The Poverty of Territorialism: Revisiting European spatial planning

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Abstract

Like Karl Popper in ‘The Poverty of Historicism’ does with the social science method going by that name, the paper criticises territorialism as a misguided way of dealing with issues. First it makes the case for territorialism implying the control of people and resources by controlling area, what is called territoriality. Under territorialism and the crisis of the European Union the paper shows that this crisis raises questions about what the Union is, or should be. The prevailing answer, strengthening nation states, may lead to its disintegration, Jan Zielonka argues, but this will not mean the resurgence of nation states, epitomes of territorialism as they are. Pursuing the neo-medieval alternative, the paper reports on Zielonka foreseeing overlapping territorial and functional arrangements. The next part discusses spatial planning in the neo-medieval empire where space must be understood as overlapping and intersecting areas, each with its own form of governance. The implication for European planning, true also for strategic planning generally, is to abandon the pursuit of spatially integrated policies. Planning should produce parallel and overlapping schemes for various territorial and functional spaces instead.

Keywords: Territorialism, Territoriality, European Spatial Planning, European Union a Neo-medieval Empire

“Whether we like it or not, we live in a connected world.” (President Barak Obama, BBC World Service, 24 April 2016)

“Integration driven by autonomous functional networks without a strong European centre will in due time be seen as a much more appropriate way forward.” (Jan Zielonka 2014)

Introduction

"You, as a political project, are in denial", said a triumphant Nigel Farage, Member of the European Parliament for the United Kingdom Independence Party to his fellows. The occasion was the meeting of the European Parliament after Britain had voted to leave the European Union (EU). His object of ridicule was the dream of an EU as a Political Union. But whoever thinks like Farage that ring-fencing a territory means independence for its government and people is also in denial. Even a true European Union with a government
subject to control by the European Parliament – the President of the European Parliament’s preferred answer to Brexit¹ – could not compel global networks to do its bidding. In today’s world, sovereignty is an illusion, as is the view of the world as neatly divided into boxes. This paper identifies this as territorialism, hence ‘The Poverty of Territorialism’.

The allusion is to the title of “The Poverty of Historicism”. Like Sir Karl Popper in this well-known work does with the social science method to which he gives this label, so with this paper: It looks at territorialism as an approach. Now, to Popper historicism is an “approach to the social sciences which assumes that historical prediction is their principal aim, and which assumes that this aim is attainable...” (Popper 1957, Page 3; emphasis in the original). But being able to predict something that is unique, like historical development, is logically impossible.

Territorialism, too, is an approach. Under it, bounded spaces – territories – are deemed the primary objects of policymaking and planning. A classic statement of the rationale for planning based on territorialism is by the Schuster Report on planning education (Committee of Qualifications of Planners 1950) For nearly all its activities, the Schuster Report says, the community depends on the limited supply of land, and the location of development can have a profound effect elsewhere in the community. The planning that was meant was by UK planning authorities, each responsible for a defined area. But land is in limited supply only because the search is restricted to the territory for which the authority is responsible. This prevents the authority from looking wherever the investigation should take it, with no regards to borders.

My concern with territorialism comes from reflecting on European spatial planning. I came to the conclusion that planning within closed territories was fundamentally flawed; that, unless it looked beyond territorial confines, planning could not fulfil its calling. From here it was a short step to concluding that the system of nation states is flawed.

The idea for writing on the poverty of territorialism came on the morning after a referendum had advised the Dutch government against ratification of the EU association treaty with Ukraine. Other member states and, where it had competence in the matter, the European Commission had already taken a decision in favour. The vote was a mark of the reassertion by the people of Dutch national sovereignty. Their horizon was the territory of the Netherlands, as if it formed a unit of analysis and political action in its own right.

The Dutch referendum came only months before the ‘once in a lifetime’ decision, the outcomes of which we now know, as to whether or not the United Kingdom should leave the EU (‘Brexit’). Whatever its eventual consequences, once it became known, the outcome of the Brexit referendum stunned the world. There is a famous book on the eve of the Great War, 'The Sleepwalkers' (Clark 2012). More generally speaking, writing on how the world

tumbles into war, Barbara Tuchman (1984) has chosen the equally evocative term ‘The March of Folly’. But before embarking on the Great War at least, some leaders had last-minute doubts. But Churchill pointed out that the first party reversing troop trains moving up to the front would have made itself vulnerable. Electoral calendars may similarly prevent leaders to act on their better judgement. Defining their constituencies by territories, elections – and referenda for that matter – systematically disregard interdependence. They sanctify territorialism.

