Profiled Side-Channel Analysis in the Efficient Attacker Framework
Stjepan Picek (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Annelie Heuser (Université de Rennes)
Guilherme Perin (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
Sylvain Guilley (Secure-IC SAS)
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Abstract
Profiled side-channel attacks represent the most powerful category of side-channel attacks. There, the attacker has access to a clone device to profile its leaking behavior. Additionally, it is common to consider the attacker unbounded in power to allow the worst-case security analysis. This paper starts with a different premise where we are interested in the minimum power that the attacker requires to conduct a successful attack. We propose a new framework for profiled side-channel analysis that we call the Efficient Attacker Framework. With it, we require attacks to be as powerful as possible, but we also provide a setting that inherently allows a more objective analysis among attacks. To confirm our theoretical results, we provide an experimental evaluation of our framework in the context of deep learning-based side-channel analysis.