Post-quantum WireGuard

Conference Paper (2021)
Author(s)

Andreas Hulsing (Eindhoven University of Technology)

Kai Chun Ning (KPN)

Peter Schwabe (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, Max Planck Institute for Security and Privacy)

Florian Weber (Eindhoven University of Technology)

Philip R. Zimmermann (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science, KPN)

Research Group
Cyber Security
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1109/SP40001.2021.00030 Final published version
More Info
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Publication Year
2021
Language
English
Research Group
Cyber Security
Article number
9519445
Pages (from-to)
304-321
ISBN (print)
978-1-7281-8935-2
ISBN (electronic)
978-1-7281-8934-5
Event
42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021 (2021-05-24 - 2021-05-27), Virtual, San Francisco, United States
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586

Abstract

In this paper we present PQ-WireGuard, a post-quantum variant of the handshake in the WireGuard VPN protocol (NDSS 2017). Unlike most previous work on post-quantum security for real-world protocols, this variant does not only consider post-quantum confidentiality (or forward secrecy) but also post-quantum authentication. To achieve this, we replace the Diffie-Hellman-based handshake by a more generic approach only using key-encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs). We establish security of PQ-WireGuard, adapting the security proofs for WireGuard in the symbolic model and in the standard model to our construction. We then instantiate this generic construction with concrete post-quantum secure KEMs, which we carefully select to achieve high security and speed. We demonstrate competitiveness of PQ-WireGuard presenting extensive bench-marking results comparing to widely deployed VPN solutions.