The Case for Territorialism

As Popper has done with historicism, the first step taken is to make the case of territorialism. A quick scan of the literature shows that as a term it is used frequently to describe animals being willing to – not all exhibit this behaviour – defend the area in which they roam, feed and breed. The area which a species frequents habitually without being possessive about it is called its home range.

A common assumption is that territorialism also applies to humans. As the saying goes: my home is my castle, home connoting security, warmth and cosiness, preferably guaranteed through ownership giving control over access to, and behaviour within, a bounded space.

Indeed, territorialism implies control of people and resources by controlling area, what is called territoriality (Sack 1986). Neolithic man may have become territorial when starting to cultivate the land, requiring a sedentary way of life. Territorialism goes beyond this. It refers to a fundamental principle of spatial organisation. The assumption is of a seamless cover of territories, each with a definitely owner. The EU territory, for instance, and continents more generally speaking, are presented as the sums of individual territories, a specific ‘metageography’. It concerns ways in which “territorial understandings and arrangements are shaping how things are organized on the ground.” (Murphy 2009, Page 8) Any one metageography goes at the expense of other ways of ordering space, for instance by water catchment areas.

More generally speaking, territorialism stands for macrosocial space being “wholly organized in terms of units such as districts, towns, provinces, countries and regions.” (Scholte 2000, Page 47) Each unit is conceived as “a rendering of ... ‘space' as a political category: owned, distributed, mapped, calculated, bordered and controlled” (Elden 2010, Page 810). Like home owners, each unit is thus a sovereign authority wielding exclusive power over a homogenous territory (Perkmann 2007, Page 257).

The analogy with landed property is instructive: The rights of its owners are subject to various forms of public control and their enjoying the fruits of their property depends on public service provisions. So with administrative units: Each district, each town, each province is subject to some form of regulation and is dependent on external provisions, for instance in the field of infrastructure. But the state is different. At least formally speaking, it is the court of last resort and the repository of all public powers vested in it and the holder
of all public funds for which it can be called to account. At its borders, “controls take place over the movement of people, services, and goods .... The concept ... orientates the convergence of people with a given territory and myths of a common history ... about who we are, where we belong, and to whom our loyalties should lie” (Vaughan-Williams 2011, Page 185). Borders in particular “…express sovereignty as a power to attach populations to territories..., to ‘administrate’ the territory through the control of population, and, conversely, to govern the population through the division and the survey of the territory.’ (Balibar 2009, Page 192) States are thus the ultimate building blocks. Where there is no sovereign, no owner responsible for, and with a stake in, maintaining order, there is a no-man’s land of lawlessness. Order and security and meaning are strong points in favour of territorialism.

Another point in favour is that territorialism gives emotional satisfaction. It circumscribes the area of land with its inhabitants, those whom one could and should – if only potentially – know and, at least in the spirit, interact with, preferably in a common idiom. From commonalities such as these comes attachment and from attachment solidarity. Territorialism thus becomes the basis for a social contract between the inhabitants of a given territory.

The French state in particular features territorialism. It considers itself responsible since the French Revolution the well-being of citizens by means of public services “defined and regulated principally in a national framework by the administration subject to the control of the political power accountable to the nation, the community of citizen-voters-users-taxpayers, from which it derives its legitimacy. The public service is required to be, in theory if not in practice, homogenous throughout the whole of the national territory” (Peyrony 2014, Pages 307-308; translation by the author).

The complement, also felt strongly, is the equality of citizens. Equality before the law is of course a common principle, but France has raised it to lofty heights. The Republic is based on the assumption of equal citizens forming an organic whole, a body inhabiting a territory which a conscript army – a novelty at the time and one that changed the face of warfare – has defended against invading monarchs conspiring with the forces of restoration. This finally and truly meant the royal patrimonium being transferred to the people (Rosanvallon 2011, Page 38). Sovereign control of territory is particularly important in democracies where the “absolutization and sacralization of borders is perhaps even greater ... precisely because it expresses the fact that the state is ideally the people’s property...” (Balibar 2009, page 193).

