In the last few years, we witnessed a growing body of literature about automated negotiation. Mainly, negotiating agents are either purely self-driven by maximizing their utility function or by assuming a cooperative stance by all parties involved in the negotiation. We argue that, while optimizing one’s utility function is essential, agents in a society should not ignore the opponent’s utility in the final agreement to improve the agent’s long-term perspectives in the system. This article aims to show whether it is possible to design a social agent (i.e., one that aims to optimize both sides’ utility functions) while performing efficiently in an agent society. Accordingly, we propose a social agent supported by a portfolio of strategies, a novel tit-for-tat concession mechanism, and a frequency-based opponent modeling mechanism capable of adapting its behavior according to the opponent’s behavior and the state of the negotiation. The results show that the proposed social agent not only maximizes social metrics such as the distance to the Nash bargaining point or the Kalai point but also is shown to be a pure and mixed equilibrium strategy in some realistic agent societies.

The problem of allocating students to supervisors for the development of a personal project or a dissertation is a crucial activity in the higher education environment, as it enables students to get feedback on their work from an expert and improve their personal, academic, and professional abilities. In this article, we propose a multi-objective and near Pareto optimal genetic algorithm for the allocation of students to supervisors. The allocation takes into consideration the students and supervisors’ preferences on research/project topics, the lower and upper supervision quotas of supervisors, as well as the workload balance amongst supervisors. We introduce novel mutation and crossover operators for the student–supervisor allocation problem. The experiments carried out show that the components of the genetic algorithm are more apt for the problem than classic components, and that the genetic algorithm is capable of producing allocations that are near Pareto optimal in a reasonable time.