Searched for: author%3A%22Harrenstein%2C+P.%22
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document
De Weerdt, M.M. (author), Harrenstein, P. (author), Conitzer, V. (author)
A contract auction establishes a contract between a center and one of the bidders. As contracts may describe many terms, preferences over contracts typically display indifferences. The Qualitative Vickrey Auction (QVA) selects the best contract for the winner that is at least as good for the center as any of the contracts offered by the non...
journal article 2011
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Harrenstein, P. (author), Máhr, T. (author), De Weerdt, M.M. (author)
The negative conclusions of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem|that only dictatorial social choice functions are non-manipulable|can be overcome by restricting the class of admissible preference profiles. A common approach is to assume that the preferences of the agents can be represented by quasilinear utility functions. This restriction allows...
conference paper 2008