Cyber-Attack Detection and Countermeasure for Distributed Electric Springs for Smart Grid Applications

Journal Article (2022)
Author(s)

Jie Chen (Hivision Technology)

A.J. Gallo (TU Delft - Team Riccardo Ferrari)

Shuo Yan (Royal Melbourne Institute of Technology University)

Thomas Parisini (University of Cyprus, University of Trieste, Imperial College London)

Shu Yuen (Nanyang Technology University, Imperial College London)

Research Group
Team Riccardo Ferrari
Copyright
© 2022 Jie Chen, A.J. Gallo, Shuo Yan, Thomas Parisini, Shu Yuen Ron Hui
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1109/ACCESS.2022.3145015
More Info
expand_more
Publication Year
2022
Language
English
Copyright
© 2022 Jie Chen, A.J. Gallo, Shuo Yan, Thomas Parisini, Shu Yuen Ron Hui
Research Group
Team Riccardo Ferrari
Volume number
10
Pages (from-to)
13182-13192
Reuse Rights

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Abstract

With increasing installations of grid-connected power electronic converters in the distribution network, there is a new trend of using distributed control in a cyber layer to coordinate the operations of these power converters for improving power system stability. However, cyber-attacks remain a threat to such distributed control. This paper addresses the cyber-attack detection and a countermeasure of distributed electric springs (ESs) that have emerged as a fast demand-response technology. A fully distributed model-based architecture for cyber-attack detection in the communication network is developed. Based on a dynamic model of ES with consensus control, a local state estimator is proposed and practically implemented to monitor the system. The estimator is fully distributed because only local and neighboring information is necessary. A countermeasure for the distributed ESs to ride through the cyber-attack and maintain regulatory services in a microgrid is demonstrated successfully. Experimental results are provided to verify the effectiveness of the proposed cyber-attack detection method and its ride-through capability.