The accelerated digitalisation of society along with technological evolution have extended the geographical span of cyber-physical systems. Two main threats have made the reliable and real-time control of these systems challenging: (i) uncertainty in the communication infrastructure induced by scale, and heterogeneity of the environment and devices; and (ii) targeted attacks maliciously worsening the impact of the above-mentioned communication uncertainties, disrupting the correctness of real-time applications. This article addresses those challenges by showing how to build distributed protocols that provide both real-time with practical performance, and scalability in the presence of network faults and attacks, in probabilistic synchronous environments. We provide a suite of real-time Byzantine protocols, which we prove correct, starting from a reliable broadcast protocol, called PISTIS, up to atomic broadcast and consensus. This suite simplifies the construction of powerful distributed and decentralized monitoring and control applications, including state-machine replication. Extensive empirical simulations showcase PISTIS's robustness, latency, and scalability. For example, PISTIS can withstand message loss (and delay) rates up to 50 percent in systems with 49 nodes and provides bounded delivery latencies in the order of a few milliseconds.@en

Recently, streamlined Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols, such as HotStuff, have been proposed as a means to circumvent the inefficient view-changes of traditional BFT protocols, such as PBFT. Several works have detailed trusted components, and BFT protocols that leverage them to tolerate a minority of faulty nodes and use a reduced number of communication rounds. Inspired by these works we identify two basic trusted services, respectively called the Checker and Accumulator services, which can be leveraged by streamlined protocols. Based on these services, we design Damysus, a streamlined protocol that improves upon HotStuff's resilience and uses less communication rounds. In addition, we show how the Checker and Accumulator services can be adapted to develop Chained-Damysus, a chained version of Damysus where operations are pipelined for efficiency. We prove the correctness of Damysus and Chained-Damysus, and evaluate their performance showcasing their superiority compared to previous protocols. @en

In this paper, we consider the Byzantine reliable broadcast problem on authenticated and partially connected networks. The state-of-the-art method to solve this problem consists in combining two algorithms from the literature. Handling asynchrony and faulty senders is typically done thanks to Gabriel Bracha's authenticated double-echo broadcast protocol, which assumes an asynchronous fully connected network. Danny Dolev's algorithm can then be used to provide reliable communications between processes in the global fault model, where up to f processes among N can be faulty in a communication network that is at least 2f+1-connected. Following recent works that showed how Dolev's protocol can be made more practical thanks to several optimizations, we show that the state-of-the-art methods to solve our problem can be optimized thanks to layer-specific and cross-layer optimizations. Our simulations with the Omnet++ network simulator show that these optimizations can be efficiently combined to decrease the total amount of information transmitted or the protocol's latency (e.g., respectively, -25% and -50% with a 16B payload, N=31 and f=4) compared to the state-of-the-art combination of Bracha's and Dolev's protocols.@en

Current vehicular Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems either incur high false-positive rates or do not capture zero-day vulnerabilities, leading to safety-critical risks. In addition, prevention is limited to few primitive options like dropping network packets or extreme options, e.g., ECU Bus-off state. To fill this gap, we introduce the concept of vehicular Intrusion Resilience Systems (IRS) that ensures the resilience of critical applications despite assumed faults or zero-day attacks, as long as threat assumptions are met. IRS enables running a vehicular application in a replicated way, i.e., as a Replicated State Machine, over several ECUs, and then requiring the replicated processes to reach a form of Byzantine agreement before changing their local state. Our study rides the mutation of modern vehicular environments, which are closing the gap between simple and resource-constrained "real-time and embedded systems", and complex and powerful "information technology" ones. It shows that current vehicle (e.g., Zonal) architectures and networks are becoming plausible for such modular fault and intrusion tolerance solutions—deemed too heavy in the past. Our evaluation on a simulated Automotive Ethernet network running two state-of-the-art agreement protocols (Damysus and Hotstuff) shows that the achieved latency and throughout are feasible for many Automotive applications.@en

Nous considérons un réseau (modélisé par un graphe) utilisé pour propager des informations. Dans ce contexte, une source d’information diffuse à l’ensemble du réseau un message. Si la source est fiable, c’est à dire qu’elle envoie le même message à tous ses voisins directs, on souhaite qu’un nombre limité de participants malveillants qui tentent de miner sa crédibilité en retransmettant des messages sourcés contradictoires, ne puisse pas berner les participants hon- nêtes. Si la source est malveillante (et qu’elle cherche à augmenter l’entropie en envoyant tout et son contraire à ses voisins directs), les participants honnêtes doivent diminuer l’entropie des messages issus de la source, soit en les igno- rant, soit en délivrant un unique message (le même pour tous). Dans cet article, nous montrons que les méthodes dans la littérature pour résoudre ce problème peuvent être améliorées grâce à des optimisations spécifiques et inter-couches. Nos simulations montrent que ces optimisations peuvent être efficacement combinées pour diminuer la quantité totale d’informations transmises ou la latence du protocole. @en