Infrastructure Network Resilience Analysis with Disruptions of System Order
Davis C. Loose (University of Virginia)
Megan C. Marcellin (University of Virginia)
Igor Linkov (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center )
Gigi Pavur (University of Virginia)
Maksim Kitsak (TU Delft - Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science)
Michael A. Deegan (U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Insititute for Water Resources )
James H. Lambert (University of Virginia)
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Abstract
Disruption of complex infrastructures systems involves cascading failures and interdependencies. This paper presents a network-based approach to assessing infrastructure resilience using scenario-based disruptions that remove entire sectors from the network. This approach evaluates system-wide vulnerabilities by modeling structural failures through the removal of nodes from the infrastructure graph. The framework uses a directed graph to represent interdependencies and uses eigenvector centrality to rank sector influence. Disruptive scenarios, including power outages, communication failures, and hybrid threats are applied to evaluate changes in system order. Spearman's rank correlation quantifies the disruptiveness of each scenario, identifying which sectors experience the most significant shifts in importance. Results show that disruptions to the communications sector cause the greatest reordering of system orders, while disruptions to water & wastewater have a lower impact. The analysis demonstrates how different hazards affect regional resilience and provides insights for decision-makers to schedule the risk countermeasures.
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File under embargo until 14-07-2026