ANNEX I:
Literature study precedent Olympics (1992-2008)

Figure A. geographical locations and dates of the five preceding Olympic Games

Structure of case analysis
In figure A the geographical locations and dates of all five preceding Olympic Games are illustrated. Annex I consists of five case analysis which helped to extract lessons from five Olympic processes. All five cases are divided into the four strategic activities by Mintzberg (1997) and thereby after each subparagraph the relation to the model by Daamen (2010) is given by indicating (in *cursive grey style*) one or more distinct resources in an urban area development process. The strategic model helps to provide the case analyses with a framework to understand, evaluate and compare all processes to extract some valuable lessons. These lessons are the result of positive and negative experience of one or more cases. By doing so the lessons can be better applied in different contexts, thus are more generic applicable.
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Barcelona’92

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I. Barcelona 1992

“Largely successful transformation of Barcelona in 1992 has been the classic example of Olympic regeneration (Kornblatt, 2006).”

1.1 Introduction

After the reign of Franco (1939-1975) Spain was left with some serious new challenges. There was a clear shift to a more left-wing government. Spain was facing a big economic crisis and Barcelona had to deal with the adoption of a new urban masterplan with different strategies (van Beek 2007; Gold & Gold 2007).

The city’s traditional economic base in engineering and other forms of manufacturing had been seriously damaged during the 1970s and 1980s by periods of world economic recession, restructuring and the effects of global competition.

1.2 Visioning: commitment & legitimacy

In 1976 the Plan General Metropolitá (PGM) was created by the local Municipality in order to set out the actions needed to re-establish the public space and facilities for the following years (Gold & Gold, 2007). Barcelona’s ambitions were huge for redeveloping the city, but huge plans are often accompanied with huge costs. According to Garcia the city could not effort these investment so this was the moment they designed the well-known Barcelona-model (van Beek, 2007). In the Barcelona-model the Olympic plan was integrated into the existing urban plans and the Olympics should act as a catalyst for urban change.

“The Barcelona model was invented to easily establish public and private partnerships and to develop and benefit all together (Gold & Gold, 2007)”

The primary objectives Barcelona wanted to achieve with the new urban masterplan were 1) to adapt the city to the new and modern global opportunities, 2) solve the problems which the economic crisis had brought upon the city and 3) to incorporate long-term development projects throughout the city (COOB’92, 1992; Marshall, 1996; van Beek 2007; Gold & gold, 2007; Kindel et al, 2009; Qu & Spaans, 2009). - visioning

Barcelona estimated some Urban Goals:
1) open the city to the sea;
2) distribute spatially the improvements and re-equip the city’s sporting facilities;
3) promote communication infrastructures, especially the road network (Marshall, 2004)
This third goals was partly achieved by realizing a ring road around the city, which prevented the traffic streams through the city centre in the years before. - visioning

Partial spatial interventions were integrated into a strategic plan for the city as a whole. The newly transformed areas, public open spaces were given an important role as a means to generate identity and to foster social and cultural integration (Garcia-Ramon, 2000). - visioning

From the late 1980s there were increasing needs for western industrialised cities to regenerate their run-down areas associated with suburbanization, urban displacement or the decline of manufacturing; the Olympics provide opportunities for such operations (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - catalyst role

Montjuïc can be seen as the main Olympic park, because most of the main venues of the ’92 Games were located there. The post-use of the park at Montjuïc can be called limited, most of the time the park is abandoned, except for an occasional open-air event in the park (Bakker,
Contrary to the post-use of the park is the post-use of the stadiums, which is well designed. A lot of concerts or small sports events are hosted in the Estadi Olimpic Lluis Companys. Thereby the multifunctional stadium Palau Sant Jordi with its flexible floor hosted several events in the post Games period and still maintains to keep up with newly build venues in Spain. The Piscines Picorneel Swimming stadium nowadays functions as a public swimming pool and is occupied throughout the whole year (Bakker, 2009). - commitment: weak after-use

1.3 Planning: Instruments & Time and result

It is good to take into account that it is hard to measure the economic impact of the Games, as their planning and preparation coincided with Spain joining the European Community in 1986 (Gold & Gold, 2007). - time-result (momentum)

Many of the project undertaken had been planned long before Barcelona was awarded the 1992 Games, but once again, the oncoming Olympics gave new urgency in starting, and completing, these projects (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - time-result

First hosting city that developed the Olympics under a public-private partnership. Although they had their problems with the new collaboration, it was a revolutionary change in the planning culture (van Prooye, 2010). Barcelona did an attempt to tackle the after-use of the venues by creating a municipal organisation, which was responsible for the exploitation of the venues and facilities after the Games (Marshall, 1996; van Beek, 2007; Qu & Spaans, 2009) - instruments (public-private-partnership)

1.4 Venturing: Property & Finance

The Mayor in that time, Pasqual Maragall, wanted Barcelona to bid for the Olympics to speed up the PGM. In this way Barcelona could attain a very large amount of finance on a short-term basis (van Prooye, 2010). This was the first real example that the Olympic Games were strategically used to catalyse urban regeneration plans of a city. - finance

Barcelona was one of the first cities that used a substantial part of the Olympic budget for non-Olympic purposes. Clusa (1999) describes that although it is hard to quantify the exact amount of non-Olympic investments made, a mere 15 per cent of the total cost was used for strictly related event costs. Coaffee (2007) described that large parts of the Olympic budget were used for infrastructural purposes due to the growing population, high levels of unemployment and deprivation of certain neighbourhoods. - finance

Olympic Plan covered four locations, namely Olympic Park Vall d’Hebron, Vila Olímpica (Parc de Mar), Montjuïc and Diagonal. By choosing to realize the Olympic centres in this way it supported the urban renewal theory Barcelona had already started. The city created new centres in order to realize a higher level of facilities in more diverse parts of the city and adding quality (Marshall, 2004). - property

Barcelona had selected four key development areas in their PGM. They acquired the land in these strategic locations during the recession in the 1970s, which gave them an excellent position to development these areas. The developments of these areas were focussed on the transformation of brownfields, the orientation of the city towards the sea and the upgrade of low quality areas. In addition, venues and facilities were renovated or newly constructed were
necessary, e.g. the Olympic Stadium was renovated (Kindel et al, 2009; Qu & Spaans, 2009; Prooye, 2009). – property: acquisition of the land

Though committed to hosting a thoroughly successful event, COOB (Comité d’Organisation Olympique Barcelona) crucially, took the strategic decision to invest the funding into securing long-term, positive change for the city (Clark, 2008). Brunet (2005) states that an almost 6:1 ratio of spending on building work and infrastructural improvements relative to funding spent organising the event itself. - finance

The municipal government owned strategic land areas, in this way it was possible to implement the Olympic project and the PGM together (Gold & Gold, 2007). - property: own strategic land

The Games formed the lead to reset the reputation and significance of the Montjuïc. This meant relocation of (illegal) housing and regeneration of the Montjuïc real estate (Bakker, 2009). - property: re-image

The Montjuïc stadium had been the site for the 1929 Exposition and the 1936 People’s Olympiad; it was remodelled as the centrepiece of the 1992 Games and a symbol of local sporting heritage. After the Games in 2004 the Diagonal, one of the major connections in the city, connecting west and east, was finished, thanks to the catalyst role of another major event, the Forum 2004 (Bakker, 2009). - property

Poblenou was an area consisting of derelict warehoused and railway facilities, cutting off the beach from the city and fragmenting the neighbourhood. Olympic development rehabilitated this area with stylish apartments, a new sewage system, a new coastal ring road, a new marina (Olympic Harbour) and other amenities along the 5,2 kilometre barrier-free coastal strip (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - property

This area was chosen to function as a catalyst to stimulate the development towards the Mediterranean Sea, part of the ‘opening up Barcelona towards the sea’ objective. The Olympic village overlooking the ocean was the beginning of the transformation of the Poblenou area towards the north of the city along the coastline. The Olympic village and port were the starting point for new developments in the Poblenou area, being a modern start after the deindustrialization of the old Barcelona had set in (Bakker, 2009). - property

Vall d’Hebron and Parc de Mar were part of the original model for new centrality and were allocated to serve Olympic Use. The other two Olympic areas, Montjuïc and Diagonal were added to the list being areas with strong emphasis on public facilities. Sufficient empty space was available in Vall d’Hebron and urban renewal was necessary because of decayed real estate and areas or space being obsolete (Marshall, 2004). - property

We can separate these Olympic areas into two categories, namely recognisable as Olympic venue (Montjuïc and Poblenou) and less recognisable (Vall d’Hebron and Diagonal) due to the presence of event-specific buildings. - property
1.5 Learning: Expertise & information

Many cities have tried to copy the urban successes of Barcelona but did not succeed in such a way as Barcelona did. Even Barcelona was not capable of reproducing their own success of the 1992 Olympic Games with organising the Forum 2004, which has probably something to do with the effect of a certain time and the process a city is in (Bakker, 2009). This exactly explains the struggle Olympic host cities have to deal with.

Roche (2000) describes this problem as one of the many paradoxes of the modern Olympics as follows; ‘On the one hand, each Olympic Games is both utterly standardised, in that it run according to IOC rules and the incorporated rules of the numerous governing bodies regulating the sports represented and on the standardised periodicity of its four-year calendar. On the other hand, each Olympic Games is also utterly unique. (....) They are unique not just in the changing casts of athletes and in their performance and achievements, but also, obviously, in terms of their sites and locations’

-information (Olympics as a case study)

The project was developed by a team of architects and planners led by Oriol Bohigas, one of Barcelona’s most influential planners (Martorell et al., 1992; Ribas Pira, 1992).

