Print Email Facebook Twitter Unbeatable cooperative strategies under noise Title Unbeatable cooperative strategies under noise Author Timmermans, Raymond (TU Delft Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science) Contributor Yorke-Smith, N. (mentor) Venkatesha Prasad, R.R. (graduation committee) Degree granting institution Delft University of Technology Programme Computer Science and Engineering Project CSE3000 Research Project Date 2021-07-01 Abstract This paper combines the concepts of noise and stability in the iterated prisoner's dilemma. The purpose is to find strategies that score well (have a high cooperation percentage) in a homogeneous noisy environment, but are also robust to invasions. Generally, strategies that perform best under noise are maximally forgiving, however, susceptibility to exploitation then also increases. By modifying the payoff variables to increase the incentive for cooperation stability is more easily achieved. Performance and stability for several strategies under noise are compared. Subject prisoner's dilemmagame theorystabilityiterated prisoner's dilemmanoise To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:9115d7b7-8eff-4e8f-8ec9-758e8e3a1d9a Part of collection Student theses Document type bachelor thesis Rights © 2021 Raymond Timmermans Files PDF final_paper_2_.pdf 513.19 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:9115d7b7-8eff-4e8f-8ec9-758e8e3a1d9a/datastream/OBJ/view