Exoskeletons are technologies that can help to increase or improve mobility, dexterity, and strength. They can be used as assistive devices, to restore lost affordances, or for rehabilitation. While mechanical exoskeletons are passive and rely on the body's power for movement, powered exoskeletons are active mechanical systems that can assist or enhance a user's capacity, including in strength and performance. They also offer scope to augment or enhance beyond simple medical support, with potential in the future for superhuman power and strength. While these technologies present promising clinical opportunities, including for those who want to regain walking capacity, they also bring ethical questions, such as about data privacy and accessibility. In addition, the physical features of the technology can prove mentally, physically, and financially demanding, and may be deployed in contexts where user choice and autonomy is constrained. In this article, we discuss these issues, and raise some pertinent ethical questions, not all of which can be easily answered. We touch upon medical and therapeutic uses, for industrial and workplace settings, and in military contexts specially, given these are contexts where such technology may be required or even imposed. We argue that reasonable optimism for such technologies needs to be tempered by sufficient ethical assessment to identify and address barriers to research, development, and use. As well as managing any impacts and expectations for the health and wellbeing of users, the potential impact on autonomy and the risk of coercion, we have to consider what kind of data may be recorded or used, and the risk that these technologies could exacerbate existing inequalities or harms.

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Exoskeletons are technologies that can help to increase or improve mobility, dexterity, and strength. They can be used as assistive devices, to restore lost affordances, or for rehabilitation. While mechanical exoskeletons are passive and rely on the body's power for movement, powered exoskeletons are active mechanical systems that can assist or enhance a user's capacity, including in strength and performance. They also offer scope to augment or enhance beyond simple medical support, with potential in the future for superhuman power and strength. While these technologies present promising clinical opportunities, including for those who want to regain walking capacity, they also bring ethical questions, such as about data privacy and accessibility. In addition, the physical features of the technology can prove mentally, physically, and financially demanding, and may be deployed in contexts where user choice and autonomy is constrained. In this article, we discuss these issues, and raise some pertinent ethical questions, not all of which can be easily answered. We touch upon medical and therapeutic uses, for industrial and workplace settings, and in military contexts specially, given these are contexts where such technology may be required or even imposed. We argue that reasonable optimism for such technologies needs to be tempered by sufficient ethical assessment to identify and address barriers to research, development, and use. As well as managing any impacts and expectations for the health and wellbeing of users, the potential impact on autonomy and the risk of coercion, we have to consider what kind of data may be recorded or used, and the risk that these technologies could exacerbate existing inequalities or harms.

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This paper asks what sorts of ethical caution ought to attach to increasingly data-driven approaches to understanding the brain. This is taken to be an important question especially owing to a likely near future of neuromonitoring and neuromodulation devices with applications in psychiatry. The paper explores this by i) sketching the concept of ‘digital twin,’ ii) drawing a schematic picture of ‘brain datafication’ in general, and iii) developing a means of understanding some challenges present in datafication through the lens of digital twins. One central concern arises from the role algorithmic processing of neural recordings plays in terms of neuroscientific objectivity, with knock on effects for psychiatric ethics. Essentially, this is owing to a way in which algorithmic processing in brain data construction appears to be deductive in character, but is in fact based on a particular scheme of inductive inference. The challenges explored urge ethical caution as they concern epistemological gaps in data-centered neuroscientific progress, as well as knock-on effects for psychiatry.

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This paper examines the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD, hereafter autism). In so doing we examine some problems in existing diagnostic processes and criteria, including issues of bias and interpretation, and on concepts like the ‘double empathy problem’. We then consider how novel applications of AI might contribute to these contexts. We're focussed specifically on adult diagnostic procedures as childhood diagnosis is already well covered in the literature.

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This paper examines the use of artificial intelligence (AI) for the diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder (ASD, hereafter autism). In so doing we examine some problems in existing diagnostic processes and criteria, including issues of bias and interpretation, and on concepts like the ‘double empathy problem’. We then consider how novel applications of AI might contribute to these contexts. We're focussed specifically on adult diagnostic procedures as childhood diagnosis is already well covered in the literature.

