The popularity of blockchain technology has bootstrapped many “Web3” applications, e.g., Ethereum and IPFS, that apply distributed ledger technology to store transactions. The amount of transactions generated and stored in such Web3 applications is significant and, in its raw form, usually not searchable by users. Existing Web3 transaction indexing and search engines are predominantly centralized and, therefore, can manipulate search results or censor particular queries. With the proliferation of Web3 transactions and applications, a decentralized and censorship-resistant search primitive is becoming essential. We present DESCAN, a decentralized and censorship-resistant indexing and search engine for Web3. Users index their local Web3 transactions using custom rules that output triplets. Generated triplets are bundled in a distributed transaction graph that is searchable by other users. To coordinate search and distribute the storage of the transaction graph over peers in the network, we build upon a Skip Graph (SG) data structure. Since the Skip Graph does not provide any resilience against adversarial peers that censor searches, we propose four modifications to improve its robustness. We implement DESCAN and conduct experiments with up to 12 800 peers and 10 million Ethereum transactions. Our experiments show that DESCAN with our modifications enabled can tolerate 20% adversarial peers and 35% unresponsive peers without disruption. Moreover, we find that searches in DESCAN are usually completed well within a second, even when the network grows. Finally, we show that storage and network costs are evenly distributed amongst peers as the network grows.

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Decentralized storage networks offer services with intriguing possibilities to reduce inequalities in an extremely centralized market. Fair distribution of rewards, however, is still a persistent problem in the current generation of decentralized applications using token-based incentives. They are often disproportionally concentrated with small number of early adopters and high-resourced participants. Incentive mechanisms capable of addressing this problem are still poorly understood. This paper aims to help fill this gap by developing our Tit-forToken (Tit4Tok) model. Tit4Tok realizes incentives based on the triad of altruism (selfless behavior), reciprocity (Tit-for-Tat), and monetary rewards compatible with a free market. Tit4Tok analyzes the effects of storage-, and network-parameters fine-tuning to achieve fair distribution of rewards for participants. We present a comprehensive exploration of different factors when incentivized peers share bandwidth in a libp2p-based network, including uneven distributions emerging when gateways provide data to users outside the network. We quantified the Income-Fairness with the Gini coefficient, using multiple model instantiations and diverse approaches for debt cancellation. We propose regular changes to the gateway neighborhood and show that our shuffling method improves the Income-Fairness from 0.66 to 0.16. We quantified the non-negligible cost of tolerating free-riding (altruism). The performance is evaluated by extensive computer simulations and using an IPFS workload to study the effects of caching.@en

Catalyzed by the popularity of blockchain technology, there has recently been a renewed interest in the design, implementation and evaluation of decentralized systems. Most of these systems are intended to be deployed at scale and in heterogeneous environments with real users and unpredictable workloads. Nevertheless, most research in this field evaluates such systems in controlled environments that poorly reflect the complex conditions of real-world environments. In this work, we argue that deployment is crucial to understanding decentralized mechanisms in a real-world environment and an enabler to building more robust and sustainable systems. We highlight the merits of deployment by comparing this approach with other experimental setups and show how our lab applied a deployment-first methodology. We then outline how we use Tribler, our peer-to-peer file-sharing application, to deploy and monitor decentralized mechanisms at scale. We illustrate the application of our methodology by describing a deployment trial in experimental tokenomics. Finally, we summarize four lessons learned from multiple deployment trials where we applied our methodology.@en

Manipulation of user transactions by miners in permissionless blockchain systems is a growing concern. This problem is a pervasive and systemic issue that incurs high costs for users of decentralised applications and is known as Miner Extractable Value (MEV). Furthermore, transaction manipulations create other issues such as congestion, higher fees, and system instability. Detecting transaction manipulations is difficult, even though it is known that they originate from the pre-consensus phase of transaction selection for building blocks, at the base layer of blockchain protocols. In this paper, we summarize known transaction manipulation attacks. We present LO, an accountable base layer protocol designed to detect and mitigate transaction manipulations. LO is built around the accurate detection of transaction manipulations and assignment of blame at the granularity of a single mining node. LO forces miners to log all the transactions they receive into a secure mempool data structure and to process them in a verifiable manner. Overall, LO quickly and efficiently detects censorship, injection or re-ordering attempts. Our performance evaluation shows that LO is also practical and only introduces a marginal performance overhead.