Napoléon took France to new heights, not only militarily but also culturally. Other countries emulated the example, forming nation-states of their own. Nation-states fostered, indeed insisted upon the loyalty of their peoples by fostering togetherness, romantic love for their countries and patriotic spirit, taking them far on the road to progress and prosperity.
But how about relations between states and their territories? Here comes the downside of state territorialism. The relations between sovereign states – international relations – are not regulated in anything like the same way as are relations between territorial administrations within each state individually. Of course there have been attempts to deal with this issue of how to manage international relations. The EU is one of the more insistent efforts to do so, going beyond the management of, in principle anarchic international relations. Coincidentally, the EU and its ambitions have led to European spatial planning initiatives, presently under the label of territorial cohesion (Dühr, Colomb & Nadin 2010; Faludi 2010). It is this EU project which seems in crisis, not to speak of European spatial planning which seems all but forgotten.

**Territorialism and the EU Crisis**

Referring to the euro crisis, German Defence Minister Ursula von der Leyen at a meeting of the Globsec Bratislava Global Security Forum in April 2016 admitted that, when introducing the euro “we didn’t have the heart to tell our people … that we’d have to build up new financial infrastructure and to partly give up national sovereignty where finance is concerned to the European level.” The same is true she said for Schengen and Dublin where serious implications had remained obscure. Regulating international relations affects state sovereignty. By implication it also affects state territorialism. Needless to say both implications are controversial. Voicing an opinion now frequently heard from national governments – though more so from some than of others – the Czech foreign minister at the same meeting articulated well-known concerns about relevant Commission proposals, saying: “We have to accept dissenting opinions…”

At issue is the very construct of the EU. The literature on the matter easily fills whole libraries. Basically it concerns how to deal with state sovereignty, and with it with state territorialism. It is assumed that the EU springs from member states voluntarily surrendering, as they may under international relations theory, specific sovereign controls to it. So the EU becomes a kind of functional authority. Alternatively, the EU itself may be seen as a state-like construct with a personality of its own, just like states are said to have personality. This takes state territoriality, too, to a higher level. Under this view, the EU is often portrayed as an emergent federation. A third line of argument is that the EU is something new, unheard of, sui generis, maybe a harbinger of the future. But this is not a popular view, neither with the ‘territorial-administrative complex’ (Faludi 2016a) pursuing its own interests in each and every member state, nor with a bewildered public looking for protection in a challenging world.

Introducing an ironic note, some authors compare the EU with the middle ages. The proposition had already been put forward by Jan Zielonka, Professor of European Studies at Oxford University, a Dutch and UK citizen of Polish extraction (Zielonka 2006). Even before the refugee crisis had hit to the full, he had published another short book, ‘Is the EU
Doomed? (Zielonka, 2014). It is discussed here because, obviously, the crisis relates to territorialism, but it also raises questions about what the Union is, or should be.

Not to mince words, the EU, Zielonka says, has become an embarrassment. It will survive, if at all, in weakened form, but interestingly he opines that this will not lead to strengthening the epitomes of territorialism, nation states. Rather, it will strengthen, for instance, cities, regions and non-governmental organisations, making state borders fuzzier and dividing loyalties even further. Administrative jurisdictions will overlap even more than now, supporting the case for viewing the EU as a neo-medieval empire. Instead of a pan-European government, there will thus be diverse and decentralised networks in areas such as transport, energy, migration, tourism and sport. Between them, these networks would get things done more effectively and efficiently, ensuring what Fritz Scharpf (1999) has identifies as output legitimacy to distinguish it from input legitimacy generated through democratic procedures, the latter implying an EU model of integration run by from a single centre.

For the current situation, Zielonka invokes Barbara Tuchman, quoted above, on the ‘march of folly’: the European Council generating events driving them to a place they shouldn't even visit, a place called disintegration. Indeed, any attempt to create a federation, however light, may prompt this development. The strategy should be the opposite, "creating more 'Europes' and not more Europe, meaning a single integrated continent." (Zielonka 2014, Page 48) More ‘Europes’ would be the proper response to a situation where sovereignty is jealously guarded.

