A key debate in the study on land, housing and natural resources revolves around the notion that general institutional forms (such as private, common, public, and likewise formal property rights) lead to a certain institutional performance (as may be expressed in terms of prices, transaction costs or sustainability). However, a modest, yet, growing stream in institutional analysis aims to move away from ‘merely describing the characteristics’ of institutions (i.e., form variables) to ‘performance or quality measures’ (i.e., function variables). Following this line of argument, the credibility thesis as put forward in this journal (Ho, 2014) postulates that the form of institutions is unrelated to their performance, and institutions are unintentional outcomes rather than designed artefacts. The primary goal of this research is to ascertain whether this dual prediction could be observed in a simulation model that is driven by agent behaviour and interaction, resulting in emerging institutions. We devise an empirically verified agent-based model within a classical thought experiment on a common property resource to validate the thesis’ predictions. First, our model confirms that different forms of institutions can have a similar performance. Second, we ascertain that successful institutions in difficult management situations can emerge (rather than being designed) that are beneficial for the sustainability of the common resource and the appropriators of that resource.

In their studies of collective exploitation of common-pool resources, Ostrom and other scholars have stressed the importance of sanctioning as an essential method for preventing overuse and, eventually, the collapse of commons. However, most of the available evidence is based on data covering a relatively small period in history, and thus does not inform us about the evolution of rules, including sanctions, over time. In this article, we demonstrate, based on historical sources covering several centuries, that sanctioning was not always the preferred way of preventing or dealing with free-riding in institutions for collective action, but that the legal context is decisive to understand why commoners in some countries were using more sanctions than those in others to regulate commoners' behavior. Commoners that could self-govern their resources used fewer sanctions, and when they did, it was mainly to avoid overuse of their most vulnerable resources. Moreover, graduated sanctioning seems to be less important than suggested in Ostrom's famous Design Principles, and was reserved primarily for immediate threats to the commons' resources. We also show the importance of other types of rules, such as differentiated rules, which have hardly been taken into account in literature to date.

We present an analysis of regulatory activities in historical commons offering a unique picture of their long-term institutional dynamics. The analysis took into account almost 3,800 regulatory activities in eighteen European commons in two countries across seven centuries. Despite differences in time and space, we found a shared pattern where an initial, highly-dynamic institutional-definition phase was followed by a relatively long period of stability and a final burst of activities, possibly in an attempt to respond to new challenges. In addition, most of the initial regulatory activities focused on resource use, while towards the end other activities prevailed. Our approach allows for a better understanding of institutional dynamics and our findings also provide important insights about how to regulate the use of current natural resources.

Historical commons represent self-governed governance regimes that regulate the use and management of natural and man-made shared resources. Despite growing scientific interests, analyses of commons evolution and temporal dynamics are rare and drivers of change (birth, adaptation, dissolution) remain obscure. We apply an interdisciplinary approach and address these issues from an eco-evolutionary perspective. Analyses of > 400 Dutch commons over more than a millennium (between the 9th and the 20th century) uncovered that most commons originated between 1200 and 1700, and that there was a particularly high rate of evolution during 1300-1550, a pattern intermediate to gradualism and punctuated equilibrium in biological evolution. Dissolutions of commons were rare prior to 1800 and peaked around 1850, comparable to a mass extinction in biology. Temporal trends in number, spatial distribution, density, and dispersion of historical commons were distinctive and resembled developments seen at the levels of species and individuals in the growth of biological communities and populations, in that they showed signs of saturation determined by the abundance and distribution of resources. The spatiotemporal dynamics of commons also pointed to important roles of social, economic and political factors, such as new reclamations of resources and pressure on resources due to population growth. Despite internal and external pressures, the self-governing commons studied here were very successful, in the sense that they persisted for on average >350 years. There was a weak positive relationship between the use of multiple resources and the lifespan of commons, resembling associations between diversity and persistence seen in biological systems. It is argued that eco-evolutionary perspectives can further the understanding of the long-term dynamics of commons as institutions for collective action, vitalize future research, improve management of shared goods, and advise about sustainable utilization of finite resources.

A appropriate bottom-up rule system can support the sustainability of common-pool resources such as forests and fisheries. The process that leads to the developments of such institutional settings requires the considerations of multiple social, physical, and institutional factors over long time horizons. In this paper, we present the SONICOM model as a general exploratory model of CPR systems. The model can be configured to represent different CPR systems in order to explore what kind of institutional settings result in stable systems, i.e. situations where the resource and the appropriators are in a state of well-being. We use a large-N-dataset of CPR management institutions to validate the model. The results show numerous correlations between various parameters of the system such as rule compliance, social influence and resource growth rate which help explaining the process of institutional emergence as well as unveiling the conditions under which systems are stable.

In this paper we present an abstract replication of institutional emergence patterns observed in common pool resource (CPR) problems. We used the ADICO grammar of institutions as the basic structure to model both users’ strategies and institutions. Through an evolutionary process, users modify their behaviours and eventually establish a management institution for their CPR system, leading to significant benefits both for them and for the commons as a whole. We showed that, even with a high level of abstraction, by taking an evolutionary perspective and using the ADICO structure, we are able to observe common institutional patterns. We confirmed that, even within this simplified environment, institutions significantly contributed to the sustainable management of common-pool resource systems.