Security Vulnerabilities in LoRaWAN

Conference Paper (2018)
Author(s)

Xueying Yang

Evgenios Karampatzakis

C. Dörr (TU Delft - Cyber Security)

F.A. Kuipers (TU Delft - Embedded Systems)

Research Group
Embedded Systems
Copyright
© 2018 Xueying Yang, Evgenios Karampatzakis, C. Dörr, F.A. Kuipers
DOI related publication
https://doi.org/10.1109/IoTDI.2018.00022
More Info
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Publication Year
2018
Language
English
Copyright
© 2018 Xueying Yang, Evgenios Karampatzakis, C. Dörr, F.A. Kuipers
Research Group
Embedded Systems
ISBN (print)
978-1-5386-6313-4
ISBN (electronic)
978-1-5386-6312-7
Reuse Rights

Other than for strictly personal use, it is not permitted to download, forward or distribute the text or part of it, without the consent of the author(s) and/or copyright holder(s), unless the work is under an open content license such as Creative Commons.

Abstract

LoRaWAN is a MAC-layer protocol for long-range low-power communication. Since its release in 2015, it has experienced a rapid adoption in the field of Internet-of-Things (IoT). However, given that LoRaWAN is fairly novel, its level of security has not been thoroughly analyzed, which is the main objective of this paper. We highlight the security features present in LoRaWAN, namely activation methods, key management, cryptography, counter management, and message acknowledgement. Subsequently, we discover and analyze several vulnerabilities of LoRaWAN. In particular, we design and describe 5 attacks: (1) a replay attack that leads to a selective denial-of-service on individual IoT devices, (2) plaintext recovery, (3) malicious message modification, (4) falsification of delivery reports, and (5) a battery exhaustion attack. As a proof-of-concept, the attacks are implemented and executed in a controlled LoRaWAN environment. Finally, we discuss how these attacks can be mitigated or protected against.

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