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Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that additional constraints are met which are not always easy to guarantee in practice. It...
book chapter 2010
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
When there is one buyer interested in obtaining a service from one of a set of sellers, multi-attribute or multi-issue auctions can ensure an allocation that is efficient. Even when there is no transferable utility (e.g., money), a recent qualitative version of the Vickrey auction may be used, the QVA, to obtain a Pareto-efficient outcome where...
journal article 2010
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
Some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally require that the preferences of at least one side of the auction are publicly known. However, sometimes it is very costly, impossible, or undesirable to publicly announce such preferences. It thus is interesting to find methods that do not impose...
conference paper 2009
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
The main question addressed in this paper is whether a theoretical outcome determined by an auction mechanism can be reasonably approximated by negotiation among agents in order to drop some of the unrealistic constraints or assumptions presupposed by the mechanism. In particular, we are interested in whether the assumption that a buyer publicly...
conference paper 2008
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