was in control that even if the Games were not awarded the regeneration of East London could already start. The planning applications were designed by the London Development Agency and approved by the Greater London authority and the Mayor. These planning permissions allowed the ODA (and after the Games the LLDC) to continue with the development for the Games and legacy.
London’s future was to look East, to accommodate the growth of London; from eight million to nine million people in the coming years. Canary Wharf was one way, which was to secure the financial centre back there. The next place became Stratford, an area in which post-industrial land had to be re-used for new purposes, had to build on transport and should help closing central London said Andrew Altman in a lecture during the ULI conference ‘creating legacy’ (2012).”

The decision to choose for the Olympic park close to Stratford was due to two reasons:
1. In this way the Games could respond to a need for regeneration, investment and remediation with many physical barriers to be tackled, which was in the London plans already for years,
2. Stratford was forecast to be in the top five transport places in London, which gives this area major opportunities in terms of becoming a well-connected part of London, see figure 5.11.

Transport, mobility and access were central objectives for many preceding bids. In London, the city as a whole had a mature transport system, but the East end needed to be better integrated told Graham Goymour in an interview (Aecom, 2013). London was economically growing East.

Lesson: Choose a strategic location for an optimal legacy
The decision to choose for East London was two-fold. On the one hand this location will become part of the well-connected London transport system and next to the Olympic park a major infrastructural project (Stratford International) was already being realised around the time of becoming an applicant city. On the other hand London’s vision was to look East, the city had to expand. By upgrading this deprived area a strategic solution was found.

By choosing for this strategic location was sure that in Games-mode and Legacy-mode the site will be perfectly incorporated into the local needs and existing facilities. Future host cities should always consider the Games-time and Legacy by deciding which location is most strategic.

Stratford Railway acquired land in July 2000 or even slightly before, in total they had 350 hectares. Before it was a local manufacturing base, which was in decline for 30 years. They wanted to redevelop. Stratford was chosen because there already was strong commitment for parallel commercial development. It had decent infrastructure (high speed train, the jubilee line).

In figure 5.13 (and annex III) the boundary of the Olympic park is illustrated, which clearly shows that both Stratford International Railway Station and Westfield Shopping centre are outside the Olympic Park, although during Games-time and in legacy they will be well-connected. The Olympic Village is inside but during the transition period a road runs between the park and the village.

Figure 5.16. The location of Westfield, Stratford and the venues inside or outside the Olympic park

“The games formed the impetus to bring the site into regeneration (Deloitte, 2013).”
Olympic Village

When the deals with the private sector to fund the Athletes’ Village and Media Centre became problematic, the government funders enabled the Delivery Authority to continue the construction work in parallel with resolving how to fund the two projects (National Audit Office, 2012: 30).

Originally the Olympic village was an entirely private sector development. Because of the downturn they could not find a developer or consortium, which was willing to invest in residential at that time. They had to arrange a competition and then a joint venture of Qatari Diar (investment fund) and Delancey (a UK company) took over ownership, it was a halfway house then developed by public money, because it had to be delivered for the event. Now it is pre-sold, which means that the housing blocks are owned by this joint venture but until the end of the event available for the Olympic athletes. The infrastructure, physical improvements and modifications are delivered by public money. The Olympic Village is now being transformed into homes for the private and social sector, the first tenants will get in at July/September 2013. It still has to be checked what percentage of new residents lived there before and if they had priority.

The Orbit

In many documents and in several interviews the intention of London was stated to only build things if necessary in 2030. Why did they build the Orbit then, for what purpose? Was it only because London wanted to integrate a multi-cultural identity in the Olympic Park, by selecting the world famous Indian artist, Anish Kapoor to design the observation tower?

During the Olympics the views were spectacular for those lucky ones, only a few thousand people were allowed to visit the Orbit daily, paying 15 pounds for an entrance ticket.

The construction of the Orbit can better be seen as £25 million of funding going into the Games by ArcelorMittal, a world leading steel and mining company. They wanted to connect their brand to the Olympics. ArcelorMittal was committed to re-buy the steel after the Stadium is being downsized from 80,000 to 25,000 seats. London’s wealthiest man (Lakshmi Mittal) sponsored ¼ of this artwork. On thing is certain. The Orbit is the only object in the Park that does not have a purpose, Kapoor and Johnson both confirmed, but added that the orbital form and material makes it more interesting to look at than the Eiffel Tower (forbes.com, 2013).

“Locating the primary Olympic Zone in the Lower Lea Valley, which was characterized by insufficient infrastructure, community deprivation and high unemployment, ensured massive investments flowing into new facilities, amenities and public spaces prior to 2012 (Kassens-Noor, 2012: 87).”

Several organisations in the Olympic process analysed and compared the preceding Games according to financial viability and delivery. A recent study by Cousins (2004) on mega projects
and risk has revealed, across the world nine out of every ten transport infrastructure project costs exceed initial estimated costs by between 50 and 100 per cent. 

Like mentioned before, it is very hard to exactly estimate the Olympic costs. Cities and organisations involved are juggling with dividing expenses as Olympic or as non-Olympic. In London some stadiums were built for the legacy and are seen as non-Olympic costs. What happened a lot was that responsibilities and funding changed over time, sometimes LOCOG did expenses on the account of the government, because it was more logic to do so.

The initial budget for the London 2012 Olympics was £4 billion (2004), RICS (2012) even states it was £2.4 billion. In 2007 the budget was revised to £9.325 billion. Out of several documents table 5.2 is created, it gives a brief overview of the costs that run through the Olympic process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Funding from</th>
<th>£ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lottery</td>
<td>2.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London (Greater London Authority and LDA)</td>
<td>875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Government</td>
<td>6.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Olympic Committee</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sponsorship</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ticket sales</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>11.298</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expenses by</th>
<th>£ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Olympic Delivery Authority</td>
<td>6.248</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Site preparation and infrastructure</td>
<td>1.820</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Venues</td>
<td>1.110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Transport</td>
<td>890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Other Olympic park projects</td>
<td>900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- International Broadcast centre/ Main press centre</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Olympic and Paralympic village</td>
<td>940</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local authorities and Department for Culture and Sports</td>
<td>2.537</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London Organising Committee for Olympic Games</td>
<td>2.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.785</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Estimated Revenues *</th>
<th>£ million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct: Seven-week Games period in London</td>
<td>2.119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in consumer spending</td>
<td>750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in economic output</td>
<td>1.140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in UK resident's incomes</td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect: From 2012-2015</td>
<td>10,098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stimulus for the economy</td>
<td>5.100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase in economic output every year</td>
<td>1.370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional income for UK residents per year</td>
<td>296</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*needs to be checked in 2015

Table 5.2 compiled by author, sources guardian.co.uk, Sportcal, RICS (2012) and more

In terms of legacy, the costs associated with the Games are less ‘madness’ or ‘scandal’ and more a public investment in a process of social re-engineering of London’s East End (Poynter & Macrury, 2009: 197). In the end it would have been spend over a much longer period.

**Lesson:** Work with realistic cost estimations
5.4.3 **Planning: Time/result & Instruments**

London was the first city ever to have planning permission before the bid was awarded in 2005. The park masterplan included two scenarios: Olympics and no Olympics, thereby it also covered the post-Games legacy phase, which was approved in October 2004 by the Joint Planning Authorities Team (JPAT) set up by the four host boroughs (R&R, 29th June 2012).

Under the terms of the Regional Development Agencies Act 1998, the LDA has the statutory powers to compulsorily assemble land for purposes linked to economic development, urban regeneration and ‘sustainable development’, with an emphasis on the local scale. Employing these powers to assemble land for an international event required the establishment of a close link between Olympic ambitions and those informing the LDA’s approach from 2002 to physical regeneration in the Lea Valley (instruments). The LDA thus confirms in 2004 the twofold aim of ‘delivering a successful Olympic Games and a legacy of sustainable mixed-use regeneration in the Lower Lea Valley (London Development Agency, 2004).

Despite the need for 30 more planning permissions for relocations and six High Court challenges, the site was handed over to the ODA on schedule at the end of July 2007. No evictions were necessary (RICS, 2012). But the LDA is still dealing with the negotiations about the relocation of business and people at this moment, some had to negotiate through private agreements (Interviews Deloitte, 2013; Davis & Thornley, 2010).

During the ULI conference (2012) Hugh Robertson (UK Government) noted that ‘getting started early has been absolutely key to the legacy planning’.

