Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Payoff distribution in robust coalitional games on time-varying networks

Raja, A.A. (TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico)
Grammatico, S. (TU Delft Team Bart De Schutter; TU Delft Team Sergio Grammatico)

2022

In this article, we consider a sequence of transferable utility coalitional games, where the actual coalitional values are unknown but vary within known bounds. As a solution to the resulting family of games, we formalize the notion of 'robust core.' Our main contribution is to design two distributed algorithms, namely 1) distributed payoff allocation and 2) distributed bargaining, which converge to a consensual payoff distribution in the robust core. We adopt an operator-theoretic perspective to show convergence of both algorithms executed on time-varying communication networks. An energy storage optimization application motivates our framework for 'robust coalitional games.'

Control systems
Costs
Distributed Algorithms
Dynamic Games
Energy Systems
Game Theory
Games
Multi-agent systems
Network systems
Resource management
Stability criteria
Uncertainty

http://resolver.tudelft.nl/uuid:ed57b150-d7fa-4455-85a9-7a2e43fb0e8c

https://doi.org/10.1109/TCNS.2021.3113269

2023-07-01

2325-5870

IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 9 (1), 511-520

Green Open Access added to TU Delft Institutional Repository 'You share, we take care!' - Taverne project https://www.openaccess.nl/en/you-share-we-take-care Otherwise as indicated in the copyright section: the publisher is the copyright holder of this work and the author uses the Dutch legislation to make this work public.

Institutional Repository

journal article

© 2022 A.A. Raja, S. Grammatico