Cross-border electricity market effects due to price caps in an emission trading system

An agent-based approach

Journal article (2014)
Department
Engineering, Systems and Services (TPM) (TU Delft)
Copyright: This is an open access article under the CC BY license
DOI: https://doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.03.037
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Published Date

05-05-2014

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Source:

Energy Policy, 71, 2014

Faculty

Technology, Policy and Management

Department

Engineering, Systems and Services

Abstract

The recent low CO2 prices in the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) have triggered a discussion whether the EU ETS needs to be adjusted. We study the effects of CO2 price floors and a price ceiling on the dynamic investment pathway of two interlinked electricity markets (loosely based on Great Britain, which already has introduced a price floor, and on Central Western Europe). Using an agent-based electricity market simulation with endogenous investment and a CO2 market (including banking), we analyse the cross-border effects of national policies as well as system-wide policy options. A common, moderate CO2 auction reserve price results in a more continuous decarbonisation pathway. This reduces CO2 price volatility and the occurrence of carbon shortage price periods, as well as the average cost to consumers. A price ceiling can shield consumers from extreme price shocks. These price restrictions do not cause a large risk of an overall emissions overshoot in the long run. A national price floor lowers the cost to consumers in the other zone; the larger the zone with the price floor, the stronger the effect. Price floors that are too high lead to inefficiencies in investment choices and to higher consumer costs.