This process is different than other projects in the UK like Crossrail. The LDA who bought all the land was a regeneration agency. They have spent a lot of time helping business to relocate. Crossrail, a transport organisation, has less regard to all businesses it acquires for the development of the Crossrail. The LDA did have that rationale to protect business, people and jobs.

**Lesson:** Realise early acquisition of the land

Knowledge from preceding Olympics has shown the importance of owning strategic land or being in the position to acquire the land. Although the LDA was in the position to relocate the businesses and people in the area, early acquisition was instrumental for the delivery of the project. The Olympics have an immovable deadline, therefore delays in procedures about the land acquisition and site preparation need to be avoided.

Thanks to special regulations (see next page) the LDA could easily mark the site that was needed...
for Games and legacy. By having the permission to acquire the land, even if the Games will not be awarded, the LDA was in control to continue developments.

Graham Goymour of Aecom explained in an interview (2013) “One of the success factors in terms of legacy planning for London was to establish a masterplan, which put in place an outline-planning framework. Developers who now have to step into this arena have to work with a well-established framework. There is also a planning permission for this masterplan, which establishes the amount and type of development. Although there were changes during the process, and these will occur, this outline planning framework is able to respond to these changes and be flexible to market changes.”

The plans for the site after the Games were then developed in more detail in the Legacy Masterplan Framework (LMF) published as a draft for consultation by the London Development Agency in 2009. Although this document contains a considerable amount of detail, its stated objective is to be illustrative of potential and to establish some key principles. It does, however, present a ‘preferred Legacy Framework’ for consultation with ‘legacy partners, stakeholders and the wider public’ (LDA, 2009a; LDA, 2009b, p. 4). It stresses that this framework needs to be flexible so that it can adapt to future uncertainties such as changes in the real estate market.

**Lesson:** Create an outline-planning framework that can respond to changes in the process and market

By creating such an outline-planning framework the organisation responsible for the legacy, in London the LLDC, is able to continue with the regeneration of the site. The priority in this framework lies in the ability to create something deliverable and realisable for the benefit of the city and citizens. The framework includes the amount and type of developments in a bounded area. This outline-planning framework in London gave the LLDC the legacy status to develop and sell of land. The outline-planning framework was approved by the Greater London Authority (GLA), which gave the LLDC room to deliver and not to ask permission from government every now and then.

As already mentioned before the Olympic process has an immovable deadline. Host cities have to deliver enormous development in less than seven years. To be able to deliver on time some special planning instruments are used to speed up the process. In London there were some new planning instruments, called the Olympic regulations:

1. There was right at the start a special planning solution created, because the park was overlapping four boroughs, they had to form a structure in which they could jointly all agree the planning framework, the Host Borough Unit (HBU).
2. Two Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO), which gave the LDA the mandate to relocate people if there was a clear need to acquire the land for the Olympics or the legacy and sell it for a fair market value plus compensation for losses in profit due to the relocation.
3. Some changes to the tax regime, import of horses of Guns. Not really changes in legislation but more changes in small regulations. - *instruments*

During the Olympic process two CPOs were actually promoted: one for the underground and the power lines (Power Lines CPO) and a second one for the Games and legacy (Olympic Legacy CPO 2005). The ODA (2005) and RICS magazine (2012) report that these CPOs were part of their ‘Relocation strategy’.
In the UK there is a Statutory Compensation Code (SCC), which includes the statutory matters for compensation. The compensation is about the cost of moving plus the cost in loss of profits for the businesses that had to move. Once you lose your property, you have six years to reclaim or compensate. Regarding the Olympic CPO there will be a spike of claims in the end of July 2013, many businesses and people will try to reclaim their property (so they can move back to the area) or ask for a compensation.

Preceding Games (chapter 4) have shown us that the Olympics can act as a catalyst to speed up the process and increase attraction and investments. According to governance and bureaucracy, if the Olympics would not have happened planning permissions etc. would have taken decades. There was a political will to deliver before the Games to be able to continue working on the legacy afterwards.

"Without the Games the regeneration should have taken more time, maybe thirty or forty years to achieve those goals, but it was important to fix the East end. The investments would not have been there for the athletic facilities, those were the big cost impacts, we would have seen more communal buildings" said Bill Hanway in his presentation during the ULI conference in May 2012).

Lesson: Use Olympic regulations to speed up the process

Olympic regulations are an interesting method to speed up the development that have to be delivered on time. Host cities can specially design these new planning instruments, but could also make use of adaptations to existing regulations. The advantage of such Olympic regulations is that it prevents the process from falling into delays and thereby creates opportunities for the continuation of these regulations for further development projects.

"The Olympics was really a fantastic excuse for a major infrastructural project in the city, and to shape the city, to set a platform for city building for a next generation of London. Yes there were sports goals, financial applied goals, but fundamentally from the urban development perspective this is a fantastic way to facilitate re-building of the city and massive investments in infrastructure (Altman, CEO LLDC, during the ULI conference, May 2012)."
5.4.4 Learning: Expertise & Information

The London 2012 Games happened in a market and with people that knew how to deliver a regeneration project, like experts as David Higgens, Dennis Hone, Andrew Altman, Heather Hancock. The best people were selected (ULI, 2012).

One of these experienced professionals was David Higgins. In November 2005 he became Chief Executive of the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA). He performed a similar role for the Sydney 2000 Olympics (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

Ken Livingstone was a passionate story teller and persuaded the government to bid for the Games were Johnson was more focusing on what the games and regeneration really could deliver for the people and the city. “There had been leadership influences, Boris Johnson had a very different approach than Ken Livingstone in terms of the types of physical environment. The convergence of the two has actually made us change the plan for the better (Presentation of Bill Hanway, Aecom, at ULI congress, May 2012).”

Continuity of key personnel is an important success factor in urban development projects. Due to the crisis many governmental positions changed over the time, which led to inefficient use of expertise and knowledge loss. Contrary, continuity at senior levels was largely achieved across the programme (National Audit Office, 2012: 30).

Niall McNevin and Shaw, who both have a long involvement with the project and the area, initially led the ODA promoter team. Ramsey was a planner at Newham for more than 30 years and Shaw had worked on the London Docklands regeneration project from 1985 to 1998 and became deputy chief planner at ODA in 2006 (R&R, 29th June 2012).

“Work with extraordinary talent. This is a once in a lifetime project, this is a type of project where you only have one chance to get it right. If you fail here, nothing will be successful in the future on the site (stated Bill Hanway in his presentation at ULI, 2012).”

After the Games, the government should use the skills generated by officials who have worked on the Games, by deploying people to roles that use this experience (National Audit Office, 2012: 9).

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<th>Lesson: Make use of existing expertise and put the right people in the right place</th>
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The Olympics are once in a lifetime opportunity to promote the host city on a worldwide stage. Host cities can only deliver it once, so things have to be done right. Therefore making use of existing expertise (local, regional or national) is instrumental for the delivery of the project.
The expertise in London 2012 process was both ways around: on the one hand it brought new insights and expertise and on the other hand it was about making use of local expertise and knowledge from preceding projects. The Olympics embed a special feature, it can be used as a case-study for business in showing what they are capable of to deliver. For businesses it is of great importance to get involved in such an eminent project. For involved companies showing clients or other business that they were involved in the Olympics indicates that they are capable of doing any other project. The Olympics and regeneration plans were major projects including major forces, cross-party partnering and an immovable deadline.

Secondment (Dutch: detachering) forms a crucial role in the learning process. By using secondees in the Olympic organisations like the LOCOG, ODA and LLDC local experts are learning (new) lessons, which could be of great value for local business or local projects afterwards. Knowledge sharing. This also forms part of the legacy created by the Games.

**Lesson:** Share knowledge by secondment

In May 2009 the new Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, established a new public sector, not-for-profit agency called the Olympic Park Legacy Company (OPLC). Davis & Thornley (2010) state that a leading urban regeneration expert from the United States, Andrew Altman has been appointed as Chief Executive. Richard Rogers, the Mayor's architecture adviser, recommended Altman, who has led the private sector regeneration of a waterfront in Washington DC, similar to the Olympic Park in that it had been dominated by industrial sites and had a history of deprivation. His CV also includes public sector experience with senior planning roles in Washington, Los Angeles and Oakland (standard.co.uk). – expertise

The Mayor of London, Boris Johnson, felt the legacy-oriented companies did not have enough power/influence during the pre-Olympic period. That was the reason to transfer ownership and responsibility for the delivery of the Olympic Park land and assets from the OPLC to the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC), which responsibilities will be greater over the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and a wider area including planning powers and development control. (LLDC website, 2012; National Audit Office, 2012: 19). – expertise/ instruments

**Lesson:** Steer on strong governmental control

In former research it already became clear that if host cities wanted to steer on long term developments, a dominant role from government was necessary. Public (local, regional or national) bodies give priority to the legacy, where IOC and OCOGs focus on the delivery of a successful event.

