Of Mechanism Design and Multiagent Planning

Conference paper (2008)
Department
Software Computer Technology (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
Copyright: The Author(s)
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Published Date

21-07-2008

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Source:

ECAI 2008: Proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence, University of Patras, Greece, 21-26 July 2008; authors version

Source:

http://www.iospress.nl/book/ecai-2008/

Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Software Computer Technology

Abstract

Multiagent planning methods are concerned with planning by and for a group of agents. If the agents are selfinterested, they may be tempted to lie in order to obtain an outcome that is more rewarding for them. We therefore study the multiagent planning problem from a mechanism design perspective, showing how to incentivise agents to be truthful. We prove that the well-known truthful VCG mechanism is not always truthful in the context of optimal planning, and present a modification to fix this. Finally, we present some (domain-dependent) poly-time planning algorithms using this fix that maintain truthfulness in spite of their non-optimality.

Files

Ecai081.pdf
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