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Harrenstein, B.P. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Conitzer, V. (author)
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. These results, however, are limited to settings where there is some commonly desired commodity or numeraire|money, shells, beads, etcetera...
conference paper 2009
document
Harrenstein, P. (author), Máhr, T. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
The negative conclusions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem|that only dictatorial social choice functions are non-manipulable|can be overcome by restricting the class of admissible preference profiles. A common approach is to assume that the preferences of the agents can be represented by quasilinear utility functions. This restriction allows...
conference paper 2008