Although strong governmental control was crucial for the London Olympics one of the biggest lessons from large complex project in the UK was that one of the reasons they have not delivered is because of political interference.

The role of the government is to be (financially) committed and to give clear directions. They then have to trust the organisations and people put in charge of it said Heather Hancock in an interview in 2012.
Hancock (2012) added, “The government said we will back these Games. We will stick with it, we will not argue about it, there has been no political argument about the Games being a good thing. But, we (the government) will be very clear what has to be delivered, but we will allow the people, who are put in charge, to do it.” - learning: expertise

**Lesson:** Monitor low political interference, trust the people to deliver

Former large complex project in the UK have shown that political interference can result in major delays in terms of delivery. Although the government in London was in strong control of the legacy (via GLA, Mayor, LDA and later on LLDC) they had to trust the people and organisations to deliver. For future projects and Olympics this is an interesting lesson.

"Lessons can be learned from the Thames Gateway, well intended, arguable too many kooks, desperate policies on local level or no policy sometimes at all in some of the local authorities and certainly no unitary authority (Wyatt @ ULI, 2012)."

“Off course you learn from different places” states Andrew Altman, CEO of the LLDC, at the ULI congress, 2012. “Barcelona is much talked about, we learned from their housing issues and how they dealt with it. But if you go to the venues today, they are not always in the greatest shape. Athens did a good job on the transport infrastructure, venues not so well. Sydney started much later with legacy, did a good job on the park, but did not do a masterplan for many years later. Los Angeles was more a private affair, less visible legacy. Munich has a great park, but was not really about urban regeneration. If you put all these pieces together it leads to London.”

"Barcelona 1992 was probably seen as a highlight in terms of regeneration potential, clearly because of the leadership of the Mayor and the team delivering that transformation from the history of Barcelona to the future and what type of investment undertaken for the growing needs. This is a very strong model we looked at said Bill Hanway at the ULI congress, 2012."

‘Learning from preceding Games’ is not really a lesson from London, but more an indication of the importance to learn from expertise and information from the past. London experts always clearly stated in interviews and lectures that it all started with learning from good and bad practises from the past.
5.5 Criticism

Although London had established some very clever strategies not all were delivered as intended. Such as ‘minimising waste or rather protecting investment’ formed a strong strategy by only building venues or facilities with a clear after-use. In this paragraph some missed opportunities are described by referring to literature and to empirical data.

International Broadcasting Centre - venturing

The International Broadcasting Centre and Press Centre were just built, its legacy was not taken into account. It was not being seen as part of the legacy, it was not built for a future thinking. It was situated in the North corner of the site where it should have the least impact. So London did miss their strong legacy strategy here.

On the 5th of March Regeneration & Renewal reported “Olympic legacy chiefs (Andrew Altman and Baroness Ford) have serious concerns about the possibility of finding a viable legacy use for the massive London 2012 IBC.” They stated that it will be a challenge to find a future tenant, preferably it should become a digital cluster, because of the available telecommunication infrastructure. If not it could function as a storage facility.

The Broadcasting centre became a political debate, because if a decent after-use plan is not realised it will reflect on the Mayor of the Prime Minister. They started a tender procedure in which Deloitte won the bid. Chris Lewis of Deloitte explained in an interview (2013) that due to the fact that Deloitte’s client network was leveraged to be sure that they could guarantee that their proposed tenants or owners will be in.

After-use of the Olympic stadium - venturing

The initial plan for the Olympic stadium did not state a clear end-user but did incorporate legacy planning in terms of downsizing the stadium to a scale that will increase the success of its after-use. The LLDC has the responsibility for the running of the stadium, as it will be for the Media Centre. After a long process West Ham was announced and contracted as future tenant in March of this year (2013).

The Olympic stadium was designed from a flexible perspective, the upper tier could be removed, but through the process it became unclear if downsizing was still an option. The stadium has an athletic track, which needs to be preserved for the World cup Athletics in 2017. This minimizes the adaptability level for future users (think about Football stadiums in the UK: supporters want to sit along the sideline). The track has to be there, at least until August of 2017 when the stadium is host to the World Championship in Athletics.

It is interesting to look at the problems that arise during the process to find a new tenant and in relation with the time-span:

….. 5 March 2010

- Baroness Ford, Chair of the OPLC, said she remained committed to London 2012 Organising Committee chair Sebastian Coe’s aim to ensure an athletics end-use as this was an important commitment made in the Games bid. She added by saying that the stadium will be reduced to a 25,000 seater athletics stadium. She ended with “we must get to a good decision on the stadium
and we must do it this year it can’t be left to drag on.” An open tender was developed.

08 November 2011
- The tender process, in which West Ham was the preferred new owner, was suddenly overwhelmed by political debate, because it was claimed they fell foul of EU state aid rules governing the distribution of public funding. The OPLC offered full ownership, which was in conflict with EU state aid rules, because the stadium was developed by state aid. Ford said “we are restructuring our offer and will come to the market shortly with an offer for rental of the stadium, rather than ownership, to narrow the scope for litigation.’

May 2012
- Altman, former CEO of the LLDC reacted on a question about the after-use of the stadium that they are now looking to other possible end-users and create a mixed-use venue, back to where they came from: The bid commitment states ‘the stadium is a multi-use, multi-sport stadium with athletics at its core (R&R, 8 November 2011).’

13 July 2012
- A restructured tender delivered four new stadium bids, West Ham United FC, Leyton Orient FC, Formula One and a University College of Football Business.

8 November 2012
- Due to substantial conversions requested by the bidders the Stadium may not reopen until 2016.

6 December 2012
- West Ham was the preferred end-user. Negotiations with West Ham United began, in the end of 2012, over the financial terms of the lease. The LLDC is processing a detailed design for a non-football option in case the club is unable to meet the requirements. The LLDC has said that the opening date depends on the level of adaption required: for the function as football stadium it could reopen 2015-2016, for non-football function 2013-2014.

8 January 2013
- Financial arrangements are been agreed upon with West Ham United.

22 March 2013
- West Ham United will lease the stadium for a period of 99 years for 2 million pounds a year.

Bloomberg (2013, 22nd march) states that the seat capacity will be reduced to 54,000 seats and a roof will be installed. The cost to adapt the venue will be as much as 190 million pounds. West Ham will contribute 15 million pounds to the deal, with Newham Council investing 40 million pounds, the UK government agreed to pay an extra 25 million if the stadium needed to be adapted.

The LLDC says “this stadium agreement will generate hundreds of new jobs, encourage many thousands of visitors to the local area and act as a catalyst for further economic investment and growth in the area.” The future has to turn out if this hooligan-related facility will give an economic boost to the area. Thereby, what will be the effect on the borough of Newham?

Less employment and open-tenders than intended - commitment
Although London intended to get 36,000 people into employment they have fallen short of its initial target, only 34,500 jobs were created (DCMS, 2012; R&R 13th November 2012). The ODA’s construction programme supported 177,000 job years of employment from 2007 to the start of 2012 (National Audit Office, 2012:19).

London aimed to enable businesses of all sizes to bid for Games contracts, but in the end 54 per cent of all contracts were awarded to companies in London. Thereby firms located in London that had been trading for more than five years were significantly more likely to have been
shortlisted (R&R 13th November 2012).

**Soil cleaning - property**
The ODA states on their website that it can be seen as successful brownfield redevelopment (ODA, 2012 & LOCOG, 2012).

Sydney showed the world that if a decontaminated area is not entirely cleaned future users will not be interested, due to high costs for soil cleaning and having the risk that worse things happen. The site for the Olympics in 2012 was also decontaminated. A special soil cleaning hospital was constructed on-site. Total soil cleaning should have been too expansive, so London decided to only clean up the ground till a certain depth, depending on the level of contamination, and then covered with a plastic membrane. After some decades all ground underneath the membrane will be naturally cleaned. For Sydney some future users were not interested in developing there, because of the huge costs for soil cleaning that still had to be done. In London probably there will not be too many problems regarding new developments, at least they hope!