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The costs of the COVID-19 pandemic are yet to be calculated, but they include the loss of millions of lives and the destruction of countless livelihoods. What is certain is that the SARS-CoV-2 virus has changed the way we live for the foreseeable future. It has forced many to live in ways they would have previously thought impossible. As well as challenging scientists and medical professionals to address urgent value conflicts in the short term, COVID-19 has raised slower-burning value questions for corporations, public institutions, governments, and policymakers. In simple terms, the pandemic has brought what we care about into sharp relief, both collectively and individually. Whether this revaluation of our values will last beyond the current pandemic is unknown. Once COVID-19 has been tamed, will the desire to return to our previous lives be irresistible? Or will living under pandemic conditions have taught us something that will be incorporated into how we design our future lives and technologies? These are hard questions for the ethics of technology, which this volume aims to explore and address.@en

The landscape of electronic marketplaces has been monopolized by a handful of market operators that have accumulated tremendous power during the last decades. This trend raises concerns about fairness and market manipulation by these operators acting as gatekeepers. These concerns have recently been outlined in the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA). In this work, we highlight how technological logic of separation understood in the framework of decentralization can address manipulation concerns. As a first step, we devise a reference model of electronic marketplaces, containing six functional components, and outline how control over these components enables different manipulative practices by gatekeepers. We identify two dimensions of decentralization that can counterbalance monopolistic abuse of marketplace components. We then present a software implementation of our reference model and demonstrate how decentralization and unbundling of market components can alleviate manipulation and fairness concerns. We end our work with a review of related approaches and conclude that modular and interoperable marketplaces can enable an open ecosystem of fair electronic markets envisioned by the DMA.

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Decentralized reputation schemes present a promising area of experimentation in blockchain applications. These solutions aim to overcome the shortcomings of simple monetary incentive mechanisms of naive tokenomics. However, there is a significant research gap regarding the limitations and benefits of such solutions. We formulate these trade-offs as a conjecture on the irreconcilability of three desirable properties of the reputation system in this context. Such a system can not be simultaneously generalizable, trustless, and Sybil resistant. To handle the limitations of this trilemma, we propose MeritRank: Sybil tolerant feedback aggregation mechanism for reputation. Instead of preventing Sybil attacks, our approach successfully bounds the benefits of these attacks. Using a dataset of participants’ interactions in MakerDAO, we run experiments to demonstrate Sybil tolerance of MeritRank. Decay parameters of reputation in MeritRank: transitivity decay and connectivity decay, allow for a fine-tuning of desirable levels of reputation utility and Sybil tolerance in different use contexts.@en

The growing number of implementations of blockchain systems stands in stark contrast with still limited research on a systematic comparison of performance characteristics of these solutions. Such research is crucial for evaluating fundamental trade-offs introduced by novel consensus protocols and their implementations. These performance limitations are commonly analyzed with ad-hoc benchmarking frameworks focused on the consensus algorithm of blockchain systems. However, comparative evaluations of design choices require macro-benchmarks for uniform and comprehensive performance evaluations of blockchains at the system level rather than performance metrics of isolated components. To address this research gap, we implement Gromit, a generic framework for analyzing blockchain systems. Gromit treats each system under test as a transaction fabric where clients issue transactions to validators. We use Gromit to conduct the largest blockchain study to date, involving seven representative systems with varying consensus models. We determine the peak performance of these systems with a synthetic workload in terms of transaction throughput and scalability and show that transaction throughput does not scale with the number of validators. We explore how robust the subjected systems are against network delays and reveal that the performance of permissoned blockchain is highly sensitive to network conditions.@en

Existing digital identity management systems fail to deliver the desirable properties of control by the users of their own identity data, credibility of disclosed identity data, and network-level anonymity. The recently proposed Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) approach promises to give users these properties. However, we argue that without addressing privacy at the network level, SSI systems cannot deliver on this promise. In this paper we present the design and analysis of our solution TCID, created in collaboration with the Dutch government. TCID is a system consisting of a set of components that together satisfy seven functional requirements to guarantee the desirable system properties. We show that the latency incurred by network-level anonymization in TCID is significantly larger than that of identity data disclosure protocols but is still low enough for practical situations. We conclude that current research on SSI is too narrowly focused on these data disclosure protocols.@en

In this paper, we explore solution directions for the implementation of Safe by Design (SbD) in safety regimes for academic experimentation. SbD is a dynamic and anticipatory strategy for safety regulation in academic research. In this strategy, safety is taken in a broader sense including not only issues of technical precaution of avoiding risks of experimentation but also the societal responsibility of researchers and research institutes of identifying possible future risks. In our research, we have interviewed academic researchers from different disciplines and university support personnel about the factors that enable and limit the possibilities of researchers to implement SbD in safety regimes for experimentation. We articulate our findings in terms of a core set of research values and in terms of conflicts between safety and these research values. And we argue that tools for resolving value conflicts as originating in design for values research can provide directions to solve the value conflicts, and thus help academic researchers to adopt SbD in their experimentation.

