PRIDE
A Privacy-Preserving Decentralised Key Management System
David Kester (Student TU Delft)
T. Li (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Z Erkin (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
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Abstract
There is an increase in interest and necessity for an interoperable and efficient railway network across Europe, creating a key distribution problem between train and trackside entities’ key management centres (KMC). Train and trackside entities establish a secure session using symmetric keys (KMAC) loaded beforehand by their respective KMC using procedures that are not scalable and prone to operational mistakes. A single system would simplify the KMAC distribution between KMCs; nevertheless, it is difficult to place the responsibility for such a system for the whole European area within one central organization. A single system could also expose relationships between KMCs, revealing information, such as plans to use an alternative route or serve a new region, jeopardizing competitive advantage. This paper proposes a scalable and decentralised key management system that allows KMC to share cryptographic keys using transactions while keeping relationships anonymous. Using non-interactive proofs of knowledge and assigning each entity a private and public key, private key owners can issue valid transactions while all system actors can validate them. Our performance analysis shows that the proposed system is scalable when a proof of concept is implemented with settings close to the expected railway landscape in 2030.