**Lesson:** Make people responsible and accountable for legacy goals

**Social legacy - commitment**
Regeneration and Renewal wrote in December that the Mayor of London should do more to deliver a social legacy for East London, improving education and skills to help local people get jobs (permanently).

Probably due to the crisis London was unable to deliver more permanent jobs. Westfield shopping centre created many jobs, but was a separate development next to the Games. Although many temporary jobs were created the intended amount of permanent employment was not delivered.

**Resignation of LLDC-CEO - expertise**
The Department for Communities and Local Government has a grant agreement and system accountability statement in place, through which it intends to monitor use of the grant to the Legacy Development Corporation and the Olympic Park assets (National Audit Office, 2012).

Suddenly in the August of 2012, just after the Olympics finished, Altman left the LLDC. Some reports say that Altman is effectively paying for failing to get long-term tenants for the stadium sorted out more quickly, and some talk said “with Baroness Ford gone he was bound to follow as part of the passing of the old regime (Guardian, 22nd June, 2012, London 2012 Blog)”.

Some experts involved in the process gave another explanation: the LLDC just needed a change. Altman is more of a visionary, a master planner. The phase the LLDC gets in now is of running and operating the park and execution is therefore another type of leader is necessary. Altman is a professor at LSE and his focus is more on theory than on execution, so it makes sense.

Unfortunately the continuation of key personal could not be delivered on the long term. The involvement of many experts stopped after the event.
Host Borough involvement - commitment

LOCOG’s contractors were required to demonstrate how they would deliver against our Employment & Skills commitments from the initial tender response stage of procurement (Creating employment opportunities briefing note, November 2012)

IOC and LOCOG should have included local food chains instead of using coca cola and McDonalds. One of the things Hackney was looking at at that point of time as a legacy within the Hackney bid of the park was to have a sort of a food-manufacturing centre of excellence. It was also looking at how to ensure all the food businesses that have been on Hackney Wick. So they could benefit from the Olympics said Liz Fenton from the Borough of Hackney in an interview (2013). In the end there were few opportunities for local parties to get involved in terms of food program.

Knowledge loss - expertise

Because of all the austerity measures (nl: bezuinigingsmaatregelen) knowledge transfer and continuation of key personal is not that great as it should be. With a financial cutback of 250 million a year across the six boroughs a large amount of people working at the Boroughs were been fired, restructured or replaced. This sort of issues restrict benefits that could have been aimed.

A lot of expertise just disappeared. Organisations involved wrap up and people move on to other projects. So you had a great deal of expertise in a relevantly small number of companies such as Deloitte (professional service provider), Aecom (legacy planner), Eversheds (lawyers). They have become very closely together, but they are project specific, people start to leave. There is no central place of learning were that knowledge is captured. There is a big leakage there. IOC could play an important role in that.
5.6 Conclusion

The London case really helped to understand what legacy planning includes and how it needs to be delivered. Former Olympic host cities really tried to incorporate long-term objectives into their Olympic plan, but in the end saw the priority shift to delivering the event on time and according to requirements set by the IOC and organising committee. At every stage of the process London grasped back to their main vision “legacy at its core”. Although legacy was in it from the beginning it had to go through some iterations to get more shape. Therefore a special Legacy corporation, the LLDC, was established and an outline-planning framework was delivered and approved by local government (GLA and Mayor). These two elements plus a third one (early acquisition of the land) were London specific lessons and will result in the continuation of the regeneration of East London and will (very likely) deliver a successful legacy for the city and citizens. The future will turn out if London strategies were well designed and delivered.

5.6.1 Strategies

The London case gave us new insights and confirmed the role of the strategic activities and distinct resources by Daamen (2010) in the Olympic process. Figure 5.21 shows the lessons learned from the London case are divided over the four strategic activities by Mintzberg (2007). The most important and London specific lessons are highlighted.
In an interview with Daamen (November 2012) he stated that some strategic activities or resources could be more important to make progress at a certain stage. The most important elements for London are summarised:

Commitment
In table 5.2 the lessons learned from the Olympic process in London are divided over the four strategic activities. In the discussions with some experts in London it became clear that the most important resource for the Olympic process was ‘commitment’. London did have a strong vision (5.3.1), but more important they were committed to deliver and to integrate legacy.

Although there was strong control by government and from the mayor via special governmental bodies such as LDA, OPLC and LLDC, they trusted the organisations to deliver and did not interfere too much.

Property
Regeneration was necessary for East London and the city leaders and bodies involved were keen on giving priority to this large-scale transformation project with Olympics in it. By choosing for Lower Lea Valley as site for the Olympics, located only a few miles from the city centre, and by upgrading the infrastructure London was sure that the site will be a strategic location in terms of legacy planning. From government there was a strong focus on delivering this legacy and establishing an organisation responsible for the legacy planning. The city wanted to minimise waste and reduce unnecessary expenses by only investing in stadiums, infrastructure and facilities that had a clear function after the Olympics.

London was very keen on delivering on time and therefore they started with acquisition of the land already before winning the bid. Planning permissions were delivered in an early phase, which gave them the power to deliver the developments on time. In comparison with preceding host cities London had the most existing and temporary venues used for hosting the Olympics.

Due to the crisis the investment by private parties was limited and established Public Private Partnerships could not get funding, so the government had to step in. All venues were delivered but the amount of investments by government was higher than estimated.

Instruments
London established some special Olympic regulations for acquiring the land and to speed up the regeneration of East London. The planning outline framework that was delivered just before the Games started, gave LLDC the mandate to continue developing the area after the event.

Expertise
London really did a decent analysis of several preceding Olympics and have put the right people on the right positions. Many experts (event- or regeneration related) were involved in recent former regeneration or mega-event projects in the UK.

Many knowledge from hosting the Olympics was transferred to UK companies by using secondees in the Organising Committee or Legacy corporations. Thereby London seriously stated to use the Games as a case-study for other cities and transfer their knowledge.
In figure 5.25 the role of the strategic activities in the Olympic process of the London 2012 Games is illustrated. Although the theory states that all activities are involved in the process, some activities can have priority in a specific part or process to make progress.

**Learning** – For London learning from preceding Games and project was instrumental for establishing a decent legacy vision. During the process the organisations involved worked together and learned from each other. After the Olympics the knowledge and expertise gathered in the process can be used (as a case-study) for future projects.

**Visioning** – London established a clear strategy ‘a large regeneration project with Games in it’ in which ‘legacy planning’ had the focus. In each phase this vision formed the starting point and London was committed to deliver this legacy at all stages of the process.

**Planning** – In preceding Olympics the planning was an iterative process in which every phase had to be evaluated and reflected to make the process more efficient.

**Venturing** – Mainly during the initiation phase London had to venture what (property) they wanted to deliver and how (finance). In comparison with preceding Games in which after the event they had to start over again and had to re-vision, London did put much emphasis on the
end of the preparations period. In this period agreements about the after-use of the venues and park were delivered.

5.6.3 Transitional Period
London had a totally different approach than preceding Games regarding legacy. Their thoroughness to deliver ‘an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens’ was embodied in their strong will to integrate legacy planning form the beginning. The transitional period that was explained in paragraph 2.6 had a different position in the process of London 2012, see figure 5.26. Thereby the importance, role and order of the strategic activities were different.

![Figure 5.23 Transitional period in London 2012 process (see annex II for larger image)](image)

**Pre-event period**
During the pre-event period the focus started locally and became more and more influenced by global stakeholders and media. The pressure by media and the public is getting bigger, which results in frictions and changes in terms of organisational set-up, long-term objectives, etc. Like many experts stated in their presentations or during the interviews, it all started by learning (1) from the past (expertise and information). Projects, like London Docklands, King’s Cross, were used as a reference by London and thereby lessons from preceding Olympics were extracted and summarised, see figure 5.22. London made a decent analysis, which resulted in a strong vision - visioning (2) - in which it clearly integrated legacy planning. London created a funded base, by creating commitment and setting up legitimacy. Getting people and parties involved and committed was instrumental.

When the Olympic consent (bid book and application form) was submitted the government required also a planning consent for what comes after the Games. “Actually the Olympic consent was done well, but the one according legacy was too general. But, there was a starting point, no other preceding host city had ever done (Deloitte, 2013).”