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The ongoing COVID-19 emergency clearly presents novel challenges, both in terms of difficulties for maintaining public health and in assuring that governmental responses are ethically sound. Centrally, responses must respect, as best as possible, fundamental human rights and human values. Conflicts among values arise in response to the crisis, and public officials have no choice but to prioritize some while sacrificing others. Utilizing the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy within the framework of post-normal science (PNS), we investigate and recommend processes and measures to address COVID-19 that support increased public health, while upholding established rights and values. The effectiveness and legitimacy of science-led policymaking requires investigation of how that policy ought to be made (e.g. concepts of policymaking and PNS), as well as how it ought to interact with diversely-constituted publics (e.g. public inclusion in policymaking and policy communication).@en

The ongoing COVID-19 emergency clearly presents novel challenges, both in terms of difficulties for maintaining public health and in assuring that governmental responses are ethically sound. Centrally, responses must respect, as best as possible, fundamental human rights and human values. Conflicts among values arise in response to the crisis, and public officials have no choice but to prioritize some while sacrificing others. Utilizing the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy within the framework of post-normal science (PNS), we investigate and recommend processes and measures to address COVID-19 that support increased public health, while upholding established rights and values. The effectiveness and legitimacy of science-led policymaking requires investigation of how that policy ought to be made (e.g. concepts of policymaking and PNS), as well as how it ought to interact with diversely-constituted publics (e.g. public inclusion in policymaking and policy communication).@en

The ongoing COVID-19 emergency clearly presents novel challenges, both in terms of difficulties for maintaining public health and in assuring that governmental responses are ethically sound. Centrally, responses must respect, as best as possible, fundamental human rights and human values. Conflicts among values arise in response to the crisis, and public officials have no choice but to prioritize some while sacrificing others. Utilizing the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy within the framework of post-normal science (PNS), we investigate and recommend processes and measures to address COVID-19 that support increased public health, while upholding established rights and values. The effectiveness and legitimacy of science-led policymaking requires investigation of how that policy ought to be made (e.g. concepts of policymaking and PNS), as well as how it ought to interact with diversely-constituted publics (e.g. public inclusion in policymaking and policy communication).@en

The ongoing COVID-19 emergency clearly presents novel challenges, both in terms of difficulties for maintaining public health and in assuring that governmental responses are ethically sound. Centrally, responses must respect, as best as possible, fundamental human rights and human values. Conflicts among values arise in response to the crisis, and public officials have no choice but to prioritize some while sacrificing others. Utilizing the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy within the framework of post-normal science (PNS), we investigate and recommend processes and measures to address COVID-19 that support increased public health, while upholding established rights and values. The effectiveness and legitimacy of science-led policymaking requires investigation of how that policy ought to be made (e.g. concepts of policymaking and PNS), as well as how it ought to interact with diversely-constituted publics (e.g. public inclusion in policymaking and policy communication).@en

The ongoing COVID-19 emergency clearly presents novel challenges, both in terms of difficulties for maintaining public health and in assuring that governmental responses are ethically sound. Centrally, responses must respect, as best as possible, fundamental human rights and human values. Conflicts among values arise in response to the crisis, and public officials have no choice but to prioritize some while sacrificing others. Utilizing the concepts of effectiveness and legitimacy within the framework of post-normal science (PNS), we investigate and recommend processes and measures to address COVID-19 that support increased public health, while upholding established rights and values. The effectiveness and legitimacy of science-led policymaking requires investigation of how that policy ought to be made (e.g. concepts of policymaking and PNS), as well as how it ought to interact with diversely-constituted publics (e.g. public inclusion in policymaking and policy communication).@en

Technologies controlled directly by the brain are being developed, evolving based on insights gained from neuroscience, and rehabilitative medicine. Besides neuro-controlled prosthetics aimed at restoring function lost somehow, technologies controlled via brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) may also extend a user’s horizon of action, freed from the need for bodily movement. Whilst BCI-mediated action ought to be, on the whole, treated as conventional action, law and policy ought to be amended to accommodate BCI action by broadening the definition of action as “willed bodily movement”. Moreover, there are some dimensions of BCI mediated action that are significantly different to conventional cases. These relate to control. Specifically, to limits in both controllability of BCIs via neural states, and in foreseeability of outcomes from such actions. In some specific type of case, BCI-mediated action may be due to different ethical evaluation from conventional action.@en

