Ascending from Political Gridlock to Space Sustainability

Abstract

Earth’s orbits are becoming increasingly congested, which makes the orbital environment more fragile and harder to use safely. One of the most damaging single events is a destructive anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test that creates long-lived debris, as these fragments threaten civil, commercial, and military space services and raise collision risks. Despite the shared danger, current international law does not explicitly ban debris-creating ASAT tests and existing accountability mechanisms remain weak. At the same time, diplomatic forums are divided between states favouring voluntary behavioural norms and states advocating a new legally binding instrument, which slows collective action and sustains political gridlock. This raises the question of how a practical and verifiable governance solution can be designed to reduce and ultimately prevent debris-creating ASAT testing under today’s geopolitical constraints, and which institutional design options the Netherlands can realistically support to improve debris prevention and accountability. This thesis treats the technical risks, legal gaps, and political barriers as a systems and institutional design challenge. Using Ostrom’s ADICO grammar, it specifies institutional rules through three core elements: agreement scope, verification, and consequences, then evaluates designs against three goals: debris prevention, accountability, and political feasibility. The design space is built from four inputs: lessons from comparative regimes (the Antarctic Treaty for transparency and a living forum, Maritime Law for precise zonal rules and dispute settlement logic, and the Nuclear Weapons Treaty for norm-building and stigmatisation), expert interviews on what is acceptable in current diplomacy and the potential role of The Hague, verification lessons from the UNIDIR handbook and the Netherlands Space Office verification study, and effect-based, technology-neutral rule reasoning focused on observable outcomes. Screening these ideas yields three contrasting scenarios: Design 1, a direct-ascent debris ban in low Earth orbit verified through national technical means and SSA with public attribution as the main consequence; Design 2, an all-kinetic debris ban across all orbits verified through a multilateral data-sharing cell with stronger collective “naming and shaming”; and Design 3, a technology-neutral ban on deliberate debris creation across all orbits verified by an independent technical body with stronger consequences such as suspension of regime benefits and privileges. The evaluation shows a clear trade-off between political feasibility and accountability, and recommends starting with Design 1 as a realistic first step that can open a pathway towards stronger, more comprehensive governance over time. The thesis also identifies concrete Dutch contributions to enable this pathway, including reframing the issue as space safety and sustainability, using middle-power diplomacy to build cross-regional coalitions (including Global South partners), promoting The Hague as an optional venue for arbitration and peaceful dispute settlement, and strengthening technical credibility through support for SSA/SST expertise and transparent verification practices.