From that moment on London started venturing (3): what was realisable, deliverable and feasible. The city had to gather resources like finance and property and consider what are the best options to deliver the event and its legacy.
From that moment on the vision was made more realistic, deliverable and financeable and something that the people wanted. As Deloitte (2013) explained lots of financial modelling was done. “We sort of boiled everything down into something people want and something that we thought developers could filled and something we thought the government would support.”

Then a business plan was established containing the key elements that needed to be delivered in the early phases and financial applications to government to deliver and to mitigate risks. From then the real planning started.

Then the actual planning (4) started, knowing that there is an immovable deadline. It is an iterative process in which the ‘when and what’ (time/result) and the ‘how’ (instruments) have to be chosen, adapted and revised several times.

Normally it would have taken many decades to deliver these planning applications, but due to the immovable deadline of the event it had to be delivered much quicker. The final legacy planning permission was delivered a few months before the Olympic event, so in 2012. It was a real consent, something deliverable, so when the Games will finish there was a planning permission that could deliver a conventional regeneration (Deloitte, 2013).

Transitional period
Former Olympic hosts did not establish any clear after-use plan or organisation that could continue the maintenance and use of the venues. London decided that in the end of the pre-event period fundamental agreements on planning permissions had to be delivered so they could continue with the regeneration process after the event. Just before the Games in 2012 the Greater London Authority and Mayor approved the outline-planning framework.

Instead of having a transitional period after the event London placed this period in the end of the pre-event period. Due to the crisis financial backing from private parties decreased and the government had to step in even more. It is crucial that in this stage the government is in a position to change the set-up of some organisations and create (new) instruments to ensure that legacy promises will continue after the event. So it is again about commitment and using the right expertise so the planning can continue during the transitional period. To be sure that delivered investments will be for the benefit of the city and its citizens London was in an iterative processes between planning and venturing. The success of their legacy planning had to be secured in this period. To be able to use the momentum of the Games the regeneration had to start as soon as possible after the event, but first some necessary adjustments had to be done, the transformation period.

Transformation period
The London Paralympics ended on 9 September 2012 and from then on the park was closed for visitors. The Olympic park is now being transformed into the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and will re-open in the end of 2013. Some stadiums will be downsized to local dimensions to better function in the after-event period. The side wings of the Aquatics centre will be detached, the upper tier of the Olympic Stadium will be dismantled and some adjustment to the stadium will be made according to the agreements with West Ham, the future user. The Riverbank Arena will be dismantled and the hockey pitches will be transported to other UK cities. The Basketball Dome will be transported to other cities in the UK or even to Rio de Janeiro. The infrastructure in the park, like bridges and pavements, will be fitted to necessary dimensions.
London was really keen on delivering their legacy, so they first wanted to have all things fixed in the park. In the summer of 2013 the park will be re-opened and will be occupied by different tenants, users and residents. An important lesson for London was that preceding Games like Sydney and Athens showed that only making the park accessible is not enough. All amenities in the park need to have a clear role and all together form the pumping heart of the park. The park has to breath, instead of just becoming a site for tourists or visitors.

Post-event period

Former Olympic host cities like Sydney, Barcelona and Athens, had to start over again after the event to find future users for the site and the venues. London had already done this before the event and thus could continue their regeneration process. The next developments were already defined in their outline-planning framework and the London Legacy Development Corporation is in the position to develop the next phases of the regeneration plan London 2030.

Continuation of visioning and planning formed the most important strategic activities in this period and for some facilities like the International Broadcasting Centre and the new housing blocks the LLDC has to keep on venturing to find investors and future-users.

In this post-Event period London is willing to share their knowledge and expertise to future host cities of the Olympics, Worldcups, EXPO’s etc., the strategic activity learning was transferred.
VI. Conclusion
Chapter 6: Conclusion

In this chapter four essential elements for future host cities in terms of legacy planning are examined. First of all the definition of legacy (§6.1) has to be revised. Second, an overview of the legacy strategies (§6.2) for future Olympic host cities will be given in relation to the theory (strategic model). In §6.3 the role of the different strategic activities and resources in an Olympic process are described. The last paragraph (§6.4) will explain the role and position of the transitional period in the Olympic process.

The research question was “what lessons can be learned from preceding Games to create legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities?” These lessons were described in chapter four and five. In this chapter these lessons will be converted into some legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities.

6.1 General

The London case really gave extra value to this research. Besides the new information and insights it added to existing studies done by former academics or professional companies, some interesting changes according to legacy planning occurred. During conducting research in London it was discovered that since the Games in London we should make a distinction between what was legacy before and what is meant with legacy ever since. In chapter one, legacy was described as ‘something left behind by a predecessor’, it could be planned or unplanned, tangible or intangible. This definition has a pretty negative association. It contained venues and facilities that were built for the Olympics and mostly did not have a clear after-use.

London 2012 have showed the world that legacy can have a more positive association, namely by creating elements for the future need of a host city. In London, legacy became part of a large regeneration project, in which this legacy did not have anything to do with ‘what was left behind by the Games’, but had all to do with a clear vision about what was needed for the future of the city. Legacy thereby became part of the pre-event period, it was seen as deliverables such as skills, infrastructural development and investments, that were already delivered before the event actually started. In 2006 Brunet stated the following:

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…
“The Olympic resources are not cost but investment”
…
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In line with the old definition of legacy cost is a logical resource for the things that are left behind, because those facilities left unused did not have any function after the Games and were seen as unnecessary expenses. In the new terminology of legacy, like in London, the costs for the venues and other facilities are seen as investments for the benefit of the city and citizens.

Barcelona and London both stated that a large part of the investments was done for non-Olympic developments, more than seventy percent. Several key players involved in the process explain that the amount of investments is not that outrageous high with the argument that otherwise it would have been spend over a much longer period. The Olympics only speed up the process.
Organising large-scale sporting events in the current economical situation is a risky undertaking. Several cities are not able to generate enough support from the inhabitants, because the huge investments needed for organising the event are in conflict with the major cutbacks set by (national) government. Sustainable developments and therefore legacy planning becomes more and more important. Many preceding host cities have been shown to lack the ability to find users for the new constructed venues after the event. It becomes more and more important to justify decisions in terms of after-use of the venues. All investments made should be in line with the cities future demand.

Due to the crisis, private party involvement in urban development projects has decreased enormously in general. Only large international companies still have the financial means to become part of the Olympic process. On the other hand the role of public bodies has become more and more important in terms of financial viability. This gives opportunities for better legacy planning if cities are committed. The government in many preceding Games had to guarantee it would back the investments if financial shortfalls occur. Next to that the government has to become more committed to steering an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens.

Although overall interest in bidding to organise the Games has reduced, some cities are even more strongly focused on bidding for the Games. They still believe in the great potential that such an event can bring for the city in terms of city promotion, economic growth and urban improvement. Most preceding host cities focussed on transport, mobility and access. This trend can be seen today by Madrid, candidate city for 2020, already invested billions in a new ring road and infrastructural improvements as part of their pre-Olympic bid.

While it may be possible to see the impact of Olympic driven urban investments, there does not appear to be a pattern (strategy, Mintzberg) one can rely on in predicting which strategies will most likely succeed. The applicability and success depends on the context. Cities in two developed countries, Los Angeles and Barcelona, both appear to have won the Olympic development game but used different strategies (respectively private and public). On the other hand, Sydney, also in a developed country, put in fewer resources than Barcelona and seems not to have won, or at least not to have succeeded as well as Barcelona did. At the same time, Atlanta tried to play the Games using the Los Angeles strategy, but its success, if it was successful, was more modest than that realised by the city it sought to emulate (Poynter & MacRury, 2010).

In the next three paragraphs the three most important elements to steering for future Olympic host cities will be explained. These three elements consist of:

§6.2 strategies for future Olympic host cities,
§6.3 the role of the strategic activities in the Olympic process,
§6.4 the role and position of the transitional period.
6.2 Strategies

In this chapter the urban legacy strategies will be summarised and divided into the four strategic activities and briefly explained. In chapter four several essential lessons out of preceding Olympic Games were extracted out of an intensive literature study about the summer Olympics of 1992-2008. In chapter five an in-depth case about the Olympic process for the London 2012 Games was delivered to come up with some interesting new findings (lessons). All these lessons were compared, evaluated and reflected upon, bringing us to figure 6.1. In this figure the lessons from the past and present are converted into urban legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities. They are divided into the four strategic activities by Mintzberg (1997) and set out in the strategic model by Daamen (2010). The most important strategies for legacy planning are highlighted.

