On the real-world security of cryptographic primitives
From theory to practice
Z. Najm (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
P.H. Hartel – Promotor (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
S. Picek – Copromotor (TU Delft - Cyber Security)
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Abstract
In the digital era, data has become a critical asset, driving innovation across industries while simultaneously presenting significant security challenges. Cryptography provides essential tools to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of sensitive information throughout its lifecycle. This thesis addresses the gap between theoretical cryptography and practical implementations, emphasizing the cost, feasibility, and resilience of cryptographic systems in real-world contexts. Key contributions include: (i) an assessment of the practical cost of differential cryptanalysis attacks, particularly on ciphers with 80-bit security, exemplified through SHA-1 chosen-prefix collision studies; (ii) an analysis of passive side-channel attack mitigation techniques, with a focus on embedded systems and IoT devices, including comparative evaluation of AES and ChaCha20; (iii) the study of active fault injection attacks, exploring detection and countermeasure strategies, particularly via electromagnetic fault injection (EMFI); and (iv) the proposal of a security-aware design flow for lightweight cipher implementations, integrating cryptanalysis, side-channel, and fault attack considerations into practical system design. The findings advance understanding of security-performance trade-offs, highlight the importance of empirical evaluation alongside theoretical proofs, and provide guidelines for designing robust, cost-effective cryptographic solutions, including post-quantum readiness.