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Máhr, T. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an issue, or where it is difficult to express the utility of all participants in a monetary domain. We propose a modified Vickrey auction based only on preferences over the...
book chapter 2007
document
Stranders, R. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Witteveen, C. (author)
In an open Multi-Agent System, the goals of agents acting on behalf of their owners often conflict with each other. Therefore, a personal agent protecting the interest of a single user cannot always rely on them. Consequently, such a personal agent needs to be able to reason about trusting (information or services provided by) other agents....
book chapter 2008
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Wu, M. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author), La Poutré, H. (author)
In this paper, we present an automated multi-agent multi-issue negotiation solution to solve a resource allocation problem. We use a multilateral negotiation model, by which three agents bid sequentially in consecutive rounds till some deadline. Two issues are bundled and negotiated concurrently, so win-win opportunities can be generated as...
book chapter 2009
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Grootenboers, F. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Zargayouna, M. (author)
Demand responsive transportation has the potential to provide efficient public door-to-door transport with a high quality. In currently implemented systems in the Netherlands, however, we observe a decrease in the quality of service (QoS), expressed in longer travel times for the customers. Currently, generally one transport company is...
book chapter 2010
document
De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Zhang, Y. (author)
In games where agents are asked to declare their available resources, they can also strategize over this declaration. Surprisingly, not in all such games a VCG payment can be applied to construct a truthful mechanism using an optimal algorithm, though such payments can prevent under-reporting of resources. We show this for the problem of...
book chapter 2010
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Zutt, J. (author), Van Gemund, A.J.C. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Witteveen, C. (author)
An important problem in transportation is how to ensure efficient operational route planning when several vehicles share a common road infrastructure with limited capacity. Examples of such a problem are route planning for automated guided vehicles in a terminal and route planning for aircraft taxiing at airports. Maintaining efficiency in such...
book chapter 2010
document
Jalilzadeh, B. (author), Planken, L. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
We consider online mechanism design without money, where agents are allowed to trade items with other agents, in an attempt to improve their own allocation. In an off-line context, this problem is known as the House Allocation Problem (HAP). We extend HAP to an online problem and call it the Online House Allocation Problem (OHAP). In OHAP,...
book chapter 2010
document
Hindriks, K.V. (author), Tykhonov, D. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
A result of Bulow and Klemperer has suggested that auctions may be a better tool to obtain an efficient outcome than negotiation. For example, some auction mechanisms can be shown to be efficient and strategy-proof. However, they generally also require that additional constraints are met which are not always easy to guarantee in practice. It...
book chapter 2010
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