While all four strategic activities play a role during the process, in certain phases some activity or activities can become strategically more important to make progress at that stage (Daamen, 2012). By dividing the legacy strategies into the four strategic activities and over the eight distinct resources it is possible to take some conclusions regarding the importance of each. All legacy strategies are briefly described below.

Figure 6.1 Legacy strategies for future Olympic host cities
6.2.1 Visioning
The strategic activity visioning forms the starting point of the Olympic process and needs to be taken into account during each phase. Although ‘legitimacy’ is necessary, in an Olympic process it all starts with ‘commitment’.

* Incorporate the Olympic Plan into the existing urban plans
Both in the literature study about the preceding five summer Olympics (1992-2008) and in London (2012) it became clear that the Olympic plan should be integrated into existing urban plans. In this way long-term local demands can be speeded up and delivered. By incorporating the Olympic plan into the existing urban plans the city can deliver better legacy creation.

* Strong vision: integrate sustainable developments, not only mention it
London was the first city in the Olympic history that had an ‘outline planning framework’ accepted before the event. Instead of having to establish a legacy corporation after the event that will be responsible for finding future users of the venues, facilities and infrastructure, London had these arrangements and organisational set up delivered already before the event. In this way they could continue the regeneration process after the event.

* For an optimal legacy: negotiate, tailor and steer on local demands
A city should be committed to negotiate with the IOC and the Organising Committee about what they have to deliver and how. They should always take into account that what they are building is for the benefit of the city and citizens, otherwise they should choose for other solutions, like temporary venues or upgraded existing facilities.

* Get the people involved and give them influence
In some preceding Olympics the public voice was heard, which resulted in a better connection between the Olympic plan and the future demands of the city and its citizens. Although involvement by residents or communities will always be limited, they should be heard, because in the end the people are the end-user, not the IOC.

* Make people responsible and organisations accountable for the delivery of the legacy
Only establishing an organisation responsible for the legacy is not enough, this organisation should be also accountable for the delivery. Therefore some bodies should be established that monitor the entire process and communicate to public leaders (Prime Minister in London).

6.2.2 Planning
The Olympic process is special in two ways: it has an immovable deadline and an enormous amount of organisations and people involved (scale). Therefore the strategic activity ‘planning’ has to be taken into account during the whole process. At each stage the ‘time/result’ should be checked and (new) ‘instruments’ need to be established and adapted to deliver.

* Incorporate the legacy plan in an early phase
In the previous subparagraph (§6.2.1) we explained the importance of incorporating the Olympic plan into the existing plans. To make the legacy effective it needs to be integrated in an early phase. Former Olympic host cities (1992-2008) showed that although cities intended to integrate legacy planning, due to international pressure or lack of time and money the priority shifted from legacy to event. To be sure that the city and citizens benefit from the realised legacy it is important to set ‘legacy-planning’ at the core of the process, ensuring incorporation of local objectives.
* Create a planning framework that can respond to changes in the market and the process

London was the first city to have delivered (and approved by government) an outline planning framework, which formed a decent instrument to continue with the developments in the area after the Olympics for the regeneration of East London. Although this framework is agreed upon, it is flexible so it can respond to changes in the market and the process.

* Make use of changes in the urban context: momentum

Several preceding Olympic host cities used the Olympics to respond to a certain change in the urban context (i.e. de-industrialisation or political climate change). By using the momentum of the Olympics major investments can be gathered and existing urban plans can be speeded up.

* Create or use Olympic regulations to speed up the process

Some preceding Olympic host cities established some special Olympic regulations to speed up the process. By making use of these special Olympic instruments planning permission or acquisition of the land could be accelerated. Some of the special regulations could be of benefit after the Olympics for other major infrastructural projects.

6.2.3 Venturing

The strategic activity ‘venturing’ has become a crucial element of legacy planning. In preceding Games (1992-2008) the host cities mainly started planning after having designed a vision. Due to the crisis and demand-driven developments cities should better venture what ‘property’ they need in the future and how they could it be realised in terms of ‘finance’.

* Choose a strategic location

Many preceding Olympics (i.e. Sydney, Athens and Beijing) showed poor legacy-planning in terms of the site selection. Homebush Bay was far outside the downtown of Sydney, which was extremely pleasant during the event for spectator flows etc., but after the event the Olympic Park was left un-used. Athens did not have any clear plans for the Olympic park and Beijing decided to locate the Olympic park in the more developed North, which made the gap between the wealthy North and poor South even stronger.

* Own or control strategic land

Although Athens tried to revise their initial Olympic plan, the government was not in the position to acquire strategic grounds. Therefore they had to choose for a scattered Olympic plan with venues through the whole city. In other cities the government did not always owned strategic grounds, but was in the position to acquire. In London a special compulsory purchase order (CPO) was developed to acquire the land and to be able to relocate people and businesses.

* Get early acquisition of the land and planning permissions

To better plan the legacy it is important to get planning permissions in an early stage. London was the first city ever that had already acquired the land before even winning the bid. Thanks to this early acquisition they were in a position to better plan the legacy. The poor planning and governance in Athens is seen as a bad example from the past, which resulted in scattered venues.

* Make use of temporary and existing facilities

In some preceding Olympics existing venues were used to host the Olympics and therefore modified, face-lifted or upgraded. London was the first city that had temporary/flexible venues which could be dismantled after the event and re-built elsewhere, Olympic Stadium (upper tier
was removed after the Olympics (80,000>58,000), Aquatics Centre (both wings were detached, 17,500>2,500), Basketball Arena (transported to Rio), Hockeypitches (transported to other UK cities) and Beach Volleyball (dismantled). By making use of existing and temporary venues cities can decrease the unnecessary expenses. Almost all cities had to struggle with finding a user or function for the main Olympic stadium after the Games.

* Be clear about the costs and guarantee continuing investments
Although the Dutch bid process for the 2028 Olympics did not have much support, due to unclear numbers about the costs of organising the Olympics. In many preceding Games the Olympic costs has been an arguable topic. There is still a major problem in terms of transparency, namely the division of Olympic and non-Olympic costs. Even in London some expenses, like the Aquatics centre, were seen as non-Olympic costs, because the city wanted to have a swimming centre for the surrounding boroughs.

6.2.4 Learning
The strategic activity learning can be seen as a really important one in the initiation and after the event. Olympic host cities should learn from each other and the IOC should help future host cities more by transferring knowledge about how to deliver instead of just sharing lists of requirements. Having the right ‘expertise’ and ‘information’ available is essential for an efficient organisation of the event and delivery of the legacy.

* Strong governmental control is necessary for successful integration of legacy objectives
Some preceding examples showed that when the government does not have strong involvement in the process legacy-planning dominant bodies like IOC and OCOGs, who are event oriented, shift the priority from legacy to delivery of the event. Therefore host cities should be strongly in control of the delivery and should interfere about what and how things should be delivered, taking into account that they have to trust the organisations that have to deliver.

* Use skilled people with expertise from preceding games or previous (local) project
The Olympics are an once in a lifetime project, which means that things have to be delivered on time and in place (and preferably in budget). Although the Olympics bring so much potential and opportunities at the same time there are big risks at stake. Therefore host cities want the best people in charge, so experts from previous large-scale projects or with involvement in preceding Olympics are used.

* Develop and integrate an organisation responsible for the legacy
Some preceding Games did focus on legacy-planning but did not have an organisation responsible for it. Cities like Barcelona, Sydney and Beijing established such an organisation after the event to find future users for the venues, stadiums and infrastructure. London gave a clear example how to develop and integrate such an organisation highlighting to get to an organisation fully responsible for the legacy with the mandate to continue investments.

* Transfer knowledge (case-study) from the games by secondees
IOC states and communicates about their role in transferring knowledge from one to another Olympic host city. In the end, they only come up with major lists of deliverables and cities have to find out how to deliver. The role of secondees is important for the continuation and optimisation of legacy planning. Secondees from different public or private (local) companies will transfer their knowledge. The Olympics can be used a case study for people involved.
6.3 Process

In this paragraph the relation of the different strategic activities in the Olympic will be described and thereby a comparison between ‘the past (1992-2008)’ and ‘the present (2012)’ is done. Figure 6.2 illustrates both Olympic processes in preceding Games and in London.