- expertise

For a decent legacy creation a decent composition of the organisation is necessary. In Barcelona the Public Private Partnerships were for 70% publicly financed. Two main organisations were developed, being Barcelona Promoció and Concerned Management. The two organisation highly controlled by public hands were successful in creating post-Olympic use by having the right stakeholders in the right place. In the concerned management model the local involvement was the key to success and for Barcelona Promocio the clear task it needed to realize (Bakker, 2009).

- expertise

The public/private partnership was absolutely instrumental to the success of the whole operation. But nevertheless it should be pointed out that whereas most of the investment was private, the design and the management of the operation was mostly public, following a pattern that was general in the Barcelona 1992 Olympic Games. This needs to be pointed out today, when there is such general discredit and mistrust about the efficiency of the public sector (Clusa, 1996; Oriol Nellò, 1995).

- expertise

Planning was directed almost exclusively by architects and urban designers, whose main concern had been creating good urban form (Marshall, 2004).

- expertise
## 1.6 Success factors

### Environmental

1. Major infrastructural improvements were delivered, which played an important role for the after-use phase, like the construction of new ring roads (Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. Regeneration of Barcelona’s seafront and Poblenou area. The location of the Olympic village necessitated a new placement of two rails lines that separated downtown Barcelona from the coastline. This industrial area was replaced by beaches, which were easy accessible from downtown (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Gold & Gold, 2007).

3. The sewage system was also modernised and cultural interest in Barcelona was rekindled. Four museums and a botanical garden were renovated in preparations for the Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Gold & Gold, 2007).

4. The Olympics kick-started extensive secondary infrastructure projects, existing redevelopment plans were speeded up.

5. A less visible, but nonetheless significant effect of the Games was the upgrading of the urban technology and telecommunications systems necessary to host the world’s media (Gold & Gold, 2007). These improvements had major implications for the further development of the city as an administrative centre (Sánchez, 1992).

6. Beautification and renovation of thoroughfares and town squares such as Plaça de la Mercé and Plaça Reial (Clarke, 2008).

### Social

1. Increase in sports participation. From 36% of the population in 1983 to 51% three years after the ‘92 Olympics (Bakker, 2009).

2. Creation of the Cultural Rejuvenation Project (Clark, 2008)

### Economical

1. Increase in tourism, by 2000 the number of foreign visitors to the city doubled from 1992 reaching a total of 3.5 million per year (Clark, 2008). By 2004, Barcelona was the number one tourist destination in Europe (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

2. Improvement of the international image, the attempt at image improvement was successful (Gold & Gold, 2007). In 1990, Barcelona occupied the 11th position in, which rose to 6th position in 2001 of best European cities of FDI (Clark, 2008; Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

3. The impact of the city’s nomination as Olympic host city was immediate: unemployment underwent a dramatic fall. An additional permanent employment was secured for an estimated 20,019 people (Brunet, 2005). Between October 1986 and August 1992, Barcelona’s general unemployment rate fell from 18.4% to 9.6%, while the Spanish figures were 20.9 and 15.5% respectively. The housing market came back to life and, of course, the construction industry experienced a boom (Brunet, 1995; Clark, 2008). Between 1986 and 1991 employment rose by 20 per cent in the rest of the metropolitan region (Gold & Gold, 2007).

4. 1987-1992 estimated total economic impact of the 1992 Games was around USD 26 billion (Clark, 2008).
### Organisational

1. New methods of intervention and management of urban planning were introduced (Gold & Gold, 2007). The public/private partnership was absolutely instrumental to the success of the whole operation (Clusa, 1996; Oriol Nel.lo, 1995).

2. The key to the success of the Barcelona Games lies in the strength of the objectives (organisational excellence and urban impact), the inter-institutional consensus, the use of special management bodies, mixed private-public funding models, and also the successful harnessing of the Olympic impetus and the attraction of investment (Samaranch, 1992).

3. International interest; Jacques Rogge (2002) said about the outcomes for Barcelona, that internationally, as an organisational model – the memory of the excellent organisational and sporting results lives on as a model of urban transformation. Locally, since the scale of investment and the Olympic legacy has a far-reaching impact through improving the city’s economic and strategic positioning.

### Non-success factors

1. Failed to realise affordable housing after the Games (source?)

2. The notable success of city marketing strategies, linked to the new ‘symbolic economy’ or ‘cultural economy’ and based upon urban tourism, the media and leisure, contrasts with much less attention paid to other important aspects: public transport and, above all, housing (Monclús, 2003).

3. Barcelona Olympics left the central Spanish government $4 billion in debt, and the city and provincial governments an additional $2.1 billion in the red.

*The New York Times* wrote two days after the Games’ closing ceremony, “the athletes never had a chance. It doesn’t matter how high they jumped or how fast they run… the Gold Medal went to Barcelona” (Brunet, 2005).
1.7 The Barcelona Model

One of the strongest thoughts of the regeneration plan of Barcelona for the Olympics of 1992 was the fact that several programmes were adopted. These programmes were already proposed but due to the winning of the bid 1992, these programmes did not suffer on longer delays or even to be cancelled totally (Chalkey and Essex 1999; Marshall 2000; Monclus 2007, Coaffee 2007). –integration of the plans

The objectives of Barcelona '92 were very clear (organisational and sportive excellence and the urban transformation of the city) and so were the procedures (institutional unity, mixed public-private funding, etc.). And since the results of this 'Barcelona Model' were positive, then the term 'model' is often used in the sense of being exemplary for other cities organising similar events (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). -visioning

The aim was to minimise the organisational costs, therefore the facilities and infrastructure constitute part of the Olympic legacy, the benefits of which continue after the Games, and were, therefore, to be maximised (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). -finance

The central Spanish government and Barcelona City Hall set up a joint venture, Barcelona Holding Olímpic, SA (HOLSA), to facilitate the investment process. In an excellent example of mixed public-private funding, HOLSA built the main Olympic facilities, the bulk of the 78 km of new road infrastructure and the Olympic Village. -expertise

Total indirect or infrastructure spending linked to the Games between 1986-1993 = $ 8,0 billion. A total of 61.5 per cent of Olympic funding was allocated for building work. This illustrates a key feature of Barcelona '92: its structuring effect on the city, according to an urban planning perspective represented by Bohigas (1986), Busquets (1992) and Esteban (1999), among many others. -finance

Poynter & MacRury (2009) divide the success of Barcelona in five components, namely a mixed economy, institutional unanimity, capacity for urban regeneration= procedures organisational and sporting excellence and urban transformation and welfare = objectives

The investments are the key element within the economic resources mobilised by Barcelona '92, and were crucial in the economic impact of the Games, the city’s transformation and the subsequent increase in economic activity, income and wellbeing (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). -finance

Barcelona has been outstandingly successful in strengthening and maintaining the Olympic impetus, thus increasing its own level of economic activity and income, improving its quality of life and social cohesion, and advancing strategically (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). -time/result: using the momentum of the Games

Highly positive outcomes: organisation, the investment, the economic and social impact, the urban transformation, the efficient use of the Olympic opportunity and legacy (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). -finance

The continued investment in infrastructure and development driven by such events as the Forum, and development of the Poblenou district into a high-added value information and technology area, is the key to the city's maintaining its 6th position among European cities. The investment in urban transformation must go on. European integration and globalisation are factors, which favour Barcelona, as long as the city maintains the Olympic spirit (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

The Barcelona Model is mainly a favourable example for architects, planners, academics, urban designer because of the good design and the quality of the public urban spaces or because of the capacity to manage a unique flagship event into a lever and strategic instrument of urban renewal and urban regeneration (Monclus, 2003). -expertise
Regarding the uniqueness of the Barcelona Model some literature describes it as a special situation in which the city was at that time (democracy after Franco and metropolitan decentralisation) that created the efficacy of the plan. The Olympic plan was adequately incorporated into the existing plans for the ‘new Barcelona’.

Pasqual Maragall, the former mayor of Barcelona was clear about the Barcelona strategy: “Quality first, quantity after”. He found it essential to understand that improving public spaces is relevant to solving social and economic problems. The initial small-scale operations were followed by large-scale strategic urban planning projects (Rogers, 1999).

Monclús (2003) speaks about a two-fold objective in all event led regeneration plans, namely the renewal of the image of the city and the use of the events as catalysts for pursuing specific operations of urban development. The originality of Barcelona lies in the efficiency of public sector leadership, reflecting the significant political and social consensus of the moment.

The renewed interest for the role and the formalization of public space is a result of the long period of disinterest due to the increasing industrialisation (Monclús, 2003). The international attention on the Barcelona Model was on “qualitative urban planning” and “strategic urban planning”.

In addition to the coastal and waterfront projects directly linked to and spurred on by the Olympic Games, there was another series of large projects in the city. These were developed and formalized from the mid-1980s and also fell into this category of ‘strategic urban projects’. These include the so-called ‘areas of centrality’, the interventions in the city road system and other projects centred on large infrastructures, associated with the implementation of the ring roads and road accesses. In relation to the ten ‘areas of centrality’, it must be said that these developed ideas were already foreseen in the PGM of 1976. To those ten areas two Olympic sectors were also added, namely Montjuïc and Diagonal (Monclús, 2003).

Barcelona was not an exception in the context of European planning, but it efficacy used the Olympic as an occasional catalyst for these strategic projects (Monclús, 2003). What also stands out in these years is the efficacy of the Barcelona model in its ability to deploy all sorts of political and planning instruments to motivate the large-scale projects (Monclús, 2003).

