Against epistemic transparency of algorithms
Juan M. Durán (TU Delft - Technology, Policy and Management)
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Abstract
Epistemic transparency is often proposed as a solution to algorithmic opacity, wherein revealing the inner logic of an algorithm provides reasons or supporting evidence for the justification of its outputs. I argue that transparency is defective in belief formation and thus inadequate as an epistemology of algorithms. Two objections are developed: transparency regress and bootstrapping, both rooted in transparency’s status as a time-sliced, ‘outsourced’ inferentialist epistemology. While weaker forms—such as contextual transparency—are briefly considered, the central argument remains that transparency fails to provide justification and should be abandoned as an epistemology of algorithms.
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