![Figure 6.2 Role and position of the strategic activities during the process (preceding Games and London)](image_url)

**Legacy**

What immediately becomes clear is that London had legacy at its core. It was always about the regeneration of East London with the Games in it. Therefore their legacy planning already started from the beginning and up till the event this legacy creation was called the pre-legacy. Even without winning the bid, they would have started the process of land acquisition and soil cleaning, next to that some major infrastructural improvements were delivered.

**Venturing**

In preceding Games the venturing took place mainly in the initiation and had to restart again after the event, this due to poor legacy planning. London wanted to prevent itself from falling into such an unclear period in which preceding Games had to venture what kind of organisations to establish for the future use of the venues, facilities and infrastructure. London therefore put much pressure on the end of the preparations phase to deliver an outline planning framework, in which clear agreements about the after-use of the park, the venues and future developments of the park were made.

**Visioning**

In preceding Games we saw a strong vision during the initiation- and bidding phase. Due to international pressure, lack of time and money the vision was set aside to be sure that the event will be delivered on time and the Games could be held. Therefore the after-use thinking became of a lower priority. After the event they had to re-vision about the future use of the amenities. London holds its strong vision throughout the whole process. In the beginning legacy was in it, but very general and vague, during the process it had to go through some iterations to get more realisable, feasible and something the people wanted. Just before the Games the Greater London Authority approved the outline-planning framework to continue with the regeneration after the Games. They thereby had developed a special organisation responsible for the delivery and continuation of the legacy. After the event they could just continue with planning and venturing.
Learning
In both preceding Games (1992-2008) as in London (2012) there were many internal learning’s during the different phases. Such an enormous project asks cities to innovate, to re-design and to develop new ways of delivering, like organisations and instruments. Unfortunately in former Olympics there was not so much learning after the event, due to poor after-use planning. Although still in progress, the legacy planning delivered in London could be used as the new standard for event-led regeneration, Barcelona 2.0!

Planning
The strategic activity planning played a role in all preceding Olympics and the London case. In preceding Games planning was mostly divided into two phases: planning of the event and planning of the legacy. In London both planning phases were integrated and were always seen as complementary to each other.
6.4 Transitional period

The transitional period indicates the period in which former Olympics ended up shortly after the event had finished. In this period venues, facilities and infrastructure were left with unclear future use. Several leading (event-oriented) organisations in the process wrapped up shortly after the event and no clear agreements were made about the responsibilities in this post-event period. A new organisation had to be established to find future users for the site and to continue developments in the area. Due to poor planning of this transitional period before the event by preceding host cities such as Athens and Sydney Olympic parks and venues became abandoned in the end.

After the analysis of the five preceding summer Olympics this research gave some insight in how the different phases followed up and described the occurrence of the transitional period. In figure 6.3 an overview of these phases in relation to the theory is shown. In this paragraph the general process of the preceding Games is compared with the London case. The position and role of the transitional period forms a crucial role in legacy planning and its success.

![Figure 6.3: Process and transitional in preceding Games (1998-2008)](image)

In the figure above we can see that, although previous host cities did some research about how other host cities delivered the event and legacy, these lessons were not instrumental to their bid. Former Olympic host cities were very dedicated with ambitious plans and created an ideological vision that could help them winning the bid. After *visioning* (see star in figure 6.3) they often just started *planning*, in only seven years all intended objectives in their bid and all venues needed to be delivered. During the planning process *venturing* about ‘were we can find investments for this’ and ‘how are we going to deliver it’ gave host cities lots of stress. The priority moved more to delivering the event instead of steering on long-term objectives. After the event several organisations (IOC, OCOG and companies involved in the building process) just wrapped up, which left most Olympic parks with an unclear after-use and function. In this *transitional period* responsibilities were unclear and cities had to start over again. The momentum of the Games was seldom used to generate extra investments, to attract new...
Businesses and to create a vibrant park for the city and its citizens. Stories about empty stadiums, unnecessary expenses dominated in the media. Concentrating on legacy can justify the expenses.

London had to deal with the crisis during the Olympic process, in which there were major financial cutbacks and support for organising the Olympics by citizens, government and investors was limited. London decided not to compete with the Games of Beijing in which China showed what they were capable of regardless of the price they had to pay. London wanted to show the world that they were committed to deliver successful Games as part of a large regeneration program for the improvement of a derelict area. East London needed physical and social improvements and economic viability to become part of London. “It was a major infrastructural project with Games in it (ULI, May 2012).”

This quote exactly illustrates the way London used the Olympics to speed up an existing regeneration plan by creating momentum to upgrade the area. London gave the word ‘legacy’ a new definition (paragraph 6.1). It showed how you could host such an event, in which major global and local forces are conflicting, and still keep on thinking about the big picture; an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens in 2030. A re-positioning of the transitional period in comparison with preceding Games was essential to prevent the park, venues and infrastructure from falling into decay, see figure 6.4.

In strategic terms, London changed the order of strategic activities by clearly stating that learning from the past experience and information (form local development projects, national governance, preceding Games etc.) formed the base of their initiation. They then created a clear vision with legacy at its core and used the Games as a catalyst for new investments and urban change. To create a decent plan London integrated the feasibility already in their bid-phase by venturing the possibilities in ways of property and finance. By having these concrete plans they could start their planning process, not only for the seven years up to the event, but for some decades to leave a lasting legacy for London.
Their strong legacy planning was embodied in their vision, which formed a decent base throughout the whole process. In relation to preceding Games (1992-2008) the transitional period occurred (was planned) before the event and after the event there was only a short transformation period. In this period venues were dismantled or downsized, event-related organisations wrapped up and the site was re-opened after being secured for many years. In 2013, a year after the Olympics in London, the park will be re-opened and all venues and facilities will have a clear function.

By placing the transitional period before the event, clear agreements about the further developments of the site could be made. An outline-planning framework was approved by the government and mayor to give the legacy corporation (LLDC) the mandate to develop the site and later on sell off parts. With this outline-planning framework in place they were sure that the regeneration would continue after the event (see chapter 5).

In the post-event period former Olympic host cities had to re-start again by establishing new organisations for the after-use of the park and the venues. They had to venture out what financial instruments could be used to sell of, rent or demolish some property. Due to decent legacy planning in the pre-event period of London, the legacy of London will probably not fall into decay. The methods of London will be of value for future Olympic host cities or cities that organise major sporting or cultural events. Public and private parties in London felt the need to transfer their knowledge so the fourth strategic activity was deported.

Concluding, the pre-planning of this transitional period entirely depends on a combination of the city’s ability to create a clear organisational structure and thereby the role of the leadership and expertise. The establishment of an outline-planning framework, like in London, gives a host city the opportunity to have approval for developments and future use of the park and facilities already before the event.
B. Reflection

7.1 Relevance of this research

London Case
Lots of research and impact studies have already been done about preceding Olympics, but less is known about the London case. This research adds to existing research by providing new information and insights according to the process and delivery of the event and legacy. The analysis of the case highlighted specific lessons that are of added value for future host cities that are organising the Olympics or other large sport or cultural events.

Better understanding of the Olympic process
This research helps us to better understand the Olympic process and makes a comparison between several preceding summer Olympic Games (1992-2012). The literature study describes how the processes evolved and how ‘legacy planning’ became a more important topic. The strategic model (figure 2.13) gives this research a solid base in which all the cases can be analysed, compared and evaluated. This research outlines the different elements (the strategic activities and resources) that helped the project come to life. This will help the reader to better understand the role and dominance of each strategic activity in a certain phase.

Transitional period
This research is pioneering in the description and role of the transitional period (§6.4). To date research has lacked the ability to really describe what exactly happens in this period. This research thereby describes how London did pre-planned this period to prevent the Olympic park and other facilities from falling into decay. The way London positioned this transitional period and added a transformational period is of added value for future host cities (figure 6.4)

Poor record on legacy planning
Preceding Olympic host cities showed a poor record on decent ‘legacy planning’. This research provided us with valuable lessons extracted from preceding Games on how to better plan the after-use of the venues, facilities and infrastructure. Certainly, the case of London showed important new lessons for legacy planning and the commitment to their vision.