In June 1999, Barcelona received a very important international award, the Royal Gold Medal, given annually by her Majesty of the Queen of the UK on the advice of the Royal Institute of British Architect (RIBA) to recognize outstanding distinction in architecture and design. Following this, a number of publications with design concerns, planning concerns, or social concerns have dealt with the description, interpretation and evaluation of the Barcelona “model” (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004).
II. Atlanta 1996

2.1 Introduction
In the 1980s, Atlanta was a city of two faces. The nation was on the rise and the city of Atlanta had also become a rich community. However this did not decrease the poverty and the gap between rich and poor, and it is maybe even safe to say between black and white, grew and grew. This was of concern to businesses and corporations situated in the inner city. The depreciation that the homeless and poor caused in the inner city did not benefit the businesses that were settled there. This is why an elite club of nine business and society elite, led by the successful real estate law attorney Billy Payne, stepped up and thought of the idea to host the Olympic Games in order to create short-term finance for upgrading the attraction of the inner city to attract more business to the city (Newman, 1999; Engle, 1999; Beaty, 2007, Van Prooye, 2009).

A very important factor, which played a crucial role in the perspective towards sports in Atlanta, was that Atlanta was the first major city to see sports as a multi-billion dollar business (Engle, 1999).

Additionally America entered a post-federal and global period in which the government was open for more private initiative and developments (Andranovich, 2001).

2.2 Visioning: commitment & legitimacy
These political developments led to a perfect political climate for a private Olympic ambition. The ‘Crazy Atlanta Nine’ as they were called, therefore had the opportunity to use the Olympic Games to establish a higher international business profile of the city (ACOG, 1997; Beaty, 2007). – visioning

In Atlanta’s candidature file is stated that:
- “As birth place of the modern human rights movement, Atlanta has the moral vision to express the ideals of justice and equality inherent in fair play exceedingly well”
- “The Games provide a chance for a city to demonstrate to the world the true power of the Olympic Ideals.”
- “We must prepare and implement this once-in-a-lifetime opportunity with the certainty that the rewards are fairly and equitably apportioned among all the citizens of our community.

The Corporation for Olympic Development in Atlanta (CODA) pledged to improve fifteen impoverished districts and use the Games to tackle wider problems of poverty and inner city decay (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - commitment

An important objective of ACOG was to establish Atlanta as a ‘global’ city with a brand that would be recognised beyond the borders of the USA (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - visioning

Atlanta determined three clear goals of the Olympic Bid, namely (1) promote image of world class tourist & conference city, (2) redevelop downtown Atlanta and (3) provide benefits to city residents (Andranovich et al., 2001) - visioning

IOC’s opinion after the Olympics of 1996 was never to host a completely ‘private’ Olympiad anymore. The big problem was that the designed public-private-partnership could not work, because the municipal government was side-lined from the developments. Thereby the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games was a private body, they could neglect the wishes of the society (Chalkley & Essex, 1999, Poynter & MacRury, 2009). commitment: lack of social commitment and low control by government)
ACOG asserted that the Olympics were ‘not a welfare program, [they are] a business venture. If they [the city government] wanted to be more involved, they should've voted to pay their own expenses’ (Rutheiser, 1996).

2.3 Planning: Instruments & Time and result

The first day of the Atlanta Games demonstrated flaws in the city’s transport system and the Games’ communications infrastructure. The international press corps and many spectators missed events due to traffic congestion and bus breakdowns. Journalists were late filing copy because computer systems failed to deliver results data from the competition sites were located in and around the city (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

There was a nail bomb planted by Eric Rudolph, a right-wing extremist, during the Games that killed two people and injured more than one hundred, this overshadowed several days of the event (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

By contrast, civic groups, community leaders and academic writers have focused upon the process of gentrification and the displacement of poorer, mainly black sections of the community, arguing that the Olympic legacy reproduced long term patterns of discrimination and impoverishment (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

Because Olympic-related development was largely controlled through ACOG and not MAOGA, ACOG became the focal point of much of the conflict over development (Andranovich et al., 2001). ACOG’s role as a vehicle for pursuing a broader redevelopment and remaining strategy can best be illustrated by the creation of the Centennial Olympic park in Downtown Atlanta (Ruthheiser, 1996).

ACOG was able to overcome difficulties that had stopped earlier redevelopment plans by skilfully coordinating the park proposal with other Olympic projects and using the Olympic timeline to generate momentum (Andranovich et al., 2001).

As a private organization, ACOG could use its power to facilitate the redevelopment projects it saw as beneficial, but it was not obligated to be responsive to protests from city residents (Andranovich et al., 2001).
2.4 Venturing: Property & Finance

Next to the aforementioned goals one of their objectives was to be no fiscal burden on the city, to the point where some would allege the Olympic Games in Atlanta were overly commercialised (Minnaert, 2011). – finance

The government had a small role in the initiative. They had the policy that they were not to be financially liable for such events, but they did however fully support the idea and were happily willing to facilitate the Games (Simmons, 2000; Beaty, 2007). – finance

Most venues were located within a three-kilometre circle of the Olympic Ring in the heart of the city; many others were constructed on a temporary basis at Stone Mountain Park site, 25 kilometres east of downtown Atlanta. The Olympic Stadium was designed as a combination of athletic ground and baseball diamond so that it could be converted into a ballpark after the Games (Liao & Pitts, 2006). – property

To provide the Olympic concourse a commemorative legacy, the organizers set up an 8.5 hectare Centennial Olympic Park in the city centre with a rich collection of horticultural works (Liao & Pitts, 2006). – property

Of the estimated $1.58 billion ACOG spent on the 1996 games, $517 million was spent on construction including $209 million spent on new Olympic Stadium. Another $127 million was spent on the athletes’ village and the city spent $50 million on infrastructure. Atlanta also relied on federal largess, nearly $609 million worth, to speed up transportation, public housing and other infrastructure projects for the Games (U.S. General Accounting Office, 2000). – finance

The venues and facilities were handed over to the local sports teams and universities, therefore municipal control was not necessary (Arbes, 1996; Engle, 1999; Simmons, 2000). – property

Ten new venues were constructed, after the Games the Olympic Stadium was home to the US Major League Baseball team. Many of the new venues were located at, and later donated to, local colleges and universities (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). – property

The Olympic village was located on the campus of Georgia Tech and is nowadays used for student housing (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). – property

All of the permanent facilities constructed at the University sites are now fully occupied by students and the property has all been totally turned over to the university and is back in their management at this time (Moragas et al., 1996) – property

The major non-sport legacy of the Atlanta Games is Centennial Park, a downtown park designed to improve the lives of local residents after the Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009) – property

In the United States, Olympic bid committees are private, non-profit organizations. The reason that Olympic bid committees are privately organized is that local governments lack the necessary resources to conduct Olympic bid campaigns. Although public money is often used in some fashion, in practise Olympic bids by American cities are paid for by the contributions from private businesses (Andranovich et al., 2001). – finance
2.5 Learning: Expertise & information

Atlanta broadly followed the Los Angeles ‘model’ though there were three key bodies that formed Tri-Party Agreement to oversee the Games – the private sector led Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG), the state run Olympic Authority (MAOGA) and the city (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). – expertise

According to Andranovich et al (2001) the Atlanta Bid was initiated by entrepreneurs and was funded by public and private parties, which were supported by the local government.

- expertise

The centennial games of Atlanta in 1996 represent a pause in Olympic urban transformation as it concentrated on the development of essential sporting facilities (Liao & Pitts, 2006). – information

Perhaps the most significant legacy of the Atlanta games for the Olympic movement was the IOC decision that the Olympic Games would never again be given to a city that has no significant public sector commitment, either in the form of a financial contribution or, at the very least, a guarantee to meet the necessary costs of organising the Games (Richard Pound, the IOC’s chief liaison with ACOG, quoted in Rutheiser 1996).

- information

The park became a metaphor for the ‘break down’ of relationships and symbolic of a planning process designed to meet private rather than public interests, a process for which the Atlanta ’96 Games has come to be remembered (Rutheiser, 1996).

- information

“Yarbrough (2000) writes that if you walk around the City today and look it is almost as if the centennial Olympic Games were never here.”

Inevitably, the evaluations of the Games’ legacy for Atlanta vary considerably. The world’s media largely considered the Games to be ‘over commercialised and poorly organised’ (Ward, 2006) and the IOC tended to agree, taking the view that the private sector funding model with its ‘down to the wire finances, have convinced the IOC of one thing, we are never going through this again (Preuss, 2004). (lesson: low private involvement)

The government played a facilitating and supportive role, but was not involved in the developments at first. The ACOG thus received the full responsibility for the Olympic developments, and the developments were totally privately dominated (Chalkley & Essex, 1999; Newman, 1999; Andranovich, 2001). - expertise: poor governmental influence

The passive attitude the government had concerning the Olympic movement, led to a very private domination of the Olympic developments, which in turn did not lead to a superb integration into the urban masterplan. The private developments were all mainly focussed on the post-Games use and they all had purposes for after the Games (Chalkley & Essex, 1999; Newman, 1999; Andranovich, 2001). - expertise

The local organizing infrastructure consisted of ACOG, MAOGA, the city and the CODA. Members of the bid committee incorporated a new non-profit civic organization, the Atlanta Committee for the Olympic Games (ACOG), to stage the games (Andranovich et al., 2001). - expertise

The relationship between the three was worked out in a “tri-party agreement”, the terms of which made it clear that real authority would reside with ACOG (Fish, 1992; Roughton, 1992).
Later, city leaders created the Corporation for Olympic Development in Atlanta (CODA), a public-private partnership intended to spearhead the redevelopment of inner city neighbourhoods. Ultimately, CODA was underfunded given its ambitious goals and had little positive impact on neighbourhood residents (French & Disher, 1997).