Not that Zielonka would applaud strengthening sovereignty. It is meaningful only, he says, where state borders overlap with market transaction fringes, military frontiers and migration trails. In terms of animal behaviour referred to in the introduction, sovereignty – and the territorialism that goes with it – make sense only where people’s home range coincides with territory of the state of which they are citizens. Since this is no longer the case, relying on the resurgence of the nation state is not the answer. Instead, networks are and so are NGOs. Citizens will therefore have “ever-more multiple loyalties and associations and less trust in traditional communal hierarchies and values. Europe will look like a complicated puzzle without a clear institutional structure, legal order and ideological consensus.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 75)

In terms of the topic of this paper, territorialism, the misgivings are not about dealing with territory in any general sense of the word. The misgivings are about ‘absolutistic territorialism’. This is meant to say that, in principle, state territoriality allows for no compromise. Contrast this with academic theorising seeing spaces as constructed and reconstructed by actors ad-hoc, with outcomes depending on who is involved. (Faludi 2016b)

The Neo-medieval Alternative
So, instead of a return to a ‘Westphalian’ order, so called after the Peace of Westphalia concluded in 1648, an order commonly defined as being based on the recognition of state sovereignty, Zielonka foresees a new, medieval order. By this he does not mean a return to the middle ages. What it does mean is the exercise of authority resembling the medieval model: overlapping authorities, divided sovereignty, differentiated arrangements and multiple identities. In terms of the blatant territorialism implied in the Westphalian model relying on fixed and hard border lines, the future will bring the opposite: fuzzy borders. Rather than central redistribution, it will feature different types of solidarity. Rather than imposing rules, the future is one of bargaining, flexible arrangements and incentives.

Medievalism does not necessarily mean the death of the nation state but an increasing importance of other polities resulting in hybrid institutional arrangements and multiple political allegiances. "Even democracy is likely to be less territorial." (Zielonka 2014, Page 82)

The state-centred model of representative democracy is increasingly unpopular and non-state democratic representation on the rise. Invoking Saskia Sassen (1991), Zielonka sees agglomerations and ‘global cities’ filling the political and administrative vacuum left by the loss of power at national level. "Modern cities operate transnationally through a variety of trans-border networks, often ignoring traditional interstate diplomacy. Their inhabitants are also transnational.... They are actors from a different, super-modern universe..." (Zielonka 2014, Page 90) They sometimes work like the medieval Hanseatic League. Heading a team advising the then European Commissioner for regional policy, Danuta Hübner, Fabrizio Barca, too, put much faith, not only in large agglomerations, but all sorts of entities other than administrative territories as the carriers of, in his case, EU cohesion policy. As against this, established and democratically sanctioned elites are prone to become ‘rent-seeking’. (Barca 2009, Faludi 2016a). The very relationship between territory, authority and rights is likely to change. Will integration still be possible?

Indeed, for followers of Jean Monnet, Zielonka says, all this heralds the end of integration. Whether he is right to invoke Monnet as a witness is a moot point (see below). Anyhow, the crisis of integration may prove a blessing in disguise. States were not necessarily the best agents of integration. They tried to use the EU “for their own parochial ends without committing any significant resources to common endeavours.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 93)

It is worth looking into integration methods suitable for a neo-medieval environment. Zielonka refers to neofunctionalism associated with the classic work, predating as it did the EU, by David Matrany. Accordingly, the future is for interdependent and transnational polities involving multiple actors and not just states. “States are likely to take part... For instance, one can hardly imagine a network dealing with Europe's immigration or security without the participation of states. However, non-state actors should be allowed to play a meaningful role...” (Zielonka 2014, Page 95)

So, Zielonka envisages functional alongside territorial integration, in the terms of Hooghe and Marks (2010), multi-level governance Type II alongside Type I. “Governance in the
present-day EU is largely about constructing and maintaining the European centre of authority. The new vision of integration should emphasize problem-solving capacities, and this requires rules that are able to cope with a complex and ever-changing environment.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 97) All this leads him to conclude that “the EU may well be doomed, but this is not all bad news for European integration.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 101)

However, like banks, the EU may have become too big to fail. So Zielonka applauds that, like with the compartmentalisation of banks, there “are currently more than thirty European agencies and bodies spread across the entire continent...” (Zielonka 2014, Page 102) Interestingly, this also means capital functions being spread all over Europe (Hein 2004). Such agencies could, and should, be strengthened. So the EU would not be formally dissolved, but it would become less powerful, heralding, rather than the demise of integration its revival. “Europe's governance structure will not look like a pyramid, but like a 'junction box' with numerous points of interaction and intersection... [It] will embrace the basic principles of democracy – plurality and self-government. It will also embrace the basic principles of effective governance: functional coordination, territorial differentiation and flexibility.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 107)