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Self-sovereign identity (SSI) solutions implemented on the basis of blockchain technology are seen as alternatives to existing digital identification systems, or even as a foundation of standards for the new global infrastructures for identity management systems. It is argued that ‘self-sovereignty' in this context can be understood as the concept of individual control over identity relevant private data, capacity to choose where such data is stored, and the ability to provide it to those who need to validate it. It is also argued that while it might be appealing to operationalise the concept of ‘self-sovereignty’ in a narrow technical sense, depreciation of moral semantics obscures key challenges and long-term repercussions. Closer attention to the normative substance of the ‘sovereignty’ concept helps to highlight a range of ethical issues pertaining to the changing nature of human identity in the context of ubiquitous private data collection.

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Matchmaking is a core enabling element in peer-to-peer markets. To date, matchmaking is predominantly performed by proprietary algorithms, fully controlled by market operators. This raises fairness concerns as market operators effectively can hide, prioritize, or delay the orders of specific users. Blockchain technology has been proposed as an alternative for fair matchmaking without a trusted operator but is still vulnerable to specific fairness attacks.
We present MATCH, a decentralized middleware for fair matchmaking in peer-to-peer markets. By decoupling the dissemination of potential matches from the negotiation of trade agreements, MATCH empowers end-users to make their own educated decisions and to engage in direct negotiations with trade partners. This approach makes MATCH highly resilient against malicious matchmakers that deviate from a specific matching policy We implement MATCH and evaluate our middleware using real-world ride-hailing and asset trading workloads. It is demonstrated that MATCH maintains high matching quality, even when 75% of all matchmakers is malicious. We also show that the bandwidth usage and order fulfil latency of MATCH is orders of magnitude lower compared to matchmaking on an Ethereum blockchain.@en

This paper looks at the development of blockchain technologies that promise to bring new tools for the management of private data, providing enhanced security and privacy to individuals. Particular interest presents solutions aimed at reorganizing data flows in the Internet of Things (IoT) architectures, enabling the secure and decentralized exchange of data between network participants. However, as this paper argues, the promised benefits are counterbalanced by a significant shift towards the propertization of private data, underlying these proposals. Considering the unique capacity of blockchain technology applications to imitate and even replace traditional institutions, this aspect may present certain challenges, both of technical and ethical character. In order to highlight these challenges and associated concerns, this paper identifies the underlying techno-economic factors and normative assumptions defining the development of these solutions amounting to technologically enabled propertization. It is argued that without careful consideration of a wider impact, such blockchain applications could have effects opposite to the intended ones, thus contributing to the erosion of privacy for IoT users.

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New network technologies are framed as eliminating ‘transaction costs’, a notion first developed in economic theory that now drives the design of market systems. However, the actual promise of the elimination of transaction costs seems unfeasible, because of a cyclical pattern in which network technologies that make that promise create processes of institutionalization that create new forms transaction costs. Nonetheless, the promises legitimize the exemption of innovations of network technologies from critical scrutiny.

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The moral significance of blockchain technologies is a highly debated and polarised topic, ranging from accusations that cryptocurrencies are tools serving only nefarious purposes such as cybercrime and money laundering, to the assessment of blockchain technology as an enabler for revolutionary positive social transformations of all kinds. Such technological determinism, however, hardly provides insights of sufficient depth on the moral significance of blockchain technology. This thesis argues rather, that very much like the cryptographic tools before them, blockchains develop in a constant feedback loop. Blockchain applications are driven by values, normative assumptions, and personal commitments of researchers, which shape moral effects of technology. At the same time these very assumption are often embedded in preexisting moral conception and ethical theories, implicitly or explicitly accepted by blockchain developers. And just as the introduction of one flawed element in the cryptographic application can have mass scale effects, the introduction of flawed normative assumptions can have far reaching consequences in blockchain applications. @en

This chapter argues that the choice of trust conceptualisations in the context of consumer Internet of Things (IoT) can have a significant impact on the understanding and implementations of a user’s private data protection. Narrow instrumental interpretations of trust as a mere precondition for technology acceptance may obscure important moral issues such as malleability of user’s privacy decisions, and power imbalances between suppliers and consumers of technology. A shift of focus in policy proposals from trust to the trustworthiness of technology can be the first step on the way to addressing these moral concerns. It is argued that complexity of IoT systems, comprised of technological artefacts and institutional data-collecting entities, warrants the moral value of distrust as a prima facie assumption for technological design and regulatory measures. Such a conceptual perspective highlights importance of technological measures that can minimise reliance on trust in consumer IoTs and regulatory measures aimed to improve transparency of IoT architectures. @en

This paper argues that the practical implementation of blockchain technology can be considered an institution of property similar to legal institutions. Invoking Penner's theory of property and Hegel's system of property rights, and using the example of bitcoin, it is possible to demonstrate that blockchain effectively implements all necessary and sufficient criteria for property without reliance on legal means. Blockchains eliminate the need for a third-party authority to enforce exclusion rights, and provide a system of universal access to knowledge and discoverability about the property rights of all participants and how the system functions. The implications of these findings are that traditional property relations in society could be replaced by or supplemented with blockchain models, and implemented in new domains.

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