2.6 Success factors

### Environmental

1. Make use of temporary and existing facilities
2. The creation of the Olympic Centennial Park, a downtown park designed to improve the lives of local residents after the Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009)

### Economical

1. Ten years after the Olympic Games were held in Atlanta, the city was still being transformed by an Olympic legacy that changed the face of downtown Atlanta and strengthened the city’s position as a global commerce hub (Matthewman et al, 2009)
2. The tourism business expanded and 18 new businesses were attracted to the city, which led to an increase in the employment rate and increased wages and extra tax revenues. (Arbes, 1996; ACOG, 1997; Engle, 1999; Matthewman et al, 2009)
3. The 1996 Games drew more attendees than any prior Olympic Games, created a $5 billion economic impact and branded Atlanta.
4. A worldwide Lou Harris poll revealed that positive perceptions of Atlanta among corporate decision makers nearly doubled after the Olympic Games. In 2009 Atlanta was home to nearly 1,600 international companies, representing a more than 30 per cent increase in international companies since the Olympic Games (Matthewman et al., 2009).
5. $650 million new construction, $609 million in federal funds, $5 billion in tourism

### Organisational

1. Chamber expands international sports presence (Andranovich et al., 2001).
2. Local politics nationalized
3. Federal Empowerment Zone and Affirmative action employment & Purchasing

### Non-success factors

1. Almost entirely private funded
2. Small role public bodies (government and city)
3. No real intention to regenerate by using the Olympics to improve facilities etc. Only small improvements were done (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).
4. CODA (Committee for Olympic Development) failed to use the Games as a catalyst to improve the loves of the city’s poor residents. The funds that were realised where mainly used for sidewalk improvements, street trees etc. (Minnaert, 2011)
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<td>5.</td>
<td>The increase in job opportunities was more symbolic than substantive (Rutheiser, 1996).</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>Centennial Park construction destroyed more than 10% of shelter space for the homeless (Rutheiser, 1996).</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>The set objectives on social level were highly ambitious, and only through intensive and targeted programmes could they have been achieved (Minnaert, 2011).</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>Atlanta was ‘virtually at war with journalists’</td>
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<td>9.</td>
<td>No infrastructural improvements, which led to an overburdened transportation system during the Games (Poynter &amp; MacRury, 2009).</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>The mixed reviews of the Games subsequently presented by the IOC and the world’s media were not, however, mainly focused upon security, the event itself had demonstrated that some features central to the success of the bid, had been poorly delivered, especially the telecommunications systems, traffic management and the financial package specifically designed to deliver the event (Poynter &amp; MacRury, 2009).</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>The first day of the Atlanta Games demonstrated flaws in the city’s transport system and the Games’ communications infrastructure. The international press corps and many spectators missed events due to traffic congestion and bus breakdowns. Journalists were late filing copy because computer systems failed to deliver results data from the competition sites were located in and around the city (Poynter &amp; MacRury, 2009).</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>Although the downtown of Atlanta was upgraded by the expansion of the light rail and the improvement of the airport, the desired deprived neighbourhood upgrades did not occur, only some beautifications were made (Arbes, 1996; Chalkley &amp; Essex, 1999; Newman, 1999; Simmons, 2000)</td>
</tr>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>The 1996 Games in Atlanta had little impact on non-sports development (Poynter &amp; MacRury, 2009).</td>
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III. Sydney 2000

3.1 Introduction
Sydney has seen a rapid growth in population due to the gold rushes and industrialisation. The result of this growth led to the fact that Sydney holds 20% of the Australian population, but some areas are unintentionally underdeveloped (Gold & Gold, 2007).

Tourism became a major economical provider for Australia due to major recessions, increasing foreign debt, globalization effects and economic deregulation, a decrease of traditional employment has occurred (Hall, 1998). This led to the final Olympic ambitions in Sydney. The Central government also incorporated this idea and wanted to use the Games to put the nation back on the map (Owen, 2001).

3.2 Visioning: commitment & legitimacy

The motive behind Sydney’s bid for the Olympic Games in 2000 was to contribute to Australia’s internationalisation and to promote the city as a global city (Cashman 2002, Hollway 2001). Next to this Sydney aimed to pursue a tangible legacy, including spectacular Olympic venues, an upgraded infrastructure system and an impulse for its urban regeneration programme (Chen & Spaans, 2009). When the IOC wanted to adopt sustainable development to the Olympic movement, Sydney decided to integrate this and have the ambition to be the first ‘Green Olympics’. - visioning

So the major goal for Australia as a country was clear: a stronger global position. To attain this goal the international tourism had to be expanded and regional service based activities had to be attracted (2001; Morse, 2001; Owen, 2001; Chen et al, 2010). - visioning

Sydney aimed to focus on the integration of indigenous peoples, the engagement of different cultural communities and employment and training programmes for the construction industry (Minnaert, 2011). – commitment

The remediation of Homebush Bay and the related concept of the ‘Green Games’ were attractive features of the bid because the environmental measures proposed were more ambitious than any previous Olympic Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). Homebush was no longer considered ‘a dirty, polluted industrial zone’ but a ‘post-industrial, clean and green space of leisure and sport’ (Dunn and McGuirk, 1999). – visioning

The Sydney Organising Committee (SOCOG) was bound by enabling legislation to use best endeavours to ensure that preference is given to the use of Australian goods, services and materials (Moragas et al, 1996). - legitimacy
3.3 Planning: Instruments & Time and result

Homebush Bay was zoned to be reclaimed for recreational purposes in a 1984-planning document. Once again, the Olympics prompted long planned investments to be accelerated (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - time/result: speed up planned investments

Chen & Spaans (2009) describe that Sydney created a special Olympic Legislation to accelerate development processes and to meet the deadlines for the Games with a level of certainty. – instruments: special Olympic legislation

Hosting the World Cup Rugby 2003 in the Sydney Olympic Park demonstrated the value of staging future mega-events in Olympic venues. The Rugby World Cup also enabled the Sydney public to reconnect with the park (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - instrument

Sydney organised the Olympic Arts Festival, a four-year cultural celebration beginning in 1997, which used the Olympic as an opportunity to showcase the best in art and cultural events drawn. The festival helped to galvanise support from the non-sports sectors of the community by emphasising that the Games were to benefit the city as a whole (Clark, 2008). – instruments, time/result

3.4 Venturing: Property & Finance

The main site for the Games at Homebush Bay, some 15 kilometres west of Sydney Harbour, was a neglected urban wasteland comprising unusable swamp, outdated industrial premises and noxious landfill sites, and had been earmarked for environmental rehabilitation (Liao & Pitts, 2006). – property

This site selection was brave and was killing two birds with one stone, namely clean up a highly toxic area and build sustainable and environmentally sound infrastructure there (Chan et al., 2006). The Olympic site was located in the disadvantaged West. Through large-scale infrastructural changes to the area, it was intended to increase equality (Minnaert, 2011). – property

The new Athletics Stadium, warm-up track and Aquatic Centre, together with the Olympic Village, would create a multi-use centre for Western Sydney (SOCOG, 2001). - property

Consisting of 14 grand venues, the Homebush site formed the largest venue cluster in Olympic history. This included the 115,000-seat stadium Australia, the largest Olympic stadium ever created (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - property

The Olympic Stadiums (Stadium Australia and Sydney Superdome) have faced major financial shortfalls, which have threatened their viability, despite being a tourist attraction for nine million people annually. - property

Some observers question whether a new stadium and arena were necessary since they seemed to duplicate existing facilities downtown. Indeed, the Homebush stadium and arena have entered into bankruptcy, as has a rail link from downtown to Homebush (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). - property

Chen (2012) states that one of the main problems for the after-use phase is that the chosen area, HomeBush Bay, is located far outside downtown Sydney. This makes the use of the venues in the after-use much harder (Liao & Pitts, 2006). – property: a strategic location is necessary for a
It is important from the outset to place Sydney's Olympic vision and its legacy – what has been promised and has been realised – in the context of the time. Sydney's Olympic vision was framed in the early 1990s, when legacy was of much lesser importance in Olympic discourse than it is now (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). The world of legacy has changed remarkably since 2001. The international IOC had earlier recognised the importance of impacts when it created the Olympic Games Global Impact (OGGI) programme in 2001. OGGI assists with the transfer of Olympic knowledge from one Olympic city to another and it enables the IOC to better understand and manage future Olympic Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

During the organisation of the 2000 Games two new government agencies arise: Sydney Organising Committee Olympic Games (SOCOG) and the Olympic Coordination Authority (OCA). The SOCOG had to organise the event according to the IOC requirements and the OCA was the authority responsible for delivering the venues and facilities for the Olympic Games. Next to these two authorities they developed the Olympic Roads and Transport Authority (ORTA), which was responsible for all ground transport services. It was a public-private partnership that saw the Homebush site created, with exceptional transport connections to the Sydney city region and Games “That captured the imagination of the nation, as a direct route to performance on a world economic stage” (Tibott, 2001).

To increase the tourism industry Sydney set up the Olympic Business Roundtable (OBRT) with representatives from government, Olympic sponsors, SOCOG and industry groups. OBRT launched a series of business promotion programmes which aimed to present a high-profile business image of Australia to provide a business matching service between Australian and overseas companies (Yu, 2004).

SOCOG is bound by enabling legislation to use best endeavours to ensure that preference is given to the use of Australian goods, services and materials (Moragas et al, 1996). The strategic plan was created by the government, which acted on a big-city level. Subsequently a public authority called the Sydney Olympic Park Authority (SOPA) was established to be responsible for the realisation and management of an Olympic urban development project (Heurkens, 2008).

This SOPA was created nine months after the Games, on 1st of July 2001, to create a vibrant and active centre within the metropolitan Sydney. The SOPA transformed the park into a new location for cultural activities, sports and environmental educational programmes (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

Although there were numerous spatial and environmental improvements throughout, the major stadiums turned into ‘white elephants’ shortly after the Olympics. The Sydney Olympic Park became yet another white elephant after the Games closed and a long-term plan for its redevelopment, turning the site over to residential and commercial use, did not appear until 2005. This happened because the government and private parties did not create a post-Games organisation (Lockhead, 2005; Chen et al, 2010)
3.6 Success factors

When we change the focus from the sixteen days of the Games to the post-Olympic period, the answer to the question concerning the legacy that the Olympics left Sydney is somewhat mixed (Furrer 2002).

