Template attacks (TAs) are one of the most powerful side-channel analysis (SCA) attacks. The success of such attacks relies on the effectiveness of the profiling model in modeling the leakage information. A crucial step for TA is to select relevant features from the measured traces, often called points of interest (POIs), to extract the leakage information. Previous research indicates that properly selecting the input leaking features could significantly increase the attack performance. However, due to the presence of SCA countermeasures and advancements in technology nodes, such features become increasingly difficult to extract with conventional approaches such as principle component analysis (PCA) and the Sum Of Squared pairwise T-difference-based method (SOST). This work proposes a framework, AutoPOI, based on proximal policy optimization to automatically find, select and scale down features. The input raw features are first grouped into small regions. The best candidates selected by the framework are further scaled down with an online-optimized dimensionality reduction neural network. Finally, the framework rewards the performance of these features with the results of TA. Based on the experimental results, the proposed framework can extract features automatically that lead to comparable state-of-the-art performance on several commonly used datasets.

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SHA-3 is considered to be one of the most secure standardized hash functions. It relies on the Keccak-f[1 600] permutation, which operates on an internal state of 1 600 bits, mostly represented as a 5 x 5 x 64-bit matrix. While existing implementations process the state sequentially in chunks of typically 32 or 64 bits, the Keccak-f[1 600] permutation can benefit a lot from speedup through parallelization. This paper is the first to explore the full potential of parallelization of Keccak-f[1 600] in RISC-V based processors through custom vector extensions on 32-bit and 64-bit architectures. We analyze the Keccak $\mathbf{f}[1 \ 600]$ permutation, composed of five different step mappings, and propose ten custom vector instructions to speed up the computation. We realize these extensions in a SIMD processor described in System Verilog. We compare the performance of our designs to existing architectures based on vectorized application-specific instruction set processors (ASIP). We show that our designs outperform all related work in throughput due to our carefully selected custom vector instructions.@en

This paper uses RISC-V vector extensions to speed up lattice-based operations in architectures based on HW/SW co-design. We analyze the structure of the number-theoretic transform (NTT), inverse NTT (INTT), and coefficient-wise multiplication (CWM) in CRYSTALS-Kyber, a lattice-based key encapsulation mechanism. We propose 12 vector extensions for CRYSTALS-Kyber multiplication and four for finite field operations in combination with two optimizations of the HW/SW interface. This results in a speed-up of 141.7, 168.7, and 245.5 times for NTT, INTT, and CWM, respectively, compared with the baseline implementation, and a speed-up of over four times compared with the state-of-the-art HW/SW co-design using RV32IMC.

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Firmware updates are often termed as a panacea to vulnerable Internet-of-Things (IoT) networks, as firmware updates can fix the exposed bugs and prevent them from being exploited in the future. However, a secure firmware update is a challenging task as IoT devices are often employed in unattended networks. Moreover, malicious updates of firmware in any of the devices of a network, or the non-execution of an update, can create havoc. Although security mechanisms like remote attestation (RA) are quite popular to identify malicious nodes in a network, they are costly in terms of computation/memory usage and communication overhead. To overcome these issues, we propose a “Secure Hardware-enabled Protocol for Firmware Updates (SHeFU)”. The aim of the proposed protocol is two-fold: 1) we obviate the need for remote attestation, and 2) we make sure that malicious nodes are isolated from benign nodes. Assuming a restricted threat model and network constellation, SHeFU ensures secure firmware updates and prevents compromised nodes from communicating with benign nodes in a network.@en

Side-channel attacks represent a powerful category of attacks against cryptographic devices. Still, side-channel analysis for lightweight ciphers is much less investigated than for instance for AES. Although intuition may lead to the conclusion that lightweight ciphers are weaker in terms of side-channel resistance, that remains to be confirmed and quantified. In this paper, we consider various side-channel analysis metrics which should provide an insight on the resistance of lightweight ciphers against side-channel attacks. In particular, for the non-profiled scenario we use the theoretical confusion coefficient and empirical optimal distinguisher. Our study considers side-channel attacks on the first, the last, or both rounds simultaneously. Furthermore, we conduct a profiled side-channel analysis using various machine learning attacks to recover 4-bit and 8-bit intermediate states of the cipher. Our results show that the difference between AES and lightweight ciphers is smaller than one would expect, and even find scenarios in which lightweight ciphers may be more resistant. Interestingly, we observe that the studied 4-bit S-boxes have a different side-channel resilience, while the difference in the 8-bit ones is only theoretically present.

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Evolvable hardware (EH) architectures are capable of changing their configuration and behavior dynamically based on inputs from the environment. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of using EH to prevent Hardware Trojan Horses (HTHs) from being inserted, activated, or propagated in a digital electronic chip. HTHs are malicious hardware components that intend to leak secret information or cause malfunctioning at run-time in the chip in which they are integrated. We hypothesize that EH can detect internal circuit errors at run-time and reconfigure to a state in which the errors are no longer present. We implement a Virtual Reconfigurable Circuit (VRC) on a Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) that autonomously and periodically reconfigures itself based on an Evolutionary Algorithm (EA). New VRC configurations are generated with an on-chip EA engine. We show that the presented approach is applicable in a scenario in which (1) the HTH-critical areas in the circuit are known in advance, and (2) the VRC is a purely combinatorial circuit, as opposed to the on-chip memory holding the golden reference, which requires one or more cycles to be read/written. We compare two different approaches for protecting the system against HTHs: Genetic Programming (GP) and Cartesian Genetic Programming (CGP). The paper reports on experiments on four benchmark circuits and gives an overview of both the limitations and the added value of the presented approaches.

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Finding the shortest addition chain for a given exponent is a significant problem in cryptography. In this work, we present a genetic algorithm with a novel encoding of solutions and new crossover and mutation operators to minimize the length of the addition chains corresponding to a given exponent. We also develop a repair strategy that significantly enhances the performance of our approach. The results are compared with respect to those generated by other metaheuristics for exponents of moderate size, but we also investigate values up to 2 255- 21. For numbers of such size, we were unable to find any results produced by other metaheuristics which could be used for comparison purposes. Therefore, we decided to add three additional strategies to serve as benchmarks. Our results indicate that the proposed approach is a very promising alternative to deal with this problem. We also consider a more practical perspective by taking into account the implementation cost of the chains: we optimize the addition chains with regards to the type of operations as well as the number of instructions required for the implementation.@en

Finding the shortest addition chain for a given exponent is a significant problem in cryptography. In this work, we present a genetic algorithm with a novel encoding of solutions and new crossover and mutation operators to minimize the length of the addition chains corresponding to a given exponent. We also develop a repair strategy that significantly enhances the performance of our approach. The results are compared with respect to those generated by other metaheuristics for exponents of moderate size, but we also investigate values up to 2 255- 21. For numbers of such size, we were unable to find any results produced by other metaheuristics which could be used for comparison purposes. Therefore, we decided to add three additional strategies to serve as benchmarks. Our results indicate that the proposed approach is a very promising alternative to deal with this problem. We also consider a more practical perspective by taking into account the implementation cost of the chains: we optimize the addition chains with regards to the type of operations as well as the number of instructions required for the implementation.@en