On Game-Theoretic Planning with Unknown Opponents' Objectives

Many autonomous navigation tasks require mobile robots to operate in dynamic environments involving interactions between agents. Developing interaction-aware motion planning algorithms that enable safe and intelligent interactions remains challenging. Dynamic game theory renders a powerful mathematical framework to model these interactions...

Online and offline learning of player objectives from partial observations in dynamic games

Robots deployed to the real world must be able to interact with other agents in their environment. Dynamic game theory provides a powerful mathematical framework for modeling scenarios in which agents have individual objectives and interactions evolve over time. However, a key limitation of such techniques is that they require a priori...

Cost Inference for Feedback Dynamic Games from Noisy Partial State Observations and Incomplete Trajectories

In multi-agent dynamic games, the Nash equilibrium state trajectory of each agent is determined by its cost function and the information pattern of the game. However, the cost and trajectory of each agent may be unavailable to the other agents. Prior work on using partial observations to infer the costs in dynamic games assumes an open-loop...

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff...

A robust saturated strategy for n-player prisoner's dilemma

We study diffusion of cooperation in an n-population game in continuous time. At each instant, the game involves n random individuals, one from each population. The game has the structure of a prisoner's dilemma, where each player can choose a continuous decision variable associated with the probability of cooperating or defecting. We turn...

Time aspects in games and in optimal control