Technologies controlled directly by the brain are being developed, evolving based on insights gained from neuroscience, and rehabilitative medicine. Besides neuro-controlled prosthetics aimed at restoring function lost somehow, technologies controlled via brain-computer interfaces (BCIs) may also extend a user’s horizon of action, freed from the need for bodily movement. Whilst BCI-mediated action ought to be, on the whole, treated as conventional action, law and policy ought to be amended to accommodate BCI action by broadening the definition of action as “willed bodily movement”. Moreover, there are some dimensions of BCI mediated action that are significantly different to conventional cases. These relate to control. Specifically, to limits in both controllability of BCIs via neural states, and in foreseeability of outcomes from such actions. In some specific type of case, BCI-mediated action may be due to different ethical evaluation from conventional action.@en

Neuroprosthetic speech devices are an emerging technology that can offer the possibility of communication to those who are unable to speak. Patients with 'locked in syndrome,' aphasia, or other such pathologies can use covert speech-vividly imagining saying something without actual vocalization-to trigger neural controlled systems capable of synthesizing the speech they would have spoken, but for their impairment. We provide an analysis of the mechanisms and outputs involved in speech mediated by neuroprosthetic devices. This analysis provides a framework for accounting for the ethical significance of accuracy, control, and pragmatic dimensions of prosthesis-mediated speech. We first examine what it means for the output of the device to be accurate, drawing a distinction between technical accuracy on the one hand and semantic accuracy on the other. These are conceptual notions of accuracy. Both technical and semantic accuracy of the device will be necessary (but not yet sufficient) for the user to have sufficient control over the device. Sufficient control is an ethical consideration: we place high value on being able to express ourselves when we want and how we want. Sufficient control of a neural speech prosthesis requires that a speaker can reliably use their speech apparatus as they want to, and can expect their speech to authentically represent them. We draw a distinction between two relevant features which bear on the question of whether the user has sufficient control: voluntariness of the speech and the authenticity of the speech. These can come apart: the user might involuntarily produce an authentic output (perhaps revealing private thoughts) or might voluntarily produce an inauthentic output (e.g., when the output is not semantically accurate). Finally, we consider the role of the interlocutor in interpreting the content and purpose of the communication. These three ethical dimensions raise philosophical questions about the nature of speech, the level of control required for communicative accuracy, and the nature of 'accuracy' with respect to both natural and prosthesis-mediated speech.@en

Neuroprosthetic speech devices are an emerging technology that can offer the possibility of communication to those who are unable to speak. Patients with 'locked in syndrome,' aphasia, or other such pathologies can use covert speech-vividly imagining saying something without actual vocalization-to trigger neural controlled systems capable of synthesizing the speech they would have spoken, but for their impairment. We provide an analysis of the mechanisms and outputs involved in speech mediated by neuroprosthetic devices. This analysis provides a framework for accounting for the ethical significance of accuracy, control, and pragmatic dimensions of prosthesis-mediated speech. We first examine what it means for the output of the device to be accurate, drawing a distinction between technical accuracy on the one hand and semantic accuracy on the other. These are conceptual notions of accuracy. Both technical and semantic accuracy of the device will be necessary (but not yet sufficient) for the user to have sufficient control over the device. Sufficient control is an ethical consideration: we place high value on being able to express ourselves when we want and how we want. Sufficient control of a neural speech prosthesis requires that a speaker can reliably use their speech apparatus as they want to, and can expect their speech to authentically represent them. We draw a distinction between two relevant features which bear on the question of whether the user has sufficient control: voluntariness of the speech and the authenticity of the speech. These can come apart: the user might involuntarily produce an authentic output (perhaps revealing private thoughts) or might voluntarily produce an inauthentic output (e.g., when the output is not semantically accurate). Finally, we consider the role of the interlocutor in interpreting the content and purpose of the communication. These three ethical dimensions raise philosophical questions about the nature of speech, the level of control required for communicative accuracy, and the nature of 'accuracy' with respect to both natural and prosthesis-mediated speech.@en

This paper addresses the question of managing the existential risk potential of general Artificial Intelligence (AI), as well as the more near-term yet hazardous and disruptive implications of specialised AI, from the perspective of a particular research project that could make a significant contribution to the development of Artificial Intelligence (AI): the Human Brain Project (HBP), a ten-year Future and Emerging Technologies Flagship of the European Commission. The HBP aims to create a digital research infrastructure for brain science, cognitive neuroscience, and brain-inspired computing. This paper builds on work undertaken in the HBP's Ethics and Society subproject (SP12). Collaborators from two activities in SP12, Foresight and Researcher Awareness on the one hand, and Ethics Management on the other, use the case of machine intelligence to illustrate key aspects of the dynamic processes through which questions of ethics and society, including existential risks, are approached in the organisational context of the HBP. The overall aim of the paper is to provide practice-based evidence, enriched by self-reflexive assessment of the approach used and its limitations, for guiding policy makers and communities who are, and will be, engaging with such questions.@en