Defenders of the status quo will complain about the lack of transparency which would result, a justified concern, Zielonka says, but networks will still be subject of the laws of the countries they operate in. Also, self-regulation is often more effective than central rule. The size and functional scope of a unit also matter. Power will be deconcentrated and, anyway, there are more ways of securing accountability. Networks are for instance subject to informal controls. Finally, it is easier to reform one network at a time than whole multi-purpose institutions. Referring to the bête noir of the British – the reader is reminded that he is also a British subject and teaching at Oxford, Zielonka adds:

“Abandoning the ambition of an ever-closer union ... may well require a "Copernican" revolution in our thinking about integration. However, upholding the status quo is not a viable option.” (Zielonka 2014, Page 113)

Spatial Planning in the Neo-medieval Empire

This paper is not about European integration in general but about European spatial planning. So this part discusses spatial planning in the neo-medieval empire where European space can no longer be seen through the lens of territorialism. Rather, it should be seen as comprising overlapping and intersecting areas, each requiring its own governance. In fact, European space itself cannot be conceived of as a fixed container but rather as the intersection between various spatial configurations. The implication for European planning, in fact for strategic planning generally, is to abandon the pursuit of spatially integrated policies. Instead, planning should be about producing parallel and overlapping schemes for the various territorial and functional spaces concerned. The planning that comes from this is
soft, with shifting constellations within boundaries that are also soft. This as against planning, as is the common view, being contained within fixed, judicial boundaries.

Indeed, in a paper discussing Thames Gateway heralding soft planning for soft spaces, Allmendinger and Haughton (2009, Page 619) refer to “an apparent predilection for promoting new policy scales, initially at least through the device of fuzzy boundaries”. This is definitely a trend. Soft spaces come in many shapes. There are so-called macro-regional strategies for the Baltic Sea Area, the Danube Area, the Adriatic and Ionian Sea Region and the Alpine Space with more being contemplated (European Parliament, 2015; Gänzle & Kern eds. 2016). In macro-regions, under the authority of the European Council, the European Commission coordinates relevant policies and brokers agreements for managing select policies. With no sharp boundaries, the spaces are soft. This requires no new EU legislation, money or institutions. Still, sociologists would say that, albeit informal institution-building comes into play. Conceivably, such informal institutionalisation might lead to more formal arrangements in future. Be that as it may, ad hoc formations are the objects also of cross-border and transnational planning. In fact, mainstream EU Cohesion policy often concerns areas criss-crossing administrative boundaries.

Political geography couches such discussions in terms of relative, or relational, and absolute space, with a fascination with the former. Seeking to come to interim conclusions, a 2013 issue of Regional Studies accepts the need, however, “to be aware of the persisting relevance of the territorial dimension of socio-spatial processes’ (Varró & Lagendijk 2013, Page 21). As another author says in the same issue, the relative and absolute view of space thus coexist. So one must expect “ever-more-complex configurations in order to make emergent strategies compatible with inherited landscapes of socio-political organization, and for new conceptual frameworks capable of theorizing the ‘inherently polymorphic and multi-dimensional’ nature of social relations”. (Harrison 2013, Pages 71-72) The same author alludes to the paper by Jessop, Paasi & Jones (2008) reviewing relevant discussions in geography. All this chimes well with what Healey (2010, Page 71) says about place governance: Places being mixed in with administrative areas result in “a tangle of complex relations and arenas, in which particular actors come together”.

The above has a bearing on spatial planning in the EU where it is being pursued under the guise of a somewhat mooted policy of promoting territorial cohesion. Because of the nature of the EU construct, nation-states and their territories are considered supreme, apparently making that construct, as Zielonka (2014) has been shown to believe, doomed to fail. The only – unrealistic – alternative to sustaining national sovereignty under theories of the state and of international relations seems a United States of Europe with its own territoriality. Now, although he did talk in terms of a United States of Europe, Monnet’s main concern was functional integration, hence the accolade of him as the first ‘statesman of interdependence’ (Duchêne 1994). Also, as pointed out, alternatives to conceptualising the EU in terms derived from the theory of the modern state exist. Zielonka apart, there is Roche perceiving it as a
‘socio-political UFO’. This of course reminds of Jacques Delors characterizing it famously as an ‘unknown political object’ (Ross 1995). Roche couches the discussion in terms more directly relevant to planning. Accordingly, the EU is a network society and a neo-imperial system. He notes also “the inadequacy of the 'super-state' and nation-state analogies” (Roche 2012, Pages 40-41).