Current situation
In times of economical downturn (crisis) public and private parties want to decrease unnecessary expenses and minimize waste. Thereby private parties are less willing to invest in large development projects, due to the risk of their investments. Demand-driven developments become more and more important. This change in mind-set also affects the bids of the candidate cities. Future host cities want to better control their investments and want to prevent newly built facilities, venues and infrastructure from falling into decay. Cities thereby opt to respond better to the future demand of the city and citizens. The analysis of the London 2012 Olympics in this research gave a good insight in how future host cities should give more priority to long-term developments and how the national and local government should be in control. The analysis of preceding Olympics (1992-2008) showed us that if the government is not committed to these long-term developments during the process some dominant stakeholders like IOC and the Organising Committee will give priority to event-related issues and the legacy becomes irrelevant.
Importance of these lessons for other projects
The strategies that are provided in the conclusions of this research are not only useful for a major event like the Olympics but could be used for cities in which other sport- or cultural-led development projects take place like EXPO’s, World Cup’s or Cultural Capital of Europe. These strategies are not only useful for major development projects, but are also applicable for modal development projects like de Floriade, the Youth Olympics, het Jeroen Boschjaar 2016.

7.2 Levels of interest
Although the Olympics is the biggest sporting event in the world, the legacy strategies in this research could be applicable for:

I Governments
   * City governments (hosts),
   * National governments (costs guarantees),
   * Regional governments).

II Businesses
   * Businesses that profit from the major construction programme and advisory services,
   * Businesses that profit from the economic boost generated by hosting the Olympics.

III Science
   Researchers, academics, experts in regeneration

7.3 Limitations of this research
Research period
This research was conducted between February 2012 and April 2013, which gave the author the opportunity to see three phases of the Olympic process, namely the preparations, the event and the legacy. This research tried to analyse the Olympic process and thereby measure the impact of the Olympics and the success of the legacy. Because the Games just finished and the site is nowadays being transformed into the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park it is hard to really analyse the legacy. Although some parts might be realised already, the real London’s legacy has to be delivered in the coming years. The legacy story has to be continued. Therefore some intended strategies need to be revised in the near future.

Context dependency
The legacy strategies provided in this research are a result of lessons from different preceding Olympic Games. Good and bad examples from the past could help future host cities to better plan their legacy. However it is important to take into account that these legacy strategies are not just applicable for every future host city, the success of each legacy strategy depends on the context. Some strategies that worked for London could not be applied to the Olympics in Rio due to different cultural backgrounds, other governance structure, a less developed country or an unclear long-term city vision. It could also depend on the scale of the event, will it be locally oriented or more global. Future host cities should therefore take into account the risk of just copying these legacy strategies without first adapting them to the new context.

Legacy on the agenda
Since 2001 the IOC clearly stated they want to support and promote sustainable developments and want cities to better integrate the Olympic plan for the benefit of the city and citizens. A future host city needs at least 10-11 years for the bid-procedure, candidature and preparations to deliver the event. Although this research may indicate that London is the first city that has given
legacy a new definition, London was also the first city to really integrate it in their bid and continue it through the process. London can better be seen as a step forward into a new generation of Olympic Games, the legacy Games, at least let’s hope so.

Referencing
The Olympic Games are seen as a fascinating and inspiring event and therefore a lot is written about it. Many parties involved use documents, articles and publications to communicate about their experience and their role in the process. Documents are mainly published in a very positive way and could be used as promotion material or as a case study for future projects or Games. The documents and literature about the London case mainly describe what is intended and not what is realised.

Outline-planning framework
One of the success factors of the legacy planning in London is the creation of an outline-planning framework (see chapter 5) and the approval by government. The Legacy Corporation (LLDC) is responsible for the execution of the framework and needs to continue developments in the Park and thereby sell of property and find future users. Although agreements are made on the content of this document, the framework is flexible to adapt to changes in the market, which could lead to unrealised objectives. Only the future will tell if the new set-up of the LLDC is effective enough to execute the plans approved in May 2012. Therefore it is important to monitor this process.

7.4 recommendations of further research
As mentioned in 7.3 one of the limitations of this research is that the period in which the research was done does not give the opportunity to really analyse the success and impact of the London process. Therefore in a few years the London case should be revised again and in 2030 we could really state if the intended strategies and objectives are delivered.

In 2013 the Olympic park will re-open and some experts state that all facilities in the park will then have a clear function and role. Previous parks such as Athens and Sydney were left abandoned because the parks were not of any use afterwards. It is interesting to analyse whether the new Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park in 2013 will or will not become a vibrant park for the Londoners. Crucial will be the extent to which the park is accepted by the boroughs and how well integration with local communities is executed?

On building level it would be interesting to research the opportunities of temporary and flexible stadiums. In London we saw some examples of temporary stadiums or even permanent stadiums with some detachable parts. It could be interesting to further develop the design of temporary stadiums and thereby research the costs for building, adjusting and dismantling. Are the temporary stages just rented? Is the steel of the upper tier of the Olympic stadium been sold off after the event? The Copper Box (Basketball stadium) will be transported to Rio, on what terms?

One of the biggest problems concerning legacy planning in preceding Olympics is the fact that there is not one organisations or institution responsible for the knowledge transfer between two Olympic host cities. In the past, the IOC did establish some organisations (OGGI and OGKM) to transfer knowledge between two Organising committees. However such transfers of
knowledge resulted in a long list of requirements that need to be delivered and are thus limited. It could be very interesting to research the opportunities of such a legacy-knowledge organisation for future Games.

Finally, during this research I have read a lot about changes in the formula of the Olympic Games. The Dutch Bid (XML, 2012) indicated some new ways of co-organising the Games, with several cities in one country or even with several cities around the world. Recently the UEFA decided that the European Championship Football will be hosted in several cities in the near future and therefore the amount of (unnecessary) new football stadiums will decrease. The World Baseball Classics have shown that a large international sport event can be hosted successfully in different countries.

The new Olympic formula should consider the fact that less than 0.1% of the spectators view the match live in the stadium. Broadcasting rights are becoming more and more important sources of funding for the event. Understanding these improvements can be made to make the sport more interactive, for example by making the camera positions more spectacular. Viewing first person, real time footage from the sportspersons' point of view is something that could be explored. How cool would it be if Epke Zonderland or Usain Bolt should have worn a camera helmet and if we could have heard them breathe?
C. Literature


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## D. Interviews

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exploration phase</th>
<th>Delft University of Technology</th>
<th>Friso de Zeeuw</th>
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<tr>
<td>Date: 05-2012</td>
<td>Location: Delft, NL</td>
<td>Professor Urban Area Development</td>
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<tr>
<th>NOC*NSF (Dutch Olympic Committee)</th>
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<td>Date: 13-06-2012</td>
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<td>Date: 17-05-2012</td>
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<th>Deloitte</th>
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<tr>
<th>IOC (International Olympic Committee)</th>
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<tr>
<th>Anna Vos</th>
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<th>AECOM</th>
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<td>Date: 04-02-2013 (Call)</td>
<td>Senior Manager</td>
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<tr>
<td>Location: NL -- Lausanne</td>
<td>Olympic legacy and knowledge transfer</td>
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**Conferences**

**Urban Land Institute**  

**Gebiedsontwikkeling 2.0**  
15 March 2012, Utrecht “Slim vlottrekken”

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23 May 2012, ’s-Hertogenbosch  
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Figures & Tables
Chapter blade made by Erwin Heurkens, August 2012
Frontpage image made by Rogier Rombouts
Figure 0.0 http://europasicewolf.wordpress.com/2012/07/22/london-1st-city-to-have-hosted-3-olympic-games/
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Figure 1.2 © roger rombouts
Figure 1.3 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12004490
Table 1.1 Preuss (2006)
Figure 1.4 some recent newspaper headlines
Chapter blade made by Erwin Heurkens, August 2012
Figure 2.1 © roger rombouts
Table 2.1 Poynter & MacRury (2012)
Table 2.2 Cashman (1998)
Figure 2.2 © roger rombouts
Table 2.3 http://www.olympic.org
Figure 2.3 http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sport/football/article-2187614/Olympic-Stadium-white-elephant--Sam-Allanlyce.html
Figure 2.4 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2012/aug/05/taylor-wimpey-olympic-park
Table 2.4 Roberts & Sykes (2000) adjusted
Figure 2.5 http://sideburnmag.blogspot.nl/2012/07/barcelona-countdown.html
Table 2.5 Compiled by author
Figure 2.6 http://www.langsleysports.com/client/index/23926.html?photo_id=266
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Table 2.6 Mintzberg (1992)
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“It is not so much that London is hosting the Olympics for the third time in just over 100 years and is the only city to do so. It is rather that London is Olympic in ways that few other places can ever be (Greg Clark, 2012).”