Epistemic Actions, Abilities and Knowing-How: A Non-Reductive Account

Journal article (2022)

Authors

S.R.M. Miller University of Oxford, Ethics & Philosophy of Technology - TPM , Charles Sturt University
Research Group
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology (TPM) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2022 S.R.M. Miller
DOI
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https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2021.2020931
Abilities Epistemic action Knowing-how Propositional knowledge Knowledge-by-acquaintance
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Published Date

2022

Language

English

Reuse Rights

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Faculty

Technology, Policy and Management

Department

Values Technology and Innovation

Research Group

Ethics & Philosophy of Technology

Abstract

The aim is to provide a synoptic view of the epistemic landscape in respect of epistemic actions, abilities and knowing how. The resulting view consists of the following propositions: (1) knowledge-by-acquaintance cannot be reduced to propositional knowledge or to knowing-how or some combination of these; the same point holds for propositional knowledge in relation to knowledge-by-acquaintance and knowing-how, and to knowing-how in relation to knowledge-by-acquaintance and propositional knowledge; (2) These categories of knowledge are, nevertheless, interdependent in a number of senses; (3) Abilities are not the same thing as know-how; (4) Epistemic actions need to be distinguished from behavioral actions; (5) Judgements are epistemic actions which, if successful, result in knowledge and, therefore, the sharp contrast drawn between, on the one hand, comings to believe and, in particular, judgments and, on the other hand, actions – with respect to being freely chosen – is not sustainable; (6) Judgements manifest both abilities and know-how.

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