EU policies addressing spatial configurations cross-cutting local, regional, and national boundaries, encouraging the areas and the stakeholders concerned to assume new identities create complexity. But Europe deserves better than being forced into the straightjacket of thinking exclusively in terms of states and of their territories as containers. Here, the learning experience of European spatial planning (Stead ed. 2011; Faludi 2014) may stand in good stead, but relevant debates cannot be initiated, let alone sustained, by planners alone. Having said this, planners have the, perhaps unique ability to create and invoke metaphors shaping thinking about European space in all its complexity.

Two metaphors may perhaps be helpful in this respect: Europe as an archipelago and Europe as a cloud. (Faludi 2016c) Europe as an archipelago comes down to seeing European space, rather than as a set of contiguous, fixed territories, as a group of islands in a sea of malleable functional territories, with wave patterns, as they commonly doe, re-modelling their shorelines incessantly. Planning, then, concerns the activities on the islands, more in particular whether the islanders succeed in integrating them. Importantly, it also and in particular concerns how well islanders manage their relations with the sea around them and the other islands, those that are close as well as those that are far behind the horizon.

Europe as a cloud refers to the fact that, far from European institutions fitting neatly into one overall box, the spaces they cover overlap, creating an apparently disorderly pattern. Thus, there is the European Economic Area; the Schengen Area including amongst other non-members of the EU Switzerland; the euro zone, but note that non-members Montenegro and Kosovo and mini-states not otherwise involved like the Vatican also use the euro. There are the Cooperation Areas also under INTERREG, some of them overlapping so that certain parts of the EU, regions in Austria and Scotland amongst them participate in two or more such programmes. Also, Cooperation Areas are frequently transcending the EU’s external borders. There are also the macro-regions, already mentioned, which do the same: overlapping the external borders of the EU. And there is the Mediterranean Union, now largely defunct, of which all 28 EU members states are members alongside with the lateral states of the Mediterranean.

Whether viewing the EU as an archipelago or a cloud, the calling of planning is conceptualising spatial or territorial relations. This requires formulating non-binding strategic spatial visions. The purpose should be to help coping with the interrelations between the constitutive elements of the EU and, since the EU is not a finished product, to prepare for change.
Indeed, just as clouds change their shapes, so with the EU: It is, and remains, in flux. Planning might smoothen the process. This view of planning might be disturbing, as Zielonka’s neo-medieval vision of Europe is. It stretches our imagination and ability to cope. But, then, the challenges which Europe faces may do the same.

**Concluding Comments**

As the great philosopher Sir Bertrand Russel has written, apparently referring to advances in modern physics:

“I think the universe is all spots and jumps, without unity, without continuity, without coherence and orderliness or any other properties that governesses love. Indeed, there is little but prejudice and habit to be said for the view that there is a world at all. Physicians have recently advanced opinions which should have led them to agree with the foregoing remarks; but they have been so pained by the conclusions to which logic would have led them that they have been abandoning logic for theology in shoals.” (Russel 1949, Pages 98-99)

Planners should not allow themselves to be accused of the same weakness of character. They should face the truth that the world is not, and does not lend itself to, being ordered once and for all. It is “all spots and jumps”, as Russel has been quoted as saying. Planners should cope with this confusing world without the illusion of being able to finally bring it to heel. Like social scientists who, according to Popper, should drop the illusion of historical development being an object that they might be able to grasp in all its complexity and whose course they could predict and help steering, planners should do away with territorialism. The image of a well-ordered world of boxes stacked into boxes, presumably until the globe, too, is safely cocooned in one super box is an illusion, and an inhumane one to boot. It puts the box, in particular that of the nation-state, above the human being. Yes, human beings need nests into which to withdraw, but they should be able to freely choose their home range where they go to work, seek entertainment and recreation and, yes, find their mates. The one million of babies purportedly born to parents who have met, not in the cosiness of their home state but on an adventurous study beyond the confines of their own territory under the EU’s Erasmus programme are harbingers of the future.

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