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Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
Some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose...
conference paper 2009
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
The main question addressed in this paper is whether a theoretical outcome determined by an auction mechanism can be reasonably approximated by negotiation among agents in order to drop some of the unrealistic constraints or assumptions presupposed by the mechanism. In particular, we are interested in whether the assumption that a buyer publicly...
conference paper 2008
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author)
In this paper, we show that it is nonetheless possible to construct an opponent model, i.e. a model of the opponent’s preferences that can be effectively used to improve negotiation outcomes. We provide a generic framework for learning both the preferences associated with issue values as well as the weights that rank the importance of issues to...
conference paper 2008