**Environmental**

1. The presence of sport facilities in Sydney with international standards (Hollway, 2001; Matthewman et al., 2009).
2. Thanks to the 2000 Games the Homebush Bay is regenerated (Chen & Spaans, 2009). Extensive land reclamation and decontamination for the construction of Sydney Olympic Park (Clark, 2009; Poynter & MacRury, 2009).
3. The improvement of urban quality due to rehabilitation of the Homebush Bay area (Hollway, 2001).
4. First host city that aimed for ‘Green Games’, which was obliged by the IOC (Chen & Spaans, 2009).
5. The development of economic infrastructure as an impulse of the Games (Hollway, 2001; Matthewman et al., 2009).
6. Nowadays the Park is embraced by businesses because as a healthy work environment and its appealing location and became Sydney’s second major business event destination (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; SOPA, 2006).
7. A substantial upgrading of Sydney Airport, earlier than would otherwise have occurred, to standards in keeping with Sydney’s status as an international city and tourist destination (Matthewman et al., 2009)

**Organisational**

1. Without the Olympics in 2000 the regeneration of Homebush Bay and the new railway would never have been delivered in the time frame or on this scale. (Scarle 2002; 850).
2. The success of Sydney lies in the early preparations for the Bidding Phase (Herbert Wolff, BNR, April 2012)
3. According to Owen (2001) and Chen et al. (2010) the general change in the governance to an entrepreneurial point of view had led to a public-private partnership, which was an example for the rest of the nation.
4. Sydney, as a metropolis, learnt and upgraded skills to manage events, transport and deliver goods and services, at the same time as the centre of the city had been upgraded with wider footpaths, improved lighting and selective additions to cultural and development infrastructure (Matthewman et al., 2009)
5. Massive investment of public and private funding that has had a lasting impact on Australian businesses and has changed the way Australian sports are funded (Clark, 2008).

**Economical**

1. The Games have left a significant image legacy through presenting contemporaneous
Australia, and making the case for Sydney as a ‘world city’ in the sense argued by Sassen (1994) (Gold & Gold, 2007).

For Sydney, New South Wales and Australia, the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games provided massive exposure and publicity to the world and in many cases a first or a renewed awareness of Australia (Matthewman et al., 2009). Sydney had received massive international exposure, due to the extensive marketing campaign that was executed (SOCOG, 2001; Morse, 2001).

2. Sydney and thereby Australia became an important tourist and business destination, tourism increased (Clark, 2008; Matthewman et al., 2009). The ‘Aboriginal’ profile like Gold & Gold (2007) call it. Clear indications of the positive impact of place marketing was the large influx of overseas visitors to Sydney during the Games and that 50-60 per cent of the economic impact was generated by the Olympic-related tourist visits and tourist spending over the ten year period between 1994-2004 (Chalip, 2000).


4. PWC estimated that the increased exposure added AUD 6.1 billion to the Australian economy (Clark, 2008).

5. The IOC claimed that SOCOG established the ‘most financially successful domestic sponsorship programme to date’ (SOCOG, 2001).


7. Greater expertise and confidence in tendering, both domestically and overseas, on large-scale projects (PwC, 2001).

Social

1. Boosted their national pride. Nationally the Games did bring a major positive social legacy to Sydney and Australia; the contribution to the sense of community and the national spirit (Chen et al, 2010).

2. Next to this ‘national celebration’, as the Olympics were seen by central government, the multicultural population played a central role in a desire to unite the nation (Gold & Gold, 2007).

3. Researchers at the University of Birmingham and the University of Sydney investigated that the suicide rate in Sydney fell in the run up to the Olympic Games. The suggested reason is that such an event fosters a communal sense of well-being and local communities directly experience the benefits as the Games approach (BBC News, 2004).

4. The Homelessness protocol is a lasting legacy of the Sydney 2000 Olympics for socially excluded persons in the host community and the wider region (Minnaert, 2011).
## Non-success factors

1. No clear strategy for the after-Olympic period, many venues turned into white elephants (Heurkens, 2008; Lockhead, 2005; Chen et al, 2010; Lenskyj, 2002; Waitt, 2003; Gold & Gold, 2007)). Sue Holliday, former chief planner of the Games in 2000 told during a conference in 2008 that the host city should have focused more broadly on a legacy programme for the Olympic site: “Sydney is paying the price” (The Independent, 2008).

2. The decision to clean up a part of the Homebush Bay area was a brave one. In terms of legacy it was not a strategically good decision. Due to the distance to downtown Sydney the new venues and facilities are not that attractive for people living in the city centre in the after-Olympic period (Chan et al., 2006).

3. Looking to the social outcomes locally the Games had a mainly negative influence, such as the fact that the local community received an insufficient amount of information about the developments. Eventually the community felt downplayed (Owen, 2001; Chen et al, 2010).

4. Overall the social aspect was absent from the main strategies, which has led to a decrease of the life quality of the low-income groups, because landlords saw the possibilities for selling or letting their properties for more money (Owen, 2001; Blunden, 2007; Chen et al, 2010).

5. Research by Blunden (2007) shows that the staging of the Olympic Games brought forward and escalation in housing costs in Sydney and some loss of low-income housing stock.

6. The committee chose to landfill the site instead of segregate and treat it. They also chose to treat only the Homebush Bay site, ignoring the surrounding area that was contaminated but not part of the Olympic Village (Chan et al., 2006). Nowadays the site must be maintained with care to ensure that leaching of contaminants does not occur (Ministry of the Environment, Australia, 2006).

7. Lack of commitment to purchasing long-term Green Power for all Olympic venues. Sydney’s failure to meet its own environmental Guidelines in the areas of air conditioning and refrigeration (RAC) in Olympic venues is widely regarded as the largest and most systematic environmental failure of its Olympic games (Chan et al., 2006; Gold & Gold, 2007). The water management system could have enabled grey and black water collection and power stations for better environmental results (Greenpeace, 2001). While spectators were moved around by less polluting modes of transport, Olympic VIPs were transported by low-efficiency, petrol burning Holden vehicles that produce more greenhouse gases than their original designs did in 1948 (Greenpeace, 2001).

8. Programs were not targeted sufficiently to have a great effect on the long-term unemployed (Minnaert, 2011).

9. Many Olympic contractors wanted people who were already employed, skilled and having “the right attitude” to work, while a lot of the long term unemployed and those from areas of high unemployment were not getting Olympic jobs (Lenskyj, 2000). The case of the employment programme for the Sydney Olympics in particular clearly demonstrates that to achieve real change for socially excluded groups, a targeted strategy is needed, as general programmes do not tend to reach those with multiple disadvantage (Minnaert, 2011).

10. Main limitation was the emphasis on succeeding at a global rather than local level. This is a fundamental tension that remains unresolved within the Olympic hosting Process and requires much more careful attention in the future. The success in Sydney was more on satisfying the demands of global partners. This resulted in a feeling of pride and renewed confidence in the city and nation (Gold & Gold, 2007).

11. Many venues at Homebush Bay have experienced low usage in recent years, suggesting the after-use issue is still a pressing subject to be explored (Liao & Pitts, 2006).
3.7 After Olympic Authority

Although Sydney’s legacy plans were developed belatedly, individuals and government have responded to new post-Games opportunities. The Sydney-Beijing Olympic Secretariat (SBOS), which was established in February 2002, is a prime example of a shrewd and timely response to Beijing’s success in winning the bid for the 2008 Olympic Games in July 2001. Its aim was to assist local Australian business to gain access to the Chinese Olympic market. The continuing commitment of individuals, such as Sandy Hollway and David Churches, to an Australian Olympic presence in future Olympic and other Games has reaped rich dividends. This Australian Olympic and Games export industry continues to play a significant role in the Organisation of Olympic Games at Beijing and London (Poynter & MacRury, 2009, p.141).

The 2001 State budget allocated $50 million Australian dollars to the new Sydney Olympic Authority (which has replaced the OCA) for post-Olympic expenses at the Park and former Olympic venues (Moore, 2001).

The case of Sydney’s Olympic stadiums thus raises the general issue if whether public-private projects are justified in relation to potential risks to government. Due to lower revenues in terms of after Olympic events, the State government had to grant concessions in favour of the private parties in the after-use period (Searle, 2002).

This SOPA was created nine months after the Games, on 1st of July 2001, to create a vibrant and active centre within the metropolitan Sydney. The SOPA transformed the park into a new location for cultural activities, sports and environmental educational programmes (Poynter & MacRury, 2009; Heurkens, 2008).

The creation of the SOPA was a clear step in line with the IOC statement to steer more on an enduring legacy for the city and its citizens afterwards. In Barcelona they also created the Barcelona de Serveis Municipals (BSM) in 2003, a (really late) after Olympic authority to manage the after-use and maintenance of the stadiums and venues (Klee, 2012). *sign: after-use planning during the process is more on the agenda
IV. Athens 2004

4.1 Introduction
In 1990 Athens was a city developed by its citizens and not by the government. There was a shortage of public owned land, which resulted in low public development participation. This hands-off approach of the government resulted in a very slow infrastructural development process that almost stood still in the preceding decades (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007; Gold & Gold, 2007).

For Greece Athens was a dominant metropolis, but could not fulfil this role in its international region due to several inhibiting factors, such as geographical isolation and lack of effective relations with neighbouring nations (Coccossis et al, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007).

