A Side-Channel Attack Using Order 8 Rational Points against Curve25519 on an 8-Bit Microcontroller

Conference Paper (2019)
Author(s)

Yoshinori Uetake (Okayama University)

Keiji Yoshimoto (Okayama University)

Yuta Kodera (Okayama University)

L.J.A. Weissbart (Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen, TU Delft - Cyber Security)

Takuya Kusaka (Okayama University)

Yasuyuki Nogami (Okayama University)

Research Group
Cyber Security
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDAR.2019.00037
More Info
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Publication Year
2019
Language
English
Research Group
Cyber Security
Pages (from-to)
225-231
ISBN (electronic)
9781728147253

Abstract

Among the increasing evolution of IoT devices, practical applications need reliable secure protocols to communicate with each other. A major issue for modern cryptosystems is an implementation of secure and trustworthy mechanisms to rely on. A side-channel attack against these cryptosystems may overturn the guarantee of security against conventional cyber-attacks. Elliptic curve cryptography is public-key cryptography based on elliptic curves, and one of the well-known curves is Curve25519 which is used for TLS protocols as a recommended curve. This curve is mainly implemented on limited resource devices such as microcontrollers. However, this curve poses a weakness for low-order points during a Diffie-Hellman key exchange is employed. This research demonstrates possible exploitation of a threat of order 8 rational points of Curve25519 and shows results of the side-channel attacks using order 8 rational points on an embedded system. The results indicate the order 8 rational points might be applied to key extraction as attacker sides.

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