This article explores literatures from various sources to highlight and understand differences among key players surrounding the perceived nature and role of civil society in research from different literature streams. Including Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in research activities is an integral part of a broad drive towards integration of science and society. Interest in CSO inclusion in research is widespread, but lacks a coherent focus and clarity on what CSOs are. Without this clarity, CSO-inclusive research, or policy, may be ineffective. This article addresses this gap in knowledge by presenting findings from an exploration of academic, policy and research project literature in order to come to a view on CSOs in research. This culminates in a typology of CSOs and provides a means of identifying types of CSOs. The typology shows four main types of CSO (common cause, shared voice, research-oriented, commercially oriented) and provides a definition for each type, along with a basis for the definition; an example of each; some typical terminology; typical area of activity; properties; typical mission; key areas of interest and their ‘action logic’ in research.@en

This article explores literatures from various sources to highlight and understand differences among key players surrounding the perceived nature and role of civil society in research from different literature streams. Including Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in research activities is an integral part of a broad drive towards integration of science and society. Interest in CSO inclusion in research is widespread, but lacks a coherent focus and clarity on what CSOs are. Without this clarity, CSO-inclusive research, or policy, may be ineffective. This article addresses this gap in knowledge by presenting findings from an exploration of academic, policy and research project literature in order to come to a view on CSOs in research. This culminates in a typology of CSOs and provides a means of identifying types of CSOs. The typology shows four main types of CSO (common cause, shared voice, research-oriented, commercially oriented) and provides a definition for each type, along with a basis for the definition; an example of each; some typical terminology; typical area of activity; properties; typical mission; key areas of interest and their ‘action logic’ in research.@en

This article explores literatures from various sources to highlight and understand differences among key players surrounding the perceived nature and role of civil society in research from different literature streams. Including Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in research activities is an integral part of a broad drive towards integration of science and society. Interest in CSO inclusion in research is widespread, but lacks a coherent focus and clarity on what CSOs are. Without this clarity, CSO-inclusive research, or policy, may be ineffective. This article addresses this gap in knowledge by presenting findings from an exploration of academic, policy and research project literature in order to come to a view on CSOs in research. This culminates in a typology of CSOs and provides a means of identifying types of CSOs. The typology shows four main types of CSO (common cause, shared voice, research-oriented, commercially oriented) and provides a definition for each type, along with a basis for the definition; an example of each; some typical terminology; typical area of activity; properties; typical mission; key areas of interest and their ‘action logic’ in research.@en

In 1950 Alan Turing asked whether machines could think. This question has been vigorously debated since, and its relevance for machine intelligence, or even agency, continues to provoke interdisciplinary debate. In fact, Turing's next step in his paper is to ask a far more nuanced question about imitation, which, we suggest, assumes a number of connections between intelligence, agency and the possibility of imitation. This paper will offer three key arguments against these assumptions, and in so doing make the following claims: (1) that intelligence is not a guarantee of personhood or agency, (2) that Turing's claims for imitation neither resolve the issue of intelligence, nor of agency, and that (3) recognition between agents (or recognition of agency) centres on the interpersonal relationship between agents, which in turn centres on the possibility for communication with a shared language. Our paper does not seek to argue either for or against the possibility of machine thought. Instead we seek to question whether any such processing would be recognized (by other agents) as thought or agency, and what this recognition might involve.@en

In 1950 Alan Turing asked whether machines could think. This question has been vigorously debated since, and its relevance for machine intelligence, or even agency, continues to provoke interdisciplinary debate. In fact, Turing's next step in his paper is to ask a far more nuanced question about imitation, which, we suggest, assumes a number of connections between intelligence, agency and the possibility of imitation. This paper will offer three key arguments against these assumptions, and in so doing make the following claims: (1) that intelligence is not a guarantee of personhood or agency, (2) that Turing's claims for imitation neither resolve the issue of intelligence, nor of agency, and that (3) recognition between agents (or recognition of agency) centres on the interpersonal relationship between agents, which in turn centres on the possibility for communication with a shared language. Our paper does not seek to argue either for or against the possibility of machine thought. Instead we seek to question whether any such processing would be recognized (by other agents) as thought or agency, and what this recognition might involve.@en