Athens is the capital and by far the most important city in Greece, exhibiting a variety and a concentration of economic sectors and activities, such as high-level public administration, business headquarters and wide array services, with a population of about 4 million in the greater metropolitan area of Attica. However, considering the European urban network as a global urban system, Athens ranks low (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004).

The city exhibits all the spatial disadvantages of larger cities in the European periphery (unplanned residential areas on the outskirts, lacking or obsolescent infrastructure, degraded built fabric, traffic congestion, environmental pollution) caused by the rapid and unregulated economic and physical growth experienced in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, due to extensive rural immigration (CEC, 1992).

For many decades, urban design has been confined to small-scaled, fragmentary and soft interventions. On the one hand development of private land has been regulated by the state mainly through building legislation and the master plan of the area controlling only land uses, building densities and the shape of the street system; and this kind of minimalism by the state, along with land division into small properties, has ensured that the physical form of urban space – the architecture of the city – is a product of step-by-step development and literally a property-by-property design of space (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004).

In 2004, the Olympic Games returned to their birthplace Athens in 2004. The first modern Olympics were held in Athens in 1896. Athens aimed to host the Games after the first Olympic century, but saw Sydney being awarded as the host for the 2000 Olympics, who’s bid was in a more developed stadium.

4.2 Visioning: commitment & legitimacy
The ambitions were clear: to integrate with the (inter)national opportunities Greece had and put Athens back on the International map (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Getimis & Hlepas, 2007). These ambitions incorporated the re-urbanization of Athens, especially on infrastructural level (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004). The Games were necessary to generate financial means to invest in these ambitions.

Next to these global and local ambitions Greece had an ethical ambition. Greece, the
geographical birthplace of the modern Olympics (1896), disliked the commercialization and political role of the Games and wanted to regain the traditional values of the Olympics (Coccossis, 2003; Gold & Gold 2007). - visioning

Not explicitly stated, but the strategy underlying Athens’ candidacy and the city’s preparation for Olympics 2004 was to enlarge the city’s development prospects and put Athens on the map as a major metropolitan centre in southeast Europe (Economou et al., 2001). - visioning

Thereby Athens aimed to achieve infrastructural improvements for the city. Social sustainability aims are but fleetingly mentioned. Thereby Athens wanted to improve the quality of life for residents, to attract tourists and investors and to improve the image of Athens (Minnaert, 2011). - visioning

Local communities held high aspirations to showcase successful organization and to reinvent Athens as a thriving postmodern city embracing the new century (Liao & Pitts, 2006).

Projects like Calatrava’s redesign of open space surrounding the major Olympic venue in Marroussi, the waterfront redevelopment at Faliron Bay and the projects carried out by Agency for the Unification of the Archaeological Sites of Athens were designed to provide Athens’ residents and visitors with important cultural and amenity spaces, thus boosting the consumption-oriented economy and upgrading the city’s image as a major metropolitan centre in Southeastern Europe (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). – visioning

4.3 Planning: Instruments & Time and result

A big applause to a small city, which did delivered the Olympic venues and facilities, but just before the start of the Games. – time/result

After the Games, the government formed a new public company, the Olympic Real Estate SA, which aimed to manage and exploit the Olympic venues. Most stadiums were leased to private parties, because the government wants to avoid the operating and maintenance costs of the venues as well as to find sources of funding to pay off the huge public debt. In the end the future use of the venues was not defined, only the Olympic Village had a feasible after-use plan, namely residential housing for low income groups.

- instruments

When Athens was awarded the right to host the Olympic Games, the government executed another round of research on the most optimal developments for the Olympics (Gold & Gold, 2007). After this research, a new development model was established. The model can be seen as one giant organisation, as clear distinctions between tasks are not visible. Additionally the government has full responsibility and bares the full risk. An addition to the vagueness of the model, is that it has been changed multiple times over the years preceding the Games (ATHOC, 2005; Van Prooye, 2009). This resulted in major delays. – instruments, time/result

The government of Athens decided to reconsider the Olympic plans after the bid was won in order to make sure they were going to benefit the city as optimal as possible, this after a relatively long planning period of 7 years (Van Prooye, 2009). - time/result
4.4 Venturing: Property & Finance

The main site was Athens Olympic Sport Complex (O.A.C.A.), located in the city’s north-eastern suburb nine kilometres from the Akropolis (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - property

Other major developments took place at the Faliro coastal zone, Hellenikon, Goudi and Marathonas. The 530-hectare brownfield site at the obsolete Hellinikon airport was converted into Europe's largest park for sports and recreational use. The 2,300 unit Olympic Village was built at the foot of Mountain Parnitha, 25 kilometers north-west of the city centre, aiming to attract more migrants to this under-populated area in the longer term (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - property

Massive necessary investments were needed and this resulted in the construction of a new airport, 201 km of new roads, 25 km of light rail, two additional metro lines and the rehabilitation of some coastal districts (Preuss, 2004; Kindel et al, 2009; Matthewman et al, 2009; NOC*NSF, 2007). - property

Although there were indeed declined areas in the geographical heart of the city, new development and redevelopment projects for the Olympics of 2004 were scattered all over the plan of the city without a focus (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). – property

This was a result of the history of land acquisition in Greece (4.1) is described. Such a kind of landscape mosaic, characterizing most Greek cities, will be overlapped in the case of Athens by an evenly scattered net of new formal episodes – caused by the all-new building and public open space schemes for Olympics 2004. (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). – property

Due to the permanence of re-designed, re-constructed and re-used spatial structures, there will no doubt be a positive impact on the city’s development prospects (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). – property

In Athens, public investment exceeded $10 billion, and in Beijing, more than $40 billion. - finance

Although the Games left these great infrastructural improvements, the Olympic venues remained empty or unused, due to low participation of private parties in the direct surroundings. Homogeneous zones arose which were not beneficial to the urban structure (Gospodini, 2009). Gold & Gold (2007) describe the overall score of the environmental developments as very low.- property

Hoping for a 'Barcelona Effect' the spending on stadiums and all aspects of infrastructure was so lavish that one-third of the cost was borne by the European Economic Community’s development fund. Even with this aid, the debt burden on Athens and Greece is said to near $7.1 billion, which is more likely to a 'Montreal Effect' (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). – finance
4.5 Learning: Expertise & information

There has been no strategic plan for Athens after 2004. Moreover, despite the successful experience of many cities taking advantage of mega-events for revitalizing large and central declined urban areas, Athens did not adopt such a strategy (Beriatos & Gospodini, 2004). – information

According to economic development there is a total absence of an enabling framework. In theory the Regional Operational Programme – ROP, i.e. Community Support Framework (CSF) at regional level – could perform such a challenging task, but because of its focus at a medium term programming horizon there is no strategic orientation in practise. Furthermore it lacks the means to link physical strategic planning with socio-economic development programming. In addition, there is absence of key actors, such as from the private sector or the civic society, as it is mostly dealt with at technocratic administrative level from Central Government (Coccossis et al., 2003). - expertise

A problem concerning governance is that Greece continues to rely on formal mechanisms of administration (state). The actual role of the private sector and civic society (professional associations and other partners) has to be, more or less, invented. Non-governmental organisations are underrepresented in Greece (Coccossis et al., 2003). - expertise

A typical example in the condition of urban/regional co-operation is the problematic relationship between the private and public sector: the public sector is unable to press the state and vice versa (Coccossis et al., 2003). - expertise

There is a lack of Metropolitan Administration that does not intervene substantially in planning. Also there is no experience of networking, or specialisation of urban centres through collaboration, something that could bring forth regional economies (Coccossis et al., 2003). – expertise

Urban/ regional co-operation is the responsibility of many organisations and actors for the same issue, thus acting as a living proof of the proverb ‘too many cooks spoil the broth’. - expertise
4.6 Success factors

Environmental

1. Massive improvements on the urban infrastructure (airport, metro, tram rails, restaurants and hotels) (Preuss, 2004; Kindel et al, 2009; Matthewman et al, 2009; NOC*NSF, 2007). The main focus was on taking advantage of the tangible infrastructure and facilities that remain. (Poynter & MacRury, 2009). Athens now has an infrastructure conductive to economic growth (Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. The Games undoubtedly accelerated urban renewal and brought investment in transport and telecommunications (Gold & Gold, 2007).

3. Archaeological remains were restored and supported with museum facilities (Liao & Pitts, 2006; Gold & Gold, 2007).

Social

1. Greece benefited from a nationwide feeling of confidence, because the Games brought a global addition to prestige and prosperity. It eventually led to a mobilization of the citizens of Greece. Before the citizens never really contributed to the planning culture, but the Olympics created an increasing public awareness of environmental issues (Preuss, 2004; Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. The strongest points that really worked in favour of Athens was the overwhelming majority of the Greek population that supported hosting the Games in 2004 (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

3. Like stated above, Greece wanted to revive the traditional values of the Olympics, and it did. The historical and modern cultural value increased, though it was not a great extent (Gold & Gold, 2007)

4. The cultural sector has benefited from new performance spaces, exhibition spaces and renovated museums (Gold & gold, 2007).

Economical

1. The Games did increase the tourist industry by six million extra tourists. Thanks to the Olympic Games the Greek economy has a 4% annual increase and the GDP increased with 1.4%. Like in some other hosting cities, these impacts were mostly on a specific area, called Attica (Preuass, 2004; Gold & Gold, 2007; Matthewman et al, 2009)

2. Games spending helped the sluggish Greek economy to record a 4 per cent annual increase (Payne, 2006), but most of the revenue benefited the Athens region (Gold & gold, 2007).

3. The Games were seen as a vehicle that showed how the city could use major events to lever investment, modernize the built environment and expand Athens' international role (Gold & Gold, 2007).

Organisational
1. The macro economic effects, apart from the direct measurable positive impact on tourism, include gaining expertise in technical and managerial issues. The intangible benefits such as new organisational patterns, new forms of governance and co-operation, organisational experience in various sectors, a new city-country image and the legacy of volunteerism have added value to the development of the city and country (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).

