Wide-Area Damping Control Resilience towards Cyber-Attacks

Abstract

By increasingly relying on network-based operation for control, monitoring, and protection functionalities, modern wide-area power systems have also become vulnerable to cyber-attacks aiming to damage system performance and/or stability. Resilience in state-of-the-art methods mostly relies on known characteristics of the attacks and static control loops (i.e., with fixed input/output channels). This work proposes a 'dynamic loop' wide-area damping strategy, where input/output channel pairs are changed dynamically. We study 'reactive' dynamic switching in case of detectable attack and 'pro-active' dynamical switching, in case of undetectable (stealth) attacks. Stability of the dynamic loop is presented via Lyapunov theory, under parametric perturbations, average dwell time switching and external perturbations. Using two-and five-area IEEE benchmarks, it is shown that the proposed strategy provides effective damping and robustness under various detectable (e.g., false data injection, denial-of-service) and stealth (replay, bias injection) attacks.