Print Email Facebook Twitter Boolean Negotiation Games Title Boolean Negotiation Games Author Bulling, N. (TU Delft Interactive Intelligence) Hindriks, K.V. (TU Delft Interactive Intelligence) Contributor Kaminka, Gal A. (editor) Fox, Maria (editor) Bouquet, Paolo (editor) Hüllermeier, Eyke (editor) Dignum, Virginia (editor) Dignum, Frank (editor) van Harmelen, Frank (editor) Date 2016 Abstract We propose a new strategic model of negotiation, called Boolean negotiation games. Our model is inspired by Boolean games and the alternating offers model of bargaining. It offers a computationally grounded model for studying properties of negotiation protocols in a qualitative setting. Boolean negotiation games can yield agreements that are more beneficial than stable solutions (Nash equilibria) of the underlying Boolean game. To reference this document use: http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:c31b916d-b60c-453b-8693-40299ef6c033 DOI https://doi.org/10.3233/978-1-61499-672-9-1748 Publisher IOS Press ISBN 978-1-61499-671-2 Source ECAI 2016 - 22nd European Conference on Artificial Intelligence Event ECAI 2016, 2016-08-29 → 2016-09-02, World Forum, The Hague, Netherlands Series Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications, 0922-6389, 285 Part of collection Institutional Repository Document type conference paper Rights © 2016 N. Bulling, K.V. Hindriks Files PDF 45531295_FAIA285_1748.pdf 215.99 KB Close viewer /islandora/object/uuid:c31b916d-b60c-453b-8693-40299ef6c033/datastream/OBJ/view