The Soft legacy provided new ways of managing like the private-public partnerships as a new way of generating development funds (Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. Despite some errors, the event was delivered on time (Gold & Gold, 2007).

3. They adjusted flexibility to unprecedented security measures.

4. The Games highlighted the problems of bureaucracy and encouraged a more flexible approach to problem solving (Gold & Gold, 2007).

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Non-success factors

1. The after-use was, also due to an economic decline, a big negative aspect (Gold & Gold, 2007). Due to poor planning there was a lack of legacy plan for the Olympic venues, which were mostly left unused. The Hellenic Olympic Properties (HOP) was established by the government to exploit and manage the venues after the Games till new users were found (Bariatos & Gospodini, 2004; Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. In Bakker’s thesis (2009) he made an analysis on the Olympic legacy of Athens 2004 and Barcelona 1992. He describes that the Olympic park itself does not have a fixed post usage. Thereby the Olympic stadium managed in the years after to host some sport events after football club Panathinaikos returned to their home grounds. An athletic stadium has the problem that it does not function well as a football stadium, due to the 400 meter track around the pitch. OAKA has two venues that have found post-Olympic usage four to five years after the Games (Bakker, 2009).

4. In 2008 the Pakistan Daily Times reported that almost all of the Olympic venues had fallen into varying states of disrepair and that the annual cost to maintain the sites was estimated at £500 million. This conclusion is supported by other reports (Matthewman et al., 2009). Gold & Gold (2007) state that many of the Olympic venues did not have an after-use.

5. Costs overruns, the expenditure for Olympic installation nearly quintupled from the original budget (Liao & Pitts, 2006).

6. Transportation and infrastructure did not work after the Olympics. Some infrastructure was delivered to get to the Olympic venues, which were left unused after the Games (Gold & Gold, 2007).

7. The Greece’s tourism industry felt out of the world’s top ten destinations (Kornblatt, 2006).

8. Greece and Athens did not receive the international reputation they aimed for, the Games did not create the desired legacy for the city or nation. Some examples are political accusations arise because of expanding costs, the pioneering of a new public-private partnership model in the planning culture failed. In general the Greek authorities did not used the potential for changing the governance structure, although the government gained knowledge on the economy and on organising events (Gold & Gold, 2007; Hlepas, 2010).

9. Greek economy struggled and Greece was holding the highest public debt following the 2004 Games and many speculate that hosting the Games contributed to their overall debt crisis.

10. There was no policy for tackling poverty or social exclusion during the Athens Olympics (Minnertz, 2011).

11. There was a time loss of three years, due to re-designing the Olympic plan and developments after winning the bid (Van Prooye, 2009).

12. There is no doubt that corners were cut, plans cancelled and tasks left incomplete, issues.
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<td>13.</td>
<td>Environmentalists were particularly critical that the rules laid down in the tender for the Olympic Village were largely ignored when reducing construction costs became the priority (Gold &amp; Gold, 2007).</td>
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<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>The locations of the venues, the Olympic village and the Olympic park were far outside the city centre, which indicates that the after-use (legacy) was not adequately designed.</td>
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V. Beijing 2008

5.1 Introduction
China is a nation on a severe rise. Since the establishment of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, dramatic changes have taken place. The developments over time were conducted under the context of several models with communist tendencies. Eventually this led to the Dengist-model, in which the public had strong control, but with inevitable capitalist features (Gold & Gold, 2007; Van Prooye, 2009).

The enormous potential China has, was expressed in the massive development the nation went through in the previous decades. Especially China’s Golden Coast had potential and lived up to this potential. This placed China in a position wherein it opened up to global connections, by which it became an open, wealthy and urban society. This led to the fact that China was rapidly becoming one of the most powerful nations in the world. Sports have always played an important role in the Chinese culture. Politics and sports were closely interwoven, and sport was used as an instrument for the promotion of pride and identity (Gold & Gold, 2007; Van Prooye, 2009).

After hosting the Asian Games in 1990, the idea of hosting the largest sports event in the world was born. The Olympics were ideal to create a showcase towards the rest of the world to show what China was capable of. Thus a bid was placed for the 2000 Olympics. Unfortunately, this was lost by two votes to Sydney due to pollution and infrastructural problems, as well as human right protests for events which occurred only a few years prior (Gold & Gold, 2007).

5.2 Visioning: commitment & legitimacy
Eleven years later the situation was changed and in 2001 the Chinese government placed a bid to host the Games of 2008 in Beijing. The drive behind the bid was again to show the world what China had become, as well as modernize and industrialize Beijing. The city was to change from a producer city to a city of consumption, of knowledge-based activities and with an enhanced international profile. This included the desire to promote industrial optimisation and upgrading and to solve economic problems. This is also how the theme of ‘Green Games’ was related to the Beijing Games. All these objectives were to support the primary goal the Olympics were to have; enhance the international recognition (IOC, 2001; Gold & Gold, 2007). - visioning

For Beijing and for China as a whole, the IOC announcement came as a form of redemption, especially after the failed 1993 bid for the 2000 Games (Ong, 2004).

Still a lot of people argued China’s poor record on human rights and didn’t found them capable of upholding the ideals of peace and freedom embodied in the Olympic Charter. Meanwhile other people found a Chinese Olympics an eventual necessity, due to China’s economic power and its growing stature within the Olympic Movement (Ong, 2004).

In the report of the IOC commission for the Games of the XXIX Olympiad in 2008 (2001) was stated that 96 per cent of Beijing’s population supported the hosting of the Olympics, which is quite an amount.

In many respects, the Olympics are a national rather than just a city-based event (Gold & Gold, 2007). Watts (2005) states that Beijing remains the most polluted city in the world.

- visioning
The motives between both bids were almost equal. China saw the Games, like many other cities, as a generator for urban developments and wanted to use the Games for upgrading China’s international prestige and image, both domestically and internationally, of national strength and unity (Ong, 2004). In other words, the primary goal for hosting the Olympics in 2008 was ‘enhancing the international recognition (IOC, 2001; Gold & Gold, 2007). - visioning

According to their ‘greening the Games-approach’, Beijing had a strong desire to improve environmental aspects like the air quality, water environment, ecological conversation and construction, industrial pollution and solid waste management (Chan et al, 2006). This resulted in the following objectives extracted from Beijing’s bid and their official guidelines and objectives:
- increase the number of buses and taxis operating on natural gas by 37 per cent (Bid Beijing, 2008),
- 292 days each year should be with “blue sky days”, this because Beijing has world’s highest levels of Nitrogen dioxide, which can cause fatal damages to the lungs (Watts, 2005),
- in 2008 the water quality in the area reservoirs need to meet national standards and resume function a drinking water,
- increasing greening space, by 2007 the urban green coverage rate should be raised to around 50 per cent and thereby green and beautify urban areas.
- relocate enterprises and take measures to prevent and control industrial pollution,
- decrease coal consumption from 26 million tons in 2002 to 15 million tons in 2008 and replace it with natural gas (Xinhua, 2002).
- using newer technologies for new construction projects by using cleaner energy,
- by 2008, Beijing hopes that noise in urban areas reaches the national standard, and that radiation and radioactivity comply with national standards as well.
- Beijing set 2005 as a goal to have properly treated all domestic refuse generated in urban areas and satellite towns. - visioning

The greatest legacy of the Beijing Games will be a largely intangible one – its human and cultural legacy. This goal is expressed in one of the three themes for the Olympic Games, renwen aoyun, which has been translated into English as the “humanistic” or “people’s” Games (Brownell, 2008). – visioning

BOCOG worked in multiple levels of government to divide ownership of the new facilities and responsibility for their construction. The biggest part of the venues lies under jurisdiction of the Beijing city government. Some universities will get some fees for modifications, but will remain under their management. Other venues were given a freedom to govern the construction or modification of facilities and to govern their after-games-usage (Ong, 2004). – commitment
Due to the fact that the government was in strong control of the developments, they made sure the developments fit as optimally as possible in the urban masterplan of the city. Therefore the Olympics were used as a catalyst for indirectly related developments throughout the city (Gold & Gold, 2007; Van Prooye, 2009). – commitment: strong control by government, Olympics as catalyst for urban development

### 5.3 Planning: Instruments & Time and result

Final decisions on most of these venues, based on design, plans for post-Games use, and overall cost, were made by the end of 2003 (Ong, 2004). – time/result

### 5.4 Venturing: Property & Finance

Most venues are constructed in a 405-hectare Olympic Park on the Northern edge of the city’s central mass and adjacent to the old Asian Games Park. The idea was to make full use of the existing sports premises left from the 1990 Asian Games and to reinforce, in a symbolic sense, the city’s north-south axis, as a series of key Olympic buildings sit right on the Northern end of this ritualistic axis lining up with Tiananmen Gate at the city’s geographic centre (Liao & Pitts, 2006). - property

Parts of the Olympics will be staged away from Beijing, in some cases the cities are located hundreds, one thousand an two thousand miles from Beijing itself (Gold & Gold, 2007). - property

Under the BOCOG plan, the Olympics would utilize 37 competition venues in China. Of the 32 venues in Beijing, 19 would be new and would be renovated pre-existing structures (Ong, 2004). - property

The Olympic Green would include the Olympic Village and the Media Village, as well as other press facilities and communications infrastructure (BOCOG, 2001). - property

Beijing’s infrastructure is one big problems, citizens have to deal with daily traffic jams due to the occupancy rate of the ring road and the amount of vehicles. Thereby the location of the Forbidden city makes it impossible to create a south-north and east-west axes. For the Olympics some infrastructural improvements were done, but only because of the odd-and-even traffic plan during the Olympics the city’s infrastructure was sufficient for the Games. Still distances were too long. Their transportation system was expanded by a fourth ring road. – property

A high priority for Beijing was their communications infrastructure, especially high-tech telecommunications infrastructure.

