Regulatory incentives for transmission system operators under flow-based market coupling

Abstract

Flow-based market coupling is a critical element of the electricity market in Europe. Transmission System Operators determine the commercial transmission capacity that can be implicitly traded in a zonal day-ahead market. However, this entails a trade-off: higher commercial transmission capacities increase market efficiency, affecting the electricity market prices, but also increase redispatch costs, affecting the network tariff. The decision on the commercial transmission capacity should optimally balance day-ahead welfare and redispatch costs, but depends on the rules and regulated incentives enforced on the TSOs. A MinRAM criterion, i.e., imposing minima for the commercial transmission capacity, is a one-size-fits-all policy without variation in time and space that unlikely leads to optimal transmission capacity allocation and is hard to tune because regulators have incomplete information. Incentive regulation is an alternative policy instrument promoting welfare-maximizing commercial transmission capacities, robust against information asymmetry. We provide a set of mathematical conditions to properly design an incentive scheme that rewards price convergence and penalizes excessive redispatch costs. Therefore, this paper serves as a stepping stone towards tapping the full potential of cross-border trade in zonal markets for policymakers, regulators, TSOs and market participants.