Multi-party private set intersection protocols for practical applications

Conference paper (2021)

Authors

Asli Bay Antalya Bilim University, Antalya
Z. Erkin Cyber Security - EEMCS , Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
Mina Alishahi Eindhoven University of Technology
J.V. Vos Cyber Security - EEMCS
Research Group
Cyber Security (EEMCS) (TU Delft)
Copyright: © 2021 Asli Bay, Z. Erkin, Mina Alishahi, J.V. Vos
DOI
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https://doi.org/10.5220/0010547605150522
Bit-set Representation Multi-Party Private Set Intersection Privacy-preserving Protocols Threshold PKE
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Published Date

2021

Language

English

Reuse Rights

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Faculty

Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science

Department

Intelligent Systems

Research Group

Cyber Security

Abstract

Multi-Party Private Set Intersection (MPSI) is an attractive topic in research since a practical MPSI protocol can be deployed in several real-world scenarios, including but not limited to finding the common list of customers among several companies or privacy-preserving analyses of data from different stakeholders. Several solutions have been proposed in the literature however, the existing solutions still suffer from performance related challenges such as long run-time and high bandwidth demand, particularly when the number of involved parties grows. In this paper, we propose a new approach based on threshold additively homomorphic encryption scheme, e.g., Paillier, which enables us to process the bit-set representation of sets under encryption. By doing so, it is feasible to securely compute the intersection of several data sets in an efficient manner. To prove our claims on performance, we compare the communication complexity of our approach with the existing solutions and show performance test results. We also show how the proposed protocol can be extended to securely compute other set operations on multi-party data sets.