Looking to the Olympic Legacy, Beijing gave the after-Games usage a high priority in their candidature documents. The Olympic Village will be converted into a permanent residential area, and the athletes’ residences will be sold off as commercial apartments, helping to ease Beijing’s serious housing shortage. Thereby many of the university facilities returned directly to their original university environments (BOCOG, 2001). - property
An analysis by Tobias Birkendorf considered that economic growth can be attributed to the Beijing Olympic Games primarily by the realisation of necessary infrastructure investments and that investment led to improvements of the overall production conditions for domestic and foreign enterprises, making investment for private enterprises in Beijing more attractive (Matthewman et al., 2009). – property

Beijing officials also used the Sydney budget as a close working model. The two main portions of revenues were selling broadcast rights (US$709 million) and sponsorship deals (US$260 million) (Olympic Games Bid Committee, 2008). – finance

5.5 Learning: Expertise & information

The Beijing 2008 Olympic Games Bid Committee (BOBICO) consisted of officials from the Beijing municipal government, the State Council, the State Sport General Administration and several other national agencies with a stake in Olympic planning (Mayor Landmarks of 2008 Bid, p. 28). This committee had to complete the detailed questionnaire of the IOC after being accepted as a candidate. Beijing received the status “excellent’ for their 2008 bid after many official visits by the IOC Evaluation Commission. - expertise

The strong central planning exercised by the Chinese government allows the leadership to make tough decisions and implement them quickly (Chan et al, 2006). - expertise

The government established Olympic Service Groups to encourage public support for Beijing’s bid through events and programs. Thereby they invested in programs that dealt with city beautification and foreign language instruction (Ong, 2004). - expertise

The BOCOG decided to work closely with official from the IOC to use knowledge from the past and other regional sporting events. Chinese officials have held several meeting with official from the Organising committee for the 2004 Athens Games (Ong, 2004). - information

The IOC coordination commission, responsible for ensuring proper interaction between a Games’ local Olympic Organizing Committee and the overall body, has visited Beijing several times and has praised the scope and speed of Beijing’s Olympic preparations (Ong, 2004). - information
5.6 Success factors

Environmental

1. Extensive infrastructural improvements and beautification endeavours are being made in the whole city beyond the Olympic precincts (Liao & Pitts, 2006).
2. Beijing’s two-line subway system and its extensive bus system were both popular methods of public transportation, the Beijing Capital International Airport could handle 35 million passengers daily (Ong, 2004).
3. Next to the expansion of the airport, seven new subway lines and 80 stations, new roads and ring roads and 37 new venues and 59 training facilities were developed. These massive improvements of the urban structure and stock were necessary for the rapid growth of the city (Gold & Gold, 2007; Brunet & Xinwen, 2009; Kindel et al, 2009).
4. The venues and facilities that were built near and for the universities were well utilized.
5. Still environmental issues in Beijing are argued, but they did show signs of progress.
6. Development has also impacted on refurbishment of 25 historic areas, including many of the city's landmarks, old streets, and four corner residences that date from the imperial period; and restoration of Beijing's many historic places, including the Forbidden City (Matthewman et al., 2009).

Social

1. One of the three key elements of BOCOG’s overall strategic concept is the concept of a “People’s Olympics”. Like stated before 96 per cent of the Beijing people was supporting the Games. The public voice and public participation that the government and the BOCOG have attempted to encourage during the bidding and preparations process paradoxically may help to in calculate an independent public voice that endures after the Olympics. In this sense the Olympics could contribute to long-term political reform in China and further changes (Ong, 2004).
2. The Games did improve the quality of living and social problems, like the obesity problem, which was given attention (Gold & Gold, 2007; Brunet & Xinwen, 2009).

Economical

1. After the Games the entire world knew who China was and what they were capable of, they had opened up the rest of the world. They changed their mode of economic growth in order to be able to grow to greater heights (Matthewman et al, 2009; Brunet & Xinwen, 2009).
2. The Olympics may accelerate China’s drive towards international integration and will further political reform and increased personal freedom within the state. (Ong, 2004)
3. Between 2002 and 2006 the average annual economic growth of Beijing rose with 1,7 per cent to 12,1 per cent due to the catalytic effect of hosting the Games (Poynter & MacRury, 2009).
4. Between 2001 and 2006 the number of foreign visitors increased from 2.8 billion to 3.9 billion.

5. The Olympic stadium nowadays generates big revenues as major tourist attraction, visitors pay €7.50 a day.

6. The Olympics have had a significant influence on Beijing's economic development, environment, and the growth of the country's advertising, television, Internet, mobile phone, clean energy, and sports sectors (Matthewman et al., 2009)

7. In the post-1998 real estate boom, housing prices in Beijing rose between 400 and 1,000 percent between 2001 and 2008.

8. In total, Beijing has doubled its GDP per capita from 2001 to 2008 (Chen, 2012:28).

Organisational

1. In relation to Athens, were the government was not in control of the land development, the government in Beijing was in strong control of the developments. Beijing definitively used the Olympics as a catalyst for indirectly related developments throughout the city (Gold & Gold, 2007).

2. The strong central planning exercised by the Chinese government allows the leadership to make tough decisions and implement them quickly (Chan et al, 2006).

Non-success factors

1. The current development imbalance and social inequity increased between the north and south of Beijing.

2. Although Beijing succeeded in improving the air and water quality, the prediction is that these changes are only for the short-term (Brunet & Xinwen, 2009). About 200 polluting factories inside the fourth ring were moved out to Beijing’s suburbs or even to neighbouring provincial cities. Other factories went through significant technical upgrading, or were obliged to reduce or cease production (Chen, 2012). Probably, after the Games these factories will get back on full production speed. After the Olympics, millions of cars will be back on the road, the city’s factories and power plants will once again begin emitting fumes, and thousands of construction projects will start up again as Beijing gets back to its normal life. The growing Chinese middle class, with its consumerist identity, is putting serious environmental pressures on the country (Chan et al., 2006)

3. The stadiums on the Olympic Green could not be feasible used in its normal function, but because of high interest by tourist a profit of 70% was made shortly after the games. The NOS highlighted (22th July 2011) both the Olympic Stadium (Bird’s nest) and the Olympic Swimming Stadium (Watercube). Both stadiums could not attract enough events of championships to make them feasible for the future. They transformed the Watercube into the world biggest water paradise with 3.000 visitors a day. Post-use of the stadiums in Beijing remains a difficult task (Chen, 2012)

4. Some sectors, such as manufacturing, lost revenue due to plant closings related to the government’s efforts to improve air quality (Matthewman et al., 2009)

5. The smaller venues had problems by financing their maintenance and operation costs.
6. On the one hand BOCOG claims that only several thousand people were affected by the Olympic project. One the other hand the Centre of Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) estimates that a total of 1.5 million people were displaced. A large part of these relocated people should as well be relocated when Beijing should not have hosted the Olympics, due to necessary infrastructural improvements. According to Chen (2012) numbers about the people that had to move were not calculated in a proper way. Between 1991 and 2003 1.5 million people were relocated from such areas out to the high-rise residential blocks in the suburbs (Gold & Gold, 2007). Estimates suggest that approximately 300,000 people have been evicted specifically because of the Olympics, although the government of the PRC denies this (Acharya, 2005).

7. The citizens were not that much in a position of rejecting governmental plans because of the strong governmental control, which made it possible to execute plans without considering the society’s objection too much (Chan et al, 2006).

8. Locally the social addition was lacking, not many affordable housing was delivered and low-income groups were even more segregated. The social and economical difference between the Northern and Southern part of Beijing was expanded (Chen, 2012).

9. Also in Beijing, the effects of the Games were not financially positive for all citizens: the price of land, homes and home rentals for example rocketed around the time of the Games (Dong & Mangan, 2008).

10. Because of the high investments and redevelopment over several areas some historical parts had been abandoned. The Nanchizi area west of the Forbidden City have seen major renovations, resulting in the loss of many of Beijing’s historic ‘hutong’ (enclosed urban area with small streets and small housing, which already exists for 700 years). Demolition across the whole city, which particularly threatens the old ‘hutong’ and ‘siheyuan’ area (Cook and Murray, 2001).

11. During the planning and construction and after the Olympics some scandal occurred due to the strong public control with capitalist tendencies, corruption was inevitable (Gold & gold, 2007).

12. One of the hard things mentioned Minnaert (2011) is the role of a communist government, under which socially excluded citizens are not mentioned.

13. Groups that do not conform to the image of a prosperous and attractive city, had to struggle to compete during the Games (Minnaert, 2011).

14. Growing problem of obesity, contradictions in sponsorship Coca-cola and Macdonalds (fastfood) and thereby Samsung and Panasonic (passive lifestyle).

15. Beijing missed the opportunity to address the gentrification process that the city is facing (Chen, 2012)
ANNEX II:

Transitional period (London)

1. Olympic periods
2. Global
3. Local
4. Phases
5. Strategic activities related to the different periods
Transitional period (Preceding Games)

Pre-event Period
Event Period
Post-event Period

Transitional Period

Global showcase in local context

INITIATION-BID-PREPARATIONS

Decision process
Planning
Visioning
Learning

Planning
Visioning
Learning

Planning
Visioning
Learning

Planning
Visioning
Learning

Planning
Visioning
Learning

Legitimation

LEGACY

strategic activities related to the different periods

olympic periods
Local Phases

1 Global
2 Local
3 Pre-event Period
4 Event Period

PREPARATIONS
Annex III

Illustration of the Olympic park during the Olympic Games (2012)