Quantifying Control Performance Loss for a Least Significant Bits Authentication Scheme

Conference Paper (2026)
Author(s)

Bart Wolleswinkel (TU Delft - Mechanical Engineering)

Riccardo Ferrari (TU Delft - Mechanical Engineering)

Research Group
Team Riccardo Ferrari
URL related publication
https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/11625501 Final published version
More Info
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Publication Year
2026
Language
English
Research Group
Team Riccardo Ferrari
Pages (from-to)
3718-3723
Publisher
IEEE
ISBN (electronic)
978-3-907144-13-8
Event
2026 European Control Conference, ECC 2026 (2026-07-07 - 2026-07-10), Reykjavik, Iceland
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Abstract

Industrial control systems (ICSs) often consist of many legacy devices, which were designed without security requirements in mind. With the increase in cyberattacks targeting critical infrastructure, there is a growing urgency to develop legacy-compatible security solutions tailored to the specific needs and constraints of real-time control systems. We propose a least significant bits (LSBs) coding scheme providing message authentication and integrity, which is compatible with legacy devices and never compromises availability. The scheme comes with provable security guarantees, and we provide a simple yet effective method to deal with synchronization issues due to packet dropouts. Furthermore, we quantify the control performance loss for both a fixed-point and floating-point quantization architecture when using the proposed coding scheme. We demonstrate its effectiveness in detecting cyberattacks, as well as the impact on control performance, on a hydro power turbine control system.

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