Multi-Variant Execution Environments (MVEEs) are a powerful tool for protecting legacy software against memory corruption attacks. MVEEs employ software diversity to run multiple variants of the same program in lockstep, whilst providing them with the same inputs and comparing their behavior. Well-constructed variants will behave equivalently under normal operating conditions but diverge when under attack. The MVEE detects these divergences and takes action before compromised variants can damage the host system. Existing MVEEs replicate inputs at the system call boundary, and therefore do not support programs that use shared-memory IPC with other processes, since shared memory pages can be read from and written to directly without system calls. We analyzed modern applications, ranging from web servers, over media players, to browsers, and observe that they rely heavily on shared memory, in some cases for their basic functioning and in other cases for enabling more advanced functionality. It follows that modern applications cannot enjoy the security provided by MVEEs unless those MVEEs support shared-memory IPC. This paper first identifies the requirements for supporting shared-memory IPC in an MVEE. We propose a design that involves techniques to identify and instrument accesses to shared memory pages, as well as techniques to replicate I/O through shared-memory IPC. We implemented these techniques in a prototype MVEE and report our findings through an evaluation of a range of benchmark programs. Our contributions enable the use of MVEEs on a far wider range of programs than previously supported. By overcoming one of the major remaining limitations of MVEEs, our contributions can help to bolster their real-world adoption.@en

Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU) is a recent hardware feature that allows programs to assign virtual memory pages to protection domains, and to change domain access permissions using inexpensive, unprivileged instructions. Several in-process memory isolation approaches leverage this feature to prevent untrusted code from accessing sensitive program state and data. Typically, PKU-based isolation schemes need to be used in conjunction with mitigations such as CFI because untrusted code, when compromised, can otherwise bypass the PKU access permissions using unprivileged instructions or operating system APIs. Recently, researchers proposed fully self-contained PKU-based memory isolation schemes that do not rely on other mitigations. These systems use exploit-proof call gates to transfer control between trusted and untrusted code, as well as a sandbox that prevents tampering with the PKU infrastructure from untrusted code. In this paper, we show that these solutions are not complete. We first develop two proof-of-concept attacks against a state-of-the-art PKU-based memory isolation scheme. We then present Cerberus, a PKU-based sandboxing framework that can overcome limitations of existing sandboxes. We apply Cerberus to several memory isolation schemes, and show that it is practical, efficient, and secure.@en